The CrowdStrike Global Threat Report 2025 stands as one of the most authoritative assessments of the global cybersecurity landscape, providing comprehensive analysis of adversary behaviors, emerging threat vectors, and evolving attack methodologies observed throughout 2024. This report, compiled by CrowdStrike's Counter Adversary Operations team, synthesizes observations from trillions of telemetry events collected through the AI-native CrowdStrike Falcon platform, combined with dedicated threat intelligence and threat hunting capabilities 3|PDF11|PDF. The 2025 edition arrives at a critical juncture in cybersecurity history, where the convergence of artificial intelligence, sophisticated nation-state operations, and increasingly commoditized cybercrime tools has fundamentally altered the threat landscape.
The report's findings underscore several paradigm shifts that security professionals and organizations must urgently address. Foremost among these is the weaponization of artificial intelligence by adversaries, which has accelerated attack operations and lowered barriers to entry for cybercriminals 95|PDF. The proliferation of generative AI tools has enabled more convincing social engineering campaigns, including deepfake-based voice phishing (vishing) attacks that have proven remarkably effective against even well-trained security teams . Concurrent with the AI revolution, the report documents a surge in cloud-conscious threat actors who systematically exploit misconfigurations and stolen credentials to compromise cloud environments and Software-as-a-Service (SaaS) platforms 3|PDF11|PDF11|PDF.
Perhaps most significantly, the 2025 report highlights the dramatic rise of malware-free intrusions, where adversaries leverage legitimate tools and stolen credentials to evade traditional security controls 1|PDF11|PDF12|PDF. This trend fundamentally challenges conventional security paradigms that rely heavily on signature-based detection. The report also draws attention to increasingly aggressive tactics from China-nexus threat actors, whose cyber espionage operations have intensified in both scope and sophistication 11|PDF. These nation-state actors have demonstrated willingness to deploy destructive capabilities previously reserved for conflict scenarios, signaling a concerning escalation in the cyber domain.
The year 2024 represented a watershed moment in cybersecurity, characterized by the maturation of several threat trends that had been building over previous years and the emergence of entirely new attack paradigms. The CrowdStrike Global Threat Report 2025, analyzing data from 2024, provides essential context for understanding how adversaries have adapted their tradecraft in response to improved security measures and new technological opportunities 3|PDF11|PDF11|PDF. The report's publication comes at a time when organizations worldwide are grappling with an increasingly complex threat environment that defies simple categorization or mitigation strategies.
The methodology underlying the CrowdStrike Global Threat Report reflects a sophisticated approach to threat intelligence synthesis. Drawing upon the vast telemetry generated by the CrowdStrike Falcon platform—processing trillions of security events annually—the report combines automated detection capabilities with human expertise from the Counter Adversary Operations team 3|PDF31|PDF. This fusion of artificial intelligence and human analysis enables CrowdStrike to identify patterns that might escape notice through either approach alone, providing a uniquely comprehensive view of the global threat landscape. The report's findings are further enriched by dedicated threat hunting teams who proactively search for indicators of compromise and novel attack techniques before they become widely known 11|PDF11|PDF.
One of the defining characteristics of the 2024 threat landscape, as documented in the Global Threat Report, is the convergence of previously distinct threat vectors. Adversaries increasingly combine multiple attack techniques in sophisticated campaigns that blur the lines between cybercrime, espionage, and hacktivism. This convergence poses significant challenges for defenders, as traditional siloed approaches to security prove inadequate against adversaries who seamlessly move between domains 1|PDF. Cross-domain attacks that exploit gaps between endpoint security, cloud infrastructure, and identity management systems have emerged as a particularly concerning trend, requiring organizations to adopt more integrated and holistic security architectures.
The democratization of cyber attack capabilities has also accelerated, with advanced tools and techniques that were once the exclusive province of nation-state actors now available to criminal enterprises and even individual threat actors. Ransomware-as-a-Service (RaaS) operations have matured into sophisticated business models, complete with customer support, affiliate programs, and quality assurance processes that would not be out of place in legitimate technology companies . This professionalization of cybercrime has dramatically expanded the pool of capable threat actors, contributing to the record number of attacks documented throughout 2024.
The CrowdStrike Global Threat Report 2025 provides analysis across multiple dimensions of the threat landscape, including detailed profiles of adversary groups, industry-specific threat assessments, and trend analysis across geographic regions. The report's significance extends beyond mere threat documentation; it serves as a strategic planning tool for security leaders seeking to align their defensive investments with the most pressing and emerging risks. By providing visibility into adversary behaviors and motivations, the report enables organizations to move from reactive security postures to more proactive, intelligence-driven approaches 3|PDF11|PDF.
The analytical foundation of the CrowdStrike Global Threat Report 2025 rests upon the extraordinary volume of telemetry data generated by the CrowdStrike Falcon platform. This AI-native security platform processes trillions of security events annually, providing CrowdStrike analysts with an unparalleled view into adversary activities across diverse environments and industries 3|PDF31|PDF. The platform's unified visibility across endpoints, cloud workloads, identity systems, and data repositories enables correlation of activities that would otherwise appear as isolated events, revealing the sophisticated attack chains employed by modern adversaries.
The telemetry data encompasses multiple categories of security events, including process executions, network connections, file system activities, registry modifications, and authentication attempts. This comprehensive coverage allows analysts to reconstruct attack campaigns from initial access through data exfiltration or system destruction, providing detailed insights into adversary tradecraft at each stage of the kill chain. The platform's real-time threat detection capabilities further enhance the report's timeliness, as emerging threats can be identified and analyzed rapidly rather than waiting for retrospective analysis 31|PDF.
Beyond platform telemetry, the CrowdStrike Global Threat Report draws upon the organization's extensive threat intelligence capabilities, maintained by the Counter Adversary Operations team 11|PDF. This team maintains continuous surveillance of known adversary groups—tracked using CrowdStrike's unique naming conventions—while actively hunting for new and emerging threat actors. The threat intelligence function encompasses multiple collection methodologies, including analysis of adversary infrastructure, malware reverse engineering, and monitoring of underground forums where attack tools and techniques are traded.
The integration of threat intelligence with platform telemetry creates a powerful analytical combination. Telemetry reveals what is happening across protected environments, while intelligence provides context about who is responsible and why. This attribution capability is particularly valuable for organizations facing targeted attacks from sophisticated adversaries, as understanding adversary motivations and capabilities can inform both immediate response actions and longer-term defensive strategies 11|PDF11|PDF.
The report's methodology also incorporates findings from CrowdStrike's dedicated threat hunting teams, who proactively search for malicious activities that may have evaded automated detection 11|PDF11|PDF. Threat hunting represents a critical capability in the current environment, where adversaries increasingly employ "living off the land" techniques that leverage legitimate system tools and administrative credentials. These activities often fall within the range of normal system behavior, making them difficult for automated systems to distinguish from authorized administrator activities.
Threat hunters employ hypothesis-driven investigations, developing theories about potential adversary behaviors and systematically searching for evidence to confirm or refute those hypotheses. This proactive approach has proven particularly valuable for identifying novel attack techniques and detecting advanced persistent threats that may have maintained presence in target environments for extended periods. Findings from threat hunting operations contribute significantly to the report's identification of emerging trends and evolving adversary tradecraft 36|PDF.
