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Bibliographia. Annotated Bibliographies on Religion and Philosophy PDF Free Download

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Bibliographia. Annotated bibliographies

Raul Corazzon || rc@ontology.co || Info

Bibliographia. Annotated

Bibliographies on Religion and

Philosophy

What's New: Last Update: September 13th, 2025.

This website is devoted to bibliographical resources on philosophy

and religion.

I will begin with Bibliographies on the history of early Christianity;

the planned sections are:

Bibliographies of philosophy: on arguments not treated in my other

websites.

Hebrew Bible: Bibliographies on the formation of the Pentateuch,

the Canon, the psuedepigrapha, textual criticism and the history of

the research.

New Testament: Bibliographies on the synoptic question, the

gospels, the letters, Acts of Apostles and Revelation, the formation of

the Canon, the psuedepigrapha, textual criticism and the history of

the research.

Literature of the Early Christianity: Bibliographies on the Apostolic

Fathers, orthodoxy and heresy.

Literature of the Early Judaism: Bibliographies on the birth of

Judaism and the Parting of the Ways between Christianity and

Judaism.

Philosophy and Phenomenology of Religion: Definition of 'Religion',

Analytic and Continental perspectives; the dichotomy between

Sacred and Profane; the debate over the existence of God.

Sociology of Religion: The Sociology of Early Christianity; Charisma

and Its Routinization in Early Christianity; Messianism and

Millenarism from a sociological perspective.

Study Guides: this section contains Bibliographies on dictionaries

and encyclopedias of philosophy, manuals of style for philosophy

students and a selection of introductory readings on history of

philosophy, metaphysics, ontology and the philosophy of logic.

Other religions: This section will contain bibliographies on the most

important religions other than Christianity and Judaism.

Currently this site is in an early stage of development: only few

sections are available; if you are interested, please be patient: in the

next future I will add more pages. This is my third website after

“Theory and History of Ontology and “History of Logic” that I will

continue to develope.

Bibliographia. Annotated bibliographies
Raul Corazzon || rc@ontology.co || Info
What's New on This Site: Recently
Modified Pages
Recent Updates
September 13th, 2025: Added Annotated bibliography of Peter
Abelard: I. Literary Works
September 13th, 2025: Added Annotated bibliography of Peter
Abelard: II. Logical, theological and ethical works
August 30th, 2025: Added Abelard and Heloise. Bibliography of the
English Studies
August 30th, 2025: Updated Abelard's Philosophy. Bibliography of
the English Studies
August 20th, 2025: Updated Peter Abelard. Bibliography on His
theology and the doctrine of the Trinity
August 12th, 2025: Updated Peter Abelard. Bibliography on His
Ethics and Moral Philosophy
September 10th, 2024: Added Bibliography on mental language in
the Middle Ages
July 1st, 2024: Added From Greek to Latin. The development of the
Latin philosophical vocabulary
December 8th, 2023: Updated Boethius' Contribution to the
Quadrivium. Selected Bibliography

Bibliographia. Annotated bibliographies
Raul Corazzon || rc@ontology.co || Info
Contents of the projected pages
Bibliographies on Philosophy
Boethius
Boethius' Contribution to Quadrivium. Annotated Bibliographyy
Peter Abelard
Bibliography on Abelard theology and His doctrine of the Trinity
Bibliography on Abelard Ethics and Moral Philosophy
Bibliography of the Medieval Theories of
Mental Language
Annotated bibliography of studies in English:
A - Kel
Kin - O'Ca
Pan - Z
Annotated bibliography of studies in other languages:
French, Italian, German, Portuguese, Spanish, Latin
Bernard Bolzano
Bibliography on Bolzano's Practical Philosophy: Religion, Politics,
Aesthetics
Bernard Bolzano

Bibliography on Bolzano's Practical Philosophy: Religion, Politics,

Aesthetics

Philosophy from Greek to Latin. The

development of Latin philosophical

vocabulary

Studies in English A - J

Studies in English K - Z

Studies in French, Italian, German

Questions of Biblical Criticism

Hebrew Bible Textual Criticism

History of the Hebrew Bible Critical Research

New Testament Textual Criticism

History of New Testament Critical Research

Hebrew Bible

(Under construction)

New Testament

The Synoptic Gospels

The Synoptic Problem

The Gospel of Matthew

The Gospel of Mark

The Gospel of Luke

The Pauline Epistles

1 Thessalonians, 1 Corinthians, 2 Corinthians, Philippians, Philemon,

Galatians, Romans

Early Developments of Christianity

The Acts of the Apostles

Deutero-Pauline Epistles

2 Thessalonians, Colossians, Ephesians

Pastoral Epistles

1 Timothy, 2 Timothy, Titus

The Epistle to the Hebrews

The Catholic Epistles: James, 1 Peter, 2 Peter, Judas

The Johannine Literature

The Gospel of John

The Epistles: 1, 2, 3 John

The Christian Apocalyptic

The Book of Revelation

The Canon of the New Testament

The Formation of the Canon

The New Testament Apocrypha

on the Apocryphal Literature

General Studies on the Apocryphal Literature

New Testament Apocrypha

Apocryphal Gospels

Apocryphal Acts

Apocryphal Letters

Apocryphal Apocalypses

Early Christian Orthodox Literature (I-II

Centuries)

Apostolic Fathers

Clement of Rome (fl. c. 95)

Ignatius of Antioch (fl. c. 100-115)

Polycarp of Smyrna (69- 155)

Didaché (100-150)

The Epistle of Barnabas (130-131)

Papias of Hierapolis (c. 60-130)

Quadratus of Athens (d. 129)

Papias of Hierapolis (c. 60-130)

Epistle to Diognetus (130 ? - late 2nd century ?)

The Shepherd of Hermas (90-150)

Christian Writers of the Second Century

Justin Martyr (c. 100-165)

Aristide of Athens, Apology (c. 120-138)

Clement of Alexandria (c. 150-215)

Tertullian (155-c. 220)

Melito of Sardis (d. 180)

Irenaeus (early 2nd century – died c. 202)

Athenagoras of Athens (c. 133-c.190)

Theophilus of Antioch (d. 183-185)

Hippolitus of Rome (170-235)

Bibliography on the Early Christian Heterodox Literature (I-II

Centuries))

The Problem of the Birth of Heresy

Dissent in the First Century

The Bauer Thesis: The Origins of Orthodoxy and Heresy

Simon Magus

Ebionism

Nicolaism

Heresies of the Second Century

Christian Gnosticism

Sethianism

Marcionism

Montanism

Ebionites

Nazarenes

Elchasaites

Philosophy and Phenomenology of Religion

History of the Ontological Argument for the

Existence of God

General Introduction

General Works on the History of the Ontological Argument

Anselm of Canterbury's argument in the Proslogion

The Medieval Period from Anselm of Canterbury to Duns Scotus

The Modern Period from Suárez to Frege

The Contemporary Period from Barth to the Present Time

A Selection of Primary Texts

Fundamental Questions

The Sacred

Monotheism and Polytheism

Sociology of Religion

The Sociology of Early Christianity

Charisma and Its Routinization in Early Christianity

Messianism

Millenarism

Bibliographical study guides

Study Guides on Western Philosophy

Introductory Works, Dictionaries, Encyclopedias

Bibliography of Philosophy and Manuals of Style

General Works on the History of Philosophy

Formal and Descriptive Metaphysics

Formal and Descriptive Ontology

Philosophical Logic and Philosophy of Logic

Bibliographia. Annotated bibliographies
Raul Corazzon || rc@ontology.co || Info
Bibliographies on Philosophy
Boethius
Boethius' Contribution to Quadrivium. Annotated Bibliographyy
Peter Abelard
Bibliography on Abelard theology and His doctrine of the Trinity
Bibliography on Abelard Ethics and Moral Philosophy
Bibliography of the Medieval Theories of
Mental Language
Annotated bibliography of studies in English:
A - Kel
Kin - O'Ca
Pan - Z
Annotated bibliography of studies in other languages:
French, Italian, German, Portuguese, Spanish, Latin
Bernard Bolzano
Bibliography on Bolzano's Practical Philosophy: Religion, Politics,
Aesthetics
Philosophy from Greek to Latin. The
development of Latin philosophical
vocabulary
Studies in English A - J

Studies in English K - Z

Studies in French, Italian, German

Bibliographia. Annotated bibliographies

Raul Corazzon || rc@ontology.co || Info

Boethius' Contribution to the

Quadrivium. Selected Bibliography

Bibliography

1. Barrett, Sam. 2013. The Melodic Tradition of Boethius’ De

consolatione philosophiae in the Middle Ages. Kassel:

Bärenreiter.

Volume I: Text; Volume II: Transcriptions and Commentary.

2. Bell, Nicolas. 2009. "Readings and Interpretations of

Boethius’s De institutione musica in the Later Middle Ages." In

Sapientia et Eloquentia: Meaning and Function in Liturgical

Poetry, Music, Drama, and Biblical Commentary in the Middle

Ages, edited by Iversen, Gunila and Bell, Nicolas, 365-380.

Turnhout: Brepols.

"Throughout the Middle Ages the primary text for the

understanding of music was Boethius’s De institutione musica.

Boethius was essentially a philosopher. The purpose of his

discourses in the liberal arts was to enable the mind to move

closer to an abstract truth: it was only after one understood the

truth that was inherent in music, in arithmetic, or in the other

liberal arts, that one could begin to have an understanding of

philosophy.(1) He was also a theologian — or at least, as far as

Boethius was concerned, the purpose of the study of music was

essentially a theological one. In the De institutione musica, the

extensive discussions of instrumental music were intended not

simply as an exemplification of the geometrical principles of

harmonic theory; they were also the first stage in an intellectual

progression, first from musica instrumentalis to musica

humana — from the practical understanding of the monochord

to the understanding of the human soul — and ultimately from

musica humana to musica mundana — to the divine plan of

the world and the heavens, the music of the spheres." (p. 365)

(1) See Calvin M. Bower, ‘The Role of Boethius’ De institutione

musica in the Speculative Tradition of Western Musical

Thought’, in Boethius and the Liberal Arts: A Collection of

Essays, ed. by Michael Masi, Utah Studies in Literature and

Linguistics, 18 (Bern: Lang, 1981), pp. 157–74.

3. Bernhard, Michael. 1990. "Glosses on Boethius' "De

institutione musica"." In Music Theory and its Sources:

Antiquity and the Middle Ages, edited by Barbera, André, 136-

149. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press.

4. Bohlin, Erik. 2017. "An Unnoticed Gloss in Boethius, Institutio

arithmetica II, 54." Latomus no. 76:403-408.

"The last chapter of the second book of Boethius’ Institutio

arithmetica deals with the proportion which in the chapter’s

heading is called maxima et perfecta symphonia “the greatest

perfect concord”. With modern notation the proportion can be

described thus: In a sequence of four numbers a, b, c, d – which

are positive integers and for which a > b > c > d – the

proportion is a : c = b : d, or, inversely, c : a = d : b, and such

that b = (a + d) / 2 and c = (2ad) / (a + d).

The numbers d, b, a will thereby constitute an arithmetic

progression, in which b is the arithmetic mean, and the

numbers d, c, a a harmonic progression, in which c is the

harmonic mean. The sequence is exemplified and expounded

further in the chapter by the numbers 12 (= a), 9 (= b), 8 (= c),

and 6 (= d)."

(...)

"According to the editions of G. Friedlein (1867), J.-Y.

Guillaumin (1995), and H. Oosthout and J. Schilling (1999), the

passage reads thus:

In quattuor enim terminis si fuerit quemadmodum primus ad

tertium, sic secundus ad quartum, proportionum ratione

scilicet custodita, geometrica medietas explicatur et quod

continetur sub extremitatibus aequum erit ei quod sub utraque

medietate ad se inuicem multiplicata conficitur. (Boeth.,

arithm. II, 54, 3) 4

Guillaumin translates it into French as follows:

“En effet, dans quatre termes [a, b, c, d], si le second [b] est au

quatrième [d] comme le premier [a] est au troisième [c], la

raison des rapports se conservant, cela développe une médiété

géométrique et le produit des extrêmes [ad] sera égal au

produit des deux moyens multipliés entre eux [bc].” (5)

I shall now demonstrate that the words ad se inuicem

multiplicata are redundant and most likely spurious. (pp. 403-

404, notes omitted)

(...)

"To conclude: As it has been demonstrated (i) that the words ad

se inuicem multiplicata are superfluous at arithm. II, 54, 3 and

(ii) that there are no attestations in Boethius’ work to indicate

that he uses such phrases with the participle multiplicatus in a

redundant fashion, I propose that the words in question are not

of Boethius’ hand, but have been added and inserted into the

text as a gloss." (p. 408)

(5) J.-Y. Guillaumin, Boèce. Institution arithmétique, Paris,

1995, p. 175

5. Bower, Calvin. 1984. "The Modes of Boethius." The Journal of

Musicology no. 3:252-263.

6. Bower, Calvin M. 1978. "Boethius and Nichomachus: An Essay

Concerning the Sources of De institutione musica." Vivarium

no. 16:1-45.

"I begin this inquiry with two underlying assumptions. First,

Boethius was principally a translator when putting together the

De institutione musica. The treatise seems to follow the De

institutione arithmetica in the chronology of Boethius’ works,

and the arithmetical treatise is recognized to be a translation of

Nicomachus of Gerasa εισαγωγή άριθμητική.

(...)

Boethius’ method of composing in his early works is that of

compiling through translation with some commentary; the

arithmetical treatise and the logical works clearly demonstrate

this point. Thus ininquiring into Boethius’ sources I am trying

to determine which Greek treatise Boethius was translating

when he compiled his musical treatise.

My second assumption is that Boethius was a conscientious and

competent translator." (pp. 1-2)

(...)

"Since this essay is somewhat expository in nature, its

organization must largely follow that of Boethius’ treatise.

Seven principal sections will be designated as follows:

I. Pattern of citation in the mathematical works

II. Books I and II

III. Book III

IV. Book IV

V. Unity of Books I-IV

VI. Nicomachus and Ptolemy

VII. Book V and the original scope of De institutione musica

In that my conclusions concerning the first three books are

similar to those of Pizzani (*) and other writers, these sections

may be brief and concise. Since my treatment of Book IV stands

in sharp contrast to previous scholarship, that section must be

the most detailed and extended." (pp. 3-4 notes omitted)

(*) Ubaldo Pizzani 'Studi sulle fonti del “ De Institutione

Musica” di Boezio', Sacris erudiri, 16 (1965), 5-164.

7. ———. 1981. "The Role of Boethius' De Institutione Musica in

the Speculative Tradition of Western Muiscal Thought." In

Boethius and the Liberal Arts: A Collection of Essays, edited by

Masi, Michael, 157-174. Bern: Peter Lang.

"An attempt to define the role of Boethius’ De institutione

musica in the speculative tradition of Western musical thought

may appear to be an awesome and even pretentious task,

especially in context of a study as brief as the present one. My

limitations may seem even more severe in that I will confine my

discussion to musical writings before the year 1100. The

centuries immediately prior to 1100 saw the birth of that sphere

of study which has come to be called musical theory; the nature

of the thought which has grown and developed within this

sphere was largely shaped during the years between about 500,

when Boethius compiled his De institutione musica, and the

year 1000, when the first full flowering of medieval musical

theory was completed in the works of such theorists as Guido of

Arezzo and Herman of Reichenau.

If my temporal and spatial boundaries for this study seem

small, I would like my consideration of the word "speculative"

to seem large. By "speculative tradition" I do not mean what

Boethius would term musica mundana or even musica

humana; I mean rather man’s verbal reflections and

meditations concerning an art so universal yet so difficult to

grasp intellectually and articulate verbally. If my study has any

basic thesis, it is that Boethius’ De institutione musica played a

highly significant and clearly definable role in shaping the

language and concepts with which Western man sought to

understand and articulate music. One might begin to prove this

thesis by compiling an index of the places in musical theory

where Boethius has been quoted or cited, or those relatively few

places where he has been both quoted and cited. But such an

approach seems too discursive; moreover, it has been basically

accomplished in several other studies. (1) The mere quoting of

an author does not prove that his thought is crucial in shaping

the ideas of the writer quoting, especially during the Middle

Ages. My approach will be to examine Boethius’ basic position

and attitude toward music, both in itself and in comparison

with other theorists. Thereafter I will trace the history of

Boethius’ text and of reflections concerning music in

subsequent centuries. Finally, I will show how Boethius’

attitude essentially shaped the understanding of and

articulation concerning music in the ninth through the eleventh

centuries.

In discussing the nature of Boethius’ treatise I do so with the

understanding that it is basically a translation of Greek sources

and not an original work. (2) But for the sake of ease in

discourse, as well as the fact that medieval man viewed the

work as the creation of Boethius, I shall speak of the basic

contents of the work as words and thoughts of Boethius." (p.

157)

(1) W. Brambach, Die Musiklitteratur des Mittelalters bis zur

Blüthe der Reichenauer Sängerschule (Karlsruhe, 1883).

Gerhard Pietzsch, Die Klassifikation der Musik von Boetius bis

Ugolino von Orvieto (Halle, 1929).

(2) Ubaldo Pizzani, "Studi sulle fonti del De Institutione Musica

di Boezio,“ Sacris Erudiri XVI (1965), 5-160; C.M. Bower,

"Boethius and Nicomachus: An Essay Concerning The Sources

of De institutione musica," Vivarium XVI (1978), 1-45.

8. ———. 2002. "The Transmission of Ancient Music Theory into

the Middle Ages." In The Cambridge History of Western Music

Theory, edited by Christyensen, Thomas, 136-167. Cambridge:

Cambridge University Press.

"Boethius, following Pythagorean and neo-Platonic authors

before him, held that quantity was divided into two basic

genera: discrete quantity – or multitude; and continuous

quantity – or magnitude. The monad, or unity, was the source

of discrete quantity, and this genus could increase into infinite

multitude; yet its basic element, unity, remained indivisible.

Magnitude, or continuous quantity, might be represented by

the line or a shape, which was delimited with respect to

increasing and growth, but could be infinitely divided. The two

basic genera of quantity were, in turn, subdivided into two

species: multitude is best represented by number, and every

number can be considered in and of itself (even, odd, perfect,

square, cube, etc), or it can be considered in relation to another

(in ratios and proportions – e.g., 2:1, 3:2, or 6:4:2); magnitude

is best represented by shapes, and some shapes are fixed and

immobile (e.g., a line, a triangle, a cube), while others are in

motion (e.g., the sun, the moon, the heavenly spheres). Four

areas of study were thus defined by the very nature of quantity:

arithmetic pursued number in and of itself; music examined

number in ratios and proportions; geometry considered

immobile magnitudes; astronomy investigated magnitudes in

motion. Boethius described these four disciplines as the

quadrivium, the fourfold path by which the soul was led from

the slavery of sensual knowledge to the mastery of knowing

immutable essences. Musica thus became a necessary

prerequisite to the study of philosophy. (19)" (pp. 141-142)

(19) See De institutione arithmetica I.1; De institutione musica

II.3

9. Caiazzo, Irene. 2020. "Medieval Commentaries on Boethius’s

De arithmetica: A Provisional Handlist." Bulletin de

philosophie médiévale no. 62:3-13.

10. Caldwell, John. 1981. "The De Institutione Arithmetica and the

De Institutione Musica." In Boethius: His Life, Thought and

Influence, edited by Gibson, Margaret, 135-154. Oxford:

Blackwell.

"Boethius stands at the very end of a long tradition of

mathematical philosophy that had extended for nearly a

thousand years. (1) His work on music is much the more

original of the two treatises to be considered in this chapter,

and it is to that that the greater part of our attention will be

devoted; but Boethius also wrote on arithmetic at least of the

other mathematical arts, and his contribution must be

considered in the light of a tendency in antiquity to isolate the

four speculative mathematical subjects — arithmetic, music,

geometry and astronomy — and to group them together as a

unit which Boethius was apparently the first to call the

‘quadrivium’ or ‘quadruvium’. (2) Opposed to this of course was

the trivium of grammar, rhetoric and dialectic, the whole

forming the group of sevenu liberal arts’ which combined with

the ‘three philosophies’ made up the staple diet of the medieval

university curriculum. With these larger units we are not here

concerned. But the development of the quadrivium, and the

contribution of Boethius to it, demands a closer look." (p. 135)

(1) In the East, however, writers such as Michael Psellus,

Bryennios and Pachymeres reproduced ancient musical theory

in their treatises of the Byzantine middle ages, just as Boethian

philosophy is reproduced in the works of Hucbald, Regino of

Prüm, Johannes de Mûris and innumerable others of the West.

But even if Boethius himself were proved to be a wholly

unoriginal thinker in music, his work would still belong to the

very end of the long cultural tradition to which it relates, and

from which the works of Cassiodorus and Isidore already mark

a significant break.

(2) Arith. I. i: pp. 7. 25, 9. 28.

11. Chamberlain, David S. 1970. "Philosophy of Music in the

Consolatio of Boethius." Speculum no. 45:80-97.

Reprinted in Manfred Fuhrmann und Joachim Gruber (Hrsg.),

Boethius, Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft,

1984, pp. 377–404.

12. Courcelle, Pierre. 1981. "Boethius, Lady Philosophy, and the

Representations of the Muses." In Boethius and the Liberal

Arts: A Collection of Essays, edited by Masi, Michael, 211-218.

Bern: Peter Lang.

13. Dehnert, Edmund John. 1969. "Music as Liberal in Augustine

and Boethius." In Arts Libéraux et Philosophie Au Moyen Âge.

Actes du Quatrième Congrès International de Philosophie

Médiévale, 987-991. Paris: Vrin.

14. Edmiston, Jean. 1974. "Boethius on Pythagorean Music." Music

Review no. 35:179-184.

15. Erickson, Raymond. 1992. "Eriugena, Boethius, and the

Neoplatonism of Musica and Scolica Enchiriadis." In Musical

Humanism and Its Legacy: Essays in Honor of Claude V.

Palisca, edited by Kovaleff Baker, Nancy and Russano

Hanning, Barbara, 53-78. Stuyvesant, NY: Pendragon Press.

"Because Eriugena’s writings include discussions of the liberal

arts and music, they have attracted the interest of music

historians. And because Eriugena uses certain terms that are

found in the Enchiriadis treatises, scholars for the past 150

years have argued for, or at least accepted the likelihood of,

links between Eriugena and the treatises. Indeed, no less

eminent a scholar than Jacques Handschin was certain that

Eriugena knew Musica enchiriadis. (8) Furthermore, none of

today’s leading authorities on Carolingian theory — even when

a proposed point of contact has been disputed — has argued

against such links altogether. (9) It is the intention here,

however, to do just that: to assert that there is no likely

connection between Eriugena and the Enchiriadis treatises and

to demonstrate that the concepts and vocabulary of the

Enchiriadis treatises that have been attributed to Eriugena

(and indirectly to Greek Neoplatonism) are all explainable in

terms of the earlier Latin tradition, and Boethius in particular,

to that end, we will undertake a brief review of previous

scholarship on this question and a more detailed critique of

new, as yet unevaluated claims for Eriugenian influence." (pp.

56-57)

(8) “Die Musikanschauung des Johannes Scotus (Erigena),”

Deutsche Vierteljahrsschrift für Literaturwissenschaft und

Geistesgeschichte V (1927) 339.

(9) For example, Michel Huglo, “Bibliographie des éditions et

études relatives â la théorie musicale du Moyen Age," Acta

musicologica LX (1988) 261, refers to the author of Musica

enchiriadis as “disciple de Jean Scot”."

16. Evans, Gillian R. 1975. "The influence of quadrivium studies in

the eleventh. and twelfth-century schools." Journal of Medieval

History no. 1:151-164.

Abstract: "This p·aper considers the nature of some of the

evidence for the study ef the subjects of the quadrivium in the

eleventh and twelfth centuries, and the sources of

contemporary interest in the mathematical arts. The survival in

the eleventh and

twelfth centuries qf manuscripts ef the quadrivium texts of such

late-classical writers as Boethius and Martianus Capella is

considered, and their mathematical ideas are analysed in

relation particularly to the thought of William of Conches, Peter

Abelard and others. An examination ef mathematical notions

employed in the specific context ef textbook commentary on

Aristotle's Categories is followed by discussion of the method

of proving the unity of the Trinifv by means of analogy with the

properties of points, lines and surfaces."

17. ———. 1978. "Introductions to Boethius's “Arithmetica” of the

Tenth to the Fourteenth Century." History of Science no. 16:22-

41.

"The much-neglected introductions to arithmetical texts —

especially Boethius’s Arithmetica — which are to be found in a

number of manuscripts of the tenth to the fourteenth century,

are essentially teaching-aids. Even if they were not necessarily

used on every occasion in the actual presence of a master, they

preserved his spoken comments for the use of the student

reading alone. In whatever way they were employed, their

purpose is primarily instructional; they complement the text to

be studied, and they seem to have no pretensions to stand as

works of literature in their own right. It is striking that the

authors of many of these introductions, commentaries and

glosses have often found it convenient to explain arithmetic by

means of notions drawn from grammar, logic or rhetoric.

Grammar and logic in particular were subjects undergoing

active development during these centuries." (p. 22)

18. ———. 1978. "A commentary on Boethius's Arithmetica of the

twelfth or thirteenth century." Annals of Science no. 35:131-141.

19. ———. 1981. "Boethius’ Geometry and the four Ways."

Centaurus no. 25:161-165.

"It is evident on the most cursory reading that neither of the

Geometries which have survived under Boethius’ name are, as

they stand, authentic works. They contain material which

places them, at the earliest, in the tenth century; they are

disorderly and repetitious. Nevertheless, there is every reason

to believe that Boethius wrote a Geometria, and it is not, on the

face of it, impossible that some fragments of the original may

survive, embedded in these fraudulent treatises. Some work has

been done upon the Euclidean translations which are found in

both versions, but little attempt has been made to answer the

question: what should we expect the Geometria to have

contained? Boethius himself provides some evidence on this

point which has been largely overlooked." (p. 161)

20. ———. 1994. "John of Salisbury and Boethius on arithmetic." In

The World of John of Salisbury, edited by Wilks, Michaerl, 161-

167. Oxford: Blackwell.

21. Folkerts, Menso. 1981. "The Importance of the Pseudo-

Boethian Geometria during the Middle Age." In Boethius and

the Liberal Arts: A Collection of Essays, edited by Masi,

Michael, 187-209. Bern: Peter Lang.

Reprinted as Essay VII in M. Folkerts, Essays on Early

Medieval Mathematics: The Latin Tradition, New York:

Routledge 2003.

"Compared to the other writings of Boethius on the Trivium

and Quadrivium, his Geometria takes a special place. We do

not have this work in its original form, but only in two later

adaptations: both contain only part of the original but on the

other hand they are enlarged through a variety of insertions.

Therefore any study of the importance of Boethius’ Geometria

in the Middle Ages should not only try to show the influence of

geometrical writings which were transmitted under the name of

Boethius, but also should try to understand the origin of such

compilations. From these two demands, then, arises the

organization of my essay: the first section will be concerned

with the scanty evidence known about the authentic Geometria

as well as with the contents and origins of both extant

compilations. In the second part of my essay I will attempt to

show the dissemination and impact of both writings during the

Middle Ages. For this purpose I will make use of entries of the

Geometria in medieval library catalogues and of allusions to it

in other medieval writings. A broader understanding of the

importance of these two writings and of their comprehension in

this period can be gained from an analysis of the scholia to one

of these compilations which have been neglected up to now.

Such a study should make it possible to indicate the value of

these treatises in comparison with the other two, authentic,

works of the Boethian quadrivium - the Arithmetica and

Musica." (p. 187)

22. ———. 2003. "The Geometry II Ascribed to Boethius." In

Essays on Early Medieval Mathematics: The Latin Tradition,

edited by Folkerts, Menso. New York: Routledge.

Essay IX, This is the English translation, with some changes, of

the article "Das Problem der pseudo-boethischen Geometrie",

Sudhoffs Archiv 52 (1968), 152-161. A more detailed analysis is

given in Folkerts, "Boethius" Geometrie II, ein mathematisches

Lehrbuch des Mittelalters, Wiesbaden 1970.

23. Fournier, Michael. 2008. "Boethius and the consolation of the

quadrivium." Mediaevalia et Humanistica no. 34:1-21.

"Conclusion. The books of the Consolation form a step-by-step

ascent from the lower part of the soul to the higher. For

Boethius, the ascent passes from sense (book 1) and

imagination (book 2) to reason (books 3–4), but it ends with a

glimpse of what is beyond reason (book 5). Intellect and not

reason characterizes the divine life and is its mode of knowing

all the lower modes in a simple way. Boethius moves the reader

from the lower modes of knowing to the higher by showing the

limits of each mode. At the end of each book there is an

opposition or a contradiction that cannot be resolved by the

mode and points to the need to adopt a higher mode of

knowing.

The Consolation not only advances from lower modes of

knowing to higher, but also presents an ascent through the

levels of being. When Philosophy appears to the Prisoner her

height is ambiguous (Consolation 1,1,1), and she appears at one

moment to “confine herself to the ordinary measure of man”

(Consolation 1,1,2), while at another moment it appears that

“the crown of her head touched the heavens” (Consolation

1,1,2) and at yet another she appears to have “penetrated the

heavens themselves” (Consolation 1,1,2) and passed beyond the

reach of human vision. The three heights of Lady Philosophy

represent the terrestrial world of process, the spheres of the

heavens that circumscribe the natural world, and the

transcendent divinity. For Boethius, consolation requires an

ascent from the lower, human perspective to the highest, divine

perspective, even if this divine perspective is only intimated or

adumbrated." (p. 19)

24. Guillaumin, Jean-Yves. 2012. "Boethius's De institutione

arithmetica and its Influence on Posterity." In A Companion to

Boethius in the Middle Ages, edited by Kaylor Jr., Noel Harold

and Phillips, Philip Edward, 135-161. Leiden: Brill.

Abstract: "The first systematic and well-developed treatise on

the mathematical subject in the Roman world, the De

institutione arithmetica should be considered as the first fruits

of the intellectual activity of the young Boethius. It is from the

pen of Boethius in the De institutione arithmetica that we find

the first use of the word quadriuium to designate the meeting

of the four mathematical sciences: arithmetic, music, geometry,

and astronomy. Boethius was intrigued at least as much by the

philosophical aspect of the study of arithmetic as by its strictly

technical and scientific aspects in the modern sense of the term.

Without a doubt, what Boethius and Nicomachus understood

by arithmetic would be much better expressed today by the

term arithmology. The arithmetic treatise of Boethius

profoundly marked the intellectual evolution of the West

during the High Middle Ages and up to the beginning of the

Renaissance."

25. Heilmann, Anja. 2013. "'amica est... similitudo' (Boeth. mus.

1,1): Musiktheorie und musikalische Ästhetik bei Boethius." In

Das Schöne in Theologie, Philosophie und Musik, edited by

Mayer, Cornelius, Müller, Christof and Förster, Guntram, 83-

94. Würzburg: Echter Verlag.

26. Hicks, Andrew. 2016. "Re-interpreting an Arithmetical Error in

Boethius’s De institutione musica." Music Theory & Analysis.

International Journal of the Dutch-Flemish Society for Music

Theory no. 3:1-26.

Abstract: "In an influential 1981 article, “Interpreting an

Arithmetical Error in Boethius’s De institutione musica (iii.14–

16),” André Barbera drew attention to a problematic set of

arithmetical proofs. At Ins. mus. 3.14ff. Boethius purports to

prove that (1) the minor semitone is larger than three commas

but small than four, (2) the major semitone is larger than four

commas but smaller than five, and (3) the tone is larger than

seven commas but smaller than eight. All of these conclusions

are correct, but the mathematical procedure seems inherently

flawed, for Boethius manipulates the numerical difference

between the terms of a ratio as if it were an accurate

quantification of the resultant interval.

Barbera maintained that the rationale motivating the erroneous

mathematics “lies at the heart of Pythagorean cosmogony.”

Boethius (Barbera argued) set out to find the numerical truth

underlying acoustic phenomena and “seems to have been

satisfied by the apparent numerical verification of what he

could hear.” The origin of this “arithmetical error” can be

specified with greater precision than the vague invocation of

“Pythagorean cosmogony” allows. First, I demonstrate that

Boethius’s arithmetical error is not nearly as erroneous as

Barbera and others would have us believe; rather, it represents

an approximate method of calculation used to prove

relationships otherwise incalculable. Secondly, I argue that this

approximate method was not developed by Boethius but was

faithfully translated from his immediate Greek source,

Nicomachus of Gerasa’s (now lost) Eisagoge musike. Thirdly, I

suggest that this method, or at least its basic principle, was not

independently developed by Nicomachus either, for similar

arithmetical methods arose within the early stages of the Greek

commentary tradition on Plato’s Timaeus."

27. Jeserich, Philipp. 2013. Musica Naturalis: Speculative Music

Theory and Poetics, from Saint Augustine to the Late Middle

Ages in France. Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press.

Translated from the German Musica naturalis, Stuttgart: Franz

Steiner, 2008 by Michael J. Curley and Steven Rendall.

Chapter 6: Boethius, De institutione arithmetica and De

institutione musica, pp. 117-154.

28. Kárpáti, András. 1987. "Translation or Compilation?

Contributions to the Analysis of Sources of Boethius' De

institutione musica." Studia Musicologica Academiae

Scientiarum Hungaricae no. 29:5-33.

I. To understand the De institutione musica, first we have to

see clearly the intentions of the writer. Boethius has few Latin

antecedants. Both Cassiodorus and he himself mention the

work of the 4th century Albinus. (9) Albinus wrote a geometry

and probably a dialectics, too. (10) Cassiodorus esteemed high

of Gaudentius’ work Introductio harmonica (11) and wrote that

it was translated to Latin by his friend, Mutianus.12 It is not

clear whether Boethius could know this or not. Besides these,

all the musicological works written in Latin are a few Vitruvius-

excursions, (13) the 9th book of Martianus Capella’s illustrious

De nuptiis and some chapters of De die natali by Censorinus.

(14) Augustinus’ De musica deals only with rhythmics and

metrics, and we also know about Apuleius’ work on music, (15)

though it is lost. So Boethius was right in thinking that there

was no comprehensive work in Latin which could contain high-

level theoretical matter and from which Greek music — theory

could be thoroughly learnt. Especially the interpretation of the

Pythagorean theory was missing, which used mathematical

means, for Censorinus and Martianus Capella borrowed a lot

from Aristeides Quintilianus’ work, who belonged to

Aristoxenus’ school. So Boethius’ intentions were clearly to

supply this basic lack." (pp. 6-7)

(9) Cf. Cassiodorus, Institutiones 5, 10, p. 19. (Gerbert).

(10) “ Albinus quoque de eisdem rebus scripsisse perhibetur,

cuius ego geometricos quidem libros editos scio, de dialectica

vero diu multumque quaesitos reperire non valui.” ( De

interpretatione ed. secunda I. PL 64, 394 A).

(11) “ Habetis hie (sc. in Bibliotheca Romae) Gaudentium

Mutiani Latinum, quem si sollicita intentione relegitis, huius

scientiae (sc. musicae) vobis atria patefacit.” (Cass.: Inst. 5, 10.)

(12) Cf. Cassiodorus Ib.

(13) Vitruvius, De architectura 5, 5, 3.

(14) Censorinus, De die natali 10; 12; 13.

(15) Cf. Cassiodorus I. c. 1b

29. Kibre, Pearl. 1981. "The Boethian De Institutione Arithmetica

and the Quadrivium in the Thirteenth Century University

Milieu at Paris." In Boethius and the Liberal Arts: A Collection

of Essays, edited by Masi, Michael, 67-80. Bern: Peter Lang.

30. Kijewska, Agnieszka. 2003. "Mathematics as a Preparation for

Theology: Boethius, Eriugena, Thierry of Chartres." In Boèce ou

la chaîne des savoirs, edited by Galonnier, Alain, 625-648.

Louvain-Paris: Éditions Peeters.

31. Kirby, Helen. 1981. "The Scholar and his Public." In Boethius:

His Life, Thought and Influence, edited by Gibson, Margaret,

44-69. Oxford: Blackwell.

"Boethius’ motives in embarking upon his intellectual projects

were not as grandiose as has sometimes been argued: from the

evidence which remains he cannot be regarded as having

conceived a ‘Hellenist Renaissance’ on a significant scale. He

saw his role as one of enriching the Latin intellectual tradition

with the transfusion of Greek material, in the mould of many

Latin intellectuals before him. He believed that he had an

audience, interested in Greek culture if not skilled in the Greek

language, and the opposition to such an enterprise (if indeed

contemporaries recognised his intellectual activities as having

the coherence this word implies) should not be

overemphasised. Boethius’ intention in his philosophical

programme was, and this cannot be overstressed, a highly

technical one, that of reconciling the philosophical schemes of

Plato and Aristotle, and he himself makes no claim for it to

have any greater significance than this." (p. 59)

32. Lemoine, Fannie J. 1981. "The Precious Style as Heuristic

Device: The Function of Introductions to the Arts in Martianus

Capella and Boethius." In Boethius and the Liberal Arts: A

Collection of Essays, edited by Masi, Michael, 51-65. Bern:

Peter Lang.

33. Mair, John. 1981. "The Text of the Opuscula Sacra." In

Boethius and the Liberal Arts: A Collection of Essays, edited by

Masi, Michael, 206-213. Bern: Peter Lang.

34. Masi, Michael. 1971. "Manuscripts Containing the De Musica of

Boethius." Manuscripta. A Journal for Manuscript Research

no. 15:89-95.

35. ———. 1974. "Boethius and the Iconography of the Liberal

Arts." Latomus no. 73:57-75.

"To anyone who reads the texts of the quadrivium, it is obvious

that for Boethius proper order was very important.

(...)

Each discipline is logically prior to the following and each is

dependent on the previous for its principles of procedure. The

four arts of the quadrivium must be studied in the given order

and they ultimately serve as preparation for a study of

philosophy; the conclusion of their study is an approach to the

wisdom of the Consolation of Philosophy. Indeed, without the

study of the quadrivium, true wisdom is not available to the

student.

(...)

"The second point in my exposition, while extending the scope

of the discussion, at the same time involves it in a simple but

important philosophical consideration. Basic to the nature of

the quadrivium is an understanding of the purpose of the

arrangement of the disciplines. It is the matter of the nature,

arrangement, and purpose of the disciplines where we see the

increasing schematization of the allegories of the liberal arts

during the late Middle Ages." (pp. 58-59 note momitted)

(...)

"At this point it is important to review the conceptual binding

force within the quadrivium which enables its disciplines to be

extended universally to all the arts and to the diverse modes of

thought beyond them. The logical principles of the disciplines

in the quadrivium are drawn from number theory, which is

explained in considerable detail and with some application by

Boethius in the De Arithmetica.

(...)

The proportional definitions of the De Arithmetica are

extended to the relationships between sounds in the De

Musica, second discipline of the quadrivium.

(...)

From the De Musica, the student of the liberal arts proceeded

to the De Geometria. The science of geometry applies the

concepts of proportion and order to the dimensions of planes

and to the shapes of figures extended into solids. To these

geometrical figures are applied the rules of harmonic

proportion as outlined in the De Arithmetica and realized in

sounds by the De Musica.

(...)

In the study of astronomy, the principles of order and

proportion, the metaphor of harmony, and the ideals of the

proper arrangement of parts receive their broadest extensions.

Man was thought to embark on the highest order of learning

when he undertook a survey of the heavens. In the context of

the liberal arts, we find this larger meaning in the arrangement

of celestial spheres in Dante’s Paradiso." (pp. 65-66)

36. ———. 1981. "Boethius' De Institutione Arithmetica in the

Context of Medieval Mathematics." In Congresso

Internazionale di Studi Boeziani (Pavia, 5-8 ottobre 1980):

atti, edited by Obertello, Luca, 263-272. Roma: Editrice

Herder.

"During the last three or four centuries, the name of Boethius

has been linked almost exclusively with the De Consolatione

Philosophiae. However, as it has been recently recognized

among Boethian scholars more generally, Boethius was

recognized during the Middle Ages as the author of a variety of

important works on logic, music, theology and mathematics (1).

Some of these works became standard texts for the curriculum

of the seven liberal arts. In recent years there has been

considerable research into the writings and texts of Boethius as

seen in the context of medieval culture (2). These more recent

studies and re-evaluations of Boethius’ work have been

important because they demonstrate the complexity of

Boethius’ influence - notably that of his mathematics. His De

Arithmetica had an influence not only on writers of

mathematics but also on those who were concerned with the

principles of music, literature, ethics, and architecture. In this

essay I would like to examine the Boethian relationship with

other medieval mathematical writing, and in so doing hopefully

I might demonstrate his authoritative standing among writers

of such texts. But, as well, in order to show the full scope of his

work I would like to touch briefly on works outside the field of

mathematics, although it will be possible to do so in only the

most sketchy manner." (p. 263)

(1) See, for example, the entry under "Boezio", Dizionario

Biografico degli Italiani, Voi. 11 (1969), 142-165.

(2) See Pearl Kibre, « The Quadrivium In Thirteenth Century

Universities (with special reference to Paris) », in Arts

Libéraux au moyen-âge (Montreal, Canada: 1969), pp. 175-191.

37. ———, ed. 1981. Boethius and the Liberal Arts: A Collection of

Essays. Bern: Peter Lang.

Contents: Introduction 1; Myra L. Uhlfelder: The Role of the

Liberal Arts in Boethius' Consolatio 17; Eleonore Stump:

Boethius and Peter of Spain on the Topics 35; Fannie J.

Lemoine: The Precious Style as Heuristic Device: The Function

of Introductions to the Arts in Martianus Capella and Boethius

51; Pearl Kibre: The Boethian De Institutione Arithmetica and

the Quadrivium in the Thirteenth Century University Milieu at

Paris 67; Michael Masi: The Influence of Boethius De

Arithmetica on Late Medieval Mathematics 81; Ubaldo Pizzani:

The Influence of the De institutione musica of Boethius up to

Gerbert D'Aurillac 97; Calvin M. Bower: The Role of Boethius's

De institutione musica in the Speculative Tradition of Western

Musical Thought 157; Julia Bolton Holloway: "The "Asse to the

Harpe": Boethian Music in Chaucer 175; Menso Folkerts: The

Importance of the Pseudo-Boethian Geometria during the

Middle Age 187; Pierre Courcelle: Boethius, Lady Philosophy,

and the Representations of the Muses 211-218.

