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UNIVERSITY
OF
CALGARY
The
Rhetoric
of
War
in
the
Battle
of
Britain
•
by
Chelsea
Sambells
A
THESIS
SUBMITTED
TO
THE
FACULTY
OF
GRADUATE
STUDIES
IN
PARTIAL
FULFILMENT
OF
THE
REQUIREMENTS
FOR THE
DEGREE
OF
MASTERS
OF ARTS
DEPARTMENT
OF
COMMUNICATION
STUDIES
CALGARY,
ALBERTA
November,
2009
©
Chelsea
Sambells
2009
UNIVERSITY
OF
CALGARY
FACULTY
OF
GRADUATE
STUDIES
The
undersigned
certify
that
they
have
read
and
recommend
to
the
Faculty
of
Graduate
Studies
for
acceptance,
a
thesis
entitled
"The
Rhetoric
of
War
in
the
Battle
of
Britain"
submitted
by
Chelsea
Sambells
in
partial
fulfillment
of
the
requirements
for the
degree
of
Master
of
Arts.
Supervisor,
Dr.
Tania
Sm
ith,
Faculty
of
Communication
and
Culture
Dr.
Michael
Keren,
Faculty
of
Communication
and
Culture
Dr.
Pat
Brennan,
Department
of
History,
Faculty
of
Social
Sciences
2OO1
Date
ABSTRACT
This
study
evaluates the
role
of
rhetoric
in
the
Battle
of
Britain
(1940).
By
analyzing
Churchill's
and
Hitler's
rhetoric,
as
exhibited
in
four
specific
speeches,
this
thesis
suggests
that
these
leaders'
rhetoric
played
an
important,
albeit
unexplored,
role
in
the
unfolding
of
these
events.
Previous
studies
have
not
evaluated
either
Churchill's
or
Hitler's
rhetoric in
this
manner,
implying
that
more
rigorous
scholarship
is
required
in
both
historical
and
rhetorical
publications
relating to
the
Second
World
War.
Theoretical
frameworks,
based
upon
the
works
of
Isocrates,
Cicero,
Aristotle
and
Pericles,
explore
and
assert that
Churchill's
improved
oratory
skills,
when
compared
to
Hitler's
declining
persuasive
capacity,
assisted
in
the
Battle
of
Britain's
unfolding.
Although
rhetoric's
degree
of
influence
cannot
be measured
quantitatively,
political
leaders,
their
rhetoric
and
history
share
a
unique
relationship
that
leads
to
further
insight
into
rhetoric's
role in
war.
)
11
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
First,
I
am
very
grateful
to
Dr.
Tania
Smith,
for
her
excellent
and
sound
judgment
with
this
thesis.
Her
consistent
attention
to
detail,
her
after
-
hours
discussions
and
her
ability
to
praise
my
work,
as
well
as
constructively
criticize
it,
has
led
me
to
producing
a
thesis
that
I
am
very
proud
of.
Go
Rhetoric!
Also,
I
would
like
to
acknowledge
the
students
and
other
faculty
members
at
the
University
of
Calgary
for
their
support,
in
the
classroom
or
in
Grad
Lounge,
with
this
long
process.
Naturally,
I
would
like
to
thank
my
family
and
friends
-
Mom
for
introducing
me
to
war
movies
at
a
young
age,
for
proofreading
the
thesis
and
for
remaining
patient
during
my
periodic
outbursts
of
impatience;
Dad,
for
humorously
telling
me
to
"get
back
to
work",
even
after
a
fourteen
hour
day;
Richard
for
being
interested,
even
if
far
away;
and
Gaela,
for
making
me
laugh
at
myself
and
reminding
me
to
not
take
things
too
seriously.
Last,
but not
least,
to
James
Brewer,
who
spent
many
late
nights
with
me,
providing
me
with
food,
anecdotes
to
make
me
laugh
and
never
ending
encouragement.
111
TABLE
OF
CONTENTS
ABSTRACT
ii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
iii
TABLE
OF CONTENTS
iv
LIST
OF
TABLES
vii
LIST
OF
FIGURES
viii
LIST
OF
ABBREVIATIONS
AND
TERMS
ix
CHAPTER
ONE:
INTRODUCTION
1
The
Relationship
between
Rhetorical
Texts
and
Historical
Context
4
Previous
Rhetorical
and
Historical
Scholarship
about
Churchill
and
Hitler
6
"Rhetoric":
A
Product
of
Ancient
Greek
Society
8
Research
Questions
9
The
Criteria
for
Selecting
the
Primary
Texts 10
Why
the
Battle
of
Britain?
'12
Selection
of
Historical
Data
14
Brief
Overview
of
Thesis 15
Significance
of
this
Thesis
to
Rhetorical
and
Historical
Scholarship
16
The
Limitations
of
this
Thesis'
Scope
17
CHAPTER
TWO:
LITERATURE
REVIEW
19
Reviewing
the
Scholarship
about
Churchill's
and
Hitler's
Rhetoric
19
Churchill:
Automatic
Glorification
and
Inconsistent
Frameworks
21
Hitler.
Ethics,
the
Propaganda
Ministry
and
Mein
Kampf
25
The
Battle
of
Britain:
The
Best
Literature
for
Rhetorical
Scholarship
32
The
Ethical
Challenges
in
Post-WWII
Historical
and
Rhetorical
Scholarship
36
CHAPTER
THREE:
RESEARCH
METHODS
37
Dissertation
Type
38
Contribution
to
Rhetorical
Studies
as
a
Discipline
39
Criteria
for
Selecting
Classical
Texts
42
Rhetorical
Methods
of
Inquiry:
Rhetorical
Criticism
45
Technical
Qualities
of
Rhetoric:
Aristotle's
Logos,
Ethos
and
Pathos
45
Churchill
and
Hitler.
The
Glory of
the
Nation
and
Pericles'
Funeral
Oration
48
Rhetorical
Methods
of
Inquiry:
Rhetorical
Biography
49
iv
Free
Will
and
Determinism
in
the
Study
of
Rhetorical
Biography
50
Rhetorical
Methods
of
Inquiry:
Rhetorical
History
52
Rhetorical
Perspectives
upon
Definitions
of
History,
Cause
and
Effect
and
Historical
Contingency
53
Definition
of
History
53
Cause
and
Effect
55
The
Contingency
of
Rhetoric
in
the
Study
of
History
58
Rhetorical
and
Historical
Methods
Combined:
Rhetoric
Creates
History
59
CHAPTER
FOUR:
THE
IDEAL
ORATOR
61
Background
of
Isocrates
and
Cicero
62
Education
and
Knowledge
64
Intrinsic
and
Extrinsic
Ethos
69
Table
1.'
The
Ideal
Orator
Visualized
76
Figure
1:
A
Timeline
of
the
Battle
of
Britain
(1940)
78
CHAPTER
FIVE:
CHURCHILL'S
AND
HITLER'S
RHETORIC
IN
THE
BATTLE
OF
BRITAIN
79
Introduction
to
Analyzing
Rhetoric
in
War
79
Phase
One:
Dunkirk
and
the
Antecedents
to
the
Battle
of
Britain
80
Rhetorical
Analysis
of
June
4,
1940
Speech
"We
Shall
Fig/it
On
the
Beaches"
82
"Operation
Sealion"
and
Plans
to
Invade
Britain
91
Rhetorical
and
Technical
Aspects
of
the
Battle
of
Britain
94
Phase
Two:
The
Beginning
of
the
Battle
of
Britain
and
the
"Irrational"
British
99
Rhetorical
Analysis
of
July
19,
1940
Speech
"The
Generous
Peace
Proposal"
100
The
"Great
Battle"
Against
Britain.'
The
Summer
of
1940
110
Rhetorical
Analysis
of
meAugust
20,
1940
Speech.'
"The
Few"
113
Phase
Three:
The
Battle
of
Britain
as
a
Civilian
War
122
Rhetorical
Analysis
of
Hitler's
Speech,
September
4(h,
1940:
The
"Winterhilfswerk"
Address
124
The
Finale:
Germany
Loses
the
Purpose
to
Invade
130
CHAPTER
SIX:
CONCLUSION
135
Policy
vs.
Promise-making
137
Respect
and
Emotion
138
Churchill's
Brutal
Honesty
139
Dilemmas
of
Studying
Hitler
140
Implications
for
Future
Study
141
Practical
and
Contemporary
Applications
142
V
LIST
OF
TABLES
Table
1:
The
Ideal
Orator
Visualized
75
vii
LIST
OF
FIGURES
Figure
1:
A
Timeline
of
the
Battle
of
Britain
77
viii
LIST
OF
ABBREVIATIONS
AND
TERMS
Adlertag
Eagle
day
Heere
German
Army
BEF
British
Expeditionary
Force
Kriegsmarine
German
Navy
Luftwaffe
German
Air
Force
Operation
Seelöwe
Operation
Sealión
RAF
Royal
Air
Force
RDF
Radar
Direction
Finding
Wehrmacht
German
Armed
Forces
2
p.
2042).
By
offering
peace
to
the
British,
Hitler
claimed
that
he
was
desperate
to
resolve
the
situation
with
the
British
(Domarus,
1997,
p.
2064-2065).
Hitler
presented
himself
as
a
pacifist
who
was
forced
into
war.
How
could
Hitler's
speech
have
effectively'
persuaded
his
audiences?
How
important
is
oratorical
proficiency
to
the
fate
of
a
nation
at
war?
And,
again,
what
role
did
Hitler's
speech
play
in
the
subsequent
unfolding
of
the
summer's
events?
Throughout
July
and
August,
1940,
the
Luftwaffe
bombed
airfields,
ports
and
other
strategic
targets
with
the
goal
of
eliminating
the
Royal
Air
Force
(RAF)
(Messenger,
1990,
p.
13;
Lukacs,
2001,
p.
140).
However,
the
RAF
was
not
as
easy
to
destroy
as
the
Germans
had
expected.
Converted
automobile
factories
became
production
sites
for
aircraft
components
(Messenger,
1990,
p.
23)
and
Radar
Direction
Finding
towers,
erected
along
the
south
coast
of
Britain,
helped
to
anticipate
attacks
coming
from
the
Luftwaffe's
bases
in
mainland
Europe
(Price,
1977,
p.
68).
Moreover,
the
Spitfire
and
Hurricane
airplanes
challenged
the
Luftwaffe's
Messerschmitt
109s
and
Messerschmitt
110
airplanes
(Messenger,
1990,
p.
16-21).
The
RAF
had
greater
endurance
than
the
Germans
had
anticipated.
On
August
20,
1940,
Churchill
gave
yet
another
speech,
eulogizing
lost
pilots
and
crewmen,
while
describing
the
courageous
spirit
of
the
British
people
(Clayton
&
Craig,
2002,
p.
219).
In
light
of
all
the
industrial
and
mechanical
qualities
each
nation
had
under
its
control,
could
it
be
that
Churchill's
speeches
had
a
social
impact
that
contributed
to
the
success
of
these
technological
advances?
And,
how
was
Churchill
using
rhetoric
effectively
to
commemorate
national
losses?
Although
civilian
targets
were
not
seen
as
desirable
from
a
strategic
standpoint
by
the
German
commanders
(Calder,
1969,
p.
152),
an
error
made
by
Luftwaffe
navigators
on
August
24,
1940
culminated
in
bombing
London's
city
center
(Price,
1977,
p.
22).
In
retaliation,
Churchill
ordered
Berlin
to
be
bombed
(Price,
1977,
p.
78).
These
increasing
3
night-time
attacks
upon
civilian
targets
had
a
devastating
effect.
Not
only
were
each
country's
civilians
becoming
familiarized
with
the
realities
of
war,
but
each
government
now
had
to
grapple
with
the
increasing
loss
of
life
and
justify
it
to
their
respective
nation.
On
September
4,
1940,
Hitler
gave
another
speech
to
an
audience
comprised
primarily
of
social
workers
and
nurses.
Although
Hitler's
rhetoric
had
been.
consistently
persuasive
up
to
this
moment
(Domarus,
1997,
p.
2081),
his
speech
on
September
4,
1940
was
a
rhetorical
failure.
His
unfocused
and
disorganized
approach
did
little
to
calm
his
audience,
and
his
treatment
of
the
British
was
one
of
distain,
rather
than
respect,
creating
an
enemy
that
could
have been
viewed
as
unworthy
of
challenge.
By
the
end
of
September,
1940,
Hitler
postponed
the
invasion
(Price,
1977,
p.
86).
By
the
end
of
October
1940,
the
Battle
of
Britain
had
ended
(Messenger,
1990,
p.
104).
Neither
country's
air
force
had
been
eliminated,
but
the
military
objective
to
invade
England
had
been
lost
(Price,
1977,
p.
86).
Could
it
be
that
Hitler's
rhetorically
weak
speech
on
September
4,
1940,
contributed
to
the
Luftwaffe's
failure
to
secure
air
space?
In
what
ways was
Hitler's
speech
rhetorically
ineffective?
And
finally,
how
and
in
what
ways,
did
both
Churchill's
and
Hitler's
rhetoric
operate
throughout
the
Battle
of
Britain?
How
important
could
Churchill's
and
Hitler's
speeches
have
been
to
the
unfolding
of
the
Battle
of
Britain?
What
correlations
between
Hitler's
rhetoric
and
the
historical
context
can
be
discovered?
While
many
of
these
questions
may
never
be
answered,
or
scientifically
proven,
some
rhetoricians,
and
historians
suggest
that
there
is
a
strong
and
real
connection
between
the
speeches
of
leaders
and
the
unfolding
of
historical
events.
Very
rarely
does
a
WWII
scholar
forego
to
mention
Churchill
or
Hitler
without
recognizing
the
importance
•of
their
rhetoric
within
their
public
lives
(see
Lukacs,
2001;
Heywood,
2003;
Baldoni,
2003;
Roberts,
2003;
Best,
2001;
Gilbert,
1984;
Brendon,
1984;
Manchester,
1988;
Clayton
&
Craig,
2002;
Domarus,
1997).
Many
scholars
have
interpreted
these
speeches
5
classical
rhetorical
theories
provided
by
Isocrates,
Cicero,
Aristotle
and
Pericles
aid
in
performing
a
rhetorical
criticism
of
each
leader's
speeches
as
being
rhetorically
effective
(i.e.
Aristotle
and
Pericles)
or causal
and
effectual
forces
in
the
historical
context
(i.e.
Isocrates
and
Cicero).
This
thesis
is
not
just
an
analysis
of
the
dialogue
between
enemies
or
just
a
comparison
of
adversaries'
speeches,
but
includes
the
causes
of
history
and
the
effects
of
rhetoric
-
or,
conversely,
the
causes
of
rhetoric
and
the
effects
of
history.
If
this
thesis
merely
studied
the
speech
itself,
without
historical
context
(such
as
Lyons,
2006),
then
it
would
indeed
be
impossible
to
investigate
the
impact
of
Churchill's
and
Hitler's
rhetoric
upon
the
historical
context
of
the
Battle
of
Britain.
Therefore,
rhetorical
texts
and
historical
context
are
absolutely
necessary
to
evaluate
in
this
thesis
and
must
be
treated
as
evidence
of
the
other's
impact.
A
brief
synopsis
of
how
Churchill's
speech
on
June
4,
1940
is
treated
within
this
thesis
exemplifies
this
approach.
Churchill's
June
4,
1940
speech
responded
to
a
rhetorical
exigence
which
was
fuelled
by
the
preceding
historical
events,
such
as
the
evacuations
at
Dunkirk,
the
low
morale
of
British
citizens
(Clayton
and
Craig,
2002,
p.
128),
and
the
new
relationship
Churchill
sought
to
create
with
British
citizens
after
his
recent
appointment
as
Prime
Minister.
Historical
circumstances
caused
Churchill
to
create
a
specific
type
of
rhetorical
reaction,
which
was
then
presented
to
audiences
in
the
form
of
a
speech.
Thus,
Churchill's
rhetoric
is
evidence
of
history's
effect.
Furthermore,
Churchill's
June
4,
1940
speech
also
affected
historical
and
rhetorical
circumstances.
An
example
of
rhetoric's
affect
upon
historical
circumstances
was
when
Churchill's
June
4,
1940
speech
appealed
to
the
United
States
for
military
support.
Churchill
had
hoped
the
United
States
would
declare
war
on
Germany.
However,
the
United
States
rejected
this
appeal.
But,
as
this
thesis
will
suggest,
this
inaction
still
affected
the
historical
perception
that
Britain
was
isolated
during
this
battle.
Without
this
speech,
and
the
appeal
to
the
United
States,
then
perhaps
history
might
have
6
been
different
or
the
perception
of
Britain
at
that
time
might
have
been
different.
Therefore,
the
fact that
the
United
States'
rejected
Britain's
request
for
help
is
evidence
of
rhetoric's
effect
upon
historical
context.
Finally,
a
rhetorical
effect
of
Churchill's
June
4,
1940
speech
was
the
response
from
the
Nazi
Germany.
Churchill's
speech
expressed
the
national
will
to
survive
and
continue
fighting.
The
Nazis
targeted
the
British
as
stupidly
courageous
and
almost
laughable.
Because
of
this,
Hitler
would
declare
on
July
19,
1940,
once
again,
that
he
desired
peace
with
the
British.
In
turn,
Hitler's
declaration
of
peace
would
provoke
the
British
government
to
yet
again
reject
capitulation.
Thus,
Churchill's
rhetoric
affected
Hitler's,
which
yet
again,
affected
Churchill's.
Therefore,
rhetoric
can
affect
rhetorical
texts,
such
as
speeches.
Previous
Rhetorical
and
Historical
Scholarship
about
Churchill
and
Hitler
While
many
historical
and
rhetorical
scholars
suggest
that
Churchill
and
Hitler
were
prolific
orators
and
that
the
exploration
of
their
rhetoric
would
be
productive
(Roberts,
2003;
Baldoni,
2003;
Best,
2001;
Brendon,
1984),
very
few
have
focused
upon
the Battle
of
Britain
with
a
perspective
that
values
the
importance
of
rhetoric
within
that
military
campaign.
Furthermore,
the
most
surprising
aspect
of
previous
scholarship
on
Churchill
and
Hitler
is
that
the
scopes
of
previous
studies
have
not
included
a
comparison
of
both
leaders'
rhetoric
within
one
study.
This
thesis
will
not
only
attempt
to
apply
a
thorough
and
consistent
rhetorical
framework
to
both
orators,
but
also
to
suggest
how
Churchill's
and
Hitler's
rhetoric,
when
compared,
played
a
significant
role
in
the
Battle
of
Britain.
Although
many
historians
credit
Churchill
for
possessing
superior
oratory
skills
and
a
talent
for
courageous
leadership
during
crises,
Churchill
has not
often
been
investigated
within
a
rhetorical
framework.,
Although
Winston
Churchill's
(1874
-
1965)
7
various
speeches
posses
great
historical
importance,
they
are
not
often
analyzed
with
a
rhetorical
framework.
As
will
be
seen
in
the
literature
review,
only
two
previous
attempts
to
rhetorically
analyze
Churchill's
speeches
could
be
found
(Lyons,
2006;
Hostetler,
1997).
They
demonstrate
that
Churchill
was
a
major
historical
figure
whose
rhetorical
actions
are
a
site
for
productive
contemporary
inquiry.
However,
these
studies
do
not
suggest
that
rhetoric
was
a
contributing
factor
to
historical
events.
Each
applies
only
one
Classical
rhetorical
theory
or
model
to
the
analysis
of
Churchill's
speeches.
This
suggests
that
Churchill's
speeches
require
further
scholarly
criticism
in
an
effort
to
understand
how
Churchill's
rhetoric
played
an
important
role
in
the
Battle
of
Britain
In
addition,
any
study
of
Adolf
Hitler
(1889-1945)
is
fraught
with
ethical
and
moral
dilemmas.
As
Hitler
was
the
primary
architect
behind
the
savage
genocide
of
the
Holocaust,
any
academic
approaches
to his
actions
and
influence
must
not
only
investigate
the
facts
with
the
utmost
scrutiny
and
respect
for
all
the
individuals
and
groups
that
were
victimized
by
his
ideologies.
Many
researchers
solve
the
ethical
dilemma
of
trying
to
study
a
racially
discriminating
government
by
demonizing
Hitler
(Lyons,
2006).
It
is
not
the
goal
of
this
dissertation
to
demonize
Hitler,
nor
to
valorize
Churchill.
Instead,
it
is
a
goal
of
this
dissertation
to
understand
how
Hitler's
rhetoric
was
a
product of
Nazi
beliefs
and
circumstances,
and
the
effect
of
that
rhetoric
upon
the
unfolding
of
the
Battle
of
Britain.
While
scholars
have
studied
Hitler's
rhetoric
(Scanlan,
1951;
Lee,
2005;
Katz,
1992),
studies
focus
primarily
upon
Hitler's
Mein
Kampf
or
the
Nazi
Propaganda
Ministry,
rather
than
upon
Hitler's
rhetorical
performance.
This
denotes
that
more
scholarship
is
required
to
understand
Hitler
as
an
orator,
the
strategies
of
Hitler's
speeches,
and
how
they
impacted
his
immediate
situation.
9
&
Herzberg,
2001,
p.
69).
Thus,
Isocrates'
definition
is
much
different
from
Aristotle's,
and
more
appropriate
for
this
thesis,
since
it
argues
that
rhetoric
is
morally-laden,
speaker-dependent
and
context-dependent.
Research
Questions
Based
upon
the
definition
that
rhetoric
is
speaker-dependent
while
also
saturated
by
the
cultural
context
and
morals,
three
research
questions
will
be
posed.
First,
in
what
ways
were
Churchill
and
Hitler
effective
orators
with
regard
to
their
education,
knowldge,
character
and
skills?
This
question
will
be
answered
in
Chapter
Four:
The
Ideal
Orator,
in
which
Isocrates'
and
Cicero's
theoretical
oncepts
will
be
manifested
as
a
standard
by
which
to
assess
Churchill's
and
Hitler's
natural
aptitude,
education
and
knowledge,
as
well
as
their
performances
of
ethos
through
superior
morals,
modesty
and
humility.
This
chapter
will
help
to
assess
Churchill
and
Hitler
as
orators
without
the
historical
distractions
of
the
Battle
of
Britain,
comparing
these
two
leaders
in
an
effort
to
understand
their
strengths
and
weaknesses
as
orators.
The
second
research
question
is:
What
elements
of
Churchill's
and
Hitler's
rhetoric,
both
its
internal
content
and
its
relation
to
historical
context,
likely
contributed
to
the Battle
of
Britain?
After
exploring
the
potential
of
these
speakers,
one
must
then
examine
how
these
leaders
rose
to
the
rhetorical
challenge
and
whether
they
fulfilled
their
aforementioned
potential.
By
examining
Churchill's
and
Hitler's
.rhetoric
in
the
context
of
the
historical
antecedents
and
the
immediate
effects,
it
will
be
explored
how
these
leaders?
rhetoric
was
historically
contingent
and
their
responses
to
the
situation
were
unique
and
context-dependent.
As
stated,
this
thesis
values
the
relationship
between
rhetorical
texts
and
historical
context.
The
third
research
question
is
based
upon
the
connection
between
Churchill's
and
Hitler's
rhetoric
within
this
battle.
How
were
each
leader's
rhetorical
strategies
and
content
shaped
by
their
enemy's
rhetorical
performance?
Throughout
the
thesis,
the
10
interaction
between
these
opposing
forces
will
be
recognized
through
the
organization,
which
layers
the
perspectives
of
Britain
and
Germany.
The
Criteria
for
Selecting
the
Primary
Texts
Two
speeches
were
chosen
from
each
orator
in
order
to
ensure
balance
between
Hitler
and
Churchill.
More
than
one
example
of
each
leader's
rhetoric
was
needed
in
order
to
examine
his
rhetorical
adaptation
over
time.
Choosing
only
four
speeches
allowed
for
sufficient
depth
of
analysis
in
historical
context.
The
four
speeches
were
selected
based
upon
two
criteria:
1)
each
speech's
content
dealt
directly
with
the
militaristic
and
historical
unfolding
of
the
Battle
of
Britain
and
2)
each
speech
provided
new
and
informative
insight
into
each
government's
political
policies
and
were
not
just
a
reiteration
of
previous
sentiments.
For
example,
the
speech
"We
Will
Fight
on
the
Beaches"
(Churchill,
1940a),
delivered
on
June
4,
1940,
dealt
directly
with
the
threat
of
future
German
assaults
(para.
10)
and
provided
insight
into
the
British
government's
policy
of
rejecting
capitulation
(para.
18).
The
policies
and
details
provided
in
this
speech
were
"most
people's
first
chance
to
hear
the
full
details
of
Dunkirk"
(Clayton
&
Craig,
2002,
p.
128)
and
thus
provided
new
information
to
audiences.
Hitler's
speech,
"A
Generous
Peace
Proposal",
delivered
on
July
19,
1940
also
discussed
the
situation
regarding
the
impending
confrontation
with
Britain
(Domarus,
1997,
p.
2057)
and
well
as
provided
the
German
government's
offer
of
peace
(Domarus,
1997,
p.
2062).
Thus,
Hitler's
speech
on
July
19,
1940
met
the
aforementioned
criteria.
The
second
speech
of
Churchill's
to
be
analyzed
in
this
thesis,
delivered
on
August
20,
1940,
"The
Few",
eulogizes
the
British
losses
of
pilots
and
crewmen
that
had
been
experienced
by
the
nation.
The
major
political
policy
that
was
announced
highlighted
the
progress
with
the
Americans
(Clayton
&
Craig,
2002,
p.
219)
and
the
allotment
of
naval
and
air
defense
facilities
for
usage
by
the
American
forces
(Churchill,
12
2112).
Although
this
could
have
also
been
a
profitable
site
for
rhetorical
inquiry,
it
was
delivered
after
the
conclusion
of
the
Battle
of
Britain.
As
stated,
it
is
difficult
to
sustain
academic
quality
within
the
realm
of
a
Masters
thesis
by
analyzing
every
single
speech
delivered
by
Churchill
or
Hitler
throughout
the
summer
of
1940.
Transcripts
of
these
speeches
are
used
to
conduct
the
rhetorical
analyses.
The
Churchill
Center
and
Museum
at
the
Cabinet
War
Rooms
in
London
provide
electronic
transcripts
which
can
be
accessed
through
the
internet.
Although
very
little
historical
data
is
provided
on
this
website
(www.winstonchurchill.org),
the
speeches
themselves
are
the
transcripts
based
on
the
audio
recordings
during
that
time.
Therefore,
the
exact
words
said
by
Churchill
on
June
4
and
August
M
are
reflected
in
these
primary
texts
and
are
more
accurate
than
drafts
of
the
initial
speeches.
Secondary
historical
sources
have
been
used
to
place
these
speeches
in
their
historical
context.
Since
the
end
of
WWII,
many
German
scholars
have
compiled
transcripts
of
Hitler's
speeches
in
their
original
language,
with
contextual
data,
to
assist
in
the
exploration
of
Hitler's
prolific
career
as
a
German
dictator
and
politician.
Since
1962,
Max
Domarus
(1962)
and
Wolfgang
Domarus
(1987)
have
published
four
volumes
of
Hitler's
speeches
and
proclamations
in
German.
Although
originally
published
in
German,
I
will
use
the
English
translations,
copyrighted
by
the
same
author,
Wolfgang
Domarus
(1997),
for
its
evaluation.
Domarus'
(1997)
third
volume,
which
provides
Hitler's
speeches
from
1939-1940,
supplies
the
contextual
data
necessary
to
understand
how
these
speeches
were
influential,
aspects
of
their
reception
and
even
their
initial
conception
and
provides
the
primary
source of
Hitler's
speeches
in
this
thesis.
Why
the
Battle
of
Britain?
There
are
two
elements
of
the
Battle
of
Britain
that
allow
a
rhetorician
to
see
a
major
correlation
between
history
and
rhetoric.
First,
the
historical
circumstances
of
the
Battle
of
Britain,
especially
in
the
beginning
phases,
indicated
that
the
British
were
13
perceived
to
be
vulnerable
and
susceptible
to
invasion
by
the
Germans.
The
German
forces
were,
by
1940,
one
of
the
strongest
in
Europe
(Lukacs,
2001,
p.
10).
Since
Britain
had
been
generally
regarded
as
a
powerful
and
victorious
military
nation
before
Dunkirk,
the
potential
invasion
and
defeat
during
the
summer
months
of
1940
shook
the
British
nation.
However,
the
British
won
the
battle,
and
it
became
the
first
legitimate
challenge
to
the
Nazi
German
advance
westwards.
Second,
both
Churchill's
and
Hitler's
and
rhetoric
were
under
incredible
pressure
and
were
transforming
in
1940.
Winston
Churchill,
despite
the
insurmountable
odds
the
British
were
facing,
is
remembered
as
having
given
some
of
the
best
speeches
of
the
20
th
century
in
the
summer
of
1940.
Churchill's
inspirational
addresses
have
become
ingrained
within
the national
myths
of
Britain's
past
(Clayton
&
Craig,
2002,
p.
129).
Moreover,
works
that historically
examine
Churchill
praise
him
for
his
rhetorical
capacity,
especially
within
the
summer
of
1940
(Roberts,
2003;
Heywood,
2003).
Likewise
Hitler's
persuasive
abilities,
which
have
been
lauded
as
one
of
the
key
reasons
he
was
able
to
lead
the
National
Socialists
(Evans,
2003,
p.
171),
transformed
under
the
pressures
of
1940.
W.
Domarus
(1997)
contends
that
by
September
4,
1940,
Hitler's
speech-making
had
altered
and
the
"raging,
the
ill-concealed
feelings
of
impotence"
(p.
2081)
characterized
Hitler's
rhetoric
from
this
point
onwards.
These
two
qualities
-
the
vulnerability
of
the
British
to
invasion
and
defeat
by
the
strong
German
forces,
coupled
with
the
perception
of
Churchill's
reportedly
powerful
rhetoric in
comparison
to
Hitler's
apparently
declining
persuasive
capacity
-
suggests
that
perhaps
correlations
can
be
drawn
between
the
unfolding
of
history
and
rhetoric.
Could
it
be
that
these
leaders
were
reacting
to
historical
pressures?
In
what
ways
was
Churchill
a
strong
orator?
Could
it
be
that
Hitler's
response
to
battle
led
to
his
rhetorical
mistakes?
What
correlations
between
Churchill's
and
Hitler's
rhetoric
and
the
historical
14
events
of
1940
can
be drawn?
These
are
the
reasons
why
the
Battle
of
Britain
was
chosen
as
the
historical
period
in
which
to
examine
the
oratory
of
these
leaders.
Selection
of
Historical
Data
Historical
data
is
essential
to
this
thesis.
However,
rhetoricians
who
study
history
often
do
not
seek
historical
sources
that
are
flawless
or
entirely
objective
accounts,
but
rather
interpretations
of
events.
Thus,
rhetoricians
may
not
have
the
same
criteria
for
selecting
sources
as
the
scholarly
historian.
Because
rhetoricians
find
meaning
in
perceptions
of
history,
it
can
often
be
fruitful
to
include
historians'
interpretive
accounts.
Thus,
a
rhetorician
can
gain
insight
into
both
the
historical
accuracy,
through
reputable
historical
sources,
but
also
divergent
interpretations.
Although
this
presents
an
intensified
challenge
to
a
rhetorician
studying
history,
it
also
creates
a
more
comprehensive,
rhetorical
interpretation
of
historical
events.
However,
this
does
not
necessarily
mean
that
historical
sources
are
fictional
narratives
or
far
from
the
truth.
It
means
only
that
they
also
contain
the
historian's
interpretations
of
historical
data.
Thus,
while
sources
such
as
Clayton
&
Craig
(2001),
Messenger
(1990)
and
Roberts
(2003)
may
not
meet
the
criteria
of
a
scholarly
historian,
as
they
are
interpretations
to
the
Battle
of
Britain,
they
provide
information
valuable
to rhetorical
analysis.
Since
historical fact
is
also
important
to
the
analysis
of
the
causes
and
effects
of
rhetoric,
the
works
of
Evans
(2003),
Calder
(1969),
Price
(1977),
James
(2000)
and
Lukacs
(2001)
have
been
consulted
as
more
accurate
historical
accounts
of
the
events
in
the
Battle
of
Britain.
To
ensure
historical
precision
when
it
is
needed,
these types
of
texts
are
often
referenced,
especially
with
regard
to
the
dates
and
statistical
data
and
overall
unfolding
of
the
Battle
of
Britain.
15
Brief
Overview
of
Thesis
Following
the
introduction,
each
chapter
in
this
thesis
addresses
aspects
of
this
overarching
question:
What
elements
of
Churchill's
and
Hitler's
rhetoric,
both
its
internal
content
and
its
relation
to
historical
context,
likely
contributed
to
the
Battle
of
Britain?
Chapter
Two,
the
literature
review,
will
expose
the
gaps
in
scholarly
literature
with
regard
to
rhetoric,
history
and
the
Second
World
War.
How
have
previous
scholars
approached
the
connection
between
Churchill's
and
Hitler's
rhetoric
and
the
Battle
of
Britain's
outcome?
Has
rhetoric
ever
been viewed
as
having
an
affect
on
historical
military
campaigns?,
or
in
what
ways
have
Churchill's
and
Hitler's
rhetoric
been
studied?
Chapter
Three
introduces
the
methodological
tools
that
are
needed
to
bridge
rhetoric
and
history.
This
section
will
seek
an
answer
to
the
question:
What
tools
are
needed
to
bridge
rhetoric
and
history?
Since
both
historical
and
rhetorical
scholarship
is
often
viewed
as
independent
of
each
other,
it
can
often
be
difficult
for
a
rhetorician
to
connect
these
major
fields
in
one
study.
Three
key
methods
are
used
to
investigate
Churchill's
and
Hitler's
rhetoric:
rhetorical
biography,
rhetorical
criticism
and
rhetorical
history.
Chapter
Four
uses
the
first
research
method
of
rhetorical
biography.
Isocrates'
and
Cicero's
notion of
the
"ideal
orator"
is
conceptualized
as
a
standard
by
which
to
view
Churchill's
and
Hitler's
rhetoric.
In
what ways
were
Churchill's
and
Hitler's
effective
orators,,
with
regards
to
their
rhetorical
skills,
education
and
overall
rhetorical
development?
Not
only
will
their
personalities
and
rhetorical
styles
be
scrutinized,
but
also
their
education
and
their
performances
of
moral
character.
By
evaluating
these
leaders
to
an
ideal
standard,
conceptualized
by
ancient
rhetoricians,
the
rhetorical
potential
of
Churchill
and
Hitler
can
be
assessed.
16
The
following
historical
chapter,
Chapter
Five,
will
encompass
the
majority
of
the
data
analysis
in
this
thesis.
In
this
discussion,
rhetorical
history
is
conducted
and
speeches
are
examined
within
three
historical
phases.