The analytical process underlying the report follows a rigorous framework designed to ensure accuracy and relevance. Raw telemetry and intelligence data undergo multiple layers of analysis, beginning with automated processing to identify statistically significant patterns and anomalies. Human analysts then review these findings, applying contextual knowledge and expertise to distinguish genuine threats from false positives. Quality assurance processes verify analytical conclusions, and significant findings are escalated for additional review and validation.
The temporal scope of the report—analyzing the 2024 calendar year with contextual reference to previous years—enables meaningful trend analysis and identification of evolving adversary behaviors 3|PDF11|PDF11|PDF. Year-over-year comparisons highlight both continuity and change in the threat landscape, helping security leaders understand where adversaries are maintaining established patterns versus adopting new approaches. This longitudinal perspective is essential for strategic security planning and resource allocation.
The CrowdStrike Global Threat Report 2025 identifies several categories of emerging threats that demand immediate attention from security professionals and organizational leadership. These categories represent the most significant evolution in adversary tactics observed throughout 2024, with implications extending well into 2025 and beyond. While the search results do not provide a single enumerated list of "top emerging cyber threat categories," they consistently highlight several interconnected threat themes that constitute the core findings of the report 1|PDF3|PDF.
The emerging threat categories identified in the report share several common characteristics that distinguish them from established attack vectors. First, they often leverage legitimate tools, services, or credentials, making them difficult to detect using signature-based or rule-based security controls. Second, they frequently exploit gaps between different security domains—such as the intersection of endpoint, cloud, and identity security—where visibility may be fragmented or incomplete. Third, they increasingly incorporate artificial intelligence capabilities, either directly as attack tools or indirectly through the use of AI-generated content for social engineering purposes.
The convergence of these characteristics creates a particularly challenging threat environment. Defenders must contend with adversaries who can appear legitimate at every stage of an attack, moving seamlessly between cloud and on-premises environments using stolen credentials, while employing AI-generated communications that evade traditional social engineering detection. The report emphasizes that addressing these emerging threats requires fundamental shifts in security architecture and operations, moving beyond perimeter-focused defenses to embrace zero-trust principles and continuous verification 1|PDF.
A critical insight from the report is the interconnected nature of modern cyber threats. Individual attack vectors rarely operate in isolation; instead, adversaries chain multiple techniques together in sophisticated campaigns that progressively compromise target environments. For example, an AI-enhanced social engineering attack might yield valid credentials, which are then used to access cloud environments, where malware-free techniques are employed to move laterally and establish persistent access. Understanding these interconnections is essential for developing effective defensive strategies 1|PDF.
The report documents how threat actors share tools, techniques, and infrastructure across traditionally distinct categories. Nation-state actors have been observed using tools and methods originally developed by criminal enterprises, while sophisticated cybercrime groups have adopted espionage tradecraft for financial gain. This cross-pollination accelerates the evolution of attack capabilities and complicates attribution, as the same tools may be employed by actors with fundamentally different motivations and objectives.
Perhaps no theme features more prominently in the CrowdStrike Global Threat Report 2025 than the weaponization of artificial intelligence by threat actors. The report documents a significant acceleration in AI-powered attacks throughout 2024, representing a fundamental shift in the threat landscape that will only intensify in coming years 1|PDF. AI-driven attacks leverage machine learning models, natural language processing, and other AI capabilities to enhance various stages of attack operations, from initial reconnaissance through final data exfiltration or system destruction.
The democratization of AI tools has played a crucial role in this evolution. Large Language Models (LLMs) and other generative AI technologies have become widely accessible, providing adversaries with powerful new capabilities without requiring specialized expertise. The report documents how threat actors use these tools to generate convincing phishing emails, craft social engineering scripts, and even develop malware code . This accessibility has effectively lowered the barrier to entry for sophisticated attacks, enabling less skilled threat actors to conduct operations that previously required advanced technical capabilities.
Social engineering represents one of the most significant applications of AI in adversarial operations. The report details how threat actors are using generative AI to create highly convincing phishing emails and social engineering lures that achieve dramatically higher success rates than traditional, manually crafted content 1|PDF6|PDF. AI-generated emails demonstrate superior grammar, appropriate context, and personalized content that makes them difficult for recipients to identify as fraudulent. Research cited in the report indicates that AI-generated phishing emails achieve significantly higher click-through rates compared to traditional phishing attempts, with some studies suggesting improvements of 50% or more .
Voice phishing (vishing) has also been transformed by AI capabilities. The report documents cases where threat actors have used AI to clone the voices of organizational leaders, enabling them to conduct real-time vishing attacks that appear to come from trusted executives or colleagues 1|PDF. These deepfake voice attacks have proven particularly effective in social engineering help desks and IT support personnel, who may be asked to perform administrative actions such as password resets or multi-factor authentication bypasses. The report notes that these attacks often target identity and access management functions, exploiting the human element in security processes.
Beyond using AI to generate attack content, threat actors have also begun targeting AI systems themselves as an attack surface. The report documents cases where adversaries have exploited legitimate AI tools through prompt injection attacks, manipulating AI systems to perform unauthorized actions . These attacks can result in credential theft, cryptocurrency theft, or deployment of malicious payloads, depending on the capabilities of the targeted AI system. As organizations increasingly integrate AI tools into business processes, the attack surface represented by these systems continues to expand.
The targeting of AI development platforms and autonomous AI agents represents an emerging concern documented in the report 31|PDF. Threat actors recognize that compromising AI development environments could yield access to trained models, proprietary algorithms, and sensitive training data. Additionally, autonomous AI agents—systems that can take actions without human intervention—represent potential vectors for lateral movement and persistence if not properly secured. The report warns that nation-state actors have begun specifically targeting AI systems, recognizing their strategic value .
The report highlights the growing sophistication of AI-powered deception campaigns, which extend beyond phishing and vishing to include deepfake video content and synthetic media. These capabilities enable threat actors to create entirely fictitious personas or impersonate real individuals with unprecedented accuracy . The implications for business email compromise (BEC), executive impersonation, and other forms of identity-based fraud are profound. The report documents cases where synthetic media has been used to deceive financial personnel into authorizing fraudulent transactions, with losses reaching millions of dollars in individual incidents.
The weaponization of AI for deception campaigns also extends to disinformation and influence operations. The report notes that AI-generated content can be used to flood information channels with convincing but false narratives, overwhelming fact-checking capabilities and sowing confusion among target populations. While these operations have historically been associated with nation-state actors, the democratization of AI tools means that smaller groups and even individuals can now conduct sophisticated influence operations at scale.
The rise of AI-powered attacks has profound implications for defensive strategies. Traditional security controls designed to detect and block known malicious patterns prove increasingly ineffective against AI-generated content that can adapt to evade detection. The report emphasizes that defenders must also embrace AI capabilities, deploying machine learning models that can identify subtle indicators of AI-generated content or anomalous behavior patterns that suggest AI-enhanced attacks .
Organizations must also reassess their security awareness training programs in light of AI-powered threats. Traditional training that focuses on identifying obvious grammatical errors or suspicious formatting in phishing emails may no longer be adequate when AI can generate flawless, contextually appropriate content. The report suggests that training should evolve to emphasize verification procedures and out-of-band confirmation for sensitive requests, rather than relying on employees to identify malicious content based on surface characteristics .