38. ———. 1981. "The Influence of Boethius De Arithmetica on Late

Medieval Mathematics." In Boethius and the Liberal Arts: A

Collection of Essays, edited by Masi, Michael, 81-95. Bern:

Peter Lang.

"In another essay of this collection, Professor Ubaldo Pizzani

has made a study of the Boethian De Musica and how it was

disseminated throughout Europe until the High Middle Ages.

He has made clear that the history of the De Musica was closely

tied with the spread of the De Arithmetica which seems to have

been intended - or at least to have served in the medieval

schools - as an introduction to the music theory. It is my

intention in this chapter of the collection to extend Professor

Pizzani’s survey to the late history of the De Arithmetica. Wc

should be able to see that the history of the Boethian

mathematics underwent several interesting developments,

most of these quite apart from its connection with the music

theory. First and most significantly it must be noted that the

Boethian arithmetic did not lose its importance after the influx

of Arabic mathematics and the re-introduction of Greek

number theory. If we are to judge from the number of extant

manuscripts which contain the De Arithmetica, by the

frequency of citations in other treatises (with or without the

mention of Boethius' name) and by the number of early printed

editions through the 16th century (at least 25), (1) we must

conclude that the Boethian mathematics enjoyed an

extraordinary increase in popularity and influence between

1200 and 1600.

That Boethius’ mathematics should have become so widely

used may seem surprising since the superior texts of Euclid,

Nicomachus (Boethius’ source) and Archimedes were available,

could be read by many scholars, and were being translated.

Moreover, as all students of the period are aware, the nature of

mathematics was undergoing thorough and wide reaching

changes at this time. The needs of a growing merchant trade

which demanded efficient bookkeeping were responded to by

an increasingly more sophisticated computational mathematics

couched in the recently adapted Arabic number system. Though

the new mathematical technique were initially slow to grow in

European soil, by the 15th century hundreds of computational

works (2) were available for those who wanted to learn. The

ascendency of the Boethian mathematics in this context

indicates a far more interesting aspect about the development

of mathematics in the Middle Ages than that it was simply

evolving into modem algebra and trigonometry. An

examination of the various texts dealing with mathematics

shows that this discipline was becoming highly diversified in

nature by the late Middle Ages.

Until the late Middle Ages, a large portion of the mathematics

studied in the schools and universités was a carry-over of

earlier number theory, unoriginal and impractical. It was a

mathematics which oriented the student to philosophical study

and was imbued with the terminology of logic. As a preparation

for higher philosophical study, it had once served its purpose

well, but it had long since ceased to grow by the 15th century.

But practical and computational mathematics slowly broke

with the old number theory and began a new strain of

mathematics. This break occurred outside the universities and

probably began very early in the Middle Ages. It was a new

strain of mathematics that lived in the counting rooms of

merchants and its greatest exponent was Fibonacci, the son of a

trader. Certainly much of the computational mathematics was

as servile to the merchant as the older number theory was to

the philosopher. Some few thinkers, subtle and perceptive in

their study of both Greek and Arabic numbers, such as

Bradwardine, Nicholas of Oresme and Fibonacci, achieved a

scope of mathematical vision not fully appreciated until recent

times.

By the late Middle Ages the De Arithmetica had become

moribund, and the widespread popularity of Boethius served,

perhaps, to slow down the progress of mathematical

innovation. The text of the De Arithmetica was inherited by the

universities as a scrap from that vast learning of Greek thinkers

and had become fossilized as part of the Liberal Arts

curriculum, a once vital program of studies. But, for a small

number of original thinkers (whose proportion among

mathematicians has perhaps remained a constant even to our

own times) Boethian definitions of numbers, the classification

of number and ratio, and the definitions of the types of

proportionalities were the starting points for new

understandings.

I have accordingly divided my study into two parts. Initially I

will survey the evidence which makes the Boethian treatise the

best known mathematical work of the Middle Ages. Without

attempting to evaluate the works cited, I will review a few

treatises which show the way in which Boethius was adapted.

When the De Arithmetica was not used directly as a text, it

appeared in shortened form (an epitome) or merely excerpted

to reduce its length. In the second part of the essay I will

attempt to demonstrate how Boethian ideas provided seeds for

more original thought in the works of a small number of

innovative mathematicians. The most important of these are

Thomas Bradwardine, Albert of Saxony (whom he influenced),

Roger Bacon and Nicholas of Oresme." (pp. 81-82)

(1) In the introduction to my translation of the De Arithmetica

(to be published soon by Rodopi, Amsterdam [1983]), I have

listed almost 200 manuscripts of the De Arithmetica extant. A

list of printed editions may be found in David Eugene Smith,

Rara Arithmetica (Boston: Ginn & Co., 1908), p. 27.

(2) Descriptions of many such works may be found in Smith’s

Rara Arithmetica.

39. McCluskey, Stephen C. 2012. "Boethius’s Astronomy and

Cosmology." In A Companion to Boethius in the Middle Ages,

edited by Kaylor Jr., Noel Harold and Phillips, Philip Edward,

47-73. Leiden: Brill.

40. McNamee, Megan C. 2022. "Grid Space in Boethius's De

institutione arithmetica." In The Diagram as Paradigm.

Cross-Cultural Approaches, edited by Hamburger, Jeffrey F.,

Roxburgh, David J. and Safran, Linda, 389-418. Washington,

DC: Dumbarton Oaks Research Library and Collection.

41. Moyer, Ann E. 2002. "The demise of the quadrivium and the

beginning of the Scientific Revolution: Boethius in the

sixteenth century." Intellectual News no. 10:69-77.

42. ———. 2012. "The Quadrivium and the Decline of Boethian

Influence." In A Companion to Boethius in the Middle Ages,

edited by Kaylor Jr., Noel Harold and Phillips, Philip Edward,

479-517. Leiden: Brill.

43. Müller, Kathrin. 2012. "Theorie und Materialisierung der Zahl

in Boethius' De institutione arithmetica." In Was Zählt.

Ordnungsangebote, Gebrauchsformen und

Erfahrungsmodalitäten des "numerus" im Mittelalter, edited

by Wedell, Moritz, 81-102. Köln: Böhlau Verlag.

44. Otisk, Marek. 2022. "The Definitions of Number in Boethius’s

Introduction to Arithmetic." Philosophical Readings no. 14:16-

26.

Abstract: "The paper enquires into the reasons why Boethius

altered the passage addressing the definition of number in his

loose translation of Introduction to Arithmetic by the

Neopythagorean philosopher and mathematician Nicomachus

of Gerasa. While Nicomachus’s text contains three definitions

of number, Boethius lists only two. However, he also pays

attention to the definition he omits, even though he does not

regard it as a proper definition.

In his view it fails to embody the essence of number, and is to

be understood as a description of the components constitutive

of the substance of number. Although this is a possible

explanation of Boethius’s dismissal of the definition provided

by Nicomachus, the description also occupies an important

place in relation to the general characteristic of number,

because Nicomachus’s definitions fully correspond to the three

basic topics which were central to contemporary arithmetic, viz.

the science of number: number as discrete quantity, referring to

the properties of numbers and their classifications; number as

collection of units, leading to the topic of figural numbers; and

number as quantity emanating from unit and subsequently

returning to it, corresponding with numerical ratios, sequences

and their transfers."

Note 11: "Nicomachus in his Introduction to Arithmetic lists

three definitions of number:

(1) number as discrete quantity (πλήϑος ὡρισμένον);

(2) number as collection of units (μονάδων σύστημα);

(3) number as quantity emanating from unit (ποσότητος χύμα

ἐκ μονάδων συγκείμενον).

Nicomachus, Intr. arith. I, 7, 3, p. 13,7–8. English translation

by M. L. D’Ooge (Nicomachus of Gerasa, Introduction to

Arithmetic. Transl. M. L. D’Ooge. New York – London:

Macmillan, 1926, p. 190)

45. Palisca, Claude V. 1990. "Boethius in the Renaissance." In

Music Theory and its Sources: Antiquity and the Middle Ages,

edited by Barbera, André, 259-280. Notre Dame: University of

Notre Dame Press.

Reprinted in: C. V. Palisca, Studies in the History of Italian

Music and Music Theory, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994, pp.

168-188.

46. Panti, Cecilia. 2017. "Boethius and Ptolemy on Harmony,

Harmonics and Human Music." Micrologus:3-36.

Abstract: "The contribution analyzes how Boethius elaborates

the concepts of vis or facultas armonicae (power of the

harmonics) and vis armonica (harmonic power), both derived

from Ptolemy’s dynamis harmonike, namely the power to

grasp the distinctions between high and low sounds and

produce an immediate judgment of pleasure or distrust. The

essay aims to demonstrate that this concept provides the

theoretical equipment for the study of the Boethian second

genus of music, the musica humana, and consequently that

Boethius’ famous threefold division of music (instrumentalis,

humana and mundana) implies a special methodological

approach for each area. In particular, with the unfinished book

5 of the De institutione musica, Boethius turns to the practical

usefulness of music, and shifts from a pure mathematical

science, the instrumentalis, to an intermediate one, the

humana, which involves also ethics and physics. For Boethius,

this second kind of music concerns human wellness and good

government, and its knowledge is particularly recommended to

rulers and those who have political responsibilities."

47. ———. 2018. "Beauty, Ethics and Numbers in Boethius’

Quadrivial Treatises." Aisthesis no. 11:67-79.

Abstract: "The convergence of the

Neoplatonic/Neopythagorean approach with the Aristotelian

organization of the sciences is one of the most interesting

features that characterizes the two influential mathematical

treatises on On Arithmetics (De institutione arithmetica) and

On Music (De institutione musica) by Severinus Boethius.

Basing his reasoning on Nicomachus and Ptolemy, Boethius

follows the philosophical tradition that had tried to reconcile

Plato’s and Aristotle’s views. This attitude is examined in the

present paper as regards Boethius’ response concerning the

relation between numbers, ethics and aesthetics. His view

emerges as coming out of a rather complex construction, which

assigns the ethical scope of mathematics in indicating to the

human mind how to correct the ratios that realize the best

relationship in movements of the soul and the body. More

precisely, its ethical aim is to correct the specific form of

movement of human beings, that is their actions, exemplified in

the way in which mathematical ratios represent the forms of

government and musical ratios evoke and heal psychophysical

affections. More complex, on the other hand, is the relationship

between mathematics and beauty. In clear antithesis to the

position taken by Augustine on the beauty of the rhythmic

patterns that better represent the beauty of unity,

Boethius does not relate the mathematical ratios of the

consonances to an esthetical judgment by making use of the

category of beauty. For him, the physical world is totally

immersed in changes and movements, and this cannot but

impede things from expressing the stable unity, which is

required for contemplating the beautiful."

48. Pingree, David. 1981. "Boethius’ Geometry and Astronomy." In

Boethius: His Life, Thought and Influence, edited by Gibson,

Margaret, 155-161. Oxford: Blackwell.

"Cassiodorus in a letter he wrote to Boethius on behalf of

Theoderic in about 507, (1) attributes to his young

correspondent translations of Pythagoras on music, of Ptolemy

on astronomy (for which see below), of Nicomachus on

arithmetic, and of Euclid on geometry; later on, in the

Institutiones (2), he refers again to Boethius’ translation of

Euclid." (p. 155)

(...)

"It has been argued that only Boethius could and did translate

Euclid from the Greek before the twelfth century. However, this

cannot be stated with certainty, for it is clear from the

Praeceptum Canonis Ptolemei discussed below that reasonably

competent Latin translations of Greek works on the exact

sciences were still being made in the sixth century, after

Boethius’ death. There survive, in fact, two fragments of quite

different translations of Euclid that cannot be demonstrated to

have anything to do with either Boethius or with M, though one

is connected with Luxeuil, the other with Corbie." (p. 156)

(...)

"Cassiodorus in his letter to Boethius, as we have seen,

attributes to the latter a translation of Ptolemy on astronomy.

In the Institutiones (29) he gives a description of the contents

of Ptolemy’s Canones which corresponds quite well with the

Praeceptum Canonis Ptolemei which survives in some eight

manuscripts copied between the late tenth and early thirteenth

centuries. (30) Naturally, these references by Cassiodorus raise

the possibility that the Praeceptum is the translation made by

Boethius. This, however, cannot be the case. For the

Praeceptum, which comprises two reasonably competent

translations of instructions for the use of the Ptolemaic Handy

Tables, mentions the year 535 as current. (31) It was, perhaps,

intended for use in the Christian school that Cassiodorus and

Pope Agapetus hoped to establish in Rome in just that year or

the next. (32) Its existence proves that Boethius was not the

only translator of Greek texts belonging to the quadrivium in

the late fifth and early sixth centuries — a conclusion toward

which the Verona fragments of Euclid seem also to point.

Thereby the argument that M most probably represents

Boethius’ translation because we know of no other translator

(33) loses some of its force, though Boethius certainly remains

the chief suspect." (p. 159)

(1) Variae I. xlv. 4, ed. T. Mommsen (Berlin, 1894: MGH

[Monumenta Germaniae Historica] Auct. Ant. xii), p. 40. On

the translations of Euclid’s Elements see J. Murdoch in

Dictionary of Scientific Biography (New York, 1971), iv. 437-

59.

(2) Institutiones II. vi. 3, ed. R. A. B. Mynors (Oxford, 1937), p.

152.

(30) An edition is being prepared by N. Swerdlow and the

present writer.

(31) Praeceptum II. 1: a Diocletiano usque nunc anni sunt

CCLI; cf. II. 11. In Praeceptum I. 23 is mentioned Augustus

383=ad 354.

(32) Inst. I praef. 1, ed. cit. (note 2 above), p. 3. Agapetus was

pope from 13 May 535 till 22 April 536.

(33) Folkerts, [Boethius' Geometrie II. Ein mathematisches

Lehrbuch des Mittelalters, Wiesbaden, 1970] p. 72.

49. Pizzani, Ubaldo. 1981. "The Influence of the De Institutione

Musica of Boethius up to Gerbert D'Aurillac: A Tentative

Contribution." In Boethius and the Liberal Arts: A Collection of

Essays, edited by Masi, Michael, 97-156. Bern: Peter Lang.

"Among those writings of Boethius which transmitted to the

Middle Ages so much of the ancient culture, the De Institutione

Musica must certainly occupy a place of special prominence.

The second treatise of the quadrivium, according to the outline

apparently sketched by Boethius himself in the first chapter of

the De Institutione Arithmetica (1) its fame is attested not only

by the great number of manuscripts in which it has reached us,

(2) but also (and above all) by the imposing mass of scholia -

largely unpublished (3) -preserved in those manuscripts, as

well as by the flourishing medieval musicological production

that found inspiration in Boethius as the most learned and

reliable authority on the ancient musical culture. (4)

It is mainly to this last aspect that scholars as a rule have

directed their attention, (5) owing partly to the fact that

Boethius, with his approximations and misunderstandings, did

not always have a positive and stimulating effect on the musical

theories of the Middle Ages. (6) But there is another factor, no

less important, in the continuous good fortune of this treatise:

its influence, together with that of the De Institutione

Arithmetica, and the lost treatises De Institutione Geometrica

and De Institutione Astronomica, (7) on the didactic

applications of the quadrivium. Here the medieval schools did

not have in Boethius their exclusive and unchallenged master,

but turned, as well, to the great syntheses of such teachers as

Martianus Capella, Cassiodorus, and Isidor of Seville, not to

mention the De Musica of St. Augustine. Nevertheless, there is

no doubt that the Boethian corpus, with its greater amplitude,

and with the prestige conferred upon its author by his logical

and theological works, played a decisive and preeminent role.

This is true especially in the Carolingian (8) and post-

Carolingian periods, whence derive most of the codices bearing

the treatises in question. (9) It is more difficult to determine

the role they played in the nearly three centuries intervening

between their composition and the Renaissance prompted by

Charlemagne.

The fact is that the influence of Boethius on the authors of that

period - particularly Cassiodorus and Isidor of Seville, who both

dealt with the artes of the quadrivium - is not conclusively

demonstrable, particularly as far as music is concerned. An

exceptional case is that of the Venerable Bede, under whose

name we have a Musica Theorica that is definitely linked to

Boethius, but which, as I have demonstrated elsewhere (10)

and will illustrate later in this essay, came into being under very

particular circumstances that do not allow us to attribute it to

the Monk of Jarrow sic et simpliciter. An investigation into this

matter, culminating, as we shall see, in a proposal for a new

form of edition for that unique work, will give us an

opportunity to survey the mass of scholia relating to the De

Institutione Musica (for, indeed, the disiecta membra of the so-

called Musica Theorica are nothing more than scholia); to

examine some of the complex problems attending the

preparation of such an edition and the identification of sources;

and lastly, to ascertain the potential role of these scholia in

clarifying in what forms and ways the Boethian text was used in

medieval scholastic activity. At that point, with a brief survey of

the coeval musicological production, we shall bring our

investigation to a close. Our purpose is not so much to obtain

definitive solutions to individual problems as to define their

terms and to establish the areas of research and the

methodological criteria while trying to trace an outline -

however tentative and problematical - of the fortune of the De

Institutione Musica from Boethius to the scholiastic activity of

Gerbert d’Aurillac. In the absence of a thorough

documentation, it is the history up to the 9th century, at least,

that will prove hard to grasp in even its most essential stages.

But the problems that it poses, whether in philology, strictly

speaking, or in the history of culture, cannot be evaded by

anyone who wishes to understand through what adventures the

De Institutione Musica passed so decisively into the scholastic

and musicological traditions of the Middle Ages - after a period,

as it would appear, of total eclipse." (pp. 97-98)

Note: the editor is grateful to Mr. Peter Gimpel who translated

this essay from the Italian, working in close collaboration with

the author.

(1) De Institutione Arithmetica I, 1. All citations from the

Boethian treatises on arithmetic and music are taken from the

edition of G. Friedlein (Leipzig, 1867; reprinted, 1966) and

cited hereafter as DIA and DIM.

(2) A nearly complete list has been furnished recently by M.

Masi, "Manuscripts Containing the De Musica of Boethius,"

Manuscripta, 15 (1971), 89-95 and "A Newberry Diagram of the

Liberal Arts," Gesta, XI/2 (1973), 56.

(3) As far as I know, the only scholia to have yet been published

are two by Gerbert d’Aurillac (N. Bubnov, Gerberti Opera

Mathematica [Berolini, 1899] pp. 28-31), one on the harmony

of the spheres (R. Bragard, "L’harmonie des sphères selon

Boèce," Speculum, 4 [1929], pp. 206-13, and some others in my

article, "Uno pseudo-trattato dello pseudo-Beda," (Maia, I

[1957], 36-48). It should be noted, however, that a substantial

mass of scholia has been packed into this so-called treatise

attributed to the Venerable Bede, as we shall see in the course

of this study.

(4) The texts are assembled in good part in the fundamental

though somewhat obsolete collections of M. Gerbert, Scriptores

Ecclesiastici de Musica Sacra Potissimum (Typis San Blasianis,

1784; reprinted, 1931) and E. Coussemaker, Scriptores de

Musica Medii Aevi, 4 vols. (Paris, 1864-76). More up-to-date

on the critical and textual level is the Corpus Scriptorum de

Musica, but the latter is still far from completion.

(5) See the ample bibliography after the article on Boethius by

R. Wagner in the great German encyclopedia, Die Musik in

Geschichte und Gegenwart, Band II (Kassel und Basel, 1952),

col. 49-57.

(6) See for the bibliographical references the above-cited article

by R. Wagner, coll. 54-55; see also my observations in "Studi

sulle fonti del De Institutione Musica di Boezio," Sacris

Erudiri, 16 (1965), 87, 128 ff.

(7) That Boethius completed the entire cycle of the quadrivium

is deducted from incontestable evidence. (See the article,

"Severino Boezio" in the Dizionario Biografico degli Italiani, 11

[Roma, 1969], 142-65.)

(8) Our most ancient voice, in that sense, is perhaps that of

Aurélien de Moutier-St. Jean (Aurelianus Reomensis), who

lived in the first half of the 9th century and was the author of a

Musica Disciplina, largely inspired by Boethius, whom he cites

and exalts as vir doctissimus (p. 41, Gerbert) and eruditissimus

(Gerbert, p. 32).

(9) None of the extant manuscripts of the De Institutione

Musica dates from before the 9th century.

(19) U. Pizzani, "Uno pseudo-trattato."

50. Potiron, Henri. 1961. Boèce: théoricien de la musique grecque.

Paris: Bloud et Gay.

51. Rimpler, Mark T. 2012. "The Enduring Legacy of Boethian

Harmony." In A Companion to Boethius in the Middle Ages,

edited by Kaylor Jr., Noel Harold and Phillips, Philip Edward,

447-478. Leiden: Brill.

52. Schrade, Leo. 1947. "Music in the Philosophy of Boethius." The

Musical Quarterly no. 33:188-200.

"In the doctrine of music that Boethius formulated in his youth

two elements, both of ethical nature, converge, and in this

conjunction the ethical value of music surpasses that of any

other discipline in the Quadrivium. For music as the art of

sound exerts in all

events and by its very nature an influence upon the moral state

of man, or, in the words of Boethius himself , music is capable

of “ improving or degrading the morals of men” . In addition to

this, however, music as part of mathematics shares in those

educational

ethics that are inherent in the disciplines of the Quadrivium. It

contributes to the training of the intellect, which in the end

must be totally free from all bodily impediments. This is the

meaning of the education in which music assists in liberating

the human mind. The music Boethius described at the

beginning of his literary activity is of Platonic-Pythagorean

origin. It has no direct contact with the Aristotelian system of

philosophy. Music stands before philosophy; and the student of

music is driven by the ethical impulse to learn how to benefit

intellectually from the instrument that holds the key to the “

purer reason of the mind” in philosophy. With the assumption

of a pre-philosophic position of music, with the thesis of its

ethical function in the process of education, and finally with the

denial that music as a “ science” could be part of philosophy

proper, Boethius gives evidence that he wrote his works on the

Quadrivium essentially as a Platonist. In it he had no intention

— and no need— of reconciling the Aristotelian and Platonic

schools of thought with each other.

(...)

It may be puzzling to find that an incomplete book on music,

written by a man of only twenty, exercised the most

extraordinary influence upon centuries to come. It is less

puzzling when we take into account both the ethical function

and the position music was given in relation to philosophy. And

it seems to be very characteristic of this school of thought that

many a later philosopher actually did what Boethius had done,

that is to say, started any work in philosophy with a treatise on

music as a primary necessity, without ever returning to music

again. This procedure is by no means accidental; it bears all the

marks of the situation in which Boethius’ work on music

originated. The significance of this fact has been completely

overlooked. Let us think of Augustine, to name only one author

of the Latin world of humanities. The first work Augustine

wrote is his treatise on music which, however, he did not

complete in his youth. Though in later years he returned to the

subject of music— in his commentaries on the Psalms— he did

so merely for reasons of a religious nature which had nothing to

do with the Musica as a discipline of the Quadrivium. When

investigating the work of philosophers through the centuries we

are surprised how often we find music opening the course of

philosophical studies. Even Descartes, in 1618, still begins with

an Essay on Algebra and the Compendium of Music. The

theorists of music proper, also, in antiquity, the Middle Ages,

through the 16th century (e.g., Glareanus) often first presented

an “ introduction” to music. But the reason for this would

require a special discussion." (pp. 193-194)

53. Stone-Davis, Férdia J. 2011. Musical Beauty: Negotiating the

Boundary between Subject and Object. Eugene (OR): Cascad

Books.

Contents: Acknowledgments IX; Introduction XI-XVII; 1. The

Bocthian Understanding of the World, the Role of Beauty, and

the Value of Music 1; 2. Inhabiting Harmony — The World as a

Series of Relations: An Examination of the Fundamentals of

Music 12; 3. Know Thyself — The Place of Humankind within

Created Beauty: An Examination of the Consolation of

Philosophy 34; 4 The Kantian Understanding of the World, the

Role of Beauty, and the Value of Music 79; 5. The Play of

Harmony — The Subjective Powers in Relation: An

Examination of the Critique of Judgment 90; 6. Creating

Beauty: Genius and the Work of Art 119; 7. Musical Beauty: An

Enchanted Mode of Attention 158; Conclusion 191;

Bibliography 195; Index 207.

"The nature of musical meaning, considered through its

physicality, is also often clouded by frameworks built upon

aesthetic categories and principles. These provide a lens

through which the arts in general arc viewed. Such broad-

sweep approaches tend towards a certain homogenization

across their range and thereby result in distortion within

accounts of individual arts. The uniqueness of the arts is not

fully attended to. The specific category that will provide the

focus for the task at hand is beauty. Beauty features within

current aesthetic and theological discussion (standing more

peripherally within the domain of philosophical aesthetics).

Historically, however, it has been a dominant concept, acting as

a cipher for underlying presuppositions that themselves

comprise broader frameworks, both philosophical and

theological.

It is on this basis that the two central figures of our narrative

present themselves: Anicius Manlius Severinus Boethius

(c.480-c.525) and Immanuel Kant (1724-1804)." (p. XIV)

(...)

"Initially, then, we will start with Boethius for whom the world

is knowable and for whom, as a result, the physical world is of

value. Here, within an integrally theological framework, beauty

is understood as harmony and as such is constitutive of the

world: it is the principle by which the world coheres as a whole

and a property of the material world. I will show how granting

beauty this objectivity allows it a cosmic meaning or

“resonance” which extends both between and beyond subjects.

I will then demonstrate how the Bocthian account of music

illustrates his understanding of the material world and beauty.

Considering beauty as the principle of harmony grants music

significance in relation to both the intellectual and the material

for, as physical sensation, music offers knowledge of the world.

However, I shall show that ultimately Boethius stresses the

intellectual to the detriment of the material, using the physical

experience of music as merely a stepping-stone to intellectual

perception through form (with form finding its ideal location in

God). By virtue of the satisfaction and pleasure imparted by

musics physicality, Boethius’ attention is re-invigorated and he

is encouraged to re-focus on the world and, specifically, himself

as part of the world. Ultimately, however, musical

indeterminacy gives way to and is surpassed by the conceptual

truths of reason." (p. XVI)

54. Stump, Eleonore. 1981. "Boethius and Peter of Spain on the

Topics." In Boethius and the Liberal Arts: A Collection of

Essays, edited by Masi, Michael, 35-50. Bern: Peter Lang.

55. Thompson, Jeremy. 2020. "An Early Lemmatic Commentary

on Boethius’s De institutione arithmetica." Archives d'histoire

doctrinale et littéraire du Moyen Âge no. 87:115-200.

Abstract: "This edition and study present the text of an early

lemmatic commentary on Boethius's De institutione

arithmetica 1, 1-5. The text bears the title De initio A. M. S.

Boetii pauca in arithmetica and is newly reconstituted from the

membra disiecta of a codex dating to the last quarter of the

ninth century : Vatican, BAV, Reg. lat. 1424, f. 95r-98v and

Leiden, University Library, VLO 88, f. 2r-10v. This commentary

represents a fresh and significant witness to Boethius's ninth-

century reception. It contains notes on his life, a treatment of

grammatical and logical categories, and an apt handling of

arithmetical topics broached in the main work. Ninth-century

marginal annotations reveal an engaged reader perhaps

influenced by Eriugenian thought."

56. Uhlfelder, Myra L. 1981. "The Role of the Liberal Arts in

Boethius' Consolatio." In Boethius and the Liberal Arts: A

Collection of Essays, edited by Masi, Michael, 17-34. Bern:

Peter Lang.

"At the close of the Consolatio, God is looking down upon the

cosmos while the newly liberated and restored Boethius, with

the recovery of mens at the end of his philosophical return, is

looking up as far as possible toward the Divine Light, who

judges His well-ordered world and perceives everything though

He Himself is beyond understanding. The whole situation is

now the diametrical opposite of what it had been when

Boethius, at the beginning, was indulging his grief with his

elegiac Muses.

The preceding example is interwoven with the important

judicial metaphor in the Consolatio. In passing judgment on

God, Boethius had been influenced at the beginning by his

personal experience of suffering shameful injustice at the hands

if men, experience of which the autobiographical material in

Book 1 provides ample evidence. By the end, however, Boethius

has ascended beyond the limits of reason to accept on faith the

goodness of the Divine Judge whom, even in his affliction, he

had continued to recognize as Creator and Ruler (I. P.6. 4).

lu bringing about the changes so dramatically portrayed in

these opening and closing scenes, the Liberal Arts make a

contribution which it is the main purpose of this paper to

examine." (p. 19)

57. Walden, Daniel K. S. 2015. "Charting Boethius: music andf the

diagrammatic tree in the Cambridge University Library's De

institutione arithmetica, MS II. 3. 12." Early Music History no.

34:207-228.

Abstract: "This article discusses a full-page schematic diagram

contained in a twelfth-century manuscript of Boethius’ De

institutione arithmetica and De institutione musica from

Christ Church Cathedral, Canterbury (Cambridge University

Library MS Ii.3.12), which

has not yet been the subject of any significant musicological

study despite its remarkable scope and comprehensiveness.

This diagrammatic tree, or arbor, maps the precepts of the first

book of De institutione arithmetica into a unified whole,

depicting the ways music and arithmetic are interrelated as

sub-branches of the quadrivium. I suggest that this schematic

diagram served not only as a conceptual and interpretative

device for the scribe working through Boethius’ complex

theoretical material, but also as a mnemonic guide to assist the

medieval pedagogue wishing to instruct students in the

mathematics of musica speculativa. The diagram constitutes a

fully developed theoretical exercise in its own right, while also

demonstrating the roles Boethian philosophy and mathematics

played in twelfth century musical scholarship."

58. White, Alison. 1981. "Boethius in the Medieval Quadrivium." In

Boethius: His Life, Thought and Influence, edited by Gibson,

Margaret, 162-204. Oxford: Blackwell.

"The quadrivium’ designated the mathematical arts of

arithmetic, music, geometry and astronomy. (2) Boethius

appears to have been the first writer to use the term to

delineate these areas of knowledge existing in the timeless

world of being. For these arts were seen not merely as isolated

sources of skills and information, but as an indispensable path

to abstract knowledge. The created world, Boethius says,

appears to have been formed according to number, ‘for this was

the principal design in the mind of the Creator’. (3) So the arts

which consider number in its pure or solid form, static or

mobile, provide paths through the creation to its source in the

incorporeal world wherein lies true wisdom. This was the

direction of Christian contemplation as much as Neoplatonic. It

found a classic source in the verse ‘Thou hast ordered all things

in number, measure and weight’ (Wisd. 11:21). Knowledge of

the rational, numerical structure of the universe would lead to

knowledge of the divine nature and to apprehension of God

himself. (4)

Although Boethius set his mathematical works in the

framework of Neoplatonic and Christian concepts of true

wisdom, his immediate aim was severely practical: to make

available to the Latin world the treasures of Greek learning. His

De Arithmetica is chiefly a translation of a treatise by

Nicomachus of Gerasa (2nd cent a.d.); his music draws on

several Greek sources. (5) It seems likely too that Boethius

made a translation of part of Euclid's Elements which was

incorporated into medieval works bearing Boethius’ name. (6)

But the complex history of its transmission is largely

independent of that of the De Arithmetica and De Musica, and

it cannot be considered a definable, independent Boethian

quadrivial text. It therefore lies outside the scope of this study.

There is no surviving work by Boethius on astronomy; some

scholars have pointed to possible traces of such a treatise, but

the evidence is at best inconclusive. (7)

Boethius’ approach to arithmetic and music was speculative

and mathematical. ‘Arithmetica’ was the science of number, not

calculation; ‘musica’ was harmonic theory based on

Pythagorean mathematics of proportion, not music-making.

This fact was firmly pointed out in the eleventh century by

Guido of Arezzo, who declared that Boethius’ De Musica was

useful not to musicians, but only to philosophers. (8) But this is

one of the cardinal reasons for the durability of his treatises:

the science of number and proportion could serve as the

foundation of diverse practical applications as long as the

fundamental assumptions on which they were based were not

challenged. Throughout the Middle Ages, Boethius’ De

Arithmetica and De Musica remained standard texts for these

two arts of the quadrivium, sometimes supplemented by other

medieval works, but never ousted from the canon." (pp. 162-

163)

(2) On the liberal arts, see: ed. J. Koch, ‘Artes Liberales' von

der Antiken Bildung zur Wissenschaft des Mittelalters (Leiden,

1959), but see review by C. Leonardi in Studi Medievali, 3 ser.,

II (1961), 268-75; H. Marrou, Histoire de l'éducation dans

l'antiquité 6 edn (Paris, 1965) ; idem, ‘Les arts libéraux dans

l’antiquité classique’, Arts libéraux et philosophie au Moyen

Age, Actes du IVe Congrès International de Philosophie

Médiévale (Montreal/ Paris, 1969), pp. 5-27. On the

quadrivium, see: M. F. Bukofskcr, ‘Speculative thinking in

mediaeval music’, Speculum XVII (1942), 165 180; 'Artes

Liberales', ed. Koch (1959), pp. 1-31 ; 107-23; E. A. Lippmann,

‘The place of'music in the liberal arts’, Aspects of Mediaeval

and Renaissance Music, A Birthday Offering to G. Reese, ed. J.

La Rue (London, 1967), pp. 545-59; W. H. Stahl, Martianus

Capella and the Seven Liberal Arts (New York, 1971), I. 3-70;

125-227; L. Obertello, ‘Boezio, le scienze del quadrivio e la

cultura medievale’, Atti dell'Acad. Ligure di sc. e lett. xxviii

(1971), 152-70; G. Beaujouan, ‘L’enseignement du

“Quadrivium” ’, Settimane di Studio XIX. ii (Spoleto, 1972),

639-67; I have not yet seen B. Münxelhaus, Pythagoras

Musicus: Zur Reception der Pythagoreischen Musiktheorie als

quadrivialer Wissenschaft im lateinischen Mittelalter

(Bonn/Bad Godesberg, 1976).

(3) Boethius, De Arithmetica I. 2: ed. cit., [Friedlein] p. 12,

lines 14-17.

(4) Cf. Augustine, De Libero Arbitrio II. xvi-xvii. 41-6; L.

Schrade, ‘Die Stellung der Musik in der Philosophie des

Boethius als Grundlage der ontologischer Musikerziehung’,

AGP [Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie] XLI. iii (1932),

368-400.

(5) H. Potiron, Boèce, théoricien de la musique grecque (Paris,

1961) ; J. Caldwell, pp. 135-54 above [The De Institutione

Arithmetica and the De Institutione Musica].

(6) Ps-Boethius, Geometria (ed. Friedlein [1867]) pp. 372-428;

ed. M. Folkerts, ‘Boethius' Geometrie II (Wiesbaden, 1970); H.

Weissenborn ‘Die Boethius-Frage’, Abhandlungen zur

Geschichte der Mathematik ii (1879), 187-240; C. Thulin, ‘Zur

Überlieferungsgeschichte des Corpus Agrimensorum',

Göteborgs Kungl. Vetenskaps-och Vitterhets-saml. xiv (1911),

3-68; B. L. Ullman, ‘Geometry in the mediaeval quadrivium’,

Studi di Bibliografia e di storia . . . Tammaro di Marinis

(Verona, 1964), iv. 263-85; D. Pingree, pp. 155-61 above

[Boethius’ Geometry and Astronomy].

(7) W. H. Stahl (op. cit., note 2 above, p. 173 and n. 6) and B. L.

Ullman (art. cit. note 6 above, 278) suggested that it might be

found in Naples, Bibi. Naz., V. A. 13 (s. x), but the Naples

catalogue (Naples, 1827), p. 258, and N. Bubnov, Gerberti

Opera Mathematica (Berlin, 1899), pp. 478-9, ascribe the

material to Isidore, Cassiodorus and Bede. The Bobbio

catalogue of the tenth century includes ‘Libros Boetii III de

aritmetica’ (nos 384-6) ‘et alterum de astronomia’ (no. 387) ;

the twelfth-century catalogue of St Bertin mentions ‘Boetius de

geometria et astronomia’. See G. Becker, Catalogi

Bibliothecarum Antiqui (Bonn, 1885), pp. 69 and 182. But the

‘astronomiae’ are not explicitly identified as Boethius’ works.

59. Woodcock, Edith. 1943. "The Influence of Boethius on Musical

Thought." Bulletin of the American Musicological Society:30-

32.

Bibliographia. Annotated bibliographies

Raul Corazzon || rc@ontology.co || Info

Annotated bibliography of Peter

Abelard: I. Literary Works

Bibliography

1. Burnett, Charles S. F., Luscombe, David E., and Barrow, Julia.

1984. "A Checklist of the Manuscripts Containing the Writings

of Peter Abelard and Heloise and Other Works Closely

Associated with Abelard and his School." Revue d'Histoire des

Textes no. 14-15:183–302.

Abstract: "This checklist has been compiled to take stock of

what is presently known about the manuscripts of the works of

Peter Abelard and to aid and stimulate further work in

Abelardian studies. It also includes information about the

writings of Heloise and about the manuscript sources for the

study of her life. The manuscripts of the writings of some

contemporaries who were closely concerned with Abelard, e. g.

as correspondents, are added, together with manuscripts of

writings by Abelard's closest disciples and followers.

The material is arranged as follows:

Part 1. The manuscripts p. 188

Appendix : Lost, unidentified or destroyed manuscripts p. 229

Part 2. The writings of Peter Abelard p. 240

Appendix : Lost or unidentified writings of Peter Abelard p. 256

Part 3. Unauthenticated or anonymous writings giving the

teaching of Peter Abelard p. 259

Part 4. Writings which have from time to time been attributed

to Peter Abelard, either in the manuscripts in which they occur

or by later scholars p. 262

Part 5. Writings bearing directly on the doctrines of Peter

Abelard, the lives of Abelard and Heloise and the Council of

Sens p. 273

Part 6 a. Writings attributed to Heloise, or bearing on the early

history of the Paraclete p. 283

Part 6 b. List of charters issued for the Abbey of the Paraclete

be fore the death of Abbess Heloise p. 287

Part 7. Epitaphs of Abelard and Heloise p. 293

Index of works included in the checklist p. 298

The list is designed to provide guidance on the manuscripts for

those engaged in editing writings by Abelard and by his

associates and followers, as well as for those who wish to know

how, when, where and by whom these manuscripts were copied

and read. Several manuscripts are listed here which have not

hitherto been used in editions or which have only recently come

to light."

2. Peter, Abelard. 1616. Petri Abaelardi sancti Gildasi in

Britannia abbatis, et Heloisae conjugis ejus, quae postmodum

prima coenobii Paracletensis abbatissa fuit Opera. Paris:

Niclas Buon.

Edted by André Duchesne very same print with a different title

page: François d’Amboise, Peíri Abaelardi Filosofi et Theologi,

abbatis Ruyensis, et Heloissae conjugis ejus, Primae

paracletensis abbatissae Opera, Parisiis, 1616. (same text, but

different introductions).

Cited as "A. Duchesne uel F. D’Amboise".

Reprinted by Jacques Paul Migne in Patrologia Latina, vol. 178

(1856).

3. Cousin, Victor, ed. 1836. Ouvrages inédits d'Abélard pour

servir à l'histoire de la philosophie scolastique en France.

Paris: Imprimerie Royale.

Table générale des matières: Introduction I; Sommaire de

l'Introduction CCV;

Sic et Non 1; Index questionum quae continet Sic et Non 165;

Dialectica: Pars prima de partibus orationis 173; Pars secunda,

de propositionibus et syllogismis categoricis, seu Analytica

priora 227; Pars Tertia, Topica 324; Pars quarta, de

propositionis et syllogismis hypotheticis, seu Analytica

posteriora 424; Pars quinta, liber divisionum et definitionum

450; Index eorum quae in Dialectica continentur 499;

Fragmentum Germanense de Generibus et Specibus [*] 505;

Glossae in Porphyrium 551; Glossae in Categorias 577; Glossae

in Librum de Interpretatione 595; Glossae in Topica Boethii

603;

Appendice, T. Raban-Maur 611; II. Gloses du Xe siècle sur les

Catégories, etc. 616; III. Guillaume de Champeaux 623; IV,

Bernard de Chartres 625; V. Plusieurs écrits de Gerbert.

Commentaire d'Hoooré d'Autun sur le Timée. Introduction de

Porphyre et Catégories d'Aristote mises en vers 642; VI.

Guillaume dee Conches 669-677.

[*] this text is now attributed to an anomymous author:

Pseudo-Joscelin, Treatise on Genera and Species, edited and

translated by Peter King, Oxford Studies in Medieval

Philosophy, 2, 2015, pp. 104-210

4. Cousin, Victor, and Jourdain, Charles, eds. 1849–1859. Petri

Abælardi opera hactenus seorsim edita nunc primum in unum

collegit, textum ad fidem librorum editorum scriptorumque

recensuit, notas, argumenta, indices adjecit Victor Cousin,

adjuvantibus C. Jourdain et E. Despois. Paris A. Durand.

Two volumes.

5. Peter, Abelard. 1919. Philosophische Schriften. I. Die Logica

"Ingredientibus". 1. Die Glossen zu Porphyrius. Münster:

Verlag der Aschendorffschen Verlagsbuchhandlung.

Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie und Theologie des

Mittelalters. n° 21 (Part 1).

Contents: Einleitung V-XII; Logica Ingredientibus. [The Logic

that begins with the words: For beginners] First Part: Glossae

super Porphyrium [The commentary from Logica

Ingredientibus on Porphyry's Isagoge] pp. 1-109.

6. ———. 1921. Philosophische Schriften. I. Die Logica

"Ingredientibus". 2. Die Glossen zu den Kategorien. Münster:

Verlag der Aschendorffschen Verlagsbuchhandlung.

Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie und Theologie des

Mittelalters. n° 21 (Part 2).

Contents: Logica Ingredientibus. [The Logic that begins with

the words: For beginners] Second Part: Glossae super

Predicamenta [The commentary from Logica Ingredientibus

on Aristotle's Categories] pp. 111-305.

7. ———. 1927. Philosophische Schriften. I. Die Logica

"Ingredientibus". 3. Die Glossen zu PERI ERMHNEIAS.