The
first
phase
encompasses
the
beginning
of
the
battle
-
the
antecedents,
such
as
the
evacuation
of
Dunkirk
and
political
contexts,
such
as
the
newly
appointed
Prime
Minister,
Churchill,
and
the
instability
of
the
British
Empire.
The
second phase
is
characterized
by
the
actual
attacks
by
Germany's
Luftwaffe
upon
Britain's
RAF,
and
the
engagement
of
planes
in
combat.
Finally,
the
third
phase
is
typified
by
the
involvement
of
civilian
targets
and
the
inability
of
the
German
Luftwaffe
to
obtain
air
superiority
over
the
English
Channel.
Throughout
this
thesis,
Aristotle's logos,
ethos
and
pathos
theories
are
used
as
an
organizational
strategy
for
rhetorical
criticism.
Also,
Pericles'
Funeral
Oration
provides
a
comparative
model
by
which
Churchill's
and
Hitler's
rhetoric
is
examined.
Finally,
the
thesis
leads
to insights
about
the
rhetorical
ability,
rhetorical
strategies
and
the
effectiveness
of
rhetoric
within
its
historical
context.
The
conclusion
will
also
suggest
three
possible
implications
of
this
research
and
propose
further
study.
Significance
of
this
Thesis
to
Rhetorical
and
Historical
Scholarship
This
thesis
is
interdisciplinary
and
attempts
to
bridge,
and
contribute
to,
both
historical
and
rhetorical
traditions.
Other
interdisciplinary
studies
of
this
nature
primarily
use
rhetoric
as
a
lens,
and
history
as
subject
matter.
However,
both
rhetoric
and
history
will
be viewed
with
the
rigor
of
a
rhetorician,
rather
than
a
historian.
This
difference
must
be
made
clear,
as
both
history
and
rhetoric
will
be
analyzed,
but
essentially
from
a
rhetorical
perspective.
Oftentimes,
the
relationship
between
rhetoric
and
history
is
investigated
within
the
realm
of
rhetorical
studies,
rather
than
in
history
(Medhurst,
2001,
p.
498).
Rhetoricians
claim
that
there
exists
an
undeniable
relationship
between
the
two
concepts.
According
to
David
Zarefsky
(1998),
"Analyzing
the
rhetorical
dimension
of
history
is
17
compelling
not
because
rhetoric
is
somehow
ancillary
to
history
but
because
it
is
central
to
it"
(p.
9).
As
Zarefsky
claims,
rhetoric
and
history are
not
mutually
exclusive,
but
concepts
that
rely
upon
each
other
in
the
creation
of
what
Karen
J.
Turner
(1998)
claims
is
a
process
of
social
construction
(p
2).
Turner
(1998)
suggests
that
viewing
rhetorical
history
as
a
social
construction
implies
two
distinct
meanings:
First,
rhetorical
history
is
the
ways
in
which
rhetorical
processes
have
constructed
social
reality
and
second,
it
suggests
the
nature
of
the
study
of
history
is
an
essentially
rhetorical
process
(p. 2).
The
study
of
historical
situations
from
a
rhetorical
perspective
is
considered
highly
significant
to
the
greater
academic
community.
Zarefsky
(1998)
suggests
that
this
is
the
most
productive
avenue
of
inquiry
for
rhetorical
study
and
the
most
heuristic.
By
studying
important
historical
events
from
a
rhetorical
perspective,
one
can
see
significant
aspects
about
those
events
that
Other
perspectives
miss.
If
that
is
so,
then
there
is
an argument
not
only
for
the
place
of
historical
studies
within
rhetoric
but
also
for
the
contribution
of
rhetorical
studies
in
the
larger
scholarly
enterprise.
(Zarefsky,
1998,
p.
30-31).
Zarefsky
(1998)
further
suggests
that
the
realm
of
communication
studies
is
amply
suited
to
a
pursuit
of
this
kind:
"Communication
stands
poised
to
offer
a
success
story
of
truly
multidisciplinary
study"
(p.
31).
This
suggests
that
the
endeavor
to
study
history
from
a
rhetorical
perspective
is
significant
to
both
the
development
of
rhetoric,
but
also
to
the
larger
academic
and
multidisciplinary
community.
The
Limitations
of
this
Thesis'
Scope
This
thesis
does
not
examine
each
government's
propaganda
as
rhetoric,
neither
does
it
analyze
the
medium
in
which
the
speeches
were
delivered,
nor
does
it
determine
the
specific
effects
of
rhetoric
through
audience
analysis.
Although
the
concept
of
18
national
morale
will
be
occasionally
referenced,
morale
or
public
opinion
will
not
serve
as
a
method
to
measure
the
effectiveness
of
rhetoric.
Instead,
national
morale
may
be
suggested
as
having
possible
relationship
to
rhetoric,
though
no
quantitative
correlations
will
be
investigated,
discussed
or
substantiated,
except
through
secondary
sources.
Despite
the
existence
of
sophisticated
communication
technologies,
propaganda
ministries,
and
overwhelming
archival
evidence
of
civilian
receptions,
the
speeches
will
be
the
focus
of
this
analysis,
viewed
as
arising
from
oratorical
skill,
involving
rhetorical
strategies,
which
possibly
responded
to
and
created
history.
21
Churchill:
Automatic
Glorification
and
Inconsistent
Frameworks
Winston
Churchill
(1874
-
1965)
was
a
prolific
writer,
publishing
a
novel,
two
biographies,
three
volumes
of
memoirs,
and
several
histories
in
addition
to his
many
newspaper
articles.
Many
rhetorical
and
historical
scholars
have
used
his
autobiographical
and
historical
material
when
discussing
politics,
war
and
history.
However,
among
all
the
iterations
regarding
Churchill's
role
in
British
politics
and
war
efforts,
rarely
does
a
scholar
forego
to
mention
Churchill's
triumphant
speeches
and
successful
oratory
style.
Almost
every
book
that
historically
surveys
Churchill
discusses
how
his
speeches
were
instrumental
to
gaining
popular
opinion,
and
were
somehow
influential
during
WWII
(see
Heywood,
2003;
Baldoni,
2003;
Lukacs,
2001;
Roberts,
2003;
Best,
2001;
Gilbert,
1984;
Brendon,
1984;
Manchester,
1988).
Although
these
publications
suggest
that
Churchill
was
a
political
communicator,
many
fail
to
evaluate
his
speeches
with
a
rhetorical
framework.
But,
by
providing
such
information,
these
historians
have
inadvertently
assisted
a
rhetorician's
attempt
to
rhetorically
analyze
Churchill.
Thus,
historical
scholarship
can
then
be
used
by
rhetorical
scholars.
For
example,
in
Andrew
Roberts'
(2003)
book,
Hitler
and
Churchill:
Secrets
of
Leadership,
sections
exist
that
focus
upon
Churchill's
'oratory"
(p.
22-40)
and
"charisma"
(p.
42-45)
but
fail
to
apply
rhetorical
theory
or
a
consistent
rhetorical
framework
of
evaluation.
Instead,
from
a
rhetorical
standpoint,
Roberts'
work,
(though
meant
to
be
historical)
is
a
dissection
of
Churchill's
ethos
(the
ethical
qualities
of
a
speaker,
whereby
he
or
she
appears
to
have
good
will,
intelligence
and
the
audience's
best
interests
at
heart)
as
well
as
Churchill's personality
that
was
exhibited
in
massive
political
speeches.
Other
books
written
by
historians
contribute
to
a
rhetorician's
attempt
to
analyze
Churchill.
In
a
book
by
John
Baldoni
(2003),
entitled
Great
Communication
Secrets
of
Great
Leaders,
Churchill's
leadership
style
is
analyzed
to
suggest
that his
22
communication
styles,
(whereby
he
would
emphasize
honesty,
confidence
and
encourage
owne
r
ship
of
situations
onto
British
citizens)
were
inspirational
and
effective
in
a
leadership
role
(p.
10-12).
Although
Baldoni
does
not
attempt
to
analyze
Churchill's
speeches
for
their
persuasive
appeal,
,
he
mentions
that
Churchill
was
a
"natural
communicator"
(p.
10),
whose
speeches
could
halt
people
from
"what
they
were
doing,
whether
at
home
or
at
work,
to
listen"
(p.
11).
Although
Baldoni'
s
work
is
geared
towards
focusing
on
Churchill's
keen
leadership
qualities,
it
also
contributes
to
the
overall
understanding
of
Churchill's
rhetorical ethos.
Rhetorical
frameworks
that
evaluate
Churchill's
leadership
and
speeches
are
more
often
found
in
scholarly
journals,
such
as
Michael
J.
Hostetler'
s
(1997)
article
entitled
The
Enigmatic
End
of
Rhetoric:
Churchill's
Fulton
Address
as
Great
Art
and
Failed
Persuasion,
which
reviews
Churchill's
famous
"the
Sinews
of
Peace"
speech.
Popularly
referred
to as
the
"Iron
Curtain
Speech",
Churchill
delivered
this
speech
on
March
5,
1946
to
an
American
audience.
Hostetler
suggests
that
while
the
speech
was
a
rhetorically
technical
masterpiece,
it
was
a
persuasive
failure
(p.
416).
By
conducting
a
textual
analysis,
appraising
the
speech
for
style,
arrangement
as
well
as
invention,
(which
could
be
considered
Aristotelian),
Hostetler
argues
against
previous
scholarship
on
this
speech
by
Hinds
and
Windt
(1991),
who
claim
that
the
argumentative
qualities
of
the
speech
are
overpowered
by
the
strong
metaphor
the
"Iron
Curtain"
(as
cited
in
Hostetler,
1997,
p.
417).
Hostetler
displaces
Hinds'
and
Windt's
position,
to
suggest
that
the
rhetoric
in
such
situations
must
not
only
be
analyzed
at
the
micro-level,
but
that
engaging
the
larger
elements
of
a
rhetorical
situation
is
necessary
to.
understanding
its
effect
and
persuasive
success
(p.
427).
This
argument
is
highly
significant
to
this
dissertation,
as
my
research
adopts
the
same
position.
Although
Churchill's
speeches
may
be
easily
dissected
with
Aristotelian
theory
to
demonstrate
the
superiority
of
23
Churchill's
colorful
language
and
passionate
metaphors,
these
types
of
analyses
fail
to
recognize
the
importance of
rhetoric
in
a
wider
perspective.
Although
Hostetler
focuses
on
only
Churchill's
"Iron
Curtain"
speech,
without
a
comparative
framework
to
other
speeches
and
without
much
attention
to
the
affects
and
effects
of
the
speech
itself,
Hostetler
does
acknowledge
that
technical
elements of
rhetorical
moments
are
somewhat
futile
to
explore
if
not
considered
within
the
broader
context
(p.
427).
Another
article,
entitled
Winston
Churchill
and
the
rhetorical
challenges
of
democratic
statesmanship,
by
J.D.
Lyons'
(2006),
a
political
scientist,
advocates
that
there
are
specific
rhetorical
challenges
(such
as
combating
a
tyrant
with
a
"good
cause"
or
the
appeal
to
universal
justice)
to
democratic
statesmanship
that
Churchill,
Abraham
Lincoln
and
Pericles
all
experienced.
Lyons
suggests
that
Churchill
was
a
great
rhetor
that
advocated
the
privileges
of
democracy
to
British
citizens
through
various
methods,
including
the
simple
spoken
word,
leadership
tactics
and
"greatness"
(p.
4-31).
Lyons'
article
focuses
upon
the
importance
of
the
spoken
word
to
the
maintenance
of
the
state,
claiming
that
Pericles,
Lincoln
and
Churchill
used
rhetoric
to
promote
the
ideals
of
civilization,
democracy
and
victory
(p.
6).
Lyons
asserts
that
by
doing
so,
these
leaders
were
ethically
just
and
although
their
immediate
situations
were
precarious,
the
goals
of
democracy
and
civilization
sustained
their
rhetoric
to
become
central
to
the
maintenance
of
national
morale
(p.
12).
Lyons
further
suggests
that
Pericles,
Lincoln
and
Churchill
used
ethical
rhetoric
in
a
manner
which
had
the
"ability
to
inspire
without
corrupting,
to
elevate
without
destroying
foundations,
to
lead
without
succumbing
to
the
vanities
of
leadership"
(p.
12),
which
is
the
key
difference
between
the
"statesman
and
the
despot,
the
great
man
and
the
thug"
(p.
12).
Lyons'
(2006)
article
reiterates
many
sentiments
about
Pericles
and
Churchill
that
will
be
developed
within
my
thesis,
such
as
the
importance
of
rhetoric
to
the
state.
24
This
is
highly
relevant
to
my
thesis.
Although
Lyons
claims
that
this
rhetorical
quality
is
evident
in
Churchill's
speeches,
Lyons
does
not
extend
the
argument
to
Hitler.
Throughout
his
article,
Lyons
valorizes
Churchill
yet
does
not
approach
Hitler
with
the
objective
scrutiny,
referring
to
the
German
politician
as
a
"madman"
(p.
7),
with
"insane
frothings"
(p.
7)
and
the
Nazi
regime
as
a
"soul-destroying
tyranny"
(p.
7).
Although
Lyons
claims
that
Pericles,
Churchill
and
Lincoln
were
using
rhetoric
for
ethical
purposes,
he
does
not
historically
contextualize
Churchill's
rhetoric,
nor
even
Hitler's
rhetoric.
If
Lyons
had
contextualized
the
rhetoric
of
Hitler,
or
say,
Napoleon,
within
the
value-laden
cultural
frameworks
in
which
they
operated,
then
perhaps
Lyons
(2006)
would
have
created
a
more
fair
and
objective
publication.
As
such,
my
thesis
will
develop
Lyons'
claim
about
rhetoric's
importance
in
the
maintenance
of
the
state,
but
will
engage
with
Hitler's
rhetoric
while
contextualizing
it
in
historical
details.
A
fundamental
flaw
deriving
from
Lyons'
(2006)
article
is
based
upon
his
depiction
of
the
British
Empire.
Lyons
glorifies
the
British
race
as
having
"always
stood
for
something
greater
than
mere
survival;
it
had
stood
for
the
freedom
of
man"
(p.
8),
but
fails
to
take
into
account
the
centuries-long
exception
to
this
claim,
such
as
the
slavery
that
Britain
encouraged
in
their
empire.
Although
Lyons
attempts
to
rhetorically
analyze
three
major
historical
and
rhetorical
leaders,
his
obvious
favoritism
towards
Britain's
wartime
Prime
Minister,
along
with
inconsistent
discourse
analysis,
contaminates
the
major
claims
and
fundamental
assumptions
in
this
article.
Although
Lyons
provides
an
inadequate
rhetorical
evaluation,
this
does
demonstrate
that
the
attempt
has
been
made
to
rhetorically
analyze
Churchill's
speeches.
Although
Hostetler's
(1997)
and
Lyons,'
(2006)
articles
may
dissect
Churchill's
rhetoric,
neither
do
so
in
the
same
manner
as
this
thesis.
Hostetler
acknowledges
that
rhetoric
should
be
seen
within
the
broader
context
(p.
427),
but
this
analysis
does
not
25
include
how
other
speeches
or mitigating
factors
would
have
harmed
and/or
benefited
the
effectiveness
of
Churchill's
rhetoric.
Also,
Hostetler'
s
analysis
does
not
survey
Churchill's
wartime
speeches,
and
naturally
neglects
to
engage
the
rhetorical
challenges
that
are
specific
to
wartime
speeches
(such
as
the
maintenance
of
civilian
morale).
Lyons'
evaluation
of
Churchill
takes
a
thematic,
rather
than
chronological
approach
to
Churchill's
rhetoric,
connecting
Churchill's
numerous
speeches
under
the
broad
headings
of
"greatness"
(p.
11)
or
"courageous
leadership"
(p.
8).
Although
this
article
demonstrates
aspects
of
Churchill's
rhetoric
are
indeed
effective
and
memorable,
it
is
unclear
in
Lyons')
article
how
rhetoric
operates
within
the
framework
of
war
versus
peace,
or
how
certain
aspects
of
political
and
military
life
(during
WWII)
would
have
harmed
and/or
benefited
the
effectiveness
of
Churchill's
rhetoric.
My
thesis
will
attempt
to
address
these
gaps
in
the
literature,
to
include
discussions
about
Churchill's
wartime
rhetoric
and
how
two
speeches
contributed
to
the
historical
events
in
the
Battle
of
Britain.
Hitler:
Ethics,
the
Propaganda
Ministry
and
Mein
Kampf
The
scholarship
regarding
Hitler
is
vast.
Hitler's
impact
on
academic
disciplines
is
found
in,
but
not
limited
to:
science,
medicine,
politics,
history,
war,
ideological
constructions
of
race,
law,
economics,
culture,
literature,
education,
psychology
and
Germany
itself.
In
order
to
study
the
scholarship
on
Hitler,
one
must
take
a
thematic
approach.
The
following
research
was
discovered
when
searching
for
communications,
rhetoric,
propaganda,
public
speaking
and
oratory.
When
researching
rhetoric
and
the
speeches
of
Nazi
Germany,
the
now-nefarious
Propaganda
Ministry,
run
by
Josef
Goebbels,
is
often
referenced.
A
brief
discussion
about
the
Propaganda
Ministry
must
be
granted,
in
order
to
understand
the
purposes
and
27
Nazi
Germany's
communication
practices
(such
as
rhetoric,
oratory,
internal
communications,
marketing,
etc.)
often
reference
the
Propaganda
Ministry.
Moreover,
propaganda
also
has
a
relationship
with
the
rhetoric
that
was
exhibited
in
speeches
during
this
time.
After
speeches
were
delivered
by
Nazi
officials,
the
Propaganda
Ministry
would
further
disseminate
them
over
the
radio
waves
and
publish
their
content
in
pamphlets,
for
example.
Propaganda
was
highly
valued
as
a
method
of
persuasion
by
Hitler
himself
(see
"Mein
Kampf",
Hitler
(1939);
Scanlan
(1951)).
It is
important
to
note
here
that,
although
a
major
difference
between
propaganda
and
rhetoric
exists
within
this
thesis,
Hitler
did
not
regularly
use
the
term
"rhetoric",
but
used
"propaganda"
to
define
any
form
of
persuasion,
including
public
speaking.
In
his
book,
Mein
Kampf,
Hitler
(1939)
claims
that
"propaganda's
task
is
[
...
]
not
to
evaluate
various
rights,
but
far
more
to
stress
exclusively
the
one
that
is
to
be
represented
by
it.
It
has
not
to
search
into
truth as
far
as
this
is
favorable
to
others,
in
order
to
present
it
then
to
the
masses
with
doctrinary
honesty,
but
it
has
rather
to
see
its
own
truth
uninterruptedly"
(p.
236).
As
can
be
anticipated,
Hitler
makes
no
assumptions
about
the
ethical
qualities
that
propaganda
must
possess
(p.
236),
but
rather
asserts
that truth
is
negligible
in
propagandistic
settings.
Public
speaking
played
an
important
role
in
Weimar
and
Nazi
Germany
(Scanlan,
1951,
p.
431).
Public
speaking
was
a
successful
avenue
to
gain
public
support,
as
Hitler
himself
took
to
the
streets
in
the
1920s,
armed
with
moving
speeches
to
recruit
Germans
into
the
National
Socialist
movement.
Ross
Scanlan
(1951)
researched
the
importance
of
public
speaking
in
the
Nazi
regime
in
his
article
The
Nazi
Rhetorician
(p.
430-440).
Focusing
primarily
upon
Weimar
and
Nazi
Germany's
concept
of
"rhetoric",
this
academic
investigated
a
high-ranking
Nazi
official
called
Hans
Krebs,
who
published
a
guide
for
National
Socialist
speakers
entitled
Lerne
Reden!
("Learn
to
Speak!").
Scanlan
28
comments
that
it
"seems
never
to
have
occurred
to
any
Nazi
rhetorician
to
study
classical
treatises
on
rhetoric"
(p.
431).
Scanlan
asserts
that
"in
the
long
stretch
of
German
history
from
Martin
Luther
to
Adolf
Hitler
the
Nazis
found
few
orators
worthy
of
note"
(p.
432).
Thus,
viewing
rhetoric
as
having
little
German-specific
importance,
"German
scholars
customarily
treated
rhetoric
as
a
branch
of
study
in
classical
and
mediaeval
languages
or
as
the
material
for
a
philosophy
of
prose
literature"
(Scanlan,
p.
432).
Regardless
of
the
lack
of
classical
rhetorical
studies
in
Nazi
Germany,
Nazi
German
political
activists
valued
public
speaking
and
Krebs'
guide
was
meant
to
help
promising
public
speakers
become
successful
(Scanlan,
p.
435).
"German
literature,
German
philosophy,
Germany
history
and
the
Nazis'
own
brand
of
psychology
made
up
the
general
education
of
a
party
speaker"
(Scanlan,
p.
437).
Scanlan
(1951)
does
not
explain
to
what
extent
Krebs'
book
was
utilized
by
Nazi
orators,
for
how
long
or
to
what
extent
this
guide
influenced
their
education.
Instead,
Scanlan's
article
and
Krebs'
book
demonstrates
that
public
speaking
was
paramount
to
the
success
of
the
Nazi
movement
and
highly
valued
by
its
elite
members.
Also,
since
it
has
been
revealed
by
Scanlan)
that
Nazi
rhetors
did
not
receive
a
traditional,
rhetorical
education
(p.
431),
it
sanctions
rhetoricians
to
apply
any and
all
rhetorical
theory
to
Nazi
rhetoric,
and
even
allows
rhetoricians
to
develop
their
own
theories
in
regards
to
Nazi
rhetoric.
Kenneth
Burke,
a
famous
contemporary
rhetorician,
developed
his
own
theory
about
Hitler's
rhetoric.
Burke's
(1961)
rhetorical
analysis
of
Hitler,
though
based
upon
Mein
Kampf
and
not
a
specific
speech,
set
the
tone
for
subsequent
rhetorical
scholarship
dealing
with
Hitler
(Katz,
1992;
Girard,
1987;
Wink,
1992).
Various
rhetoricians
will
mention
and/or
apply
Burke's
framework
when
dealing
with
racist
regimes
(Engels,
2005;
Lee,
2006).
Also,
Burke's
analysis
has
been
used
in
modern,
democratic
settings,
29
such
as
evaluating
Illinois
Governor
George
Ryan
(Moore,
2006)
or
the
2004
United
States
Presidential
Campaign
(Spielvogel,
2005).
Entitled
the
Rhetoric
of
Hitler's
Battle,
Burke's
(1961)
essay
thematically
categorized
qualities
in
Hitler's
speeches
that
were
unique
to
Nazi
rhetoric.
This
theoretical
framework
became
paramount
to
any
rhetorical
scholarship
about
Hitler
after
Burke's
publication
date
of
1939.
Burke
identifies
that Hitler's
rhetoric
always
assumes
and
emphasizes
a
common
enemy,
suggesting
that
"Men
who
can
unite
on
nothing
else
can
unite
on
the
basis
of
a
foe
shared
by
all"
(p.
165).
Hitler,
Burke
contends,
is
using
specific
unifying
principles
because
"the
more
uniformly
the
fighting
will
of
a
people
is
put
into
action,
the
greater
will
be
the
magnetic
force
of
the
movement
and
the
more
powerful
the
impetus
of
the
blow"
(p.
166).
Burke
classifies
four
key
methods
in
Hitler's
unifying
tactics:
first,
inborn
dignity,
which
is
when
men
possess
natural
tendency
towards
superiority;
second,
projection
device,
is
a
scapegoat
tactic,
thereby
obtaining
purification
by
dissociation
(p.
174);
third,
symbolic
rebirth
proposes
that
a
positive
outcome
is
close
at
hand,
and
thus
provides
followers
with
a
goal
by
which
to
move
towards;
and
fourth,
commercial
use,'
which
is
a
non-economic
interpretation
of
economic
ills,
such
as
attacking
"Jew
finance"
(p.
175).
Burke
administers
a
critical
and
scathing
analysis
of
Hitler,
suggesting
that
"unity,
if
attained
on
a
deceptive
basis
by
emotional
trickeries
that
shift
our
criticism
from
the
accurate
locus
of
our
trouble,
is
no
unity
at
all"
(p.
188).
Burke's
essay
demonstrates
that
rhetoric
is
integral
to
the
success
of
a
politician
at
war.
Even
though
Hitler's
ethical
foundations
were
questionable or
arguably
non-existent,
Burke
does
suggest
that
rhetoric
is
a
major
contributor
to
Hitler's
success
at
achieving
political
objectives
(p
188).
Thus,
Burke
(1961)
assists
in
the
claim
that
rhetoric
has
social
and
political
ramifications,
and
its
effects
can
contribute
to
certain
outcomes.
30
Other
rhetorical
analysis
of
Hitler's
rhetoric
is
found
within
recent
scholarly
journals,
where
rhetoricians
attempt
to
analyze
Hitler's
rhetoric
within
classical
rhetorical
frameworks,
such
as
those
created
by
Aristotle
(Lee,
2005;
Katz,
1992).
An
article
by
Irving
J.
Lee
(2005)
compares
the
principles
of
public
speaking
used
by
Hitler,
Aristotle
and
Alfred
Korzybski.
In
his
analysis,
Lee
determines
that
Aristotle
and
Hitler
are
"concerned
with
the
means
of
making
discourse
effective,
with
the
art
of
organizing
statements
for
the
settled
purposes of
the
speaker"
(p.
83).
This
analysis
yet
again
evaluates
Hitler's
Mein
Kampf
as
a
rhetorical
artifact,
indicating
that
Hitler's
only
interest
in
persuasion
is
to
achieve
a
specific
effect
(Lee,
p.
82).
While
this
analysis
is
productive
insofar
as
interpreting
Hitler's
beliefs
as
rhetorical,
Lee's
scope
of
analysis
does
not
include
speeches
or
other
rhetorical
acts
of
Hitler
outside
of
Mein
Kampf,
demonstrating
a
lack
of
academic
literature
that
evaluates
Hitler's
speeches.
Although
it
may
be
easier
for
a
researcher
to
focus
only
upon
Mein
Kampf,
which
is
rich
in
Hitler's
thought-processes
and
values,
it
does
not
contribute
to
a
greater
understanding
about
how
rhetoric
operated
during
his
speeches,
and
what
effect
those
speeches
may
have
had.
Another
article
by
Steven
B.
Katz
(1992)
is
a
strong
and
thorough
analysis
of
rhetoric
that
surrounded
the
Holocaust.
Based
upon
the
treatises
of
classical
rhetoric
(such
as
Aristotle's
the
Politics
and
the
Rhetoric),
Katz
evaluates
the
role
of
technology
in
the
creation
of
the
Holocaust,
suggesting
that
because
the
rhetoric
of
the
Holocaust
supported
an
"ethic
of
expediency"
(p.
269),
it
is
partially
to
blame
for the
heinous
crimes
committed
during
that
time.
Katz's
article
is
a
rhetorical
and
ethical
evaluation
of
various
Nazi
documents
that
iterated
a
reliance
upon
technology
which
Katz
asserts
assisted
in
the
ethical
acceptance
of
the
Holocaust
during
its
execution
(p.
272).
Although
this
article
is
extremely
well-researched
and
rhetorically
consistent
in
theory
and
application,
it's
scope
in
limited
and
does
not
seek
to
analyze
the
speeches of
Hitler,
33
there
exists
a
difference
between
scholarly
rhetorical
history
and
pure
history.
As
such,
while
some
of
these
historical
publications
are
interpretative,
they
will
still
be
utilized
as
evidence
within
this
thesis.
These
publications,
though
written
for
historical
accuracy
(which
may
or
may
not
be
interpretive),
were
chosen
because
they
contextualize
the
speeches
in
historical
detail.
The
data
found
within
the
following
publications
was
not
what
was
reported
through
speeches
or
propaganda
(unless
specifically
declared),
but has
been
discerned
by
contemporary
historians
to
be
the
true
and
accurate.
The
Battle
of
Britain,
by
T.C.G.
James
(2000)
is
an
excellent
book
which
documents
the
daily
sorties
(missions
flown
by
one
airplane)
of
British
planes
and
the
German
planes
that
were
intercepted
and
reported
shot
down.
James
offers
solid
statistical
data
with very
few
embellishments
or
narratives,
rendering
it
a
book
which
is
directed
toward
the
military
historian,
rather
than
a
public
audience.
James'
book
is
also
forwarded
by
Air
Chief
Marshal
Sir
Peter
Squire,
denoting
that
it
is
a
respected
rendering
of
British
Air
Force
history.
Another
book,
The
Battle
of
Britain,
by
C.
Messenger
(1990)
examines
the
unfolding
of
the
battle
and
provides
a
full,
yet
somewhat
superficial
account,
of
the
major
moments
of
the
battle
and
the aspects
that
shaped
a
British
victory.
Messenger
presents
the
Battle
of
Britain
with
a
celebratory
attitude,
qualifying
this
book
as
interpretive.
Although
Messenger's
historical
accuracy
generally
agrees
with
other
more
scholarly
publications,
his
book
also
presents
qualities
of
German
and
British
morale.
However,
Messenger
(1990)
provides
more
insight
into
the
British
side
of
the
battle,
rather
than
the
German,
insufficiently
providing
the
reader
with
the
full
story.
Finest
Hour:
The
Battle
of
Britain,
by
T.
Clayton
and
P.
Craig
(2002),
examines
the
British
morale
and
the
German
responses
to
British
speeches
throughout
the
course
of
the
battle.
Written
with
a
view
to
provide
the
subjective
excerpts
of
diaries
and
35
The
People's
War:
Britain,
1939-1945,
by
Angus
Calder
(1969)
reviews
the
entire
war
with
the
stated
purpose
of
describing
"as
accurately
as
possible,
the
effect
of
the
war on
civilian
life
in
Britain"
(p.
15).
Thus
Calder's
book
focuses heavily
upon
British
civilian
participation
and
attitudes
towards
the
war.
As
this
thesis
seeks
to
understand
the
immediate
effects
of
rhetoric,
it
will
be
used
as
a
secondary
source
to
qualify
some
of
the
claims
made
in
this
thesis.
Calder
writes
over
150
pages
upon
the
Battle
of
Britain,
as
well
as
the
intecedent
of
Dunkirk,
and
the
subsequent
bombings
in
the
Blitz.
Generally,
Calder's
history
is
informative
and
insightful,
a
scholarly
work
with
a
large,
detailed
bibliography
to
validate
any
interpretations
made.
Finally,
Five
Days
in
London,
May
1940
by
John
Lukacs
(2001)
is
a
focused
history
of
five
days
in
May,
1940,
which
Lukacs
argues
were
decisive
to
the
outcome
of
the
entire
Second
World
War.
Although
Lukacs
admits
this
book
is
not
a
military
history
(p.
46),
he
does
suggest
that
the
political
actions
of
Churchill
and
Hitler
had
a
major
impact
upon
the
militaristic
operations
of
each
government.
Thus,
political
influences
seem
to
be
the
greater
focus
in his
examination.
With
a
keen
eye
for
detail,
as
well
as
a
strong
sense
of
context
and
each
politician's
personality,
Lukacs
creates
a
detailed
account
about
one
of
the
most
tumultuous
and
decisive
moments
in
Britain's
history.
This
book,
though
focusing
upon
May,
1940,
provides
facts,
details
and
interpretations
about
the
subsequent
months
that will
be
incorporated
within
this
dissertation.
Other
texts
will
be
cited
that
are
not
mentioned
on
these
short
lists,
since
the
aforementioned
are
the
most
prominent
and
most
useful
for
this
dissertation.
Although
there are
hundreds
of
books
upon
the
Battle
of
Britain,
these
selected
texts
are
not
only
the
most
relevant
to
this
study,
but
also
the
top
choices
for
understanding
how
rhetoric
corresponds
with
the
historical
data.
36
The
Ethical
Challenges
in
Post-WWII
Historical
and
Rhetorical
Scholarship
The
aftermath
of
the
Second
World
War
produced
a
series
of
challenges
and
new
avenues
of
exploration
for
historical
and
rhetorical
scholarship.
As
questions
arose
about
how
a
civilized
society
such
as
Germany
could
systematically
kill
over
11
million
people,
the
study
of
ethics
and
war
became
the
forefront
of
scholarship
regarding
WWII.
The
relationship
between
war
and
ethics
was
not
entirely
new
to
western
scholars,
as
even
Ancient
Greek
philosophers,
such
as
Thucydides
(460
BCE—
395
BCE)
discussed
that
war was
about
winning,
whatever
the
costs
(Bess,
2006).
Even
Niccolo
Machiavelli's
work,
The
Prince,
had
firmly
established
that
during
times
of
war
the
principles
of
morality
tend
to
take
a
back
seat.
In
Michael
Bess'
(2006)
book,
Choices
Under
Fire:
Moral
Dimensions
of
World
War
II,
he
examines
the
moral
questions
of
warfare
by
discussing
how
particular
themes
that
were
unique
to
WWII
have
emerged
in
historical
scholarship,
such
as
the
barbarization
of
warfare
(p.
7-9).
In
addition
to
drawing
distinctions
in
post-war
scholarship,
Bess
discusses
how
WWII
was
one
of
the
most
"morally
unambiguous
military
conflicts
in
all
history"
(p.
9),
literally
a
war
between
the
"good"
and
the
"bad."
However,
Bess
also
contends
that
WWII
was
morally
complex,
as
it
was
"pervaded
by
ambiguities,
trade-offs,
agonizing
choices
and
irresolvable
dilemmas"
(p.
10).
Due
to
this
dichotomy,
Bess
asserts
that
historians
have
produced
two
kinds
of
scholarship
regarding
WWII
and
usually
historians
must
choose
one
position,
or
wear
one
"hat"
over
the
other:
One
hat
represents
what
might
be
called
the
stance
of
celebration:
the
imperative
one
feels
to
recapture
vividly
the
drama,
sacrifice,
and
extraordinary
achievements
that
culminated
in
Allied
victory.
The
other
hat
represents
what
might
be
called
the
stance
of
critical
scrutiny:
the
imperative
one
feels
to
reconstruct
the
full
story
of
what
happened
as
accurately
as
possible
-
which
37
means,
among
other
things,
confronting
forthrightly
those
aspects
of
wartime
that
are
controversial,
ambiguous,
or
in
some
cases
just
plain
disgraceful.
(Bess,
p.
14).
Bess
does
not
claim
to
appreciate
one
stance
over
the
other,
but
rather
suggests
that
these
contradictions
are
significant
to
explore
and
question
for
the
purposes of
learning.
This
thesis
rejects
a
celebratory
stance,
based
upon
Bess'
framework,
but
would
rather
gravitate
towards
a
critical
scrutiny
of
the
choices
and
events
of
the
Battle
of
Britain.
Bess
claims
that
WWII
is
ethically
a
difficult
period
to
study
and
that
objective,
critical
scrutiny
is
difficult
to
achieve,
which
should
be acknowledged
in
this
study.