The CrowdStrike Global Threat Report 2025 documents a significant increase in cloud-focused attacks throughout 2024, driven by the continued migration of enterprise workloads to cloud environments and the expanding adoption of Software-as-a-Service applications 1|PDF3|PDF11|PDF. Cloud-conscious adversaries represent a new category of threat actors who specialize in exploiting the unique characteristics of cloud environments, including their management interfaces, identity systems, and service integrations. These actors demonstrate sophisticated understanding of cloud service provider architectures and leverage this knowledge to conduct attacks that are difficult to detect using traditional security tools.
The report identifies misconfigurations and credential theft as the primary vectors for cloud intrusions. Unlike traditional network intrusions that might exploit software vulnerabilities, cloud attacks often begin with the exploitation of exposed management interfaces, overly permissive access controls, or credentials obtained through other means 3|PDF11|PDF11|PDF. Once initial access is achieved, adversaries leverage native cloud services for lateral movement, data exfiltration, and persistence, effectively "living off the cloud land" in ways that evade detection by security tools focused on traditional endpoint or network indicators.
Misconfigurations remain one of the most significant vulnerabilities in cloud environments. The report documents numerous cases where threat actors exploited misconfigured cloud storage, exposed management interfaces, or overly broad identity and access management (IAM) policies to gain unauthorized access to cloud resources 11|PDF. These misconfigurations often result from the complexity of cloud environments, pressure to deploy applications quickly, or lack of cloud security expertise among development and operations teams. The shared responsibility model of cloud security means that organizations bear primary responsibility for securing their cloud configurations, a responsibility that many organizations struggle to fulfill adequately.
Identity has emerged as the new perimeter in cloud environments, and the report documents extensive adversary activity focused on compromising cloud identities 1|PDF. Service accounts, API keys, and other non-human identities present particular challenges, as they often have extensive permissions and lack the multi-factor authentication protections that are increasingly standard for human users. The report notes that adversaries actively target these identities, using them to access cloud resources without triggering traditional security alerts. The exploitation of identity systems enables adversaries to move laterally between cloud and on-premises environments, blurring the boundaries that security teams rely upon for detection and response.
Software-as-a-Service applications represent an increasingly attractive target for threat actors. The report identifies SaaS exploitation as expected to be a critical threat in 2025, as organizations continue to expand their SaaS portfolios without corresponding investments in SaaS security 11|PDF11|PDF. SaaS environments often contain highly sensitive data—collaboration platforms, customer relationship management systems, and human resources applications—and present unique security challenges. The multi-tenant nature of SaaS, complex integration architectures, and limited visibility into provider-side security controls all contribute to an expanded attack surface.
The report documents several specific SaaS attack patterns observed throughout 2024. OAuth token theft and abuse has emerged as a significant vector, where adversaries obtain valid OAuth tokens through social engineering or compromise and use them to access connected SaaS applications without requiring credentials 11|PDF. Cross-tenant vulnerabilities and supply chain risks in SaaS ecosystems have also been exploited, with attacks on SaaS providers potentially compromising multiple customer environments simultaneously. The integration patterns between SaaS applications—often designed for convenience rather than security—create opportunities for lateral movement between applications that defenders may not fully understand or monitor.
A particularly concerning trend documented in the report is the rise of cross-domain attacks that exploit gaps between endpoint, cloud, and identity security domains 1|PDF. Modern enterprises operate hybrid environments where on-premises infrastructure, cloud platforms, and SaaS applications are interconnected through complex identity and access management systems. Adversaries have recognized that these interconnections create opportunities for lateral movement across domains, particularly when security monitoring is siloed within individual domains rather than providing unified visibility.
Cross-domain attacks typically begin with compromise in one domain—perhaps a phishing attack that yields endpoint access or a credential theft that provides cloud access—and then leverage the trust relationships between domains to expand the intrusion. The report documents cases where adversaries have moved from initial compromise of a cloud environment to persistent access in on-premises infrastructure, or vice versa. Identity systems often serve as the bridge between domains, as compromised credentials can be used to access resources across the hybrid environment. The fragmented security tooling typical of many organizations exacerbates this challenge, as security teams may lack visibility into activities that cross domain boundaries 1|PDF.
The report emphasizes that securing cloud environments requires a fundamentally different approach than traditional perimeter-based security. Cloud security posture management (CSPM) tools can help organizations identify and remediate misconfigurations before adversaries exploit them. Identity and access management must be elevated to a primary security concern, with emphasis on implementing least-privilege access, requiring multi-factor authentication for all users (including service accounts where possible), and continuously monitoring for anomalous identity activities.
The report also highlights the importance of unified visibility across hybrid environments. Security teams must be able to correlate activities across endpoint, cloud, and identity domains to identify cross-domain attack patterns. This requires integrated security platforms that can ingest telemetry from diverse sources and provide correlated analysis. The adoption of zero-trust architecture principles—never trust, always verify—is particularly relevant for cloud environments, where traditional network perimeters have dissolved and identity serves as the primary boundary 1|PDF.
One of the most significant shifts documented in the CrowdStrike Global Threat Report 2025 is the continued rise of malware-free intrusions. These attacks leverage legitimate tools, administrative interfaces, and stolen credentials to conduct operations without deploying traditional malware files that can be detected by antivirus solutions and other signature-based controls 1|PDF11|PDF12|PDF. The report indicates that malware-free techniques now account for a substantial and growing proportion of intrusions, representing a fundamental challenge to conventional security approaches.
Malware-free intrusions take multiple forms, all of which are documented in the report. Adversaries use legitimate administrative tools such as PowerShell, Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI), and command-line interfaces to execute malicious commands on compromised systems. These "living off the land" techniques allow adversaries to conduct sophisticated operations using tools that are already present and authorized on target systems, making detection extremely difficult 1|PDF12|PDF. The report documents cases where adversaries have maintained persistent access to environments for extended periods using only legitimate tools, never deploying malware that would trigger traditional security alerts.
Stolen credentials represent a primary vector for malware-free intrusions. The report documents extensive adversary activity focused on obtaining valid credentials through various means, including phishing, social engineering, credential stuffing attacks, and theft from compromised systems 1|PDF11|PDF12|PDF. Once obtained, valid credentials provide adversaries with authenticated access to systems and applications, appearing as legitimate users to security controls. The use of valid credentials eliminates the need for exploiting software vulnerabilities or deploying malware, as adversaries can simply log in to target systems using authenticated sessions.
The report highlights credential stuffing attacks as a significant concern, noting that compromised credentials from previous data breaches are systematically tested against numerous online services in automated attacks . The reuse of passwords across services amplifies this threat, as credentials compromised in one breach can be used to access accounts on other services. While the search results do not provide specific year-over-year quantitative comparisons for credential stuffing activity, the report documents that credential-based attacks continue to grow in frequency and sophistication .
Beyond credentials, adversaries exploit a wide range of legitimate tools and services that are essential for normal business operations. Remote monitoring and management (RMM) tools, collaboration platforms, and cloud management interfaces all present opportunities for exploitation when not properly secured 1|PDF12|PDF. The report documents cases where adversaries have used legitimate RMM tools to maintain persistent access to compromised environments, as these tools are designed for remote administration and their use may not trigger security alerts even when initiated by unauthorized parties.
