ically able to gear up GermanyÕs war production yet).
If Fighter Command was weakening due to losses, it was not readily apparent to German
fighter pilots and bomber crews who themselves were dwindling. Luftwaffe Intelligence, on the
other hand, insisted that the RAF was down to its last fighters, overestimating the kills made by
Luftwaffe airmen and underestimating BritainÕs fighter production and aircraft reserves. It would
soon become a bitter joke with German air crews: ÒHere comes the last fifty Spitfires.Ó
In truth, German airmen fared worse in many ways than their enemy counterparts. Not only
were the Germans losing more aircraft in the battle than the British were, they were losing many
more personnel. Two thirds of the German aircraft shot down were Me110s or bombers, which
carried two to five crewmen each. Furthermore, to be shot down over England meant certain cap-
ture, whereas a British pilot who was shot down, assuming he was not hurt, could oftentimes
return to his base by evening. German aircraft also had to fly over the English Channel (which the
airmen called ÒThe SewerÓ). This was not so bad heading to target, but coming back with an air-
craft that was damaged or low on fuel was very perilous. Many Me109 pilots who had used up
too much fuel in combat over England had to ditch their fighters in the Channel. Fortunately for
them, the Luftwaffe had implemented an air-sea rescue system far superior to anything the British
had, so many downed German airmen were retrieved from the water.
German fighter pilots had one other thing going against them-Hermann Goering. He repeated-
ly berated them Òin the harshest of termsÓ according to Adolf Galland. Goering accused them of
failing to protect the bombers-which had suffered high losses-and of lacking fighting spirit. This
had a negative effect on their morale. Goering insisted that they should provide closer escort to the
bombers, which in fact limited their dogfighting ability when enemy fighters were encountered.
During a visit by Goering to the base where GallandÕs Jagdgeschwader 26 was stationed, Galland
tried arguing with Goering that the Me109 was less suited to close escort than the Spitfire, but
Goering rejected his opinion. When Goering later asked Galland what he needed for his fighter
group, Galland answered, ÒI should like an outfit of Spitfires for my unit,Ó at which point Goering
Òstamped off, growling as he went.Ó
On the British side, the ground-controlled intercept system continued to improve. Of course, it
did not always work perfectly, and interceptions were never a sure thing. The enemy might be
hidden by clouds or haze, critical time lapses might develop between ground observations and
radioed commands to squadrons in the air, or mistakes in plotting or vectoring might occur. On
August 26, Park issued a new order to No. 11 Group, designed to give headquarters and the
ground controllers more information. As soon as enemy planes were sighted by a squadron leader,
he was to radio the message ÒTallyhoÓ to the controller along with the estimated numbers, types,
position and height of the enemy before giving attack orders to his squadron.
In air combat, having a height advantage over the enemy is preferred. Sometimes a squadron
was scrambled too late to gain the desired height over the incoming raid. In cases like this, the
British would often resort to head-on attacks. The windscreens and bulbous, laminated glass noses
on German medium bombers left the bomber crews feeling exposed. When attacked head-on,
German bomber pilots would slip their aircraft in the sky, trying to throw off the aim of the attack-
ers, but also disrupting their own formation. British pilots attacking head-on were taking a bigger
risk, too. A slight miscalculation and they would ram the enemy, or they might take bullets
through their own windscreens. In a head-on attack, the relative speed of approach was in excess
of 500 miles per hour. This allowed the pilots only a couple of seconds of firing opportunity
before the aircraft had passed each other. A few seconds more on opposite courses, and the oppos-
ing aircraft would be a mile apart.
In sheer numbers of aircraft, the main British fighter in the Battle of Britain was the Hawker
HISTORICAL
TalonSoft’s Battle of Britain 91