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While most of the analysis of on-board information technology in trucks does distinguish
between different levels of functionality, none of the formal scientific literature directly separates
the role of EOBRs from other aspects of onboard technology. This distinction is drawn more
carefully when considering the relationship between EOBRs and fleet management systems
(FMSs) in the development of the social scientific definition of driver harassment.
The Use of Monitoring Technology in Trucks
As far as studies that specifically relate to driver monitoring are concerned, there is a small but
extremely useful body of literature in relevant journals. The seminal study is Hubbard’s “The
Demand for Monitoring Technology.”(13) The author applies the standard microeconomic
theoretical framework to analyze the causal factors at play in the relationship between
supervisors/dispatchers and drivers. He then uses data from the 1992 Vehicle Inventory and Use
Survey (VIUS, part of the quinquennial economic census until 2002) to analyze the way in which
the demand for information gathering and monitoring systems in trucks may vary across types of
trucking operations. In this sub-section, the authors summarize the causal analysis and then
summarize the main empirical findings relevant to the present context.
Hubbard points out that the relationship between dispatcher and driver is an instance of the
principal-agent relationship8 in which the objectives of the principal and the agent are at least
partially in conflict, and the knowledge the principal has about the agent’s choices is costly to
obtain and incomplete.9 More specifically, the firm aims for the highest profit by maximizing the
difference between freight revenue and the costs of moving freight, while the agent balances a
subjective cost of effort that increases the harder he works against the desire for income and any
non-monetary perquisites of the job. Thus, the principal’s control over the agent’s behavior is
incomplete, and the principal incurs an "agency cost" of some kind (for example, somewhat
reduced productivity) by employing the agent. That is, the principal cannot generate as much net
benefit from production carried out by the agent as he or she would if labor resources were
perfectly applied to necessary tasks at the lowest market cost.
Although Hubbard does not emphasize it, the relevant literature establishes that this mismatch of
objectives is corrected, to a reasonable first approximation, by the piece rate payment
system(14,15) under which almost all road drivers in the United States work—mileage pay for
standardized trip miles.(16),10 However, as Hubbard emphasizes, differences remain. For example,
carriers would generally prefer that drivers operate their trucks at a consistent and not excessive
speed, use up available work hours before stopping for a break, and always make pickups or
8 The model of principal and agent, an application of the theory of asymmetric information, is one of the explanatory work-horses of modern
microeconomics. Summaries and reviews appear in Eisenhardt (1989) and Stiglitz(2008). Stiglitz was among the three Nobel laureates of 2001,
which was awarded for the foundational work on asymmetric information, in part because of his contributions to one of the first principal-agent
models.
9 It is initially assumed, for simplicity, that the dispatcher’s actions are perfectly aligned with the objectives of the firm. This assumption can,
of course, be relaxed, and the relationship of CEO to supervisor, and between owners and CEO (if they are different people), can be analyzed in
the same way, as relationships between principal and agent. .
10 This incentive effect is the fundamental reason for mileage pay. Normally the payment system isn’t actually by the number of miles driven,
but by the standard number of miles attached to each trip or trip segment (Burks, Belzer, et al. 2010). But paid miles are accumulated by
completing trip segments or trips, so other things held equal, more miles are better. Some motor carriers go further in making the incentives of
firm and driver compatible by having a second set of smaller incentives, such as a bonus system for meeting fuel mileage objectives. In some
cases, firms utilize owner-operators, who are residual claimants on their truck’s income after all expenses, and therefore have even higher-
powered incentives than do employee drivers on piece rates.