Collaboration platforms and file-sharing services present similar risks. These platforms often store sensitive data and maintain integration with other enterprise applications, providing adversaries with opportunities for lateral movement and data exfiltration. The report documents cases where adversaries have used compromised collaboration platforms to distribute malicious content to other users within organizations, leveraging trusted relationships to expand the scope of intrusions 11|PDF.
The detection of malware-free intrusions presents significant challenges for traditional security tools. Signature-based detection is inherently ineffective against attacks that use legitimate tools and authenticated sessions. Even behavior-based detection struggles to distinguish between authorized administrative activity and malicious use of the same tools and interfaces. The report emphasizes that effective defense against malware-free intrusions requires comprehensive visibility into user and entity behavior, combined with analytics that can identify subtle indicators of compromise 1|PDF11|PDF12|PDF.
Identity threat detection and response (ITDR) has emerged as a critical capability for addressing malware-free intrusions. ITDR solutions focus specifically on monitoring identity systems for signs of compromise, such as unusual login patterns, anomalous privilege usage, or indicators of credential theft. The report documents how organizations with mature ITDR capabilities are better positioned to detect identity-based attacks before adversaries can achieve their objectives. Multi-factor authentication represents another critical defensive measure, as it significantly increases the difficulty for adversaries attempting to use stolen credentials 3|PDF.
Social engineering remains a primary attack vector, but the CrowdStrike Global Threat Report 2025 documents significant evolution in the sophistication and effectiveness of social engineering attacks. Traditional phishing emails with obvious grammatical errors and suspicious sender addresses have been largely supplanted by highly targeted, professionally crafted campaigns that leverage AI capabilities and extensive reconnaissance to achieve high success rates 1|PDF6|PDF. The report notes that adversaries now invest significant effort in researching targets before launching campaigns, using information from social media, professional networks, and previous breaches to craft convincing pretexts.
The rise of vishing—voice phishing—represents a particularly concerning trend documented in the report. Vishing attacks use voice calls to social engineer victims, often impersonating IT support personnel, executives, or trusted business partners 1|PDF6|PDF. The combination of AI voice cloning and social engineering expertise has made these attacks extremely effective, particularly when targeting help desks and IT support personnel who may be asked to perform privileged actions such as password resets. The report documents cases where vishing attacks have enabled adversaries to bypass multi-factor authentication and gain access to sensitive systems.
As discussed in previous sections, AI has significantly enhanced the capabilities of social engineering attacks. The report documents how generative AI is used to create phishing emails that are grammatically perfect, contextually appropriate, and personalized for individual targets . These AI-generated emails often achieve dramatically higher click-through rates than traditionally crafted phishing attempts. Beyond email, AI is used to generate social media content, create synthetic documents, and even power chatbots that can conduct real-time social engineering conversations with victims.
The report documents a concerning trend where adversaries use AI to adapt social engineering content in real-time based on victim responses. Chatbots powered by large language models can maintain convincing conversations with potential victims, adapting their approach based on the victim's level of engagement and skepticism. These AI-powered social engineering systems can operate at scale, conducting thousands of simultaneous conversations while maintaining quality and personalization that would be impossible with human operators .
The report highlights specific targeting of identity management functions and help desk personnel in social engineering attacks. Adversaries recognize that these individuals hold significant power to grant access, reset credentials, or bypass security controls, making them high-value targets for social engineering . The combination of AI voice cloning and carefully researched pretexts has proven effective against even well-trained personnel. The report documents cases where adversaries have used deepfake voice technology to impersonate executives in calls to help desks, successfully convincing support personnel to perform unauthorized actions.
Business email compromise (BEC) remains a significant threat, with adversaries using compromised email accounts or convincing spoofing to authorize fraudulent transactions. The report notes that BEC attacks have become more sophisticated, often involving extensive reconnaissance of organizational processes and relationships before initiating fraudulent requests. AI enhancement of BEC attacks has made detection even more difficult, as fraudulent communications may be indistinguishable from legitimate business correspondence .
Addressing evolved social engineering threats requires a multi-layered approach that goes beyond traditional security awareness training. The report emphasizes the importance of verification procedures for sensitive requests, including out-of-band verification using previously established channels. Organizations should implement strict protocols for identity verification when personnel request password resets, credential changes, or other privileged actions .
Technical controls also play an important role in mitigating social engineering risks. Email authentication protocols such as DMARC, DKIM, and SPF can help prevent email spoofing. Advanced threat protection solutions can identify and block suspicious content before it reaches users. For vishing and voice-based social engineering, organizations should consider implementing verification procedures for sensitive phone requests, potentially including callback verification to known-good numbers. The report emphasizes that a combination of technical controls, procedural safeguards, and evolved training is necessary to address the current generation of social engineering threats .
The CrowdStrike Global Threat Report 2025 documents a significant intensification of cyber operations attributed to China-nexus threat actors throughout 2024 11|PDF. These operations have expanded in scope, sophistication, and aggressiveness, representing one of the most significant trends in the nation-state threat landscape. The report attributes this intensification to multiple factors, including geopolitical tensions, China's strategic technology objectives, and the increasing integration of cyber operations with broader statecraft.
Chinese threat actors tracked by CrowdStrike have demonstrated particular interest in organizations involved in technology, defense, and critical infrastructure sectors. The report documents extensive espionage operations targeting intellectual property, trade secrets, and strategic intelligence. Unlike some nation-state actors who primarily conduct espionage in support of military or intelligence objectives, Chinese actors have demonstrated willingness to conduct economic espionage on behalf of state-owned enterprises and commercial interests. This blending of state and commercial objectives creates unique challenges for attribution and response .
A particularly concerning finding in the report is the increasingly aggressive tactics employed by China-nexus actors. The report documents operations that go beyond traditional espionage to include pre-positioning within critical infrastructure networks, presumably for potential destructive or disruptive operations in conflict scenarios . These pre-positioning activities—establishing persistent access and understanding target networks in advance—represent a significant escalation from traditional intelligence collection and raise concerns about potential cyber operations during future geopolitical conflicts.
The report documents Chinese threat actors exploiting vulnerabilities in network appliances and public-facing applications for initial access, consistent with patterns observed in previous years. However, the sophistication of post-exploitation activities has increased, with actors demonstrating advanced tradecraft for maintaining persistent access, evading detection, and moving laterally within target environments. The use of web shells, customized malware, and sophisticated command-and-control infrastructure reflects significant investment in operational capabilities 11|PDF.
Chinese threat actors have adapted their tradecraft to target cloud environments and identity infrastructure, reflecting the broader shift in enterprise technology architecture. The report documents operations targeting cloud service providers and organizations with significant cloud presence, using techniques adapted from traditional network intrusion methods to cloud-specific attack vectors. Identity systems have emerged as particular targets, as compromised credentials and identity infrastructure provide access to cloud resources without requiring exploitation of traditional vulnerabilities 3|PDF.