CHAPTER
THREE:
RESEARCH
METHODS
Since
the
selection
of
orations,
historical
period,
orators
and
historical
texts
has
been
explained
in
the
introduction,
this
chapter
will
outline
the
thesis'
analytical
methods
and
structure
and
discuss
the
theories,
methodologies,
and
disciplinary
approaches
that
have
shaped
them.
The
chapter
first
characterizes
this
qualitative
thesis
as
a
specific
type
of
contribution
to rhetorical
scholarship.
Within
a
rhetorical
approach,
the
selection
of
specific
classical
rhetorical
theories
must
still
be
justified.
To
this
end,
the
rhetorical
appeals
of
Aristotle,
Isocrates
and
Cicero,
and
the
use
of
Pericles as
an
example
of
political
oratory
are
outlined
for
their
relevance.
This
chapter
explains
how
each
of
these
theories
are
used
within
the
major
methods
of
analysis
used
in
the
body
of
this
thesis:
rhetorical
criticism,
rhetorical
biography
and
rhetorical
history.
Then,
the
fundamental
assumptions,
challenges,
and
implications
of
studying
history
through
a
rhetorical
lens
are
discussed,
in
order
to
prevent
misunderstandings
about
the
nature
of
the
claims
being
made
about
the
interplay
between
rhetoric
and
history.
The
chapter
concludes
with
an
39
With
this
comes
a
politics
of
critical,
relativistic
inquiry
into
society
rather
than
a
politics
of
social
engineering.
(Seale,
2004,
p.
36).
Historical
and
rhetorical
methods
of
critical
inquiry
are
employed
in
this
thesis
to
gain
a
critical
understanding
of
how
political
oratory
had
an
influence
upon
history,
and
vice
versa,
without
attempting
to
create
objective
knowledge.
Its
unique
contribution
of
theory
and
analysis
methods
attempts
to
contribute
an
original
and
deeper
understanding
of
how
rhetoric
operated
in
the
oratory
and
history
of
the
Battle
of
Britain.
Contribution
to
Rhetorical
Studies
as
a
Discipline
This
thesis
is
situation
within
the
discipline
of
rhetoric,
a
discipline
that
overlaps
with
communication
studies
as
well
as
other
fields
of
study
such
as
philosophy,
literature
and
cultural
studies.
Although
rhetoric
is
still
considered
one
of
the
major
pillars
within
the
modern
scholarly
field
of
communication
studies,
it
is
sometimes
misunderstood,
even
by
communication
scholars.
(Medhurst,
2001,
p.
499).
Thus,
it
is
the
aim
of
this
discussion
to
amplify
the
unique
nature
of
rhetorical
studies
and
address
criticisms
about
its
limitations.
Rhetorical
scholars
are
often
stereotyped
as
extremely
traditional
in
their
approaches
and
humanistic.
This
is
innately
problematic
to
any
rhetorical
scholar.
According
to
Martin
J.
Medhurst
(2001):
"Many
scholars
outside
of
rhetorical
studies
still
find
it
difficult,
at
times,
to
utilize
our
scholarship
because
we
tend
to
classify
our
intellectual
work
in
way
that
they
find
simply
baffling.
Our
studies
are
neo-Aristotelian,
or
generic,
or
structuralist"
(p.
499).
However,
because
rhetorical
scholars
seek
to
analyze
relatively
recent
communication
acts
and
cultural
phenomena
in
various
contexts,
rhetoric's
capacity
as
a
scholarly
perspective
is
not
merely
traditional.
Nor
is
rhetoric
entirely
humanistic.
Medhurst
(2001)
argues
that
"rhetoric
is
inherently
interdisciplinary"
(p.
499),
as
rhetorical
scholars
must
adopt
various
foundations
and
perspectives:
"Not
only
are
rhetorical
dimensions
linked
to
the
not-so-obviously
40
rhetorical,
but
there are
many
instances
in
which
certain
rhetorical
dimensions
do
not
even
manifest
themselves
save
through
study
of
the
ostensibly
nonrhetorical"
(Medhurst,
2001,
P.
499).
Thus,
rhetorical
scholars
must
approach, bridge
and
synthesize
knowledge
from
many
empirical
or
social
scientific
fields,
such
as
communication
studies,
history,
political
science
and
sociology,
in
an
effort to
construct
a
rhetorical
study.
A
short
history
of
the
rhetorical
study
of
"public
address"
in
the
past
century
will
illustrate
how
this
thesis
approaches
its
topic.
In
the
early
20th
century,
rhetorical
studies
focused
primarily
upon
the
speaker,
or
rhetor,
and
how
they
constructed
a
speech
(Medhurst,
2001,
p.
496).
Rhetoricians
often
applied
classical
rhetorical
theory
to
speeches,
in
an
effort to
determine
their
potential
effectiveness.
Other
scholars
viewed
the
application
of
classical
theories
as
inherently
"old-fashioned
and
out
of
step
with
the
times"
(Medhurst,
2001,
p.
496).
During
the
1960s,
shifts
in rhetorical
studies
occurred.
According
to
Stewart
(2004),
"the
emphasis
changed
from
speaker-centered
to
message-centered
studies"
(p.
408).
As
new
forms
of
communication
media
became
prevalent
within
political
discourses,
hot
topics
within
acad
e
mic
communities
focused
on
the
new
media,
such
as
the
television,
as
a
persuasive
medium.
According
to
Medhurst
(2001),
the
renewal
of
rhetorical
scholarship
after
the
1960s
allowed
rhetoricians
to
encompass
genre,
myth,
metaphor,
narrative,
ideology,
the
philosophical
and
the
neoclassical
within
their
criticism
(p.
497).
From
1980
to
2000,
according
to
Medhurst
(2001),
rhetorical
scholarship,
especially
with
regard
to
political
communication,
"began
to
move
beyond
the
assumption
of
a
monolithic,
monochromatic
public
to
the
more
complex
notions
of
publics
and
specialized
spheres"
(p.
498),
while
repositioning
rhetoric
back
into
the
center
of
public
consciousness
(p.
498).
Today,
Medhurst
(2001)
contends,
rhetorical
scholars
perceive
issues
and
events
through
a
particular
set
of
lenses,
which
not
only
41
encompass
electoral
campaigns
and
television
advertisements,
but
also
race,
gender
and
politics
(p.
498).
In
light
of
this
history
of
the
discipline,
this
thesis
is
speaker-centered
and
focuses
on
oratory
in
a
way
that
brackets
the
complex
issues
of
communication
technology
and
does
not
employ
contemporary
communication
theories.
Therefore,
it
could
be
called
"old-fashioned"
(Medhurst,
2001,
p.
496).
In
response
to
this
accusation,
it
can
be
pointed
out
that
many
contemporary
scholars
apply
twentieth-century
theoretical
works
(i.e.
Habermas,
Giroux,
and
Foucault)
to
previous
historical
events.
Reliance
on
modern
theories
can
be
equally
vulnerable
to
accusations
of
anachronism
and
cultural
irrelevance
to
the
objects
of
study.
While
this
thesis
does
apply
classical
rhetorical
theories
to
assess
the
rhetorical
situation
and
the
effectiveness
of
speech,
it
also
moves
beyond
the
limitations
typical
of
the
early
20th
century
rhetorical
study.
The
original
contribution
of
this
thesis
is
produced
by
bridging
together
rhetoric
and
history
through
an
innovation
combination
of
methods
that
is
not
typical
of
pre-
1960s
rhetorical
studies.
This
thesis
does
not
solely
focus
upon
one
speaker
in
one
rhetorical
situation,
but
studies
two
opposing
speakers
(i.e.
Churchill
and
Hitler)
from
two
cultures.
It
examines
the
role
of
militaristic
and
political
antecedents
upon
their
rhetoric,
and
the
likely
immediate
effects
of
their
rhetoric
upon
subsequent
events
in
the
Battle
of
Britain.
Studying
the
Second
World
War
"through
a
theoretical
and
practical
lens
of
rhetoric"
(Medhurst,
2001,
p.
498)
produces
"a
different
kind
of
story
than
our
friends
in
history,
or
sociology,
or
political
science"
(Medhurst,
2001,
p.
498).
It is
also
important
to
mention
that
many
scholars,
especially
during
the
mass
communications
era
that
erupted
after
WWII,
viewed
propaganda
and
rhetoric
as
the
same--persuasive
acts
by
governments
that
were
unethical
and
manipulative.
Too
often
42
scholars
(i.e.
Kimble,
2005;
Lee,
2005)
associate
the
words
together
without
much
acknowledgement
for
each
concept's
very
different
meaning.
Unlike
propaganda
analyses
such
as
those
by
Kimble
(2005)
and
Lee
(2005),
which
are
characterized
as
message-oriented
studies
typical
of
the
post-19605
and
attempt
to
quantitatively
measure
persuasive
campaigns
and
their
effects,
rhetoric
is
often
studied
within
the
realm
of
interpretation
and
humanistic
exploration.
This,
one
could
suggest,
is
due
to
the
nature
of
rhetoric.
Rhetoric
is
interpretive.
Its
effects
are
less
predictable
and
its
affect
on
human
behavior
difficult
to
ascertain.
Although
both
rhetoric
and
propaganda
share
the
fundamental
quality
of
persuasion,
it
seems
that
societies
always
return
to
the
rhetoric
of
their
leaders,
not
the
propaganda
of
their
governments,
for
collective
inspiration
and
remembrance.
Rhetorical
studies
is
capable
of
creating
insight
even
though
it
may
not
employ
quantitative
measurements
like
propaganda
analysis,
nor
social
scientific
methods
like
other
communication
scholars.
Traditional
rhetoric,
is
not
an
outmoded
method
of
analysis,
but
a
method
which
utilizes
theory
to
generate
new
knowledge
through
modern
application.
Basically,
traditional
rhetorical
studies
continues
to
create
insight,
just
with
older
and
more
traditional
tools.
Criteria
for
Selecting
Classical
Texts
For
rhetorical
scholars,
the
classical
rhetorical
tradition
"represents
an
authoritative
period
of
initial
conceptual
development;
it
serves
as
an
unsurpassed
resource
for
theoretical
frameworks
[...1
it
is
a
privileged
object
of
both
admiring
imitation
and
critical
displacement
for
reproducing
and
transforming
the
rhetorical
tradition
as
canon
and
history"
(Mailloux,
2005,
p.
182).
Aristotle's
rhetorical
theory
was
chosen
for
two
purposes:
first,
it
provides
a
vocabulary
and
structure
useful
in
appraising
the
technical
qualities
of
each
leader's
rhetoric,
thus
allowing
comparison
and
discussion
about
their
immediate
effectiveness
43
within
their
historical
context;
and
second,
it
has
stood
the
test
of
time
as
a
theory
that
can
be
applied
across
cultures
(Gross,
2005,
p.
36).
Aristotle
(384
BCE
-
322
BCE)
was
a
philosopher,
a
student
of
Plato
and
a
teacher
of
Alexander
the
Great
(Merlan,
1954,
p.
60;
Bizzell
&
Herzberg,
2001,
p.
169).
Not
only
did
Aristotle
contribute
to
the
field
of
rhetoric,
but
his
definitions
of
its
linguistic
properties
have
influenced
the
studies
of
literature,
psychology,
logic
and
politics,
among
other
disciplines.
His
book
on
rhetoric
was
written
primarily
from
a
theoretical
perspective,
meaning
that
Aristotle
was
philosopher
of
rhetoric
(one
who
studies
rhetoric
at
a
distance)
more
than
a
rhetor
(one
who
performs
rhetoric).
Aristotle
is
perhaps
the
most
scientific
classical
theorist
of
rhetoric
in
his
approach.
Metaphorically
speaking,
Aristotle
places
rhetoric
under
a
microscope
and
compartmentalizes
its
parts,
labeling,
defining
and
categorizing
as
he
goes.
His
concepts
of
logos,
ethos
and
pathos
will
be
evaluated
and
later
applied
to
Churchill
and
Hitler,
because
these
concepts
will
help
illustrate
the
formal
elements
of
these
speeches.
However,
Aristotle
is
not
specifically
useful
when
understanding
how
rhetoric
contributes
to
military
history.
Aristotle
can
help
a
rhetorician
understand
how
speeches
were
internally
constructed
to
be
effective,
rather
than
why
or
what
made
them
effective
within
their
specific
cultural
context.
In
order
to
supplement
Aristotle's
technical
framework,
Isocrates
has
been
chosen
as
a
source
of
philosophies
and
norms
for
rhetorical
education
and
practice.
Isocrates
theorizes
the
rhetorical
aptitudes,
aims
and
training
process
needed
by
an
"ideal"
political
orator.
Isocrates
was
a
teacher
and
practitioner
of
rhetoric
in
Athens
during
a
time
of
much
political
upheaval.
As
a
result,
Kennedy
(1991)
notes,
political
themes
are
present
throughout
his
treatises,
as
they
were
"the
great
issues
of
Greek
society
and
its
historical
tradition,
especially
the
need
for
the
union
of
the
Greek
states
against
threats
from
Persia"
(p.
11).
Due
to
Isocrates'
belief
in
the
importance
of
moral
44
leadership,
as
well
as his
own
ideals
of
peace
and
unity,
his
theories
have
been
chosen
as
a
means
to
assess
the
rhetorical
potential
of
Churchill
and
Hitler
to
fulfill
the
Isocratic
ideal
of
community-building
oratory.
Cicero
was
chosen
because
his
theories
help
to
further
develop
the
technical
theories
of
Aristotle
and
educational
ideals
of
Isocrates
and
apply
them
both
to
the
practical
challenges
of
oratory
within
a
period
of
political
upheaval.
Cicero
is
especially
unique
because
he
was
heavily
influenced
by
the
rhetorical
theories
of
Isocrates,
Plato
and
Aristotle
but
expanded
their
arguments
to
include
his
own
political
perspective
(Bizzell
&
Herzberg,
2001,
p.
285).
In
many
ways,
Cicero's
theoretical
debate
about
the
formation
and
skills
of
the
ideal
orator
bears
the
stamp
of
the
instabilities
in
Julius
Caesar's
Rome.
Finally,
Pericles'
Funeral Oration
serves
as
an
example
of
effective
war
oratory
which
can
be
compared
to
Churchill's
and
Hitler's
rhetoric.
Pericles,
an
Athenian
statesman,
orator
and
general
of
Athens'
armies
during
the
Peloponnesian
-Wars
is
recorded
as
performing
a
Funeral
Oration
which
is
considered
to
be
"the
rhetoric
of
boundless
global
mastery"
(Jarratt,
2005,
p.
101).
This
text
carries
within
it
the
content
and
structure
of
a
refined
and
apparently
effective
rhetorical
act,
in
which
the
relationship
between
personal
sacrifice
and
public
good
is
emphasized.
By
using
Pericles'
Funeral Oration
as
a
comparison
model,
Churchill's
and
Hitler's
rhetoric
can
be
seen
as
uniquely
shaped
by
the
orator's
skill
and
the
historical
context
and
more
or
less
effective
in
creation
national
unity
during
war.
The
use of
classical
theories
in
rhetorical'
studies
is
"repeatedly
praised
for
its
ongoing
relevance
or
criticized
for
its
exclusionary
narrowness
[...as]
the
classical
canon
is
continually
championed,
expanded,
reinterpreted,
or
challenged"
(Mailloux,
2005,
p.
182).
Even
the
modem
rhetorician
Kenneth
Burke
(1961)
assumed
that
rhetoric
is
not
a
45
completed,
faultless
field.
Further
interpretation
and
application
of
classical
theory
contributes
to
the
field's
enhancement
and
development.
Rhetorical
Methods
of
Inquiry:
Rhetorical
Criticism
The
primary
research
method
is
"rhetorical
criticism,"
in
which
rhetorical
theories
guide
the
analysis
of
an
oration's
internal
features
and
leads
to
arguments
about
its
likely
effects
within
its
immediate
context.
For
example,
in
Chapter
Five,
Aristotle's
ethos,
logos
and
pathos
theories
and
Pericles'
Funeral
Oration
are
used
simultaneously
to
perform
a
rhetorical
criticism
of
the
technical
qualities
of
Churchill's
and
Hitler's
rhetoric.
The
criticism
produces
insights
on
the orator
and
his
rhetorical
strategies,
as
well
as
connects
elements
of
the
speech
to
the
immediate
responses
of
the
enemy
and
other
historical
events
in
the
Battle
of
Britain.
Technical
Qualities
of
Rhetoric:
Aristotle's
Logos,
Ethos
and
Pathos
As
Aristotle's
three
appeals,
logos,
ethos
and
pathos,
will
constitute
the
majority
of
the
rhetorical
criticism
method
in
Chapter
Five,
it
is
necessary
to
explain
Aristotle's
framework.
Aristotle
defined
rhetoric
as
the
"faculty
of
observing
in
any
given
case
the
available
means
of
persuasion"
(Aristotle,
trans.
2001,
p.
181).
The
means
of
persuasion,
according
to
Aristotle,
contained
three
appeals,
or
"proofs"
that
were
integral
to
a
rhetor'
s
arsenal.
Aristotle
was
the
first
person
to
"recognize
clearly
that
rhetoric
as
an
art
of
communication
was
morally
neutral",
capable
of
both
harm
and
good
(Kennedy,
1991,
p.
ix).
Thus,
the
three
proofs
a
speaker
could
use
were
not
based
on
a
moral
framework,
but
rather
a
somewhat
value-free
evaluation
of
the
effectiveness
of
their
rhetoric.
Logos,
the
appeal
to
reason,
works
through
argumentation
and
logic
and
was
considered
by
Aristotle
to
be
the
most
powerful
of
all
three
proofs.
So
long
as
the
46
audience
was
capable
of being
reasoned
with,
then
the rhetor
could
persuade
them
to
a
specific
end
through
syllogisms
(complete
arguments)
and
enthymemes
(incomplete
arguments
in
which'
the
audience
supplies
the
missing
premise,
minor
premise
or
conclusion)
(Griffin,
1997,
p.
304-305).
Aristotle
presumed
that
a
good
rhetor
would
adapt
his/her
logos
to
the
subject
matter
and
occasion.
Second,
ethos
is
the
ethical
appeal
of
the
speaker.
Ethos
evokes
the
speaker's
moral
authority
or
the
shared
concerns of
speaker
and
audience
(Bizzell
&
Herzberg,
2001).
Aristotle
further
specified
three
sub-categories
of
ethos:
perceived
intelligence
or
wisdom
of
the
speaker,
his
virtuous
character
and
his
goodwill
towards
the
audience
(Griffin,
1997,
p.
306-307).
According
to
Aristotle,
audiences
judge
the
speaker
for
intelligence,
virtue
and
generally
positive
behavior
towards
the
audience
and
their
interests
(Griffin,
1997,
p.
306).
Ethos
can
be
"intrinsic"
to
the
speech,
demonstrated
by
means
of
the
orator's
skill,
and/or
a
feature
of
the
orator's
public
character
and
reputation
"extrinsic"
to
the
speech.
For
example,
before
Churchill
gave
any
war-time
speech,
the
audience
knew
him
as
a
newly-appointed
Prime
Minister,
who
was
part
of
the
Conservative
party,
who
had
been
active
in
politics
for
decades,
who
was
also
a'
journalist,
etc.
These
types
of
qualities
were
already
known
about
Churchill
and
the
audience
would
have
already
had
pre-made
assumptions
about
Churchill's
(in)abilities
before
he
gave
a
speech.
However,
during
and
after
the
speech,
Churchill's
ethos
would
be
strengthened
or
reinforced
by
what
he
said,
which
would
develop
trust
in
Churchill's
,moral
and
ethical
character.
Ethos
is
also
both
content
and
form-related.
A
speaker's
character
imprints
itself
upon
what
is
said
and
why
it
is
said
as
well
as
how
it
is
said.
Thus,
rhetoricians
can
evaluate
ethos
as
integral
to
both
content
and
form
of
a
speech.
Ethos
will
be
evaluated
throughout
this
thesis,
to
demonstrate
that
the
effectiveness
of
a
speaker's
reputation
is
central
to
viewing
rhetoric
as
a
major
contributor
to
historical
events.
47
Finally,
pathos
is
the
appeal of
the
speaker
to
the
emotions
of
the
audience,
such
as
fear,
anger
or
compassion.
There
are
two
ways
in
which
pathos
is
demonstrated
within
a
rhetorical
act.
The
first
appeal
to
pathos,
according
to
Aristotle,
related
specifically
to
the
audience's
emotional
state
in
response
to
reasoning.
Aristotle
believed
that
the
effective
speaker
must
know
how
to
stir
up
the
various
emotions
of
the
audience
(Griffin,
1997,
p.
307-308)
by
characterizing
a
person,
idea
or
situation in
a
way
that
would
inspire
a
national
or
appropriate
(not
necessarily
reasonable
or
ethical)
feeling
towards
it.
Aristotle
suggested
that
humans
experience
six
major
emotions,
as
well
as
their
antecedents:
Anger
(vs.
Mildness),
Love
(vs.
Hate),
Fear
(vs.
Confidence),
Shame
(vs.
Shamelessness),
Indignation
(vs.
Pity)
and
Admiration
(vs.
Envy)
(Griffin,
1997,
p.
307-
8).
Considered
to
be
the
first
categorization
of
human
psychology (Kennedy,
1991,
p.
33),
Aristotle
suggested
that
a
speaker
must
manipulate
the
audience's
emotions
to
suit
the
occasion.
Second,
the
style
and
delivery
of
the
speech,
by
employing
colourful
vocabulary,
visual
metaphors
and
passionate
body
language,
can
inspire
or
move
the
audience
to
feel
an
emotion
(Griffin,
1997,
p.
307).
Although
some
rhetoricians
would
suggest
counting
metaphors
or
adjectives
as
a
way
in
which
to
measure
pathos,
Aristotle
did
not
theorize
that
pathos
was
created
through
the
sheer
quantity
of
pathos
appeals.
This
study
will
only
generally
mention
the
intensity
of
linguistic
variety
and
whether
it
was
notably
portrayed within
Churchill's
and
Hitler's
rhetorical
acts.
For
example,
Hitler's
appeal
to
pathos
was
clearly
demonstrated
at
the
ends
of
his
speeches,
when
he
would
shout
and
use
strong
body
language
to
assist
the
closing
of
his
rhetoric.
Oftentimes,
emotional
language
and
imaginative
descriptions
impassion
the
audience
with
images
of
an
improved
political
future.
Although
this
thesis
will
primarily
focus
upon
the
logos
and
48
ethos
of
Churchill's
and
Hitler's
speeches,
pathos
must
not
be
ignored,
as
it
was
central
to
both
speakers'
speeches
and
delivery.
Churchill
and
Hitler:
The
Glory
of
the
Nation
and
Pericles'
Funeral
Oration
A
comparative
aid
to
rhetorical
criticism
is
offered
by
Pericles'
Funeral
Oration.
Like
Pericles
in
Ancient
Greece,
Churchill
and
Hitler
both
eulogized
the
lost
soldiers,
pilots
and
civilians
during
the
Battle
of
Britain.
Pericles
not
only
theorizes
about
the
importance
of
the
rhetor
when
eulogizing
the
deceased,
but
suggests
that
militaristic
enterprises
are
heavily
connected
to
the
unity
and
immortality
of
the
nation.
Pericles
(495
BCE
-
429
BCE)
was
an Athenian
statesman,
orator
and
general
of
Athens'
armies during
the
Peloponnesian
Wars.
Pericles'
activities
and
speeches
were
recorded
by
the
historian
Thucydides
(460
BCE
-
395
BCE),
who
wrote
transcripts
of
his
speeches
from
memory.
Pericles
was
not
just
a
renowned
statesman,
but
also
an
advocate of
the
arts
and
started
the
construction
of
what
would
become
the
Acropolis.
He
reigned
during
Athens'
"Golden
Age"
and
his
influence
on
the
ancient
city
is
well
documented
(Palmer,
1982).
It
must
be
noted
that
Pericles
was
fighting
an
offensive
war,
meaning
that
he
was
attacking
a
foreign
nation,
due
to
beliefs
in
specific
political
ideologies.
Pericles'
Funeral
Oration
was
a
eulogy
to
the
armies
that
had
fallen
during
the
first
Peloponnesian
war
(431
BCE
-
421
BCE).
The
situation
and
aims
of
Pericles
parallel
or
contrast
those
of
Hitler
and
Churchill.
This
will
be
further
investigated,
in
detail,
in
Chapter
Five.
The
opening
argument
of
Pericles'
speech
demonstrates
the
insight
of
the
author'
and
orator
into
the
function
and
challenges
of
political
oratory.
It
begins
by
addressing
the
need
to
praise
those
who
fell
in
battle.
But,
as
Pericles
continues,
he
suggests
that
'According
to
Plato
and
the
opinion
of
most
scholars
today,
the
speech
was
likely
composed
by
Aspasia
(470
BCE
—400
BCE),
Pericles'
mistress
(Bizzell
&
Herzberg,
2001,
p.
58).
However,
Pericles
is
remembered
today
as
the
orator
who
delivered
the
speech.
49
speech-making
is
difficult
during
the
circumstances,
because
a
politician
might
trivialize
the
deeds
of
the
dead
through
poor
oratory:
Our
belief in
the
valor
of
these
men
should
not
depend
on
whether
one
man's
oratory
is
good
or bad.
[
...
]
It
is
also
not
easy
to
find
the
right
words
when
the
occasion
and
subject
of
the
speech
make
it
difficult
to
persuade
the
listeners
that
the
words
are
true.
(Pericles,
trans.
1979,
p.
32).
Not
only
does
this
observe
the
duty of
the leader
to
speak
well
on
such
an
occasion,
but
highlights
the
situational
challenge
of
speaking
credibly
about
what
is
uncertain.
Since
Pericles
understood
the
political
function
and
importance
of
rhetoric,
as
well
as
its
situational
challenges,
he
becomes
a
rhetorician
who
is
aligned
with
some
fundamental
assumptions
of
this
study.
Occasionally
in
Chapter
Five,
the
content
and
the
structure
of
Pericles'
speech
will
be
compared
to
Churchill's
and
Hitler's
speeches.
Rhetorical
Methods
of
Inquiry:
Rhetorical
Biography
The
method
of
rhetorical
criticism
is
strengthened
by
rhetorical
biography,
which
emphasizes
the
agency
and
limitations
of
the
orator.
Rhetorical
biography
seeks
to
understand
how
the
speaker's
upbringing
and
education,
as
well
as
own
attitudes
towards
oratory,
has
influenced
their
rhetoric
(Gonchar
&
Hahn,
1978,
p.
55).
This
type
of
rhetorical
analysis
examines
the
speaker
to
understand
how
the
sjeaker'
s
potential
could
have been
cultivated
before
the
rhetorical
act,
enriching
the
rhetorical analysis.
Isocrates'
and
Cicero's
theories,
since
they
focus
so
often
on
the
education
of
the
ideal
orator,
will
serve
as
a
standard
by
which
to
examine
Churchill's
and
Hitler's
education,
knowledge,
character
and
skills
explained
in
Chapter
Four.
50
Free
Will
and
Determinism
in
the
Study
of
Rhetorical
Biography
Rhetorical
biographers
must
be
cautious
when
claiming
a
direct
causal
relationship
between
a
speaker's
background
and
actual
rhetorical
performances
(Gonchar
&
Hahn,
1978,
p.
55).
Since
this
thesis
suggests
that
Churchill's
and
Hitler's
oratory
is
affected
by
their
agency
and
free
will,
as
well
as
determined
by
the
immediate
historical
context,
the
relationship
between
free will
and
determinism
must
be
explained
as
part
of
the
methodology.
Is
the
orator's
speaking
ability
and
performance
"determined"
by
his
aptitude,
upbringing, or
the
historical
circumstances
leading
up
a
speech?
Determinism
is
the
philosophical
concept
that
causal
relationships
haye
certain,
rather
than
uncertain
outcomes.
Robert
L.
Carneiro
(2000),
a
philosopher
of
history
and
historiography,
defines
determinism
as
a
scientific
concept
that
suggests
that
"Event
A
will
occur
because
of
the
presence of
a
certain
set
of
antecedent
conditions
[
...
]
(thus)
Event
A
will
invariably
occur
if
and
only
if
those antecedent
conditions
are
present"
(p.
49).
If
rhetoric
is
determined,
then
Churchill's
and
Hitler's
agency
did
not
influence
social
change.
Determinism
suggests
that
an
outcome,
such
as oration,
or
an
oration's
effects,
will
occur
when
those
specific
conditions
are
satisfied.
Determinism's
inevitability,
assuming
that
certain
conditions
are
met,
limits
the
alternatives
of
human
beings
and
disregards
the
importance
of
choice
in
the
creation
of
social
change.
On
the
contrary,
numerous
publications
have
been
based
upon
the
belief
that
human
behavior
arises
from
human
choice,
or
free
will
(Simpson,
1994;
Cialdini,
2001;
Bizzell
&
Herzberg,
2001;
Speer,
1970,
Burke,
1969).
Many
historians
also
believe
choice
to
be
integral
to
historical
outcomes.
Aaron
Gurevich
(1992),
a
Russian
historian,
states
that
"history
is
a
process
in
which
freedom
and
necessity
interrelate
dialectically"
(p.
15),
and
then
he
adds:
51
Historical
change
is
the
result
of
human
choice.
In
any
situation,
however
static
it
may
appear,
someone
will
start
something
unprecedented,
following
the
promptings
of
freedom,
however
uncircumscribed.
The
cultivation
of wild
grass
or
the
domestication
of
animals,
the
invention
of
working
tools,
sculpting
of
statues,
devising
of
magic
spells,
composition
of
prayers
or songs,
calls
to
revolt,
drawing
up
of
guild
statues,
scientific
discovery,
are
all
the
products
of
free
will,
of
the
activity
of
an
individual
or
a
social
group.
(Gurevich,
1992,
p.15-16).
Gurevich
is
by
no
means
alone
in
with
his
assertion
that
human
choice
affects
human
behavior.
This
thesis
is
founded
on
the
belief
that
the
choices
of
Churchill
and
Hitler
influenced
their
rhetoric,
and
the
choices
of
individual
citizens
influenced
their
response
to
it.
On
the
other
hand,
free will
should
not
be
misunderstood
as
the
notion
that
people
have
complete
control
over
their
lives.
Instead,
free
will
can
be
viewed
as
human
beings
freely
choosing
their
actions
which
are
affected
by
biological
and
social
forces.
Martin
Heidegger
(1927/1962)
advocated
the
concept
that
individual
freedom
is
constrained
by
an
idea
called
"thrownness",
which
refers
to
"the
fact
that
we
are
thrown
into
a
multitude
of
arbitrary
conditions
that
influence
our
lives
and
opportunities"
(as
cited
in
Wood,
2004,
p.
53).
Therefore,
free will
is
tempered
by
thrownness
and
the
contingent
aspects
of
human
culture
and
social
life.
Isocrates
also
suggested
that
kairos,
the
context
of
the
rhetorical
situation
(Bizzell
&
Herzberg,
2001,
p.
69)
constrains
the
orator
to act in
a
specific
manner.
Likewise,
Cicero
also
suggests
that
doxa,
or
the
community
values
and
audience
expectations
also
limits
the
strategies
available
to
the
rhetor
(Leff,
2003,
p.
139).
While
the
orator
operates
as
an
autonomous
individual,
based
upon
the
principles
of
free
will,
limited
by
Heidegger's
thrownness,
kairos
and
doxa,
there
is
a
two
way
relationship
53
challenges,
and
then
viewing
them
and
their
speeches
as
producers
of
historical
events,
this
thesis
positions
history
within
a
discussion
about
rhetoric,
and
vice
versa.
Rhetorical
Perspectives
upon
Definitions
of
History,
Cause
and
Effect
and
Historical
Contingency
Since
this
thesis
engages
with
historical
context
from
a
rhetorical
perspective, the
thesis'
fundamental
assumptions
about
history,
historical
cause
and
effect,
and
historical
contingency
must
be
addressed.
This
will
help
to
explain
the
nature
of
this
thesis'
rhetorical
perspective
upon
historical
scholarship.
Definition
of
History
Robert
L.
Carneiro,
historiographer
and
author
of
The
Muse
of
History
and
the
Science
of
Culture
(2000)
has
surmised
that
three
definitions
of
"history" are
employed
by
historians
and
academics:
1.
History
is
everything
that
human
beings
have
ever
done.
2.
History
is
the
surviving
record of
everything
that
human
beings
have
ever
done.
3.
History
is
the
selection,
arrangement,
and
presentation
of
certain
aspects
of
this
surviving
record.
(Carneiro,
2000,
p.
13).
This
study
defines
history
as
a
combination
of
Cameiro's
(2000)
last
two
points,
as
the
objects
of
this
research
are
four
speeches
and
the
resultant
secondary
scholarship
that
has
been
produced
since
1940CE.
Thus,
the
term
history
in
this
thesis refers
to
surviving
records
of
human
actions
(such
as
orations),
as
well
as
historians'
selection,
arrangement
and
presentation
of
those
specific
moments.
Therefore,
the
leaders
who
performed
rhetoric,
as
well
as
the
scholars
who
have been
interpreters
of
their
rhetoric,
are
granted
a
limited
but
important
place
of
power
and agency
in
the
creation
of
history.
54
The
relationship
between
rhetoric
and
history
has
been
investigated
by
many
rhetorical
scholars.
Rhetoric,
Zarefsky
(1998)
asserts,
is
central
to
the
creation
of
history
(p.
30-31).
Likewise,
Turner
(1998)
claims
that
rhetorical
situations
have
constructed
social
reality
(p.
2).
Social
reality,
in
this
context,
can
be
considered
as
any
historical
or
social
events
that
have
perpetuated
specific
cultural
values.
Zarefsky
(1998)
makes
clear
distinctions
about
the
scholarly
pursuit
of
rhetorical
history.
Zarefsky
(1998),
like
Bitzer
(1968)
assumes
that
rhetoric
is
situational
and
that
its
assessment
must
be
made
in
the
context
of
that
situation.
Zarefsky
(1998)
places
emphasis
on
the
importance
of
studying
history
when
studying
rhetoric.
He
outlines
four
key
areas
of
scholarship
in
rhetorical
history:
1.
The
history
of
rhetoric
2.
The
rhetoric
of
history
3.
The
historical
study
of
rhetorical
events
4.
The
study
of
historical
events
from
a
rhetorical
perspective.
(Zarefsky,
1998,
p.
30-31).
The
first
category
usually
documents
the
"genealogy"
and
variety
of
rhetorical
theories
and
teaching
from
Ancient
Greece
to
the
present.
This
approach
does
not
portray
rhetoric
as
a
significant
contributor
to
the
creation
of
history
-
merely
a
theme
that
can
be
studied
and
taught.
The
second
form
of
rhetorical
history,
"rhetoric
of
history,"
is
primarily
concerned
with
how
the
values
and
persuasive
qualities
of
a
historian's
publications
affect
the
documentation
of
history.
