
Aegis 2024
78 happiness and comfort. In both cases, anger
is not appropriate, and even directly threatens
a person’s well-being.
e idea that anger is something that
can be controlled and, again, rationalized,
would be, to a philosopher, radical: the
general idea of anger in philosophy is that
it is irrational, and, in the case of rage,
which is what Cherry is truly upholding,
uncontrollable or dangerous. ere has
been philosophical thought on anger
prior to Cherry, but it has generally been
limited by rationality and appropriateness.
Cherry, though, creates criteria for anger
philosophers, for elements of anger to be
philosophized about, and for dierent types
of anger, especially those related to racist
ideologies and interactions. She creates
camps of philosophers on anger, especially
by the ways in which they theorize on anger:
the “concern distinction camp…the intent
distinction camp…[and] the type distinction
camp” (Cherry 12-13). Each camp of
philosophers is concerned with moralizing
anger based on their specic distinction–
respectively, why a person is angry, what a
person wants to do with their anger, and if
their anger is sudden and violent, or long-felt,
rational, and seeking change (Cherry 12-13).
Cherry draws on all of these ideas to create
yet another type of anger philosophy: e
variation artist, a person who can consider
all aspects of these complexities of anger, and
who uses that lens to distinguish dierent
kinds of anti-racist anger. She identies ve
separate types of anti-racist anger including
Rogue Rage, Wipe Rage, Ressentiment Rage,
Narcissistic Rage, and, chiey, Lordean Rage,
named aer Audre Lorde. Cherry argues
that Lordean Rage is the most appropriate
form of anger of any introduced, as it is
aimed at those who are complicit in racism
and reinforcing racist institutions. It is
transformative and world-building, long-
held and rational, and must have a focus on
solidarity, drawing on its namesake: “I am not
free while any [other] is unfree” (Cherry 24).
For all of the aforementioned descriptions,
Lordean Rage fullls all requirements set by
the formerly ascribed philosophers on the
morality of anger.
To a person well-versed in feminist
theory, gender theory, sexuality theory,
race theory, intersectionality theory, or a
person who is well-read in the works of
radicals of color, e Case For Rage may
feel derivative: it at times seems more like
a vehicle for carefully curated quotes from
and paraphrasing of Lorde than anything
groundbreaking in the aforementioned
elds. e tone of the book also runs in
opposition to other books and essays in the
eld, especially Lorde’s own work; e Case
for Rage, a book completely about the power
of anger, is even keeled and methodical. It, to
me, lacks energy or anger, which is good for
a philosophical audience being introduced to
the concept, but ies in the face of the culture
of feminist and race studies, especially as it
seems to present itself as a novel idea, rather
than a repackaged, less angry commentary
on Lorde’s work and the work of her
contemporaries. With an entire chapter on
how to be a good “rage renegade” (“allyship”
is a term that is “not without controversy”
as it “implies that racial justice is a ght for
the marginalized alone” (Cherry 120)), it is
clear that the intended recipients of the book
are exactly the discussed “rage renegades.”
e tips and tricks that Cherry oers contain
pieces of wisdom which amount to “just
because you are also angry at injustice
does not mean you share the oppressive
experiences of the oppressed,” “don’t assume
that your anger about oppression is more
important than the anger of those who are
oppressed,” “don’t be performatively angry
or assume that you’re eternally morally
correct,” and “white saviorism is not helpful”
(Cherry 122-138). ese pieces of advice