Münster: Verlag der Aschendorffschen Verlagsbuchhandlung.

Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie und Theologie des

Mittelalters. n° 21 (n° 3).

Contents: Glossae super Periermeneias [Glosses on Aristotle's

De Interpretatione] pp. 307-503.

8. ———. 1933. Philosophische Schriften. II. Die Logica

"Nostrorum Petitioni Sociorum". Die Glossen zu Porphyrius.

Münster: Verlag der Aschendorffschen Verlagsbuchhandlung.

Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie und Theologie des

Mittelalters. n° 21 (n° 4).

Contents: Logica nostrorum petitioni sociorum: Glossulae

super Porphyrium pp. 505-580. Glossae super Porphyrium

secundum vocales pp. 583-588. Untersuchungen pp. 591-633;

Sachindex zu den Texten pp. 634-648.

9. Dal Pra, Mario, ed. 1969. Abelardo. Scritti di logica. Firenze:

La Nuova Italia.

Second edition; first edition Milano, Bocca 1954.

Indice: Introduzione XI; Avvertenze XL; Introductiones

dialecticae: Editio super Porphyrium 3; Glossae in Categorias

43; [Logica Ingredientus 7] Editio super Aristotelem De

Interpretatione 69; De divisionibus 155; Logica «

Ingredientibus » : Super Topica Glossae 205-330.

"Quanto viene raccolto nel presente volume costituisce un

contributo che integra, in parte, le lacune ancora esistenti nella

nostra conoscenza delle opere logiche di Abelardo, ben lungi

però dall'eliminarle interamente. D'altra parte la posizione di

Abelardo nella storia della filosofia medievale ed in particolare

nella storia della logica è tanto rilevante, oltre che per il merito

intrinseco di parecchie dottrine, specialmente per il fatto che

egli si trova a far da tramite fra tutta la tradizione che risale a

Boezio e gli sviluppi posteriori della logica nei secoli XIII e XIV,

che una conoscenza la più completa possibile di tutti i suoi

scritti logici nel loro reciproco intrecciarsi storico è un obiettivo

da perseguire insistentemente." (pp. XI-XII, una nota omessa)

10. Buytaert, Eligius, ed. 1969. Petri Abaelardi Opera Theologica I.

Commentaria in Epistolam Pauli ad Romanos; Apologia

contra Bemardum. Turnhout: Brepols.

Corpus Christianorum. Continuatio Mediaevalis, 11.

11. ———, ed. 1969. Petri Abaelardi Opera Theologica II.

Theologia christiana. Theologia scholarium (recensiones

breviores). Capitula haeresum Petri Abaelardi. Turnhout:

Brepols.

Corpus Christianorum. Continuatio Mediaevalis, 12.

12. Buytaert, Eligius, and Mews, Constant J., eds. 1987. Petri

Abaelardi Opera Theologica III. Theologia 'summi boni'.

Theologia 'scholarium'. Turnhout: Brepols.

Corpus Christianorum. Continuatio Mediaevalis, 13.

13. Ilgner, Rainer M., ed. 2001. Petri Abaelardi Opera Theologica

IV. Scito te ipsum. Turnhout: Brepols.

Corpus Christianorum. Continuatio Mediaevalis, 190.

14. Romig, Mary Foster, Luscombe, David, and Burnett, Charles S.

F., eds. 2004. Petri Abaelardi Opera theologica V. Expositio in

Hexameron; Abbreviatio Petri Abaelardi Expositionis in

Hexameron. Turnhout: Brepols.

Corpus Christianorum. Continuatio Mediaevalis, 15.

Mary Foster Romig, A Critical Edition of Peter Abelard’s

“Expositio in hexameron, unpiblished Ph. D. dissertation, 1981.

15. Luscombe, David E., and Mews, Constant J., eds. 2007. Petri

Abaelardi Opera theologica VI. Sententie - Liber

Sententiarum. Turnhout: Brepols.

Corpus Christianorum. Continuatio Mediaevalis, 14.

16. Buytaert, Eligius, Luscombe, David E., Barrow, Julia, Burnett,

Charles S. F., and Keats-Rohan, Katharine, eds. 2014. Petrus

Abaelardus. Opera theologica. Turnhout Brepols.

Summary: "This set of three volumes includes the complete text

of Peter Abelard's theological works as published in Corpus

Christianorum, Continuatio Mediaevalis volumes 11, 12, 13, 14,

15 and 190.

17. Engels, Lodewijk Jozef, and Vande Veire, Christine eds. 2021.

Petrus Abaelardus. Sermones. Turnhout: Brepols.

Corpus Christianorum. Continuatio Mediaevalis, 286.

First edition D'Amboise vel Duchesne (1616) p. 727-971.

First critical edition: Paola De Santis, I sermoni di Abelardo

per Ie monache del Paracleto, Mediaevalia Lovaniensia 31,

Leuven: Leuven University Press 2002.

"La tradizione manoscritta dei sermoni di Abelardo è molto

povera, ancor più di quella già scarna degli altri scritti per il

Paracleto. Infatti, dei trentasei sermoni che vengono attribuiti

al Magister palatinus, solo nove risultano trasmessi dai codici;

per i rimanenti bisogna ricorrere all'Editio princeps del 1616,

da cui derivano, con qualche aggiunta, le edizioni di V. Cousin

del 1849 e di J.P. Migne del 1855. Una moderna edizione

critica, pur avvalendosi di conoscenze più ampie e di metodi di

indagine storica e filologica più progrediti, dovrà pur sempre

basarsi sulla prima edizione stampata. Quest’ultima, da parte

sua, ci informa . scarsamente sui codici utilizzati, di cui si sono

perdute le tracce. É importante, perciò, ricostruire anzitutto un

quadro completo della tradizione manoscritta dei sermoni, che

aiuti ad illuminare meglio i problemi della trasmissione di

questi testi. A tale scopo si descriveranno i dati essenziali

esterni ed interni dei codici e, poiché si tratta sempre di

manoscritti compositi ed eterogenei, si cercherà di vedere quale

posto vi occupano i sermoni di Abelardo, ricavandone, se del

caso, qualche ipotesi sulla loro area di diffusione. Inoltre si

terrà conto dei codici andati perduti e si esamineranno le

caratteristiche delle due pricipali edizioni, l'Editio princeps e

quella del Cousin. Sulla base dei dati ottenuti, verranno, infine,

prese in considerazione le possibili relazioni tra i testimoni

manoscritti per ricavarne i criteri da adottare nella presente

edizione dei Sermones lI, IV e XIV del ciclo de tempore e dei

Sermones XXV, XXXII e XXXIV del ciclo de sanctis. (pp.1-2)"

18. Peter, Abelard. 1995. Ethical Writings: His Ethics or “Know

Yourself” and His Dialogue between a Philosopher, a Jew and

a Christian. Indianapolis: Hackett.

Translated by Paul Vincent Spade.

With an Introduction by Marilyn McCord Adams.

19. ———. Epistolae.

First editions: Duchesne, A., Petri Abaelardi sancti Gildasi in

Britannia abbatis, et Eloisae coniugis eius, quae postmodum

prima coenobii Paracletensis, abbatissa fuit, Opera, Paris 1616.

Same edition, but with a different title: F. d' Amboise, Petri

Abaelardi Filosofi et Theologi, abbatis Ruyensis, et Heloissae

coniugis eius, prima paracletensis abbatissae, Opera, Paris

1616.

Rawlinson, R, Petri Abaelardi abbatis Ruyensis et Heloissae

abbatissae Paracletensis Epistolae, Oxford 1718.

"Although Abelard was not a prolific letter-writer, a number of

uncollected letters survive which he wrote to different people

for various reasons: letters of dedication prefacing works,

letters relating to his quarrels with Roscelin, the monks of St

Denis and with Bernard, some short letter-treatises.(62)" (John

Marenbon, The Philosophy of Peter Abelard, Cambridge:

Cambridge University Press 1997, p. 72)

(62) The 'uncollected' letters are edited in Smits, Letters (Ep. 9-

Ep. 14; Checklist §§ 278-83) except for his letter to his followers

against Bernard (Checklist § 284), ed. in Klibansky, 'Peter

Abailard', pp. 6-7 (see above p. 30 [*]) and the dedicatory

letters, all to Heloise, to the Hymnarius Paraclitensis, the

commentary on the Hexaemeron and the sermons (edited

along with these works). For the occasional letters, see above, p.

27, n. 84 (Ep. 10, to St Bernard), 18-19 (Ep. 11, to the abbot and

monks of St Denis), 57-8 (Ep. 14 to the bishop of Paris).

The letter-treatises are Ep. 9, to the nuns of the Paraclete (a set

of recommendations for their studies, perhaps related to the

Rule); Ep. 12 (on the superiority of monks to canons) and Ep.

13 (a defence of logic, which may in fact be a short note or

fragment, not a letter at all). Smits comments in detail on the

textual history, dating and contents of these letters.

[*] ed. in R. Klibansky, 'Peter Abailard and Bernard of

Clairvaux', Mediaeval and Renaissance Studies 5 (1961) 1-27

(edition on pp. 6-7).

Critical edition: The Letter Collection of Peter Abelard and

Heloise, edited with a revised translation by David Luscombe

after the translation by Betty Radice, Oxford Meedival Texts,

Oxford: Clarendon Press 2013.

"David Luscombe has provided a long-awaited edition with

meticulous attention to the transcription of manuscripts and

recording of variants. He also supplies informed commentary

on numerous points of historical detail relevant to the

correspondence, above all to Abelard's Historia calamitatum

(identified here as Letter 1, rather than by its familiar, but

inauthentic title). The critical edition thus replaces those by

Jacques Monfrin of the Historia calamitatum and by Eric

Hicks [*[of the subsequent letters, as well as those by J .T.

Muckle and T. McLaughlin, published in Mediaeval Studies

between 1950 and 1956." Constant J. Mews, "Between

authenticity and interpretation: On the letter collection of Peter

Abelard and Heloise and the Epistolae duorum amantium",

Tijdschrift voor Filosofie, 76, 2014, p. 824.

[*] E. Hicks (éd.), La vie et les epistres Pierres Abaelart et

Heloys sa fame, traduction du XIIIe siècle attribuée à Jean de

Meun avec une nouvelle édition des textes latins d'après le ms.

Troyes Bibl. mun. 802 par Éric Hicks, Genève, Slatkine; Paris,

Champion 1991.

Main English Translations:

The Letters of Abelard and Heloise. Translated with an

Introduction and Notes by Betty Radice. Revised by M- T.

Clanchy, London: Penguin Books 2003 (first edition 1973)

Abelard and Heloise, The Letters and Other Writings,

Translated with Introduction and Notes, by William Levitan

Selected Songs and Poems, Translated by Stanley Lombardo

and by Barbara Thorburn, Indainapoli: Hackett 2007.

The Letters of Heloise and Abelard. A translation of their

collected correspondence and related writings, Translated and

edited by Mary Martin McLaughlin with Bonnie Wheeler, New

York: Palgrave Macmillan 2009.

Main Italian translation:

Abelardo ed Eloisa, Epistolario, A cura di Ileana Pagani. Con

considerazioni sulla trasmissione del testo di Giovanni Orlandi,

Torino: Utet 1974.

Main French translation:

Abélard et Héloïse, Correspondance, Traduction d’Octave

Gréard présentée, revue et annotée par Édouard Bouyé, Préface

d’Étienne Gilson, Paris: Gallimard 2000.

Héloïse et Abélard, Lettes et vies, Introduction, traduction,

notes, annexes, bibliographie (mise a jour en 2015) et

chronologie par ves Ferroul, Paris: GF Flammarion 1996.

20. ———. "Historia calamitatum [Epistola 1]."

Date of composition: ca. 1132.

Critical editions:

Jacques Monfrin, Abélard: Historia Calamitatum. Texte

critique avec une introduction, Paris: Vrin 1959.

Alexander Andrée (éd.), Historia calamitatum: Consolation to

a Friend: Edited from Troyes, Médiathèque du Grand Troyes,

MS 802, Turnhout: Brepols 2015.

Summary: "Peter Abelard’s Letter to a Friend, frequently

known as The Story of My Calamities, recounts the meteoric

and disastrous career of one of the driving forces of the twelfth-

century renaissance.The son of a minor Breton noble family, a

public intellectual who turned the academic establishment on

its head, lover of Heloise, and sometimes his own worstenemy,

Abelard produced in elegant prose one of the signal works of

medieval autobiography. This new edition presents the Latin

text as it appears in the earliest manuscript—until recently

misdated by a hundred years—studded with a commentary that

explicates the circumstances of its composition, context, and

language."

21. Muckle, Joseph T. 1953. "The Personal Letters between Abelard

and Heloise [Epistolae 2-5]." Mediaeval Studies no. 15:47–94.

Date of composition: 1132-1135.

"In this edition I am limiting myself to the two intimate and

personal letters written by Heloise to Abelard and Abelard's

reply in a spiritual vein to each; I am adding the very beginning

of Heloise's third letter which, except for this paragraph, is not

personal but an exposition of the incongruities of the

Benedictine Rule when applied to Orders of women, and

contains a request that Abelard write an account of the rise of

sisterhoods and compose a rule suitable for women." (p. 47)

22. ———. 1955. "The Letter of Heloise on Religious Life and

Abelard's First Reply [Epistolae 6-7]." Mediaeval Studies no.

17:240–281.

Date of composition: 1132-1135.

"The text of the first four letters [*] published in Mediaeval

Studies, (XV) 1953. I also included there the text of the

introduction of the first of the letters which follow since it is of

a personal character. In her letter Heloise sets forth with some

digressions the incongruities of the Rule of St. Benedict when

applied to women, and asks Abelard to compose an adaptation

of that rule for nuns. She also asks Abelard to write for her and

for her community a history of religious life of women. In letter

VI Abelard sets forth to answer the second request. In it he

would trace religious life of women back to Apostolic times. He

displays no knowledge of the rise of organized religious

communities of women in the East in the fourth century.

Abelard was a better dialectician than historian." (p. 240)

[*] Epistolae 2-5.

23. McLaughlin, T. P. 1956. "Abelard’s Rule for Religious Women

[Epistola 8]." Mediaeval Studies no. 18:241–292.

"This letter, (...), completes the new edition of the Historia

Calamitatum and of the correspondence between Heloise and

Abelard by J. T. Muckle C.S.B., published in Mediaeval Studies,

XII (1950), 163-213; XV (1953), 47-94 and XVII (1955), 240-

281.* It contains Abelard's reply to the request of Heloise that

he compose for her religious an adaptation of the Rule of St.

Benedict. In it he discusses the virtues of monastic life,

recrutement, the duties of the abbess and other officers,

buildings, food and clothing, prayer and study." (p. 241)

°While receiving invaluable aid from Father Muckle in the

preparation of following text, it is only fair to him to

acknowledge that I accept sole responsibility for the readings

adopted."

24. Smits, E. R. 1983. Peter Abelard: Letters IX–XIV. An Edition

with an Introduction [Epistolae 9-14]. Groningen:

Rijksuniversiteit.

Date of composition: between 1135 and 1140.

25. Klibansky, Raymond. 1961. "Peter Abailard and Bernard of

Clairvaux [Epistola 15]." Mediaeval and Renaissance Studies

no. 5:1–27.

Date of composition: 1140-41.

The letter is at pp. 6–7.

26. Rubingh-Bosscher, Josepha Marie Annaïs, ed. 1987. Peter

Abelard, "Carmen Ad Astrolabium". A Critical Edition.

Groningen: Rijksuniversiteit

"2. The state of scholarship and the aims of the present study

Research on the Carmen ad Astralabium is characterized by a

rather late but turbulent start in the 19th century. The Carmen

was not incorporated in the first edition of Abelard's opera,

(D'AMBOISE-DUCHESNE 1616), and was first mentioned, as

far as I know, by Dorn GERVAISE in La Vie d'Abeillard (1720,

I, 169-170). The first 12 verses of the Carmen, based on MS

Cotton Vitellius C.VIII (latter part of the 11th c., which we shall

call C from now on) in the British Museum (as its library

signature at the time), became known under the title: Petri

Abaelardi Versus elegiaci ad Astralabium filium suum de

moribus er vita pia ac proba. The editor was Dorn J.F.

CLEMENT, who published the verses in the Histoire littéraire

de la France (XII, 1763, 133-134) and derived the title from a

table of contents of a later date in the codex itself. The same

title is also used in the Cottonian Library catalogue (PLANTA

1802, 424). CLÉMENT's publication was a definitive authority

for over 70 years, until within space of eight years (1838-1846)

three editions came out, each based on different witnesses, with

different rubrics and a different number of verses, but all

purporting to offer the text with moral didactic verses, written

by Abelard to his son Astralabe.

The first complete edition of C was given by Victor COUSIN in

his Fragments philosophiques (1838, II, 168-171): 226 verses,

with the affirmation that this was the entire work." (p. 7)

Date of composition: "It may not be possible to date the

composition of the Carmen more specifically than to observe

that it is of a piece with numerous other texts written by and to

Abelard around the early to mid-1130s. The Heloise section of

the Carmen (379–384, discussed in greater detail later in the

chapter), must postdate Heloise’s Ep. IV. Similarly, numerous

ideas expressed in Heloise’s Ep. VI, which were then

represented by Abelard in his Ep. VIII, Rule for the Nuns of the

Paraclete, appear again in the Carmen. Themes that arise in

both the questions and solutions of the Problemata Heloissae

occur in the Carmen. The Carmen also resonates with ideas

relayed in Abelard’s ethical works, such as the Collationes and

Scito te ipsum, with his biblical exegesis in the Expositio in

Hexameron, the scriptural conundrums he explored in the Sic

et non, and his poetic works, such as his Hymns and Planctus.

(8)" Juanita Feros Ruys, The Repentant Abelard, p. 14)

New edition and English translation in: Juanita Feros Ruys,

The Repentant Abelard: Family, Gender, and Ethics in Peter

Abelard’s Carmen Ad Astralabium and Planctus, New York:

Palgrave Macmillan 2014.

Part III: Latin text, pp. 93-142; Part IV: English translation,

pp. 143-168.

Italian translation: Graziella Ballanti, Pietro Abelardo,

Insegnamenti al figlio: Commento, traduzione e testo latino.

Roma: Armando Editore, 1991.

27. Burnett, Charles S. F. 1984. "Peter Abelard: Soliloquium: A

Critical Edition." Studi medievali no. 25:857–894.

Date of composition: middle 1120's.

English translation: Robert Wadholm, "Anointed to

Philosophize: A Translation and Pentecostal Reception of Peter

Abelard's Soliloquy", Proceedings of the Society for Pentecostal

Studies, 2019, pp. 6-12.

28. Peter, Abelard. Hymnarius Paraclitensis.

First editions:

Victor Cousin, Petri Abælardi opera, t. I, Paris, 1849, p. 295-

328.

Jean-Baptiste Pitra, Patrologia latina, t. 178, Paris, 1855, col.

1765-1816.

Critical editions:

Franz Dolveck, Pascale Bourgain (eds.), L’Hymnaire du

Paraclet. Introduction, texte latin et notes par Franz Dolveck,

préface et traduction par Pascale Bourgain, Turnhout Brepols

2022.

Joseph Szövérfly, Peter Abelard's Hymnarius Paraclitensis: An

annotated edition with introduction: Vol. 1: Introduction to

Peter Abelard’s Hymns; Vol. 2 The Hymnarius Paraclitensis —

Text and Notes, Albany: Classical Folia Editions 1975.

"Peter Abelard’s Hymnarius Paraclitensis is not only a major

monument of twelfth-century hymnody and poetry in general,

but also a work of personal significance. Written at Heloise’s

request, it was a labor of love and in poetic form, it often

expresses Abelard’s personal approach and his views on some

subjects, more directly than some of his other writings. This is a

very rare feature in medieval Latin hymnody. Supposedly,

hymns were a “liturgical” genre, a form of “objective” poetry

without “personal” and “subjective” feelings and views. The

great medievalist, Wolfram von den Steinen, however, rightly

pointed out the ‘subjective’ character of Abelard’s liturgical

hymnody, thus placing him into a new framework and new

context altogether." (Vol. 1, p. 7)

(...)

"I have approached this Hymnarius as a literary work not as a

liturgical document. It is a work of great importance for the

development of poetry, religious as well as secular, in the

twelfth century and afterwards.

I hold with Spanke that Abelard not only created new and

hitherto unknown forms of versification by using “new” lines,

line combinations and stanzas but, also served as a model for

his contemporaries, thus contributing also to the development

of secular vernacular lyrics and to that of courtly poetry. He

liberated medieval versification from the traditional formal

constraints of a few established classical and early medieval

models by giving example to hymnodists, troubadours, and

trouvéres alike. This is, however, only a fraction of his total

contribution as subsequent researches may show us later." (Vol,

1, p. 8)

Chrysogonus Waddell, Hymn Collection from the Paraclete,

Trappist, Kentucky: Gethsemany Abbey, 1989: Vol. 1:

Introduction and Commentary; Vol, 2: Edition.

"In his review of a still relatively recent edition of the hymns of

Peter Abelard, Michel Huglo ended his remarks on a positive

note: "even though we wait for the publication of a still better

edition, this one will urge the reader on to read and study the

poetry of one of the greatest writers of the Middle Ages" (1).

Ever since the nineteenth century there has been no dearth of

editions of Abelard's hymnody; and, given the intrinsic interest

of this remarkable material, there is every likelihood that

edition will follow upon edition for centuries to come, with each

successive edition marking time till yet a better one appears,

and with Huglo's observation remaining applicable to each and

every new edition." (Vol. 1, p. III)

(1) In Scriptorium 33 (1979), p. 339, reviewing the edition by J.

Szövérfly, Peter Abelard's Hymnarius Paraclitensis 2 vols.

(Albany-Brookline: Classical Folia Editions, 1975).

"The present introductory volume attempts chiefly to study the

actual use of Abelard's hymns at the Paraclete. It does indeed

study, through superficially, matters touching on the formal

aspect of Abelard's hymnody; but these and related questions

call for treatment by specialists such as Peter Dronke, and in

book-length monographs." (Vol. 1, p. IV)

Pierre Abélard, L’Hymnaire du Paraclet. Introduction, texte

latin et notes par Franz Dolveck. Préface et traduction par

Pascale Bourgain, Turnhout: Brepols 2022.

"Le texte latin ici imprimé est entièrement fondé sur les

manuscrits, collationnés de première main sur les originaux

puis, pour des vérifications, sur des photographies.

L’auteur de ces lignes regrette de ne pouvoir fournir ici une

édition critique, qui permettrait au lecteur de contrôler chacun

des choix opérés et à l’éditeur de les justifier ; mais il ne peut

s’empêcher de se réjouir de l’absence d’apparat critique,

espérant qu’ainsi l’Hymnaire sera d’abord goûté comme un

monument littéraire plutôt que comme un document

historique.

L’ordre des hymnes adopté, qui est en partie nouveau, a déjà

été justifié ; on trouvera en annexe une concordance avec les

éditions précédentes, même s’il serait souhaitable

d’abandonner les références par numérotation continue au

profit d’indications plus précises, par jour ou par fête puis par

heure ou par numéro au sein d’un cycle. Une seconde annexe

donne la liste des leçons où cette édition diffère des

précédentes."p. 34)

English translations: The Hymns of Abelard in English Verse,

translated by Sister Jane Patricia, Lanham: Unversity Press of

Americ a 1986.

"The hymns in Migne's Patrologia Latina, volume 178, 1772-

1818, number only ninety-three. Dr. Joseph Szövérffy in 1975

published his annotated text, including forty more hymns from

a collation of the

manuscripts from Brussels and Chaumont as well as from the

edition of Dreves[*]. His work has been critized by Peter

Dronke and by M. Silvestre, and where it made adifference in

translation I have followed Silvestre's corrections.

Dr. Szövérffy's introduction to the Hymnarius Paraclitensis

(HP), volume 1, contains much material on Abelard's

background and his skill both as poet and as liturgist. The

collection of one hundred and thirty-three hymns is not

complete, for parts of the manuscript are missing. There are no

Advent hymns, and though no hymn exists for St. Stephen,

there are hymns for St. John the Evangelist and the Innocents

at the same time of the year. Some of the apostles' days have no

hymns, nor does the feast of the Trinity. Father Chrysogonus

Waddell concludes in his analysis of the liturgy that the abbey

of the Paraclete, for whom the hymns were written, adopted the

Cistercian breviary, adding its own feasts.(1)" (p. 25)

[*] Hymnarius Paraclitensis sive hymnorum libelli tres. Ad

fidem codicum Bruxellensis et Calmontani edidit Guido Maria

Dreves, Paris; Lethielleux 1891.

(1) Chrysogonus Waddell, "Peter Abelard as Creator of

Liturgical Texts," paper read at Kalamazoo International

Congress of Medieval Studies, 1975.

Patricia Hilary Woods, The Festival Hymns of Peter Abelard: A

Translation and Commentary of the Hymnarius Paraclitensis

Libellus II, Unpublished Ph. D. thesis, 1992available at

ProQuest Disseretation ref. number 11007748.

Summary: "This thesis examines the hymns contained in Peter

Abelard's Hymnarius Paraclitensis Libellus II and those for the

Sacred Triduum. Together these hymns describe and celebrate

the major events of the hlstoxy of redemption from Nativity to

Pentecost, finishing with Church Dedication.

The forty-seven hymns fall into groups, each of which is

assigned to one of the Feasts. In this examination, each group is

preceded by a Foreword which discusses the techniques

Abelard employs to make a coherent whole out of the individual

hymns. There follows the text, translation and commentaries.

The text is based on that of Chiysogonus Waddell (Hymn

Collections from the Paraclete Cistercian Liturgy Series 9,

Gethsemani Abbey 1987). Although a translation of the hymns

exists (Sister Jane Patricia The Hymns of Peter Abelard in

English Verse University Press of America 1986), it suffers

from the poetic licence Involved in translating the poetry of one

language into that of another. I give a more literal and more

accurate translation.

The hymns have been discussed in varying degrees of depth by

different commentators, the most notable being Guido Dreves

(Petri Abaelardi Peripatetici Palatini Hymnarius Paraclitensis

Paris 1891), Joseph Szövérfly (Peter Abelard's Hymnarius

Paraclitensis Albany-Brookline 1975) and Chrysogonus

Waddell.

Dreves and Szövérfly concentrate on literary and theological

aspects, Waddell on versification, music and the history of the

hymns within the Paraclete liturgy.

Building on these commentaries, I have attempted to set

Abelard's hymns within a theological and historical framework

and to elucidate further the theology of the hymns by reference

to his own prose works, especially the sermons, and to a wide

range of patristic and contemporary writing. I offer a number of

new interpretations based on different Scriptural and

theological texts.

Whereas Szövérfly generally discusses the literary aspect of the

hymns as a body, I have systematically examined them as

Individual pieces of literature, assessing the literary techniques

employed and their merit as poems. Because they are hymns, I

have tried to set them in their liturgical context, showing how

he Incorporates in them references to the services for which

they were composed."

29. ———. "Planctus."

First editions:

Petri Abaelardi Opera (1616).

Edélestand du Méril, Poésies populaires latines antérieures au

XIIe siècle (Paris: Brockhaus et Avenarius, 1843).

——— “Poésies d’Abailard,” Journal des savants de Normandie,

44 (1844), 119–153.

——— Poésies populaires latines du moyen âge (Geneva:

Slatkine Reprints, 1977; first publication Paris: Firmin Didot

Frères, 1847).

Critical editions:

Wilhelm Meyer, Wilhelm Brambach, "Petri Abaelardi Planctus

(III.) virginum Israel super filia Jeptae Galaditae", Gesammelte

Abhandlungen zur mittellateinischen Rythmik, t. I, Berlin,

1905, p. 340-356.

Wilhelm Meyer, "Petri Abaelardi planctus I II IV V VI",

Romanische Forschungen, 5. Bd., Festschrift Konrad Hofmann

zum 70sten Geburtstag (1890), pp. 419-435 (reprinted in

Gesammelte Abhandlungen, pp. 357-374).

Guido Maria Dreves, Analecta Hymnica Medii Aevi, 48,

Leipzig, 1905, pp. 223-232.

Pietro Abelardo, I «Planctus», Introduzione, testo critico,

trascrizioni musicali a cura di Giuseppe Vecchi, Modena;

Società Tipografica Modenese 1951.

Juanita Feros Ruys, The Repentant Abelard: Family, Gender,

and Ethics in Peter Abelard's Carmen ad Astralabium and

Planctus, New York: Palgrave Macmillan 2014, Part IV -

Planctus Text, pp. 245-256.

English translation: Juanita Feros Ruys, The Repentant

Abelard: Family, Gender, and Ethics in Peter Abelard's

Carmen ad Astralabium and Planctus, New York: Palgrave

Macmillan 2014, Part IV - Plancrtus Text, pp. 257-266.

Italian translation: Pietro Abelardo, Planctus. Consolatoria.

Confessio fidei lamenti. Consolazione. Professione di fede.

Testo latino a fronte a cura di Massimo Sannelli, Lavis (TN): La

Finestra Editrice 2002 (seconda edizione 2013).

French translation: Pierre Abélard, Lamentations. Histoire de

mes malheurs. Correspondance avec Héloise, texte latin

traduit et présenté par Paul Zumthor; note musicologique de

Gérard Le Vot, Arles; Actes Sud 1992.6

Bibliographia. Annotated bibliographies

Raul Corazzon || rc@ontology.co || Info

Annotated bibliography of Peter

Abelard: II. Logical, theological

and ethical works

Abelard's dialectical works

1. ———. 1969. "Introductiones Parvulorum." In Scritti di logica.

Firenze: La Nuova Italia.

First edition: V. Cousin, Ouvrages inédits d'Abélard, Paris,

1836, pp. 551-593, contains a partial edition of the glosses on

Porphyry and on the Categories.

Full edition in M. Dal Pra, Pietro Abelardo. Scritti di Logica:

Introductiones Dialecticae: Editio super Porphyrium, Glossae

in Categorías, Editio super Aristotelem de Interpretatione, De

Divisionibus..., second edition, 1969, pp. 1-203.

Italian translation: Introductiones Dialecticae: Editio super

Porphyrium, pp. 3-42: Pietro Abelardo. I commenti all'Isagoge

di Porfirio. Saggio introduttivo, traduzioni, note e apparati a

cura di Simona Pollini, Milano-Udine: Mimesis 2022, testo

latino pp. 177-215; traduzione italiana pp. 217-273.

Doubts on the authorship:

"Peter Abelard’s first known glosses on Isagoge, Categories, On

interpretation and On division – variously referred to as the «

Editiones », the « Introductiones parvulorum », or literal

commentaries – were supposedly written very early in his

career, probably around 1102-1104 when he was in his early

twenties. Originally discovered by V. Cousin (1836, p. X-XVIII),

they are found in the manuscript Paris, BnF, lat. 13368, f. 128r-

168r, and are edited by M. Dal Pra (1969, 19541). The title «

Introductiones parvulorum » was given on the basis of an

alleged cross-reference in Abelard’s Dialectica to such a work;

as we will see, this reference is no longer accepted by scholars.

Since, as will be argued here, there are important reasons to

question whether these glosses form a set, and whether the

attribution to Abelard is correct, I will use the neutral «

editiones » to refer to them." Margaret Cameron, "Abelard’s

Early Glosses: Some Questions", in Irène Rosier-Catach (éd.),

Arts du langage et théologie aux confins des XIe et XIIe siècles,

Torunhout: Brepols 2011, p. 647)

(...)

"Possibly none of the questions raised in this article on its own

is sufficient to overturn the attribution, but taken together they

raise serious difficulties for anyone who wishes to continue to

defend that the editiones were written by Abelard. There do,

however, seem to be extremely good reasons to break up the set

of the editiones by excluding the gloss on Categories from the

rest: unlike the others, it is an anonymous fragment, different

in style and has required a special defence for its inclusion in

the set. In what follows, I will examine each of the five pieces of

evidence. I will argue that there are insufficient reasons to

continue to attribute these works to Abelard or to consider that

they form a set.(1)" (Margaret Cameron, op. cit., p. 648)

(1) In « A note on the Attribution of the Literal Glosses in Paris,

BnF, lat. 13368 », Christopher Martin will examine the

doctrinal content of the Isagoge, On interpretation and On

division glosses and compare it with views Abelard is known to

espouse elsewhere in his writings.

"Despite Bernhard Geyer’s well considered and very cautious

admission of the glosses found in BnF, lat. 13668, into the

canon of Peter Abaelard’s work there has until now been no

systematic investigation of the merits of their claim for

inclusion there." Christopher J. Martin, "A Note on the

Attribution of the Literal Glosses(1) in Paris, BnF, lat. 13368 to

Peter Abaelard", in Irène Rosier-Catach (éd.), Arts du langage

et théologie aux confins des XIe et XIIe siècles, Torunhout:

Brepols 2011, p. 605.

(...)

"I could go on to give more examples of the way in which the

Literal Glosses fail to agree and fail to offer any trace of the

philosophical positions set out by Abaelard in his Dialectic and

his Logics but at this point I think that I have shown enough to

at least raise very considerable doubt about the authorship of

these texts. For myself, I was convinced as soon as I began to

read the Literal Glosses that they are not the work of the great

Peripatetic of Pallet. He was the greatest star of his day and, as

Geyer surely saw, they are the product of a very much lesser

light." Christopher J. Martin, op. cit., p. 646)

2. ———. 1969. "Glossae in Categorias." In Scritti di logica, edited

by Dal Pra, Mario, 43–67. Firenze: La Nuova Italia.

Introductiones dialecticae (Introductiones parvulorum) II.

"The Gloss on the Categories

Abelard continues his theme that logica is concerned with

words rather than things in his gloss on the Categories, which

he describes as dealing with “the names of all things and

subjects, in whatever ways.”(26) He considers the distinction

between categories “more according to the meaning of words

than according to the natures of things.”(27) Aristotle had

opened the Categories by discussing three types of name:

equivocal or ambiguous, univocal or common, and

denominative (as in grammaticus, so named from grammatica).

As part of his comment on ambiguity, Boethius had observed

rather briefly that ambiguity had to be distinguished from

metaphor (translatio), unless it named distinct subject things

(subiectae res).

Abelard seizes on Boethius’s comment that “metaphor is not a

property” to emphasize that metaphor is a type of linguistic

usage. Boethius had argued that some metaphorical usages are

ambiguous, as when a word such as “charioteer” (auriga),

which normally refers to one thing, is transferred to another

thing, such as the captain of a ship. Abelard develops this

comment to explain that words have a distinct meaning

through metaphor (per translationem)." (Constant C. Mews,

Abelard and Heloise, New York: Oxford University Press 2005,

pp. 85-86)

3. ———. 1969. "Editio super Aristotelem De interpretatione." In

Scritti di logica, edited by Dal Pra, Mario, 69–154. Firenze: La

Nuova Italia.

Introductiones dialecticae (Introductiones parvulorum) III.

4. ———. 1969. "Super Topica glossae." In Scritti di logica, edited

by Dal Pra, Mario, 205–330. Firenze: La Nuova Italia.

Logica 'ingredientibus' VII.

The commentary from Logica Ingredientibus on Boethius De

topicis differentiis.

New edition: Karin Margareta Fredborg, "Abelard on Rhetoric",

in Constant J. Mews, Cary J. Nederman, Rodney M. Thomson

(eds.), Rhetoric and Renewal in the Latin West 1100-1540:

Essays in Honour of John O. Ward, Turnhout: Brepols 2003,

pp. 55-80 (text on pp. 65-80).

"Even if the Arsenal manuscript can only supply us with

roughly half of this digression on rhetoric, it is most welcome to

have a second copy of a text otherwise only preserved in a

single manuscript that, despite its orderly appearance, presents

difficulties to the modem reader and editor. Still worse,

Abelard’s commentary survives only as a torso. His

commentary on most of Books II and in is missing in MS Paris,

BnF lat. 7493, fols 168ra-183vb (s. XII).(9) The commentary on

De differentiis topicis is probably from around 1120(10) and

Abelard is clearly still engaged in an ongoing discussion with

his former teacher, William of Champeaux {preceptor noster

Willelmus eiusque sequaces), explicitly so in the section

immediately following this digression on rhetoric." (p. 58)

(9) Super topica, pp. 205-330; Green-Pedersen, The Tradition

of the Topics in the Middle Ages. The Commentaries on

Aristotle’s and Boethius’ ‘Topics’ (Munich: Philosophia, 1984),

p. 41., p. 424. The text breaks off in the gloss on Book Il, PL

64,1184A.

(10) Green-Pedersen, Tradition of the Topics, p. 424; Mews,

‘‘On Dating the Works of Peter Abelard’, Archives d ’histoire

doctrinale et littéraire du moyen âge, 52 (1985), 73-134 p. 91

and ‘Aspects of the Evolution of Abelard’s Thought on

Signification and Predication’, Gilbert de Poitiers et ses

contemporains, ed. by Jean Jolivet and Alain de Libera

(Naples: Bibliopolis, 1987), pp. 15-41 (pp. 15, 25); John O.

Ward, Ciceronian Rhetoric in Treatise, Scholion and

Commentaries, Turnhout: Brepols 1995, p. 109; John

Marenbon, The Philosophy of Peter Abelard (Cambridge:

Cambridge University Press, 1998), pp. 46-48.

"Edition

I have used the manuscript P = MS Paris, BnF lat. 7493 as my

main manuscript, partly because it preserves the full text of the

digression, and partly because A = MS Paris, Arsenal 910, is

obviously abbreviating certain sections, particularly towards

the end. A, however, occasionally supplies a better reading, as

can be seen from the apparatus; all variants are indicated,

except trivial details of word order and A often preferring

‘scilicet’ for P ’s ‘videlicet’, ‘id est’ for ‘hoc est’. Dal Pra followed

P with a few conjectures. Where Dal Pra’s readings of P differ

from my own, this is also indicated in the apparatus except for

trivial misprints and misreadings ( ‘vero’ for P’s ‘ut’ in §1.2).

However, Dal Pra’s insistance on lectio difficilior in the

technical terminology of ‘constitutio’ and ‘iudicatio’, preferring

‘constructio’ and ‘indicio’ I have not followed. The word order

and orthography follows P with its occasional use of c for t and

e caudata (=ae); A never makes use of e caudata and, very

occasionally, has a different word order. (p. 61(

5. ———. 1969. "Editio super Porphyrium." In Scritti di logica,

edited by Dal Pra, Mario, 3–42. Firenze: La Nuova Italia.

Introductiones dialecticae (Introductiones parvulorum) I.

6. ———. 1969. "De divisionibus." In Scritti di logica, edited by

Dal Pra, Mario, 155–204. Firenze: La Nuova Italia.

Introductiones dialecticae (Introductiones parvulorum): IV.

Gloss on Boethius De divisione.

Date of composition: "One of the earliest known writings of

Peter Abelard (possibly a text taken down from spoken

commentary) is a set of short “literal” glosses on the Isagoge of

Porphyry, the Categories and Periermeneias of Aristotle and

the De divisione of Boethius. In the one manuscript in which

they occur, Paris, Bibl. nat. lat. 13368, ff. 128-167v (s. xii), the

glosses on Porphyry and Aristotle are each described as an

Editio, perhaps in imitation of the commentaries of

Boethius(6). Because Abelard is more concerned to expose the

literal meaning of the text than his own opinion on individual

questions of logic, these glosses are believed to date to an early

period of his career, between 1102 (when he first started

teaching at Corbeil) and 1113-14 (date of his return to Notre-

Dame)(7). The brevity of his comment on the passage of the

Isagoge about genus and species, which he used as a point of

departure for his debate with William of Champeaux on the

nature of universals, would suggest that this gloss was

composed before the disputation, that is before 1108-9(8)."

(Constant J. Mews, "On Dating the Works of Peter Abelard",

Archives d'Histoire Doctrinale et Littéraire du Moyen Age, 60,

1986, pp. 74-75)

(6) There is no title to the gloss on the Categories (of which the

beginning and end is missing), but one can assume it would

have been titled Editio by analogy with the accompanying

glosses on the Isagoge and Periermeneias. That the gloss on

Boethius is titled De divisionibus in the MS, not Editio, may be

a deliberate choice, reflecting a desire not to place Boethius on

the same level as the other authors. The gloss on the De

differentiis topicis (not part of the literal glosses), is simply

titled super Thopica glose (see below n. 14).

(7) Dal Pra, Scriiti di logica, pp. xv-xvi.

(8) Ed. sup. Por. 5-6; cf. Hist. Cal. 70-100. On the chronology

of Abelard’s early career, see R.-H. Bautier, Abélard en son

temps, [Paris : Les Belles lettres , 1981] p. 54 (21-77).

7. ———. 1956. Dialectica. Assen: Van Gorcum.

First edition: The Dialectica was edited incompletely for the

first time by Victor Cousin in Ouvrages inédits d'Abélard, Paris

1836, pp. 173-497.

First complete edition of the Parisian manuscript with an

introduction by L.M. De Rijk (Introduction CVI pages; Text

pages 51-637); second revised edition 1970 (Introduction CXII;

Text pages 51-669).

The beginning (and the end?) of the text is missing:

"Nevertheless I commence the text on p. 51, in the case

someone should be fortunate enough to find it [the beginning]"

(De Rijk, note 3, p XIII).

Contents of the Introduction: 1. Peter Abailard. Life. Works on

logic IX; 2. Abailard's Dialectica. The manuscript. Sources. 3.

Masters mentioned in the Dialectica. Date of the Dialectica

XII; 4. The content of the Dialectica XXV; 5. Inference.

Consequence. Syllogism XXXI; 6. Categorical proposition.

Terms. Copula. Identity theory. Inherence theory XXXVI; 7.

Hypothetical proposition. Implication. Conjunction.

Disjunction XLIII; 8. Supposition XLIX; 9. Truth and falsity LI;

10. Affirmation. Negation. Signum quantitatis LV; 11. Modal

propositions LIX; 12. Categorical syllogism LXIII; 13.

Hypothetical syllogism LXVIII; 14. Argumentation. Kinds.

Locus differentia. Maxima propositio LXXV; 15. Division.

Kinds. Definition. Kinds LXXXV; 16 Abailard's position in

twelfth century logic. Dialecticians and Anti-dialecticians.