The
third
aspect,
"the
historical
study
of
rhetorical
events,"
documents
the
various
rhetorical
moments
within
history
(rhetorical
criticism
within
history),
but
once
again,
may
not
claim
that
rhetoric
has
a
pivotal
role
in
history
creation.
55
This
thesis
aligns
itself
with
the
fourth
category
-
the
study
of
historical
events
from
a
rhetorical
perspective.
Thus,
it
means
that
history
is
viewed
with
a
rhetorical
framework,
emphasizing
the
importance
of
rhetoric in
the
creation
of
history.
Cause
and
Effect
This
thesis'
methodological
approach
towards
history
presumes
that
Churchill's
and
Hitler's
rhetoric
and
other
historical
events
caused
and
affected
one
another
in
a
qualitative
interplay
of
forces
over
time.
Therefore,
the
relationship
between
cause
and
effect
must
be
addressed
through
rhetorical
and
historical
approaches.
Within
rhetorical
discussions
of cause
and
effect
a
controversial
article
by
Lloyd
Bitzer
(1968)
argued
that
"rhetoric
is
situational"
(p.
3),
which
implies
that
the
historical
meaning-context
of
a
situation
shapes
its
rhetoric,
the
actions
of.
the
rhetor
and
the
reactions
of
the
audience.
Bitzer thus
allocates
the
power
of
the
rhetorical
outcome
to
the
situation.
Bitzer's
(1968)
main
arguments
are
not
only
that
"rhetoric
is
situational"
but
that
"exigence"
(the
social
conditions
that
call
forth
speech)
"strongly
invites
utterance"
and
"the
situation
controls
the
rhetorical
response"
and
determines
its
effectiveness
(p.
3-
14).
However,
Richard
E.
Vatz
(1973)
rejected
Bitzer's
claim
that
the
situation
controls
the
rhetoric
and
its
success.
He
asserted
that
the
rhetor
influences
the
situation
and
can
even
create
exigence
by
being
in
a
position
to
interpret
and
define
a
rhetorical
situation.
Vatz
(1973)
inverts
Bitzer's
claims
by
saying
that
"situations
are
rhetorical,"
"utterance
strongly
invites
exigence"
and
"situations
obtain
their
character
from
the
rhetoric
which
surrounds
them
or
creates
them"
(p.
159).
This
debate,
much
like
the
"chicken
and
the
egg",
inquire
what
came
first,
or
what
had
more
influence.
Did
the
words
of
the
speaker
create
meaning
in
a
social
or
historical
situation?
Or
did
the
historical
or
social situation
give
the
speaker's
words meaning?
56
Although
this
thesis
does
not
seek
to
determine
whether
rhetoric
or
social
reality
stimulated
the
other,
the
debate
is
important
to
acknowledge.
Rhetorical
scholars
view
this
debate
as integral to
understanding
the
interplay
between
rhetoric
and
our
creation
of
meaning
during
documented,
historical
situations.
Even
though
very
few
scholars
today
can
agree
on
the
subject,
it
suggests
the
power
that
rhetoric
has
had
on
the
construction
of
social
and
historical
realities.
Turner
(1998)
advocates
that
"rhetorical
history
offers
us
the
opportunity
to
see
rhetoric as
a
perpetual
and
dynamic
process
of
social
construction,
maintenance,
and
change
rather
than
as
an
isolated,
static
product"
(p.
4
).
Beyond
rhetorical
studies,
many
mass
communication
theorists
have
posited
and
studied
how
communication
affects
human
behavior.
This
phenomenon
was
heavily
studied
after
WWII,
when
leading
social
scientists
attempted
to
empirically
measure
the
effects
of
propaganda
and
communication
upon
citizens
(Simpson,
1994).
Harold
Lasswell,
Walter
Lippman,
Paul
Lazarsfeld,
Theodor
Adorno
and
many
others
investigated
the
relationship
between
communication
acts
and
human
behavior,
concluding
that
a
connection
between
the
two
exists
(Simpson,
1994).
Another
more
contemporary
psychologist
Robert
B.
Cialdini
(2001)
researched
the
effects
of
various
social
influences
(such
as
advertisements,
speeches,
technology,
etc.)
on
people's
lives
and
their
responses
(p.
3-18).
His
research
has
suggested
that
political
speeches
which
appeal
to
specific
socio-cultural
circumstances
in
a
society
can
indeed
have
strong
effects
on
people's
voting
habits
and
their
desire
for
political
change
(Cialdini,
2001,
p.
3-18).
The
vast
amount
of
scholarly
literature
regarding
communication
and
human
behavior
generally
advocates
a
strong
and
real
connection,
suggesting
that
communication
is
influential
upon
human
choice.
As
history
can
be
seen
as
a
documentation
of
the
moments
when
social
choice
has
led
to
change
for
individuals
and
groups,
it
is
significant
to
understand
rhetoric's
role
58
In
support
of
this
view,
Evans
(2003),
a
historian,
emphasizes
that
people's
choices
in
WWII
were
affected
by
context
and
beliefs:
Things
could
easily
have
turned out
very
differently
to
the
way
they
did
at
a
number
of
points
in
the
history
of
Germany
[
...
]
(People
acted
within)
conditions
that
included
not
only
the
historical
context
in
which
they
lived,
but
also
the
way
in
which
they
thought,
the
assumptions
they
acted
upon
and
the
principles
and
beliefs
that
informed
their
behavior.
(Evans,
2003,
p.
xx).
Here
we
return
to
the
familiar
issue
of
free will
and
determinism.
Although
people
may
have
been
prevented
from
acting
in
particular
ways
by
their
social
and
cultural
conditions,
they
still
had
a
degree of
choice
to
behave
in
certain
ways,
according
to
their
thoughts,
assumptions,
principles
and
beliefs.
The
Contingency
of
Rhetoric
in
the
Study
of
History
Finally,
beliefs
about
historical
contingency
must
be
addressed
as
a
key
methodological
assumption
when
studying
history.
Historians
often
view
"contingency"
as
the
"what
ifs"
of
history
(which
provokes
historians
to
entertain
the
existences
of
other
plausible
histories).
However,
rhetorical
historians
view
contingency
in
a
different
manner.
The
historical
perspective
on
contingency
will
be
dealt
with
first.
According
to
the
historiographer
Cameiro
(2000),
historical
contingency
has
"a
direct
and
profound
bearing
on
the
way
historians
have
seen
and
interpreted
the
course
of
history"
(p.
72).
The
fascination
with
the
chance
elements
of
history,
and
the
"seductive
belief
that
they
outweigh
its
irregularities,
patterns
and
trends
is
characteristic
of
[
..
. ]
traditional
historians"
(Carneiro,
2000,
p.
72).
However,
these
chance
elements of
history,
and
their
importance
in
the
historical
outcome,
are
only
significant
to
a
historian
who
possesses
complete
knowledge
about
all
the
facts
and
data,
a
situation
which
is
rare,
if
not
impossible.
If
a
historian
ever
had
the
fortunate
position
of
hindsight
and
almost
complete
knowledge,
then
the
contingencies
of
history
would
seem
highly
fascinating.
59
Although
historians
are
not
omniscient,
thy
have
the
ability
to
judge
previous
events
with
much
more
complete
knowledge
than
a
historical
figure
had
at
their
disposal.
In
hindsight,
scholars
know
more
about
what
choices
Churchill
and
Hitler
should
have
made
in
order
to
achieve
victory.
Rhetorical
contingency
does
not
operate
in
this
manner,
since
rhetoric
takes
the
perspective
of
the
orator
and
audience. Churchill
and
Hitler,
though
well-informed,
did
not
possess
the
same
knowledge
about
their
situation
as
historians
do
today.
During
the
immediate
situation,
these
rhetors
were
limited
by
the
context
in
which
they
operated.
Rhetorical
historians
value
the
limits,
pressures
and
uncertainties, in
order
to
understand
the
reasons
why
a
rhetor
performed
in
a
certain
manner.
Especially
when
conducting
speaker-oriented
studies,
rhetoricians
view
the
uncertainties
of
history,
the
contingent
choices
made
available
to
rhetors,
as
a
gradual
process
of
interaction
between
a
leader's
choices,
their
rhetoric
and
history.
In
summary,
rhetorical
history
seeks
to
understand
the
interplay
between
free
will,
cause
and
effect,
and
contingency,
in
what
Stephen
J.
Gould
(1992)
called
was
a
"revolving
board
of
alterable
history":
"We
are
not
pawns
in
a
grand
chess
game
played
by
inexorable
natural
(and
social)
laws,
but
effective
rooks,
knights,
bishops,
kings
and
queens
on
a
revolving
board
of
alterable
history
with
no
set
outcome"
(p.
21).
Rhetorical
and
Historical
Methods
Combined:
Rhetoric
Creates
History
As
this
discussion
has
outlined,
there
is
still
much
debate
about
the
relationship
between
history
and
rhetoric.
Some
rhetoricians
claim
that
the
context
affects
rhetoric,
others
claim
that
rhetoric
affects
context.
The
combined
methods
of
my
thesis
acknowledge
these
debates
by
balancing
and
layering
the
approaches
favored
by
each
side
of
the
debate.
The
combined
approaches
of
rhetorical
criticism,
rhetorical
biography
and
rhetorical
history
assist
in
the
exploration
of
the Battle
of
Britain
as
not
only
a
historical
60
conflict,
but
a
rhetorical
one
as
well.
By
employing
rhetorical
theories
to
Churchill's
and
Hitler's
rhetoric,
such
as
Isocrates,
Cicero,
Aristotle
and
Pericles,
the
Battle
of
Britain
is
seen
from
a
new
and
fresh
point
of
view.
Ultimately,
the
method
of
parallel
examination
of
Churchill
and
Hitler
appears
within
each
and
every
chapter,
adding
the
element
of
comparison
and
the
interplay
between
two
rhetorical
opponents.
As
the
literature
review
in
the
next
chapter
will
illustrate,
the
unbalanced
and
partial
perspectives
within
rhetorical
and
historical
scholarship
has
greatly
contributed
to
the
choice
of
this
underlying
method.
63
speak"
(Isocrates,
trans.
2001,
para.
30).
In
this,
Isocrates
rejected
his
reputation
as
a
Sophist,
suggesting
that
although
he
was
paid
for
his
mentorship,
he
was
encouraging
the
pursuit
of
discussion
in
political
philosophy
and
education,
and
not
in
fanciful
discourse
typical
of
the
Sophists
(Bizzell
&
Herzberg,
2001,
p.
69-70).
In
this
essay,
Isocrates'
described
the
character
and
education
of
the
ideal
orator
that
one
can
use
to
evaluate
Churchill
and
Hitler.
Cicero
developed
and
strengthened
Isocrates'
concept
of
the
"ideal
orator."
During
the
reign
of
Julius
Caesar,
Cicero
was
an
active
politician
and
outspoken
proponent
of
democracy.
Cicero
(106
BCE
—43
BCE)
was
a
successful
Roman
lawyer,
orator,
consul,
philosopher
and
political
theorist.
After
becoming
a
successful
lawyer
in
Rome,
Cicero
traveled
extensively
throughout
Greece
and
Asia
Minor,
absorbing
and
learning
the
philosophies
of
Ancient
Greek
academics.
Upon
his
return,
Cicero
became
heavily
entrenched
in
politics,
employing
his
natural
oratory
skills
and
eloquence
to
overcome
social barriers
and
was
elected
into
series
of
offices,
culminating
in
the
highest,
that
of
consul
(Bizzell
&
Herzberg,
2001,
p.
284).
Due
to
his
strong stance
against
dictatorship
regimes,
Cicero
left
Rome
many
times
for
his
safety.
Eventually,
a
quarrel
with
Marc
Antony
led
to
Cicero's
assassination
when
he
was
aged
63
(Bizzell
&
Herzberg,
2001,
p.
285).
De
Oratore
or
"On
Oratory"
was
a
treatise
primarily
about
rhetoric.
De
0
ratore
was
also
a
fictional
dialogue
between
Crassus,
Antonious,
Mucius,
Sulpicius
and
Cotta,
in
which
they
discussed
rhetoric (Bizzell
&
Herzberg,
2001,
p.
287).
Cicero
was
considered
a
"high-minded
patriot"
(Bizzell
&
Herzberg,
2001,
p.
285)
who
practiced
rhetoric
daily
and
his
treatise
was
not
a
detached
or
abstract
philosophical
work,
but
a
practical
and
applicable
guidebook
to
effective
oratory
during
tenuous
times.
64
Both
Isocrates'
and
Cicero's
philosophies
about
rhetoric
will
be
utilized
to
examine
Churchill's
and
Hitler's
rhetorical
potential
without
regard
to
the
Battle
of
Britain
in
the
following
discussion.
Education
and
Knowledge
First,
Isocrates
and
Cicero
discussed
the
importance
of
natural
aptitude
in
rhetorical
education.
Education,
Isocrates
suggested,
begins
with
the
mind:
"the
mind
comes
first
and
is
of
greater
worth
[...J
the
body
(is)
to
be
servant
to
the
judgments
of
the
mind"
(Isocrates,
trans.
2001,
para.
180).
Based
on
this
argument,
Isocrates
further
claimed
that
"the
teachers
of
philosophy
impart
all
forms
of
discourse
in
which
the
mind
expresses
itself"
(Isocrates,
trans.
2001,
para.
183).
Teachers,
Isocrates
advocated,
refine
the
methods
of
articulating
the
beliefs
that
exist in
the
mind
of
the
pupil.
Thus,
teachers
were
central
to
cultivating
the
skill
of
oratory
and
must
encourage
their
students
to
meet
three
educational
conditions
in
order
to
be
successful:
They
must,
first
of
all,
have
a
natural
aptitude
[...]
secondly,
they
must
submit
to
training
and
master
the
knowledge
of
their
particular
subject
[
...
]
finally,
they
must
become
versed
and
practiced
in
the
use
and
application
of
their
art;
for
only
(under)
these
conditions
can
they
become
fully
competent
and
preeminent
in
any
line
of
endeavor.
(Isocrates,
trans.
2001,
para.
187).
This
suggests
that
natural
aptitude,
training
and
application
will
create
the
most
successful
rhetor.
Cicero
also
argued
that
natural
aptitude,
which
was
developed
through
education
and
practice,
was
integral
to
an
ideal
orator.
Cicero
stated
that
"natural
talent
is
the
chief
contributor
to
the
virtue
of
oratory;
and
indeed
[
...
]
it
was
not
the
principles
and
method
of
oratory
[...]
but inborn
capacity"
(Cicero,
trans.
2001,
para.
25).
Cicero
furthered
his
65
belief
in
natural
talent
by
suggesting
that
"good
abilities
may
through
instruction
become
better
[...
in
some
measure,
quickened
and
amended"
(Cicero,
trans.
2001,
para. 25).
Although
formal
rhetorical
education has
not
been
historically
recorded
as
eminent
within
either
Churchill
or
Hitler's
life,
they
became
self-educated
in
rhetoric,
however
informally
or
unaware
of
doing
so.
Andrew
Roberts,
a
historian
who
wrote
Hitler
and
Churchill:
The
Secrets
of
Leadership
(2003)
suggests
that
Churchill
was
actually
not
a
natural-born
speaker.
Suffering
a
harsh
stammer
in
his
childhood
as
well
as
a
lisp,
Churchill
practiced
the
phrase
"The
Spanish
ships
I
cannot
see
for
they
are
not
in
sight"
well
into
his
adulthood
(Andrews,
2003,
p.
36).
Overcoming
the
stammer
did
not
insulate
him
from
having
devastating
public-speaking
episodes.
At
age
thirty,
Roberts
(2003)
argues,
Churchill
had
a
"disastrous
experience
trying
to
address
the
Commons
entirely
from
memory
[...]
he
abandoned
the
practice.
Instead
he
would
sometimes
spend
ten
to
fourteen
hours
preparing
a
single
speech"
(p.
31).
Although
the
speeches
Churchill
delivered
in
1940
portray
Churchill's
cultivated
talent,
it
is
important
to
acknowledge
that
Churchill
was
not
naturally
gifted
as
an
orator.
However,
the
lengthy
time
period
Churchill
spent
working
on
his
oratory
reflects
Churchill's
own
beliefs
that
"rhetorical
power
is
neither
wholly
bestowed
nor
wholly
acquired,
but
cultivated"
(as
cited
in
Roberts,
2003,
p.
32).
Hitler
also,
as
Andrew
(2003)
suggests,
was
not
natural
orator.
Instead,
Hitler's
inadequate
rhetorical
talent
was
advanced
by
studying
the
performances
of
a
"Bavarian
comedian
named
Weiss-Ferdl
in
order
to
learn
how
to
captivate
an
audience"
(p.
30).
Much
like
an
actor,
Hitler
would
"endlessly
practice
his
poses
and
gestures
in
front
of
the
mirror
in his
shabby
room
in
Munich's
Thierschstrasse"
(Andrews,
2003,
p.
30).
During
the
early
days
of
Hitler's
political
career,
his
persuasive
charisma
was
demonstrated
through
his
techniques
of
an
unblinking
stare
to
the
crowd
and
obvious
66
self-confidence,
making
his
audience
spell-bound
(Andrews,
2003,
p.
43-44).
Although
it
is
a
documented
fact that
Hitler
and
his
Nazis
received
little
classical
rhetorical
education
(Scanlan,
1951,
p.
431),
Hitler's
style
was
successful,
even
if
theatrical.
During
his
career
as
Germany's
Chancellor,
Hitler
was
very
theatriäal
and
used
dramatic
lighting,
martial
music
and
"seas
of
flags"
(Andrews,
2003,
p.
30).
These
types
of
innovations
assisted
Hitler's
persuasive
appeal
and
many
hours of
practice
in
front
of
a
mirror
helped
to
enhance
his
deficient
natural
aptitude.
Practice,
Isocrates
argued,
can
assist
in
perfecting
rhetorical
appeal:
"Men
with
little
natural
talent
can
still
become
skilled
orators
through
practice
and
work"
(Isocrates,
trans.
2001,
para.
191).
Based
upon
Isocrates'
and
Cicero's
framework
of
educational
conditions
of
a
successful
orator,
it
can
be
affirmed
that
both
Churchill's
and
Hitler's
meager
natural
aptitudes
were
self-cultivated
by
practice
and
rehearsal,
manifesting
decent
rhetorical
skill
and
potential.
The
second
criterion
that
Isocrates
and
Cicero
believed
was
central
to
the
ideal
orator
was
the
possession
of
knowledge.
Isocrates
emphasized
the
importance
that
situation
and
community
values
plays
upon
knowledge:
When
[teachers]
have
given
them
(students)
experience
and
detailed
knowledge
of
these
(forms
and models
of
speech),
they
again
exercise
the
students
and
make
them
accustomed
to
hard
work,
and
then
force
them
to
synthesize
everything
they
have
learned
in
order
that
they
may
have
a
more
secure
understanding
and
their
views
(doxai)
may
be
better
adapted
to
the
right
moments
(kairoi).
It
is
not
possible
to
learn
this
through
study,
since
in
all
activities,
these
opportune
moments
elude
exact
knowledge
(episteme),
but
in
general
those
who
are
particularly
attentive
and
can
understand
the
consequences
most
often
apprehend
them.
(Isocrates,
trans.
2000,
p.
184).
67
Although
Isocrates
asserted
that
teachers
can
educate
students
through
practice
and
synthesis,
he
admitted
that
it
was
impossible
to
have
complete
knowledge,
appropriate
for
every
rhetorical
situation,
since
each
situation
arises
from
particular
exigences,
based
upon
doxa
and
kairos.
Isocrates
placed
greater
value
upon
the
rhetor's
ability
to
adapt
his/her
capacity
for
knowledge
to
the
rhetorical
situation,
indicating
that
complete
or
precise
knowledge
(episteme)
was
not
as
essential
to
effective
oratory.
Cicero
echoed
Isocrates'
position,
but
further
suggested
that
rhetors,
whom
possessed
knowledge,
must
portray
those
facts
in
a
stylistic
manner
which
was
relevant
and
powerful:
The
good
speakers
bring,
as
their
peculiar
possession,
a
style
that
is
harmonious,
graceful,
and
marked
by
a
certain
artistry
and
polish.
Yet
this
style,
if
the
underlying
subject
matter
be
not
comprehended
and
mastered
by
the
speaker,
must
inevitably
be
of
no
account
or
even
become
the
sport
of
universal
derision.
For
what
so
effectually
proclaims
the
madman
as
the
hollow
thundering
of
words
-
be
they
never
so
choice
and
resplendent
-
which
have
no
thought
or
knowledge
behind
them?
(Cicero,
trans.
2001,
para.
12).
Cicero
asserted
that
knowledge
of
the
facts
was
central
to
the
persuasive
success
of
the
orator.
Churchill
knowledge
in
speeches
was
often
portrayed
through
facts
and
numerical
information.
On
May
4,
1925,
Churchill
was
the
Chancellor
of
Exchequer
and
gave
a
speech
to
the
House
of
Commons,
promoting
a
return
to
the
pre-war
"Gold
Standard" of
currency
(Heywood,
2003,
p.
35).
When
discussing
the
federal
debts
to
the
United
States,
Churchill
relied
upon
numerical
facts
to
denote
the
influence
of
the
US
over
Britain:
68
"We
pay
every
year
our
£35,000,000
of
war
debt
to
the
United
States
(and)
we
have
to
buy
from
the
United
States
the
greater
part
of our
cotton,
tobacco
and
a
large
proportion
of
our
raw
materials
and
wheat.
We
purchased
last
year
£240,000,000
of
goods
from
the
United
States.
Whether
on
a
gold
standard
or
on
a
managed
currency
or
on
any
other
scheme
which
can
be
conceived,
her
fortunes
are
bound
to
sway
and
influence
ours
whenever
she
booms
or
slumps".
(Churchill,
1925,
para.
40).
Churchill's
use
of
numerical
data,
as
well
as
a
general
understanding
about
the
larger
federal
purchases
by
his
go
v
ernment,
demonstrated
that
Churchill
was
an
informed
individual
who
either
was
knowledgeable,.
or
performed
knowledge.
Thus,
Churchill
met
Isocrates'
and
Cicero's
expectations
of
knowledge
in
the
ideal
orator.
On
the
other
hand,
Hitler
portrayed
knowledge
in
a
very
different
manner
than
Churchill.
Isocrates
and
Cicero
did
not
specify
that
knowledge
must
be
portrayed
through
statistical
information
and
or
other
specified
means,
but
that
the
"ideal
orator"
must
have
a
strong
understanding
of
the
fundamental
knowledge
in
that
context,
in
order
to
be
rhetorically
effective.
Hitler
possessed
a
theatrical
style,
and
thus
was
more
likely
to
use
figures
of
speech
rather
than
numerical
facts
to
portray
the
circumstances.
For
example,
on
January
30,
1939,
Hitler
recalled
the
Treaty
of
Versailles
to
a
Reichstag
session
in
the
Kroll
Opera
House
in
Berlin
(Domarus,
1997,
p.
1436).
He
stated:
"We
had
to live
to
see
how,
at
the
end
of
the
war,
after
hunger
and
destitution
had
killed
more
than
800,000
children
of our Yolk,
because
of
the
gruesome
articles
of
a
Diktat
(Treaty
of
Versailles)
which
the
democratic,
humane
world
apostles
had
forced
on
us
in
the
guise
of
a
peace
treaty,
nearly
a
million
dairy
cows
were
driven
from
our
barns".
(As
cited
in
Domarus,
1997,
p.
1448).
69
Although
Domarus
(1997)
acknowledges
that Hitler's
numerical
facts
regarding
the
dairy
cows
are
exaggerated
(p.
2188),
it
denotes
that
Hitler
performed
that
he
had
knowledge.
Whether
manipulative,
or
inadvertently
false,
Hitler
depicted
himself
as
possessing
an
intact
memory,
elevated
use of
vocabulary,
and
a
decent
knowledge
base,
so
that
even
the
number
of
dairy
cows
from
an
event
twenty
,
years
previous
was
mentioned.
Thus,
Hitler
possessed
Isocrates'
and
Cicero's
quality
of
a
knowledgeable
rhetor.
Intrinsic
and
Extrinsic
Ethos
While
both
Isocrates
and
Cicero
suggested
that
the
ideal
orator
must
possess
a
strong
ethos
(the
ethical
character
of
the
speaker),
which
was
fuelled
by
the
performances
of,
modesty,
humility
and
superior
morals,
they
did
not
emphasize
Aristotle's
distinction
of
"intrinsic"
and
"extrinsic"
ethos.
This
distinction
is
essential to
assessing
Churchill's
and
Hitler's
rhetorical
capacity,
as
both
leaders
demonstrated
strong
ethos,
but
in
very
different
manners.
Aristotle
claimed
that
intrinsic
ethos
relates
to
how
well
the
speaker
portrayed
ethical
character
within
the
speech
itself,
without
regard
to
the
reputation
or
actions
of
the
speaker
beyond
the
rhetorical
situation.
He
stated:
The
orator
persuades
by
moral
character
when
his
speech
is
delivered
in
such
a
manner
as
to
render
him
worthy
of
confidence;
for
we
feel
confidence
in
a
greater
degree
and
more
readily
in
persons
of
worth
in
regard
to
everything
in
general,
but
where
there
is
no
certainty
and
there
is
room
for
doubt,
our
confidence
is
absolute.
But
this
confidence
must
be
due
to
the
speech
itself,
not
to
any
preconceived
idea
of
the
speaker's
character.
(As
cited
in
Williams,
2009,
p.
240)
70
Aristotle
acknowledged
that
the
ethos
of
the leader
can
be
established
within
the
speech,
and
provided
stylistic
and
technical
guidelines
for
ways
in
which
a
speaker
can
be viewed
as
effective.
When
relating Aristotle's
notion
of
intrinsic
ethos
to
Isocrates
and
Cicero,
both
theorists
suggested
that
one
there
are
many
ways
to
develop
one's
intrinsic
ethos.
The
performance
of
modesty
and
humility
within
a
speech
act
has
been
chosen
as
one
such
example
of
intrinsic
ethos.
The
third
criterion
that
Isocrates
and
Cicero
both
argued
was
crucial
to
the
ideal
orator
was
the
portrayal
of
diffidence
and
humility.
Although
neither
theorist
specified
whether
humility
and
modesty
should
be
portrayed within
the
content
of
the
speech,
or
merely
upon
its
delivery,
this
analysis
will
assume
the
latter
and
analyze
Churchill's
and
Hitler's
style
of
delivery.
Isocrates
stated
that
good
orators
"must
consider
carefully
how
they
can
be
seen
by
others
to
say
and
do
everything
graciously
and
benevolently,
for
those
who
give
little
thought
to
these
matters
appear
to
their
fellow
citizens
to
be
rather
difficult
and
intolerable"
(Isocrates,
trans.
2001,
para.
132).
In
addition
to
this,
Isocrates
stated
that
"the stronger
a
man's
desire
to
persuade
his
hearers,
the
more
zealously
will
he
strive
to
be
honorable
and
to
have
the
esteem
of
his
fellow
-
citizens"
(Isocrates,
trans.
2001,
para.
278).
Thus,
an
orator
who
wanted
to
effectively
persuade
will
achieve
the
esteem
of
his
citizens
by
appearing
gracious
and
benevolent.
Cicero
emphasized
Isocrates'
position
by
focusing
upon
humility
and
modesty
in
a
rhetor's
speech.
Although
Cicero
did
not
decipher
the
difference
between
humility
and
modesty,
it
will
be
assumed
that
they
are
interchangeable
concepts
without
a
great
difference
in
meaning.
According
to
Crassus'
dialogue,
humble
and
modest
orators
were
often
the
most
rhetorical
appealing:
71
Even
the
best
orators,
those
who
can
speak
with
the
utmost
ease
and
elegance,
unless
they
are
diffident
in
approaching
a
discourse
and
diffident
in
beginning
it,
seem
to
border
on
the
shameless,
although
that
can
never
come
to
pass.
For
the
better
the
orator,
the
more
profoundly
is
he
frightened
[...J
of
the
anticipations
of
an
audience
[
...
]
for
it
is
not
by
feeling
shame
at
what
is
unbecoming,
but
in
not
doing
it,
that
we
must
escape
the
reproach
of
shamelessness.
(Cicero,
trans.
2001,
para
26).
Consistent
with
the
majority
of
Cicero's
arguments,
the
audience's
reactions
were
taken
into
account.
If
an
orator
did
not
perform
humility
in
the
speech,
then
the
audience
will
assume
they
are
arrogant
in
that
rhetorical
situation.
By
appearing
arrogant,
Cicero
argued,
the
audience
may
not
forgive
the
speaker
for
their
lack
of
shamelessness
and
thus,
may
not
agree
with
their
rhetoric
(Cicero,
trans.
2001,
para.
26).
Thus,
appearing
arrogant
can
make
rhetoric
ineffectual.
Churchill
has
been
criticized
for
a
lack
of
humility
in
speech-making.
According
to
Andrew
Roberts
(2003),
Churchill's
"grand,
old-style
idiom
did
not
impress
everybody;
some
found
it
insincere,
other
pompous,
yet
other
derided
him
as
a
cross
between
a
ham
actor
and
a
music-hall
turn"
(p.
33).
Referring
to
the
Abdication
Crisis
of
1936,
when
Churchill
advocated
to
the
House'
of
Commons
that
King
Edward
VIII
should
marry
a
divorced
woman
and
still
retain
Kingship,
Churchill
was
shouted
down
and
criticized
for
unpatriotic
behavior
and
considered
pompous
(Roberts,
2003,
p.
33).
It
can
be
suggested
that in
the
two
British
speeches
which
will
be
addressed
in
this
dissertation,
Churchill
retains
a
reserved,
objective
perspective
upon
the
crises
at
hand.
But
this
"grand,
old-style"
(Roberts,
2003,
p.
33)
did
not
emphasize
his
modesty
or
diffidence.
By
these
standards
of
the
"ideal
orator,"
Churchill
did
not
meet
the
requisite
of
humility.
Instead,
Churchill's
approach
was
dry
and
monotonous.
72
On
the
other
hand,
Hitler
was
reputed
for
his
simple
and
modest
approach
in
speech
making.
According
to
Cicero,
"the
better
the
orator,
the
more
profoundly
is
he
frightened
of
the
difficulty
of
speaking,
and
of
the
doubtful
fate
of
a
speech"
(Cicero,
trans.
2001,
para.
26).
Albert
Speer
(1970),
Germany's
Minister
of
Armaments
from
1942-1945,
documented
in
his
autobiography
Inside
the
Third
Reich
that
by
1932
Hitler
was
a
renowned
politician,
emblazoned
with
swastikas
and
surrounded
by
propaganda
(p.
44).
However,
the
first
speech
of
Hitler's that
Speer
attended
demonstrated
that
the
Nazi
leader
presented
himself
modest
and
humble,
and
not
a
swastika-ridden
celebrity:
He
was
wearing
a
well-fitted
blue
suit
and
looking
markedly
respectable.
Everything
about
him
bore
out
the
note
of
reasonable
modesty.
Later
I
learned
that
he
had
a
great
gift
for
adjusting
-
consciously
or
intuitively
-
to
his
surroundings.
As
the
ovation
went
on
for
minutes,
he
tried,
as
if
slightly
pained,
to
check
it.
Then,
in
a
low
voice,
hesitantly
and
somewhat
shyly,
he
began
a
kind
of
historical
lecture
rather
than
a
speech.
To
me
there
was
something
engaging
about
it
-
all
the
more
so
since
it
ran
counter
to
everything
the
propaganda
of
his
opponents
had
led
me
to
expect:
a
hysterical
demagogue,
a
shrieking
and
gesticulating
fanatic
in
uniform.
He
did
not
allow
the
bursts
of
the
applause
to
tempt
him
away
from
his
sober
tone.
Hitler's
initial
shyness
soon
disappeared;
at
times
now
his
pitch
rose.
He
spoke
urgently
and
with
hypnotic
persuasiveness.
The
mood
he
cast
was
much
deeper
than
the
speech
itself,
most
of
which
I
did
not
remember
for
long.
(Speer,
1970,
p.
44).
Speer,
a
self-proclaimed
Nazi,
is
obviously
biased
in his
recollections.
However,
Speer'
s
(1970)
memories
of
Hitler
are
also
validated
by
Evans
(2003),
a
scholarly
historian,
who
suggested
that
Hitler
would
start
speeches
on
a
modest
note,
rising in
pitch
and
rhythm
as
they
continued
(p.
171).
Cicero
suggested
that
this
was
an
effective
way
to
persuade,
74
by
suggesting
that
the
audience's
"feelings are
won
over
by
a
man's
merit,
achievements
or
reputable
life"
(Cicero,
trans.
2001,
para.
43).
Isocrates
suggested
that
extrinsic
ethos
can
be
demonstrated
through
superior
morals.
Isocrates
claimed
that
"it
is
not
conceivable
that
he
(the
ideal
orator)
will
support
causes
which
are
unjust
or
petty
or
devoted
to
private
quarrels,
and
not
rather
those
which
are
great
and
honorable,
devoted
to
the
welfare
of
man
'and
our
common
good"
(Isocrates,
trans.
2001,
para.
275).
Therefore,
the
ideal
orator
will
have
superior
morals
that
will
be
portrayed
through
honorable
actions,
which
are
devoted
to
the
welfare
of
others.
Both
Churchill
and
Hitler
can
be
analyzed
for
their
extrinsic
ethos,
as
denoted
through
their
reputation
for
superior
morals.
In
1909,
Churchill
was
an
active
liberal
politician,
proposing
strong
a
revision
to
the
federal
budget,
called
the
"People's
Budget"
(Heywood,
2003,
p.
4).
Churchill
promoted
this
budget
that
would
increase
taxation
on
the
wealthy,
in
order
to
fund
social
programs
for
the
poor
(Heywood,
2003,
p.
4).
In
a
speech
delivered
on
January
29,
1909
to
a
public
and
political
audience
in
Nottingham,
Churchill
targeted
the
Conservative
Party's
inappropriate
budgeting
by
claiming
it
was
a
"conspiracy":
Such
is
the
great
conspiracy
with
which
the
British
democracy
is
now
confronted
[
...
]
an
attempt
to
place
the
main
burden
of
taxation
upon
the
shoulders
of
wage-
earners
and
not
on
income-drawers,
a
disastrous
blow
at
the
prosperity,
the
freedom,
the
flexibility,
and
the
expansive
power
of
British
industry,
and
a
deadly
injury
to
the
purity
of
English
public
life.
These
will
be
the
consequences,
momentous
and
long
enduring,
of
a
tariff
victory
at
the
general
election;
and
remember
it
has
been
said
that
it
takes
ten
years
to
carry
a
tariff,
but
it
takes
a
hundred
years
to
abolish
it.
(Churchill,
1909,
para.
21).
75
Churchill,
before
1940,
adamantly
stood
behind
policies
that
he
believed
were
necessary
and
purposeful
to
enhancing
the
lives
of
commoners.
