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“truth is the indispensable good for our cognition and thus the goal of all science
[wetenschap]. If there is no truth, gone with that, too, is all knowledge and science” (p.
33).
Now John Paul, like Bavinck, is persuaded that philosophical inquiry is cur-
rently laboring in a sapiential vacuum. Says Bavinck, “Wisdom itself [has] to assert its
rights again and claim a place in the field of human knowledge” (p. 48). Her place
has been denied by those who claim that in respect of the ultimate question regard-
ing the final and universal meaning of life, there is no attainable answer. The search
for meaning is, in David Hume’s graphic phrase, “totally shut up from human curi-
osity and inquiry” (David Hume, An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding [1748],
section IV, part 1; in L. A. Selby-Bigge, ed., Hume’s Enquiries, rev. P. H. Nidditch
[Oxford: Clarendon, 1975], 30). Regarding Hume’s notion of instrumental reason,
John M. Rist correctly writes: “Hume can be shown to be wrong only if reason is teleo-
logically oriented, not if it is the mere capacity to analyze and describe neutrally. If we
refuse to move to a more teleological account of reason, we are left in the hole
where Hume has dumped us” (Real Ethics: Reconsidering the Foundations of Morality
[Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002], 144). Hence, human reason is, on
this view, reduced to instrumental reason, depriving reason of any real concern for
the knowledge of ultimate truth, first principles regarding knowledge of God, man,
and the world (Fides et Ratio, §§47, 61).
By contrast, John Paul argues, the knowledge of first principles “determines
the foundations and limits of the different fields of scientific learning, but will also
take its place as the ultimate framework of the unity of human knowledge and ac-
tion, leading them to converge towards a final goal and meaning” (Fides et Ratio,
§81). This knowledge “is all the more needed today because the immense expan-
sion of humanity’s technical capability demands a renewed and sharpened aware-
ness of the ultimate goods.” “If these technical instruments lack any sense of being
ordered to something greater than a merely utilitarian end, they could appear to be
inhuman,” adds John Paul, “and turn themselves into potential destroyers of the
human race” (Fides et Ratio, §81). Against an instrumentalist conception of reason,
John Paul, as well as Bavinck, then, accept a teleological conception of reason
where the dynamism of reason is ordered to the goal and attainment of truth.
Accordingly, Bavinck argues that the search for wisdom is such that it “seeks
to press through to ‘first principles’ [prima principia]” (p. 50). These are not just first
principles respecting the different branches of human learning: “religion, ethics, law,
history, language, culture, and so on.” Rather, the nature and task of philosophy is
such that “it seeks for the final ground of all things and builds a worldview there-
on” (p. 50). In this connection, Bavinck urges us to understand that “Christianity is
the only religion whose view of the world and life fits the world and life. The idea
of Christianity and the meaning of reality belong together like lock and key: they
make sense together” (p. 28). Taking the Christian faith as his starting point, one of
Bavinck’s first principles is “that the world is grounded in wisdom and reveals wis-
dom in its whole and in all its parts (Ps 104–24; Prov 3:19; 1 Cor 1:21)” (p. 51).
Indeed, he adds, “all truth is understood in the Wisdom, in the Word, who was in