Nominalism and Realism. The question of the universals

LXXXIX; Books and Articles referred to XCV-XCVII.

"Aristotle deals with the use of speech, Abailard says (Log.

Nostr. petit., 508, 32--509, 8), in his Categories, De

Interpretatione and Topics, and with argumentations in his

Prior and Posterior Analytics (1): Porphyry wrote an

introduction to the first-mentioned treatise. Thus, the scheme

of his own Dialectica is obvious: he first treats of the parts of

speech (partes orationis): tractatus I; next the categorical

propositions and syllogisms are dealt with: tractatus II; the

treatment of the hypothetical propositions and syllogisms

(tractatus IV) is preceded by that of the topics (tractatus III);

the author ends his work with a treatise on division and

definition: tractatus V." p. XXV.

(1) Abailard's description of the Aristotelian treatises is not

wholly correct.

Date of composition: "The Dialectica is, from all the

indications, a work from the first part of Abelard’s career, quite

probably written before Abelard became a monk in 1117, and

very probably before LI [Logica Ingredientibus] was put

together, although it draws on an earlier form of the same

teaching material.(113)" (p. 41)

(113) Constant Mews (1985b, 74–104) attacked earlier views,

which placed Dial., or at least its final revision, in the 1130s or

later. He placed the work before LI but after Abelard became a

monk. Most scholars accepted his arguments, at least in so far

as they established that Dial. should not be dated after LI. I

argued (Marenbon 1997a, 40–43) that Mews’s dating should be

pushed back even a little further, to before 1117, and Mews now

(2005a, 259 n. 2 to ch. 3) accepts my view, at least for most of

the work, proposing a dating between 1112 and 1117/18 (2005,

43); Chris Martin suggests an even earlier dating, in which he is

‘beginning work on the final sections of Dial. around 1112’

(2011, 622). For the historiography of dating Dial., see

Marenbon 1997a, 40 n. 16.

References

Marenbon, J. 1997a. The Philosophy of Peter Abelard.

Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Martin, C. J. 2011. ‘A Note on the Attribution of the Literal

Glosses in Paris, BNF, lat. 13368 to Peter Abelard’. In Rosier-

Catach 2011, 605–46.

Mews, C. J. 1985b. ‘On Dating the Works of Peter Abelard’.

Archives d’histoire doctrinale et littéraire du Moyen Âge

52:73–134. Reprinted in Mews 2001.

———. 2001. Abelard and His Legacy. Aldershot: Variorum.

———2005a. Abelard and Heloise. New York: Oxford

University Press.

Rosier-Catach, I. ed. 2011. Arts du langage et théologie aux

confins des XIe-XIIe siècles: Textes, maîtres, débats. Studia

artistarum 26. Turnhout: Brepols.

8. ———. 1919. Die Logica "Ingredientibus". 1. Glossae super

Porphyrium. Edited by Geyer, Bernhard, Peter Abaelards

Philosophische Schriften. Münster: Verlag der

Aschendorffschen Verlagsbuchhandlung.

Logica 'ingredientibus' I. The commentary from Logica

Ingredientibus on Porphyry's Isagoge.

Date of composition of the Logica Ingredientibus: (c. 1119,

though some scholars believe that the sections on On

Interpretation and De topicis differentiis might be later).

"Not long after he had finished the Dialectica, Abelard was

busy preparing another comprehensive logical work - this time

in the form of commentaries - based on similar material. When

Abelard took up teaching logic again a little while after he

entered St Denis, he probably used much the same material as

he had done in Paris, but with some revision and development.

This was probably what he wrote up, between about 1118 and

1120, for his new work. The Logica survives in rather less

complete form than the Dialectica, and what remains must be

reconstructed from three different manuscripts.(36)" John

Marenbon, The Philosophy of Peter Abelard, Cambridge:

Cambridge University Press 1997, p. 46)

(...)

"Despite this messy transmission, there is every reason to

consider the Logica an integral work, conceived as a whole

(though showing some small developments in thought during

its course). Abelard has reworked his lectures carefully. His

language is well chosen and usually elegant; and he is more

selective here than in the Dialectica, excluding discussions of

secondary importance in order to set out the main issues

clearly. The surviving parts of it may give a slightly misleading

impression of the Logica. From the length of the opening

portion, the commentary on De topicis dtfferentiis seems as

though it would have been very long. If the rest of it and the

commentary on De syllogismis hypotheticis had not been lost,

the emphasis of the Logica might seem much the same as that

of the Dialectica. All the same, there is no denying that

Abelard's interest in the wider philosophical questions raised

by logic is deeper here than in the earlier work." (John

Marenbon, The Philosophy of Peter Abelard, p. 47)

(36) The commentaries on the Isagoge (= sup.Por.), Categories

(= sup.Pred.) and De interpretatione {— sup.Per.) - from the

Milan manuscript only, with the inauthentic ending, are edited

in Phil. Schr., 1-3 (Munster, 1919-27) (BGPMA 21). The

authentic ending of the De interpretatione commentary

{sup.Per (M)) is edited in Minio-Paluello, Twelfth-century

logic, pp. 3-108 (all these are Checklist §294). The De

differentiis topicis commentary (= sup.Top.; Checklist §307) is

edited in dal Pra, Scritti, pp. 205-330. Most scholars describe

this set of commentaries as his Logica Ingredientibus (from the

opening: 'Ingredientibus nobis logicam ...') in order to

distinguish it from his later commentary on Porphyry, which

they call the Logica Nostrorum Petitioni Sociorum. But since,

as I shall argue, it is more accurate to call this later work the

Glossulae, the simple title Logica will be used here without

danger of confusion.

"The reason why the Logica can be dated firmly to 1121 or

before lies in its relation to Abelard's first version of the

Theologia, the Theologia Summi Boni, which was condemned

at the Council of Soissons in March 1121." (John Marenbon,

The Philosophy of Peter Abelard, p. 48)

English translations:

"The Glosses of Peter Abailard on Porphyry", in Richard

McKeon (ed.), Selections from Medieval Philosophers, London:

Charles Scribners & Sons 1929, pp, 208-258 (translation of pp.

1-32).

"On Universals", in John F. Wippel, Allan B. Wolter (eds.),

Medieval Philosophy: From St. Augustine to Nicholas of Cusa,

New York: The Free Press 1969, pp. 190-203 (translation of pp.

7-30)

"From the “Glosses on Porphyry" in His Logica ‘ingredientibus’

", in P. V. Spade (ed.), Five Texts on the Mediaeval Problem of

Universals, Hackett: Indianapolis 1994, pp. 26–56 (translation

of pp. 7.25-32.12)

Italian translation: Pietro Abelardo. I commenti all'Isagoge di

Porfirio. Saggio introduttivo, traduzioni, note e apparati a cura

di Simona Pollini, Milano-Udine: Mimesis 2022, testo latino

pp. 275-393; traduzione italiana pp. 395-558.

9. ———. 1921. "Die Logica "Ingredientibus". 2. Die Glossen zu

den Kategorien." In Peter Abaelards Philosophische Schriften,

edited by Geyer, Bernhard, 111–305. Münster: Verlag der

Aschendorffschen Verlagsbuchhandlung.

Logica 'ingredientibus' II. The commentary from Logica

Ingredientibus on Aristotle's Categories.

10. ———. 1933. "Die Logica "Ingredientibus". 3. Die Glossen zu

Περί ἑρμηνείας." In Peter Abaelards Philosophische Schriften,

edited by Geyer, Bernhard, 307–503. Münster: Verlag der

Aschendorffschen Verlagsbuchhandlung.

Logica 'ingredientibus' II. The commentary on Aristotle's De

iterpretatione (Peri hermeneias).

English translation: An abbreviated part is translated in H.

Arens, Aristotle’s Theory of Language and Its Tradition: Texts

from 500 to 1750, Amsterdam: John Benjamins, 1984, pp. 231–

302.

11. ———. 1933. "Aus den anonymen Glossen des Cod. Ambr. M.

64 sup. Untersuchungen." In Peter Abaelards Philosophische

Schriften, edited by Geyer, Bernhard, 581–588. Münster:

Verlag der Aschendorffschen Verlagsbuchhandlung.

12. ———. 1933. "Die Logica "Nostrorum Petitioni Sociorum". Die

Glossen zu Porphyrius." In Peter Abaelards Philosophische

Schriften, edited by Geyer, Bernhard, 505–580. Münster:

Verlag der Aschendorffschen Verlagsbuchhandlung.

The Logic that begins with the words: At the request of our

friends or Little Glosses on Porphyry Isagoge.

Date of composition circa 1125.

Italian translation: Pietro Abelardo. I commenti all'Isagoge di

Porfirio. Saggio introduttivo, traduzioni, note e apparati a cura

di Simona Pollini, Milano-Udine: Mimesis 2022, testo latino

pp. 559-629; traduzione italiana pp. 631-728.

13. Jacobi, Klaus, and Strub, Christian, eds. 2010. Petrus

Abaelardus. Glossae super Peri hermeneias. Turnhout:

Brepols.

Vol. I: Corpus Christianorum Continuatio Mediaevalis, 206

(2010).

Critical edition with introduction and notes.

Table of Contents: Introduction IX; 1. Literature on the Text of

the Glossae super Peri hermeneias IX; 2. The Two Manuscripts

XIII; 3. Aristotle’s Text, Abelard’s Commentary, and Abelard’s

Systematic Extended Analyses XXXVII; 4. The Text of

Abelard’s Lecture and the Copies LIII; 5. The Dating of the

Commentary and its Relationship to Abelard’s Other Logical

Writings LXIII; 6. On the Vol. 1Edition LXV; 7.

Acknowledgments LXXIII; Appendix I: A Complete List for

albus / animal - Occurrences LXXV; Appendix II: A Complete

List of the Accidental Transpositions XXXI; Appendix III:

Concordance to Older Editions XCI.

Summary: "In 1927, this substantial commentary was edited by

Bernhard Geyer. The edition was based on the only manuscript

of the text then known to scholarship (Milan, Biblioteca

Ambrosiana M 63 sup., fols. 45r-72r). In 1938, Martin

Grabmann discovered a second manuscript of the work (Berlin,

Staatsbibliothek Preussischer Kulturbesitz, lat. fol 624, fols.

97r-146r). As Lorenzo Minio-Paluello has shown, the final part

of Abaelard’s text, which includes the long excursus on modal

logic and the commentary on chapters 12-14, is accurately

preserved only in this second manuscript. He edited this final

part in 1958.[*]"

[*] Lorenzo Minio-Paluello, Abaelardiana inedita. Vol. 1. super

Periermenias XII-XIV; 2. Sententie secundum M. Petrum,

Roma, Edizioni di Storia e Letteratura, 1958.

"The following assumptions appear plausible for the Glossae

super Perihermeneias on the basis of the present state of

scholarship:(140) The work was written circa 1118 - 1120, after

Abelard had become a monk in St. Denis.(141) In the years 1121

- 1127, in which Abelard lived in the “Paraclete” Oratorium,

which soon became a school, he again gave lectures on logic for

his students and adherents. One can conjecture that the text

was revised at this time and expanded through new extended

analyses. In the 1130’s Abelard was in Paris, and there at Mont

Ste Geneviève he not only gave lectures on theology, but also, as

he had done before, lectures on logic as well.(142) But by this

time his main interests lay with theology and there are

indications - particularly given by the commentary on On

Interpretation - that in his lectures on logic he relied upon

knowledge gained earlier and no longer worked out anything

new.(143)" (Introduction, p. LXIV)

(140) See J. Marenbon, [The philosophy of Peter Abelard,

Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1997] 36-53.

(141) See ibid., 46; 48.

(142) Compare ibid. 51-52.

(143) A central argument for this claim is the cursory manner in

which Abelard refers in his commentary, cap. 6, 1.481-485, to

the Aristotelian text of the Sophistical Refutations. In the

1130’s this text was the center of the logicians’ burning interest.

Abelard obviously no longer takes the trouble to attain the level

of the new scholarship. See L. M. de Rijk, Logica Modemorum I

(cfr. note 14 supra), Appendix F 3, A fragment of the

Perihermeneias-commentary from MS Berlin, Lat. Fol. 624;

620,27-29: Dicit Magister Petrus: “Legi et relegi Elencos;

sophisma univocationis non inveni." Respondet Magister

Albericus: “Bene dixisti quod non invenisti, quia non

intellexisti." On this topic compare L. M. de Rijk, ibid., 60; 123;

J. Marenbon, The philosophy of Peter Abelard (cfr. note 3

supra), 52-53.

14. Peter, Abelard. 1958. "Glosse Super Periermenias XII-XIV." In

Twelfth Century Logic: Texts and Studies. Vol II: Abelardiana

inedita, edited by Minio-Paluello, Lorenzo, 1–108. Roma:

Edizioni di Storia e Letteratura.

"The present volume contains an edition of two logical texts -

one certainly and the other probably by Abailard - which have

not been published in print before now.(1)

The first - a section of Abailard's longer commentary on

Aristotle's De interpretatione, now usually known as the third

part of the Logica "Ingredientibus" - was discovered about

twenty years ago by the late Martin Grabmann.(2)

The second, consisting of two sections apparently extracted

from one or two otherwise lost works by Abailard (?), was seen

and mentioned, though not ascribed to this author, by

Bernhard Geyer(3)." (Introduction, p. XI)

(1) No other unpublished logical work ascribed to Abailard are

known to exist. There are, however. a number of references to

and quotations from logical writings of Abailard in unpublished

texts; see e.g., below, p. XLI, and Grabmann's paper mentioned

in the next note. It is possible that one or more works in cod.

Orleans 266 (see below, pp. XLII-XLVI) belong to him.

(2) M. Grabmann, Kornmentare zu aristotelischen Logik aus

dem 12. und 13. Jahrundert in MS lat. fol. 624 der Preusslichen

Staatsbibliothek in Berlin (" Sitzungsb. d. Preuss.. Akad. d.

Wissenscli." 1938, pp. 185-210).

(3) B. Geyer, Peter Abaelards Philosophische Schriften, IV,

Münster 1933 (".Beitr. z. Gcsch. d. Philos. u. Theol d. Mittealt."

XXL .4), p. 595 n. 3.

(...)

"Summary of the commentary on Chapters XII-XIV

The first text printed in the present volume contains the whole

of Abailard's commentary on De interpretatione XII-XIV. Since

A breaks off about half way through Abailard's introduction to

chapters XII-XIV, our edition has a portion in common with

Geyer's edition (pp. 483.30-497.20 = 3.1-29.1;). The numbers

in square brackets to be found in the following summary refer

to the paragraphs into which we have divided the text.

The commentary on the three chapters includes: I. a treatise on

modal propositions, introductory to chapters XII and XIII; II.

the commentary on these two chapters, in whim Aristotle deals

with some problems arising out of modal propositions; III. the

commentary on chapter XIV concerning contrary

propositions." (Introduction, p. XXII)

15. ———. 1933. "Glosae super librum Porphyrii secundo vocalem."

In Testi medioevali inediti. Fontes Ambrosiani, III, edited by

Ottaviano, Carmelo, 107–207. Firenze: Olschki.

"In the same year as Geyer produced his edition of LNP [Logica

‘Nostrorum Petitioni’] and two fragments of the Glossae,

Carmelo Ottaviano published a complete edition of the latter

work and argued that they were written by Abelard himself(9).

Ottaviano based his argument on the close similarity both of

the ideas and the text itself of the Glossae to those of LI [Logica

“ingredientibus]; he did not, however, take into account the

fact that there were other parallels between the Glossae and

LNP. The intention of this study is to investigate the conflicting

claims of Ottaviano and Geyer about the authorship of these

Glossae secundum vocales and to establish their textual

relationship to the known writings of Peter Abelard." (Constant

J. Mews, "A neglected gloss on the «Isagoge» by Peter

Abelard", Freiburger Zeitschrift fur Philosophie und Theologie,

31, 1984, p. 36)

(...)

""Conclusion

This study has been concerned with the close relationships,

both textual and thematic, between the anonymous Glossae

secundum vocales, found in the Milan, Biblioteca Ambrosiana

MS. M. 63 sup., ff. 73ra-81vb, and various known writings of

Abelard on logic and theology.

These anonymous glosses seem to represent a revision made by

Abelard of his Logica ’Ingredientibus’, while they appear to

have been themselves revised in the Logica ’Nostrorum

petitioni sociorum’.

16. ———. 1992. "Notae Super Porphyrium." Traditio no. 47:100–

102.

Notae super Porphyrium. Second Appendix to Yukio Iwakuma,

"Vocales, or Early Nominalists", Traditio, 47, 1992, pp. 37-111.

17. ———. 1993. Des intellections [Tractatus de intellectibus].

Paris: Vrin.

Critical edition, French translation and commentary by Patrick

Morin.

"This piece—apparently from a larger treatise—is attributed to

Abelard in its only manuscript, and it has many very close

parallels with LI [Logica Ingredientibus] (both the

commentary on the Isagoge and especially that on On

Interpretation) and some with LNPS [Logica nosatrorum

petitioni sociorum](102). It does not seem, though, to be a

compilation, since it gives a more thorough and nuanced

treatment of the

workings of the mind and its relation to language and reality

than is found in any other known work of Abelard’s.(103) The

passages shared with it might, indeed, strengthen the case that

LNPS is by Abelard,

but they are all from the discussion of universals, which is the

part of the commentary which seems in any case to be most

clearly Abelardian, though perhaps as recorded by a student."

John Marenbon, Abelard in Four Dimensions, Notre Dame:

Indiana University Press 2013, p. 38.

Date of composition: (probably c. 1122–25)

First editions:

Victor Cousin, Ouvrages inédits d'Abélard (1836).

Lucia Urbani Ulivi, La psicologia di Abelardo e il "Tractatus de

intellectibus", Roma: Edizioni di Storia e Letteratura 1976, pp.

103-127.

Abelard's theological works

1. Buytaert, Eligius, Luscombe, David E., Barrow, Julia, Burnett,

Charles S. F., Keats-Rohan, Katharine, Mews , Constant J., and

Romig, Mary Foster, eds. 2014. Petrus Abaelardus. Opera

theologica. Turnhout: Brepols.

Three volumes.

This set of three volumes includes the complete text of Peter

Abelard'stheological works as published in Corpus

Christianorum, Continuatio Mediaevalis volumes 11, 12, 13, 14,

15 and 190.

2. Peter, Abelard. 1987. "Theologia 'summi boni'." In Petri

Abaelardi Opera Theologica III. Theologia 'summi boni'.

Theologia 'scholarium', edited by Buytaert, Eligius and Mews,

Constant J., 83–201. Turnhout: Brepols.

TSum = Theologia ‘Summi boni’ in both redactions.

Date of composition: c. 1120.

"Of all the theological writings produced in France in the first

half of the twelfth century, none became quite so controversial

as the Theologia of Peter Abaelard. An early version, the

Theologia ‘Summi boni’, was burnt at the council of Soissons in

March/April 1121. A much revised version, the Theologia

'Scholarium", was harshly criticized by Bernard of Clairvaux at

the council of Sens, 2 June 1140, and earned its author

temporary excommunication by Pope Innocent II. The

reputation which the Theologia gained among Abaelard's

contemporaries has tended to cloud understanding of the work

itself.

Abaelard's principal intention in the Theologia is to present

rational analogies and arguments which illuminate the

Christian doctrine of God as a trinity of divine persons co-

existing in a unity of essence. His central theme, supported by

the authority of the Old Testament and of classical philosophy,

is that ‘Father’, 'Son' and 'Holy Spirit' are names which signify

different properties or attributes in God: his power, his wisdom

and his benignity or goodness towards creation. The

relationship between the three persons of the Trinity can be

compared, he argues, to that between these three attributes.

Implicit to his approach is an assumption that God reveals

himself through human reason and that through rational

reflection man can gain some understanding of his Creator.

While his argument from authority remained substantially

unchanged through every version of the Theologia, his

philosophical argument underwent continuous modification,

not least in the face of the controversy which it aroused. His

critics assumed that he was implying that the Son and Holy

Spirit did not share fully in the omnipotence of the Father.

Abaelard's response was to insist that he was formulating

analogies rather than definitions of the Trinity, whose true

identity could never be adequately captured in human speech."

(p. 15, a note omiited)

ìtalian translation: Pietro Abelardo, Teologia del sommo bene,

testo latino a fronte, a cura di Marco Rossini, Milano: Rusconi

1996.

French translation: Abélard, Du bien suprême, Paris: Vrin

1978.

3. ———. 1969. "Theologia christiana." In Petri Abaelardi Opera

Theologica II. Theologia christiana. Theologia scholarium

(recensiones breviores). Capitula haeresum Petri Abaelardi,

edited by Buytaert, Eligius, 69–372. Turnhout: Brepols.

TChr = Theologia Christiana in all its forms.

Date of composition: (c.1122-26).

"The Theologia Christiana has been published, more or less

completely, three times. The editio princeps is of E. Marténe

and U. Durand, Thesaurus nouus anecdotorum, t. V, Paris,

1717, col. 1139-1156 (Introduction of Marténe), and 1155-1360

(text of Abelard). Marténe used the only codex known to him,

viz. the one of Marmoutiers-Tours, and consequently the end of

the work is missing. The editor erroneously completed TChr in

a few instances. We saw that to the annotations of TChr belong

parallel texts copied from TSch and indicated with some sort of

an incipit and explicit only. When Marténe discovered the

abbreviated parallel texts, he did not hesitate to fill the gap

between the incipit and explicit by copying from the Theologia

'Scholarium' as edited by Duchesne.

The deficiencies of the edition are mainly a consequence of the

fact that it is based upon only one manuscript, and then a codex

in which Abelard's annotations were joined to the work

according to three or four different systems. Marténe did not,—

or simply could not, under the circumstances,—understand the

riddle of the annotations of TChr. He even complicated the

problem by omitting practically all the annotations which had

been written in the margin of T, and by assigning the wrong

place to a section which was already in a poor state in T, namely

V, 28-35 with their annotations.

J. P. Migne, PL 178, Paris, 1855, col. 1113-1124 (Introduction of

Marténe), and 1123-1330 (text of Abelard), gave a rather

faithful reproduction of the editio princeps. Even the material

disposition of the annotations is an imitation of Marténe. Thus

Migne did not add to the confusion.

The third edition was due to V. Cousin and C. Jourdain, Petri

Abaelardi opera hactenus seorsim edita, t. IL, Paris, 1859, p.

357-566 (main text as in Marténe), and p. 804-809

(fragments)." (pp. 23-24)

"TChr, then, is an original work on God triune. In its

fundamental inspiration it is more ‘Christian’ than some more

recent theological text-books, which in their “Tractatus de Deo

uno’ seem to forget entirely that Blessed Trinity does exist.

TChr is a ‘theology’ in the patristic sense of the word.

But so are TSum and TSch. Hence, the relationship between the

three works must be considered. Before this is done, let it be

mentioned that later in this Introduction it will beproved that

TChr chronologically follows upon the second redaction of

TSum, but precedes the first redaction of tsch, and that at least

some annotations of the last redaction of TChr depend upon

the third redaction of TSch." (p. 28)

English translation: abbreviated translation by J. R. McCallum,

Abelard’s Christian Theology, Merrick, NY: Richwood 1948

(reprinted 1976).

4. ———. 1987. "Theologia 'Scholarium'." In Petri Abaelardi

Opera Theologica III. Theologia 'summi boni'. Theologia

'scholarium', edited by Buytaert, Eligius and Mews, Constant

J., 309–549. Turnhout: Brepols.

tsch = Theologia ‘Scholarium’, the two short redactions.

TSch = Theologia ‘Scholarium’, third, third annotated, and

fourth redactions.

Date of composition: first redaction before 1130.

"The version of the Theologia most familiar to Peter Abaelard's

contemporaries was the Theologia ‘Scholarium’ — also known

as the Introductio ad theologiam or simply as the Theologia,

the title used by Abaelard himself. (!) Attitudes to the work

varied greatly. Peter Lombard quoted from it extensively

(without acknowledgement) in his IV Libri sententiarum.

Bernard of Clairvaux judged it to be a viper's nest of heretical

doctrine.

In order to arrive at a balanced judgement of the Theologia

‘Scholarium’, it is clearly necessary to understand what

Abaelard was trying to achieve in this version of his treatise.

The Theologia ‘Scholarium’ contains Abaelard's most mature

reflections on the nature of the Trinity and of God's action in

the world. It deserves to be studied as such.

I. The work

Abaelard's principal intention in the Teología ‘Scholarium’ is to

place discussion of God as a trinity of persons within the

context of the faith through which human salvation can be

attained. He opens the work with summary definitions of faith,

charity and sacrament, the three elements which he identifies

as essential to salvation. While all three need to be discussed (L

9: *de singulis diligentius agendum est"), he concentrates in the

Theologia ‘Scholarium’ on faith, “the foundation of all good

things", in the divine nature.

(...)

The second book of TSch opens with a long defence of Christian

study of pagan writers. Abaelard appeals to the 'authority of

Augustine, Jerome and Gregory, against those who use these

very same authors to deprecate interest in secular wisdom (II,

1-60). He justifies the writing of a treatise about Christian faith

by pointing to the many doubts and questions which the

Fathers had failed to answer (II, 61).

(...)

Abaelard's major new argument in book two of the Theologia

‘Scholarium" is a suggestion that the Trinity is like the bronze

seal.

The three divine persons are related to each other in the same

way as are the attributes of being bronze (es), of being a thing

able to seal (sigillabile) and of sealing (sigillans) in a bronze

seal. This analogy has the advantage of illustrating as well the

operation of divine grace. God stamps his image on man in the

way that a king stamps his image onto wax. As in earlier

versions of the Theologia, Abaelard holds that men and women

can gain some rational understanding of the trinitarian nature

of God, even if they can never comprehend it fully, through

reflection on the divine power, wisdom and goodness manifest

in the world.

In the third book Abaelard reflects further on the nature of God

as the supreme good and as the rational basis to all creation

(III, 1-17). He then analyses what is meant by God's

omnipotence (18-82), his wisdom (83-116) and his goodness

(117-120) in relationship to what happens in the world, above

all in relation to the mystery of evil. Abaelard is convinced that

there is a reason for all things, even if this reason seems to be

impenetrable to human understanding." (pp. .203-204)

(1) The title Theologia ‘Scholarium’ was coined by H.

Ostendler, Die Teología ‘Scholarium’ des Peter Abaelards, in

Aus der Geisteswelt des Mittelalters, BGPTMA,

Supplementband 3.1, 1935, p. 263-81. Hitherto it had been

known as the Introductio ad theologiam, the title applied by

Duchesne in 1616; see above, p. 18-19.

5. ———. 1969. "Theologia scholarium (recensiones breviores)." In

Petri Abaelardi Opera Theologica II. Theologia christiana.

Theologia scholarium (recensiones breviores). Capitula

haeresum Petri Abaelardi, edited by Buytaert, Eligius, 401–

451. Turnhout: Brepols.

"The relations between TChr and tsch-TSch are quite different.

First, tsch which corresponds to the Prologue and Book I, 1-126

of TSch, copied irregularly TChr I, 6-37, much more regularly I,

38-70 ; it took some stray elements from TChr II-IV, altogether

not more than parts of six paragraphs.

As to TSch I, it was copied irregularly from TChr I, 6-37, more

regularly from I, 38-136; substantial sections of TChr II-IV are

to be found in TSch II, namely TChr II, 1-13 and 117-125, TChr

III, 119-142, and TChr IV, 116-160. Of the same Books II-IV

loose elements are to be found in TSch Prologue, and Book I.

TChr V, 1-30 corresponds to TSch III, 1-29, but from there on

both works go their own way. TSch, consequently, treated TChr

rather freely, and by liberating itself largely from TChr III-IV, it

is also quite independent of TSum II-III." (p. 28)

6. ———. 1969. "Commentaria in Epistolam Pauli ad Romanos."

In Opera Theologica. I. Commentaria in Epistolam Pauli ad

Romanos; Apologia contra Bemardum, edited by Buytaert,

Eligius, 41–340. Turnhout: Brepols.

"Nature of the Work

'The Commentary is divided into a Prologue and four Books.

The division into Books is rather artificial. Compared to the

modern division of the Epistle to the Romans, the Commentary

proper is divided as follows:

Lib. I = Rom. I, 1 - III, 18

Lib. II = Rom. III, 19 - VI, 18;

Lib. III = Rom. VI, 19 - IX, 5;

Lib. IV = Rom. IX 6 - XVI 27:

The Commentary of Abelard is a literal interpretation of the

Epistle as it was understood in those days, but with a good

many theological or theologico-exegetical questions

interspersed. The originality of the Commentary resides more

in the questions inserted than in its exegesis proper." (p. 16)

Date of composition: (1134-1138) "In summary, then, the

Commentary was composed after Sermon III, after Epist. VII,

and after the third redaction of the Theologia ‘Scholarium’.

Some of the additions to Comm. Rom., at least, presuppose

Sermon XXIV. On the other hand, the Commentary has been

written before TSch III, 106-120 (the oldest section composed

for the fourth redaction of the Theologia 'Scholarium'), and

consequently, before the first draft of the Ethica, which

presupposes the existence of TSch III, 106-120; moreover, the

Comm. Rom. explicitly refers to the Ethica as to a work still in

the planning stage. The Commentary was also composed

before the Liber sententiarum attributed to Abelard, since this

last work copied from the Comm. Rom. Possibly between the

Liber and the Commentary the composition of the Tropologia

took place." (p. 36)

(...)

"...we must conclude that the Commentary was redacted not

later than 1137, and after the full third redaction of the

Theologia ‘Scholarium’ I-III." (p. 37)

First editions: "Of the Commentary there are three complete

editions, but the last two depend solely on the first, and not

directly on one or more manuscripts, not even on the

manuscript of the editio princeps. They are:

1. A. Duchesne uel F. D’Amboise, Petri Abaelardi... opera,

Paris, 1616, pp. 491-725. The editio princeps is really the work

of Duchesne alone, as stated by both Duchesne and d’Amboise

(21), and it was based on one manuscript only: the lost codex of

Mont-Saint-Michel." (p. 14)

(...)

"2. J. P. Migne, Patrologia latina, vol. CLXXVIII, Paris, 1855,

col. 783A-978D. Migne reproduced the editio princeps, with

the following changes. He adapted the spellings to the system of

the Patrologia; the marginal notes of Duchesne were either

introduced into the text (references to the chapters of the

Epistle to the Romans; a few corrections proposed — and

printed — by Duchesne), or became footnotes; others (the

marginal notes of the manuscript) were omitted." (pp. 15-16)

(...)

"3. V. Cousin, adiuuante C. Jourdain, Petri Abaelardi opera

hactenus seorsim edita, vol. II, Paris, 1859, p. 152-356.

This is a second reproduction of the edition of Duchesne

without the benefit of manuscripts, although done with greater

care than the reprint of Migne. Again the marginal notes of

Duchesne are rather footnotes here, and some citations have

been identified." (p. 16)

English translation: Peter Abelard, Commentary on the Epistle

to the Romans, translated by Steven R. Cartwright,

Washington, D.C.; The Catholic University Press of America

2011.

"The major subjects of each book are as follows:

Prologue: Functions of the Old and New Testament, the

purpose of the epistle, modus tractandi, question on the

conversion of the Romans, the epistle’s place in the Pauline

corpus.

Book I: Human and divine natures of Christ, the Trinity,

circumcision, intention, reason, natural law, philosophy, Jews

and Gentiles.

Book II: Righteousness, redemption, necessity of baptism,

grace, circumcision, original sin, the death of Christ and his

immunity from sin.

Book III: Love and charity, the nature of the law, grace,

redemption, consent, concupiscence, the Holy Spirit,

predestination, Christ’s incarnation and death.

Book IV: Predestination, election, grace, mercy, righteousness,

faith, conscience, Jews and Gentiles, prayer, love, scripture,

women in the Church." (p. 13, a note omitted)

7. ———. 1936. "Abbreviatio commentariorum Petri Abaelardi in

Epistolam ad Romanos." Bohoslavia no. 31:7–45.

First edition: Arthur M. Landgraf, ‘Petri Abaelardi Expositionis

in Epistolam S. Pauli ad Romanos Abbreviatio’, Bohoslavia, 31,

1936, pp. 7–45.

Date of composition: 1130s or later.

8. ———. 2004. "Expositio in Hexameron." In Petri Abaelardi

Opera theologica V. Expositio in Hexameron; Abbreviatio

Petri Abaelardi Expositionis in Hexameron, edited by Romig,

Mary Foster, Luscombe, David and Burnett, Charles S. F.

Turnhout: Brepols.

Date of compositon: probably 1130s.

First critical edition: Mary Foster Romig, A Critical Edition of

Peter Abelard’s “Expositio in Hexameron", unpublished Ph. D.

dissertation, 1981 available at ProQuest Dissertation ref. n.

DP28768.

"A rich and venerable tradition underlies Peter Abelard's

Expositio in Hexameron. The hexameron as a literary genre is a

commentary on the six days of creation as told in Genesis,

based on either or both of the creation stories.(1) The Greek

word used for these commentaries indicates their origin in the

Hellenistic East where Christian hexameral writing began,

following the works of Philo Judaeus and Josephus.(2) Some

Syriac influence can be seen in the work of Basil, who wrote the

first true hexameron.(3) Here, the commentary follows the

creation story verse by verse instead of being focused on only

one particular aspect such as the creation of man.

Ambrose, who wrote the first Latin hexameron, leaned heavily

on Basil's work, which was later translated into Latin by

Eustathius in the fifth century.(4)" (p. XII)

(1) Strictly speaking, this word should be spelled 'hexaemeron',

but for reasons of economy I have Anglicized the spelling. Note

also that I use the Anglicized 'Abelard' even though the

inscription on MS A reads Abaelardi, to conform with recent

usage. Although there are some twelfth-century poems which

indicate that his name had five syllables, Luscombe has found

thirty-seven different medieval forms of his name. For that

reason I chose a simple and well-known spelling. See D. E.

Luscombe, The School of Peter Abelard (Cambridge, 1969), p.

315. For an example of the poetry, see Peter Dronke, Abelard

and Heloise in Medieval Testimonies (Glasgow, 1976), pp. 50-

51.

(2) 2A good survey, unfortunately weighted toward the Greek

background and the earlier middle ages, is given by F. E.

Robbins, The Hexameral Literature (Chicago, 1912).

A forthcoming Ph.D. dissertation by Gunar Freibergs on the

medieval hexameron should remedy this deficiency. [The

medieval latin hexameron from Bede to Grosseteste,

University of Southern California, 1981]

(3) Basil, Hexaemeron, PG 29:3-208. (All PL and PG listings

are given as volume-column.) Abelard did not appear to have

been acquainted directly with the Latin paraphrase of this work

made by Eustathius, PL 53:867-966.

Abelard seemed to be echoing Basil when he likened the action

of the Holy Spirit 'brooding' over the waters in Gen. 1:2 to that

of a hen brooding over her eggs. This similarity caused Dronke

to attribute Abelard's imagery to Basil's direct influence. (See

Peter Dronke, Fabula [Leiden, 1974], p. 94 and note 3.) But this

same idea is imparted by Augustine in De Genesi ad litteram

1.2, ed. J. Zycha, CSEL, vol. 27, part 1, p. 27. It is paraphrased

by Abelard on pages 14-15 of the present edition.

(4) Ambrose, Exaemeron, ed. C. Schenkl, CSEL, vol. 32, part 1.

Ambrose did not copy Basil's Hexaemeron, but edited it and

added some ideas of his own.

English translation: Peter Abelard, An Exposition on the Six-

day Work, Introduction, translation and notes by Wanda

Zemler-Cizewski, Turnhout: Brepols 2011.

"Summary,

In his prologue, Abelard addresses Heloise and her spiritual

daughters as his intended readers, explaining that at her

request,he has undertaken the difficult task of commenting on

the literal sense of Genesis.

(...)

"Abelard announces at the beginning of his commentary that he

will offer historical, moral, and mystical interpretations, but

intends to ground his reading primarily in history, or the “truth

of things done.” He then offers an accessus ad auctorem(8) in

the manner current among cathedral school interpreters of

ancient texts: the prophetic author is identified as Moses; the

author’s intention is to entice the newly liberated Israelites into

knowledge and service of God, their Creator; the subject matter

or materia of the text is, in a suitable pun, the material world

itself, as it is created and set in order over the course of six

days." (è. 12)

(8) E. A. Quain, “The Medieval Accessus ad auctorem,” in

Traditio 3, 1945, pp. 215-264.

9. ———. 2004. "Abbreviatio Petri Abaelardi Expositionis in

Hexameron." In Petri Abaelardi Opera theologica V. Expositio

in Hexameron; Abbreviatio Petri Abaelardi Expositionis in

Hexameron, edited by Romig, Mary Foster, Luscombe, David

and Burnett, Charles S. F., 135–150. Turnhout: Brepols.

Date of composition: 1130 (?)

Summary: "These two editions present Peter Abelard's

Exposition of the Biblical Hexameron and a work which is a

shorter version of this and which is usually called an

Abbreviation. In his Exposition, which is much influenced by

the commentaries of St Augustine, Abelard gives priority to the

historical and literal sense and attempts a naturalistic

explanation of the process of creation while retaining symbolic

and moral interpretations. Like his contemporaries, William of

Conches and Thierry of Chartres, Abelard shows an especial

interest in Plato's Timaeus, in chaos theory, in the four

elements, and in the anima mundi. But his Exposition is also a

profoundly religious work. The manuscripts and the

contributions of their various scribes are closely examined in an

Introduction in which the possibility is considered that one of

these scribes may be Abelard himself. Additions and changes

made by the scribes are printed in different types in the edition

which follows. A separate Introduction assesses the nature of

the Abbreviation and compares it with the Exposition. The two

editions were begun by Mary Romig+ and Charles Burnett

respectively. They have been prepared for publication by David

Luscombe."

10. Burnett, Charles S. F. 1985. "Expositio Orationis Dominicae

'ultorum legimus orationes'." Revue Bénédictine no. 95:60–72.

Edited in Charles F, Burnett, The 'Expositio Orationis

Dominicae 'Multorum legimus orationes', Abelard's Exposition

of the Lord's Prayer?

"Abelard's authentic commentary on the Lord's Prayer, based

on the text using supersubstantialem rather than cotidianum,

distinct from that erroneously printed among his works."

(Constant J. Mews, Peter Abelard, Aldershot: Ashgate 1985, p.

60)

First edition: A. Duchesne uel F. D’Amboise, Petri Abaelardi...

opera, Paris, 1616, pp. 611-616.

11. ———. 1986. "‘Confessio fidei ad Heloisam’ - Abelard’s Last

Letter to Heloise?: a Discussion and Critical Edition of the

Latin and Medieval French Versions." Mittellateinisches

Jahrbuch no. 21:147–155.

First edition: A. Duchesne uel F. D’Amboise, Petri Abaelardi...

opera, Paris, 1616, pp. 308-309; Quae est Petri Abailardi fidei

confessio, ad Heloissam, coll. 376-378 of Migne edition.

Date of composition: 1140 (Constant J. Mews, Peter Abelard,

Aldershot: Ashgate 1996, p. 62.

English translations: pp. 154-155.

Abelard Confession of Faith, in Abelard and Heloise, The

Letters and Other Writings, Translated with Introduction and

Notes, by William Levitan, Indianapolis: Hackett 2007, pp.

260-261.

12. ———. 1986. "Peter Abelard, Confessio fidei Universis. A

Critical Edition of Abelard's Reply to Accusations of Heresy."

Mediaeval Studies no. 48:111–138.

Latin text pp. 132-138.

"In the Confessio fidei Universis Abelard replies to each of

seventeen of the capitula under which his heresies had been

listed in the Capitula haeresum XIX attached to St. Bernard of

Clairvaux, Epistola 190 ad Innocentium papam, with a brief

statement of the orthodoxy of his belief. A much more detailed

and scholarly reply to the same capitula (in addition to the two

which have been omitted in the Confessio fidei 'Universis')

appears to have been the subject of Abelard's Apologia, of

which we have only the opening section and fragments

preserved in Thomas of Morigny's answer to that work.(3) The

verbal similarities between the two works suggest that they

were composed in the same circumstances.(4) In both works

Abelard refutes the allegation in the Capitula haeresum xix that

the propositions listed are to be found in his Theologia, his

Scito te ipsum (Ethica) and his Sententiae (a work whose

composition he denies). In both works also he brings together

the same authorities to show that he has a right and a duty to

defend himself. However, there are important differences." (pp.

111-112, a note omitted)

(1) This title has become conventional, but is not given in the

earliest and best manuscripts (see below, p. 131). Lest there

should be any confusion between this work and the Confessio

fidei ad Heloissam (PL 178.37 5-78), the latter work will always

be referred to by its full title; the word Confessio on its own,

therefore, will refer only to the Confessio fidei 'Universis'.

(3) Ed. Buytaert, [Opera Theologica] I 341-68.

(4) For the parallels see the first section of the apparatus

beneath the text, edited below.

Date of composition: 1140 ca.

First edition: A. Duchesne uel F. D’Amboise, Petri Abaelardi...

opera, Paris, 1616, Apologia seu fidei confessio, coll. 106-108.

13. Peter, Abelard. "Expositio Symboli Apostolorum." In.

Edited by Victor Cousin and Charles Jourdain, Petri Abaelardi

opera Vol. 1, Paris 1849, pp. 603–615.

A Commentary on the Apostles' Creed.

14. ———. "Expositio fidei in symbolum Athanasii."

Edited by Victor Cousin and Charles Jourdain, Petri Abaelardi

opera Vol. 1, Paris 1849, pp. 615–617.

15. ———. 1969. "Apologia contra Bernardum." In Opera

Theologica. I. Commentaria in Epistolam Pauli ad Romanos;

Apologia contra Bemardum, edited by Buytaert, Eligius, 359–

368. Turnhout: Brepols.

"Manuscripts of the complete Apologia are not known. We

have only a codex of Munich, containing the beginning of the

work, and the Disputatio contra Petrum Abaelardum of

Thomas of Morigny preserved in a Budapest codex, which

contains a few fragments of the Apologia, partly identical with

the large fragment of Munich. Consequently, in this

Introduction we must speak only of two manuscripts." (p. 343)

Date of composition: "Written before the synod of Sens, but

after Thomas of Morigny settled in Paris, the Disputatio

[contra Petrum Abaelardum] must have been composed

around Easter, 1140, and the Apologia contra Bernardum

somewhat earlier, say during the second half of 1139, of during

the winter 1139-1140. It must have been sometime before

Easter 1140, because it is unlikely that the Apologia went

straight from the desk of Abelard to that of Thomas.