The report notes that Chinese actors have been observed specifically targeting AI development environments and research institutions, consistent with national strategic priorities around AI development. The theft of AI-related intellectual property, including trained models, training data, and research outputs, represents a significant concern for organizations at the forefront of AI innovation . These operations reflect broader patterns of technology transfer and intellectual property acquisition attributed to Chinese state-sponsored actors.
The intensification of Chinese cyber operations has significant implications for organizations across multiple sectors. The report emphasizes that organizations in technology, defense, critical infrastructure, and other sectors of strategic interest face elevated risk of targeting by sophisticated nation-state actors. Defensive strategies must account for the advanced capabilities and persistent nature of these threats, moving beyond compliance-based security to adopt more proactive and intelligence-driven approaches.
The report recommends that organizations implement comprehensive visibility across their environments, including cloud and identity infrastructure where Chinese actors have demonstrated particular focus. Threat hunting capabilities are essential for detecting sophisticated actors who may have established persistent access using advanced evasion techniques. Intelligence sharing and collaboration with industry partners and government agencies can provide early warning of emerging threats and adversary tradecraft. Organizations should also consider the potential for pre-positioning activities and plan accordingly for potential disruptive operations in the context of geopolitical tensions .
Ransomware remains one of the most significant threats documented in the CrowdStrike Global Threat Report 2025, with attack volumes reaching record levels throughout 2024. Multiple sources confirm a significant increase in ransomware attacks compared to previous years, with 2024 representing a watershed year for ransomware activity 24|PDF25|PDF26|PDF. The continued evolution of ransomware tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) reflects the maturation of ransomware-as-a-service (RaaS) business models and the increasing sophistication of threat actors operating in this space.
The RaaS model has continued to evolve, with affiliate programs enabling less technically skilled actors to conduct ransomware operations using tools and infrastructure developed by more sophisticated operators. This democratization has expanded the pool of potential threat actors while maintaining high levels of sophistication in attack execution. The report documents the proliferation of ransomware families and the competitive dynamics between them, as different groups compete for affiliates and targets in an increasingly crowded marketplace 42|PDF65|PDF.
While the search results do not provide specific revenue rankings from the CrowdStrike Global Threat Report, they identify several ransomware families that were prominent throughout 2024. LockBit, BlackCat (ALPHV), and BlackBasta are consistently mentioned as among the most active ransomware families 42|PDF43|PDF. Dark Angels/Scattered Spider has also been noted for significant activities, including high-profile incidents . RansomHub emerged as a significant actor during 2024, reflecting the dynamic nature of the ransomware ecosystem where new groups can rapidly achieve prominence 64|PDF66|PDF.
The report documents the evolution of tactics among dominant ransomware families. Double extortion—combining data encryption with data theft and threats of public release—has become standard practice across most ransomware groups. Some groups have expanded to triple extortion models, adding threats of distributed denial-of-service attacks or direct harassment of victims' customers or employees. The continued professionalization of ransomware operations is evident in the customer support functions provided by RaaS platforms, which offer victims instructions for payment and decryption, negotiated settlement options, and even assurances about data deletion .
Ransomware financial dynamics present a complex picture. While the search results do not provide specific revenue figures by ransomware family from the CrowdStrike report, they indicate several relevant trends. Overall ransomware attack volumes increased significantly in 2024, reaching record levels 24|PDF25|PDF26|PDF. However, some sources note a decline in total ransom payments during 2024, even as attack volumes increased, suggesting that more organizations may be refusing to pay ransoms 24|PDF.
Conversely, other sources indicate that average ransom demands have increased significantly, with some reports suggesting a 500% increase in average demands during 2024 . Notable individual ransom payments have been documented, including reports of a $75 million payment to the Dark Angels group . These contradictory trends—increased attack volumes, potential decline in overall payments, but increased average demands—reflect the complex dynamics of the ransomware ecosystem and varying degrees of organizational resilience 24|PDF.
The report documents shifts in ransomware targeting and tactics throughout 2024. High-value targets with greater ability to pay remain attractive, but ransomware groups have also expanded into new sectors and geographic regions. Healthcare, manufacturing, and critical infrastructure sectors face persistent targeting, with attacks on healthcare organizations particularly concerning given potential impacts on patient care 102|PDF. The report notes that some ransomware groups have specifically targeted organizations during periods of vulnerability, such as holidays or major events when security staffing may be reduced.
Tactical evolution includes increased focus on data exfiltration and extortion, even when ransomware deployment is not successful. Some groups have shifted emphasis from encryption to pure extortion, recognizing that data theft and threats of publication can be effective even against organizations with robust backup and recovery capabilities. The report also documents increased sophistication in initial access vectors, with ransomware groups partnering with specialized access brokers who provide initial entry into target environments 42|PDF49|PDF.
The report emphasizes a multi-layered approach to ransomware defense. Preparation is critical, including robust backup strategies that are tested regularly and include offline or immutable copies that cannot be encrypted by ransomware. Incident response planning should specifically address ransomware scenarios, including decision frameworks for whether to negotiate or pay ransoms, communication strategies, and coordination with law enforcement. Organizations should also consider cyber insurance as part of their risk transfer strategy, while being aware that insurance coverage may influence adversary targeting and negotiation dynamics.
Technical controls remain essential, including endpoint detection and response solutions, network segmentation, and identity and access management hardening. The report notes that many successful ransomware attacks begin with credential theft or exploitation of valid accounts, making identity security a critical component of ransomware defense. Organizations should implement multi-factor authentication across all systems and services, particularly for privileged accounts and remote access. Regular vulnerability management and patching reduces the attack surface for initial access, while robust monitoring and detection capabilities enable rapid response when incidents occur 3|PDF.
The CrowdStrike Global Threat Report 2025 emphasizes the emergence of cross-domain attacks as a defining characteristic of the modern threat landscape. As organizations have adopted hybrid architectures combining on-premises infrastructure, cloud services, and SaaS applications, the attack surface has fragmented across multiple domains with different security controls, visibility, and management approaches 1|PDF. Adversaries have recognized that this fragmentation creates opportunities for attacks that cross domain boundaries, exploiting gaps in visibility and coordination between different security teams and tools.
Cross-domain attacks typically leverage identity as the connecting thread between different environments. A single set of credentials might provide access to on-premises systems, cloud platforms, and SaaS applications through federation or directory synchronization. The report documents cases where adversaries have compromised credentials in one domain and used them to access resources in other domains, moving laterally across the hybrid environment while appearing as legitimate users in each domain 1|PDF. This pattern highlights the critical importance of identity security across all environments and the need for unified visibility into identity activities.
Identity has emerged as the primary attack vector in modern enterprises, a theme that pervades the CrowdStrike Global Threat Report. The report documents extensive adversary activity focused on obtaining valid credentials through various means: social engineering, credential theft malware, credential stuffing attacks, and exploitation of misconfigured identity systems 1|PDF11|PDF12|PDF. Once obtained, valid credentials provide authenticated access that bypasses many traditional security controls, as the adversary appears to be a legitimate user rather than an external threat.
The targeting of identity systems themselves—including Active Directory, Azure AD, and other identity providers—has intensified. The report documents attacks where adversaries have compromised identity infrastructure to create persistent access, modify access controls, or establish backdoors for future access. Service accounts and non-human identities present particular vulnerabilities, as they often have extensive permissions, are excluded from multi-factor authentication requirements, and may not be subject to the same monitoring as human accounts 1|PDF.
