
Vol V No 07 | Aerospace Newsletter 26
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While the Indian military establishment set
its forces into motion, carrying out a careful
and calibrated assessment of the options it
had been practising, gaming and training for,
the Pakistani establishment, fearing the worst,
was deployed and ready to defend. The short
and intense conict that was to follow after the
political go-ahead signalled a doctrinal shift in
India’s employment of force to achieve political
objectives. The nation was prepared to go up
the escalation ladder to achieve its political
goals. It was ready to call the nuclear blu
that Pakistan had gotten so used to employing
at every opportunity. The attack on the terror
camps and infrastructure was executed
awlessly by the IAF on the night of 06-07 May
2025, even as the Pakistan air defence systems
were on alert. Taken aback by these strikes,
deep inside Pakistan and Pakistan Occupied
Kashmir, the PAF was bound to retaliate, and
it did by attempting to strike at IAF bases and
cities simultaneously on the night of 08-09 May
2025. Having crossed the redlines of attacking
Indian military installations, the IAF hit back,
targeting thirteen airelds simultaneously on 10
May 2025, inicting much damage to aireld
infrastructure and aircraft.
The physical and psychological impact of the
IAF’s strike led to capitulation, with Pakistan
asking for a ceasere that was apparently
perceived to be at the behest of the United States
of America. The truth, however, is now out in
the open as the Indian External Aairs Minister,
Dr S. Jaishankar, has stated that he had claried
to his counterpart in the United States that the
request for a ceasere must come through the
DGMO channel from Pakistan. The IAF started
the air campaign on its own terms, defying the
odds of a surprise that wasn’t there considering
the circumstances and nishing it on its own
terms, having met the political objectives. The
air defence set-up consisting of the homegrown
IACCS network that had integrated sensors and
weapon systems across the services ensured
that there was no signicant damage to Indian
military installations, infrastructure and cities
despite the Pakistani oensive of drones and
missiles. The IAF was not only able to defend
but also simultaneously carry out oensive
action, taking the ght to Pakistan’s heartland
and leaving them exposed and vulnerable. This
doctrinal shift in the employment of air power
by the IAF has successfully busted the myth of
air power playing a supporting role in surface
forces.
The debate on splitting air power assets
between theatre commands must also be laid to
rest as centralised planning and decentralised
execution during Operation Sindoor clearly
demonstrated the ecacy of air power with
all its might. While indigenously developed
drones, weapon systems like the Akash and
Brahmos delivered to telling eect, this should
also compel the nation to take a hard look at
the limitations of the IAF in terms of capacity,
force enablers and secure operational data
links that are urgently required to make the
IAF more potent. It is in the national interest
to keep the sharp edge of the sword of military
power ready to strike at all times. The IAF
has delivered in a sharp and intense conict,
rewriting the rules of engagement, controlling
the escalation matrix on its own terms and
delivering upon the political objectives. The
synergy between the Indian Army and the IAF
was evident in integrating the multi-layered air