On the other hand, it must have been not earlier than the

second half of 1139, since Bernard entered the fight actively

only after Easter 1139 (46)" (p. 355)

(46) Cf. General Introduction, supra, XI.

First edition: "Apologia contra Bernardum, of which the

incipit was known through Otto of Freising, and of which P. Ruf

discovered and edited a substantial fragment, namely the first

part of the Apologia. Smaller extracts, not all found in the

fragment of Munich, were preserved by the Disputatio contra

Petrum Abaelardum of Thomas of Morigny.(21)"

(21) New edition of both, at the end of the present volume, p.

559-368.

References

Paul Ruf, Martin Grabmann, Ein neu aufgefundenes

Bruchstück der Apologia Abaelards, Sitzungsberichte der

Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1930, Heft 5.

The Work: "Upon receiving a copy of the accusations which

Bernard of Clairvaux levelled against him, Abelard wanted to

defend himself. Dispensing himself from writing a useless

prologue, Abelard first intended to reproduce the list of

accusations and subsequently to answer them (n. 1). He copied

verbatim the ‘capitula’ of Bernard (n. 2), adding even the

concluding phrase in which it is stated from which works of

Abelard the accusations have been lifted, — to which Abelard

rejoined that the phrases are not to be found in his work and

that an inauthentic work had been used (n. 3). Realizing that

this general refutation would not suffice to defend his

reputation, Abelard mentioned that he would answer all the

accusations individually, following the order of Bernard’s list

(n. 4)." (pp. 350-351)

Bibliography

Rodney M Thomson, Michael Winterbottom (eds.), For and

Against Abelard: The invective of Bernard of Clairvaux and

Berengar of Poitiers, Woodbridge: The Boydell Press,

Woodbridge 2020.

16. Boyer, Blanche B., and McKeon, Richard, eds. 1976. Peter

Abailard. Sic et Non: A Critical Edition. Chicago: The

University of Chicago Press.

Date of composition: first draft 1121; revisions 1121-1126; final

version 1127-1132.

"In 1836 Victor Cousin rescued from the obscurity which had

prevailed against it for almost seven hundred years, the Sic et

Non of Peter Abailard. Having discovered, in the libraries of

Avranches and Tours, two manuscripts containing the work, he

published brief descriptions of each and edited from them

extensive portions of text.(1)

These consisted of the Prologus, questions 1 through 39 and

twenty-nine others, interspersed with the titles of the rest. To

the whole, Cousin appended an Index Quaestionum numbering

157(2). In a few footnotes he verified, or questioned, the

attribution of citations passim and reported textual

peculiarities of the manuscripts.

The latter are concrete evidence of a singular disparity in form

and content which he analyzed cursorily in describing the two.”

(p. 1)

(...)

"A third manuscript of the Sic et Non came to light in 1851

through the publication by Dom Luigi Tosti of Storia di

Abelardo e dei suoi tempi. Emulating the procedure of Cousin,

and in terms of comparison with Cousin's MSS, Tosti described

a MS of Monte Cassino and printed under the caption "Alcuni

capi finora inediti . . 2” nine questions, nos. 25-30 and 34-36 in

the sequence of that codex. Also he drew up comparative

indices of questions (Argumenta capitum . . .) as read in it and

as listed by Cousin, interpolating notice of contradictions in

order and matter among the 87 items of the one. and the 157 of

the other.)

(...)

The first--and only--complete edition of 158 questions

appeared, by regrettable coircidence, in the same year as Tosti's

publication. This was based on still another MS, one which had

come from the monastery of Tegernsee in 1804 to Munich,

where its presence was subsequently publicized by the editor of

Abailard's Epitome theologiae Christianae.(7) There was no

real collation of this manuscript with any of the others, but to

correct its deficiencies, the editors, Henke and Lindenkohl,

referred to Cousin's printed account of the two French

manuscripts." (pp. 2-3)

(1) Victor Cousin, Ouvrages inédits d'Abélard pour servir à

l'histoire de la scolastique en France (Paris 1836), pp. clxxxvi-

clxxxix 3-169.

(2) Cousin overlooked completely the presence of q. 127 in both

MSS; in the Turonensis (ff. 114v-115r) without a heading but

with a space left for the insertion of omne, whereas in the

Abrincensis the title stands not in its proper place at the head of

the question (ff. 190r-191r) but below the last line of text on f£.

189v. Consequently Cousin's list of 157 questions is short by

one, and to all numbers after q. 126 one digit should be added.

The correct numbering is here substituted for Cousin's in all

references to questions following q. 126.

(7) Epitome theologiae Christianae, ed. Frid. Henr. Rheinwald,

Anecdota ad historiam ecclesiasticam pertinentia, particula ii,

(Berolini 1835), reprinted in Migne, Patrologia Latina 178,

Praefatio, col. 1694, n. 1.

English translation: YES AND NO: Peter Abelard's SIC ET

NON, translated by Priscilla Throop, Charlotte, VT:

MedievalMS, 2007.

Italian translation of the Prologue: Pietro Abelardo. Pro e

Contro. Il Prologo del Sic et Non, raduzione e cura di Riccardo

Mazzarol, Rho (MI): Ati Editore 2011.

17. Peter, Abelard. 1958. "Secundum Magistrum Petrum

Sententie." In Twelfth Century Logic: Texts and Studies. Vol

II: Abelardiana inedita, edited by Minio-Paluello, Lorenzo,

109–122. Roma: Edizioni di Storia e Letteratura.

Date of composition: probably mid-1120s.

"The short text which appears under the title of " Secundum M.

Petrum sententie " in a collection of logical writings originally

belonging to the library of the monastery at Fleury (cod.

Orleans 266, pp. 278-281) is fragmentary.

(...)

"The text clearly consists of two sections, in no way

distinguished from each other in the manuscript. The first

contains the analysis of a paralogism; the second, four

problems arising from the use of 'totum', and their solutions. It

is conceivable that the second section originated in the study of

- or might even be extracted from a commentary on - Boethiu's

De divisione, which is partly concerned with 'totum' and

includes more than once examples referring to the part of a

house. But their is nothing in the first section of the Sententie

to suggest that it may belong to such a work, or indeed that it is

part of the same work as the second section. There is, however,

much in common between the two sections: the concepts used

and the methods applied for the solution of logical difficulties

arc the same: much turns, in both sections, on the distinction

between the " personal " and the "ad sensum" reference of

words, or, roughly speaking, between the reference to

individual things and the reference to concepts. Again, much

use is made of logical " regule " in both sections. These common

characteristics do not necessarily point to unity of work, but

rather to the interest which caused the compiler to connect

these two sections in one text.

This text can be tentatively ascribed to Abailard. It is found in

the midst of writings by Jocelyn (Goslenus) and other,

anonymous, masters of the first half and middle of the twelfth

century. Mention is made, in some of these texts, of Magister

Petrus, Magister P ., Magister Guido, Magister Ulgerius,

Magister Goslenus, Magister W., Magister Walterus, Magister

Galterius. It is well known that Abailard is often referred to as "

Magister Petrus ", particularly in texts of logic; and there is no

evidence that any other logician of that time was being referred

to in that way. Abailard is often concerned with the distinction

between personal and " ad sensum " reference; some at least of

the examples used for this purpose in the Sententie are used by

Abailard in his commentary on the De interpretatione.(23)

'Petrus' is used as an example both in the Sententie and in

Abailard's works.(24) An inexact reference to Boethius ("

naturam dicit similitudinem rerum nascentium ") is found in

our text and, twice, in the Logica 'Ingredientibus' .(25) There is

nothing in the style of the Sententie which could easily be

shown to be alien to Abailard's style." (Introduction, pp.

XXXIX-XLI)

(23) E. g., "mulier quc dampnavit salvavit" is an example of

double reference for relative pronouns, here (p. 118.4-5) and in

the commentary on the De interpretatione (397.a Geyer);

water, referred to by the

" demonstrative " pronoun " tu ", is another example in both

places (119.9. 14 here, and 397.16 ff. in that commentary)

;."Socrates est quod ipse est" occurs, in similar circumstances,

here (118.20-21) and there (397.23 ff).

(24) E.g. 327.21,31 Geyer; 54.s, 130.1-20 etc. De Rijlk.

(25) Pp. 57.29 and 315.21 Geyer.

18. ———. 1929. Sententiae Florianenses, nunc primum edidit,

prolegomenis, apparatu critico, notis instruxit Henricus

Ostlender. Bonn: Peter Hanstein.

Date of composition: probably mid-1130s.

"It is in the teaching recorded in the collections of Sententie

that he explores [the programme outlined at the beginning of

the Theologia Scholarium,] systematically. Three main

collections of Abelardian Sententie are known: the Sententie

Abaelardi (or, as they will usually be called here for brevity,

simply the Sententie; some scholars refer to them as the

Sententie Hermanni)' the Sententie Florianenses and the

Sententie Parisienses. The Sententie Abaelardi were printed

nearly two centuries ago, but doubts about their authenticity

have prevented many scholars from realizing their true value as

a witness to Abelard's comprehensive theological system.

It has been thought that they were based at second-hand on a

lost, much extended version of the Theologia Scholarium;(29)

or, more recently, that they and also the Sententie Florianenses

and Sententie Parisienses, were all derived from the (now lost)

Liber sententiarum mentioned by St Bernard, which itself was

taken from Abelard's oral teaching.(30) Constant Mews,

however, has now demonstrated that, except for a revised

version of the Sententie Abaelardi, all three collections date

back to the period (c. 1132-5) when Abelard was still working to

produce the first full version of his Theologia Scholarium, and

that they give a direct and accurate account of his teaching.

The Liber sententiarum mentioned by St Bernard is a different,

later report of Abelard's teaching. According to Mews, the

Sententie Abaelardi are an official reportatio of Abelard's

lectures, corrected and revised by Abelard himself, whilst the

other two collections are unofficial accounts of his oral

teaching. Perhaps this is, to some extent, an oversimplification;

but there is little doubt that the Sententie Abaelardi give an

accurate digest Abelard's teaching, whilst parts of the Sententie

Parisienses preserve the give and take of discussion in

Abelard's classes." (John Marenbon, The Philosophy of Peter

Abelard, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1997, pp. 62-

63, some notes omitted)

(29) Heinrrich Denifle, Die Sentenzen [Abaelards und die

Bearbeitungen seiner Theologia vor Mitte des 12. Jhs.', Archiv

f. Litteratur- und Kirchengeschichte 1 (1885) 402-69, 584-624.

[

(30) H. Ostlender, 'Die Sentenzbiicher der Schule Abaelards',

Theologische Quartalschrift 117 (1936), 208-52. For Bernard's

references to the Liber sententiarum, see Ep. 188 and 190, pp.

11: 15, 40: 9-10). William of St Thierry mentions what seems to

be this work, without naming it, in his letter to Bernard (p. 377:

28-9). Abelard, however, writes in Conf. fid. 'Universis', 138: 5:

'nusquam liber aliquis qui sententiarum dicatur a me scriptus

repperiatur'; cf. Apologia 360: 34 - 361: 43.

19. ———. 1934. "Sententie Parisienses." Spicilegium Sacrum

Lovaniense. Etudes et documents no. 34:3–60.

Date of composition: probably mid-1130s.

"A course of theology is preserved in three versions, known as

the Sententiae Florianenses, the Sententiae Parisienses and the

Sententiae Abaelardi (which used to be known as the

Sententiae Hermanni). These all used to be considered works

by Abelard’s pupils, but they are now generally accepted as

reports of Abelard’s own lectures: the Sententiae Parisienses

give the impression of largely uncorrected notes, which convey

the vivacity of classroom discussion, whereas the Sententiae

Abaelardi seem to be a careful presentation of the teaching,

perhaps corrected and authorized by Abelard himself.(31)"

John Marenbon, Abelard if Four Dimensions, Notre Dame;

University of Notre Dame Press 2013, p. 22)

20. Buzzetti, Sandro, ed. 1983. Sententie magistri Petri Abelardi

(Sententie Hermanni). Firenze: La Nuova Italia.

Date of composition: probably mid-1130s.

Crtical edition: Opera theologica, 6. Sententie - Liber

Sententiarum, pp. 5–152, edite by D. M. Luscombe.

21. Peter, Abelard. 2007. "Liber sententiarum Magistri Petri

[Abaelardi] (fragmenta in aliis scriptis servata)." In Petri

Abaelardi Opera theologica VI. Sententie - Liber

Sententiarum, edited by Luscombe, David E. and Mews ,

Constant J., 162–171. Turnhout Brepols.

Date of composition: (late 1130s).

A reportatio of Abelard’s theological teaching, quoted by his

critics but repudiated by him. Reconstructed from works

attacking Abelard. Edited by C. J. Mews.

22. ———. 1992. "Positio vocum sententiae." Traditio no. 47:66–

73.

Appendix to Yukio Iwakuma, Vocales, or Early Nominalists

(pp. 37-111).

An anonymous discussion of the predication of terms, and of

the nature of identity and difference.

23. ———. 1983. "Ordinale Paraclitense." In The Old French

Paraclete Ordinary and the Paraclete. Vol II, edited by

Waddell, Chrysogonus. Gethsemany Abbey, Kentucky:

Trappist.

The Ordinal reflects the liturgical provisions of Abelard and

contains his arrangement of the Calendar and choice of

scriptural readings.

24. ———. 1987. The Paraclete Statutes. Institutiones Nostrae.

Introduction, Edition, Commentary,. Getshemani Abbey,

Kentucky: Trappist.

"Only one extant manuscript is known to contain the minuscule

text of Institutiones nostrae. This is the almost certainly best

known of all the manuscripts familiar to scholars of

Abelardiana, that is, Troyes, Bibliothèque Municipale, ms 802.

Of those manuscripts containing the letters allegedly exchanged

between Abelard and Heloise, this is the earliest (late thirteenth

or. perhaps even early fourteenth century), the most complete

(it alone contains the integral text of the Rule for Nuns

introduced by letter VIII), and textually the best. The letters

and the Rule (ff. 1r-88v) are followed by Institutiones nostrae

(ff. 89r-90v) and a

series of canons and statutes dealing with women religious, and

drawn from disparate sources (ff. 90v-102v). The verso of the

final folio is filled out by a fifteenth- or sixteenth century

transcription of epitaphs of Abelard and Heloise and of Peter

the Venerable's absolution of Abelard." (p. 19)

English translation: The Letters of Heloise and Abelard: A

Translation of Their Collected Correspondence and Related

Wrtings, Translated and edited by Mary Martin McLaughlin

with Bonnie Wheeler, New York: Palgrave Macmillan 2009, pp.

313-315.

25. Heloise, and Peter, Abelard. "Problemata Heloisae cum Petri

Abaelardi Solutionibus." In.

"Abelard’s contacts with Heloise can be used to date a further

set of material. As mentioned above, when Abelard’s Historia

calamitatum came into Heloise’s hands, it began a famous

exchange of letters between the couple. Since the Historia must

have been written in about 1132, these letters, which include a

history of female monasticism (Ep. 7) and Abelard’s Rule for

the Paraclete (Ep. 8), will date from the period immediately

following. The correspondence makes it clear that Abelard had

not been in intellectual contact with Heloise and her nuns in

the period before it began, and so two other works which

Abelard wrote at Heloise’s request—a commentary on the

Hexaemeron and a set of answers to theological questions

posed by her (Problemata Heloissae)—can be confidently dated

to the period after 1132.(37) Although there is no definite latest

date for them, it is probable that they were written before the

Council of Sens.(38) At the time of the Council, Abelard’s

immediate concern was with the accusations against him—his

Apologia contra Bernardum and the two confessions of faith

(one addressed to Heloise) can be dated to this period;

afterwards, his health declined. Abelard also wrote sermons for

the nuns of the Paraclete, and they must be dated to the period

after 1132 and very probably before 1141."

(37) See Comm. Hex., ed. Romig, p. 4, lines 30–35.

(38) Mews (1985b [‘On Dating the Works of Peter Abelard’.

Archives d’histoire doctrinale et littéraire du Moyen Âge

52:73–134], 119–20) puts forward some reasons, which he

himself acknowledges to be less than conclusive, for thinking

that Abelard wrote Comm. Hex. before Comm. Rom.

"The Problemata Heloissae comprises a set of forty-two

“problems” set forth by Heloise and their solutions provided by

Abelard. The questions deal largely with matters of scriptural

interpretation, and several echo the concerns in Heloise’s

better-known letters. I focus here on the prefatory letter that

introduces the Problemata, which shares stylistic similarities

with Heloise’s earlier letters to Abelard. Heloise opens the letter

with an invocation of Jerome’s teachings to Marcella. While her

earlier epistolary overtures proffered a Senecan ethos, her

citation here quite literally declares a Jeromian model, a

performance of her continuing obedience to Abelard’s

injunctions.. She asks, once again, that Abelard write back, but

this time the request is more focused: she wants him to answer

exegetical questions that have arisen for her and her sisters in

the studies he commanded them to pursue. These questions

“disturb” their study and cause them to be “sluggish” in their

reading." (Katherine Kong, Lettering the Self in Medieval and

Early Modern France, Rochester: D. S. Brower 2010, pp. 95-

96, notes omitted)

First edition: Victor Cousin, Opera Petri Abelardi..., Vol, 1, pp.

237-294; also in Migne, Patrologia latina, vol. 178.

Date of composition: probably later 1130s.

English translations:

E. M. McNamer, The Education of Heloise: Methods, Content

and Purpose of Education in the Twelfth Century, Lewiston:

Mellen, 1991, pp. 111–183.

The Letters of Heloise and Abelard: A Translation of Their

Collected Correspondence and Related Writings, Translated

and edited by Mary Martin McLaughlin with Bonnie Wheeler,

New York: Palgrave Macmillan 2009, pp. 213-267.

Abelard's ethical works

1. Peter, Abelard. 2001. Scito te ipsum [Ethica]. Turnhout:

Brepols.

Critical edition with Introduction in German (pp. IX-LIX) by

Rainer M. Ilgner.

Date of composition: (probably late 1130s).

Other critical edition: Peter Abelard's Ethics, an edition with

introduction, English translation and notes by David E.

Luscombe, Oxford: Clarendon Press 1971.

"Abelard entitled his book of ethics Scito te ipsum, Know

Thyself, and elsewhere he referred to this work as his Ethics.(5)

The term ethica often signified in the twelfth century the

rational ethics of the ethici, the pagan moralists.

(...)

Yet Abelard's Scito te ipsum is not a treatise on rational

morality considered in the light of pagan doctrine. In two

books, the second of which survives only in a fragment, Abelard

proposed to study evil and goodness, contempt of God and

obedience to God. In the first book, which is complete, Abelard

considers actual, as distinct from original, sin and also the

remedies for sin-penance, confession, absolution, and

satisfaction. The sources cited are almost exclusively Scriptural

and Patristic; pagan authorities and ideas are much less

evident. Yet the title of this book is justified. Isidore of Seville

had used the word ethica to indicate the four principal virtues

of which prudence consisted in the profession of the true faith

and in the knowledge of the Scriptures according to their

historical, figurative, and spiritual senses.3 Abelard's Ethica is

a theological monograph upon the moral aspects of the

Christian religion. ][tis the counterpart of his Theologia, which

is a theological monograph upon God and the Trinity. As for the

title Scito te ipsum, it serves aptly and allusively to hint at

Abelard's concern for the inner point of view in moral

discussion, the attitudes of a man rather than the nature of his

deeds.

The centre of interest in Abelard's Ethics is the theory of

intention and the definition of sin. Abelard argued, with an

abiding appeal and force, that God thinks not of what is done

but in what mind it is done; merit and praise accrue to a human

agent not for his actions but for his intentions." (Peter

Abelard's Ethics, pp. XXX-XXXII)

(5) See below, p. 130 n. 2.

"Some idea of the remaining or at least of the projected

contents of this second book of the Ethics may well be provided

in two passages in Abelard's Expositio of the Epistle to the

Romans. In the first (Expos. ii. 4; PL 1;8. 84rn-842A) Abelard

reserves three questions for lengthier consideration in the

Ethics. First, since God's gifts are of grace, in what do merits

consist? Secondly, do merits consist in will alone or also in

deed? Thirdly, does virtue, which is not manifested in action,

suffice for beatitude? In the second passage (v. 13; PL 178.

95oc-951A) Abelard reserves to the Ethics a discussion of the

duty to love one's neighbour if he is in hell or destined for hell

and of the question whether one should will what is not good to

be done, e.g. pray for the salvation of all although only a few

will achieve salvation." (p. 130, note 2)

Other English translations:

Abailard's Ethics, Translated with an Introduction by J, Ransay

McCallum. Foreword by Kenneth Kirk, Oxford: Basil Blackwell

1935.

Ethical Writings: His Ethics or “Know Yourself” and His

Dialogue between a Philosopher, a Jew and a Christian,

Translated by Paul Vincent Spade. With an Introduction by

Marilyn McCord Adams, Indianapolis. Hackett 1995, pp. 1-58.

2. ———. 2001. Collationes or Dialogus inter Philosophum,

Iudaeum, et Christianum. New York: Oxford University Press.

Edited and translated by John Marenbon and Giovanni

Orlandi.

"Giovanni Orlandi has been responsible for editing the Latin

text, drawing up the textual apparatus and writing Section X of

the Introduction (on the manuscripts and the transmission of

the text).

John Marenbon has been responsible for the other parts of the

Introduction, the Abstract, the English Translation, the Notes,

and the Indices." (p. VI)

Date of composition: "There have, then, been four main

suggested dates for the Collationes: 1025-7 (Mews's earlier

view); c.1130-c.1137 (Mews' new alternative possibility); c. 1136

(Buytaert); c. 1142 (the traditional view). Which, if any, is

correct?

The terminus post quem of the Collationes is easily established.

In § 78, the Christian refers by name to the Theologia

Christiana. Abelard used this name only for the second main

version of the Theologia that which he made after the

condemnation of the Theologia Summi Boni at Soissons. The

Collationes could not have been written before the Theologia

Christiana was ready, in 1123 at the earliest.

The terminus ante quern is far more difficult to fix. Buytaert

and Mews both try to determine it by reference to the

Commentary on the Hexaemeron, 32 and Mews also tries to

show it by reference to the Commentary on Romans and to

Scito teipsum (the 'Ethics'). (33) None of these attempts

produces a conclusive result." (p. XXVIII)

(,,,)

"To summarize. The Collationes were written after 1123 and

probably before c. 1135, very probably before 1140. The

comparisons with Abelard's other writings which will be made

in the next section suggest (but do not firmly establish) a time

of composition in the middle or the second half of the 1123-35

period. Perhaps the most likely time of all for the Collationes to

have been written would be Abelard's period at St Gildas, that

is, between 1127 and about 1132.

This dating would fit well with the fact that, in form, the

Collationes lack the links with teaching which characterize the

main writings which can be dated to the period at the Paraclete

and those (except the pieces composed for Heloise) of the

second Paris period (c.1132-9)." (p. XXXII)

First edition: Georg Friedrich Heinrich Rheinwald (ed.), Petri

Abaelardi Dialogus inter Philosophum, Judaeum et

Christianum, (Anecdota ad historiam ecclesiasticam

pertinentia, I, Berlin, 1831), reprinted in Patrologia Latina,

clxxviii, col. 1609-82.

Main Translations:

English:

A dialogue of a philosopher with a Jew, and a Christian.

translated by Pierre J. Payer, Toronto: Pontifical Institute of

Mediaeval Studies 1979.

Ethical Writings: His Ethics or "Know yourself" and His

Dialogue between a philosopher, a Jew, and a Christian,

translated by Paul Vincent Spade; with an introduction by

Marilyn McCord Adams, Indianapolis: Hackett 1995, pp. 59-

148.

French:

Œuvres choisies d'Abélard (Logique, Éthique, Dialogue entre

un philosophe, un juif et un chrétien, trad. Maurice de

Gandillac, Paris: Aubier-Montaigne, 1945; repritnt:

Conférences (Dialogue d'un philosophe avec un juif et un

chrétien). Connais-toi toi-même (Éthique), Paris: Éditions du

Cerf, 1993.

Italian:

Dialogo tra un filosofo, un giudeo e un cristiano, trad. Cristina

Trovò, Introduzione di Mria Teresa Beonio Brocchieri

Fumagalli, Milano, Rizzoli 1992.

Other works related to Abelard

1. "Capitula haeresum Petri Abaelardi." In. 1969. Petri Abaelardi

Opera Theologica II. Theologia christiana. Theologia

scholarium (recensiones breviores). Capitula haeresum Petri

Abaelardi, edited by Buytaert, Eligius, 473–480. Turnhout:

Brepols.

"Turning now to the Capitula haeresum, there is no historical

reason to believe that they were compiled by St Bernard. The

little work must date from early in the dispute of 1139-1140,

although there is no evidence that it must be put before

William's [of Saint-Thierry] intervention. Its exclusive use of

TSch and the spurious book of Sentences places it

chronologically close to William. It must have been compiled

before the list of Bernard, because in the Capitula thesis III is

on its regular place (in Bernard’s list it is the 7th). Being older

than Bernard’s, it would explain why in this better known list

proposition 14 is out of order, although Letter 190 shows that

Bernard realizes that it is to be connected with the first theses

of his list. The formulation, then, of the propositions in the

Capitula haeresum would have prepared the way for Bernard

rather than the opposite. In other words, I believe that the have

been compiled around Easter 1139.

There remains, ultimately, the question of the author of the

Capitula haeresum. I think that the compilation is the work of

scholars of the school of Laon, and that the last *capitulum' has

been added by Walter of Mortagne. The latter, indeed, a

longtime resident of Laon, had criticized a few years earlier

Abelard’s first redaction of the Theologia ‘Scholarium’ for the

very same doctrine which we find in thesis XIV, quoting a

text of the said redaction which corresponds to the text of

proposition XIV. Abelard had taken to heart the criticism of

Walter as is attested by the changes he made in the text on

occasion of the second redaction of the Theologia *Scholarium’

(31), The readings of this second redaction remained the same

in the third,—the one attacked by William of Saint-Thierry,—

and Walter on seeing this third redaction must have

been dissatisfied with the changes made. On the other hand,

among the scholars of the school of Laon Abelard had a poor

reputation dating back from the time when he had belittled the

eldery Anselm of Laon (32), the master of the school. As soon

as they knew that Abelard was in trouble again, these scholars

must have been more than willing to contribute to the downfall

of the man they disliked so heartily. (33)." (pp. 466-467)

(31) Epist. ad P. Abaelardum 3; tsch 57.

(32) Hist. calam., ed. J. Monfrin, 68-70.—It might be noted

that Laon belonged to the ecclesiastical province of Reims, and

that William of Saint-Thierry resided at Signy in the diocese of

Reims itself; moreover, that William and Walter were fellow-

countrymen, William being from Liége and Walter from the

vicinity of 'Tournai.

2. Landgraf, Artur Michael, ed. 1937. Commentarius

Cantabrigiensis in epistolas Pauli e schola Petri Abaelardi.

Notre Dame University of Notre Dame.

Written by a disciple of Abelard.

Table of Contents:

1. In epistolam ad Romanos. (pp. 42-223)

2. In epistolam ad Corinthios Iam et IIam, ad Galatas et ad

Ephesios. (pp. 225-446)

3. In epistolam ad Philippenses [etc.] (pp. 447-651)

4. In epistolam ad Hebraeos. (pp. 653-864)

3. Burnett, Charles S. F., and Luscombe, David E. 2005. "A New

Student for Peter Abelard: The Marginalia in British Library

MS Cotton Faustina A. X." In Itinéraires de la raison: Études

de philosophie médiévale offertes à Maria Candida Pacheco,

edited by Meirinhos, José Francisco, 163–186. Turnhout:

Brepols.

Bibliographia. Annotated bibliographies

Raul Corazzon || rc@ontology.co || Info

Bibliography on the Letters of

Abelard and Heloise: English

Studies (First part)

Bibliography

1. Amsler, Mark. 1987. "Genre and Code in Abelard's Historia

Calamitatum." Assays. Critical Approaches to Medieval and

Renaissance Texts no. 1:35–50.

"In what follows I want to elucidate some of the most important

features of the Historia Calamitatum as a narrative text and, in

so doing, indicate how narrative codes can differ from genres.

Reflecting on the Historia, we can perceive three different

though interrelated codes working in the narrative: (1) the

confessional autobiography, archetypally represented in the

Christian tradition by Augustine's Confessiones; (2) the moral

allegorical interpretation of the adultery of Venus and Mars;

and (3) the stereotyped Christian argument against women,

that is, antifeminist discourse. These three discourses

determine the text's narrative structure, but because they are

not always compatible, junctures and paradoxes appear in the

narrative. These impediments are multiplied by the narrator's

use of prolepsis to collapse the narrative line. The narrator

attempts to resolve and transform all these junctures, but the

result is that the resolutions lead to new junctures and

paradoxes.

Students of medieval iconography and allegory will recognize

that the Venus and Mars code is closely connected with the

antifeminist code.

The adultery of Venus and Mars (male virtus corrupted by

female luxuria) was often used as an example to bolster the

argument against women. But the correlation of these two

codes is short-circuited by the Historia's particular realization·

of the genre of confessional autobiography with its portrayal of

the sinner redeemed by grace. Unlike autobiography, which

denotes a specific narrative form, the codes of Venus and Mars

and antifeminism may be figured in a variety of genres, but

they are not themselves genres. The result is that the genre of

the confessional autobiography links the two codes so that the

instrument of sin in one code becomes the occasion for

salvation in the other." (pp. 36-37)

2. Arenberg, Nancy. 2015. Textual Transvestism: (Re)Visions of

Heloise (17th-18th-Centuries). Amsterdam: Rodopi.

"The epistolary genre is an intriguing area in French literature

where the focus is on complex systems of communications

constructed between writer and receiver. The love letter is not a

recent genre; the roots of the epistolary novel can be traced to

the rich cultures of ancient Greek and Roman civilizations.(1)

Clearly, however, the most influential historical precursor to

the modern love letter was Ovid’s Heroides, a work that

contained twenty-one missives, written in verse, by famous

mythological or real characters such as Sappho, Phaedra, Dido,

Hermione or Penelope. Ovid also included exchanges between

lovers in the final six epistles that concluded his text." (p. 11)

(...)

"After Ovid, the next stage of literary activity in the epistolary

genre occurred in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries." (p. 12)

(...)

"In discussing Heloise’s and Abelard’s love letters, a

chronological method is useful, but recent publications of new

translations in the seventeenth and eighteenth-centuries will

deviate slightly from a pure sequential approach. However, a

chronological study will be carried out as much as possible in

order to explore why it is important to study what happens to a

woman’s love discourse as it fell into the hands of male

imitators throughout the centuries." (p. 18)

(...)

"My study will show that the revisions of Heloise’s persona over

two hundred years may be indicative of, and have helped

construct, ideological changes in expectation concerning the

role of women." (p. 18)

(1) See Charles Kany’s introduction in The Beginnings of the

Epistolary Novel in France, Italy and Spain (Berkeley,

Berkeley, UP, 1937): 1-10.

3. Bagge, Sverre. 1993. "The Autobiography of Abelard and

Medieval Individualism." Journal of Medieval History no.

19:327–350.

Abstract: "This article discusses Abelard's Historia

Calamitatum in connection with the debate on 'the individual

or 'individualism' in the Middle Ages, which has been going on

between adherents of 'the Renaissance of the Twelfth Century'

and scholars placing the emergence of the modem individual in

more recent periods. The conclusion largely supports the latter

point of view. Abelard does not tell a continuous story of his

life, he does not describe a conversion or a new understanding

of his own self as the result of his tragic experience and, as an

intellectual, he does not emphasize his own independent

thinking in opposition to his surroundings. By contrast, he

understands his own life through models derived from sacred

history, according to the contemporary idea of typology.

However, his vivid description of the tragic events of his life

and of his own reactions to them contains a strong element of

subjectivity and his emphasis on merit rather than status when

competing with other intellectuals is in a certain sense

individualistic.

In this respect Abelard may also be regarded as representative

of more widespread attitudes in contemporary scholarly

milieux. Finally, it must be noted that similar objections can be

raised against renaissance or early modem individualism as the

ones adduced here against regarding Historia Calamitatum as

an expression of medieval individualism."

4. Baswell, Christopher. 2003. "Heloise." In The Cambridge

Companion to Medieval Women’s Writing, edited by Dinshaw,

Carolyn and Wallace, David, 161–171. Cambridge: Cambridge

University Press.

"Heloise’s own writings, however, record a pr ofound and

persistent will to choose her role, often in conflict with the men

and institutional expectations around her, including Abelard,

and their efforts to inscribe and circumscribe her. What she

sometimes willed, and how she expressed that will in her

letters, remain shocking.

That shock at the core of Heloise’s choices — the scandal of her

will — is the cultural irritant which has provoked the many

versions of her identity from her own day until now. These

pages explore the profound and unresolved spiritual crises,

crises of secular and religious conversion, that characterized

Heloise’s choice and will in the relatively small body of her

surviving letters." (p. 161)

5. Benton, John F. 1975. "Fraud, fiction, and borrowing in the

correspondence of Abelard and Heloise." In Pierre Abélard et

Pierre le Vénérable. Les courants philosophiques, littéraires et

artistiques en occident au milieu du XIIe siècle, edited by René,

Louis, 469–511. Paris: Editions du Centre national de la

recherche scientifique.

"As a step toward such an investigation, which will have to call

upon the learning of scholars skilled in various disciplines and

areas of knowledge, this paper presents an hypothesis intended

to stimulate further research following Abelard’s own dictum:

“Through doubting we arrive at inquiry, and through inquiry

we perceive the truth.”(3) Simply put, the hypothesis offered

here is that sometime in the thirteenth century a forger, or a

pull of forgers, motivated by a desire to modify the institutions

of the Paraclet, compiled and reworked the eight letters we can

read today in ms. T, making use of both authentic writings of

Abelard (including the lost Exhortatio ad fratres et

commonachos) and a twelfth-century “autobiographical” letter

which was itself a work of imaginative fiction, produced

perhaps by some skilled student of the ars dictaminis. The

hypothesis that the text we have now is composed of at least

three different elements, authentic but otherwise unrecovered

writing of Abelard, inauthentic twelfth-century material, and

inauthentic thirteenth-century addition, may seem unduly

complicated, but it is the best explanation I can find for the

heterogeneous character of the letters, in which some passages

must have been written in the twelfth-century and others seem

to date from the thirteenth, and in which some portions have

the ring of the genuine Abelard and others contain errors which

presumably would not have been written by Abelard, Heloise,

or anyone familiar with the early history of the Paraclet." (pp.

469-470)

6. ———. 1980. "A reconsideration of the authenticity of the

correspondence of Abelard and Heloise." In Petrus Abaelardus

(1079-1142). Person, Werk und Wirkung, edited by Thomas,

Rudolf, 41–52. Trier: Paulinus-Verlag.

"The complex hypothesis I presented at Cluny in 1972 was the

best explanation I could then find to account for differences

between the prescriptions of Abelard’s Rule and documented

practices at the Paraclete, as well as certain difficult passages in

the text. I wish I could say now either that significant new

evidence supported that hypothesis and raised it to a higher

level of certainty, or that on the other hand it had been refuted

so thoroughly that it could now be safely ignored.

Unfortunately, it does not yet seem to me possible to declare

with confidence either that the correspondence is a blatant

fraud or that it is unquestionably authentic. In certain

significant respects, largely because of the work of Fr.

Chrysogonus Waddell which, with his permission, I will present

to the public for the first time in this paper, my hypothesis of

1972 now seems to me weaker than it did seven years ago. On

the other hand, we still do not have a determinative stylistic

analysis of the text and a few of my earlier points remain

unrefuted, so that at present it now seems prudent to maintain

some doubts about authenticity. In this paper I shall try to

present an assessment of the current situation, hoping that

further research will resolve our problems before another seven

years have passed." (p. 42)

7. ———. 1987. "The correspondence of Abelard and Heloise." In

Fälschungen im Mittelalter. Internationaler Kongress der

Monumenta Germaniae Historica, München, 16–19 September

1986. Band V, 95–120. Hanover: Hahnsche Buchhandlung.

Abstract: "This paper approaches the question of the

authenticity and the authorship of the Historia calamitatum

and the letters supposedly exchanged between Heloise and

Abelard, through an investigation of word frequencies, phrases,

and other stylistic issues, making use of computer-assisted

counting and a concordance of the Historia and Letters Two to

Seven. Recently Tore Janson [*] studied the cursus patterns

used in the correspondence, and concluded that on the basis of

that evidence, the correspondence had either one author or one

editor who imprinted his or her style on all the letters. A study

by the present author of the means and standard deviations of

24 words shows that on the basis of these words the letters

attributed to Heloise cannot be differentiated from those

attributed to Abelard; the style of the Historia calamitatum is

close to that of the letters, but Letters Three, Five and Seven

("Abelard") are more similar to Letters Two, Four and Six

("Heloise") than they are to the Historia. The use of quotations

is also consistent with the hypothesis that Abelard was the

single author of the entire correspondence, and some of the

concepts which appear in the letters attributed to Heloise are

strikingly Abelardian. Moreover, Letters Two, Four and Six

contain a number of phrases, more or less unusual, which

appear in the letters attributed to Abelard and in other works

surely written by him. The author challenges the explanation

that as Abelard's student and wife, Heloise wrote in the same

style, and points out that according to the correspondence,

contact between the two was minimal after their conversion to

monastic life. The more contact one hypothesizes in order to

explain the style of the letters attributed to Heloise, the more

difficult it is to explain their content. The paper was presented

orally at the International Congress of the Monumenta

Germaniae Historica on Falschungen im Mittelalter on

September 18, 1986 and is to be published substantially in the

form which follows in the Proceedings of that Congress."

[*] School of Cursus in the twelfth century and the letters of

Heloise and Abelard (1988).

8. Benton, John F., and Prosperetti Ercoli, Fiorella. 1975. "The

Style of the Historia Calamitatum: A Preliminary Test of the

Authenticity of the Correspondence Attributed to Abelard and

Heloise." Viator. Medieval and Renaissance Studies no. 6:59–

86.

"In 1972 at the International Colloquium on Peter Abelard and

Peter the Venerable held at the abbey of Cluny, Professor

Jacques Monfrin called for a study of the correspondence of

Abelard and Heloise which would make use of machine-

readable texts and recently developed techniques for computer-

assisted tests of authenticity and the attribution of authorship.

(1) This paper is not a response to that request for a full-scale

investigation of the correspondence, for it is based on

conventional hand counting of only a few words and

constructions. Instead, this is a modest preliminary study to

test the validity of earlier statements about the style of the

correspondence and its authorship, to attempt to determine

whether a computer-assisted investigation would be worth the

cost and effort, and to consider how such a study might best be

undertaken." (p. 58)

(...)

"The limited survey of vocabulary and constructions which

forms the basis of this paper suggests that the author of the

Historia calamitatum was both careless in his repetition of

conventional constructions and given to the creation of

artificial emphasis through the repeated use of certain adverbs.

If this author was Abelard, he wrote his autobiographical letter,

the letter in which he bared his soul not only to his anonymous

friend but to the world, in a style quite unlike and inferior to

that of his other works. If the author was not Abelard, then one

of the most important documents in medieval history needs to

be reexamined and reinterpreted.(49) We hope that this survey

will lead to a more intensive investigation of style that will

determine which of these possibilities is correct.

(1) Jacques Monfrin, "Le probleme de l'autenticite de la

correspondance d'Abelard et d'Heloise," in Actes du Colloque

International Pielle Abelard - Pierre le Venerable (Paris 1975)

409-424, esp. 423.(...)

(49) Durant W. Robertson, Jr., Abelard and Heloise (New York

1972), 99-118, argues that the Historia is a work of self-

criticism in which Abelard mocks himself, as in the use of a

quotation from Ovid about Ajax which seems to have ironic

implications. Whether Abelard, who steadfastly held his ground

against his critics in a number of his other works, was likely to

present himself as a subject of ridicule is open to· debate. If

Abelard did not write the Historia, then it is worth asking

whether the real author intended to present Abelard in a

favorable fashion or not. The problem is complicated by the

possibility of interpolation. On the one hand, perhaps the letter

was written about the time of the Council of Sens by one of

Abelard's critics, and was later changed by someone who

wished to improve the image of the founder of the Paraclete. On

the other hand, the letter may have been written originally by

someone favorable to Abelard and changed by someone who

wished to emphasize the contrast between his early pride and

lust and his later Christian behavior after his conversion.

9. Blamires, Alcuin. 1998. "Caput a femina, membra a viris.

Gender Polemic in Abelard’s Letter “On the Authority and

Dignity of the Nun’s Profession." In The Tongue of the Fathers:

Gender and Ideology in Twelfth-Century Latin, edited by

Townsend, David R. and Taylor, Andrew, 55–79. Philadelphia:

University of Pennsylvania Press.

"However, even supposing a conventual context able to sustain

the intellectual qualities shown here, there was no foundational

genealogy comparable to that which Abelard had constructed to

link a highly educated nun with august female philosophical-

monastic forbears.(23)

And that was why, if her husband would not respond to her

emotionally, the next best thing was to challenge him (albeit

strategically on behalf of “all” the Paraclete nuns) to console her

by formulating an originary auctoritas for the identity as nun

into which he had rushed her at their crisis.(24)

That he understood her absolutely is proved both by some

features of letter 7 now to be considered and by the way he

concludes it: trusting that he has not only dealt with the

auctoritas of her calling, but also commended its propria

dignitas (particular dignity) and its excellentia so that she may

embrace it the more zealously.(25) He, as philosophus, could

never ultimately be short of propria dignitas; culture was

littered with famous male antecedents. Letter 7 is all about

recovering and inventing the dignity of a professional

genealogy for her, and thence arise its power and its radicalism

in terms of gender issues. Having retrieved the challenge to

which the letter responds, we now need to survey what

precedents and arguments it offers, attending particularly to

strategies of gender polemic that those arguments adopt. This

will provide a context for discussion of some particularly

striking examples of polemic and for attendant questions about

Abelard’s standpoint. In concluding, I will suggest how the

strategies deployed in the letter express the “empathy” that I

am attributing to it." (pp. 57-58)

(23) Newman interestingly speculates that for Heloise, as much

as for Abelard, “the classical otium philosophicum exerted a

strong attraction” (“Authority,” 150).