Not
only
did
Churchill
demonstrate
that
a
Tory
budget
would
cripple
the
common
Englishman,
but
that
it
also
inhibited
British
trade.
Although
qualities
of
ethos
and
ethical
rhetoric in
the
Battle
of
Britain
will
be
analyzed
in
detail
later,
it
can
be
assumed
for
the
moment
that
Churchill's
performances
of
superior
-morals
to
a
public
audience
met
Isocrates'
and
Cicero's
second
criterion
of
an
ideal
speaker.
While
Hitler
performed
superior
morals
to
audiences
in
several
instances,
his
"good"
intentions
exhibited
through
intrinsic
ethos
did
not
mirror
his
extrinsic
ethos.
For
example,
on
February
10,
1937,
Hitler
gave
a
speech
at
the
Berlin Sports
Palace
and
his
public
audiences
about
the
history
of
the
Nazi
Party
since
1919
(Evans,
2003,
p.
323).
By
retelling
the
circumstances
of
inflation,
the
impoverishment
of
the
peasantry
and
the
rise
of
unemployment,
Hitler
explained
his
intentions:
"Just
as
I
have
taken
this
office,
so
I
shall
leave
it.
I
have
done
it
neither
for
salary
or
wages.
I
cannot
divest
myself
of
the
faith
of
my
people,
cannot
dissociate
myself
from
my
love
for
this,
my
people,
and
I
cherish
the
firm
conviction
that
the
hour
will
come
at
last
in
which
the
millions
who
despise
us
today
will
stand
by
us
and
with
us
will
hail
the
new
[
...
]
German
kingdom
of
greatness
and
power
and
glory
and
justice".
(As
cited
in
Evans,
2003,
p.
324).
Hitler's
performance
of
superior
morals
-
the
selflessness,
the
love of
others,
the
empathy
-
all
denoted
that
Hitler
at
least
peiformed
the
act
of
morality
to his
audiences.
However,
Hitler's actions,
even
during
this
1937
excerpt,
did
not
reflect
his
intentions
in
speeches.
Not
only
were
there
boycotts
on
Jewish
businesses
and
goods
a
regular
occurrence
in
Nazi
Germany,
but
Hitler's
revolutionary
evening
on
June
30,
1934,
called
the
"Night
of
the
Long
Knives"
had
occurred,
resulting
in
some
hundreds
76
being
killed
(Bergen,
2003,
P.
70-71).
Furthermore,
Hitler's
Germany
in
1936
had
forced
six
hundred
Gypsies
out
of
Berlin
into
detention
by
a
sewage
dump,
in
preparation
for
the
international
spotlight
of
the
1936
Olympics
(Bergen,
2003,
p.
76).
Although
the
concentration
camps
were
not
public
knowledge,
Germany
was
becoming
increasingly
discriminatory
and
violent.
Thus,
it
can
be
interpreted
that
Hitler's
demonstrations
or
performances
of
superior
morals,
though
perhaps
satisfied
in
his
intrinsic
ethos,
were
not
developed
in
his
extrinsic
ethos.
Thus,
Hitler
did
not
meet
Isocrates'
and
Cicero's
notion
of
a
good
extrinsic
ethos,
as
demonstrated
through
superior
morals,
which
weakened
his
rhetorical
potential.
Table
1:
The
Ideal
Orator
Visualized
QUALITIES
CHURCHILL
HITLER
Previous
Education
(developed
through
practice
and
application)
Yes Yes
Knowledge
Yes
Yes
Intrinsic
Ethos,
Modesty
and
Humility
No
Yes
Extrinsic Ethos,
Superior
Morals
Yes
No
"Table
1:
The
Ideal
Orator
Visualized"
depicts
how
Churchill
and
Hitler
have
been
compared
as ideal
orators.
According
to
the
standards
set
out
by
Isocrates
and
Cicero,
it
can
be
suggested
that
both
leaders
had
comparable
rhetorical
skill,
even
though
77
their
strengths
and
weaknesses
differed.
Although
Churchill
depicted
an
arguably
detached
and
cold
approach,
he
also
was
capable
of
demonstrating
calm
and
resolve
-
superior
characteristics
that
could
become
useful
in
crisis.
On
the
other
hand,
Hitler's
unethical
actions
did
not
mirror
the
moral
beliefs
that
were
performed
in his
speeches.
Howevr,
Hitler
did
perform
modesty
and
humility,
which
could
have
contributed
to
the
German
people's
belief
in
his
compassion
and
sincerity.
Both
leaders
had
basically
equivalent
rhetorical
skill.
Churchill's
and
Hitler's
rhetoric
during
the
Battle
of
Britain
will
now
be
investigated
with
theories
of
Aristotle
and
the
comparative
model
of
Pericles'
Funeral
Oration
to
understand
bow
their
rhetoric
affected the
historical
outcome.
78
Figure
1:
A
Timeline
of
the
Battle
of
Britain
(1940)
JUN
4:
Churchill's
Speech
"We
Shall
Fight
on
the
Beaches"
JUL
19:
Hitler's
Speech
"The
Generous
Peace
Proposal"
AUG
20:
Churchill's
Speech
"The
Few"
SEP
4:
Hitler's
"Winterhilfs-
werk"
Address
PHASE
ONE
PHASE.
TWO
PHASE
THREE
MAY
MAY10:
Churchill
appointed
as
Prime
Minister
II
JUN
JUN
3:
Final
day
of
Dunkirk
Evacuation
JUN22:
France
signs
armistice
with
Germany
JUL
10:
Battle
of
Britain
begins
AUG
SEP
AUG
13:
AUG
25.
"Adlertag"
Bombs
commences,
first
dropped
on
major
offensive
Berlin
by
Luftwaffe
AUG
24:
Bombs
dropped
on
London
OCT
SEP
15.
RAF
overpower
Luftwaffe;
Proclaimed
"Battle
of
Britain
Day"
OCT
14/15:
Most
intense
bombing
on
London
NOV
OCT31:
Greatly
decreased
air
activity,
Battle
of
Britain
ends
79
CHAPTER
FIVE:
CHURCHILL'S
AND
HITLER'S
RHETORIC
IN
THE
BATTLE
OF
BRITAIN
Introduction
to
Analyzing
Rhetoric
in
War
In
order
to fully
understand
the
rhetorical
importance
of
Churchill's
and
Hitler's
speeches
during
the
summer
of
1940,
the
Battle
of
Britain
must
be
evaluated
as
a
historical
conflict.
By
analyzing
the
social,
political
and
military
antecedents
of
each
rhetorical
act,
this
chronological
overview
will
emphasize
the
importance
of
rhetoric
in
each
specific
instance.
By
employing
the
rhetorical
theoretical
framework
outlined
in
Chapter
3,
it
will
be
argued
that
the
rhetorical
aspects
of
four
speeches
helped
to
shape
and
determine
the
course
of
the
battle,
further
suggesting
that
rhetoric
played
a
significant
role
within
the
Battle
of
Britain.
Aristotle's
logos,
ethos
and
pathos
will
help
to
illustrate
the
technical
qualities
of
the
logical
arguments,
moral
character
of
the
rhetor
and
the
style
of
the
speech
itself.
Pericles'
Funeral
Oration
will
provide
a
comparative
framework,
by
which
the
structure
and
content
of
the
speech
will
be
analyzed,
to
determine
whether
Churchill
and
Hitler
emphasized
the
role
of
sacrifice
in constituting
the
nation,
and
the
immediate
effects
of
such
a
claim.
Isocrates
and
Cicero
will
be
mentioned
periodically
to
add
further
comparison
of
Churchill
and
Hitler's
rhetoric
with
the
Ancient
Greek
standard
of
the
"ideal
orator."
As
stated
within
the
research
methods
chapter,
both
rhetorical
history
and
rhetorical
criticism
are
alternated
within
this
chapter.
This
enables
one
to
focus
upon
the
content
of
the
speeches
and
the
ramifications
those
rhetorical
acts
may
have
had
upon
the
decision-making
processes
of
each
government
regarding
their
military
action.
80
Phase
One:
Dunkirk
and
the
Antecedents
to
the
Battle
of
Britain
When
Germany
invaded
Poland
on
September
1,
1939,
Britain
declared
war
on
Germany
two
days
later.
Britain's
international
prestige
and
great
power
status
were
fuelled
by
its
strong
Royal
Navy
and
historical
ties
to
many
affluent nations.
However,
during
the
months
that
followed,
Germany
succeeded
in
occupying
the
majority
of
Western
Europe,
which
threatened
Britain's
survival.
On
May
10,
Germany
commenced
the
campaign
in
Western
Europe,
called
Operation
"Gelb"
("Yellow")
and,
although
the
German
forces
had
a
weaker
numerical
force
than
their
adversaries,
they
had
demonstrated
"a
singleness
of
purpose
and
a
flexibility
in
action
that
had
brought
them
victory
in
fewer
than
six
weeks"
(Lucas,
1987,
p.
122).
The
German
armed
forces
were
now
considered
the
mightiest
in
Europe
(Lukacs,
2001,
p.
10).
In
the
early
days
of
June,
1940,
the
armies
of
France
and
Britain
were
in
a
precarious
position.
330,000
British
and
French
troops
were
trapped
on
the
shores
of
Dunkirk,
France
(Lukacs,
2001,
p.
191),
while
the
German
Army
advanced,
leaving
them
vulnerable,
basically
defeated
and
with
little
opportunity
to
survive.
Not
only
was
this
huge
population
of
British
and
French
forces
overpowered,
but
it
was
also
a
symbolic
loss
of
British
strength.
Operation
"Dynamo"
was
put
into
effect
by
the
British
government,
whereby
the
Royal
Navy
evacuated
220,000
British
and
120,000
French
troops
to
the
nearby
English
coast
(Calder,
1969,
p.
108).
Over
the
course
of
eight
days,
the
British
operation
was
able
to
remove
the
Allied
fighting
forces
(Messenger,
1990,
p.
12)
that
would
not
occupy
the
coast
of
France
until
the
Normandy
landings
of
1944.
Unfortunately
for
the
Allies,
the
evacuation
did
not
allow
the
transport
of
heavy
equipment
and
weapons.
Also,
the
Royal
Navy
lost
some
200
ships
and
the
Royal
Air
Force
(RAF)
lost
170
planes
in
an
effort
to
keep
the
Luftwaffe
(German
Air
Force)
from
attacking
soldiers
waiting
on
the
beaches
(Messenger,
1990,
p.
12).
June
3,
1940
was
the
last
day
of
the
evacuation
of
Dunkirk.
Although
the
British
suffered
severe
losses
of
81
heavy
equipment,
ships
and
aircraft,
the
evacuation
was
considered
highly
successful.
But,
the
evacuation
also
indicated
to
the
international
community
that
Britain
was
incredibly
vulnerable
(Calder,
1969,
p.
107;
Clayton
and
Craig,
2002,
p.
128).
Two
major
changes
in
military
power
occurred
for
the
Britain
during
the
following
months.
First,
for
one
of
the
few
times
in
Britain's
history,
the
country
was
susceptible
to
defeat
by
an
advancing
adversary,
suggesting
to
the
international
community
that
not
only
was
Britain
in
danger
of
defeat,
but
the
German
forces
were
stronger
and
far
more
ambitious
than
initially
considered
(Clayton
and
Craig,
2002,
p.
128;
Calder,
1969,
p.
107).
Thus,
Britain's
retreat
indicated
to
Germany's
enemies
that
they
must
not
be
overconfident
in
gaining
victory,
but
cautious
and
vigilant
when
dealing
with
German
forces.
This
cautious
approach
was
reflected
in
Winston
Churchill's
speeches
and
influenced
the
manner
in
which
he
dealt
with
the
Battle
of
Britain.
Second,
the
evacuation
caused
the
British
government
to
turn
to
the
RAF
as
the
pillar
of
the
nation's
defense.
According
to
T.C.G.
James
(2000),
author
of
The
Battle
of
Britain:
The
general
effect
of
the
German
occupation
of
Western
Europe
upon
the
air
defense
of
Great
Britain
was
to
extend
the
area
that
was
open
to
air
bombardment
and
to
intensify
the
scale
of
attack
that
was
to
be
expected.
The
counter-measures
that
were
taken
can
thus
be
described
under
two
heads:
first,
the
extension
of
the
air
defense
system
to
the
newly
threatened
districts;
second,
the
expansion
of
the
fighter
force
and
the
associated
defenses
to
meet
the
increased
scale
of
attack.
(James,
2000,
p.
3).
Although
the
expansion
of
the
RAF's
role
required
major
economic
revisions
to
the
British
government's
war-time
policies,
the
RAF's
ability
to
defend
the
island
became
absolutely
critical
to
maintaining
the
sovereignty
of
Britain.
This
heightened
attention
to
82
the
RAF's
importance
would
be
further
illuminated
in
Churchill's
speeches
(Calder,
1969,
p.
110).
On
June
4,'1940,
one day
after
the
evacuation
from
Dunkirk
were
complete,
Winston
Churchill
addressed
the
House
of
Commons
in
Britain
with
his
speech
"We
Shall
Fight
on
the
Beaches"
(Churchill,
1940a).
This
speech,
described
below,
has
become
one
of
the
most
famous
of
the
20th
Century,
as
it
approached
Britain's
near-
defeat
with
a
surprisingly
optimistic,
yet
rational,
attitude.
Churchill
accomplished
many
tasks
in
this
speech.
First,
he
supplied
the
British
people
with
official
details
about
the
evacuation
of
Dunkirk.
Second,
he
expressed
the
government's
policy
which
rejected
capitulation
to
Germany.
Third,
he
made
a
public
declaration
for
assistance
to
the
Commonwealth
countries,
as
well
as
the
United
States.
Finally,
he
outlined
the
steps
the
government
would
take
in
the
event
of
further
attacks
by
the
Germans
and
a
full
out
invasion.
Naturally,
when
a
government
is
at
war,
a
leader
must
take
the
necessary
steps
to
inform
his
citizens
about
the
government's
position
regarding
the
crisis.
However,
it
is
how
Churchill
framed
these
facts
and
policies
which
made
it
incredibly
effective
and
rhetorical.
Rhetorical
Analysis
of
June
4,
1940
Speech
"We
Shall
Fight
On
the
Beaches"
A
rhetorical
analysis
of
Churchill's
speech,
based
upon
the
Aristotelian
framework
of
ethos,
logos
and
pathos
as
well
as
Pericles'
Funeral
Oration,
will
aid
in
determining
how
Churchill's
approach
helped
to
reinforce
unity
and
civilian
morale
during
a
tenacious
moment
in
Britain's
history.
By
first
evaluating
Churchill's
ethos,
or
moral
authority
and
ethical
character,
it
will
help
to
establish
the
audience's
perceptions
of
Churchill
before
and
throughout
the
speech,
while
also
clarifying
his
role
as
a
rhetor
within
this
crisis.
83
After
Neville
Chamberlain
resigned
as
the
Prime
Minister
in
May,
1940,
Churchill
was
appointed
as
Prime
Minister.
Although
Churchill
had
the
confidence
of
the
three
major
parties,
many
were
not
convinced
that
Churchill's
position
as
Prime
Minister
would
ensure
survival,
nor
a
victory,
against
the
Germans
(Lukacs,
2001,
p.
13-14).
After
the
evacuations
of
Dunkirk
in
June,
1940,
it
was
imperative
to
the
stability
of
the
British
government
that
Churchill
made
the
correct
decisions,
whether
by
speech-making
or
policy-making.
Before
rising to his
feet
in
the
House
of
Commons
on
June
4,
1940,
Churchill
was
a
well-known
journalist
and
politician
who
was
out-spoken,
witty
and
determined.
However,
it
was
unclear
whether
Churchill
was
going
to
rally
public
opinion
or
follow
in
the
footsteps
of
his
predecessor,
Chamberlain,
and
generate
further
political
instability
within
the
British
government
(Lukacs,
2001,
p.
12).
According
to
T.
Clayton
and
P.
Craig
(2002), authors
of
Finest
Hour: The
Battle
of
Britain,
Churchill's
speech
on
June
4,
1940
was
paramount
to
the
maintenance
of
civilian
morale,
as
many
had
been
left
to
speculate
about
defeat,
implied
by
the
evacpation,
and
national
morale
had
been
very
low
(p.128).
Indeed,
a
national
pessimism
had
arisen
(Lukacs,
2001,
p.
197).
However,
many
British
people
would
hear
Churchill's
speech.
According
to
Angus
Calder
(1969)
some
seven
out
of
ten
people
in
Britain
heard
Churchill's
five
radio-broadcast
speeches
throughout
this
summer
(p.
97).
Therefore,
the
speech
on
June
4,
1940,
along
with
others
Churchill
would
deliver,
was
instrumental
to
invoke
a
fresh
and
informative
relationship
between
the
newly-elected
Prime
Minister
Churchill
and
British
citizens
(Clayton
&
Craig,
2002,
p.
128).
Churchill's
ethos
and,
in
particular,
his
virtuous
character,
was
developed
in
the
speech
by
exhibiting
traits
of
honesty
and
objectivity.
Whereas
other
political
leaders
might
shy
away
from
brutal
facts
that
illustrate
the
vulnerability
of
the
state,
Churchill
met
this
information
head
on.
Even
more
so,
Churchill
(1940a)
emphasized
that
judgments
must
be
made
upon
the
receipt
of
factual
data:
84
I
asked
the
House
a
week
ago
to
suspend
its
judgment
because
the
facts
were
not
clear,
but
I
do
not
feel that
any
reason
now
exists
why
we
should
not
form
our
own
opinions
upon
this
pitiful
episode
[
...
]
The
enemy
attacked
on
all
sides
with
great strength
and
fierceness,
and
their
main
power,
the
power
of
their
far
more
numerous
Air
Force,
was
thrown
into
the
battle
or
else
concentrated
upon
Dunkirk
and
the
beaches.
(Churchill,
1940a,
para.
6).
Honesty,
a
key
aspect
of
ethos,
which
is
highly
valued
within
western
society,
was
exhibited
by
Churchill
when
he
confronted
the
brutal
truth
of
the
crisis.
This
honesty,
albeit
brutally
truthful,
was
consistently
exhibited
within
the
speech,
further
suggesting
that
Churchill's
relationship
to
his
citizens
was
formed
on
the
basis
of
reliable
and
unswerving
statement
of
fact
and
truth.
An
additional
aspect
of
Churchill's
virtuous
character
was
how
he
treated
his
enemies.
Griffin
(1997)
suggests
that
by
being
charitable
to
your
enemy,
you
appear
good,
honest
and
even
respectable
(p.
306).
This
was
a
major
component
of
Churchill's
ethos
that
Hitler
lacked.
Although
Churchill
(1940a)
could
have
easily
attacked
or
ridiculed
his
enemy,
he
did
not
and
instead
treated
his
enemy
with
the
utmost
respect
by
calling
the
Germans
a
"very brave
race"
(para.
10)
and
referring
to
Hitler
as
"Herr
Hitler"
(para.
14).
When
Churchill
critiqued
Hitler
or
Germany,
he
claimed
that
Germans
are
similar
to
a
powerful
machine,
which
was
led
blindly
into
battle:
Behind
this
armored
and
mechanized
onslaught
came
a
number
of
German
divisions
in
lorries,
and
behind
them
again
there
plodded
comparatively
slowly
the
dull
brute
mass
of
the
ordinary
German
Army
and
German
people,
always
so
ready
to
be
led
to
the
trampling
down
in
other
lands
of
liberties
and
comforts
which
they
have
never
known
in
their
own.
(Churchill,
1940a,
para.
2).
Churchill
implied
that
the
German
people
can
only
be
humanized
by
liberty
and
comfort
-
qualities
which
their
country
has
disallowed them.
Churchill's
critique
was
more
85
compassionate
than
disrespectful.
Churchill
could
have
easily
described
the
Germans
as
an
evil
and
inhumane
race,
but
he
did
not.
This
poetic
treatment
of
Britain's
enemy
demonstrates
sympathy
for
the
foe
that
was
prohibited
from
liberty.
This
level
of
sympathy
demonstrated
Churchill's
virtuous
character.
Another
aspect
of
ethos
is
the
goodwill
of
the
speaker,
which
demonstrates
that
the
speaker
has
the
best
interests
of
the
audience
at
heart
(Griffin,
1997,
p.
306).
Churchill
has
been
critiqued
for
being
overly
pompous
and
grand,
rather
than
sensitive
to
his
audience's
needs
(Roberts,
2003,
p.
33).
Whereas
Hitler
appealed
to
the
uneducated,
lower
class
audiences
by
appealing
to
compassion
in
simple
language,
Churchill's
detached
stance
and
high
level
vocabulary
have
been
named
as
his
major
persuasive
failing
(Roberts,
2003,
p.
33).
In
the
speech
of
June
4,
1940,
Churchill
only
slightly
portrayed
his
goodwill
and
it
was
not
a
heavily
developed
aspect
of
his
ethos.
When
Churchill
(1940a)
stated
"I
take
occasion
to
express
the
sympathy
of
the
House
to
all
who
have
suffered
bereavement
or
who
are
still
anxious"
(para.
12),
Churchill
was
directly
addressing
the
interests
of
his
audience.
His
empathy
was
evident
throughout
the
speech,
but
Churchill
never
suggested
that
he
was
only
thinking
of
the
citizens
and
their
plight.
Instead,
Churchill's
rhetoric
was
more
consistently
directed
towards
the
deeds
of
the
pilots
and
aircrew
and
how
Churchill's
government
will
help
support
their
military
efforts.
The
audience's
ability
to
perceive
intelligence
in
the
speaker
is
the
third
aspect
of
ethos,
and
this
was
apparent
within
Churchill's
speech.
As
Griffin
(1997)
suggests,
perceived
intelligence
"has
more
to
do
with
practical
wisdom
and
shared
values
than
it
does with
training
at
Plato's
Academy"
(p.
306).
Churchill
reminded
citizens
that
Britain
was
capable
of
victory
during
the
most
tenuous
times.
By
reminding
the
audience
of
the
great
triumphs of
British
history,
'including
the
Round
Table
and
the
Crusaders,
Churchill
rejected
the
fear
caused
by
a
vulnerable
position
and
embraced
the
hope
bound
within
the
86
victories
of
a
historic,
national
past.
Clayton
&
Craig
(1999)
interpret
that
Churchill
"began
to
make
his
listeners
feel
a
part
of
history
themselves"
(p.
129)
and
that
"hope
and
heroics
were
being
offered
to
a
nation
starved
of both"
(p.
129).
This
evocation
of
the
national
history,
albeit
slightly
mythical
and
valorized,
demonstrated
shared
values
and
historical
wisdom
that
Churchill
was
able
to
capitalize
upon,
in
order
to
develop
his
ethos
and
the
audience's
unity.
Logos,
or
the
appeal
to
reason,
was
considered
by
Aristotle
to
be
the
strongest
of
the
three
proofs
of
persuasion
(Bizzell
&
Herzberg,
2001,
p.
4).
Logos
does
not
equate
to
intelligence
of
the
speaker.
Instead,
logos
must
demonstrate
that
the
speaker
has
a
rational
argument.
The
very
fact that
Churchill
rejected
national
capitulation,
given
that
Britain
was on
the
brink
of
defeat,
was
targeted
by
Hitler
as
"irrational"
in
his
future
speeches.
But,
if
one
follows
Churchill's
reasoning
behind
his
government's
"never
surrender"
policy,
it
was
based
upon
the
foundation
that
Britain
would
survive
insurmountable
odds
as
it
had
done
in
the
past:
1
have,
myself,
full
confidence
that
if all
do
their
duty,
if
nothing
is
neglected,
and
if
the
best
arrangements
are
made,
as
they
are
being
made,
we
shall
prove
ourselves
once
again
able
to
defend
our
Island
home,
to
ride
out
the
storm
of
war,
and
to
outlive
the
menace
of
tyranny,
if
necessary
for
years,
if
necessary
alone.
(Churchill,
1940a,
para.
18).
Based
upon
the
belief
that
Britain
could
endure
war
because
of
its
legendary
ability
to
survive,
this
denotes
that
the
argument
was
based
upon
the
merits
of
the
British
people
and
history.
If
British
citizen's
were
to
disagree
and
suggest
that
they
cannot
survive,
then they
are
disagreeing
with
the
aforementioned
British
history
and
British
legacies.
Therefore,
Churchill's
argument
was
problematic
to
oppose.
Because
if
one
did,
then
he
or
she
was
unpatriotic
and
obviously
did
not
understand
the
ability
of
the
British
will.
Although
this
could
be
advantageous
to
evoke
unity
within
the
British
people,
this
also
87
inhibited
any
dissent
from
the
audience
and
could
be
considered
unreasonably
hopeful.
Even
today,
historians
argue
that
this
position
is
"incredibly
optimistic"
(Heywood,
2003,
p.
89),
given
the
dire
circumstances
of
the
British.
Pathos,
the
emotional
appeal of
the
speaker,
is
demonstrated
during
the
invention
of
the
speech
and
upon
its
delivery.
Not
only
does
pathos
relate
to
the
figures
of
speech
and
varied
linguistic
properties,
but
pathos
also
relates
to
the
tone
of
the
speaker's
voice
and
the
delivery
of
the
message
(Griffin,
1997,
p.
307-308).
As
this
thesis
will
not
analyze
the
audio
recordings
of
the
speeches,
this
analysis
is
limited
to
the
text
itself.
The
linguistic
technicalities
of
the
speech
itself
demonstrate
that
Churchill
had
a
full
command
of
the
English
language
and
a
colorful
array
of
metaphors
at
his disposal.
For
example,
when
Churchill
(1940a)
discussed
the
opportunities
for
Britain's
youth
at
war,
he
memorialized
them
as
"The
Knights
of
the
Round
Table,
the
Crusaders"
(para.
11).
Or,
Churchill
(1940a)
personified
the
British
Army
as
an
organism,
suggesting
that
the
country
operated
and
experienced
as
a
whole:
"The
whole
root
and
core
and
brain
of
the
British
Army,
on
which
and
around
which
we
were
to build,
and
are
to
build
[
...
]
seemed
about
to
perish
upon
the
field
or
to
be
led
into
an
ignominious
and
starving
captivity"
(para.
4).
Churchill
(1940a)
also
used
repetition
throughout
the
course
of
his
speech,
which
was
best
demonstrated
near
the
end,
when
he
repeated
the
phrase
"we
shall"
eleven
times
(para.
18).
By
using
repetition,
vivid
adjectives
and
a
high
level
of
vocabulary,
Churchill
varied
his
message
through
creative
linguistic
means.
The
emotional
state
of
the
audience
is
also
a
key
aspect
of
pathos.
According
to
Griffin
(1997),
"Aristotle
believed
that
the
effective
speaker
must
know
how
to
stir
up
the
various
emotions
of
the
audience"
(p.
307).
As
stated
previously,
Aristotle
suggested
six
key
emotional
states
and
their
antecedents,
which
characterize
the
primary
emotions
an
audience
could
feel.
In
this
speech,
Churchill's
pathos
exhibited
both
a
desire for
fear
and
its
antecedent,
confidence.
For
example,
the
majority
of
Churchill's
speech
focused
upon
89
Churchill
solidly
portrayed
a
developed
ethos
(even
if
good
will
was
not
overly
emphasized),
that
Churchill's
logos
was
based
upon
a
belief
in his
citizen's
historic
ability
to
overcome
and
Churchill's
pathos
evoked,
then
dismissed,
fear in
a
nation
which,
when
forced
to
see
the
brutal
reality
of
the
situation,
also
became
confident
and
hopeful.
Churchill's
speech
on
June
4,
1940
must
also
be
compared
to
Pericles'
Funeral
Oration.
By
emphasizing
the
link
between
personal
sacrifice
and
public
glory,
it
further
solidified
the
relationship
between
civilian
and
government,
and
suggested
that
war
was
necessary
to
the
maintenance
and
legacy
of
the
nation.
Similar
to
Pericles,
Churchill
eulogized
the
deceased
soldiers
and
military
personnel
in
this
speech.
Although
eulogy
was
not
the
primary
motivation
of
Churchill's
speech,
the
importance
of
sacrifice
to
the
nation
was
mentioned.
Upon
discussing
the
fighting
at
Boulogne
and
Calais,
Churchill
praised
the
soldiers
who
fought,
yet
had
to
surrender.
Churchill
(1940a)
stated:
Only
30
unwounded
survivors
were
brought
off
by
the
Navy,
and
we
do
not
know
the
fate
of
their
comrades.
Their
sacrifice,
however,
was
not
in
vain.
At
least
two
armored
divisions,
which
otherwise
would
have been
turned
against
the
British
Expeditionary
Force,
had
to
be
sent
to
overcome
them.
They
have
added
another
page
to
the
glories
of
the
light
divisions.
(para.
3).
Due
to
the
personal
sacrifice
of
individuals,
Churchill
offered
them
glory
in
the
legacies
of
their
units.
Therefore,
their
personal
loss
was
a
national
gain.
This
sentiment
was
reflected
in
Pericles'
speech,
which
illustrates
the
relationship
between
military
losses
and
national
glory:
They
gave
their
lives
for
that
common
good
and
for
themselves
they
won
praises
that
will
not
grow
old,
the
most
distinguished
of
sepulchers
-
not
the
sepulchers
in
which
they
now
lie,
but
where
their
glory
is
laid
down
in
everlasting
remembrance.
(Pericles,
trans.
1979,
para
43).
90
Churchill,
like
Pericles,
ascertained
the
connection
between
the
individual
and
the
nation.
This
maintained
the
belief
that
war
was
necessary
and
that
sacrifice
was
inevitable.
By
making
this
distinction,
Churchill
was
effectively
persuading
listening
soldiers
that
their
actions
would
be
remembered
and
absorbed
into
the
legacy
of
the
nation.
Overall,
Churchill's
June
4,
1940
speech
was
an
immaculate
and
surprisingly
astounding
testament
to
the
power
of
rhetoric in
war.
The
negative
or
disappointing
aspect
of
rhetoric
found
in
Churchill's
June
4,
1940
speech
regards
the
position
that
he
placed
his
audience.
With
defeat
considered
highly
probable,
surrender
impossible
and
survival
imperative,
Churchill
forces
his
audience
into
a
unique
position.
If
they
disagree,
then
they
were
revolting
against
a
consistent
national
theme which
dictates
that
the
British
survive
against
all
odds.
Thus,
disagreement with
Churchill
was
a
violation
of
British
history
and
character.
However,
Churchill's
speech
was
powerful
and
persuasive,
given
Britain's
dire
situation.
Not
only
did
he
inform
his
citizens
of
the
truthful
facts
with
brutal
honesty,
but
he
was
capable
of
framing
these
enumerable
failures
as
antecedents
to
a
victorious
outcome.
Indeed,
records
of
national
sentiment
denote
that
the
British
populace
believed
they
would
triumph
eventually,
but
the
contradictory
belief
that
Nazi
invasion
was
possible
also
began
to
surface
in
May,
1940
(Lukacs,
2001,
p.
36-37).
Regardless,
Churchill
maintained
respect
for
the
enemy,
referring
to
them
as
a
"brave
race"
(para.10)
and
pitied
their
collective
mentality
of
following
their
leader
into
war.
Churchill
reiterated
the
British
nation's
ability
to
survive
and
focused
upon
British
history
as
a
source
of
motivation
and
reassurance,
creating
a
positive
relationship
between
the
British
government
and
citizens,
based
on
facts
and
a
common
national
legacy.
Instead
of
coming
straight
across
the
Channel
after
the
BEF
as
many
British
had
expected,
the
Germans
concentrated
on
finishing
off
France
(Calder,
1969,
p.
110).
By
91
June
14
the
German
Army
had
entered
Paris,
and
on
June
22,
the
French
had
signed
an
armistice
with
the
Germans
(Calder,
1969,
P.
110).
The
German
forces
now
viewed
Western
Europe
as
theirs.
According
to
J.
Lucas
(1987),
a
veteran
of
the
German
Wehrmacht
and
author
of
World
War
Two
Through
German
Eyes,
"The
German
soldiers
who
had
fought
their
way
across
Flanders
and
then
through
the
Dunkirk
perimeter
to
the
beaches
(witnessed)
the
vast
material
losses
that
the
Allies
had
suffered
[
...
]
they
knew
their
army
had
gained
a
great
victory"
(p.
123).
The
surrender
of
France
was
significant
to Hitler's
vision
of
the
future.
He
had
hoped
that
the
fall
of
France
would
bring
Britain
to
her
senses
and
that
she
would
make
peace
(Calder,
1969,
p.
140),
"thus
enabling
him
to
concentrate
on
the
overthrow
of
Russian
bolshevism"
(Messenger,
1990,
p.12).
The
fall
of
France
had
serious
ramifications
to
Britain.
Italy
was
an
ally
of
Germany
and,
with
France
eliminated
from
fighting,
Britain
stood
alone
-
only
Britain's
empire
overseas
and
the
exiles
from
occupied
Europe
could
support
her.
With
the
surrender
of
Paris,
Britain's
isolation
was
now
complete
and
her
vulnerability
to
attack,
both
through
military
and
rhetorical
means,
was
intensified.
"Operation Sealion"
and
Plans
to
Invade
Britain
Hitler
was
reluctant
to
focus
all
German
efforts
on
Britain,
and
his
decision
to
invade
Britain
did
not
come
easily
(Calder,
1969,
p.
119).
Hitler
wanted
to
focus
his
attention
on
Russia
because
of
his
innate
desire
to
rid
Europe
of
Bolshevism
while
simultaneously
wanting
to
expand
his
empire
for
the
appropriation
of
"living
space"
(Lucas,
1987,
p.151).
Nevertheless,
Hitler
chose
Britain
due
to
a
number
of
reasons.
A
major
contributor
to
Hitler's
choice
to
invade
Britain
was
based
upon
a
study
called
Directive
Number
9,
which
had
been
conducted
in
November
1939
by
the
Directorate
of
Naval
Operations
in
Germany.
The
study
had
already
assembled
a
plan
for
invading
Britain,
thus
providing
Hitler
with
researched
avenues
of
action
for
any
Channel
92
landings
(Lucas,
1987,
P.
126).
Directive
Number
9
was
revisited
in
1940
by
Hitler's
top
staff,
and
concluded
that
a
successful
invasion
of
Britain
would
only
occur
if
the
attacker
had
both
naval
and
air
superiority
(Lucas,
1987,
p.
126).
Naval
superiority
was
not
easily
obtained,
as
Britain's
Royal
Navy
was
one
of
the
finest
and
largest in
the
world
(Calder,
1969,
p.
119).
In
fact,
the
German
navy
("Kriegsmarine")
opposed
the
invasion
of
Britain
(termed
"Operation
SeelOwe",
Operation
Sealion)
because
its
Navy
did
not
have
enough
ships
to
protect
a
land
invasion,
and
there
were
no
specialized
landing
craft
available
(Lucas,
1987,
p.
126).