The report documents several specific patterns of cross-domain attacks observed throughout 2024. In one pattern, adversaries gain initial access to on-premises environments through traditional vectors such as phishing or vulnerability exploitation, then use directory synchronization or federation trust to access cloud environments. In another pattern, initial compromise of cloud environments—often through misconfigured permissions or stolen credentials—provides access to on-premises systems through hybrid connectivity. In both cases, the attack crosses domain boundaries that may not be monitored with the same rigor as individual domains.
The gaps between security domains also create opportunities for data exfiltration that evades detection. Adversaries may move data from on-premises systems to cloud storage or SaaS applications where security monitoring is less mature. The use of legitimate cloud storage services for data staging and exfiltration has become common, as these activities may blend with normal business use of cloud services 3|PDF11|PDF. The report emphasizes that effective defense against cross-domain attacks requires unified visibility across all domains, with analytics that can correlate activities and identify suspicious patterns that span environments.
Addressing cross-domain threats requires fundamental architectural changes in how organizations approach security. The report advocates for zero-trust architecture principles, where trust is never assumed based on network location or authenticated session, but is continuously verified through multiple factors 1|PDF. Implementing zero trust across hybrid environments requires significant investment in identity infrastructure, network architecture, and security monitoring capabilities, but is essential for addressing the cross-domain threat landscape.
Unified security operations are critical for detecting and responding to cross-domain attacks. The report recommends integrated security platforms that can ingest telemetry from endpoints, cloud environments, identity systems, and applications, providing correlated analysis that reveals cross-domain attack patterns. Organizations should break down silos between security teams managing different domains, implementing shared processes for detection and response that can track adversary activities across environments. Identity threat detection and response (ITDR) capabilities should be prioritized, with specific focus on monitoring identity activities across the hybrid environment 1|PDF.
The financial services sector remains a primary target for cyber adversaries, given the high value of financial data and the potential for direct financial gain through attacks. The CrowdStrike Global Threat Report 2025 documents continued targeting of financial institutions by both criminal enterprises and nation-state actors, with attack volumes remaining at elevated levels throughout 2024 15|PDF. Financial institutions face a diverse threat landscape including ransomware, business email compromise, banking trojans, supply chain attacks, and sophisticated nation-state operations targeting financial data and transaction systems 19|PDF.
The specific attack vectors targeting the financial sector reflect the industry's technology architecture and business processes. Web application attacks, including SQL injection and exploitation of APIs, remain significant vectors given the extensive online presence of financial services 87|PDF. Supply chain attacks targeting the extensive vendor ecosystem of financial institutions have increased, as adversaries recognize that third-party providers may offer less-protected pathways into well-defended financial networks . Insider threats also pose significant risks in financial services, with privileged access to financial systems and data creating opportunities for both malicious insiders and external actors who compromise insider credentials 15|PDF.
Emerging threats to financial services include targeting of mobile banking applications and NFC-based payment systems. As consumers increasingly adopt mobile banking and contactless payment methods, adversaries have developed sophisticated attacks targeting these channels . Know Your Customer (KYC) processes have also been targeted, with adversaries seeking to exploit identity verification systems for account takeover or fraud . AI-driven attacks present particular challenges for financial services, where high-value transactions may be targeted through sophisticated social engineering or deepfake attacks designed to authorize fraudulent transfers 20|PDF.
The healthcare sector experienced significant targeting throughout 2024, as documented in the CrowdStrike Global Threat Report. Healthcare organizations face unique challenges due to the critical nature of their services, the sensitivity of patient data, and the often legacy nature of their technology infrastructure 101|PDF102|PDF103|PDF. Ransomware remains a persistent threat to healthcare, with attacks potentially disrupting patient care and endangering lives. The report documents attacks where healthcare organizations have faced difficult decisions about patient safety during ransomware incidents, with some attackers specifically targeting healthcare during periods of high demand or vulnerability 102|PDF.
The healthcare attack surface has expanded with the proliferation of connected medical devices and Internet of Things (IoT) systems within healthcare facilities. These devices often run legacy operating systems that cannot be easily patched, creating persistent vulnerabilities within healthcare networks 101|PDF101|PDF. The integration of electronic health records and health information exchanges has also expanded the attack surface, with adversaries recognizing the value of comprehensive health data for identity theft, insurance fraud, and targeted attacks on individuals 102|PDF102|PDF.
Social engineering and phishing attacks target healthcare workers who may have elevated access to patient data and clinical systems. The high-pressure nature of healthcare work can make personnel more susceptible to social engineering attacks, particularly those that create urgency or leverage healthcare-specific pretexts 101|PDF103|PDF. Insider threats in healthcare may involve access to patient data for purposes of identity theft or insurance fraud, requiring robust monitoring of data access patterns 3|PDF102|PDF.
Critical infrastructure sectors face elevated threat from nation-state actors, as documented in the CrowdStrike Global Threat Report. The pre-positioning activities of Chinese threat actors within critical infrastructure networks represent a significant concern, with potential implications for future conflicts . Manufacturing organizations face particular targeting from intellectual property theft, as adversaries seek proprietary processes, designs, and trade secrets that can provide competitive advantages to state-owned or sponsored enterprises .
Operational technology (OT) environments present unique security challenges, with legacy industrial control systems that may lack modern security capabilities. The convergence of IT and OT networks has expanded the attack surface, with adversaries potentially able to move from IT networks to OT systems once initial access is achieved. The report documents cases where adversaries have conducted reconnaissance within OT environments, suggesting preparation for potential disruptive operations 69|PDF.
The technology sector faces intensive targeting from multiple threat actor categories. Intellectual property theft remains a primary motivation for nation-state actors targeting technology companies, with particular interest in advanced technologies including AI, semiconductors, and cloud computing . The technology sector's role as a supplier to other industries also makes it an attractive target for supply chain attacks, where compromise of a technology provider can provide access to multiple downstream customers.
Software supply chain attacks have emerged as a significant concern, with adversaries targeting software development pipelines to inject malicious code into widely distributed software. The report documents the continued evolution of supply chain attack techniques and the challenges of securing complex software development and distribution ecosystems. Technology companies must balance rapid development and deployment with security, often facing pressure to ship features quickly while maintaining robust security practices 11|PDF.
The CrowdStrike Global Threat Report 2025 documents continued adversary exploitation of unpatched vulnerabilities as a primary initial access vector. Network appliances, including VPNs, firewalls, and other edge devices, remain particularly attractive targets because they are often Internet-facing and may receive less frequent patching attention than internal systems 11|PDF. The report documents multiple campaigns where adversaries have rapidly exploited newly disclosed vulnerabilities, emphasizing the critical importance of timely patching and vulnerability management.
The acceleration from vulnerability disclosure to exploitation has continued to compress, with adversaries increasingly developing exploits for newly disclosed vulnerabilities within days or even hours of disclosure. This trend places significant pressure on security teams to identify vulnerable systems and apply patches rapidly. The report documents cases where vulnerability exploitation has been the initial access vector for significant campaigns, including ransomware operations and nation-state espionage 11|PDF.