(24) My diagnosis of a deeply personal motivation for Heloise’s

request differs from that of McLaughlin, who believes that it

arises from Heloise’s perception of the “ambiguous status” of

the female monastic life, in that theoretically “nuns were

laywomen living a religious life’—an ambiguity underlined by

the period’s enthusiastic female response to the call to the vita

apostolica (“Peter Abelard and the Dignity of Women,’ 294).

Georgianna connects Heloise’s request with controversy over

varying interpretations of the Benedictine Rule (“Any Corner of

Heaven,” 231-32). Unfortunately, Catherine Brown overlooks

the request in her absorbing exploration of a “deployment of

cultural masks of ‘the feminine’” by Heloise (“Muliebriter:

Doing Gender in the Letters of Heloise,” 42).

(25) Muckle 1955: 281; Scott Moncrieff: 175. This concluding

passage validates the manuscript title De auctoritate vel

dignitate ordinis sanctimonialium, which was adopted by

Muckle in his edition of the letter (1955: 253), though he had

earlier (1950: 164-65) referred to it as the De origine

sanctimonialium. For convenience (while retaining the

important focus on female auctoritas) this essay will abbreviate

the manuscript title to De auctoritate sanctimonialium.

References

Abelard, Peter. “Abelard’s Letter of Consolation to a Friend

(Historia calamitatum).” Ed. J.T. Muckle. Mediaeval Studies

12 (1950): 163-213.

Abelard, Peter and Heloise. “The Letter of Heloise on the

Religious Life and Abelard’s First Reply.” Ed. J. T. Muckle.

Mediaeval Studies 17 (1955): 240-81.

Abelard, Peter and Heloise. The Letters of Abelard and Heloise.

Trans. C. K. Scott Moncrieff. New York: Cooper Square, 1974.

Brown, Catherine. “Muliebriter: Doing Gender in the Letters of

Heloise.” In Gender and Text in the Later Middle Ages, ed.

Jane Chance. Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 1996. 25-

51.

Georgianna, Linda. “Any Corner of Heaven: Heloise’s Critique

of Monasticism.” Mediaeval Studies 49 (1987): 221-53.

McLaughlin, Mary Martin. “Abelard as Autobiographer: The

Motives and Meaning of His ‘Story of Calamities?” Speculum

42 (1967): 463-88.

_________. “Peter Abelard and the Dignity of Women:

Twelfth Century ‘Feminism’ in Theory and Practice.” In Pierre

Abélard, Pierre le Vénérable: Les courants philosophiques,

littéraires et artistiques en Occident au milieu du XTIe siecle,

ed. René Louis, Jean Jolivet, and Jean Chatillon. Paris:

Editions du Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, 1975.

287-333.

Newman, Barbara. “Authority, Authenticity, and the

Repression of Heloise.” Journal of Medieval and Renaissance

Studies 22 (1992): 121-57. Reprint in Newman, From Virile

Woman to Woman Christ.

_________. From Virile Woman to Woman Christ: Studies

in Medieval Religion and Literature. Philadelphia: University

of Pennsylvania Press, 1995.

10. Boos Dykeman, Therese. 1999. "Heloise (1100-1163)." In The

Neglected Canon: Nine Women Philosophers First to the

Twentieth Century, edited by Boos Dykeman, Therese, 39–72.

Dordrecht: Kluwer.

"Heloise's contribution to the philosophical canon of the

twelfth century has barely been investigated, for Heloise was

not studied as a philosopher until as recently as the last two

decades of the twentieth century. Yet, the twelfth century canon

is not complete without including her early humanism. Other

issues about which she made original contributions to the

canon are as follows: the philosophy of love, the ethics of

intention, the concept of justice, and feminism as a rationale for

her own autonomy and for women's visibility and historical

significance.

Heloise broadened Abelard's philosophical positions with her

counter arguments, humanized his thinking, and being a wise

instructor led him to new inquiry.

The rhetoric or the eloquence and logic of the letters provides

evidence with which to judge Helo1se a philosopher. Scholars

agree that as rhetorician Heloise surpassed Abelard, who was

himself skilled in rhetoric and taught it. (14)

Peter Dronke claims that, "Abelard assimilated to quite an

extent Helo1se's habits in the epistolary style, rather than other

way round."(15) Abelard, in fact, acknowledged her "gift for

letters." Her rhetoric informs her reasoning or logos with

humanizing ethos and pathos. For Heloise demands with

passion to be taken seriously as an individual and as a woman.

She demands to have her thinking addressed by Abelard, not

only as her friend and lover, but as philosopher. In this and

other ways Heloise's style is integral to her philosophy,

especially to her feministicism." (p. 43)

(14) One critic claims that "Heloise's letters stand beside any

prose written by either sex ... . she is as articulate as Sappho or

George Eliot and makes Jane Austen or Emily Bronte tongue -

tied in comparison" (Duncan, 13). Joseph T. Muckle asserts

that the style of Heloise in contrast to Abelard in the letters is

"more compact and involved" and her style "more vivid and

forceful" (51).

(15) Dronke, Women .... II I. The rhetorical figures Heloise

uses: the paradox (if you are lost to me, I am lost because I am

in you), sentence balance, climactic paragraphs, comparisons

such as of Abelard to Christ, parallel constructions, repetitions,

allusions, hyperbole, metaphors and subtle changes in

pronouns ("I" to "we," "you" to "us"), and antithesis. These and

all the other rhetorical figures Heloise employs are more than

stylistically pleasing, more than vehicles for sensory passion.

They are, as in the Ciceronian definition of rhetoric being

eloquence and wisdom, integrated with her thinking.

References

Dronke, P. 1984. Women writers of the middle ages: A critical

study of texts from Perpetual (+203) to Marguerite Porete (+

1310). London: Cambridge UP.

Duncan, R. 1960. Abelard and Heloise. London: Faber.

Muckle, J.T., C.S.B. 1953. The personal letters between Abelard

and Heloise: introduction, authenticity and text. Medieval

Studies: 47-94.

11. Brown, Catherine. 1996. "Muliebriter: Doing Gender in the

Letters of Heloise." In Gender and Text in the Later Middle

Ages, edited by Chance, Jane, 25–51. Gainesville: University

Press of Florida.

Reprinted Eugene (OR): Wipf and Stock 2019.

"I present these readings not with the intent of ironizing a

feminist approach to Heloise into impossibility, but to

demonstrate the high interpretive stakes associated with her in

the canons of medieval and gender studies as well as the traps

that here await the necessary reading of the coimplications of

gender and text. Rather than attempting to identify

characteristics of Heloise's letters that I-as a late twentieth-

century woman, feminist, medievalist-might recognize as

"feminine" or "female," this essay will study the ways in which

Heloise, in her writing, assumes positions that she herself

identifies as gendered-the ways in which, to borrow Judith

Butler's term, this woman "does" gender in all of its-and her-

twelfth-century cultural specificity.(14) I will suggest that

Heloise chooses, for strategic reasons, to write muliebriter, and

that she does so by actively and aggressively assuming

gendered positions already partly constructed in the cultural

discourses available to her as a learned medieval writer." (p. 27)

12. Burge, James. 2003. Heloise & Abelard: A Twelfth-century

Love Story. London: Profile Books.

"The first letter of the collection is from Abelard. It is addressed

not to Heloise, however, but to an unnamed monk. It is what

was called in the Middle Ages a ‘letter of consolation’, the idea

being that the recipient should be so moved by the misfortunes

of the writer that he himself would feel better about his own

troubles. At 20,000 words it is really more of an autobiography,

an account of Abelard’s life to date. It has been known for

centuries by the phrase which he himself uses, ‘The Story of My

Misfortunes’.(*)

(...)

It is not known precisely how Heloise came to read a copy of

the autobiographical letter; perhaps Abelard even sent it to her

as well as to the monk. Her letter to Abelard in response to this

is the next in the series. She is reacting to a letter from the

husband with whom she has not spoken for fifteen years,

written to a third party, which tells the story of her own life. She

writes to him, perhaps understandably, with a considerable

amount of passion and so begins a dialogue which would

continue for the rest of their lives, as they tried to make sense of

what had happened. Abelard comes to see his fate almost as a

gift: a chance to pursue the truth without distraction. Heloise,

however, is unable to deny the essential rightness of the love

they shared.

This dialogue takes place in the context of Abelard’s continuing

and ultimately disastrous — conflict with those in authority.

These letters captivate anyone who comes in contact with them.

Not only do they contain the story of Abelard and Heloise but

they are a unique resource for anyone interested in the

thoughts and feelings of people from an age which is both so

different from and yet so similar to our own. It would have been

churlish to have asked Providence for anything more, yet there

was more." (pp. 2-3)

(*) Historia Calamitatum Mearum’. In this book I refer to this

autobiographical letter for simplicity as ‘the autobiography’. Its

other title among historians is ‘Letter I’.

13. Burnett, Charles F. 1986. "'Confessio fidei ad Heloisam’.

Abelard’s Last Letter to Heloise? A Discussion and Critical

Edition of the Latin and Medieval French Versions."

Mittellateinisches Jahrbuch no. 21:147–155.

14. Cizewski, Wanda. 1987. "From Historia calamitatum to

Amours et infortunes: the Legend of Abelard and Heloise in

Seventeenth-Century France." Studies in Medievalism no.

3:71–76.

15. Classen, Albrecht. 2013. "Dialectics and Courtly Love: Abelard

and Heloise, Andreas Capellanus, and the Carmina Burana."

The Journal of Medieval Latin no. 23:161–183.

Abstract: "When Peter Abelard developed the principal ideas of

dialectics, he did not only redirect the theological and

philosophical discourse in a most critical fashion, but also

provided a fundamental basis for much of the subsequent

culture of courtly love. This finds powerful confirmation both in

Andreas Capellanus's De amore and in the collection of Latin

and Middle High German poems contained in the Carmina

Burana. But Abelard appears to have had the most important

impact of his own thinking on the relationship with his beloved

mistress, later wife, Heloise. In light of the Abelardian

dialectics, the old question regarding the authenticity of the

correspondence between these two people can be laid to rest as

moot. What matters most proves to be that the letters reflect on

two critically opposed positions vis-a-vis courtly love and

illustrate how love can or must be viewed through the lens of

dialectics."

16. Constable, Giles. 2005. "The Authorship of the Epistolae

duorum amantium. A Reconsideration." In Voices in Dialogue:

Reading Women in the Middle Ages, edited by Olson, Linda

and Kerby-Fulton, Kathryn, 167–178. Notre Dame: University

of Notre Dame Press.

"Scholars should not allow themselves to be intimidated by

accusations of this sort if they doubt the attribution to Heloise

or even that the letters labeled “M” were necessarily written by

a woman. Nor should they lose sight of the interest of the

letters apart from their authorship, like a work of art of which

the only value lies in the name or names attached to it. Even if

they were not written by Abelard and Heloise, it would not

subtract significantly from their interest, since they add

comparatively little to what is already known about Abelard

and Heloise. Indeed, the attribution is based almost entirely on

knowledge derived from works more firmly attributed to them.

In any case, the Epistolae are of value in themselves. Scholars

may differ regarding their authorship, date, style, and quality,

but they are without question a remarkable addition to the

corpus of medieval love letters." (p. 174, a note omitted)

17. Cook, Brenda M. 2023. Astralabe: The Life and Times of the

Son of Heloise and Abelard. Cham (Switzerland): Palgrave

Macmillan.

Introduction, by Michael Clanchy, pp. XXIII-XXVI.

"Brenda Cook succeeds in transforming a footnote in medieval

history into the story of one man’s search for recognition in

twelfth-century France and beyond. This man is Astralabe, the

only son of Abelard and Heloise, who was born around 1116/7.

Abelard says it was Heloise who gave him this unusual name,

which may have been her own invention. Brenda Cook argues

that Astralabe’s extraordinary name is a key to reconstructing

his career." (Michael Clanchy, Introduction, p. XXIII)

"From sparse and awkward materials, Brenda Cook has made

Astralabe into a real person, instead of an unfamiliar name in a

medieval book. She has therefore contributed to our permanent

stock of knowledge about the Middle Ages, particularly in her

demonstration that Astralabe became abbot of the Cistercian

abbey of Hauterive. Abelard too is seen in a more sympathetic

light. Here he is at last a family man, who is concerned for his

son, even though he himself is castrated and a priest. If Abelard

moved to the abbey of St Gildas in order to be nearer to his son,

as Brenda Cook suggests, he made a move that almost

destroyed him, as he alleges that the monks tried to kill him. In

academic books on Abelard there is little room for Astralabe.

My Abelard: A Medieval Life (Blackwell-Wiley, Oxford, 1997)

fails typically in this respect, as I have Astralabe consigned to

an appendix where I list the bare facts about him without

comment. In addition to Brenda Cook’s book, the subject of

Abelard as a family man is now very well explored by Juanita

Feros Ruys, The Repentant Abelard (Palgrave Macmillan, New

York, 2014). She publishes an edition and translation of

Abelard’s Song for Astralabe. Her ‘repentant Abelard’ repents

for his former life and so he now begins to take notice of

Astralabe and likewise of Heloise. Abelard’s family were not

with him at the end, however, because he died as a monk of

Cluny virtually as a prisoner." (Michael Clanchy, Introduction,

p. XXV)

18. De Gussem, Jeroen. 2019. Collaborative Authorship in

Twelfth-Century Latin Literature: A Stylometric Approach to

Gender, Synergy and Authority. Gent: Universiteit Antwerpen.

"English Summary

(...)

Chapter 8. Love to the Letter: Heloise and Abelard (pp. 235–

279)

Current scholarship hypothesizes —and disagreement is still

ongoing— that the renowned twelth-century lovers Heloise of

Argenteuil († 1164) and Peter Abelard (1079–1142) may be held

responsible for having collaboratively composed two letter

collections. The first is their conventionally ‘accepted’ letter

collection (the Heloise-Abelard collection) consisting of eight

letters, which constitutes a dialogue from which the pair

recounts their early life and love story and gradually develops

into a foundational document for the Paraclete, the monastery

founded by Abelard in 1122 and seven years later presided over

by Heloise as prioress. The second collection is a set of 113

short letters exchanged between two anonymous lovers (<V >ir

and <M>ulier), known as the Epistolae duorum amantium

(EDA). Due to a dire lack of historical information and material

sources, both of these collections have been subjected to fierce

scholarly debates when it comes to their provenance, dating,

intention and authorship.

In the past few decades, especially the restitution of Heloise’s

female authorship has been a major factor in the collections’

authenticity disputes.

The stylometric results in this chapter, however, suggest a

strong stylistic homogeneity of the Heloise-Abelard collection

in favour of Abelard, which contradicts the commonly held

scholarly consensus that both Heloise and Abelard equally

contributed to its composition. The collection’s constituent

letters appear inextricable in terms of writing patterns, and

finding a trace that might lead to a distinction in favour of

Heloise proved impossible in the current set-up. Secondly, the

EDA cannot be matched with the stylistic profiles of the

Heloise-Abelard collection. As opposed to the latter

epistolarium, it does, however, betray behaviour that is

attributable to dual authorship, meaning that a <V >ir and a

<M>ulier were responsible for composing the constituent

letters of the exchange traditionally ascribed to them. Instead

of resembling writings by Heloise and Abelard, the EDA exhibit

stylistic afiliations with the Tegernsee letters, a collection of ten

short twelfth-century erotic love letters originally composed in

current-day Germany. The chapter concludes with general

remarks on the constructed nature of medieval epistolaria,

which often served a public rather than a private function in the

Middle Ages, and were composed, revised and reconstructed

with an underlying agenda." (pp. 290-291)

19. Desmond, Marylinn. 1998. "Dominus/Ancilla: Rhetorical

Subjectivity and Sexual Violence in the Letters of Heloise." In

The Tongue of the Fathers, edited by Townsend, David and

Taylor, Andrew, 35–54. Philadelphia: University of

Pennsylvania Press.

"As he initiates his affair with his young pupil, Abelard

expresses his desire through the violent eros of pedagogy, and

ultimately he claims the erotic possibilities of violence. He

reports that his role as magister authorizes his beating of

Heloise, which increases his pleasure as her lover. Such a

construction of desire marks a convergence of the erotic and

the violent traditions of pedagogy in Western culture." (p. 36)

(...)

"The exchange of letters between Abelard and Heloise

acknowledges the significance of violence in their sexual

relations, and it likewise enacts a textual and rhetorical play of

dominance and submission. As such, the letters exemplify the

constitutive features of sadomasochism, generally identified by

the “eroticization of relations of domination and

submission.”(5)

Abelard’s depiction of his violent sexual performance in these

passages is complemented by the submissive, even masochistic

subjectivity that animates Heloise’s epistulae, in which she

willingly submits to Abelard’s rhetorical violence as it textually

reenacts this initial erotic encounter between magister and

discipula. Throughout the correspondence Heloise performs a

submissive role in an erotic dynamic scripted by Qvidian

amatory discourse and structured by epistolary rhetoric." (p.

37)

20. Dronke, Peter. 1976. Abelard and Heloise in Medieval

Testimonies. Glasgow: University of Glasgow Press.

"To return to the earlier testimonies by way of conclusion.

What they show us, I suggest, is that there is no a priori reason

against taking the Abelard-Heloise letters at their face value. To

say this does not of course eliminate the more detailed

questions: to what extent has the collection —which is clearly

not just a group of randomly assembled letters—been edited as

well as collected, and who was responsible for that editing?(72)

But whatever historical aspects of the letters may still be

debated, we have no reason to doubt their authenticity on the

ground that they express thoughts and emotions incompatible

with what we know of twelfth-century thought and emotion. All

the attitudes revealed in the letters can be paralleled in early

testimonies outside the letters. The two contemporaries—Fulco

and Roscelin—who mocked and caricatured the tragedy, under

the pretext of moral indignation, did so not because this was

the only medieval way of regarding it, or even the most obvious

way. Rather, it seems they were motivated by a personal dislike

of Abelard. By contrast, the majority of contemporaries of

whom we have evidence, and the generations immediately

following, up to the time of Jean de Meun, were convinced of

the uniqueness and stature of Abelard’s and Heloise’s love, and

regarded their tragedy with wonderment and compassion. And

no one in the twelfth or thirteenth century, to my knowledge,

ever suggests that Heloise came to see the error of her ways in

loving Abelard. Of what many of our modern judges so

confidently affirm, the medieval evidence shows no trace."(pp.

30-31)

(72) On this point, see the judicious comments of Monfrin,

Colloque [Pierre Abélard - Pierre le Vénérable. Les courants

philosophiques, littéraires et artistiques en Occident au milieu

du XII siècle], pp. 409-24, esp. p. 424:

Personne ne considère que le recueil représente la mise bout à

bout de lettres originales. Il s’agit d’un dossier organisé. Il

paraît établi d’autre part que ce dossier, aussi haut que l’on

peut remonter, vient du Paraclet.

Since these pages went to press, the problems of the critical

evaluation of medieval letters, and especially of the formation

of collections, have been finely discussed in a wider context by

Giles Constable, Letters and Letter-Collections (Typologie des

sources du moyen âge occidental, Fasc. 17, Turnhout, 1976), ch.

III.

21. ———. 1980. "Heloise’s Problemata and Letters: Some

Questions of Form and Content." In Petrus Abaelardus (1079-

1142). Person, Werk und Wirkung, edited by Thomas, Rudolf,

53–73. Trier: Paulinus-Verlag.

"While the letters of Heloise have been a focus of much

discussion in recent years, the Problemata have been

neglected. The genuineness of Heloise’s letters continues to be

challenged; that of the Problemata has been neither challenged

nor investigated. At first view, the evidence for the authenticity

of the Problemata might seem slender compared with that for

the more famous Epistolae. Only one manuscript is known:

Paris B. N. lat. 14511, from Saint-Victor. The second part of this

composite manuscript, copied probably in Paris in a hand

datable towards 1400, contains both the Problemata (fols. 18r-

44v) and Abelard’s letter de studio literarum, addressed to the

community at the Paraclete (fols. 44v-50v)." (p. 53)

(...)

"Although a vast amount has been written on Heloise’s letters,

a number of important questions have been ignored. First,

there has been no detailed discussion of the style of the letters,

no attempt to characterize the principal features of that style or

ascertain its possible sources. Second, notwithstanding some

fine work by Peter von Moos(4), the structure of Heloise’s

letters still requires more careful consideration. The same holds

true, even more, for both the style and structure of the

neglected Problemata. A third range of questions concerns the

description and evaluation of the links between the Epistolae

and Problemata. A fourth — perhaps from the vantage of

literary and intellectual history the most important — concerns

individuality of expression and content in both these works. For

Heloise should be considered not only in relation to Abelard, as

has always been customary, but also in relation to other

medieval women writers, to see precisely in what ways a

womanly awareness comes to be expressed —and to be called in

question - in her writings, and how her self-understanding

compares with that of other medieval women who have left us

written testimonies. This last problem is one that I shall return

to in detail, in the course of a forthcoming book on women

writers from the third century to the thirteenth. For the

present, I can only adumbrate swiftly some of the work that

needs to be done regarding Heloise, in each of the four topics

mentioned. The suggestions advanced are necessarily

provisional; they are to indicate, above all, how much remains

open and how rewarding fuller investigations could be." (p. 54)

22. ———. 1984. "Heloise." In Women Writers of the Middle Ages:

A Critical Study of Texts from Perpetua († 203) to Marguerite

Porete († 1310), 107–143. Csmbridge: Cambridge University

Press.

"On the distinctive technical features of Heloise's style, and

their probable source, I shall summarize, and briefly add to,

what I argued and documented in the Trier symposium on

Abelard.!(10) There an enquiry into Heloise's practice of prose

rhythms showed, first, that at the ends of sentences she used

certain kinds of cadence (in particular, cursus tardus and

cursus velox) purposively: a statistical test that enables one to

distinguish between the observed and the expected frequency

of any possible cadence showed that Heloise's choice of these

two types could not be fortuitous. Second, and more

surprisingly, Heloise's proportion of ‘slow’ to ‘swift’ cadences

was the opposite of that found in all the major northern French

writers of her day: while they, if they used cursus in their prose,

favoured swift cadences far more than slow, Heloise, though

using both swift and slow rhythms deliberately in her sentence-

endings, chose to conclude more than 25 per cent of her

sentences with a tardus, as against 16 per cent with a velox.

Third, this particular distribution corresponds precisely to that

chosen and diffused by a leading Italian teacher of letter-

writing in the first years of the twelfth century, Adalbertus,

whereas the French teachers of this art — at least all those

traced till now — overwhelmingly preferred velox cadences to

tardus ones. Fourth, the model epistles in Adalbertus’ ‘art of

letter-writing’ share with Heloise’s letters not only their choice

of sentence-endings but also, within sentences, their use of

elaborate rhythmic parallelism in phrases and clauses, a

parallelism that, especially when intense emotion is to be

expressed, is heightened by frequent, often almost regular,

rhymes. That is, it seems that Heloise was taught to compose in

an Italianate style, one that may have been quite new in France

at the time of her adolescence." (pp. 109-110)

(10) Trier 1980, pp. 53-73.

References

Petrus Abaelardus (1079-1142). Person, Werk und Wirkung,

ed. R. Thomas, J.Jolivet, D. E. Luscombe, L. M. de Rijk (Trierer

Theologische Studien 38, Trier 1980)

23. ———. 1984. Women Writers of the Middle Ages: a Critical

Study of Texts from Perpetua († 203) to Marguerite Porete(†

1310). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Chapter 5: Heloise 107; Excursus: Did Abelard Write Heloise’s

Third Letter? 140-143.

"From Heloise we have three letters to Abelard, preserved

complete in seven of the nine manuscripts of their collected

correspondence, and preserved also in the French translation of

the Abelard-Heloise letters by Jean de Meun. We likewise have

her Problemata, surviving in a unique manuscript, copied only

towards 1400: this is a series of her questions, chiefly on

problematic passages in Scripture, which she directed to

Abelard with a letter introducing them, together with Abelard's

replies. Finally, from the time after Abelard's death, we have a

brief letter of hers to Peter the Venerable, the influential abbot

of Cluny who gave protection and shelter to Abelard in his last

years. Neither this letter nor that introducing the Problemata

has ever been thought to be by anyone but Heloise. It is well

known, by contrast, that many scholars have questioned the

authenticity of her three letters in the collected

correspondence.

As the Problemata are closely linked with these letters, being,

in Van den Eynde’s words, their ‘continuation and

complement", it is hard to see how one can consistently deny

Heloise the letters to Abelard without also rejecting her share of

the Problemata. The reason that this has never been challenged

— one cannot but suspect — is because it contains nothing that

could be thought unedifying. In other words, the doubts

expressed about the three earlier letters may be motivated,

even if largely unconsciously, by the doubters’ disquiet at

certain ‘profane’ passages encountered there." (p. 108, two

notes omitted)

"My purpose here is to examine the most recent arguments by

which John Benton (Trier 1980) claims to ‘demonstrate’ or

‘support the theory of Abelardian authorship’ of the third letter

ascribed to Heloise (Ep. VI in the collection)." (p. 140)

(...)

"Before a full study of the textual problems is undertaken, one

can only say that in the portions shared by Epp. VI and VII

there is a strong likelihood of contamination, and that some

passages, which do not seem to fit into either argument, may

well have been interpolated. Ep. VIII poses special problems of

transmission, since it survives complete in only one of the nine

manuscripts that contain the collection of letters. As for Ep. VI,

even if we must reckon with the later insertion of an ill-fitting

diatribe against wine, with its own auctoritates, it is safe to say

that no reason of weight has yet been advanced for attributing

the remainder of this letter to anyone other than the person to

whom all the manuscripts assign it: Heloise." (p. 143)

24. ———. 1989. "Heloise, Abelard and Some Recent Discussions."

Proceedings of the British Academy no. 74:247–283.

Reprinted in P. Dronke, Intellectuals and Poets in Medieval

Europe, Roma: Edizioni di Storia e Letteratura 1992, pp. 323-

342.

25. Dronke, Peter, and Orlandi, Giovanni. 2005. "New works by

Abelard and Heloise? (first part: Versus et Ludi)." Filologia

mediolatina no. 12:123–146.

While this essay has been conceived as a collaborative effort,

Peter Dronke is principally responsible for the first section (in

Rnglish), Giovanni Orlandi for the second (in Italian).

"These notes on the question of attributing new poetic

compositions to Abelard or Heloise were set down in the

summer of 2003. A few months later a further contribution, by

David Wulstan and severa! of his colleagues, became accessible

to me: «The Poetic and Musical Legacy of Heloise and

Abelard», ed. M. Stewart- D.Wulstan, Ottawa-Westhumble

2003. I shall only discuss those points in the new volume which

have a direct bearing on the problem of further ascriptions to

Heloise and Abelard, and which do not simply duplicate the

arguments advanced by Wulstan in his essay in Plainsong and

Medieval Music II (2002). Some passages from this are

reproduced directly in the later publication, whilst others have

been expanded.

The volume includes two new attempts at attribution. Wulstan

(pp. 123 f.) sees Abelard as the author of Carmina Burana 136,

Omnia sol temperat, but also reports that John Ward wishes to

ascribe it to Heloise. The fact that this song uses two-syllabled

rich rhymes throughout (subtilis l Aprilis l herilis lpuerilis ... )

will, in the light of my discussion of Abelard's rhyming

technique above, indicate why any such attribution seems to me

implausible."

26. East, W. G. 1997. "This Body of Death: Abelard, Heloise and the

Religious Life." In Medieval Theology and the Natural Body,

edited by Biller, Peter and Minnis, A. J., 43–59. Rochester:

York Medieval Press.

"Conversion to the religious life was clearly seen both as a way

out of an impossible amorous entanglement, and as a possible

option for a married couple. In fact, Abelard had a close

personal precedent for considering the religious life as an

honourable option for married people: both his parents had

entered the monastic life.(4)

Rather than taking the romantic way out, Abelard and Heloise

therefore turned to religion. He took the monastic habit at

Saint Denis in Paris; she took the veil at Argenteuil.

(...)

"She [Heloise] ends the letter by asking Abelard for two things:

a history of female monasticism, and a detailed rule of life for

her community.

As Southern remarks, Abelard did what she asked, and much

more. He sent her the desired Rule and History of the Order,

long treatises that must have cost him much time and labour.

'To get the full record of what Abelard did for Heloise, we must

add about a hundred hymns, thirty-five sermons, and a

substantial series of solutions of Heloise's theological

problems.'(30) One should not forget either the half-dozen

Planctus which Abelard wrote, and which touch very closely on

the state of mind of Heloise and himself.(31)

The hymns which Abelard wrote for Heloise's community are

among the glories of Latin literature. F. J. E. Raby comments,

'Abélard, the prince of dialecticians, the master intellect of his

age, wrote a volume of hymns of which the least that can be

said is that it is worthy of his genius.'(32) Their editor describes

them as 'a major monument of twelfth-century hymnody and

poetry in general'. He goes on to say that, more than this, they

are also 'a work of personal significance . . . a labor of love.'(33)

They are a collection of hymns for the daily monastic office.

They could be used, as some of them are used, in other

churches and monastic houses, without reference to or any

necessary knowledge of the story of Abelard and Heloise. But if

one does know their story, the poems gain a considerable

resonance. Abelard had found an acceptable medium in which

to express his love for Heloise. He had written in his Historia

calamitatum of composing love songs for Heloise, some of

which were still being sung as he wrote.(3)4 This channel for

the expression of his love had now been cut off, but another had

opened up. He could now express a love for her, as ardent as

before, but now refined, sublimated, subsumed in their

common love for Christ." (pp. 50-51)

(4) 'Letter of Consolation', pp. 163-213.

Abelard briefly mentions his parents' conversion, without

specifying where or why they entered the religious life (p. 179).

For a translation of the Historia calamitatum see Radice,

Letters, pp. 57-106.

(31) They have been edited by G. Vecchi in Pietro Abelardo, I

'Planctus', Introduzione, testo critico, trascrizioni musicali,

Istituto di filologia romanza della Università di Roma, Collana

Testi e Manuali 35 (Modena, 1951).

(32) F. J. E. Raby, A Histoty of Christian Latin Poetry from the

beginnings to the close of the Middle Age (Oxford, 1953), p.

290.

(33) Peter Abelard's Hymnarius Paraclitensis, ed. J. Szövérffy,

2 vols. (Albany, NY, and Brookline, Mass., 1975), I, 7.

(34) 'Letter of Consolation', p. 184; Radice, Letters, p. 68.

References

The Letters of Abelard and Heloise, trans. B. Radice

(Harmondsworth, 1974)

27. Feilla, Cecilia A. 2003. "Translating Communities: The

Institutional Epilogue to the Letters of Abelard and Heloise."

The Yale Journal of Criticism no. 16:363–379.

"In the pages that follow, I examine the relationship between

literary and juridical translation from the twelfth to the

eighteenth centuries.

I do not attempt a comprehensive study of translation over six

centuries, but rather focus on one paradigmatic corpus of texts

through which to map the shifting relationship between texts

and tombs, letters and bodies in the constitution of

communities: the institutional epilogue to the letters of Abelard

and Heloise, the twelfth-century lovers and clerics. By

institutional epilogue I mean the story that continues after their

deaths and survives in the many literary translations of their

letters, as well as in the institutional brefs de translation

written at each transfer of their bodily remains to a new site or

tomb. This two-part epilogue spans the years 1143 to 1817 and

comprises two textual archives. The first reflects the literary

fate of the correspondence of Abelard and Heloise, and is

manifest in the numerous editions and translations of the

correspondence that appeared, most notably in the seventeenth

and eighteenth centuries.(10) The second archive refers to the

institutional fate of their correspondence within the juridical

communities in which they circulated. This archive consists of

the official letters and procès-verbaux that accompanied and

recorded each translation (exhumations, cataloguing,

movement, and re-interments) of the bodily remains of the

pair." (pp. 363-364)

(10) By literary translations I mean not only from one language

into another, but imitation, adaptation, quotation, pastiche,

and parody as well.

28. ———. 2004. "From ‘Sainted Maid’ to ‘Wife in all her

Grandeur’: Translations of Heloise, 1687–1817." Eighteenth-

Century Life no. 28:1–16.

"Due in large part to the enormous success of Alexander Pope's

poem "Eloisa to Abelard" (1717), the letters of Abelard and

Heloise experienced a remarkable rebirth and vogue in

eighteenth-century England. The fashion for their lives and

letters swept every genre in its path, and crescendoed in

popularity well into the nineteenth century. "If you search for

passion," wrote Lord Byron, "where is it . . . stronger than in the

epistle to Eloisa from Abelard." (p. 1)

(...)

"The literary and the institutional fates of Abelard and Heloise

were thus intimately connected during the eighteenth century,

and I explore this connection by focusing primarily on the

changing representation of Heloise from 1687 to 1817. My

central questions are: "What role did translation play in

creating the modern legend of Abelard and Heloise?" and "How

did the literary legend impact the lovers' role within non-

literary communities and institutions of the eighteenth

century?" (p. 1)

29. Ferrante, Joan M. 1997. To the Glory of Her Sex: Women’s

Roles in the Composition of Medieval Texts. Bloomington:

Indian University Press.

Part Two: Women in Collaboration. 2. Religious Texts, pp. 19-

67.

"There were probably many other collaborations that have not

left records, but the only collaboration between a man and a

woman on religious texts that comes close to Jerome’s with his

friends is the work Heloise persuaded Abelard to write for the

Paraclete. She asked him for a history of nuns, a rule suitable to

women, sermons, hymns, an exposition of Genesis, and

answers to theological and scriptural questions that came up

during their studies. She is thus directly responsible for much

of Abelard’s extant writing. Two of her letters of request are

extant: the one that asked for a history of women’s monasticism

(how it began and what authority there was for it) and for a rule

suitable to women (ep.5, discussed earlier), and the one that

accompanied the questions (the Problemata). But in Heloise’s

case, we have some of the “personal” letters, and they reveal

how she brought Abelard out of a psychological crisis and

focused his attention on his work by persuading him of her own

psychological as well as intellectual needs. Since this is such an

unusual opportunity to trace the stages of the collaboration, I

will go briefly through the earlier correspondence.

After she read the Historia and was worried about the danger

Abelard seemed to be in, she began to manipulate him by

emphasizing her own moral anguish and danger, in order to

draw him away from the life that threatened his body and soul.

Physical danger is what she mentions, but his psychological

state must have distressed her even more: the despair (the

word occurs in different forms through the Historia), the self-

pity, the paranoia, the possibility of suicide.(44) Abelard

mentions the story of Malchus,

a captive monk who lived chastely in the same house as his

wife; what he does not say, but Heloise no doubt remembered,

is that when the marriage was forced on them, it was the

woman who suggested they live together chastely in order to

save the man from suicide. So Heloise reminded Abelard of his

responsibility for herself and the nuns of the Paraclete, his

“creation,” of their vulnerability as women in a new house, and

offered their obedience and need in the place of his rebellious

monks, “stubborn pigs.”

More subtle and probably more effective was her presentation

of her own desperate need. By describing her grief and shame,

by admitting to the anguish of her illicit desires and the guilt of

her hypocrisy, she invited him to worry more about her

spiritual state than his own situation." (pp. 56-57)

(44) Abelard’s language in the Historia suggests that he is

virtually in despair, a very dangerous moral state in medieval

theology: “quanta desperatione perturbarer . .. proferre non

possum” (MS [Jacques Monfrin, Historia Calamitatum,

Medieval Studies, 12 (1950), 163-213.] 12.196), “penitus

desperatus” (198), “profugus ac iam desperatus” (201), “in

tantam lapsus sum desperationem” (203), “desperabam

penitus” (205).

30. Findley, Heidenreich, Brooke. 2006. "Does the Habit Make the

Nun? A Case Study of Heloise's Influence on Abelard's Ethical

Philosophy." Vivarium no. 44:248–275.

Abstract: "A careful reading of Heloise's letters reveals both her

contribution to Abelarďs ethical thought and the differences

between her ethical concerns and his. In her letters, Heloise

focuses on the innate moral qualities of the inner person or

animus. Hypocrisy - the misrepresentation of the inner person

through false outer appearance, exemplified by the potentially

deceitful religious habit or habitus - is a matter of great moral

concern to her. When Abelard responds to Heloise's ideas, first

in his letters to her and later in his Collationes and Scito te

ipsum, he turns the discussion away from her original interests.

He transforms her metaphor of the habitus as false appearance

into a discussion of another type of habitus, the habitual

process of acquiring virtue, and integrates her focus on the

animus into his developing ideas about sin as intention.

Examining the differences between Heloise's ethical thought

and Abelard's allows us to appreciate the distinct contributions

of both."

31. Flynn, William T. 2009. "Letters, Liturgy, and Identity: The

Use of Epithalamica at the Paraclete." In Sapientia et

Eloquentia: Meaning and Function in Liturgical Poetry,

Music, Drama, and Biblical Commentary in the Middle Ages,

edited by Iversen, Gunersen and Bell, Nicolas, 301–348.

Turnhout: Brepols.

"Until recently, the almost archetypal nature of the story of

Abelard and Heloise’s famous love affair has tended to obscure

the principal focus not only of their mutual correspondence,

but indeed of fully one-sixth of Abelard’s surviving writings —

the sermons, hymns, and reflections on the nature of

monasticism that he produced from the mid-1130s until his

death probably in 1142. All of these writings, and all of the now

largely lost liturgical music, were dedicated to the proper

ordering and running of his former oratory, the Paraclete,

which Abelard had given to Heloise and the other nuns expelled

from Argenteuil in 1129; his gift was confirmed by Pope

Innocent II in 1131, making the Paraclete a Benedictine

nunnery under Heloise’s direction.(2) In this chapter, I will

first examine the letters exchanged between Abelard and

Heloise, focusing principally on their salutations and closings,

in order to confirm Morgan Powell’s argument that Letters 1–8

form a coherent ‘text compiled and used at the Paraclete […]

that […] serves to justify and generate a model of the monastic

life for women’.(3) Next, I will argue that the Easter season

liturgy instituted at the Paraclete (much of which was newly

written by Abelard at Heloise’s request) closely parallels the

rhetorical argumentation adopted by Heloise and Abelard in

the letters, and that the liturgy functions as a means of bringing

Abelard’s specific interpretations of an ideal women’s

monasticism into ritual practice.

Finally, I will analyse how the sequence Epithalamica functions

within the Easter liturgy as the ritual focus of the foremass on

Easter Day, and how it contributes to the construction of the

Paraclete’s institutional identity." (pp. 301-302, a note omitted)

(2) See Mary Martin McLaughlin, ‘Heloise the Abbess: The

Expansion of the Paraclete’, in Listening to Heloise [: The Voice

of a Twelfth-Century Woman, ed. by Bonnie Wheeler (New

York: St Martin’s, 2000], pp. 1–17.

(3) [Morgan Powell, ‘Listening to Heloise at the Paraclete: Of

Scholarly Diversion and a Woman’s “Conversion”, in Listening

to Heloise, p. 255.

32. Forrai, Réka, and Piron, Sylvain. 2007. "The debate on the

Epistolae duorum amantium. Current status quaestionis and

further research." Digimed: filologia digitale dei testi

mediolatini:1–12.

Abstract: "The Epistolae duorum amantium are the object of

one of the most intense and interesting current debates in

medieval studies. Could it be the case that this set of 116

anonymous sophisticated letters and poems exchanged by a

couple of learned medieval lovers represents the actual

correspondence of Heloise and Abaelard at the time of their

love affair, as Constant Mews has claimed in a book published

in 1999 ? This ascription has been accepted by some scholars

(B. Newman, M. Clanchy, D. Boquet, etc.) ; some supporters

have even produced more arguments and evidence in favour of

such a result (S. Jaeger, J. Ward, S. Piron). On the other hand,

a number of medievalists have expressed their scepticism on

various grounds, arguing that is impossible to decide (G.

Lobrichon), that the outcome doesn’t matter much (J. Verger,

M.T. Fumagalli), or just stating their disbelief (J. Marenbon, G.

Orlandi). The number of actual argumented critics against

Mews’ view is so far rather limited (G. Constable, P. Dronke, P.

von Moos, J. Ziolkowski). Most of them originated among Latin

philologists, but it would be misleading to reduce the debate to

an opposition between disciplines (idest, the cautious

philologists against the temerary historians) or, as J.

Ziolkowski puts it, between continents (the European sceptics

vs. the enthusiastic Australians and Americans), or to perceive

it, as Ziolkowski also strongly suggests, as expressing an

ideological divide on the issue of gender studies (the defender

of the ascription beeing blinded by a feminist agenda)."

33. Fraioli, Deborah. 2000. "Pierre Bayle's Reflections on a Much

Discussed Woman: The HELOISE Article in the Dictionnaire

historique et critique." In Listening to Heloise: The Voice of a

Twelfth-Century Woman, edited by Wheeler, Bonnie, 341–360.

New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

"Pierre Bayle's commentary on the Abelard-Heloise

correspondence has never been translated into English. The

article HELOISE merits our consideration both for its inherent

interest and its relevance to the authenticity question

surrounding this correspondence." (p. 341)

(,,,)

"Several kinds of difficulties arise in finding one's way to the

invaluable and entertaining article on Heloise by Pierre Bayle,

contained in the vast encyclopedia compiled by this

seventeenth-century erudit. Although Bayle's Dictionnaire

historique et critique is cited in the bibliography of Charlotte

Charrier, Héloise dans l'histoire et dans la legende, 1933, at no.

429, it is translated neither by Richard H. Popkin in the

Historical and Critical Dictionary: Selections from the

Dictionnaire nor in the earlier four-volume selections titled An

Historical and Critical Dictionary, Selected and Abridged

from the Great Work of Pierre Bayle. For readers of French,

the original four folio volumes of the Dictionnaire are

cumbersome and relatively rare, meaning that in most cases

they are available only in rare book libraries. The best modern

access to Bayle's article on Heloise remains the nineteenth-

century, sixteen-volume edition, titled Dictionnaire historique

et critique de Pierre Bayle, edited by Beuchot." (p. 341)

(...)