Therefore,
unless
the
German
forces
possessed
air
superiority
and
could
thus
neutralize
the
RAF
and
Royal Navy,
"Sealion",
or
the
invasion
of
Britain,
would
not
succeed.
In
light
of
this
fact,
Hitler
reluctantly
agreed
to
focus
Germany's
efforts
on
continuing
the
war
with
Britain
and
invading
the
island.
The
planned
invasion
of
Britain
was
rhetorical
because
it
influenced
the
propaganda
strategies
of
the
Nazi
government
and
targeted
British
weaknesses
in
speeches.
Pictures
from
Dunkirk
which
portrayed
beaches
littered
with
abandoned
helmets
and
artillery
and
masses
of
wounded
soldiers
were
utilized
to raise
the
morale
of
German
people
(Lucas,
1987,
p.
123).
Moreover,
Churchill's
pledge
to
"never
surrender",
coupled
with
the
absolute
isolation
of
Britain
was
targeted
as
"ridiculous"
by
German
officials
(Clayton
&
Craig,
2002,
p.
191;
Domarus,
1997,
p.
2065).
Not
only
was
Britain
rhetorically
attacked,
but
Germany's
distain
of
Britain's
refusal
to
surrender
began
a
discourse
between
the
adversaries,
permitting
both
Churchill
and
Hitler to
critique
each
other
within
their
significant
speeches
during
the
summer
of
1940.
Herman
Goring,
a
major
Nazi
leader,
became
central
to
the
military
and
rhetorical
strength
of
Operation
Sealion.
Hitler
appointed
Goring,
Commander
in
Chief
of
the
Luftwaffe,
to
create
and
supervise
the
attacks
on
the
RAF.
On
June
30
1940,
GOring
issued
the
General
Directive
for
the
Operation
of
the
Luftwaffe
against
England
which
reiterated
Directive
No
9
of
the
November
1939
report
-
suggesting
that
Britain's
93
economy
would
be
best
destroyed
by
severing
her
overseas
trade
(Messenger,
1990,
p.
14;
Lucas,
1987,
p.
126).
This
strategy
was
manifested
as
focused
attacks
on
trade
barges
coming
and
going
through
the
English Channel.
Moreover,
Generalmajor
Alfred
Jodl,
Chief
of
Staff
of
the
Wehrmacht
(German
Armed
Forces)
wrote
that
"an
attack
upon
Great
Britain
had
to
be
the
next
logical
step
[...]
Britain's
will
to
resist
would
have
to
be
broken
by
force"
(Lucas,
1987,
p.
129).
Jodl
further
suggested
that
an
invasion
could
begin
as
early
as
August
1940
because
the
Luftwaffe
would
have
gained
ascendancy
in
the
air
(Lucas,
p.
129).
Also,
Goring's
rhetorical
ethos,
his
reputation,
moral
character,
and
intelligence
became
a
symbolic
rallying
point
for
German
success.
Although
Hitler
will
be
the
primary
source
of
rhetorical
analysis,
it
is
important
to
mention
Goring,
as
he
was
an
integral
aspect
to
the
battle
and
his
actions
had
direct
consequences
in
the
outcome.
Goring
(1893-1946)
was
a
veteran
of
the
First
World
War
who
became
a
national
hero
through
his
successful
career
as
a
pilot.
Having
joined
the
Nazi
Party
in
1922,
Goring
was
one
of
Hitler's
oldest
associates
and
was
appointed
president
of
the
Reichstag
in
1933.
GOring's
celebrity
status
was
fuelled
by
his
flamboyant
relish
in
luxury
and
excess.
He
was
also
an
ambitious
schemer
and
vicious
infighter.
Although
his
fiery
personality
preceded him,
GOring
was
considered
a
powerful
and
clever
man
by
the
German
public
(Bergen,
2003,
p.
40-41).
Hitler
trusted
him
as
well,
believing
in
Goring's
promise
that
the
RAF
could
be
defeated
(Lukacs,
2001,
p.
42).
The
significance
of
choosing
Goring
to
lead
the
attacks
on
Britain
was
advantageous
to
the
Nazi
cause.
As
Goring
was
a
popular
war
hero,
educated
in
military
strategy
and
also
politically
active,
his
reputation
brought
confidence
and
prestige
to
the
operation.
Britain
became
the
primary
military
target
and
central
to
the
future
victories
by
the
German
government.
The
island
adversary
was
the
most
significant
challenge
to
any
future
Nazi
successes
in
Western
Europe
and
she
was
entirely
alone,
defeated
from
the
94
shores
of
Dunkirk
and
ill-prepared
for
offensive
air
strikes
and
invasion.
Hitler's
Germany
was
ready
for
war,
as
plans
to
invade
were
settled,
the
Reich's
Air
Force
was
led
by
one
of
the
most
popular
men
in
the
country
and
Germany's
Propaganda
Ministry
was
systematically
reinforcing
the
public's
distain
for
Churchill.
Moreover,
historians
now
suggest
that
it
was
believed
by
the
British
that
Hitler
would
not
fail,
if
an
invasion
could
be
gotten
underway
(Lukacs,
2001,
p.
6-7).
From
a
rhetorical
standpoint,
Hitler
was
stronger
and
more
unified
than
ever
before.
Conquering
France
took
only
six
weeks
and
Britain,
it
was
thought,
would
not
take
much
longer.
By
July
19,
1940
Hitler's
confidence
was
manifested
by
unifying
Britain's
vulnerability
with
German
success.
Britain's
assured
downfall
was
intricately
tied
to
a
German
victory.
Rhetorical
and
Technical
Aspects
of
the
Battle
of
Britain
The
acknowledgement
of
the
technical
elements
in
the
Battle
of
Britain,
such
as
the
numerical
advantages
or
disadvantages
of
types
of
aircraft,
assists
in
the
exploration
of
rhetoric's
role
in
the
unfolding
of
the
battle
itself.
Technology
and
military
strength
did
play
a
major
role
in
this
battle's
outcome.
From
a
purely
technical
standpoint,
some
historians
perceive
that
the
German
forces
could
have
more
likely
won
the
Battle
of
Britain
(Price,
1977,
p.
37),
although
scholars
continually
dispute
this
claim
(see
Calder,
1969).
Germany
had
more
experienced
pilots,
possessed
a
statistically
higher
number
of
well-equipped
aircraft
that
rivaled
the
famous
British
Spitfire,
was
led
by
the
reputed
Goring
and
was
more
prepared
for
an
offensive
strike
than
the
British
military
defenses.
As
mentioned
previously,
could
it
be
that
rhetoric
was
one
such
factor
that
contributed
to
the
battle's
outcome?
In
order
to
investigate
the
role
of
rhetoric
in
the
Battle
of
Britain,
the
technical
aspects
must
first
be
evaluated
to
illustrate
how
technology
and
numerical
strength
can
influence
battlefield
events.
Although
historians
admit
that
most
numerical
facts
about
the
Battle
of
Britain
are
consistently
disputed
(Calder,
1969,
p.
160;
James,
95
2000,
P.
1),
this
thesis
hopes
to
find
consensus
among
scholars
regarding
specific
facts
presented
in
this
thesis,
by
using
various
scholarly
historical
sources.
To
begin,
the
state
of
each
country's
air
forces
at
the
commencement
of
battle
was
significant.
The
Luftwaffe
had
noteworthy
advantages.
First,
Germany
had
2,800
aircraft
readied
for
battle
while
the
British
possessed
as
few
as
650
fighters
(Calder,
1969,
p.
141;
Fawcett,
2006,
p.
250).
Also,
the
Germans
had
occupied
France
and
the
Low
Countries,
as
well
as
Norway
and
Denmark,
allowing
a
multitude
of
bases
from
which
to
prepare
for
battle
(Fawcett,
p.
250).
German
aircrews
were
also
highly
experienced,
having
participated
in
airborne
attacks
along
the
Western
Front,
in
Poland
and
even
Spain
(Fawcett,
P.
246;
Messenger,
1990,
p.
15-16).
Moreover,
there
were
a
large
number
of
German
pilots
who
had
been
well-trained,
even
if
they
had
never
seen
battle
(Messenger,
p.
15-16).
And
finally,
the
Luftwaffe
had
an
assortment
of
single
and
twin-engine
fighters,
medium
bombers
and
dive-bombers
at
its
command,
including
the
Messerschmitt
109
Emil
(Me109E),
a
highly
maneuverable
fighter
plane,
equipped
with
machine
guns
and
a
fast
rate
of
climb,
considered
to
be
a
"formidable
aircraft"
(Messenger,
p.
18).
Although
these
noteworthy
advantages
existed,
there
were
also
some
disadvantages
to
the
Luftwaffe's
aircraft
and
offensive
capacity.
For
example,
the
Me109E;
while
a
formidable
aircraft,
also
had
a
very
limited
operational
range
that
would
prove
a
critical
disadvantage
in
operations
over
southern
England.
Moreover,
historians
also
suggest
that
the
Luftwaffe
was
more
suited
to
provide
air
support
to
an
advancing
army,
rather
than
as
an
entity
which
could launch
successful
offensive
air
strikes
against
land
targets
(James,
2000,
p.
318).
Although
these
disadvantages
existed,
Goring's
own
perspective
valued
the
strengths
of
the
Luftwaffe
and
was
best
illustrated
when
he
stated
shortly
after
the
fall
of
France
"My
Luftwaffe
is
invincible
[
...
]
And
so
now
we
turn
to
England.
How
long
will
this
one
last
-
two,
three
weeks?"
(As
cited
in
Stone,
et.
al.,
96
2007,
P.
83).
With
such
confidence
exuding
from
the
Luftwaffe's
leader,
it
is
understandable
that
Hitler
viewed
the
Battle
of
Britain
as
already
won.
Britain,
on
the
other
hand,
was
numerically
weaker
and
less
prepared
for
a
mid-
Channel
battle.
The
Air
Officer-in-Chief
of
Fighter
Command
was
Air
Chief
Marshal
Sir
Hugh
Dowding,
who
had
been
in
charge
of
Fighter
Command
since
its
inception
in
1936
(Messenger,
1990,
p.
18).
The
RAF's
pre-war
plans
gave
priority
to
the
bomber
over
the
fighter
(Messenger,
p.
19).
Until
the
1930s,
fighters
still
utilized
the
wooden
structure
and
biplane
design
of
the
First
World
War,
with
a
slow
climb
rate
- a
huge
disadvantage
when
incoming
attacks
were
only
visually
or
aurally
detected,
preventing
the
slow
fighters
from
intercepting
air
attacks
promptly
(Messenger,
p.
19).
Hawker
Hurricane
fighters
that
entered
RAF
service
in
1938
could
not
compare
to
the
Me109
in
speed
and
maneuverability
but
were
superior
to
Messerschmitt
110's
(Mel
10) or
Stukas,
as
would
be
proven
(Calder,
1969,
p.
141;
Price,
1977,
p. 12).
However,
the
RAP
possessed
the
Supermarine
Spitfire,
which
could
match
the
Me109
in
most
combat
scenarios
and
became
vitally
important
to
defending
Britain
(Calder,
p.
141).
Usually,
Hurricanes
were
relegated
to
attacking
Luftwaffe
bombers,
while
Spitfires
engaged
Me109s
(Price,
1977,
p.
40).
A
major
problem
for
the
Luftwaffe,
as
would
be
demonstrated
in
the
coming
months,
was
that
the
Me109's
did
not
possess
sufficient
fuel
to
engage
in
long
combat
scenarios,
leaving
Luftwaffe
bombers
sometimes
unescorted
and
thus,
more
vulnerable
to
RAF
fighter
attacks.
However,
Britain
did
not
have
a
sufficient
number
of
pilots
and
to
fully
train
a
pilot
took
almost
a
year.
C.
Messenger
(1990)
suggests
that
pilots
were
of
major
concern:
"The
training
organization
had
not
expanded
at
sufficient
pace
to
cope
with
the
share
rise
in
aircrew
losses
during
the
French
campaign
and
there
was
a
worrying
shortfall.
It
was
pilots,
rather
than
aircraft
losses,
which
concerned
Dowding
more
during
the
coming
battle"
(p.
23).
It
would
not
be
until
July
1940
when
the
British
Commonwealth
Air
97
Training
Plan
(BCATP)
would
be
implemented
in
Canada
and
elsewhere
in
the
Empire
whereby
trainees
would
receive
"crash
courses"
in
piloting
fighter
planes.
However,
this
training
strategy
did
not
produce
any
pilots
that
saw
service
in
the
Battle
of
Britain
(James,
2000,
p.
7).
However,
historians
acknowledge
that
there
were
three
major
advantages
that
the
British
had:
production
of
airplanes
was
sufficient,
radar
stations
could
anticipate
attacks
and
the
RAF's
strategy
played
on
the
Luftwaffe's
weaknesses
(Messenger,
1990,
p.
21-
30;
Price,
1977,
p.
15;
James,
2000,
p.
13).
By
April
1940,
before
Churchill
came
to
power,
fighter
production
exceeded
its
monthly
target
through
the
creation'
of
a
system
of
"shadow
factories",
converted
automobile
and
technical
production
sites
that
were
manufacturing
airplane
components
(Messenger,
p.
23).
Lord
Beaverbrook,
Britain's
minister
of
aircraft
production,
concentrated
on
producing
7,300
aircraft
between
January,
1940
and
May,
1940
(Stone
et
al.,
2007,
p.
103).
However,
the
lack
of
trained
pilots
meant
that
the
full
utilization
of
all
planes
manufactured
during
this
period
never
occurred
during
the
Battle
of
Britain.
Radar
stations
erected
along
the
southeast
coast
of
Britain
were
integral
to
the
early
warning
system
developed
in
the
1930s
by
a
Scottish
scientist,
Robert
Watson
Watt
(Messenger,
1990,
p.
21-22).
His
innovation
was
a
pulsed
radio
signal
from
a
powerful
transmitter
which
could
ascertain
aircraft
at
a
range
of
up
to
100
miles,
including
bearing
and
height.
Named
the
"Chain
Home
network",
a
series
of
radio
direction
finding
stations
(RDFs)
were
erected
along
the
coasts
of
England
(Price,
1977,
p.
15).
This
technological
development
was
crucial
to
obtaining
minute-by-minute
accounts
of
German
air
location
and
attacks.
Also,
the
radar
stations
themselves
were
resilient
to
air
attacks
and
did
not
•
often
require
massive
repair
(Messenger,
p.
21-22).
According
to
Calder
(1969),
"had
the
radar
chain
not
existed,
Fighter
Command
would
have
wasted
its
strength
ineffectually
in
standing
patrols;
as
it
was,
the
British
planes
could
rise
relatively
late
to
anticipate
the
98
intruders"
(p.
143)
and
thereby,
concentrate
their
limited
resources
on
the
main
German
attacks.
Therefore,
radar
was
essential in
this
battle.
Finally,
the
RAF's
strategy
was
significant.
At
the
beginning
stages
of
the
planned
air
attacks
against
Britain,
the
Nazi
decision
to
bomb
British
ships
and
convoys
was
not
only
to
eliminate
trade
in
the
Channel,
thereby
cutting
off
Britain
from
overseas
imports,
but
also
to
provoke
the
RAF
into
sending
fighter
pilots
to
protect
the
ships,
exposing
them
to
mid-Channel
combat
against
the
Luftwaffe
fighters
(Messenger,
1990,
p.
30;
Fawcett,
2006,
p.
251;
James,
2000,
p.
13).
Thus,
by
'drawing
out'
the
RAF
fighters,
the
Luftwaffe
could
have
a
chance
of
attacking
their
enemy
over
the
Channel,
where
anti-aircraft
guns
did
not
exist,
the
Luftwaffe's
numerical
presence
was
not
visible
and
the
German
fighters
were
closer
to
bases
and
fuel
sources,
allowing
longer
time
engaged
in
combat.
However,
throughout
the
coming
months,
the
RAP
strategy
was
to
remain
close
to
home,
thereby
capitalizing
on
their
local
fuel
sources
in
order
to
create
longer
combat
times.
This
tactic
would
also
prove
useful
for
aircrew
that
had
been
shot
down,
as
aircrew
could
return
to
nearby
bases
and
fly
in
new
aircraft
almost
the
next
day.
From
a
primarily
technical
standpoint,
it
can
be
suggested
that
the
German
Luftwaffe
was
better
prepared
to
undertake
offensive
maneuvers
over
the
English
Channel,
while
the
RAP,
though
possessing
RDF,
Spitfire
and
Hurricance
aircraft,
was
less
prepared
for
a
major
offensive
strike
against
their
Island
home.
Since
there
were
so
few
pilots,
the
RAP
could
rarely
commit
its
whole
strength
against
any
one
wave
of
Luftwaffe
bombers,
and
therefore,
the
RAF's
pilots
were
often
outnumbered
(Calder,
1969,
p.
142).
With
this
in
mind,
it
seemed
highly
unlikely
that
the
battle
would
end
with
a
British
victory.
Perhaps
rhetoric
was
one
significant
factor in
this
battle
that
reconciles
this
disconnect
-
perhaps
it
was
the
strength
of
British
rhetoric
that
would
assist
in
the
battlefield
outcome,
as
well
as
the
lack
of
persuasive
rhetoric
that
would
hinder
Germany's
efforts.
100
Rhetorical
Analysis
of
July
19,
1940
Speech
"The
Generous
Peace
Proposal"
Hitler's
speech
of
July
19,
1940
requested
peace
from
the
British.
This
speech
also
depicted
the
British
government
in
a
demeaning
manner,
using
name-calling
and
ridicule
to
advance
the
claim
that
Britain's
illogical
and
unreasonable
leadership
would
lead
to
Britain's
downfall.
Furthermore,
this
speech
rhetorically
placed
the
audience,
through
pathos,
in
a
position
of
hatred
and
confidence.
Finally,
Hitler
solidified
the
relationship
between
private
sacrifice
and
public
glory
through
a
method
similar
to
Pericles,
strengthening
the
reasons
for
engaging
in
combat
with
Britain.
Once
again,
Aristotle's
concept
of
ethos
will
be
operationalized
to
evaluate
Hitler's
rhetorical
strength
and
whether
he
exhibited
the
positive
traits
of
goodwill,
virtuous
character
and
perceived
intelligence.
By
this
juncture
in
the
war,
Hitler's
Germany
was
an
unbelievable
success
(Lukacs,
2001,
p.
10).
France
had
fallen,
Poland
had
fallen,
Belgium,
the
Netherlands,
Denmark
and
Norway
were
occupied,
Spain
was
neutral
but
sympathetic
and
fascist
Italy
was
their
friend
and
ally.
In
addition
to
this,
Germany
had
an
illustrious
Luftwaffe
within
their
successful
Wehrmacht,
which
was
fuelled
with
motivation
and
belief
in
its
own
strength
by
a
Propaganda
Ministry
that
had
been
operating
since
the
late
1920s
(Calder,
1969,
p.
141;
Evans,
2003,
p.
168).
Hitler
was
an
accomplished
politician,
whose
country
had
followed
his
national
socialist
policies
to
become
an
international
power
to
be
reckoned
with.
Therefore,
before
Hitler
even
stepped
up
to
the
podium
on
the
evening
of
July
19,
1940
his
ethos,
based
upon
his
reputation
and
character,
was
already
well-developed.
Hitler's
ethos
was
also
strengthened
within
the
speech
itself.
Goodwill,
an
important
aspect
of
ethos,
demonstrates
that
a
speaker
has
the
best
interests
of
his
audience
at
heart
(Griffin,
1997,
p.
306).
Hitler
simultaneously
portrayed
goodwill
to
three
audiences,
which
were:
the
entirety
of
Europe,
his
defeated
enemies
and
his
country.
For
example,
101
Hitler
claimed
that
the
solution
for
the
German
nation
was
to
return
Danzig,
the
"ancient,
purely
German
city" (as
cited
in
Domarus,
1997,
P.
2044)
back
to
the
Reich,
because
Hitler
felt
an
innate
sense
of
responsibility:
"If
Mr.
Churchill
or
any
other
warmongers
but
had,
a
fraction
of
the
sense
of
responsibility
I
felt
toward
Europe,
they
could not
have
played
so
perfidious
a
game"
(as
cited
in
Domarus,
p.
2044).
With
such
a
view,
Hitler
demonstrated
concern
and
responsibility
for
Europe
as
a
whole.
Furthermore,
Hitler
had
his
audience's
best
interests
at
heart
when
referring
to
Poland's
rejection
of
peace
in
1939;
Hitler
suggested
that
he
had
"then
also directed
an
appeal
to
reason
to
the
men
responsible
in
the
enemy
states
and
to
their
peoples.
I
warned
against
further
pursuit
of
war,
the
consequences
of
which
could
only
be
devastating"
(as
cited
in
Domarus,
p.
2044).
Hitler also
portrayed
his
goodwill
in
regards
to
the
German
people,
by
regretting
any
sacrifice
they
must
make
in
the
future.
After
condemning
Britain's
resolve
to
continue
waging
war,
Hitler
stated:
"I
regret
the
sacrifices
it
will
demand.
I
would
like
to
spare
my
Yolk.
I
know
the
hearts
of
millions
of
men
and
boys
aglow
at
the
thought
of
finally
being
allowed
to
wage
battle
against
an
enemy
who'
has,
without
reasonable
cause,
declared
war on
us
a
second
time"
(as
cited
in
Domarus,
1997,
p.
2062).
This
speech
was
scattered
with
evidence
that
Hitler
has
the
best
interests
of
his
audience
at
heart,
be
it
Europe
as
a
whole,
his
conquered
enemies
or
his
own
German
people.
Virtuous
character,
another
key
aspect
of
ethos,
was
not
well
demonstrated
throughout
Hitler's
speech.
Relating
specifically
to
the
speaker's
goodness
and
honesty,
it
can
often
be
associated
with
being
charitable
toward
enemies
and
optimistic
about
the
future
(Griffin,
1997,
p.
306).
This
was
Hitler's
major
rhetorical
failure,
because
he
did
not
treat
his
enemies
with
a
reasonable
amount
of
respect.
Although
it
was
suggested
earlier
that
Hitler
felt
responsible
for
his
enemies'
interests,
and
thus
revealed
his
goodness,
he
did
not
express
respect
when
discussing
their
leaders.
The
following
labels
102
are
used
when
describing
Churchill,
Britain
as
a
nation
and
other
British,
Canadian
and
American
political
leaders
(as
cited
in
Domarus,
1997):
"cold-blooded
politicians"
(p.
2045),
"policy-making
warmongers"
(p.
2045),
"ill-informed"
(p.
2049),
"blind,
stupid
or
simply
vile
scoundrels"
(p.
2060),
"scum
of
the
nation"
(p.
2060),
"British
warlords"
(p.
2060),
"propped-up
heads
of
state
without
thrones;
statesmen without
subjects;
and
generals
without
armies"
(p.
2060),
"British
statesmen
are
chronically
slow
in
their
comprehension
of
almost
everything"
(p.
2061)
and
"so-called
leaders
in
Canada"
(p.
2062).
The
wrath
of
Hitler's
tongue
was
consistently
scornful
and
cold,
considering
that
Hitler's
primary
enemy,
Churchill
(1940a),
referred
to
the
Germans
as
a
"brave
race"
(para.
10)
that
should
be
pitied
more
than
anything.
Hitler's
name-calling
was
routinely
demonstrated
throughout
the
speeches
in
the
summer
of
1940
and
from
a
rhetorical
perspective
was
a
major
flaw
in
his
ethos.
If
Hitler
had
referred
to
the
British
leaders
and
people
as
brave
and
courageous,
Hitler's
rhetorical
ethos
would
have
been
strengthened
as
a
leader
who
truly
cared
about
everyone
-
including
his
sworn
enemies.
Moreover,
if
Hitler
had
treated
his
enemy
with
respect,
then
perhaps
fighting
Britain
would
have
been
viewed
by
German
soldiers
and
pilots
as
a
valuable
and
worthy
cause.
Finally,
the
last
aspect
of
ethos,
perceived
intelligence,
is
best
demonstrated
when
a
speaker
displays
practical
wisdom
and
an
appreciation
for
shared
values
with
his
audience
(Griffin,
1997,
p.
306).
Similar
to
Churchill,
Hitler
appealed
to nationalistic
qualities
(freedom,
valor,
etc.)
that
depicted
him
as
a
sensible
person
who
was
acting
in
the
name
of
Germanic
values.
He
even
suggested
that
he,
himself,
was
revolted
by
war,
but
was
only
committing
evils
in
order
to
create
a
strong
German
culture:
"Believe
me,
my
Deputies,
I
feel
an
inner
disgust
at
this
type
of
unscrupulous
parliamentarian
annihilators
of
peoples
S
and
states
[...]
It
was
not
my
ambition
to
wage
wars,
but
to
build
up
a
new
social
state
of
the
highest
culture"
(as
cited
in
Domarus,
1997,
p.
2062).
This
demonstrated
that
Hitler
perceived
himself
as
not
a
warmonger,
but
a
leader
who
was
103
keen
to act in
the
name
of
building
a
worthy
German
state.
Furthermore,
Hitler
even
makes
reference
to
shared
values
which
appealed
to
German
citizens.
For
example,
Hitler
referred
to
the
war
in
Poland
by
claiming
that
"The
war
had
to
be
pursued
in
the
name
of
culture,
humanity,
good
fortune,
progress,
civilization,
and
-
Good
God!
-
even
in
the
name
of
sacred
religion"
(as
cited
in
Domarus,
1997,
P.
2046).
Again,
Hitler
refuted
any
label
as
a
war-maker,
claiming
instead
that
he
was
a
freedom
fighter,
who
was
acting
on
behalf
of
his
precious
country.
Logos,
or
the
rational
argument
of
the
speaker,
was
apparent
in
two
major
claims
that
the
national
socialists
used
throughout
their
reign.
First,
that
the
Treaty of
Versailles
victimized
the
German
nation
and
second,
that
the
Jewish
race
sabotaged
any
internal
efforts
to
become
a
truly
Aryan,
successful,
wealthy
nation,
among
other
things
(Evans,
2003,
p.
197).
Beginning
the
speech
with
a
scholarly
discussion
about
the
Treaty
of
Versailles,
Hitler
ridiculed
Britain,
France
and
the
Jewish
race
by
reiterating
that:
It
was
thus
that
the
joint
British-French
endeavor
to
portray
the
Versailles
Treaty
as
some
type of
international
or
higher
justice
must
have
appeared
to
every
honest
German
as
nothing
other
than
an
insolent
usurpation.
The
supposition
that
British
or
French
statesmen
of
all
people
were
custodians
of
justice
itself,
or
even
of
human
culture,
was
a
stupid
effrontery
{.
.
.1
The
National
Socialist
Movement
has,
besides
its
delivery
from
the
Jewish-capitalist
shackles
imposed
by
a
plutocratic-
democratic,
dwindling
class
of
exploiters
at
home,
pronounced
its
resolve
to
free
the
Reich
from
the
shackles
of
the
Diktat
of
Versailles
abroad.
The
German
demands
for
a
revision
were
an
absolute
necessity,
a
matter
of
course
for
the
existence
and
the
honor
of
any
great
people.
(As
cited
in
Domarus,
1997,
p.
2043).
Based
upon
this
argument,
overthrowing
the
British
and
French,
who
were
co-creators
of
the
Treaty
of
Versailles,
was
a
matter
of
honor.
Hitler
situated
his
audience
in
a
difficult
104
position.
If
they
disagreed
with
Hitler,
then
they
were
suggesting
that
the
Treaty
of
Versailles
was
a
fair
contract
of
higher
justice
and
that
Wilhelm
II's
Germany,
the
Germany
of
their
ancestors,
was
in
the
wrong.
Furthermore,
to
disagree
with
Hitler
would
be
to
agree
that
the
Jews
in
Germany
were
not
sabotaging
any
efforts
of
the
German
government.
These
arguments,
among
others
that
Hitler
advocated,
have
been
central
to
various
investigations
about
Hitler's
ideologies
and
arguments
(see
Evans,
2003).
However,
it
is
not
the
goal
of
this
thesis
to
determine
the
core
principles
of
Hitler's
arguments,
nor
why
they
were
even
considered
acceptable.
Rather,
it
is
only
significant
to
this
study
to
suggest
that
Hitler's
arguments
in
this
speech
were
generally
rational
and
reasonable
to
the
audience.
Another
key
argument
that
Hitler
conveys,
directly
regarding
Britain,
was
based
upon
Hitler's
claim
that
Germany
desired
peace.
Since
Churchill,
in
his
June
4,
1940
speech,
rejected
capitulation,
Hitler
was
now
"forced"
to
make
war
with
Britain.
Just
after
the
speech
climaxed
with
the
appointment
of
twelve
officers
to
the
rank
of
Field
Marshal,
(which
were
highly
prestigious
positions
in
the
military
hierarchy),
Hitler
closed
with
what
has
been
considered
a
"peace
offering"
by
historians
(Stone
et
al.,
2007,
p.
106;
Domarus,
1997,
p.
2064).
Hitler
appeared
conciliatory
and
focused
upon
his
own
reasonable
actions
as
a
testimony
to his
peace-making,
not
his
war-mongering.
Hitler
stated:
A
great
world
empire
will
be
destroyed
[
...
]
In
this
hour
I
feel
compelled,
standing
before
my
conscience,
to direct
yet
another
appeal
to
reason
in
England.
I
believe
I
can
do
this
as
I
am
not
asking
for
something
as
the
vanquished,
but
rather,
as
the
victor,
I
am
speaking
in
the
name
of
reason.
I
see
no
compelling
reason
which
could
force
the
continuation
of
this
war.
(As
cited
in
Domarus,
1997,
p.
2062).
106
glorious
victory
of
all
time"
(p.
2042).
Hitler's
pathos
was
evident
in
his
linguistically
vivid
language
and
superlative
structure.
The
other
key
element
of
pathos
relates
to
how
the
speaker
can
move
the
audience
to
experience
certain
emotions.
As
stated
previously,
there
are
six
key
psychological
states,
and
their
antecedents,
that
a
speaker
can
aspire
to
create
in
his/her
audience
(Griffin,
1997,
p.
307).
Hitler's
speech
demonstrated
that
he
advocated
unity
through
hatred
and
confidence,
by
dismissing
the
idea
that
danger
is
near.
Hatred,
according
to
Aristotle,
is
best
achieved
by
advocating
that
a
common
enemy
exists.
Not
only
does
hatred
of
a
common
enemy
manifest
the
audience's
emotions
against
that
entity,
but
as
Griffin
(1997)
states
"a
common
enemy
can
be
used
to
create
solidarity"
(p.
308).
Hitler
achieved
this
in
his
speech.
Not
only
did
Hitler
proclaim
the
Jewish
race
was
an
obvious
enemy
("pitiful,
corrupt
political
creatures
and
greedy
financial
magnates"
{as
cited
in
Domarus,
1997,
p.
2044}),
but
his
negative
descriptions
of
Britain
also
demonstrated
his
hatred.
As
claimed
previously,
Hitler's
distain
of
British
people
and
British
leaders
was
obvious
and
culminated
in
vivid
and
angry
language.
Also,
Hitler
advocated
that
confidence
in
Germany's
military
capabilities
was
reasonable,
as
danger
was
so
far
removed
from
the
future
of
Germany.
By
advocating
that
Germany
was
in
a
strong
position,
Hitler
employed
pathos
to
assure
the
German
people
that
Germany
was
in
the
best
position.
Hitler
claimed:
The
Reich
today
stands
stronger
militarily
than
ever
before.
You
have
seen
the
losses,
individually
surely
heavy,
though
as
a
total
relatively
low,
which
the
German
Wehrmacht
has
suffered
in
battle
with
the
past
three
months
[...}
The
cause
lies
-
besides
with
the,
on
an
average,
excellent
leadership
-
with
the
outstanding
tactical
training
of
the
individual
soldier
and
of
the
units.
(As
cited
in
Domarus,
1997,
p.
2058).
107
Hitler
brought
attention
to
his
own
capacity
as
a
leader
as
a
source
of
self-assurance
to
the
German
people.
Moreover,
he
went
so
far
as to
claim
total
victory
and
a
prophet-
like
stance
that
his
predictions
will
transcend
all
obstacles:
"We
shall
reign
supreme
no
matter
what
happens"
(as
cited
in
Domarus,
1997,
p.
2059).
He
continued:
Mr.
Churchill
should
make
an
exception
and
place
trust
in
me
when
as
a
prophet
I
now
proclaim:
A
great
world
empire
will
be
destroyed.
A
world
empire
which
I
never
had
the
ambition
to
destroy
or
as
much
as
harm.
Alas,
I
am
fully
aware
that
the
continuation
of
this
war
will
end
only
in
the
complete
shattering
of
one
of
the
two
warring
parties.
Mr.
Churchill
may
believe
this
to
be
Germany.
I
know
it
to
be
England.
(As
cited
in
Domarus,
1997,
p.
2062).
This
type of
confidence,
however
powerful
as
a
rhetorical
tactic,
was
devastated
by
the
failure
to
achieve
victory
in
the Battle
of
Britain.
Hitler
was
so
convinced
that
danger
was
far
removed,
that
he
claimed
victory
even
before
the
battle
was
fully
underway.
This
promise-making
would
be
disastrous
to
both
Hitler's
ethos
and
future
rhetorical
speeches'
if
proven
wrong.
Even
Churchill,
during
the
summer
of
1940,
did
not
claim
victory,
but
survival
as
the
only
achievable
aim.
Thus,
although
Hitler
used
a
highly
precarious
measure
to
instill
confidence,
he
still
was,
at
this
moment,
exhibiting
a
strong
and
reasonable
pathos.
Hitler's
speech,
like
Pericles'
Funeral
Oration,
eulogized
the
soldiers
and
aircrew
who
had
been
lost
in
the
previous
ten
months
of
the
war.
It
is
important
to
acknowledge
that
Pericles
is
perhaps
better
suited
as
a
comparison
to
Hitler
than
Churchill.
This
is
due
to
the
fact
that
Pericles
was
in
the
same
position,
militarily,
as
Hitler,
where
"we
fight
on
enemy
soil
against
men
who
defend
their
homes"
(Pericles,
trans.
1979,
para.
39).
Since
Churchill
was
fighting
a
defensive
war
for
survival,
he
perceived
the
British
as
possessing
the
ethical
higher
ground.
On
the
other
hand,
Hitler
and
Pericles
repeatedly
108
endorsed
their
political
actions
as
justified
and
ethically superior.
Rhetorically,
this
means
that
Hitler
must
reiterate
the
importance
of
personal
sacrifice
to
the
public
glory.
This
July
19,
1940
speech
was
perhaps
the
most
significant
eulogy
that
Hitler
made
throughout
the
course
of
the
Battle
of
Britain.
Although
it
was
not
Hitler's
primary
purpose
to
eulogize
the
soldiers,
it
seemed
to
come
naturally
during
the
closing
of
the
speech.