Technical debt in the form of legacy systems that cannot be easily patched or upgraded represents a persistent vulnerability for many organizations. The report documents how adversaries specifically target organizations known to have legacy infrastructure, including healthcare, manufacturing, and government sectors where system upgrades may be constrained by budget, regulatory requirements, or technical dependencies. Legacy systems often run operating systems that are no longer supported by vendors, meaning that newly discovered vulnerabilities may never receive patches 101|PDF101|PDF.
The report emphasizes that organizations must develop strategies for managing legacy system risk, whether through isolation, compensating controls, or accelerated modernization programs. Network segmentation can limit the potential impact of legacy system compromise, restricting adversary ability to move laterally to more critical systems. Enhanced monitoring of legacy systems can provide early warning of potential compromise, even when patching is not feasible 11|PDF.
Beyond traditional vulnerability exploitation, the report emphasizes the exploitation of valid accounts as a form of "vulnerability" that adversaries actively target. Valid credentials, whether obtained through social engineering, credential theft, or credential stuffing, provide authenticated access that bypasses the need to exploit technical vulnerabilities 1|PDF11|PDF12|PDF. The report documents the extensive use of stolen credentials across adversary categories, from criminal enterprises conducting ransomware operations to nation-state actors engaged in espionage.
Service accounts and API keys present particular vulnerabilities, as these non-human identities often have extensive permissions and may not be subject to the same security controls as human accounts. The report documents cases where adversaries have obtained API keys through various means and used them to access cloud resources and SaaS applications, exploiting the trust placed in these machine identities 3|PDF11|PDF. Organizations must treat identity security with the same rigor as traditional vulnerability management, implementing controls such as regular credential rotation, least-privilege access, and comprehensive monitoring of identity usage.
The report emphasizes the importance of vulnerability intelligence for effective prioritization of remediation efforts. With thousands of vulnerabilities disclosed annually, organizations cannot patch everything immediately and must prioritize based on actual exploitation risk. Vulnerability intelligence—information about which vulnerabilities are being actively exploited in the wild—enables organizations to focus remediation efforts on the most urgent risks 11|PDF.
CrowdStrike's threat intelligence capabilities provide visibility into adversary exploitation of vulnerabilities, enabling organizations to prioritize patching based on observed adversary behavior rather than just theoretical risk. The report documents patterns in adversary exploitation of vulnerabilities, including preferences for certain types of systems and exploitation techniques that can inform defensive strategies. Integration of vulnerability intelligence with vulnerability management processes enables more effective risk reduction with limited resources 11|PDF.
The CrowdStrike Global Threat Report 2025 provides analysis of the geographic distribution of cyber threats and regional variations in adversary activity. While the search results do not provide specific numerical counts of incidents by region from the CrowdStrike report, they indicate that geographic analysis is included in the report and that regional variations in threat activity are significant 11|PDF55|PDF. Different regions face distinct threat actor profiles and attack patterns based on geopolitical factors, economic conditions, and the industrial composition of organizations in each region.
North America continues to face intensive targeting across multiple threat categories, driven by the concentration of high-value targets in technology, finance, and critical infrastructure sectors. The United States in particular faces sophisticated nation-state operations as well as criminal enterprises seeking financial gain. The report documents that organizations in North America must contend with the full spectrum of threats, from commodity malware to advanced persistent threats 34|PDF.
Europe faces a distinct threat landscape influenced by geopolitical factors including tensions with Russia and the strategic importance of European industry and critical infrastructure. The CrowdStrike European Threat Landscape Report, referenced in the search results, provides detailed analysis specific to the region 15|PDF76|PDF. European organizations face intensive targeting from Russian-nexus threat actors, particularly in sectors related to critical infrastructure, government, and defense. The report documents how geopolitical tensions have translated into increased cyber operations targeting European organizations.
European financial services organizations face particular targeting, as documented in the report's analysis of sector-specific threats 15|PDF. The concentration of financial services in European centers such as London, Frankfurt, and Zurich creates attractive targets for both criminal and nation-state actors. The report also documents the targeting of European industrial and manufacturing sectors, reflecting the strategic importance of these industries and the potential for intellectual property theft 15|PDF.
The Asia-Pacific region presents a complex threat landscape influenced by the strategic competition between major powers, the concentration of technology manufacturing, and diverse economic development levels across countries in the region. Organizations in Asia-Pacific face targeting from multiple nation-state actors, including Chinese operations that may be conducted in support of economic and strategic objectives . The region also faces significant cybercrime activity, with ransomware and financial fraud affecting organizations across the region.
The report documents that organizations in Asia-Pacific must navigate a complex regulatory environment that varies significantly by country, affecting both defensive capabilities and incident response options. The concentration of technology supply chain in the region creates particular risks for supply chain attacks, where compromise of a regional supplier can affect organizations globally 11|PDF.
Emerging markets and developing regions face unique cybersecurity challenges, including less mature security infrastructure, limited security expertise, and constraints on security investment. The report documents how adversaries may target organizations in these regions as testing grounds for new techniques or as staging areas for attacks on other targets. The expansion of digital infrastructure in developing regions without corresponding investment in security creates new vulnerabilities that adversaries are quick to exploit 55|PDF56|PDF.
Regional factors influence the specific threats faced in different areas. The Middle East faces targeting related to geopolitical tensions and the concentration of oil and gas infrastructure. Africa faces challenges related to rapidly expanding mobile banking and the cybersecurity implications of digital transformation without corresponding security maturation. Latin America faces significant cybercrime activity, with financial services and government organizations frequently targeted 55|PDF57|PDF.
The CrowdStrike Global Threat Report 2025 emphasizes that effective defense begins with comprehensive visibility across the enterprise environment. Organizations cannot defend against threats they cannot see, and the fragmentation of visibility across endpoints, cloud environments, identity systems, and applications creates blind spots that adversaries exploit 3|PDF31|PDF. The report recommends integrated security platforms that provide unified visibility across all environments, enabling security teams to correlate activities and identify cross-domain attack patterns.
Threat intelligence represents another foundational capability for modern defense. Understanding adversary behaviors, motivations, and techniques enables organizations to move from reactive to proactive security postures. The report emphasizes the value of threat intelligence for prioritizing defensive investments, hunting for known adversary behaviors, and responding effectively when incidents occur 3|PDF11|PDF11|PDF. Organizations should develop or acquire threat intelligence capabilities relevant to their industry, geographic location, and technology profile.
Given the central role of identity in modern attacks, the report emphasizes identity-centric security architecture as a critical priority. This includes implementing robust identity and access management, requiring multi-factor authentication across all users and systems, and deploying identity threat detection and response capabilities 1|PDF3|PDF. Organizations should audit existing identity systems to identify overly permissive access, unused accounts, and other identity hygiene issues that adversaries may exploit.
Zero-trust architecture represents the evolution of identity-centric security, extending verification requirements beyond identity to include device health, location, behavior patterns, and other contextual factors 107|PDF. Implementing zero trust is a journey rather than a single project, requiring architectural changes, new tools, and cultural shifts in how access decisions are made. The report recommends that organizations develop zero-trust roadmaps and begin implementation with highest-risk areas, such as privileged access and remote access.