"The complete translation of Bayle's article HELOISE follows."

(pp. 343-356)

34. ———. 2012. "Assessing Medieval Moral Outrage: the

Correspondence of Abelard and Heloise." Mediaevistik.

Internationale Zeitschrift für interdisziplinäre

Mittelalterforschung no. 25:55–68.

"Were I to analyze in what ways I find the couple's medieval

attackers, satirists, and censurers to be on far more solid

intellectual ground than their defenders, it would be to place

the cart before

the horse. This is because I believe steadfastly that the

strongest condemnation of the couple's behavior and attitudes

comes straight from the correspondence itself, and that those

medieval censurers and satirists merely play on the ironies and

laughable inconsistencies, the hyperbole, and self-

contradiction, that they have already found in the letters. In the

letters each protagonist mocks the other. And the texts

themselves, by providing scrambled and paradoxical testimony,

mock them both.

By selecting several examples in this article to argue this point,

I hope to remove myself from the moral debate, as I argue that

the letters themselves, by their skillfully paradoxical nature,

build a strong emotional case for siding with the protagonists,

but then subtly undermine that position to the point of

whimsically witty and cleverly erudite, but clear,

condemnation."(p. 59)

35. ———. 2016. "Heloise’s First Letter as a Response to the

Historia Calamitatum." Mediaevistik. Internationale

Zeitschrift für interdisziplinäre Mittelalterforschung no.

29:119–141.

"While few scholars are likely to place themselves in the camp

of Moore or Dalarun, one wonders whether the two scholars

were led to their theories by perceiving small signs that

something is amiss in the relationship between the Historia

and Heloise’s first letter, something beyond the double

implausibility that Abelard wrote his autobiography to console

a friend or that Abelard’s Historia came into Heloise’s hands

“by chance.”

The usefulness of Moore’s and Dalarun’s flexible thinking lies, I

think, not in their conclusions but in focusing our attention on

the odd affiliations, and sometimes the very lack of affiliation,

between the two documents. Addressing the contours of the

textual relationship between Abelard’s autobiography and

Heloise’s first letter, as I propose to do in these pages, uncovers

surprisingly rich terrain in which to explore the deepest nature

of the correspondence and its interpretation. I will assume here

—despite the usefulness of Moore and Dalarun’s theories as a

way to open up our thinking about the relationship between the

two texts—that the conventional chronology (Historia followed

by Heloise’s reply) is the correct one." (p. 121)

References

Jacques Dalarun, “The Last Word of the Correspondence,”

Journal of Hermeneutic Study and Education of Textual

Configuration (Nagoya, Japan), 2, 1 (2008), pp. 1–14.

Jacques Dalarun, “Nouveaux aperçus sur Abélard, Héloïse et le

Paraclet,” Francia: Forschungen zur westeuropaïschen

Geschichte 32:1 (2005), pp. 19–66.

George Moore, Héloïse and Abélard, The Works of George

Moore, vol. 14 (London: Heineman, 1933).

36. Freeman, Elizabeth. 1997. "The public and private functions of

Heloise's letters." Journal of Medieval History no. 23:15–28.

Abstract: "This article investigates Heloise's three letters to

Abelard in relation to modem debates concerning the

characteristics and usefulness of the categories 'public' and

'private'. It is common to assign women's letters and

autobiographies to the private realm. While it is not denied that

women's letters frequently fulfilled functions of a more or less

'private' nature, this article suggests that certain peculiarities of

medieval textual practices complicate this assignation.

Medieval 'participation in literacy' was always a more public

practice than modern reading and writing. Moreover, the

conventions of epistolography ensured that medieval letters

were in fact highly public documents. It is suggested then that

medieval female epistolography is a site for the interaction of

private (autobiographical) and public (literary and rhetorical)

interests. Heloise's letters show us a woman claiming her place

in both public and private realms. She used the rhetorical skill

which she had acquired via her position in the public world of

learning in order to validate her many different experiences.

Modifications to the original formulations of public and private

suggest that the spheres are not separate and exclusive but,

rather, permeable. Certainly,

Heloise reminds us of the shifting boundaries of social

categorisation, as she consciously rejects traditional binary

opposites, such as that between wife and whore, in her

individual quest for self-definition."

37. Gilson, Etienne. 1960. Heloise and Abelard. Ann Arbor:

University of Michigan Press.

"Before attempting to define the Middle Ages, we should have

first to define Héloïse. Next, we should have to look for a

definition of Petrarch. This done, we should still have to find a

definition of Erasmus. These problems resolved, we might with

some confidence seek out our larger definition of the Middle

Ages and the Renaissance. But Tree plus two make five

impossibilities. Those who have no taste for undertakings of

this kind will be content with the reading and analyzing of

texts. Like explorers in an unknown country, they will do

nothing more than keep the daily record of their trip. All about

the narrow furrow which they plough, behind and beyond what

they see to the right and to the left extends the vast territory

which they cannot see. But others, too, pass or will pass that

way. And when their paths cross and recross one another, not

only will each explorer be able to see more, but he will see in a

far juster light the few things which he already knows. Before

reality, perceived in all its ordered complexity, who will stop to

worry about formulas? It is not to be rid of history that we

study it, but to save from nothingness the whole past which

would be swallowed up without it. We study history so that

even those things which otherwise would be lost even from the

past may once again come to life in this all-important present,

apart from which nothing really exists. In order that this

particular human story may live anew in all its individual and

concrete complexity, it is enough that we know it. In order that

it may enrich us with its very substance, it is enough that we

love it." (pp. 143-144).

38. Godman, Peter. 2009. Paradoxes of Conscience in the High

Middle Ages: Abelard, Heloise, and the Archpoet. Cambridge:

Cambridge University Press.

"Why then, in the longue durée of the European conscience,

does a single century make a difference? Because that century

was the twelfth, during which new issues were perceived and

forgotten

problems recalled to memory. An example, novel in the

intensity with which it was discussed during that period, is

fictio.

Fictio does not mean ‘fiction’. Rather theological than literary,

this term signifies feigning and falsification of conscience,

particularly in penance.

Penance was given the status of a sacrament during the twelfth

century, and confession was regarded as a test of spiritual

authenticity and religious sincerity.

A travesty of both, at the moment when sinners were expected

to be truest to God and to themselves, fictio challenged the

ethical imagination of Latin Europe. That challenge found a

response in the works of Abelard, Heloise, and the Archpoet.

Usually considered separately from one another, in terms of

such harmless but unhelpful anachronisms as ‘individuality’ or

‘renaissance’, all three of them reflected on issues of moral

identity posed by feigning and falsification of conscience.

Because the morality to which Abelard and Heloise subscribed

was, or became, monastic, their reflection also led them to

allied problems of lying, dissimulation, and hypocrisy in a

religious context. In the very different context of a German

schismatic’s court, opposed to Rome and hostile to monks, the

Archpoet took fictio to its limit. There the dividing-line between

irony and blasphemy blurred.

With a refined wit directed against ethical concerns of the

previous generation, this feigned penitent, in his ‘confession’,

created a new figure of spiritual sophistry." (Preface and

acknowledgements, pp. IX-X)

39. Hellemans, Babette. 2015. "Abelard and Heloise between voice

and silence." In Voice and Voicelessness in Medieval Europe,

edited by Kleiman, Irit Rut, 83–97. New York: Palgrave

Macmillan.

"This chapter studies both the letters of Heloise and Abelard

and elements of their still-controversial reception. Its aim is to

consider voice and silence as types or expressions of rhetorical

individuality. I begin with a stance against what I see as a

persistent idea about the famous letters exchanged between

Abelard and Heloise: namely, that they are actually true letters,

written between a couple in a consecutive order and revealing

to the reader a sense of growing insight into their existence,

both as a couple and as two individuals. My approach in this

chapter draws on certain aspects of the debate that surrounds

these letters in European scholarly tradition, and especially in

Germany, where the tendency is arguably to emphasize the

historical context of a source, as opposed to what might be

described as the more politically engaged, gender-focused

scholarship predominant in North America.(1) My aim on these

pages is a modest one, namely, to consider a particular

historiographical approach to a body of commonly discussed

sources." (p. 83)

(1) For example, Linda Olson and Kathryn Kerby-Fulton,

Voices in Dialogue: Reading Women in the Middle Ages (Notre

Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2005).

40. ———. 2019. "Heloise’s Echo: The Anthropology of a Twelfth-

Century Horizontal Knowledge Landscape." In Horizontal

Learning in the High Middle Ages: Peer-to-Peer Knowledge

Transfer in Religious Communities, edited by Long, Micol,

Snijders, Tjamke and Vanderputten, Steven, 185–205.

Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press.

Abstract: "This chapter presents Heloise of Argenteuil’s quest

for an intellectual voice through her correspondences with

Abelard, Bernard of Clairvaux, and Peter the Venerable. The

relationships between these four characters are deeply

intellectual yet at the same time they are negotiated not only

through intimate conversations, but also through collaborative

monastic projects, through which the characters seek to

transform the world around them. These performances open up

a space that is at once estheticized and intellectualized, in

which interpersonal connections can develop. This is

particularly true of vocal performances such as in the letters, in

which the act of listening offers a moment of connection with

the unmistakable individuality of Heloise as a performer."

41. Irvine, Martin. 1996. "Heloise and the gendering of the literate

subject." In Criticism and Dissent in the Middle Ages, edited by

Copeland, Rita. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

"The Abelard—Heloise correspondence thus discloses that

masculinity and femininity as positions in literate subjectivity

were not pure, absolute states but rather formed from ongoing

negotiations among various kinds of (already) mixed subject

positions. For twelfth-century litterati, gender classes seemed

to be natural categories mirrored in language, and maleness

and femaleness would have been understood as both natural

and social identities. But a close reading of these letters reveals

that gendered subjectivity seldom appears as a fixed, one-

dimensional identity. Abelard’s letters alone disclose that there

was no easy equation between social sex identity and gendered

subjectivity; indeed, the Abelard—Heloise correspondence

reveals a play or drift away from a sense of fixed or essential

gender identity and creates an image of an alternating or ever-

vacillating current through which literate subjectivity was

constructed. Heloise’s strategy of negotiation and new self-

definition utilized the gender categories of the twelfth century

and resisted the totalizing or essentializing functions that these

categories often served." (p. 107, a note omitted)

42. Jaeger, C. Stephen. 1980. "The Prologue to the Historia

calamitatum and the "Authenticity Question"." Euphorion.

Zeitschrift für Literaturgeschichte no. 74:1–15.

"If we are to avoid making the weaker argument the stronger,

then we must put aside the idea that the prologue to the

Historia is based on skillful imitation of Peter Abelard.(48) The

correspondences in question are much more satisfactorily

accounted for by supposing that Peter Abelard wrote that

prologue. Mary McLaughlin has shown that there is a unity of

thought, tive and style underlying Abelard's writings for the

Paraclete.(49) The echoes of Abelard's style in the opening to

the Historia are undoubtedly part of that unity. My conclusion

is that this preface constitutes a statement, the authenticity of

which is beyond all reasonable doubt, that Abelard wrote a

letter of consolation narrating his own calamities in .order to

comfort an absent friend and to convince him of the

comparative triviality of his sufferings, That letter is of course

the Historia calamitatum." (pp. 14-15)

(48) It might be objected that the possibility of imitation, like!

or not, gains strength because of the evidence of historical

inaccuracy in the text of the Historia; we must account for

anachronisms and contradictions somehow. I for one am not

convinced that the historical evidence against its authenticity is

best accounted for by a hypothesis of forgery and fiction. The

means of corrupting a genuine text are many and well known:

scribal error, wilful tampering, large scale additions. But the

means of producing a fictional autobiography which bears

many traces -- both obvious and subtle -- of the style,

temperament and thought of the man to whom it is ascribed,

are extremely limited; very few litterati in the Middle Ages

would have commanded or would even have dreamed of

mustering such means.

(49) In: Peter Abelard and the Dignity of Women: Twelfth

Century "Feminism" in Theory and Practice. In: Pierre

Abelard - Pierre le vénérable (1975), pp., 287-333.

43. ———. 1999. Ennobling Love: In Search of a Lost Sensibility.

Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.

Chapter 12: The Epistolae duorum amantium, Heloise, and

Her Orbit, pp. 157-173.

"The defense of passionate love is a creation of Heloise. Her

sensibilities are guided by sublime ideals, her passionate nature

appreciates and defines the exalting character of passionate

love. She constructed a virtuous sexual passion of the elements

of ennobling love: selflessness, purity of intention, love of

merit, purity of love, mutuality, complete self-abandonment.

She is the architect of a higher law of pure love sanctioning

sexuality, a kind of carnal agape, set above the shallow morality

of marriage and external, bodily purity. Gilson pointed to the

couple's self-conception as "heroes of the spiritual life" (Heloise

and Abelard, p. 51). But Heloise genuinely became a heroine of

the amatory life. For Abelard the story is a crass drama of

seduction shading off into an idyll of lustfulness; his

explanation for the tragedy is simply sin punished.

But what is the exalting character of passionate love

constructed and lived by Hcloise? It certainly has to do with

willing self-abandonment, sacrifice of everything for the

beloved, salvation included. It has to do with the refusal to

repent pleasures too sweet to forget, with her maintaining of a

shallow social role (abbess, nun) while inwardly cultivating the

memory of love. Her unrepentance is not the buffoonish

defiance of Don Giovanni. Heloise fades into silence with the

insistent conviction that her love is worth her destruction, not

with a defiant "My will be done"." (pp.169-170)

44. ———. 2005. "Epistolae duorum amantium and the Ascription

to Heloise and Abelard." In Voices in Dialogue: Reading

Women in the Middle Ages, edited by Olson, Linda and Kerby-

Fulton, Kathryn, 125–166. Notre Dame: University of Notre

Dame Press.

"A set of 113 love letters, abridged, copied, and entitled Ex

epistolis duorum amantium by a Cistercian monk of Clairvaux,

Johannes de Vepria, in the late fifteenth century, enjoyed total

obscurity in the libraries of Clairvaux and Troyes until the

German medieval Latinist Dieter Schaller noticed them in 1967

and passed to his student, Ewald Könsgen, the task of editing

them. Könsgen’s edition appeared with an extensive apparatus

in 1974 with the title Epistolae duorum amantium: Briefe

Abaelards und Heloises? (1) The small flame of Könsgen’s

subtitle flickered pale against the bonfire set under the corpus

of personal and monastic writings of Abelard and Heloise two

years before by John Benton, stoked again by Benton and

Fiorella Prosperetti Ercoli in 1975, and at last all but

extinguished in 1980 by the same man who had set it.

(...)

In 1999 Constant Mews published a study of the letters

confidently arguing that the collection indeed excerpts the

authentic letters exchanged by Abelard and Heloise from the

early years of their love affair, c. 1115–1117.(5) Mews himself

and his publisher considered his studies conclusive and

announced them as such.(6) Mews’s arguments have been

accepted by John O. Ward and Neville Chiavaroli (Mews’s co-

translator) and shored up in a dense study of rhetorical aspects

of the Epistolae.

A great deal remains to be learned about these letters and their

authors from a close reading and comparison with other

comparable Latin love letters. This study explores the character

of the two authors, their literary styles, and their educational

backgrounds. The results strengthen the ascription to Heloise

and Abelard and point out what is gained for understanding the

education of the young Heloise when the letters of the woman

are recognized as products of her pen. I begin by summarizing

some of the information that is to be gleaned about the writers

and the context of their letters." (pp. 125-126, some notes

omitted)

(1) Ewald Könsgen, Epistolae duorum amantium: Briefe

Abaelards und Heloises? (Leiden and Cologne: Brill, 1974);

hereafter Könsgen. The manuscript is Troyes BM 1452. For

description and history of the text, see Könsgen, xx–xxxiii.

Könsgen can find no trace of Johannes de Vepria’s source for

the love letters. It remains unknown.

(5) Constant J. Mews with translations by Neville Chiavaroli

and Mews, The Lost Love Letters of Heloise and Abelard:

Perceptions of Dialogue in Twelfth-Century France (New York:

St. Martins, 1999).

The book includes Könsgen’s edition of the Latin texts with

translations by Neville Chiavaroli and Mews on facing pages.

See also Mews, “Philosophical Themes in the Epistolae duorum

amantium: The First Letters of Heloise and Abelard,” in

Listening to Heloise, ed. Bonnie Wheeler (New York: St.

Martins Press, 2000), 35–52.

(6) The publisher distributed a press release declaring, “Scholar

proves letters lost for eight centuries to be those of famous

lovers Heloise and Abelard.”

45. ———. 2005. "A Reply to Giles Constable." In Voices in

Dialogue: Reading Women in the Middle Ages, edited by

Olson, Linda and Kerby-Fulton, Kathryn, 179–186. Notre

Dame: University of Notre Dame Press.

Reply to G. Constable, The Authorship of the Epistolae duorum

amantium. A Reconsideration, same volume.

"Giles Constable’s gentlemanly skepticism is a brake on a

vehicle which is moving slightly above the speed limit. His

“Reconsideration” is not a refutation or a reply to the

arguments in favor of ascribing the Epistolae duorum

amantium to Heloise and Abelard. His purpose is to slow down

Constant Mews and others, like me, who have accepted Mews’s

finding, prematurely he believes. He does not present evidence

or substantial arguments against the ascription of the Epistolae

to Abelard and Heloise; he just issues a gentle cautioning.(1)

As Constable says, no “positive evidence” identifies and locates

the Epistolae duorum amantium with certainty. That means,

no signatures, no clearly locatable details of the identity of the

authors." (p, 179)

(1) Peter von Moos takes up a skeptical position far more

vehemently in a forthcoming study of the collaboration of

Heloise and Abelard at the Paraclete (“Abaelard, Heloise und

ihr Paraklet: ein Kloster nach Mass, Zugleich eine Streitschrift

gegen die ewige Wiederkehr hermeneutischer Naivitaet,” in

[Peter von Moos, Gesammelte Schriften zum Mittelalter. Bd. 1:

Abaelard und Heloise], ed. Gert Melville) [Berlin 2005 pp. 233-

302] .(...)

46. ———. 2014. "The Epistolae Duorum Amantium, Abelard, and

Heloise: An Annotated Concordance." The Journal of Medieval

Latin no. 24:185–224.

Abstract: "This concordance juxtaposes passages from the

Epistolae duorum amantium with passages from the authentic

writings of Abelard and Heloise which have clear resonance

with the anonymously transmitted love letters. The

accumulated evidence of authorship by Abelard and Heloise is

considerable. At the same time the flaws in argumentation of

the most prominent and vocal deniers of the ascription leave

the current state of the question clear: authorship by Abelard

and Heloise is probable; few arguments of substance opposing

that claim remain. The texts juxtaposed here do not prove

authorship by Abelard and Heloise conclusively, but they more

than justify placing them in the foreground as the legitimate

focus of study of the question, who wrote the Epistolae duorum

amantium."

47. Janson, Tore. 1988. "School of Cursus in the twelfth century

and the letters of Heloise and Abelard." In Retorica e poetica

tra i secoli XII e XIV. Atti del secondo Convegno

internazionale di studi dell'Associazione per il Medioevo e

l'Umanesimo latini (AMUL) in onore e memoria di Ezio

Franceschini (Trento e Rovereto 2-5 ottobre 1985), edited by

Leonardi, Claudio and Menestò, Enrico, 171–200. Spoleto:

Fondazione Centro italiano di studi sull'alto medioevo.

Bibliographia. Annotated bibliographies

Raul Corazzon || rc@ontology.co || Info

Bibliography on the Letters of

Abelard and Heloise: English

Studies (Second part)

Contents of this Section

The Correspondence of Abelard and Heloise

(K - Z)

Bibliography

1. Kamuf, Peggy. 1982. Fictions of Feminine Desire: Disclosures

of Heloise. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press.

Contents: Acknowledgments IX; Introduction: Prologue to

What Remains XI, 1 Marriage Contracts: The Letters of Heloise

and Abelard 1; 2 Writing on the Balcony: The Portuguese

Letters 44; 3 A Mother’s Will: The Princess de Cleves 67; 4

Underground Rousseau: Julie, or the New Heloise 97; 5 Detour

Signs: Les Liaisons Dangereuses 123; Notes 149; Bibliography

163; Index 167-170.

"My principal focus in each of these chapters is on the

particular structure which is working to appropriate and

disguise the force of a womans passion. In a first moment—that

of The Portuguese Letters—the structure can be located in the

subject / object syntax of the remembered discourse of

seduction. The course which Mariana follows in the five letters

is one which writes this syntax differently—and in a manner

which exposes her desire to itself.

With The Princess de Cleves, the sentence that operates to

obscure the heroine’s desire is not spoken in the lovers’

exchange but in the exchange between mother and daughter,

from where it can continue to echo and drown other voices. For

the princess, then, extricating her own desire from this

sentence cannot be a matter of reversing its syntax but would

require a break in the closed dialogue with the parent. In Julie,

or the New Heloise, it is a parent’s name—the father’s—which

functions to suppress the woman’s dissident passion and to

bury the evidence of a difference within a singular identity.

Finally, with Les Liaisons Dangereuses, we return to the syntax

of seduction but as already doubled from the outset and

therefore already reversed and uncovered. In this narrative of

multiple seductions and multiple desires, the only space left for

the appropriation of a disruptive difference is at the juncture of

the fictional text with the text of the reader's reading. It is here

as well that I conclude this book, and it will remain to my

reader to assume—or not—the difference which no text can

annihilate without leaving traces of such a violence."

(Introduction pp. XVI-XVII)

(...)

"Epilogue [to the first chapter]

We have isolated what appear to be the most important terms

of the exchange between Heloise and Abelard. These letters

stage a confrontation between, on the one hand, a system of

mirrored oppositions which cloisters the sexual object and, on

the other, a generalized economy of desire in which the

suspension of such oppositions is the scene of erotic pleasure.

Written from within her cloister, Heloise’s text dissolves the

distinction of inside and outside, the law and its transgression,

her vows and her desire.

Likewise, the act of negation repeatedly calls up its contrary

and maintains Heloise at a constant distance from any effective

break with her sexual past. No sign can represent that negation

except as a fiction, and in the space of that fiction, the space of

one sign and its negated other, the movement of desire is again

uncovered, displacing opposition with an unruly difference." (p.

41)

2. Kong, Katherine. 2010. Lettering the Self in Meideval and

Early Modern France. Roodbridge, Suffolk: D. S. Brewer.

Chaoter 2: Writing the Subjunctive into the Indicative:

Commanding Performances in the Letters of Abelard and

Heloise, pp. 55-108.

"These letters attest to the profound possibilities and limits of

epistolary discourse through which the terms of Abelard and

Heloise’s complicated relationship are contested, established,

and performed, but Heloise asks the question best in her

gesture of an outside-in willed transformation: letter writing

might well function as conduct, offering a kind of action and as

such a specifically epistolary way of being, but are there limits

to its performative, transformative powers? The multiplicity of

positions and gestures performed by Heloise and Abelard

reveals that social categories and structures can be inadequate

to convey the complicated situations in which people find

themselves. However, they are all we have, and in these letters

Heloise provides a moving example of how discursive tools can

be employed to shape ourselves to the world from the outside

in.

Her epistolary performance hangs suspended between the

representational and the real, and yet it shows how letters offer

ways of articulating an unconventional idea of the self through

writing, and it holds out the tantalizing possibility — whether

realized or not — of writing ourselves out of the desired

possibility of the subjunctive into the actual indicative." (p.

108)

3. Luscombe, David Edward. 1980. "The Letters of Heloise and

Abelard since ‘Cluny 1972’." In Petrus Abaelardus (1079-1142).

Person, Werk und Wirkung, edited by Thomas, Rudolf, 19–39.

Trier: Paulinus-Verlag.

"It will have become clear by now how far it has been beyond

my capability to offer here a precis or a omment on all that has

been contributed or refuted on the subject of the Letters since

1972, That the last few years have been fertile in argument

needs no further underlining. Three suggestions may, however,

be briefly made by way of conclusion. First, the editions we

possess of the works of Abelard are far from perfect.

The death of Father Buytaert was a great loss. But I am

confident that what one scholar seems to have initiated will be

completed soon by several. We need, too, a concordance to the

works of Abelard in order to be able to study more closely the

language and the vocabulary of this master of the arts of

language. This, too, I hope to see done soon.

Secondly, it is up to the historians now to regain some of the

ground they have recently lost to the students of literature. The

Letters are literature but they are also history. M. Jolivet

expressed himself wisely on this point: ‘L’Abélard et l’Heloise

de la correspondence, fussent-ils de pures fictions litteraires,

auraient le même droit que Julie et Saint-Preux à être appeles

de leurs noms; mais ces noms sont aussi ceux de personnages

reels..... Les linguistes tentent d’y échapper en s’en tenant, par

methode, au texte: mais cela n’abolit pas la dimension

historique et le probleme qui s’y pose(102).’

Jürgen Miethke’s study in Francia of Abelard’s contribution to

church reform is a good example of how the Historia

calamitatum, in spite of its exaggerations, can be treated as a

valuable historical source containing much precise

information(103). The Historia calamitatum fits together very

well with other diplomatic and narrative sources. Much of the

most interesting work done by Professor Benton, too, relates to

the sources for the early history of the Paraclete, its cartulary,

its ‘necrology’ and so on. But, as Monsieur Verdon has recently

remarked(104), we know so much less about the history of nuns

than of the history of monks. In the last few years the poverty of

our knowledge of the institution of the Paraclete has become

clearer. If Professor Benton would reedit the cartulary, if

someone would analyse the ‘necrology,’ then, along with Father

Waddell’s edition of the Ordinal and his study of the liturgy of

the Paraclete, great progress would be made towards a clearer

appreciation of the life of the nuns with whom both Abelard

and Heloise became concerned in their letters. I say ‘became’

concerned because a conversion of some sort did occur." (p. 31)

(102) Abelard entre chien et loup,’ Cahiers de civilisation

médiévale, XX (1977), p. 310.

(103) J. Miethke, ‘Abaelards Stellung zur Kirchenreform. Eine

biographische Studie,’ Francia, 1 (1972), pp. 158-92.

(104) J. Verdon, ‘Les moniales dans la France de l’Ouest aux

XIe et XIIe siècles,” Cahiers de civilisation médiévale, XIX

(1976), p. 247.

4. ———. 1988. "From Paris to the Paraclete: The Correspondence

of Abelard and Heloise." In Proceedings of the British

Academy, edited by Luscombe, David, 247–283.

"In another letter to Heloise, Abelard writes that he is sending

sermons, written at her request, for her and for her spiritual

daughters gathered together, as he writes, in our oratory.(106)

They follow the ordering of the feasts from the beginning of

man's redemption. He mentions as a related fact that he has

recently composed a book of hymns and sequences on her

request.(107) The hymns survive as do three accompanying

letters to Heloise, addressed again as his sister, and to the other

sisters at the Paraclete. In the first of these he cites some lines

from an otherwise unknown letter from Heloise giving her view

that in the Latin and the Gallican church the use of hymns has

become unsatisfactory. Abelard replies by reinforcing her

arguments in a manner which reminds us of his prologue to the

Sic et non: he insists on the need to stick to authentic and

accurate texts, not to use incorrect translations of the Psalms or

hymns by uncertain authors or hymns with corrupt

versification. So persuaded is he by Heloise that he has written

his new hymns to fill the gaps caused by the defective traditions

to which she has drawn attention.

His collection contains 133 newly written hymns. They are a

striking collection and embrace much of salvation history.(111)"

(pp. 268-269, some notes omitted)

(106) PL. 178, 379-80 (...)

(107) Libello quodam hymnorum uel sequentiarum a me

nuper precibus tuis consummato ... ' P.L. 178, 379-80.(...)

(111) The best exposition of the plan of the hymn books is that

of Szövérffy, Hymnarius.

References

Szövérffy, Joseph (ed.), Peter Abelard's Hymnarius

Paraclitensis. Vol. I: Introduction to Peter Abelard's Hymns.

Vol. II: The Hymnarius Paraclitensis - Text and Notes, Albany:

Classical Folia Editions 1975.

5. Marenbon, John. 2000. "Authenticity Revisited." In Listening

to Heloise: The Voice of a Twelfth-Century Woman, edited by

Wheeler, Bonnie, 19–33. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

"In 1974, the distinguished literary historian Peter von Moos

published a book called Mittelalteiforschung und Ideologie

(Medieval Research and Ideology). It might seem, at first, an

odd title for a book discussing the authenticity of the love

letters of Abelard and Heloise, especially for one taken up

entirely by a survey of previous scholarly controversy.

But von Moos's work is no ordinary history of scholarship.

(...)

This chapter continues the task von Moos began, and I, too,

hope a general moral emerges from my particular observations,

although not the same moral as his. I shall begin

chronologically where von Moos stopped. He covered a span of

170 years; I shall have just 25. But they have been crowded

years for specialists in this field, and an important new element

has entered the discussion that makes my task particularly

relevant for a volume that focuses not on Abelard but on

Heloise. Much of the most recent writing about the love letters

has been by scholars working from a variety of feminist

perspectives (as this present volume indeed illustrates). Their

contributions have given a new twist to the underlying

ideological debate, which I shall look at later. Before that I will

very briefly sketch out the main lines of the historical and

philological debate, as they were in 1974 when von Moos wrote

and as they have developed since then, and examine the

ideological conflict before the major impact of feminist

scholarship.(3)" (pp. 19-20)

(3) I present a very brief sketch of the controversy. For a fuller

account, see John Marenbon, The Philosophy of Peter Abelard,

pp. 82-90.

References

Peter von Moos, Mittelalteiforschung und Ideologiekritik. Der

Gelehrtenstreit um Héloise, Munchen: Wilhelm Fink 1974.

6. ———. 2008. "Lost Love Letters? A Controversy in Retrospect."

International Journal of the Classical Tradition no. 15:267–

280.

Review of Constant J. Mews, The Lost Love Letters of Heloise

and Abelard: Perceptions of Dialogue in twelfth-century

France, ser. The New Middle Ages (New York: St Martin’s

Press, 1999), XVII + 378 pp.

"Constant Mews has been one of the leading scholars, on the

textual side, in this recent recovery of Abelard as a philosopher.

It is due to him that the evolution of the different of versions of

his Theologia is now understood, that the Dialectica is seen as

a work from early in his career, and that the Sententiae are

recognized as an excellent guide to Abelard’s whole theological

and ethical system. On first opening the present book and

glancing at some of the pages, the reader might well – and, in

many ways, with good reason – take it as another contribution

to this process of historical elucidation: it is rich with Mews’s

knowledge of the details of ecclesiastical politics in the early

1100s and of women’s role in the intellectual life of the times, of

the varied sources for Abelard’s biography and the disputes

over their interpretation, and it seems to move easily and

purposefully into the more technical areas of his thought, such

as his treatment of universals. But the title, The Lost Love

Letters of Heloise and Abelard (LLL), gives an immediate

warning that Mews’s central purpose is to claim a sensational

discovery: a new set of letters between the famous couple,

completely distinct from the small collection known for

centuries.

Mews’s claim has been strongly contested: the controversy has

generated articles from many well-known specialists in

Medieval Latin, a lengthy answer by Mews to his critics, and a

fresh defence of the attribution by Sylvain Piron in his French

translation of the letters.5 This is why, although eight years

have passed since LLL was published, it makes sense to review

it now: it is time for a retrospect, drawing together the various

arguments, criticisms and replies, adding some new

considerations, and seeing what conclusions emerge." (pp. 268-

269)

(5) ‘Enquête sur un texte’ in Lettres des deux amants,

attribuées à Héloïse et Abélard, tr. et pr. S. Piron, Paris:

Gallimard, 2005, pp. 175–218 (= ‘Enquête’).

7. McLaughlin, Mary M. 1975. "Peter Abelard and the dignity of

women: Twelfth century "feminism" in theory and practice." In

Pierre Abélard - Pierre le Vénérable. Les courants

philosophiques, littéraires et artistiques en Occident au milieu

du XII siècle, edited by Jolivet, Jean and Louis, René, 287–333.

Paris: Éditions du Centre national de la recherche scientifique.

Abstract: An examination of the ideas relating to women and

their "dignity," frequently developed by Abelard in his writings

concerning the monastery of the Paraclete and also taken up in

a very significant manner in his other works, reveals him as the

most eloquent spokesperson, in the 12th century, of what one

might call "evangelical feminism." Indeed, making the

evangelical life and the imitation of Christ the fundamental

principle of all his reflections on the religious life of women, he

sets out a conception of their dignity and exemplary role that is

central to the reforming ideal he would like to see realized at

the Paraclete by the nuns of this monastery. In those of his

writings that deal with this subject, his personal and spiritual

views on the imitatio Christi, considered from the perspective

of women, are so revealing of the structure of his thought that

his "feminism" becomes not only the touchstone of his teaching

moral and religious, but also that of the authenticity of the

letters in which this “feminism” is most widely exposed.

8. McNamer, Elizabeth Mary. 1991. The Education of Heloise:

Methods, Content, and Purpose of Learning in the Twelfth

Century. Lewiston: Edwin Mellen Press.

"Heloise is remembered in literature only because of her

association with Abelard. This study seeks to rectify this

situation, and to give the real accomplishments of this

remarkable woman." (Preface, p. IX)

(...)

"Design of the Study

The case study qualitative research method was chosen as the

most appropriate design for this study. This design lends itself

to non-experimental studies when there is no manipulation of

the data. Qualitative case study is 'particularistic," designed to

arrive at a comprehensive understanding of the person studied.

(20) The education of Heloise is a particular study of a

particular person at a particular time in history. This study is

inductive, focusing on the process, understanding and

interpretation of the data. Since this educational case study is

historical, it necessarily borrows from historical methodology.

It relies on primary documents and secondary sources as

evidence. When dealing with primary documents, the writings

of Heloise herself and the official documents of the Paraclete

are referred to as ’'internal" evidence; other original documents

and writings are called "external" evidence. The study is

descriptive and analytical in nature.

The first step in the study was to collect data from both primary

and secondary sources which formed the case study data base.

One such source was found serendipitously. Baron Charles

Walckenaer, the present owner of the Paraclete, pointed out the

Rue de Juifs and the twelfth century synagogue at Quincy, less

than a mile from the Paraclete. Another source, the

Problemata, had not been translated into English. The official

documents of the Paraclete had been translated into French [*],

but were not available in English.

The data was then organized into categories. The first category

included references to cultural and social attitudes that

determined the education received by men and women in the

twelfth century, and events that were effecting changes in

society at this time. This category also included references to

medieval education, what was studied, and how.

The second category included references to the education of

Heloise and to her scholarship as well as references to other

scholars who were her contemporaries. The last category

covered references to the work of abbesses in the twelfth

century, references to Heloise's achievements as abbess,

references to her achievements as scholar-educator, and

references to Heloise in literature.

Having collected the data, the second step was to do a critical

examination of the sources. The primary sources used were:

three personal letters from Heloise to Abelard; her letter to

Peter the Venerable written after the death of Abelard; the

Problemata, a series of questions on problematic passages in

the Scripture, which is a letter she directed to Abelard and to

which he replied; the Institutiones Nostrae, a redaction of

Heloise's rule for her community; the Historia Calamitatum

and the Confession of Faith, both in the form of letters written

by Abelard; and four personal letters of Abelard to Heloise.

Internal examination of the primary sources required the

creation of historical context. The study called for detailed

knowledge of twelfth century culture so that there was an

understanding of the milieu in which Heloise lived and wrote.

To create this historical context, reliance was heavily placed on

secondary sources, "someone else's description and analysis of

data."(21)

Material was then selected from the sources that was relevant

to education, to scholarship, to Heloise as abbess and educator-

scholar, and analyzed in as fair a manner as possible. A modest

amount of inference in interpreting the data was used to fill in

gaps in the records, founded on the knowledge of the culture

and social climate of the first two thirds of the twelfth century,

and the concept of an intelligent woman operating in that

environment.

Narrative was used to the extent that it was necessary to

organize the material, to draw the facts together, and to give

unity and coherence to the study." (pp. 7-8)

[*] A. Lalore, Le Chartulaire de L'Abbey de Paraclet. Collection

des principaux chartulaires du diocese de Troyes. Troyes:

Bibliothèque, 1878.

(20) Merriam, Sharan B., Case Study Research in Education

(San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, W). 11.

(21) Ibid., 110.

An appendix contains the translation of the Problemata by

Heloise, pp. 111-183.

9. Mews, Constant J. 1998. "Peter Abelard and the Enigma of

Dialogue." In Beyond the Persecuting Society: Religious

Toleration Before the Enlightenment, edited by Laursen, John

Christian and Nederman, Gary J., 25–62. Philadelphia:

University of Pennsylvania Press.

"Peter Abelard (1079-1142) is often remembered as a victim of

persecution.

Punished by castration in 1117 following his affair with Heloise,

then accused of heresy at the Council of Soissons in 1121 and

again by Bernard of Clairvaux at the Council of Sens in 1140,

Abelard has long been considered a forerunner of the cause of

toleration in the West. At one stage in his career, he

contemplated going to live in Muslim territory, where he

thought he would be made more welcome than in Christendom.

Abelard lived at a time of unusual interest by some Latin

scholars in the non-Latin

world, even though strong forces were afoot to re-assert Latin

orthodoxy in Europe and the Middle East.(1) His Dialogue of a

Philosopher with a Jew and a Christian or Collationes has

been seen by some as a plea for intellectual toleration.(2) Is this

too idealistic a perspective? Was he rejecting a contemporary

trend toward exclusion of the outsider, or did he in fact

participate in that movement Anna Sapir Abulafia has

identified as the Christianization of reason in the twelfth

century, by which Christian thinkers found

reasons for proving that Jews and pagans were blind to the

truth?(3) In order to assess Abelard's contribution to the idea

and practice of religious toleration, we need to relate his

Dialogus both to his other writings and to those of his

contemporaries, for whom dialogue was often a technique for

asserting the truth rather than for engaging in a listening

exercise." (p. 25)

10. ———. 2000. "Abelard and Heloise: Logic, Love, and Desire."

Analysis (Australian Centre for Psychoanalysis) no. 9:37–57.

Abstract: "The article explores the notions of love and desire as

expressed by the 12th century's most passionate, but tragic,

lovers, Peter Abelard and Heloise. The focus is on the lovers'

relationship as described in Abelard's 'Historia calamitatum'

and in Heloise's love letters. Jacques Lacan's views on love,

desire and logic and his comparison of his own situation with

Abelard's imagined status as a persecuted logician are also

discussed."

11. ———. 2000. "Philosophical Themes in the Epistolae duorum

amantium: The First Letters of Heloise and Abelard." In

Listening to Heloise: The Voice of a Twelfth-Century Woman,

edited by Wheeler, Bonnie, 35–52. New York: Palgrave

Macmillan.

"The contrast in attitudes of the teacher and student toward

love is very similar to that which divides Abelard from Heloise.

Coupled with other parallels between the vocabulary of the love

letters and that of early logical writings of Abelard, this

similarity must constitute strong circumstantial evidence in

favor of identifYing the Epistolae duorum amantium as an

incomplete copy of the lost letters of Heloise and Abelard,

exchanged at the time of their affair in 1116/17. If this exchange

is an epistolary novel, it is a dialogue of astonishing brilliance.

These letters document a student's desire to acquire mastery of

philosophy, above all in relation to ethics. In the Historia

calamitatum Abelard was eager to show that he had

transcended what he considered to be the one major blemish

on his career, his seduction of Heloise. She took the

opportunity of reading his account (perhaps deliberately

written with the idea that it should also be read by Heloise) to

urge Abelard to enter again into a more intimate epistolary

dialogue such as she had once enjoyed at Notre-Dame.

Although initially reluctant to make that step, Abelard did

evolve in his willingness to participate in the life of the

Paraclete, as the unfolding of his correspondence makes clear.

Yet Abelard always remained committed to academic and

monastic values, profoundly patriarchal in character. There

were limits to the extent to which an educated man was

prepared to go in his dialogue with a woman. In those early

years of their relationship, Abelard had difficulty in providing

Heloise with the kind of philosophical dialogue that she sought.

Those early difficulties never fully disappeared." (pp. 48-49)

12. ———. 2001. "Hugh Metel, Heloise, and Peter Abelard: The

Letters of an Augustinian Canon and the Challenge of

Innovation in Twelfth-Century Lorraine." Viator. Medieval and

Renaissance Studies no. 32:59–91.

Abstract: " The fifty-five letters of Hugh Metel (ca. 1080-1150),

an Augustinian canon of Toul, were edited by C. L. Hugo in

1731, but have attracted little scholarly attention, even though

some of them are addressed to such famous personalities as

Bernard of Clairvaux, Peter Abelard, and Heloise. This paper

questions simplistic attempts to describe Hugh as a

traditionalist by showing that although he admired Bernard of

Clairvaux, he was much more interested than Bernard in

combining classical poetic allusions with scriptural imagery.

Hugh was interested in innovative educational trends in the

twelfth century, but became critical of negative tendencies,

such as those embodied in Peter Abelard. At the same time his

two letters to Heloise provide valuable evidence into the extent

of her reputation as an innovative writer. Hugh's prose is

compared to other contemporary letter collections, in particular

the Epistolae duorum amantium, which, this article argues,

records the early letters of Abelard and Heloise."