Hitler
drew
a
clear
relationship
between
the
sacrifices
of
the
dead
and
living
soldier
and
the
glory
of
the
state:
I
now
wish
to
conclude
in
mentioning
all
those
nameless
men
who
have
no
less
done
their
duty.
Millions
of
them
have
risked
life
and
liberty
[...
They
stand
as
a
symbol
for
all
those
hundreds
of
thousands
of
musketeers,
anti-tank
gunners
and
tank
gunners,
pioneers
and
artillerymen,
soldiers
of
the
Navy
and
the
Luftwaffe,
men
of
the
Waffen
SS,
and
all
those
other
fighters
who
stood
for
the
German
Wehrmacht
in
the struggle for
the
freedom
and
future
of our
Yolk
and
for
the
eternal
greatness
of
the
National
Social
Greater
German
Reich.
Deutschland
-
Sieg
Heil!
(as
cited
in
Domarus,
1997,
p.
2063).
Hitler
suggested
that
the
men
who
have
died
in
war
and
those
who
were
alive
and
enlisted
are
contributing
to
freedom,
the
future
of
Germany
and
the
eternal
greatness
of
the
Reich.
Pericles
issued
the
same
belief,
claiming
that
sacrifice
to
the
state
"is
the
prize
and
the
wreath
the
city
offers,
both
to
the
dead
and
the
bereaved,
for
the
ordeals
they
have
faced.
For
where
the
prizes
offered
for
virtue
are
greatest,
there
you
will
also
find
the
best
citizens"
(Pericles,
trans.
1979,
para.
46).
Even
though
Hitler.
and
Pericles
were
fighting
an
offensive
war,
and
thus
acting
on
the
belief
that
their
political
ideologies
were
of
great
worth,
they
were
capable
of
justifying
the
loss
of
life
by
suggesting
that
personal
loss
was
symbolically
tied to
national
glory
and
valor.
Overall,
Hitler's
July
19,
1940
speech
was
rhetorically
strong
and
reasonably
argued.
The
weakest
point
in Hitler's
rhetoric
was
when
he
declared
that
victory
was
109
imminent
and
that
his
promises
would
undoubtedly
come
to
fruition.
This
failing
would
only
become
transparent
when
Hitler's
Luftwaffe
was
legitimately
challenged
in
the
coming
months.
However,
at this
moment,
Hitler's
speech
was
considered
an
excellent
climax
to
the
recent
victory
in
France,
for
which
twelve
officers
were
promoted
to
the
rank
of
Field
Marshall
and
Britain
was
offered
a
"generous
peace
proposal"
(Domarus,
1997,
p.
2064).
The
British
response
to
Hitler's
offer
was
one
of
disdain
(Calder,
1969,
p.
140).
Within
an
hour
after
Hitler's
speech,
a
Daily
Express
journalist,
Sefton
Delmer,
announced
on
the
BBC
radio:
"Let
me
tell
you
what
we
here
in
Britain
think
of
this
appeal
of
yours
to
what
you
are
pleased
to
call
our
reason
and
common
sense.
Herr
Führer
and
Reichskanzler,
we
hurl
it
right
back
at
you,
right in
your
evil
smelling
teeth"
(Clayton
&
Craig,
1999,
p.
191).
The
British
government's
official
rejection
of
Hitler's
peace
proposal
was
broadcast
on
July
22,
1940
by
Lord
Halifax
in
which
he
claimed:
"We
will
see
this
fight
through,
even
if
it
takes
everything
we
have.
Nobody
entertains
any
doubts
that,
if
Hitler
should
succeed,
this
would
signal
the
end
of
all
that
makes
life
worth
living"
(as
cited
in
Domarus,
1997.
p.
2067).
The
British
rejection
of
Hitler's
offer
apparently
distressed
Hitler,
as
he
had
hoped
that
the
British
would
surrender
and
he
could
then
focus
his
army
and
Luftwaffe
upon
the
Eastern
Front
(Domarus,
p.
2065).
The
British
sentiment
towards
Hitler's
speech
remained
consistent
in
the
coming
weeks.
On
August
1,
1940,
an
English
translation
of
this
speech
was
printed
upon
green
and
yellow
leaflets
and
were
scattered
by
the
Luftwaffe
over
Hampshire
and
Somerset
(Calder,
1969,
p.
141).
This
speech
was,
once
again,
rejected
by
the
British,
who
collected
the
leaflets
and
auctioned
them
successfully
for
the
Red
Cross
(Calder,
p.
141).
Although
it
appeared
that
Britain
was
courageous
in
its
rejection
of
Hitler's
terms,
many
outsiders
believed
the
British
to
be
genuinely
"crazy".
William
Shirer,
an
American
CBS
correspondent,
was
inside
the
German
High
Command's
radio
headquarters
with
110
High
Command
when
the
British
ridiculed
"their
Führer's
words"
(Clayton
&
Craig,
2002,
P.
191).
The
Germans,
according
to
Shirer,
thought
the
"British
were
crazy"
(as
cited
in
Clayton
&
Craig,
1999,
p.
191).
According
to
J.
Lucas
(1987),
the
Germans
viewed
the
British
as
crippled
and
unable
to
continue
fighting;
any
type
of
retaliation
by
the
British
was
ridiculous
and
a
display
of
martyrdom
(p.
136).
Alexander
Hofer,
a
German
rifleman
during
July
1940,
stated
after
the
end
of
the
war
that
"The
enemy
was
as
good
as
defeated
anyway;
weak
in
number
and
in
morale.
The
English
[...]
were
a
badly
armed
army
which
had
been
shattered
at
Dunkirk"
(as
cited
in
Lucas,
p.
136).
Therefore,
many
believed
the
British
to
be
irrationally
courageous
at
a
time
when
their
forces
were
devastated
by
the
loss
of
France
and
the
evacuation
of
Dunkirk.
Hitler's
belief
in
the
German
military
and
air
forces'
success
had
been
demonstrated
and
his
confidence
was
not
without
foundation,
as
the
Germans
had
a
stronger,
more
experienced
and
better-equipped
Luftwaffe
than
the
RAF.
The
"Great
Battle"
Against
Britain:
The
Summer
01
1940
Now
that
the
rhetorical
stage
had
been
set
and
each
government
had
proclaimed
that
war
was
the
only
option,
it
was
up
to
the
military
endeavors
of
both
governments
to
decide
whether
Hitler's
promises
of
victory,
or
Churchill's
determined
belief
that
British
survival
would
be
fulfilled.
The
skirmishes
over
the
Channel
continued
from
the
initial
attack
on
July
10,
1940
until
August
10,
1940,
whereby
RAF
bases
were
bombed,
convoys
attacked
and
mid-Channel
air
battles
occurred
(Messenger,
1990,
p.
30-41).
However,
"Adlertag"
or
"Eagle
day" (August
10,
1940)
was
the
first
highly
coordinated
attack
upon
the
RAF
by
the
Luftwaffe,
with
the
sole
purpose
of
destroying
RAF
Fighter
Command.
Adlertag
was
postponed
due
to
bad
weather
until
August
11
and
its
climax
occurred
on
August
13,
1940
(Calder,
1969,
p.
144;
James,
2000,
p.
71-80).
111
During
this
phase
of
the
battle
attacks
by
the
Luftwaffe
were
aimed
solely
at
military
and
air
force
bases
while
civilian
targets
were
not
considered
advantageous
and
were
strongly
discouraged
by
Goring
and
Hitler
(Price,
1977,
p.
22).
Although
the
avoidance
of
civilian
targets
was
central
at
the
beginning
of
the
battle,
it
would
not
last
for
long.
It
must
be
noted
that
Adlertag,
or
"Eagle
day,"
appealed
to
nationalistic
qualities
and
could
have
helped
to
unify
the
German
pilots
under
one
patriotic
symbol,
thus
possessing
rhetorical
significance.
Eagles
were
often
on
the
coat
of
arms
in
Germany
and
were
considered
a
highly
patriotic
symbol.
Also,
the
eagle
symbol
was
appropriate
for
air
force
strategies,
as
the
eagle
itself
was
a
bird
of
prey
which
flew
to
find
its
victims.
Thus,
naming
the
first
highly
coordinated
attack
on
Britain,
Adlertag
served
the
rhetorical
purpose
of
promoting
unity
among
the
fighting
forces.
The
good
weather
experienced
on
August
13,
1940
did
not
ensure
victory.
Instead,
Adlertag
was
neither
a
success
nor
a
failure
for
either
side.
On
the
morning
of
August
13,
1940
the
skies
were
cloudy
and
while
Luftwaffe
bombers
were
being
escorted
over
the
Channel
by
Mel
10
fighters,
Goring
radio
messaged
the
squadrons,
calling
the
attack
off
until
a
later
day
because
of
the
cloud cover
(Lucas,
1987,
p.
139).
The
Mel
10
fighters
received
this
message,
but
the
bombers
did
not,
and
continued
to
attack,
although
the
RAF
was
able
to
intercept
and
five
Dornier
Do17s
were
shot
down
and
another
six
badly
damaged
(Lucas,
1987,
p.
139-140).
It
was
not
until
later
that
afternoon
that
the
main
attack
was
launched,
because
of
decreased
cloud cover
(Calder,
1969,
p.
145).
However,
the
Luftwaffe
High
Command
had
not
realized
throughout
the
encounters
during
July,
1940,
that
the
RAF
was
not
"rising
to
the
bait
of
Stukas
bombing
the
Channel
convoys"
(Lucas,
1987,
p.
139).
The
Luftwaffe
had
initially
hoped
that
by
drawing
out
the
RAF
fighters,
the
former
would
gain
air
time
to
fight,
as
they
would
have
enough
fuel
reserved
for
the
flight
back
over
the
112
Channel
to
home
bases
in
France
(Messenger,
1990,
P.
30;
Fawcett,
2006,
P.
251;
James,
2000,
p.
13).
However,
as
the
RAF
was
not
taking
the
bait,
the
Luftwaffe
had
very
limited
windows
of
opportunity
to
engage
in
combat,
which
rendered
the
Luftwaffe
more
vulnerable
during
a
mid-Channel
fight
(Lucas,
p.
139).
However,
on
August
13,
1940,
Adlertag,
almost
300
Luftwaffe
aircraft
assembled
mid-air
and
attacked
RAF's
Number
10
Group
in
Southern
England
as
well
as
Southampton
in
southern
England,
whereby
22
aircraft
were
destroyed
on
the
ground
at
Detling
airbase
and
the
station
commander
killed
(Messenger,
p.
52).
During
the
evening,
German
bombers
attacked
a
Spitfire
factory
at
Birmingham
and
the
Short
Brother's
factory
in Belfast,
causing
moderate
damage
to
the
production
sites
(James,
2000,
p.
71-80).
RAP
losses
reported
three
pilots
and
13
aircraft
lost,
while
at
the
same
time
the
British
Air
Ministry
claimed
that
78
German
aircraft
had
been
shot
down-(Messenger,
p.
52).
However,
the
Germans
reported
a
5:1
kill
ratio
in
their
favor,
which
Messenger
denotes
as
"party
propaganda"
(p.
52).
These
conflicting
reports
demonstrated
that
Adlertag
was
not
a
one-sided
victory
for
either party.
Adlertag
and
the
following
days
were
meant
to
be
victorious
for
the
Germans,
as
it
was
the
first
highly
coordinated
attack,
in
which
the
reputed
Luftwaffe
could
demonstrate
its
technical
and
military
superiority
over
the
British
RAF.
Instead,
the
RAF's
performance
on
Adlertag
demonstrated
that
the
RAF
was
stronger
than
initially
predicted
and
that
the
tactic
of
drawing
out
the
RAP
over
the
English
Channel
was
not
successful.
Rhetorically,
Adlertag,
though
not
a
British
victory,
encouraged
the
British
civilians
and
government
that
the
RAF
would
prevail
- a
position
that
Churchill
iterated
in
his
next
speech.
The
days
following
Adlertag
were
intense
for
both
governments.
On
August
15,
1940,
every
single
pilot
and
plane
at
the
disposal
of
the
RAP,
including
all
reserve
squadrons,
was
engaged
in
combat.
General
"Pug"
Ismay
spent
the
day
in
RAP
headquarters,
observing
the
unfolding
battle,
and
recorded
that
"There
had
been
heavy
113
fighting
throughout
the
afternoon
and
at
one
moment
every
single
squadron
in
the
group
was
engaged;
there
was
nothing
in
reserve,
and
the
map
table
showed
new
waves
of
attackers
crossing
the
coast.
I
felt
sick
with
fear"
(as
cited
in
Messenger,
1990,
p.
55).
Indeed,
historians
suggest
that
the
Luftwaffe
flew
between
1800
and
2119
sorties
(each
sortie
is
one
mission
by
one
airplane)
that
day
(Calder,
1969,
p.
144)
and,
although
it
had
been
predicted
that
total
annihilation
of
the
RAF
would
take
four
days,
the
RAF
was
demonstrating
strong
resistance
to
the
Luftwaffe's
attempts
(Fawcett,
2000,
p.
256).
On
August
18,
1940,
the
RAF
experienced
the
most
difficult
and
tragic
day
of
the
whole
summer
(Messenger,
1990,
p.
59).
Although
the
losses
were
similar
to
those
suffered
on
August
15,
1940,
the
damage
to
RAF
Fighter
Command's
infrastructure
was
much
greater,
with
the
airfield
at
Kenley
bombed
from
12,000
feet
and
Biggin
Hill
subjected
to
the
same
treatment
(Messenger,
p.
59-60;
James,
2000,
p.
119-120).
August.
18,
1940
was
considered
the
closest
the
British
came
to
defôat.
But
cloudy
weather
over
the
following
four
days
allowed
a
reprieve
and
time
for
Churchill
to
discuss
this
momentous
crisis.
Rhetorical
Analysis
of
TheA
ugust
20,
1940
Speech:
"The
Few"
The
intense
fighting
emphasized
two
major
characteristics
about
Britain's
position
that
influenced
Churchill's
rhetoric.
First,
the
RAF
was
stronger
than
initially
thought.
By
overcoming
huge
aircraft
and
pilot
losses,
the
RAF
was
still
capable
of
defensive
maneuvers.
Second,
Britain's
position
was
extremely
vulnerable.
The
vulnerability
manifested
in
losing
air
bases,
along
with
pilot
losses,
inspired
Churchill
to
recognize
that
Britain
was
in
a
unique
position,
albeit
a
seemingly
weaker
position.
Churchill's
rhetoric
denoted
that
even
a
weaker
position
can
be
strengthened
by
remembering
what
was
lost
and
what
can
be
gained.
114
The
internal
crisis
that
Churchill
found
himself
in
on
August
20,
1940
was
dissimilar
to
the
international
crisis
of
Dunkirk.
Churchill
had
already
committed
his
nation
to
a
war
against
Germany
that
some
believed
to
be
"ridiculous"
(such
as
the
United
States)
and
now,
after
intense
fighting,
Churchill
had
to
grapple
with
how
he
would
justify
the
extreme
losses
of
pilots
and
aircrew
to
his
citizens
and
the
international
community.
Churchill's
speech
to
the
House
of
Commons
that
day
was
limited
by
a
national
need
to
rationalize
the
acute
military
losses
to
the
families
of
British
citizens,
while
simultaneously
bringing
an
optimistic
perspective
to
a
country
that
seemed
to
be
on
the
edge
of
defeat.
This
speech,
like
Churchill's
June
4,
1940
speech,
served
the
purpose
of
announcing
a
variety
of
political
policies,
including
Churchill's
rejection
of
sending
food
and
supplies
to
the
civilians
in
France,
in
case
those
supplies
were
absorbed
into
the
German
war
effort.
Also,
Churchill
(1940b)
praised
Lord
Beaverbrook
for
his
infrastructure
changes
that
led
to
an
"astounding
increase
in
the
output
and
repair
of
British
aircraft"
(para.
28).
Furthermore,
Churchill
announced
that
with
the
continuation
of
this
battle
the
British
government
aimed
to
restore
French
sovereignty
(para.
34)
and
that
the
United
States
was
permitted
to
use
British
facilities
for
their
own
naval
and
air
defenses
in
the
western
hemisphere
(para.
43-44).
These
statements
demonstrated
that
the
British
government
was
still
determined
to
continue
the
aerial
fight
against
German.
Churchill's
ethos
in
this
speech
was
much
stronger
than
his
ethos
of
June
4,
1940.
Before
Churchill
said
one
word
on
August
20,
1940,
his
ethos
was
strengthened
by
the
British
capacity
to
survive
through
the
summer.
Churchill's
declaration
in
June
to
not
surrender
and
to
fight
amid
high
probably
of
defeat
had
been
viewed
as
irrationally
courageous.
However,
since
Britain
was
still
standing
and
Churchill's
aim
to
"survive"
had
been
since
fulfilled,
Churchill
was
more
likely
viewed
as
a
courageous
man
who
was
115
not
unreasonable.
Churchill's
ethos
followed
through
with
the
promises
he
made,
thus
demonstrating
a
strong
ethical
character.
In
regards
to
the
speech
itself,
Churchill's
virtuous
character,
perceived
intelligence
and
goodwill
towards
the
audience
was
consistently
exhibited.
Churchill's
virtuous
character,
meaning
his
demonstration
of
goodness
and
honesty,
with
respect
for
his
adversaries
(Griffin
1997,
p.
306),
was
best
depicted
after
Churchill
claimed
the
British
would
prohibit
sending
food
supplies
to
France.
He
explains
his
reasoning
behind
the
decision:
"if
the
Germans
use
these
commodities
to
help
them
to
bomb
our
women
and
children,
rather
than
to
feed
the
populations
who
produce
them,
we
may
be
sure
that
imported
foods
would
[
...
]
be employed
to
relieve
the
enemy
of
the
responsibilities
he
has
so
wantonly
assumed"
(Churchill,
1940b,
para.
14).
Churchill
was
claiming
that
imported
food
would
directly
assist
the
German
war
effort.
However,
Churchill
demonstrated
honesty,
goodness,
empathy
and
respect
for
his
enemy
when
he
explained
that
the
prohibition
behind
sending
food
reserves
will
be
terminated
upon
the
end
of
the
Nazi
reign:
We
shall
do
our
best
to
encourage
the
building
up
of
reserves
of
food
all
over
the
world,
so
that
there
will
always
be
held
up
before
the
eyes
of
the
peoples
of
Europe,
including
- I
say
deliberately
-
the
German
and
Austrian
peoples,
the
certainty
that
the
shattering
of
the
Nazi
power
will
bring
to
them
all
immediate
food,
freedom
and
peace.
(Churchill,
para.
15).
Churchill
demonstrated
a
high
level
of
empathy
towards
his
enemy
by
intentionally
claiming
that
help
will
be
given
when
the
Nazis
are
destroyed.
Churchill
could
have
easily
taken
an
alternative
approach
and
suggested
that
no
help
would
be
offered
to
the
two
primary
nations
that
supported
the
National
Socialists.
Instead,
Churchill's
desire
to
deliver
food
and
aid
to
the
victims
of
the
Nazis
portrayed
him
as
an
empathetic
and
respectful
leader.
116
Churchill's
perceived
intelligence,
another
key
aspect
of
ethos,
which
demonstrates
shared
values
with
his
audience
(Griffin,
1997,
p.
306),
was
also
strongly
manifested
in
this
speech.
Churchill
encouraged
the
belief
that
the
war
with
Germany
was
suited
to
British
character.
He
proclaimed:
There
seems
to
be
every
reason
to
believe
that
this
new
kind
of
war
is
well
suited
to
the
genius
and
the
resources
of
the
British
nation
and
the
British
Empire
and
that,
once
we
get
properly
equipped
and
properly
started,
a
war
of
this
kind
will
be
more
favorable
to
us
than
the
somber
mass
slaughters
of
the
Somme
and
Passchendaele.
If
it
is
a
case
of
the
whole
nation
fighting
and
suffering
together,
that
ought
to
suit
us,
because
we
are
the
most
united
of
all
the
nations,
because
we
entered
the
war
upon
the
national
will
and
with
our
eyes
open,
and
because
we
have
been
nurtured
in
freedom
and
individual
responsibility
and
are
the
products,'
not
of
totalitarian
uniformity
but
of
toleranàe
and
variety.
(Churchill,
1940b,
para.
6).
This
direct
appeal
to
the
best
characteristics
of
the
British
nation,
whether
true
or
not,
demonstrated
that
Churchill
was
confident
in
the
impending
conflict.
Moreover,
he
deliberately
appealed
to
the
shared
values
of
a
nation,
encouraging
strong
identification
and
unity
among
the
British
citizens.
Finally,
Churchill's
ethos,
in
regards
to
the
good
will
he
demonstrated
towards
his
audience's
best
interests,
was
also
portrayed.
Unlike
the
speech
of
June
4,
1940,
in
which
Churchill
lacked
a
level
of
sympathy
for
his
audience,
Churchill
now
engaged
with
the
disadvantages
of
the
current
situation
in
regards
to
the
average
citizen,
rather
than
focusing
only
on
the
country
as
a
whole.
He
acknowledged
that
in
every
aspect
of
life,
war
was
being
fought:
The
whole
of
the
warring
nations
are
engaged, not only
soldiers,
but
the
entire
population,
men,
women,
and
children.
The
fronts
are
everywhere.
The
trenches
117
are
dug
in
the
towns
and
streets.
Every
village
is
fortified.
The
front
line
runs
through
the
factories.
The
workmen
are
soldiers
with
different
weapons
but
the
same
courage.
(Churchill,
1940b,
para.
5).
This
indicated
that
Churchill
was
very
aware
about
the
average
British
citizen's
role
in
the
war,
while
also
hinting
that
a
person
need
not
be
engaged
in
combat
to
be
participating
in
the
war
effort.
At
the
end
of
the
speech,
Churchill
empathized
with
the
British
people's
current
state:
"We
are
still
toiling
up
the
hill;
we
have
not
yet
reached
the
crest-line
of
it;
we
cannot
survey
the
landscape
or
even
imagine
what
its
condition
will
be
when
that
longed-for
morning
comes"
(para.
41).
Churchill's
empathy
towards
the
average
British
citizen's
plight
was
obvious.
Dissimilar
to his
June
4,
1940
speech,
Churchill
recognized
the
difficult
tasks
of average
citizens
and
empathized
with
their
toils.
Logos,
or
the
rational
appeal
of
the
speaker,
was
evident
in
Churchill's
speech.
The
argument
in
his
June
4,
1940
speech,
which
suggested
that
ensured
survival
was
based
upon
British
history
and
British
character,
was
more
developed
in
this
speech.
Since
the
British
people
have
entered
this
war
with
their
"eyes
open"
(Churchill,
1940b,
para.
6),
they
shall
not
only
survive
but
become
victorious.
Churchill
argued
"we
have
both
the
will
and
the
means,
not
only
to
go
on
indefinitely
but
to strike
heavy
and
unexpected
blows.
The
road
to
victory
may
not
be
so
long
as
we
expect
[
...
]
Be
it
long
or
short,
rough
or
smooth,
we
mean
to
reach
our
journey's
end"
(para.
9).
Churchill
now
declared
that
offensive
strikes
are
possible,
as
well
as
victory.
This
was
a
very
different
attitude
than
what
was
exhibited
on
June
4,
1940.
But,
Churchill
was
careful
when
arguing
for
these
goals,
as
he
did
not
claim
a
time
period
or
method;
instead
he
was
declaring,
in
a
very
general
manner,
that
survival
will
continue,
victory
was
achievable
and
offensive
war
will
occur.
From
a
rhetorical
standpoint,
this
vagueness
allows
Churchill
time
to
achieve
these
goalls
through
whatever
means
he
can.
Instead
of
118
declaring
certain
particulars,
such
as
Britain
will
win
the
aerial
battle
by
the
end
of
the
summer
1940,
Churchill
strayed
from
such
promises.
This
type
of
policy-making,
rather
than
prophesy-making,
was
vastly
different
from
Hitler's.
Moreover,
if
Churchill
became
capable
of
offensive
war
to
the extent
of
victory,
then
rhetorically,
he
was
a
hero
and
fulfilled
his
promises.
Another
aspect
of
Churchill's
logos
was
exhibited
when
he
discussed
the
difference
between
the
First
World
War
and
the
current
crisis.
By
using
numbers
and
statistics,
Churchill
argued,
at
the
very
beginning
of
the
speech,
that
the
losses
experienced
since
September
1939
were
significantly
lower
in
comparison
to
the
first
year of
the
Great
War.
Churchill
claimed:
"The
British
casualties
in
the
first
12
months
of
the
Great
War
amounted
to
365,000.
In
this
war,
I
am
thankful
to say,
British
killed,
wounded,
prisoners,
and
missing,
including
civilians,
do
not
exceed
92,000,
and
of
these
a
large
proportion
are
alive as
prisoners
of
war"
(1940b,
para.
2).
Churchill
maintained,
that
these
numbers
denoted
hope
and
stated:
"There
seems
to
be
every
reason
to
believe
that
this
new
kind
of
war
is
well
suited
to
the
genius
and
the
resources
of
the
British
nation"
(para.
6).
Churchill
asserted
that
the
deaths
thus
experienced
could
actually
be
viewed
as
positive.
Although
a
little
strange
for
a
politician to
rhetorically
capitalize
on
the
numerical
losses
of
his
nation,
Churchill
helped
citizens
recognize
that
if
they
survived
the
last
war,
then
their
chances
of
surviving
this
one
is
greater.
Finally,
ihe
emotional
appeal of
Churchill,
pathos,
was
also
consistently
exhibited
by
means
of
linguistic
variety.
Metaphors,
personification
and
overall
strong
.and
vibrant
adjectives
sprinkled
Churchill's
(1940b)
speech:
"prodigious
slaughter"
(para.
1),
"potential
springboards
of
invasion"
(para.
16),
"undismayed
against
disaster"
(para. 18),
"conviction
of
final
victory
burning
unquenchable
in
our
hearts"
(para.
17),
"kindle
again
the
spark
of
hope"
(para.
24),
and
"blood-curdling
threats
and
lurid
accounts
trumpeted"
119
(para.
26).
These
phrases
were
a
testament
to
Churchill's
emotional
appeal,
as his
speech
was
not
dry but
fluid
and
colorful,
sparking
the
imaginations
of
the
listeners.
Churchill
put
forward
specific
conditions
in
order
to
emotionally
stimulate
the
audience.
Of
the
six
key
emotions
and
their
antecedents
that
Aristotle
outlined
regarding
pathos
(Griffin,
1997,
p.
308),
Churchill
portrayed
confidence
throughout
the
course
of
this
speech.
Although
Griffin
states
that
confidence
is
best
portrayed
by
suggesting
dangers
are
far
removed
(p.
308),
Churchill
did
not
suggest
that
Germany
was
weak
or
incapable
of
causing
harm.
Instead,
every
time
Churchill
stated
Germany
was
strong,
he
also
pointed
out
strengths
in
the
British
forces.
For
example,
Churchill
(1940b)
turned
his
discussion
to
aircraft
production:
"The
enemy
is,
of
course,
far
more
numerous
than
we
are"
(para.
27)
and
followed
up
by
stating:
"But
our
new
production
already,
as
I
am
advised,
largely
exceeds
his,
and
the
American
production
is
only
just
beginning
to
flow
in"
(para.
27).
Churchill
perhaps
best
described
the
reasoning
for
focusing
upon
British
strength
by
claiming
that
"the
dangers
we
face
are
still
enormous,
but
so
are
our
advantages
and
resources"
(para.
23).
Unlike
his
June
4,
1940
speech,
which
relied
upon
the
history
of
Britain
as
a
reason
for
confidence,
Churchill
now
turned
to
solid
fact
about
the
economic
strength
of
Britain
as
a
source
of
confidence.
Churchill's
speech
on
August
20,
1940
was
surprisingly
similar
to Pericles'
Funeral
Oration.
It
must
be
reiterated
that,
because
Churchill
was
fighting
a
defensive
war
on
the
grounds
of
mere
survival,
he
only
needed
to
boost
the
confidence
of
the
nation
so
that
survival
would
be
achieved.
Unlike
Hitler,
Churchill
had
the
ethical
"higher
ground"
as
he
was
reacting
to
provocation
and
defending
himself,
rather
than
acting
on
political
ideology,
without
provocation.
But
in
eulogizing
the
soldiers
that
had
died
in
his
August
20,
1940
speech,
Churchill
encouraged
the
relationship
between
private
sacrifice
and
the
public
good.
Rhetorically,
it
was
not necessary
for
Churchill
to
do
so.
Survival,
in
a
defensive
war,
needs
very
little
explanation.
Instead,
however,
Churchill
added
another
120
rhetorical
element
to his
speech,
strengthening
the
relationship
between
private
and
public,
further
justifying
the
necessity
of
war
and
the
importance
of
victory.
Pericles'
Funeral Oration
and
Churchill's
August
20,
1940
speech
employed
the
same
structure.
There
was
an
obvious
element
of
time
in
both
speeches.
This
urged
the
audience
to
recognize
the
temporal
spectrum
wherein
their
current
tasks
lay
and
how
their
legacy
will
be
fulfilled.
Churchill
began
his
speech
with
a
discussion
about
the
past.
He
not only
addressed
the
previous
year,
but
also
the
Great
War.
Then,
his
discussion
moved
into
the
present,
wheteby
he
argued
that
the
British
"genius
and
the
British
nation"
(Churchill,
1940b,
para.
6)
were
well
suited
to
the
present
conflict.
Finally,
he
discussed
the
future
of
this
battle
and
how
it
related
to
the
legacy
of
the
nation.
Pericles'
Funeral
Oration
follows
the
exact
same
structure.
First,
Pericles
discussed
the ancestors
and
how
their
plight
had
been
inherited
into
the
present.
Then
he
outlined
the
current
state
of
affairs
in
Athens
and
in
what
way
the
government
was
strong.
Finally,
Pericles
discussed
the
legacy
of
the
nation
and
how
it
was
constituted
by
her
citizens'
sacrifices.
The
similarity
between
Churchill's
and
Pericles'
use
of
temporality
assisted
the
listeners
to
feel
like
they
were
part
of
a
larger
national
enterprise.
The
historian
Jablonsky
in
S.
Heywood's
(2003)
book
Churchill
suggests
that
"by
dramatizing
their
lives
[
...
]
as
acting
appropriately
for
a
great
historic
moment,
Churchill
transformed
the
British
people
into
a
collective,
romantic
and
heroic
whole"
(p.
88).
Churchill
also
eulogized
the
loss
of
pilots
and
aircrew
since
the
beginning
of
the
war.
Much
like
Pericles,
Churchill
(1940b)
argued
that
the
British
Empire had
stood
their
ground,
however
difficult
it
may
have
been:
"The
British
nation
and
the
British
Empire
finding
themselves
alone,
stood
undismayed
against
disaster.
No
one
flinched
or
wavered;
nay,
some
who
formerly thought of
peace,
now
think
only
of
war"
(para.
18).
Churchill's
praise
of
British
courage
was
curiously
similar
to
Pericles.
Pericles
stated:
"They
preferred
to
stand
their
ground
and
to
die,
rather
than
to
yield
and
save
their lives
123
bombings
of
Berlin
detracted
from
the
belief
in
German
invincibility.
Also,
Hitler
would
use
German
casualties
to
provoke
his
citizens
during
speeches.
By
mid-August,
Goring
was
furious
that
the
RAF
was
fighting
so
strongly.
From
August
15
until
August
19,
1940,
Goring
summoned
senior
commanders
to
Karinhall,
his
country
retreat,
and
fumed
that
the
RAF
had
not
been
destroyed
(Price,
1977,
p.
37).
During
these
meetings,
Goring
instituted
other
measures
to
ensure
that
the
Luftwaffe's
primary
objective,
the
total
destruction
of
the
RAF,
would
be
achieved,
including
the
deployment
of
bombers
and
fighters
together,
so
that
the
latter
could
provide
continuous
protection
to
the
former.
He
also
ordered
that
only
one
commissioned
officer
would
be
assigned
to
each
German
bomber
due
to
the
extreme
losses
over
the
previous
months
(Messenger,
1990,
p.
65).
Although
Goring
thought
that
the
performance
of
the
Luftwaffe
thus
far
had
been
weak
and
unacceptable,
he
felt
that
these
measures
would
guarantee
success.
However,
four
days
after
Churchill's
"The
Few"
speech,
a
navigational
error
by
German
pilots
changed
the
entire
course
of
the
battle.
Although
Goring
had
given
strict
orders
that
London
was
not
to
be
attacked
without
his
permission,
Luftwaffe
pilots
lost
in
stormy
weather
dropped
their
bombs
on
London's
city
center
on
August
24,
1940
(Calder,
1969,
p.
152).
The
following
evening,
on
Churchill's
express
orders,
RAF
Bomber
Command
attacked
Berlin
for
the
first
time
(Fawcett,
2006,
p.
254).
Although
only
29
of
the
81
RAF
airplanes
sent
reported
dropping
bombs,
it
nonetheless
disproved
Goring's
"proud
boast"
that
no
British
bomber
would
ever
get
through
to
Berlin
(Messenger,
1990,
p.
67).
These
attacks
on
each
nation's
capitals
changed
the
course
of
the
battle
from
being
an
exclusively
air
force
conflict
to
becoming
a
war
of
indiscriminant
bombing
with
high
civilian
causalities.
Goring
focused
the
majority
of
the
Luftwaffe's
efforts
from
then
on,
on
civilian
targets
(Calder,
1969,
p.
153).
Also,
these
night
air
raids
were
favorable
to
124
day
attacks,
as
the
Luftwaffe
was
best
protected
at
night.
Night
air
raids
proved
increasingly
devastating
civilian
targets
(James,
2000,
p.
220-222).
On
August
31,
1940
Liverpool
in
northern
England
was
badly
bombed,
with
no
less
than
160
fires
being
started
in
its
commercial
center
(Calder,
p.
154).
From
that
time
onward,
the
RAF
continued
to
bomb
other
German
city
centers
for
the
duration
of
the
Second
World
War.
Since
Britain
was
seen
as
a
near-beaten
enemy,
Berliners
were
astounded
that
the
RAF
had
both
the
resources
and
resolve
to
attack
the
Reich's
capital
city
(Calder,
p.
153).
The
German
government
documented
public
opinion
during
this
time
and
was
astonished
to
learn
on
August
26,
1940,
the
following
sentiment
of
recorded
public
opinion:
"Die
Einfluige
englischer
Bomber
weit
in
das
deutsche
Hinterland
und
ihre
FlUge
sogar
bis
Obertialien
wurden
tiberall
mit
grossem
Erstaunen
zu
Kenntnis
genommen.
Man
beginnt
sich
auch
zu
fragen,
wie
viele
Flugzeuge
die
Engthnder
denn
noch
leistungsfhig
sind"
("The
approach
of English
bombers
far
into
German
territory
and
(English)
flights
even
into
Italy
were
noticed
everywhere
with
large
astonishment.
One
begins
to
ask
himself
how
many
airplanes
the
Englishmen
still
have
in
reserve,
if
they
are
still
efficient
after
so
many
hard-felt
losses")
(Meldungen
aus
Dem
Reich,
1968,
p.