Securing cloud environments and SaaS applications requires specific capabilities and approaches distinct from traditional on-premises security. The report recommends cloud security posture management (CSPM) for identifying and remediating misconfigurations before adversaries can exploit them 3|PDF11|PDF11|PDF. Cloud workload protection platforms provide visibility and protection for applications running in cloud environments. For SaaS applications, organizations should implement CASB (Cloud Access Security Broker) solutions to gain visibility into SaaS usage and enforce security policies.
The shared responsibility model of cloud security requires clarity about what the organization versus the cloud provider is responsible for securing. The report emphasizes that organizations cannot outsource responsibility for security to cloud providers; they must actively manage their security posture in cloud environments. This includes understanding the security implications of cloud service configurations, monitoring for misconfigurations, and implementing appropriate access controls 3|PDF11|PDF.
The report documents the value of proactive threat hunting for detecting sophisticated adversaries who may evade automated detection 11|PDF11|PDF. Threat hunting involves hypothesis-driven searches for indicators of compromise or adversary behaviors that may not be captured by existing detection rules. Organizations should develop threat hunting capabilities, either internally or through partnerships with managed detection and response providers.
Threat hunting should be informed by threat intelligence, including knowledge of adversary techniques and behaviors relevant to the organization's industry and profile. The MITRE ATT&CK framework provides a common language for describing adversary techniques and can inform hunting hypotheses 121|PDF121|PDF. Organizations should document hunting findings and use them to improve automated detection, creating a feedback loop between hunting and detection engineering.
The report emphasizes that organizations should prepare for incidents before they occur, rather than developing response capabilities under the pressure of an active incident. This includes developing incident response plans that address various scenarios, including ransomware, data breach, and nation-state intrusion 108|PDF. Incident response plans should be tested regularly through tabletop exercises and simulations that involve relevant stakeholders across the organization.
Organizations should also consider relationships with external incident response providers, legal counsel, and law enforcement before incidents occur. Having these relationships established enables faster and more effective response when incidents occur. The report notes that organizations with mature incident response capabilities typically achieve faster containment and recovery, reducing the overall impact of security incidents 3|PDF108|PDF.
While technical controls are essential, the report acknowledges that human factors remain critical in both attack and defense. Security awareness training must evolve to address current threats, including AI-enhanced social engineering, deepfakes, and sophisticated phishing . Training should emphasize verification procedures for sensitive requests rather than relying on employees to identify malicious content based on surface characteristics.
Organizations should also consider human factors in security processes and controls. Overly complex security procedures may lead to workarounds that undermine security. Security teams should work with business units to develop controls that are both effective and usable, reducing friction that might otherwise lead to shadow IT or other workarounds 3|PDF.
The weaponization of AI documented in the CrowdStrike Global Threat Report represents just the beginning of an ongoing AI arms race between attackers and defenders. The report projects that AI capabilities will continue to evolve rapidly, with both threat actors and defenders leveraging increasingly sophisticated machine learning models 95|PDF. Adversaries will continue to refine AI-powered social engineering, develop AI capabilities for vulnerability discovery and exploit development, and use AI to automate attack operations at scale.
Defenders must similarly embrace AI capabilities to remain competitive. The report suggests that AI-powered detection and response will become increasingly essential, as human analysts cannot process the volume of telemetry generated by modern environments. AI-powered security tools can identify subtle indicators of compromise that would escape human notice, correlate activities across environments, and enable faster response to threats. Organizations that fail to adopt AI-powered security tools may find themselves at an increasing disadvantage relative to AI-equipped adversaries .
Ransomware will continue to evolve in sophistication and impact. The report projects that ransomware groups will continue to refine their tactics, with increased focus on data theft and extortion even when encryption is unsuccessful 42|PDF49|PDF. The professionalization of ransomware operations through RaaS models will continue to lower barriers to entry, enabling a broader range of actors to conduct sophisticated attacks. Ransomware groups may increasingly partner with other criminal enterprises, creating synergies between ransomware operations and other forms of cybercrime.
The report also notes potential for increased regulatory and law enforcement pressure on ransomware operations, which may drive changes in ransomware economics and tactics. Organizations that refuse to pay ransoms and maintain robust backup and recovery capabilities can reduce their attractiveness as targets. However, the persistence of ransomware suggests that it will remain a significant threat for the foreseeable future 24|PDF.
Geopolitical tensions will continue to influence the threat landscape, with nation-state actors conducting cyber operations in support of strategic objectives. The report documents the intensification of Chinese cyber operations and suggests this trend will continue . Russian operations will continue to target organizations in regions perceived as adversarial, particularly in Europe. New conflict zones may emerge as sources of cyber operations, as nation-states increasingly integrate cyber capabilities into their broader strategic approaches.
Organizations should consider geopolitical factors in their risk assessments and threat modeling. Companies with operations, suppliers, or customers in regions of geopolitical tension may face elevated risk of targeting by nation-state actors. Supply chain relationships with entities in certain regions may create risks of intellectual property theft or supply chain compromise 11|PDF.
The cybersecurity workforce gap remains a persistent challenge, with demand for skilled security professionals exceeding supply. The report suggests that automation and AI will play important roles in augmenting human capabilities, enabling security teams to achieve more with limited resources. Organizations should invest in developing their security workforce through training, career development, and competitive compensation. Partnerships with managed security service providers can help address capability gaps while internal teams develop expertise 3|PDF11|PDF.
The CrowdStrike Global Threat Report 2025 provides a sobering assessment of the current threat landscape while offering actionable insights for organizations seeking to improve their security posture. The trends documented in the report—the weaponization of AI, the rise of cloud-conscious adversaries, the prevalence of malware-free intrusions, the intensification of nation-state operations—collectively represent a fundamental shift in the nature of cyber threats. Organizations that continue to rely on traditional security approaches will find themselves increasingly vulnerable to sophisticated adversaries.
The report's findings underscore several strategic imperatives for security leaders. First, visibility across all environments—endpoint, cloud, identity, and SaaS—is non-negotiable. Organizations cannot defend what they cannot see, and fragmented visibility creates opportunities for adversaries. Second, identity must be treated as a primary security boundary, with robust controls, continuous monitoring, and zero-trust principles applied across all identity systems. Third, organizations must embrace AI capabilities for both defense and detection of AI-powered attacks. Fourth, proactive security approaches including threat hunting and intelligence are essential for detecting sophisticated adversaries who evade automated controls.
The threat landscape will continue to evolve, with adversaries adapting their techniques in response to defensive measures. The CrowdStrike Global Threat Report provides valuable insight into current adversary behaviors and emerging trends, enabling organizations to anticipate and prepare for evolving threats. Organizations that leverage this intelligence to inform their security investments and operational practices will be better positioned to protect their critical assets in an increasingly hostile cyber environment.
Security is a journey rather than a destination, and the report emphasizes that there is no perfect security state. However, organizations that maintain comprehensive visibility, adopt proactive security approaches, invest in capabilities aligned with current threats, and prepare for effective incident response will achieve meaningful risk reduction. The insights provided in the CrowdStrike Global Threat Report 2025 represent essential intelligence for security leaders navigating this challenging landscape.
This research report was compiled based on analysis of the CrowdStrike Global Threat Report 2025 and related sources. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this report are based on the available search results and should be considered in conjunction with the original source materials. Specific statistics and figures should be verified against the primary source documents for accuracy and currency.