110,
translated
by
author).
Regardless
of
the surprised
and
questionable
German
morale,
Hitler
used
this
situation
to
his
advantage;
this
abrupt,
unplanned
and
highly
intense
bombing
on
civilian
targets
became
a
rhetorical
tool,
whereby
Hitler
suggested
that
Britain
acted
without
provocation
to
cause
extreme
civilian
causalities.
Rhetorical
Analysis
of
Hitler's
Speech,
September
4th,
1940:
The
"Winterhilfswerk"
Address
On
September
4,
1940,
Hitler
staged
a
"Yolk
Rally"
at
the
Berlin
Sportpalast
where
he
appeared
greatly
agitated,
nervous
and
edgy
(Domarus,
1997,
p.
2081).
His
125
audience
was
mainly
social
workers
and
nurses,
a
population
that
had
first-hand
experiences
of
civilian
causalities.
The
speech
itself
contained
a
scattered
array
of
themes.
At
first,
it
appeared
that
Hitler
would
focus
the
entirety
of
his
speech
discussing
the
war
with
Britain,
but
then
he
concentrated
on
the
failures
of
British
propaganda
to
legitimately
portray
the
strength
of
Germany's
assault
and
the
British
military
defeat
at
Dunkirk.
The
speech
climaxed
when
Hitler
threatened
to
drop
an
increasing
number
of
bombs
on
British
targets.
He
continued
further
and
discussed
the
importance of
Germany's
Winterhilfswerk
(Winter
Relief
Organization)
that
operated
during
the
reign
of
the
Nazis
and
provided
food
and
fuel
to
German
civilians.
Finally,
Hitler
ended
the
speech
with
an
unfocused
discussion
about
the
importance
of
volunteering
and
education.
Throughout
the
speech
it
seems
that
Hitler's
passion
lay
with
discussing
the
British,
but
he
was
forced,
due
to
the
presence
of
the
audience,
to
focus
on
topics
which
appealed
to
social
workers
and
nurses.
Virtuous
character,
a
significant
element
of
ethos
.,
was
poorly
demonstrated
throughout
the
course
of
Hitler's
speech.
Virtue
deals
primarily
with
appearing
good
and
honest,
as
well
as
charitable
towards
your
enemies
(Griffin,
1997,
p.
306).
Hitler's
goodness,
honesty
and
charitable
nature
were
demonstrated,
at
best,
by
his
reiterating
that
he
advocated
peace,
not
war
with
Britain,
but
that
Churchill
had
refused.
Hitler
stated:
"So
often
I
have
extended
my
hand
for
an
understanding
with
the
English
people.
You
know
it
yourselves:
it
was
my
foreign
policy
program.
I
have
recently
done
so
for
the
very
last
time.
I
now
prefer
to
fight"
(as
cited
in
Domarus,
1997,
p.
2084).
Although
it
was
true
that
Hitler
offered
peace,
it
was
at
the
cost
of
total
submission
of
his
adversary
and
under
terms
of
tyranny.
Any
belief
in
Hitler's
charitable
nature
towards
his
opponents
was
automatically
sabotaged
by
his
repeated
efforts
to
ridicule
and
scorn
his
enemy.
One
particular
sentence
126
stands
out:
"The
blabbering
of
a
Mr.
Churchill
or
a
Mr.
Eden
2
to
speak
of
the
old
Chamberlain
good
taste
forbids
-
this
blabbering
leaves
the
German
Volk
cold,
and,
at
best,
elicits
laughter"
(as
cited
in
Domarus,
1997,
P.
2085). Similar
to
Hitler's
July
19,
1940
speech,
his
rhetoric
portrayed
consistent
efforts
to
demonstrate
the
stupidity
and
failings
of
British
politicians.
For
example,
Hitler
directly
ridiculed
Churchill
but
also
sabotaged
his
own
ethos
at
the
same
time.
Hitler
stated:
British
politicians
attempt
to
portray
the
situation:
that
the
British,
Army,
tearing
at
its
reigns
like
a
wild
horse,
is
aflame
with
the
desire
to
finally
be
unleashed,
to
hurl
itself
at
the
German
enemy.
It
was
surely
close
enough
to
us
to
satisfy
this
'desire'
without
much
ado.
It
withdrew
from
our
vicinity,
and
thus
it
is
its
lot
to
portray
these
pitiful
retreats
as
great
victories.
And
this
is
what
all
its
'successes'
look
like!
(As
cited
in
Domarus,
1997,
p.
2082).
Hitler
was
obviously
boastful
of
his
nation's
previous
victory
over
Britain's
Expeditionary
Forces.
However,
Hitler
was
not
demonstrating
respect
in
discussing
his
enemy,
a
rhetorical
failing
that
Aristotle
would
suggest
was
detrimental
to
a
leader's
ethos.
This
inability
to
be
respectful
could
also
have
detrimental
effects
upon
morale,
as
it
may
have
contributed
to
overconfidence
when
fighting
an
"unworthy"
enemy.
Hitler's
perceived
intelligence,
whereby
the
speaker
appears
to
have
practical
wisdom
and
shared
values
with
the
audience
(Griffin,
1997,
p.
306),
was
demonstrated
when
Hitler
claimed
that
Germany
was
a
tolerant
and
unbiased
country
when
compared
with
the
Germany
of
the
past.
Hitler
maintained:
"Whereas
once
the
highest
distinction
was
accorded
only
to
officers,
today
a
valiant
non-commissioned
officer
or
private
may
equally
well earn
it.
The
walls
of
a
world
of
prejudice
have been
torn
down"
(as
cited
in
Domarus,
"1997,
p.
2089).
Although
Hitler
had
concentration
camps
and
the
Nuremberg
'
Robert
Anthony
Eden
(1897
-
1977)
was
the
British
Foreign
Secretary
for
a
time
under
Chamberlain
and
appointed
by
Churchill
as
Secretary
of
State
during
WWII.
127
Laws
in
place
by
this
time,
his
ideological
nature
chose
to
ignore
those
atrocities.
Rather,
he
suggested
that
due
to his
involvement
in
Germany's
political
and
social
policies,
Germany
was
a
more
tolerant
nation.
To
those
who
had
not,
up
to that point,
seen
the
concentration
camps
or
were
willingly
anti-Semitic,
Hitler's
ethos
may
have
appeared
wise
and
desirous
of
positive
and
constructive
values.
Hitler
revealed
a
sense
of
goodwill
towards
his
audience.
Sympathy
for
your
audience's
sacrifices
and
implying
that
you
have
their
best
interests
at
heart
creates
effective
rhetoric
(Griffin,
1997,
p.
306).
Hitler
demonstrated
that
those
who
give
their
time
and
money
to
the
Winterhilfswerk
program
were:
Making
sacrifices.
The
one
makes
a
sacrifice
in
donating,
the
other
in
administering
this
donation
and
in
doing
so
voluntarily
[
...
]
For
all
of
us,
in
one
way
or
another,
are
burdened
with
the
heritage
of
the
past,
our
descent,
our
social
standing,
our
profession,
and
so
on.
We
have
the
choice
of
making
do
without
millions
of
men,
who
are
irreplaceable
in
their
national
work
and
economic
activities.
(As
cited
in
Domarus,
1997,
p.
2088).
Hitler
recognized
the
plight
of
his
audience
and
deliberately
acknowledged
the
sacrifices
they
made.
Logos,
or
the
rational
appeal
of
the
speaker,
was
developed
through
various
arguments.
Not
once
did
Hitler
acknowledge
the
navigational
error
by
Luftwaffe
pilots,
but
instead
treated
the
RAF
bombings on
Berlin
with
a
sense
of
German
victimization.
This
argument
was
not
an
unfamiliar
justification
for
Hitler
to
employ,
as
most
discussions
involving
the
Treaty
of
Versailles
followed
the
same
pattern.
In
suggesting
that
the
Berlin
bombings
were
committed
without
provocation,
Hitler
argued
that
he,
himself,
was
a
peace-maker
who
was
now
forced
into
war.
He
asserted:
I
find
it
insupportable
that
a
nation
of
eighty-five
million
should
be
at
the
mercy
of
another
people
at
any
time
-
whenever
it
suits
the
plutocrats
in
London.
So
128
often
have
I
extended
my
hand
for
an
understanding
with
the
English
people
[...]
I
now
prefer
to
fight
to
finally
arrive
at
a
clear
decision.
This
decision
can
consist
only
in
the
removal
of
this
regime
of
pitiful
and
base
warmongers
and
in
a
situation
being
established
in
which
it
will
be
impossible
for
one
nation
to
tyrannically
run
all
of
Europe
in
the
future.
(As
cited
in
Domarus,
1997,
2084).
Hitler's
resolve
to
fight,
it
appeared,
had
come
with
reluctance
and
hesitation.
Moreover,
he
dismissed
the
British
as
a
regime
of
"pitiful
and
base
warmongers"
(as
cited
in
Domarus,
1997,
p.
2084)
that
were
desirous
of
tyrannical
power.
In
retrospect,
these
words
seemed
more
appropriate
if
uttered
by
Churchill.
However,
this
was
another
example
of
how
Hitler
used
logos
to
effectively
persuade
his
listeners.
A
major
failure
in
Hitler's
speech
was
that
the
pathos
he
employed
did
not
help
to
evoke
any
positive
emotional
state
from
the
audience,
such
as
love
or
confidence.
Instead,
Hitler
primarily
promoted
hatred.
Similar
to
his
July
19,
1940
speech,
Hitler
advanced
hatred
by
addressing
the
dissimilarities
between
Britain
and
Germany
through
ridicule.
Hitler's
scornful
treatment
of
his
enemy
culminated
in
a
climactic
threat
against
the
British.
He
declared:
And
should
the
Royal
Air
Force
drop
two
thousand,
or
three
thousand,
or four
thousand
kilograms
of
bombs,
then
we
will
now
drop
150,000;
180,000;
230,000.;
300,000;
400,000;
yes,
one
million
kilograms
in
a
single
night.
And
should
they
declare
they
will
greatly
increase
their
attacks
on
our
cities,
then
we
will
erase
their
cities!
(As
cited
in
Domarus,
1997,
p.
2086).
If
any
audience
member
had
been
unsure
about
his
or
her
regard
for
Britain
up
to
this
point,
then
that
person
would
have
certainly
recognized
that
hatred
of
the
enemy,
rther
than
love or
pity,
was
integral to
Hitler's
regime.
However,
this
can
still
be
thotight
of
as
effective,
since
the
dissemination
of
hatred
can
often
create
solidarity
and
unity
in
the
audience
(Griffin,
1997,
p.
308).
131
the
newspapers
were
highly
optimistic
about
the
daily
scores
of
aircraft
shot
down
•
and
the
bravery
of
the
fighter
pilots
was
widely
acknowledged
and
circulated
(Messenger,
1990,
p.
70).
On
September
7,
1940
Hitler
told
Goring
that
London
could
become
the
primary
target
of
the
Luftwaffe's
efforts
(Calder,
1969,
p.
156).
With
his
Führer's
permission,
Goring
began
a
series
of
raids
aimed
at
Britain's
capital,
with
the
express
purpose
of
exacting
revenge
for
the
bombing
of
Berlin
(Price,
1977,
p.
78).
On
September
7,
1940,
350
bombers
and
600
Luftwaffe
fighters
attacked
London
(Price,
1977,
p.
78)
resulting
in
continuous
attacks
between
the
hours of
2100
and
0300 on
the
night
of
September
7-8.
According
to
Price
(1977),
Wing
Commander
John
Hodsoll,
who
had
been
watching
the
RAF
from
the
War
Room,
stated
that
the
aircraft
above
were
"just
visible":
"Above
it
all,
just
visible,
was
the
maze
of
tiny
dots
with
their
white
of
vapor,
high
up
in
the
sky;
and
here
and
there
were
signs
of
combat;
of
weaving
trails,
as
our
fighters
did
their
best"
(p.
79).
The
sounds
of
ambulances
and
fire
engines
filled
the
streets
of
London
with
the
430
civilian
casualties
and
1000
injured
(Calder,
1969,
p.
158).
The
Luftwaffe
lost
ten
bombers
and
twenty
two
fighters,
but
had
not
obliterated
Fighter
Command
(Price,
1977,
p.
79)
The
bombing
of
London's
city
center
continued
until
the
end
of
the Battle
of
Britain
-
it
would
never
cease.
By
mid-September
1940,
Londoners
discovered
that
the
Underground
provided
them
the
safety
and
quiet
from
night
raids
and
many
would
remain
there
every
night
for
the
rest
of
the
fall
(Messenger,
1990,
p.
81).
It is
important
to
note
that
Londoners
were
particularly
resistant
to
low
morale
caused
by
the
repeated
bombings.
This
has
been
evidenced
in
publications
which
examine
British
public
opinion
specifically
(Calder,
1969,
p.
158;
Mackay,
2002,
p.
76-79;
Messenger,
p.
80).
For
example,
on
September
7,
1940
east
London
was
badly
hit
and
the
next
day,
Churchill
visited
a
shelter
in
the
East
End,
the
poorest
area
of
the
city,
where
forty
people
had
been
132
killed
the
previous
night.
According
to
Messenger,
the
Eastenders
were
delighted
to
see
him
and
said
to
Churchill:
"We
can
take
it.
Give
it
'em
back'
(p.
80).
Meanwhile,
Operation
Sealion,
the
plan
to
invade
Britain,
which
had
been
planned
for
August,
1940
was
set
back
until
September
24
and
it
was
consequently
postponed
again
until
September
27,
1940
to
allow
Goring's
air
force
time
to
prevail
(Calder,
1969,
p.
159).
The
Germans
considered
the
month
of
September,
although
notorious
for
bad
flying
weather,
would
allow
continuous
air
campaigns.
On
September
15,
1940
another
daytime
attack
by
Luftwaffe
bombers
and
fighters
was
intercepted
by
RAF
fighters.
The
British
won
the
scuffle
due
to
the
limited
range of
the
German
fighter
planes
(Calder,
1969,
p.
160;
James,
2000,
p.
261-262).
Churchill
proclaimed
this
the
"Battle
of
Britain
Day"
and
British
morale
was
high.
From
September
15
until
September
25,
1940,
there
was
reduced
Luftwaffe
activity
with
the
majority
of
bombing
executed
against
suburban
factories.
In
October,
the
Luftwaffe
resorted
to
sending
over
mostly
fighters
by
day,
while
its
bombers
attached
London
and
other
centers
by
night
(Calder,
p.
162).
Some
of
the
heaviest
bombing
of
London
occurred
on
the
night
of
October 14
and
morning
of
the
15,
but
by
October
31,
1940,
•
there
was
no
air
activity.
Although
the
Blitzkrieg
(lightning
warfare)
would
continue
until
May
10/11,
1941,
many
historians
(Calder,
p.
162;
Messenger,
1990,
p.
104-108;
Fawcett,
2006,
p.
256;
Lucas,
1987,
p.
146)
have
suggested
that
the
Battle
of
Britain
ended
with
the
greatly
reduced
demands
on
the
RAF
in
October
1940
because
of
lessening
offensive
strikes
by
the
Germans,
as
well
as
Hitler's
abandonment
of
the
plan
to
invade
Britain
-
Operation
Sealion.
The
Battle
of
Britain
did not
result
in
the
end
of
conflict.
Rather,
the
German
military
objective
to
invade
Britain
was
not
achieved
(Messenger,
1990,
p.
108;
Fawcett,
2006,
p.
255;
Ray,
1994,
p.
174-175).
Operation
Sealion
was
"pinched
to
death"
(Calder,
1969,
p.
160),
the
invasion
could
not
be
launched
because
Fighter
Command
remained
134
However,
the
role
of
rhetoric
and
its
ability
to
solidify
civilian
sentiments
through
rhetorical
means
must
not
be
overlooked.
The
Battle
of
Britain
was
of
such
a
design
that
it
seemed
inevitable
that
the
British
would
lose
to
the
numerical
strength,
preparedness
and
high
morale
of
the
Luftwaffe
forces.
However,
the
rhetoric
of
each
nation
contributed
to
its
respective
victory
and
downfall.
Two
major
flaws
are
prevalent
in
Hitler's
rhetoric
that
are
not
apparent
in
Churchill's.
First,
there
is
a
vast
difference
between
policy-making
and
prophesy-making.
Churchill
used
his
speeches
to
announce
political
policies
and any
promises,
if
made,
were done
so
with
a
vagueness'
which
allowed
Churchill
to
follow
through
without
time
constraints
or
particular
means.
However,
Hitler
proclaimed
himself
as
a
prophet
whose
predictions
would
come
true
through
specified
techniques.
When
Hitler
could
not,
follow
through,
the
validity
of
his
rhetoric
was
questioned.
Second,
respect
for
one's
enemy
is
necessary
in
warfare.
Churchill
had
the
utmost
respect
for
Hitler's
Germany
and
even
expressed
pity
at
their
situation.
Hitler,
on
the
other
hand,
used
a
large
portion
of
his
speeches
to
ridicule
and
scorn
his
enemy.
Although
this
tactic
can
often
lead
to
unity
against
a
common
foe,
it
may
not
have
had
this
desired
effect
all
the
time.
Instead,
Hitler's
ethos
was
self-sabotaged
by
his
deliberate
effort
to
rhetorically
undermine
his
enemy.
During
the
Battle
of
Britain,
Churchill's
rhetoric
was
increasingly
more
effective
to
unify
and
rally
his forces,
while
Hitler's
rhetoric
was
progressively
more
detrimental
to
his
ethos
and
in
the
end,
was
ineffective.
Since
the
battle's
result
was
the
opposite
of
what
military
force
and
technological
assets
alone
would
suggest,
the
speeches
by
each
government
cannot
be
overlooked
as
having
a
significant
effect
upon
the
outcome
of
the
battle.
Instead,
rhetoric
should
be
viewed
as
another
significant
reason
for
affecting
the
Battle
of
Britain's
outcome.
137
situation
or
his
rhetoric.
By
the
end
of
October,
1940,
the
military
purpose
to
invade
Britain
was
lost
and
the
Battle
of
Britain
was
over.
Policy
vs.
Promise-making
Theoretical
findings
can
be
distilled
from
these
chapters,
providing
further
insights
into
the
rhetorical
dynamics
of
battle.
One
of
the
initial
research
questions
was:
What
elements
of
Churchill's
and
Hitler's
rhetoric,
both
its
internal
content
and
its
relation
to
historical
context,
likely
contributed
to
the
specific
military
outcome?
It
is
the
purpose
to
now
discuss
major
elements
of
Churchill's
and
Hitler's
rhetoric
which
were
discovered
within
the
content
of
the
speeches
as
well
as
revealed
by
their
relationship
to
the
historical
context.
First,
the
difference
between
policy-making
and
promise-making
in
war
demonstrates
how
rhetoric
can
be
beneficial
and
detrimental
to
a
rhetor'
s
ethos.
Churchill
made
policies
while
Hitler
made
promises.
Churchill's
policy
to
"never
surrender",
backed
by
a
claim
that
survival
was
achievable,
was
fulfilled
by
Churchill
in
the
coming
months.
Churchill
avoided
claiming
victory
in
a
specified
time-period.
Instead,
Churchill's
ethos
would
be
reinforced
so
long
as
a
British
citizen
could
survive,
and
not
surrender,
within
the
coming
months
and
years.
On
the
other
hand,
Hitler
made
promises
to
his
citizens
that,
when
unfulfilled,
was
detrimental
to his
ethos.
Hitler
promised
victory,
forthcoming
from
the
Luftwaffe,
within
a
few
months.
He
promised
that
Britain
would
be
defeated
and
wiped
from
the
annals
of
history
and
that
Germany
would
emerge
victorious.
Naturally,
when
this
did
not
happen,
Hitler's
rhetorical
ethos
was
damaged
because
he
could
not
keep
promises.
Although
Goring
boasted
that
no
British
plane
would
ever
drop
a
bomb
on
Germany,
Berlin
suffered
nighttime
bombing
raids
throughout
August,
1940.
It is
no
wonder
that
German
citizens
as
well
as
the
Luftwaffe
began
to
lose
their
sense
of
purpose
(James,
2000,
p.
402).
The
difference
between
policy-making
and
promise-making
has
not
been
studied
within
the
realm
of
rhetorical
138
scholarship.
Although
it
is
highly
likely
that
Aristotle, Isocrates,
Cicero
and
others
would
deem
unfulfilled
promises
as
detrimental
to
the
ethos
of
a
leader,
this
has
not
been
a
well-studied
phenomenon.
Respect
and
Emotion
The
second
key
rhetorical
feature
that
was
made
evident
in
the
Battle
of
Britain
is
the
demonstration
of
respect
for
one's
adversary.
While
Churchill's
rhetoric
reflected
respect,
admiration
and
sometimes
pity
for
his
adversary,
Hitler's
rhetoric
was
angry
and
boastful
of
the
significant
advantages
the
Germans
claimed
they
possessed.
Name-calling
and
the
rhetorical
ramifications
of
that
approach
can
again
lead
to
damaging
both
the
ethos
of
the
speaker,
and
also
the
pathos
of
an
audience.
Hitler's
scornful
treatment
of
his
enemy
demonstrates
that
he
was
not
seeking
peace,
but
instead
war.
Hitler's
promise
of
being
a
peace-maker
was
thus
undermined
by
such
actions,
damaging
his
ethos.
Also,
the
audience's
emotional
state
or
pathos
became
limited
to
becoming
a
nation
fuelled
by
hate,
rather
than
love,
indignation
rather
than
pity.
Not
only
would
it
be
productive
to
explore
if
correlations
exist
between
specific
emotional
states
in
audiences
and
their
reactions
to
crises,
but
also
to
investigate
what
emotional
states
are
provoked
when
respect,
or
disrespect,
for
one's
enemy
is
exhibited
by
a
speaker.
Another
rhetorical
quality
made
apparent
in
this
analysis
is
the
importance
that
emotional
delivery
plays
in
war.
Churchill
was
cold
and
disconnected
while
Hitler
was
passionate,
arousing
and
demonstrative.
As
depicted
within
the
Battle
of
Britain,
Churchill's
cold
approach
seemed
to
be
beneficial
while
Hitler's
impassioned
stance
was
detrimental.
It
has
been
argued
that
Churchill's
emotionally
detached
manner
of
voicing
his
policies
helped
to solidify
the
resolve
of
the
British
people.
This
tactic,
expressed
through
flowery
language
and
advanced
vocabulary,
cultivated
high-mindedness
within
his
audiences,
almost
mythologizing
a
nation
into
a
timeless
legacy.
On
the
other
hand,
Hitler's
erratic
and
stimulated
approach
meant
to
unify
the
people
through
emotions, but
139
it
seemed
to
sabotage
the
determination
and
calm
of
the
German
Luftwaffe
and
people.
When
bombings
of
urban
centers
occur
regularly,
one
can
assume
that
those
inhabitants
require
a
calm
leader,
not
an
emotionally
disorganized
prophet.
Thus,
one
can
draw
the
conclusion
that
when
at
war,
a
politician
should handle
such
conflict
with
emotional
detachment
and
analytical,
unaffected
emotion.
It is
important
to
note,
however,
that Hitler's
emotional
tactic
was
incredibly
effective
when
campaigning
in
pre-war
Germany.
Hitler
invoked
an
emotional
state
of
excitement
and
enthusiasm
within
German
audiences
when
he
was
merely
the
leader
of
the
National
Socialist
party.
Hitler
was
renowned
as
a
very
persuasive
speech-maker
(Evans,
2003,
p.
171).
However,
Churchill
never
ran
for
Prime
Minister,
but
was
appointed
by
Chamberlain
in
1940.
When
Churchill
ran
for
Prime
Minister
of
Britain
in
1945,
he
was
not
elected.
One
begins
to
wonder
whether
Churchill
was,
rhetorically,
the
optimal
Prime
Minister
at
war,
while
Hitler
was,
rhetorically,
the
optimal
campaigning
politician
in
peace.
How
important
are
emotions
to
a
war-time
leader's
persuasion?
Churchill's
Brutal
Honesty
The
issue
of
honesty
in
a
politician's
rhetoric
is
problematic,
especially
if
the
government
is
at
war.
Churchill
is
often
remembered
for
his
ability
to
explicitly
describe,
through
facts,
the
state
of
the
nation.
In
Chapter
Four:
The
Ideal
Orator,
it
was
argued
that
Churchill's
honest
portrayal
of
statistical
and
numerical
data,
demonstrated
that
he
possessed
a
broad
and
complete
knowledge-base
that
Cicero
claimed
was
essential
to
the
effectiveness
of
an
"Ideal
Orator."
This
was
again
raised
in
Chapter
Five,
especially
when
analyzing
his
June
4,
1940
speech
"We
Shall
Fight
on
the
Beaches"
(Churchill,
1940a).
Churchill's
brutal
honesty,
however
depressing
it
may
appear,
was
consistently
portrayed
in
this
speech,
reinforcing
and
establishing
his
ethos
as
a
virtuous
politician.
These
two
arguments,
when
combined,
suggest
that
Churchill's
ability
to
present
himself
as
both
a
knowledgeable
and
honest
rhetor,
has
a
significant
impact
upon
the
audience's
140
belief
of
a
politician's
capacity
to
virtuously
lead
a
nation.
More
specifically,
it
could
be
argued
that
citizens
and
military
personnel
may
not
trust
a
politician
who
approaches
a
crisis
with
superficial
accounts
or
incomplete
knowledge
of
the
circumstances.
Although
Churchill
was
taking
a
chance
by
revealing
information
that
could
have
depressed
his
already-frightened
audience,
it
had
the
reverse
effect.
Instead,
Churchill's
brutal
honesty
demonstrated
courage
and
faith
in
a
nation's
capacity
to
survive.
What
balance
must
a
war-time
leader ,
possess,
which
ig
truthful
to
audiences
but
still
discreet
enough
for
enemies,
to
be
effective?
Dilemmas
of
Studying
Hitler
Another
prevalent
theme
that
was
raised
repeatedly
is
in
regards
to
the
ethical
challenges
of
dealing
with
Hitler.
As
was
the
goal
of
this
thesis,
Hitler
must
be
treated
with
cautious
objectivity
rather
than
automatic
condemnation,
especially
if
one
wishes
to
garner
some
understanding
of
Hitler
as
an
exceptional,
albeit
murderous,
statesman.
A
major
challenge
when
discussing
Hitler
is
when
he
is
evaluated
with.
a
non-National
Socialist
perspective.
In
Chapter
Four:
The
Ideal
Orator,
Isocrates
mentions
that
rhetors
must
be
judged
by
the
valuçs
of
the
community
in
which
they
operate.
This
type
of
moral
relativism
is
easier
said
than
done.
Even
if
one
views
Hitler
through
his
own
core
values,
or
tries
to
compare
him
to
another
non-Nazi
individual
(such
as
Churchill),
the
values
of
that
non-Nazi
comparison,
or
the
bias
of
any
non-Nazi
scholar
will
undoubtedly
filter
into
their
research.
However,
this
thesis
devised
a
method
by
which
to
evaluate
Hitler,
which
hopefully
overcame
some
of
these
ethical
challenges.
In
Chapter
Four:
The
Ideal
Orator,
Isocrates'
and
Cicero's
standard
of
an
"ideal
orator"
meant
that
Churchill
and
Hitler
had
to
be
evaluated
against
almost
unattainable
criteria.
Instead
of
directly
comparing
Hitler
to
Churchill
(although
that
did
occur
in
Chapter
Five),
Chapter
Four
was
an
attempt
to
evaluate
Hitler,
as
a
rhetor,
within
the
community
values
of
Nazi
Germany.
While
this
analysis
would
never
achieve
perfect
objectivity,
it
has,
at
least,
142
soldier's
morale
has
been
studied
in
various
contexts
(Heinecken,
2009;
Massie,
2008;
Steele,
2008),
it
has not
been
studied
with
regard
to
the
impact
of
political
communication.
To
what
extent
does
political
rhetoric
affect
the
morale
of
a
soldier
or
citizen?
How
can
this
relationship
be
strengthened
and/or
weakened?
By
focusing
on
the
relationship
of
political
rhetoric
to
contemporary
morale
of
citizens
and
soldiers,
it
bridges
the
gap
between
political
science
studies,
communications
studies,
rhetorical
studies
and
military
studies.
And,
if
a
comparative
framework
which
analyses
the
connection
between
political
rhetoric
and
morale
was
employed
with
a
historical
lens,
then
further
conclusions
about
what
has
occurred
and
what
is
occurring
could
take
place.
Practical
and
Contemporary
Applications
Although
the
purpose
of
the
thesis
was
limited
to
historical
analysis,
some
of
the
findings
mentioned
earlier
can
be
related
to
modern
politicians
at
war.
The
difference
between
policy-making
and
promise-making
in
wartime
speeches
is
not
only
evident
during
WWII,
but
also
during
America's
present-day
war
in
Iraq.
For
example,
George
W.
Bush's
rhetoric
could
be
analyzed
for
claims
of
policy or
claims
of
peace.
When
waging
war
in
Iraq,
was
Bush
committing
to
promises
that
he
could
not
keep,
or
was
he
making
vague
policies
thét
could
be
fulfilled?
What
affects
did
this
have
upon
Bush's
ethos?
How
was
he
regarded
by
the
public?
This concept
might
be
of use
to
contemporary
rhetoricians,
as
the
Bush
Administrations'
desperate
attempts
to
find
Iraq's
"weapons
of
mass
destruction"
seemed
to
become
a
glorified
mission,
based
upon
a
lack
of
evidence.
By
studying
the
difference
between
policy-making
and
promise-making,
modern
rhetoricians
could
assist
today's
world
leaders, in
the
Canadian
and
international
contexts,
to
maintain
a
leader's
fully-developed
ethos,
rather
than
an
ethos
that
is
damaged
by
unfulfilled
promises.
Respect
for
one's
enemy,
especially
at
war,
also
has
contemporary
significance.
Sun-Tzu
states
in
The
Art of
War
(2003):
"Humble
words,
coupled
with
increased
143
prepara;ions,
are
a
sign
of
impending
attack;
Strong words,
coupled
with
an
aggressive
advance,
are
a
sign
of
impending
retreat"
(as
cited
in
Minford,
2003,
p.
56).
Although
the
belief
that
one
should
always
uphold
respect
for
one's
enemies
is
an
ancient
concept,
advocated
by
the
oldest
of
historical
and
mythical
figures,
it
appears
that
name-
calling
is
still
evident
within
modern
communication.
The
rhetorical
effect
of
respect
arguably
originates
in
Aristotle's
categorization
of
the
six
main
human
emotions
(and
antecedents).
If
a
leader
appears
respectful
to
their
enemy,
it
not
only
strengthens
their
ethos,
but
also
helps
the
pathos
of
the
audience
to
feel
love of
their
enemy
and
admiration
of
their
leader.
This
tactic
evidently
worked
well
for
Churchill.
One
could
apply
this
concept
to
modern
day
nations
at
war,
but
also
to
national
political
parties
(such
as
Canada's
Conservatives
and
Liberals),
in
an
effort
to
reduce
infighting
and
national
division.
By
refraining
from
denigrating
one's
enemy,
a
leader
even
in
today's
world,
will
have
greater
respect
of
their
own
people
and
their
ethos
will
be
even
more
persuasive.
Finally,
a
politician
who
can
use
emotional
evocation
when
campaigning,
but
can
"turn
off"
the
emotional
switch
when
at
war,
would
be
rhetorically
the
most
effective.
This
would
be
a
very
interesting
finding
to
explore
in
other
contexts,
to
evaluate
the
most
eminent
modern
leaders.
For
example,
Barack
Obama
might
fit
this
"mould".
When
campaigning,
Obama
was
renowned
for
his
impassioned
and
emotional
stance.
However,
Obama's
rhetoric
when
dealing
with
crises,
such
as
the
economic
recession
in
2009,
or
the
Swine
Flu
in
2009,
has
been
approached
with
a
cold
and
almost
analytical
manner.
Not
only could
this
argument
serve
as
a
new
approach
by
which
to
view
modern
leaders,
but
it
could
also
inform
the
type
of
pathos,
or
emotional
rhetoric,
that
is
necessary
to
effective
persuasion
during
modern
crises.
144
Significance
of
this
Thesis
and
Final
Thoughts
While
historians
and
military
academics
study
the
strategies,
political
policies
and
numerical
strengths
of
each
participant
in
war,
they
often
fail
to
notice
another
perspective
that
rhetoricians
can
offer.
As
David
Zarefsky
(1998)
states,
"by
studying
historical
events
from
a
rhetorical
perspective,
one
can
see
significant
aspects
about
those
events
that
others
miss"
(p.
30).
When
recounting
the
Battle
of
Britain
from
a
rhetorical
perspective,
Churchill's
and
Hitler's
rhetoric
becomes
another
factor
which
is
affected
and
effects
historical
events.
Churchill's
and
Hitler's
rhetoric
was
not
necessarily
a
whimsical
or
manipulative
tool
for
propagandistic purposes,
but
can
be
viewed
as
another
significant
contributor
that
political
leaders
require
in
order
to
fulfill
political
or
military
goals.
While
Churchill's
and
Hitler's
rhetoric
has
been viewed
as
a
contributor
to
the
Battle
of
Britain,
its
effects
(upon
morale,
for
example)
are
intangible
and
cannot
be
measured
quantitatively.
Therefore,
rhetoric
cannot
be
assessed
as
the
primary
reason
for
the
British
victory.
Rhetoric
acts
within
a
spectrum
of
choices,
which
are
dependent
upon
the
community
values,
norms
and
the
context
in
which
it
operates.
Rhetoric
will
undoubtedly
always
operate
upon
a
landscape
of
shifting
values
and
varied
contexts.
It is
best
to
study
the
effects
of
rhetoric
after
the
rhetorical
situation
has
passed.
By
studying
history
from
a
rhetorical
perspective,
however
advantageous
as
a
scholarly
standpoint,
one
must
remember
that
rhetoric
is
not
a
predictable,
measurable
factor
in
social
reality.
Nevertheless,
general
principles
of
rhetoric
can
still
limit
and
guide
causes
and
effects,
making
it
not
totally
random.
As
investigated,
Churchill
exhausted
the
rhetorical
means
at
his
disposal
to
infuse
his
audiences
with
hope
and
determination.
Meanwhile,
Hitler's
rhetorical
appeals
were
not
able
to
maintain
an
appropriate
level
of
trust
in
his
ethos,
nor
an
appropriate
emotional
pathos
in
his
audience.
While
Churchill's
rhetoric
was on
the
incline,
Hitler's
145
was on
the
decline.
If
rhetoric
can
be
viewed
as
having
significant
effects
within
the
historical
events
of
the
Battle
of
Britain,
rhetoric
should
be
entertained
within
future
academic
studies
as
another
productive
avenue
of
inquiry
into
historical
and
modem
wars
and
crises.
146
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