13. ———. 2002. "Interpreting Abelard and Heloise in the

Fourteenth and Early Fifteenth Centuries: The Criticisms of

Christine de Pizan and Jean Gerson." In Chemins de la pensée

médiévale: Études ofertes à Zénon Kaluza, edited by Bakker,

Paul J.J.M., Faye, Emmanuel and Grellard, Christophe, 709–

724. Turnhout: Brepols.

"While Christine de Pizan (1365-ca. 1429) and Jean Gerson

(1363-1429) are well known for their public criticisms of Jean

de Meun’s Romance of the Rose, the occasional allusions they

made to the letters of Abelard and Heloise during the years

1401/1402 have attracted less attention.(1)

The fact that Christine de Pizan does not mention Heloise at all

in the Book of the City of Ladies is particularly intriguing, given

her interest in providing historical precedents vindicating the

dignity and wisdom of women. Christine’s alliance with Jean

Gerson during the debate about the Romance of the Rose also

raises important questions about her relationship to Latin

clerical culture.Was she, as some have argued, a conservative

prude, with little sympathy for the creative originality and

naturalism of Jean de Meun? Have her admirers exaggerated

the feminist aspect of her contribution to the debate? It

deserves to be pointed out, however, that Christine and Gerson

differed significantly in their response to the Romance of the

Rose. Just as Zénon Kaluza has warned against using Gerson’s

identification of philosophical schools to understand Parisian

intellectual life in the fourteenth and early fifteenth centuries,

so we cannot rely on the chancellor’s rhetoric to classify

contemporaries as either partisans or critics of Jean de

Meun5(5 ristine de Pizan had her own reasons for distancing

herself both from the Romance of the Rose and from the letters

of Heloise." (pp. 709-710, some notes omitted)

(1) The key documents in this debate are edited by E. Hicks, Le

débat sur le Roman de la Rose, Paris 1977 (Bibliothèque du xve

siècle, 43). They have been translated into English by J. L.

Baird and J. R. Kane, La Querelle de la Rose: Letters and

Documents, Chapel Hill (NC) 1978 (North Carolina Studies in

the Romance Languages and Literatures, 199).

14. ———. 2004. "Bernard of Clairvaux, Peter Abelard and Heloise

on the Definition of Love." Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia no.

60:633–660.

Abstract: "This paper examines the thinking of Bernard of

Clairvaux about love in relationship to the ideas of his two

famous contemporaries, Peter Abelard and Héloise.

It looks at Bernard's intellectual debt to William of Champeaux

on issues of sin and grace, and to William of Saint-Thierry for

ideas about how amor evolves into caritas.

Bernard makes a stronger link between amor and dilectio, and

introduces use of the Song of Songs, to explain how worldly

love can develop into spiritual love. The author also considers

the evolution of the ideas about love of Peter Abelard, observing

that he draws on the same definition of Cicero in the Sic et Non

and Theologia as underpins a rather crude attempt to define

love in the Epistolae duorum amantium, which the author of

the article thinks to be a record of the early letters of Abelard

and Héloise. Whereas Abelard always contrasts worldly and

spiritual love, the effort of Héloise to connect amor and dilectio

parallels that of Bernard."

15. ———. 2005. Abelard and Heloise. Oxford: Oxford University

Press.

Chapter 2. The early years: Roscelin of Compiègne and William

of Champeaux, pp-21-42.

"This chapter examines Abelard's intellectual debt to both the

vocalist theories of Roscelin of Compiègne and William of

Champeaux's teaching about dialectic in shaping his

philosophical nominalism. By looking at the earliest records of

Abelard's teaching of dialectic and glosses on Aristotle,

Porphyry and Boethius, it observes how students identified him

as an iconoclast teacher, who quickly provoked laughter by the

examples that he chose. It traces how Abelard's early conflict

with his teachers laid the foundation for the subsequent

difficulties he would experience in his career."

Chapter 3. Challenging tje Tradition: the Dialectica, pp. 43-57.

"This chapter examines Abelard's Dialectica, his first major

treatise on dialectic. The treatise is structured around an

analysis both of the major parts of speech, categories and of

different kinds of argument, categorical and hypothetical. It

argues that a driving theme is Abelard's desire to counter the

philosophically realist arguments presented by William of

Champeaux."

Chapter 5. Returning to Logica, pp. 81-100.

"This chapter examines the Logica 'Ingredientibus', a series of

commentaries on Porphyry, Aristotle, and Boethius more

profound than any of his earlier glosses. I argue that in these

commentaries Abelard adopts a much more profound theory of

universals and of other parts of speech than in the Dialectica.

Rather than emphasizing differences of opinion with William of

Champeaux, they demonstrate how far Abelard had come to

distance himself from the arguments of Boethius. Instead of

speaking uniquely about dialectic, he is now interested in

logica, the arts of language in general."

16. ———. 2008. The Lost Love Letters of Heloise and Abelard:

Perceptions of Dialogue in Twelfth-Century France. New York:

Palgrave Macmillan.

Second edition with a bibliography since 1999 (First edition

1999). With a translation by Neville Chiavaroli and Constant J.

Mews.

"This book is the product of a journey that began in 1976 when

I first came across Ewald Könsgen’s edition, Epistolae duorum

amantium: Briefe Abaelards und Heloises? (Leiden: E. J. Brill,

1974) in Auckland University Library, New Zealand. I was

attracted by the subtitle and was curious to find out how those

letters related to the more well-known correspondence between

Heloise and Abelard." (Introduction, p. XIII)

(...)

"It was when reading afresh the Epistolae duorum amantium

in 1993, this time with greater awareness of Abelard’s

vocabulary as a logician, that I encountered words and ideas

that sent a shiver down my spine. Terms like “without

difference” (indifferenter) and “knowability” (scibilitas) were

words to which Abelard paid great attention in his logic. Could

an incomplete copy have been made in the fifteenth century of

the lost love letters of Heloise and Abelard?" (Introduction, p.

XIV)

(...)

"This book focuses not just on the authorship of these letters,

but on the broader issue of relationships between educated

women and men in twelfth-century France. Heloise and

Abelard have long occupied a key role in the collective

mythology of European civilization as epitomizing values of

love and reason respectively. The protracted debate over the

authenticity of the famous letters of Abelard and Heloise is part

of an ongoing process of re-interpretation of their legacy. By

looking at the wider phenomenon in the twelfth century of men

and women communicating with each other through the

written word, always through the filter of the manuscript

record, I hope to show how the relationship of Abelard and

Heloise brings to a head many central tensions within French

society in the twelfth century." (Introduction, p. XV)

17. ———. 2009. "Discussing Love: The "Epistolae duorum

amantium" and Abelard's "Sic et Non"." The Journal of

Medieval Latin no. 19:130–147.

"There is no question that the definition of love that the teacher

came up with in letter 24 is much less sophisticated than that

presented by Abelard in his Theologia "Scholarium." The

castration seems to have precipitated in Abelard a re-evaluation

of many of his past ideas. The Sic et Non provides us with clear

evidence that he applied himself to a thorough analysis of what

the Fathers had to say about the subject, and expected his

students to do the same. Yet even before Abelard became a

monk, the Epistolae duorum amantium - if we accept them as

an imperfect record of his exchanges with Heloise - suggest that

he spent much time discussing the nature of love with his most

brilliant student, Heloise. The hypothesis that the Epistolae

duorum amantium is the work of an authentic couple, different

from Abelard and Heloise, is highly speculative, and

unsupported by historical evidence. The rival hypothesis, that

the entire exchange was invented by an imaginative literary

genius, writing sometime between the late twelfth and fifteenth

centuries, creates an even more complex hypothesis, again

unsubstantiated by any external evidence. The simplest

solution to understanding these letters is to see them as

imperfect copies of the letters that were exchanged by Abelard

and Heloise. Their early discussions of love would indirectly

influence Abelard's further presentation of the subject in his Sic

et Non as well as in his later theological teaching." (pp. 146-147)

18. ———. 2010. "Heloise." In Medieval Holy Women in the

Christian Tradition, c. 1100–c. 1500, edited by Minnis, Alastair

and Voaden, Rosalynn, 267–289. Turnhout: Brepols.

"Heloise’s interest in the text of Scripture is vividly illustrated

by the forty-two Problemata that she sent to Abelard, with an

introductory letter asking for his response to them.41 Many of

these deal with ethical dilemmas presented by the Bible, and

implicitly question traditional notions of morality. For example,

if Christ commanded that he who was without sin should cast

the first stone (John 8. 7), how could any judgement be made

upon a sinner? The final question, about whether anyone could

sin when doing something commanded by God, was interpreted

by Abelard as a key question occupying Heloise: how could

God’s command to go forth and multiply (Genesis 1. 28) be

sinful?(42) The choice of problemata to describe what

traditionally were called quaestiones itself reflects a shared

interest of Heloise and Abelard in Greek vocabulary, as ‘more

authentic’ than Latin. Through these questions, Heloise

engaged in serious commentary on the Bible. They give us a

clue to the sort of moral teaching which the abbess was

expected to give during general chapter at the Paraclete." (p.

279)

(41) Patrologia Latina, CLXXVIII, cols 677B–78D.

(42) Ibid., cols 723A–30B

19. ———. 2011. "Heloise." In Encyclopedia of Medieval

Philosophy: Philosophy between 500 and 1500, Second

Edition, edited by Lagerlund, Henrk, 699–701. Dordrecht:

Springer.

Abstract: "Heloise (c. 1095–1164) was the lover and intellectual

partner of the controversial philosopher and theologian, Peter

Abelard (1079–1142), and abbess of a religious community that

he entrusted to her, the abbey of the Paraclete from 1129 until

her death. She is most well-known for the letters that she

exchanged with Peter Abelard c. 1132/1133, after reacting to his

Historia Calamitatum, in which he argued that providence had

enabled him to survive a turbulent career in which she herself

was profoundly implicated. Whereas Abelard had presented

their affair simply in terms of lust, Heloise emphasizes that she

had always been driven by ideals of selfless love. In a third

letter, she extends her interest in the ethics of intention, asks

him for an account of religious women in history, and a rule

better adapted to the needs of women. Widely revered for her

learning, she prompted Abelard to provide many writings for

the Paraclete, including responses to a series of 42 Problemata

about questions presented by inconsistencies within the Bible.

Mews (The lost love letters of Heloise and Abelard, 2nd edn,

2008. St Martin’s Press, New York, 1999), Mews (J Mediev

Latin 19:130–147, 2009) argues that she is the young woman

whose voice is preserved in an exchange of over 100 Latin love

letters (the Epistolae duorum amantium) between a

controversial teacher and his brilliant pupil, preserved in a

fifteenth-century manuscript of Clairvaux."

20. ———. 2014. "Between authenticity and interpretation: On the

letter collection of Peter Abelard and Heloise and the Epistolae

duorum amantium." Tijdschrift voor Filosofie no. 76:823–842.

Summary: "This article reviews the recent edition by David

Luscombe, accompanied by an English translation (based on

that of Betty Radice) of The Letter Collection of Abelard and

Heloise (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 2013). In particular it

considers Luscombe's claim that the exchange begins with

quarrelling about love, but concludes with shared reflection on

religious life. It examines the unity of the letter collection as

preserved in manuscripts, with particular attention to the way

it is often reproduced, as in this volume, without the final text,

the Institutiones nostre, which sets out the actual observances

of the Paraclete in the time of Heloise, adapted from early

Cistercian observances. This is despite the fact that it follows

Abelard's Rule (correctly identified by Luscombe as his

Institutio for the Paraclete) in the fullest surviving manuscript

of the exchange, Troyes, Mediathèque MS 802.

The article also re-examines issues of philosophical vocabulary

raised by the Epistolae duorum amantium, preserved in the

library of Clairvaux, responding to Luscombe's summary of

debate about whether these might be the letters that both

Abelard and Heloise say they exchanged at the time of their

affair."

21. ———. 2014. "Abelard, Heloise, and Discussion of Love in the

Twelfth-Century Schools." In Rethinking Abelard: A Collection

of Criticai Essays, edited by Hellemans, Babette, 11–36.

Leiden: Brill.

"One consequence of Peter Abelard’s account in the Historia

calamitatum of his early relationship with Heloise is that he is

more often associated with love as sexual passion (amor) than

with love as either caritas, the spiritual ideal to which all

Christians are called, or dilectio, selfless love for a friend. Yet

Abelard was fully aware of the complexities of discusssion

about the relationship between caritas, dilectio and amor

taking place within both the schools and monastic cloisters

during the twelfth century.(1)" (p 11)

(...)

"The ideas about caritas reported in records of Abelard’s

Sententie were relatively crude compared to those in his own

writings, but they provoked alarm among some of his

contemporaries, in particular Hugh of Saint Victor—who was

devoting his own great synthesis of theology throughout the

1130s, in his treatise On the Sacraments of the Christian Faith.

Much more thoroughly than either William of Saint-Thierry or

Bernard of Clairvaux, Hugh rejected what seemed to be

Abelard’s purely human understanding of love. He did not

understand the subtleties of Abelard’s discussions with Heloise

about the nature of love and true intention. In their way, his

criticisms of Abelard were not unlike those of Heloise, that he

assumed love already existed between intimate friends, rather

than as an ideal to be reached. Hugh, however, like William and

Bernard, believed that love could only be attained through

grace. Yet there were others in the twelfth-century schools who

recognised that there were elements of value in what Abelard

had to say about caritas in the Theologia ‘Scholarium’. The

author of the highly influential Summa Sententiarum, a

masterly synthesis of doctrine from the late 1130s, included

Abelard’s definition of caritas as honorable love, directed to its

due end, along with Cicero’s definition of friendship as good

will to another, for that person’s sake, as a way of giving a more

human dimension to the meaning of caritas.

Did this definition of love in the Summa Sententiarum

transmit to the schools of the mid twelfth century a distant

memory of Abelard’s early discussions on the subject with

Heloise?" (pp. 35-36)

(1) A significant exception is the study of C. Stephen Jaeger,

Ennobling Love: In Search of a Lost Sensibility (Philadelphia:

University of Pennsylvania Press, 1999).

22. ———. 2015. "Bertrada de Montfort, Peter Abelard and Adelard

of Bath. The Critique of Authoriry in the Early Twelfth

Century." Parergon no. 32:1–29.

Abstract: "Bertrada de Montfort is well known Jor provoking

the wrath of senior churchmen in the late eleventh and twelfth

centuries, for leaving her husband, Count Fulk IV of Anjou, and

engaging in what they considered to be an illegitimate marriage

to Philip I of France. This article explores hitherto unexamined

connections between Bertrada’s role as Queen of France and

two intellectuals, both celebrated for promoting the cause of

reason against blind respect for authority, namely Peter

Abelard and Adelard of Bath. Bertrada deserves to be

considered not as a self-seeking virago, as claimed by her

critics, but as someone who challenged ecclesiastical authority

in a similar way to these two celebrated thinkers of the early

twelfth century. Both thinkers sought to place authority on a

firmer, more rational foundation, echoing Bertrada’s own

critique of ecclesiastical authority in marrying Philip against

the view of many reforming ecclesiastics."

23. ———. 2020. "Imagining Heloise as Abbess of the Paraclete."

Journal of Religious History no. 44:422–442.

Abstract: "This article argues that traditional presentations of

Heloise focus on her image as a heroine of love rather than

giving sufficient attention to her status as abbess of the

Paraclete. In particular, there has been unjustified neglect of

the final dossier in her exchange, known as the Institutiones

nostre, written in response to Peter Abelard's Institutio, or Rule

for the Paraclete. These observances were formulated to

establish uniform practices at both the Paraclete and its first

daughter‐house at Trainel, dedicated to Mary Magdalen. This

neglect of Heloise's role as an abbess encouraged a tendency in

the late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries to focus on

themes of erotic rather than religious longing, as well as a

subsequent tendency to question the authenticity of the letters

of Heloise, without full appreciation of her role as abbess of the

Paraclete. A translation of the Institutiones nostre is included

as an appendix."

24. Muckle, Joseph T. 1950. "Abelard's Letter of Consolation to a

Friend (Historia Calamitatum)." Mediaeval Studies no.

12:163–213.

"This work is commonly known today as Historia

Calamitatum, a title which is not found in any of the

manuscripts in the first hand and in only one in a second hand,

Ms Rheims 872 (see note 2, page 175), and then only as an

alternative title.

In the first editions of the works of Abelard by Amboesius

(Franc;ois d'Amboise) and Quercetanus (André Duchesne) in

1616, and in those of Orelli (1841), Cousin (1849) and of Migne

(1855), the title is: Epistola prima quae est Historia

Calamitatum Abaelardi ad Amicum scripta. The name

Historia Calamitatum was probably taken from a sentence in

the last paragraph of the work (p. 210) where Abelard says:

Haec ... de calamitatum mearum historia ... me ... scripsisse

sufficiat. We know it was so called as early as the time of

Petrarch,(1) for he speaks of the work as historia suarum

calamitatum. It does not adequately designate the contents of

the letter, much of which is devoted to an account of Abelard's

triumphs and also to consideration of the value of a quiet life

for a student.

I have retained the title found in the first hand in the two best

manuscripts: Troyes 802 and Paris, B.N. lat. 2923: Abaelardi

ad Amicum suum consolatoria (Epistola). It was not likely

given as a title by Abelard himself.

Nothing is known of the identity of the friend to whom the

letter was addressed. Various guesses have been made, while

some scholars think the epistolary form itself of the work is

simply a literary device of Abelard to afford a setting and

occasion. He had precedents enough for this in Cicero's

dialogues, not to mention those of Plato wherein treatises are

represented as records of discussions between friends on

special occasions. Whatever theory one may adopt, it is plain

that apart from the first and last paragraphs there is scarcely a

word referring to a friend. On the other hand, Heloise in her

first letter to Abelard considers that this work was a letter

written to soine particular person.

In several of the previous editions the work is divided into

fifteen chapters.

This division into chapters is found in the edition of d'

Amboise, but I have not retained it as it is not found in any of

the manuscripts." (p. 163)

25. Newman, Barbara. 1992. "Authority, authenticity, and the

repression of Heloise." Journal of Medieval and Renaissance

Studies no. 22:121–157.

Reprinted as Chapter 2 in B. Newman, From Virile Woman to

Woman Christ: Studies in Medieval Religion and Literature,

Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press 1995, pp. 46-75.

"In the unlikely event that my title has left any suspense, let me

state my own parti pris at the outset. My intention in this

chapter is twofold. First, I will try to dispatch once for all the

old hypothesis that Abelard forged the letters of Heloise as part

of a literary fiction. Then, after concluding this fervent but no

doubt futile attempt, I will show how the same questions that

have vexed the scholarly debate over Heloise—questions of

authority, authenticity, and repression of the female voice—are

precisely the questions that most vexed Heloise herself in her

pious and amorous wars with Abelard. There is, in short, an

uncanny resemblance between the debate about the text and

the debate within the text.

What, Heloise asks herself as well as her beloved, is the

authority for her monastic conversatio, for the austere and

undesired life that she chose "freely at his command"?(3) What

kind of authenticity, given her undisguised lack of vocation,

could she possibly aspire to or attain in that life? And what yoke

of repression could she bear to impose, more than a decade into

the course, on all that still displeased Abelard and God—her

desire and her anger, her memories, her words? To the chagrin

of many readers, the answer to all of these questions seems to

be "obedience to Abelard's will."

Yet if Abelard's mastery appears complete when the

correspondence ends—perhaps more complete than it ever was

in reality—it has been yet more fully realized by certain latter-

day interpreters. There are those for whom Heloise's letters are

"authentic" only as part of Abelard's oeuvre; their authoritative

word is Abelard's message of conversion; and the cost of this

would-be redemption from the limbo of thirteenth-century

forgery and eighteenth-century legend is not only the

repression of Heloise's desire, but the complete obliteration of

her voice.

I will try to show here that this "grotesque hypothesis"(4) is

grounded in a priori notions of what a medieval abbess could

write, frank disapproval of what Heloise did write, and at times

outright misogyny. Further, I want to demonstrate that the

thesis of Heloise as Abelard's literary creature not only fails to

resolve the textual problems it is invoked to explain, but creates

new and ludicrous problems that have so far been neglected

only because the proponents of this thesis have ruled whole

realms of investigation out of court." (pp. 46-47 of the reprint)

(3) "Ad imperium nostrum sponte velata," Abelard, Historia

calamitatum, ed. Jacques Monfrin (Paris, 1959): 81

(4) Evelyne Sullerot, Women on Love: Eight Centuries of

Feminine Writing, trans. Helen Lane (Garden City, 1979): 42.

The "grotesque hypothesis" is part of a widespread pattern, as

Sullerot notes: "Evaluations of women's writings on love are

subject to two very common biases: an indulgence that borders

on infatuation, on the one hand, and on the other a

thoroughgoing skepticism, causing all texts attributed to

women to be viewed as apocryphal, and in fact the handiwork

of men" (41).

26. ———, ed. 2016. Making Love in the Twelfth Century: Letters

of Two Lovers in Context. Philadelphia: University of

Pennsylvania Press.

A new translation with commentary by Barbara Newman.

"My purpose in this book is not just to take sides (though i will

do so) but still more to advance interpretation of the letters

from three standpoints. First, while the pioneering english

translation by Mews and his student Neville Chiavaroli has

served scholarship well thus far, it is time now to correct its

several inaccuracies and infelicities in the light of subsequent

research. There is room for a translation with greater literary

ambitions, especially with respect to the thirteen poems that

nestle among the prose letters." (Preface, p. XIV)

(...)

"in the second place, I have done my best to situate the

Epistolae more precisely in their intellectual and rhetorical

milieu. Thus my comment on each letter ends with a list of

citations, allusions, and parallels. Like any such apparatus, this

is a collaborative project; i have added my own discoveries to

the extensive work already done by Könsgen, Mews, Piron, von

Moos,(35) and others." (Preface, p. XIV)

(...)

"Finally and most crucially, i want to ask what the Epistolae

can tell us about the history of emotions, for which they are a

uniquely valuable source. here alone do we have a substantial

dossier of letters exchanged in real time between two lovers, a

man and a woman. None of the twelfth century’s many fictional

letters, verse epistles, troubadour and trouvère lyrics, goliardic

songs, lais, or romances offer us a comparable opportunity to

observe a real love relationship between two historical persons

as it waxes and wanes, passing through every emotional phase

from enchantment to disillusionment. The canonical letters of

Abelard and Heloise come closest, but even though they are

often called “love letters,” that label is misleading.

Exchanged between priest and nun, abbot and abbess, they

dissect an affair that had long since ended, analyzing it within a

context of spiritual formation and monastic direction. Whether

or not the famous couple also wrote the Epistolae duorum

amantium, the two exchanges are very different." (Preface, p.

XV)

(...)

"If the lovers were Abelard and Heloise, these early letters show

how they reached the point where we meet them in the Historia

calamitatum. if we should decide the lovers were only a couple

“like” Heloise and Abelard, as Könsgen proposed, their

relationship can still yield much insight into the dilemma faced

by their more famous contemporaries." (Preface, p. XVII)

(...)

"in the absence of a smoking gun, the case for Abelard and

Heloise remains unprovable. But in light of all that we know

thus far, it is highly probable." (p. 78)

27. Nye, Andrea. 1992. "A Woman's Thought or a Man's Discipline?

The Letters of Abelard and Heloise." Hypatia no. 7:1–22.

Reprinted in Linda Lopez McAlister (ed.), Hypathia's

Daughters: Fifteen Hundred Years of Women Philosophers,

Bloomington: Indiana University Press 1996, pp. 25-47.

"In what follows I consider this macroquestion of the nature

and possible future of philosophy by way of microstudy of a

disagreement between a woman student and her male

philosophy teacher, a disagreement that occurred at the very

beginnings of philosophy as an academic discipline. The

woman is the twelfth-century abbess Heloise. Her teacher is the

famous Peter Abelard, originator of many of the attitudes and

practices of academic philosophy as we know it today. At issue

between them were conflicting ideals of goodness and love but

also differences regarding thought and language. It is my hope

that a careful reading of their dispute will show that the

personal nature of their disagreement is not irrelevant to the

question of the nature of philosophy." (p. 25 of the reprint)

(...)

"Heloise’s thought not only has the negative quality of being

unlike Abelard’s, it also offers a positive example. What would a

philosophical community be like in which Heloise’s thought

would be at home. It would have to accommodate passionate

speech that comes from the problematic experience of women

and of men. It would be motivated by a concern for mutual

understanding that can stabilize and repair relations between

persons.

Its discussions would be critical and, at the same time,

constructive of new forms of understanding. Positions would be

articulated not in battles of rival wills maneuvering within an

accepted framework of concepts that may have lost any

reference to experienced reality, but in the kind of free and

open discussion that Abelard refused. If philosophy as we know

it has often perpetuated and articulated that refusal, might a

new philosophical community be informed by Heloise’s and

Aspasia’s wisdom, their subtle, sensitive, mobile, flexible

women’s tongues? Might philosophers finally admit what Saint

Paul and Abelard denied, that a woman can be the teacher of a

man?" (p. 41 of the reprint)

28. Ostrowski, Donald. 2020. Who Wrote That? Authorship

Controversies from Moses to Sholokov. Ithaca: Northern

Illinois University Press.

Chapter 4. Did Abelard and Heloise Write the Letters

Attributed to Them?, pp. 75-103.

"Two sets of letters are in question here.

The first set has fifteen letters. Nine are attributed to Abelard,

four of which are addressed to Heloise, and six attributed to

Heloise (three addressed to Abelard and one to Peter the

Venerable), which Jean de Meun claimed he found and used in

the 1280s to translate the letters into French. The second set of

113 anonymous letters was transcribed in the late fifteenth

century by the monk Johannes de Vepria (ca. 1445–ca. 1515),

prior of Clairvaux from 1480 to 1499. This set has been referred

to in the scholarship as Epistles of Two Lovers (Epistolae

duorum amantium). To keep the two sets distinct, I will refer

to the first set of letters as AH-1 and the second set as AH-2."

(p. 81)

(...)

"In 2000, John Marenbon surveyed the controversy for the

twenty-five years since von Moos’s book appeared in 1974 and

came down squarely on the side of the traditional attribution—

that is, that Abelard wrote the letters attributed to him and

Heloise wrote those attributed to her.(66) It was clear that the

defenders of the traditional view had been more resourceful in

finding evidence and formulating arguments than the skeptics.

Thus, by 2001, Dronke felt secure enough that the question of

attribution had been resolved in favor of the traditional view to

state: “I hope the oft-repeated older claim that these are

forgeries no longer needs serious discussion.”(67) But just at

the point when the Abelardo-Heloisians thought they had

vanquished the challenges of the skeptics to AH-1, they found

themselves faced with the challenge of the attribution of

another set of letters to Abelard and Heloise." (p. 96)

(...)

"When the monk Johannes de Vepria transcribed AH-2 in the

late fifteenth century, interest in them remained dormant. The

letters are unattributed but most of them, have either a V or an

M at the beginning. V is understood to stand for Vir (Man) and

M for Mulier (Woman)." (p. 96)

(...)

"In 2009, Sylvain Piron analyzed the content of M’s letters in

AH-2 and found connections with those of Heloise in AH-1:

“The crucial difference between the two women voices we have

been discussing is that one was preparing herself for the

eventuality of dramatic events, while the other had already

been through tragedy.”(81) Here then is the fundamental

conundrum of AH-2. They are letters written apparently by two

individuals who find themselves in the same or similar position

that Abelard and Heloise found themselves. There are no

noticeable anachronisms in the letters, and there is nothing in

the contents of them that would preclude their having been

written by Abelard and Heloise. Yet stylistic analysis beyond

citing particular words tends not to support the identification of

V with Abelard and M with Heloise. That leaves open the

possibility, as I mentioned above, that a third party wrote these

form letters with the exchange between Abelard and Heloise in

mind but was unconcerned about stylistic verisimilitude. The

items of AH-2 may simply have been a literary exercise and not

intended to be understood as having been written by Abelard

and Heloise." (p. 101)

(67) Peter Dronke, review of Listening to Heloise. The Voice of

a Twelfth-Century Woman, ed. Bonnie Wheeler, in

International Journal of Classical Tradition 8, no. 1 (2001):

135.

(81) Sylvain Piron, “Heloise’s Literary Self-fashioning and the

Epistolae duorum amantium,” in Strategies of Remembrance:

From Pindar to Hölderlin, ed. Lucie Doležalová (Newcastle

upon Tyne, UK: Cambridge Scholars, 2009), 50.

29. Pernoud, Régine. 1973. Heloise and Abelard. New York: Stein

and Day.

Translated from French by Peter Wiles.

"The Abelard who emerges from the Letter to a Friend must

have been exceptionally hard to get on with. He seems to have

been entirely lacking in empathy and to have shown no concern

for others - except perhaps his pupils, but here he was swayed

by vanity and the desire to strengthen his hold over them. It is

extraordinary that he should have been thrown into contact

with such an extreme ‘temperamental opposite’ as Peter the

Venerable, and even more extraordinary that it was Peter who -

quite literally, by publicly absolving him after death - had the

last word.

By the time the two met, however, Abelard had undergone an

inner change which opened his heart to Peter’s loving-kindness

and enabled him to feel its benefits to a degree which would

have been wholly impossible at the time of Peter’s earlier

approach, soon after the Council of Soissons. But for the

ordeals which he had suffered in the intervening years he would

never have assented to the reconciliation with himself and

others which Peter urged upon him." (p. 224)

30. Piron, Sylvain. 2009. "Heloise’s literary self-fashioning and the

Epistolae duorum amantium." In Strategies of Remembrance:

From Pindar to Hölderlin, edited by Doležalová, Luice, 102–

162. Cambridge: Cambridge Scholars Publishing.

"By addressing issues connected with memory in two

collections of twelfth century Latin letters – the famous

correspondence exchanged between Heloise and Abelard(2)

and the anonymous set of love letters known as Epistolae

duorum amantium(3) – this article pursues two different goals

at the same time. On the one hand, it will be easily recognised

that such personal documentation, not often preserved from

the medieval period, offers appropriate material for observing

how memories of educated people were constructed, sustained

and expressed. But the choice of studying these two collections

side by side is also connected to another explicit purpose. Such

a confrontation provides an occasion to put to the test the claim

made by Constant Mews that the two anonymous lovers are

indeed Heloise and Abelard in the early phase of their affair;(4)

this test will eventually result in formulating a new argument in

favour of this ascription. As will gradually become clear, these

two perspectives are in fact closely related, since they are both

investigating the ways in which literary memory is shaping

personal identity at its most intimate." (p. 103)

(2) Abelard, Historia Calamitatum, ed. Jacques Monfrin

(Paris: Vrin, 1974); Lettres d’Abélard et Héloïse, ed. Éric Hicks,

transl. É. Hicks, Th. Moreau (Paris: Le Livre de Poche, 2007). I

will quote from Monfrin for HC and Ep. II and IV, from Hicks

for the remaining letters.

(3) Ewald Könsgen, Epistolae duorum amantium: Briefe

Abaelards und Heloises? (Leiden: Brill, 1974).

(4) Constant J. Mews, The Lost Love Letters of Heloise and

Abelard. Perceptions of Dialogue in Twelfth-Century France,

with translations by N. Chiavaroli and C. J. Mews (New York:

Palgrave, 1999). An additional chapter to the second edition,

forthcoming in 2008, “New discoveries and insights 1999-

2006,“ presents a number of new arguments in favour of the

ascription. My references will be to that new edition.

31. ———. 2018. "Heloise’s sentimental education." Clio. Women,

Gender, History no. 47:155–166.

Translated from the French by Anne Stevens.

"In producing a new English translation, with commentary, of

the Epistolae duorum amantium (EDA), Barbara Newman has

reshuffled the cards of an already much-discussed topic.(1)

These extracts from 116 anonymous letters, poems or short

messages exchanged between a man and a woman were edited

in 1974 by Ewald Könsgen. They gave rise to a lively discussion

when, in 1999, the Australian historian Constant Mews

suggested that they could be identified as parts of the

correspondence between Heloise and Peter Abelard during

their love affair.(2) These documents constitute by far the most

extensive exchange of letters known from the entire Middle

Ages." (p. 153)

(...)

"Our understanding of the documents is substantially enriched

by the commentary and the identification of new sources which

she attaches to them. On the other hand, the way in which she

has altered the order in which the extracts are presented in the

manuscript is highly questionable. Barbara Newman has, in

fact, decided to place the two final pieces at the start of the

exchange of letters, since she regards them as constituting the

opening of the correspondence. This is not the place to embark

upon an in-depth philological analysis to demonstrate that

there is no serious textual or material justification for this

decision. I will, however, come back to it briefly below, to

demonstrate that this decision obstructs our understanding of

the relationship developed between the two correspondents."

(p. 154)

(1) Newman, Barbara. 2016. Making Love in the Twelfth

Century. Letters of two lovers in context. Philadelphia:

University of Pennsylvania Press.

32. Posa, Carmel. 2007. "Divine love in the writings of Heloise of

the Paraclete." Tjurunga no. 73:77–90.

"I want to approach this present investigation, from simply one

perspective and a theological one at that. I would like to suggest

that "Absence" is not only a metaphorical theme, but also a

theological theme, which underscores both the context of, and

expression within Heloise's writings to Abelard. In these

writings we discover an absent Abelard; an absent monastic

rule suitable for women an absent motherhood due to the

absence of the curiously named Astrolabe their son;(6) and, as I

will demonstrate in this paper, the implicit sense of an absent,

though not insignificant God. All of these moments of

"absence" culminate in the "absence" of the particular identity

of Heloise as she takes on the universal identity of the Christian

subject in her role as Abbess of the Paraclete.

The platonic temptation, pervasive through the history of

Christian theology, is to abstract the body in the discussion of

the soul's journey towards God and this has been particularly

detrimental to women's bodies and their "otherness" in relation

to men, symbolically considered more capable of imaging God

in their bodies than are the bodies of women. God, the

"irreducible Other", is not found in abstraction, but in and

through loving relationships with other bodies who are also

"other"." (pp. 78-79)

33. ———. 2011. "Problemata Heloissae: Heloise’s Zeal for the

Scriptures " Journal of Religious History no. 35:337–351.

Abstract: "Both the early love letters of Heloise and Abelard,

and their later correspondence, are suffused with the biblical

text. In these collections, Heloise either refers directly or

indirectly to the scriptures in order to sustain her arguments

with Abelard, or as in the early love letters particularly, she

moves freely in and out of either direct quotation of the

scriptural texts or allusion to it, with the ease of any monastic

writer of her era.

However, it is in the Problemata Heloissae that we find direct

evidence of Heloise’s approach to the study of Scripture for her

community of the Paraclete. The series of forty-two questions

raised in the Problemata reflects concerns with which Heloise

had been preoccupied all her life and appear consistently within

all her correspondence with Abelard. These concerns stressed

the ethical interpretation of the Bible and focused on the

struggle to maintain a life of inner integrity in the face of sin,

and the meaning of love particularly as expressed by the

“freedom of the Gospel”."

34. Robertson Jr., Durant Waite. 1972. Abelard and Heloise. New

York: The Dial Press.

"There is something very attractive about the idea of a man who

is at once a great philosopher and a great lover, and it is

perhaps unfortunate that the philosopher and the lover must

here be separated by over five hundred years. There are, in

effect, two ‘“‘Abelards,” each of whom has profoundly

influenced subsequent generations. The second Abelard,

moreover, has influenced the first Abelard, at least in

reputation, producing a tangle of fact and fiction of a kind that

makes history one of the most fascinating (and diverting) of all

studies. Both Abelards are described in the pages that follow.

There is first an account of Abelard’s life. It is impossible to

write a very full account without resorting to conjecture, but I

have tried carefully to distinguish conjecture from verifiable

fact, so that the reader can identify my own attempts at

elaboration. There follows a brief survey of the high points of

the legend of Heloise, in which the second Abelard appears in a

number of different guises. In this legend both Abelard and

Heloise shamelessly adapt themselves to current fashions,

shifting to flatter succeeding stylistic tastes. Economic, social,

and cultural changes have given them a remarkable plasticity.

Even here there is room for differing interpretations, especially

where the major documents are concerned, but I have thought

it best to set forth my own views, without calling attention to

the views of others, a procedure that would lead the reader into

a maze of footnotes inappropriate in a book of this kind."

(Preface, p. XIV)

35. Ruys, Juanita Feros. 1993. "Role-playing in the Letters of

Heloise and Abelard." Parergon no. 11:53–78.

"Widely differing readings of the Letters of Heloise to Abelard

have been offered over the years, principally because the

attitudes Heloise expresses appear to be inconsistent. even

contradictory, from one letter to another. This paper attempts

to show that the clisjunctures perceived are evidence of role-

playing by Heloise. It is my contention that she adopts different

roles in order to bend Abelard to her will, pragmatically taking

up, modifying, or abandoning roles as the situation and

Abelard's response demand." (p. 53)

36. ———. 2011. "From Virile Eloquence to Hysteria Reading the

Latinity of Heloise in the Early Modern Period." In Latinity

and Alterity in the Early Modern Period, edited by Haskell,

Yasmin and Feros Ruys, Juanita, 137–167. Turnhout: Brepols.

"As Yasmin Haskell has asked in introducing this volume: “Did

the Latin writing of early modern women mitigate, or merely

accentuate, their otherness?”. (5) This paper will attempt to

answer this question through a reading of the early modern

reception of the Latinity of the accomplished and eloquent

medieval abbess Heloise.(6) It will show that there is a clearly

chartable swing in the reception of Heloise’s Latinate writing in

the course of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, where

an initial medieval reading of this Latinity as a virile rhetoricity

that allowed Heloise to surpass her own sex and become the

equal of the male sex in eloquence was overtaken by a

perception of Heloise’s writings as quintessentially female —

abandoned, natural, unmediated, irrepressible. This shift,

driven in large part by the vernacularization, popularization,

and poeticization of Heloise’s writings, meant that the

reception of these writings became coded for gender, and it was

these gender considerations that eventually allowed the

authenticity of these writings to be questioned. In this process

not only was Heloise’s Latinity first marginalized and then

forgotten, but the concept of female Latinity in general was

constructed as at once a curiosity, and later, an impossibility."

(pp.138-139)

(5) This is a pertinent question, for we must remember that in

parallel with the evidence listed in the note above detailing the

acceptance of medieval women’s Latinity by their male peers,

there remained a strong undercurrent sense of the (potential)

alterity of women’s Latin: see Barbara Newman, “More

Thoughts on Medieval Women’s Intelligence: Denied,

Projected, Embodied,” in Voices in Dialogue: Reading Women

in the Middle Ages, ed. Linda Olson and Kathryn Kerby-Fulton

(Notre Dame, 2005), 231–243, here 234–235: “a woman’s

unexpected Latinity could be taken as a symptom of demonic

possession . . . . In short, since it was as ‘unnatural’ for a woman

to know Latin as it was for her to write, one who confounded

male expectations had to be inspired by either God or the

devil.”

(6) There have been a signiicant number of studies dealing with

the trajectory of the figure of Heloise through the early modern

period, focusing on visual images of her or her appearance in

French and/or English literature. No study to date, however,

has speciically considered issues relating to her Latinity and its

reception.(...)

37. ———. 2019. "Before the Affective Turn: Affectus in Heloise,

Abelard, and the Woman Writer of the Epistolae duorum

amantium." In Before Emotion: The Language of Feeling,

400–1800, edited by Ruys, Juanita Feros, Champion, Michael

W. and Essary, kirk, 61–75. New York: Routledge.

"As other essays in this volume reveal, there was a revolution in

thinking about the nature of emotions, their functioning in the

human person, and their role in the relationship between the

individual soul and God taking place in twelfth-century

monastic and early scholastic culture. These ideas, often

focused on the terms affectus and affectio, are evident amongst

the Victorines (Michael Barbezat), the Cistercians (Constant J.

Mews), and female-centric monastic culture (Barbara

Newman). Yet in this same period, the highly influential

philosopher and theologian Peter Abelard (1079–1142), and

Heloise, his former student, long-term intellectual colleague,

and abbess of the Convent of the Paraclete (d. 1164), show

themselves less moved by this new thinking on emotions, and

more indebted to Augustinian ideas of affectus based in the will

as disposition, intention, or inclination." (p. 61, a note omitted)

38. Smith, Anne Collins. 2002. "The Problemata of Heloise." In

Women Writing Latin: From Roman Antiquity to Early

Modern Europe. Volume 2: Medieval Women Writing Latin,

edited by Churchill, Laurie J., Brown, Phyllis R. and Jeffrey,

Jane E., 173–190. New York: Routledge.

"While Heloise did curtail her expression of her grief and

perplexity about their personal relationship in response to

Abelard’s command,(9) by no means did she cease to write.

Among the valuable writings by Heloise during this period are

the Problemata, a list of questions that Heloise and her

students collected as they studied scripture and submitted to

Abelard.(10) At first glance, the Heloise who emerges in the

Problemata appears far less personally engaged with her topic

and thus far less personally accessible to the reader than the

Heloise of the Letters. Unlike the Letters, which directly

concern issues of relevance to Abelard and Heloise’s personal

history, the Problemata draw nearly all their questions from

scripture. They are written in the first person plural, and there

is no indication which questions, if any, are asked by Heloise

herself and which come from her students.

Nevertheless, the Problemata offer us considerable insight into

Heloise’s teaching persona and pedagogy. The text opens with a

cover letter that functions as an apologia for the project. Its first

paragraph cites St. Jerome’s praise of Marcella for her scholarly

enthusiasm. Heloise records Jerome’s approval that Marcella

did not “think that anything I might answer was right, in the

manner of the Pythagoreans, nor did a prejudged authority

without reason have value according to her; but she examined

all things, and thought broadly with a wise mind, so that I felt

that I had not so much a student as a judge.” Marcella is clearly

held up as a type that Heloise intends to emulate. Abelard,

meanwhile, is cast in the role of Jerome, whose answers are to

be judged by examination and not simply accepted on

authority." (pp. 174-175)

(9) Clanchy remarks on the implications of this command:

“More significant in its consequences for European culture than

the castration and persecution of Abelard (the ‘calamities’ that

followed his marriage) was the silencing of Heloise, as that was

a prelude to the silencing of academic women as a class for the

next eight centuries” ([Abelard: A Medieval Life (Oxford:

Blackwell’s, 1998)],p. 46).

(10) A complete English version of Heloise’s Problemata and

Abelard’s responses may be found in McNamer’s The

Education of Heloise [(Lewiston, N.Y.: Edwin Mellen Press,

1991)

39. Southern, Richard William. 1970. Medieval Humanism and

Other Studies. Oxford: Blackwell.

"We may reasonably suppose that it was Heloise who preserved

the correspondence and placed the earlier letters in front of the

monastic instructions. They contained the only record of the

life of the founder, and they provided an explanation for the

foundation of the monastery and its customs. Heloise and

Abelard alone can have had copies of both sides of the

correspondence, and she survived him in the monastic life for

twenty years. The letters dominated her life as they did not

dominate Abelard’s; indeed they were her life, and the basis for

the life of the monastic foundation that she did her best to

make great. Why should she alter them?

She would scarcely alter Abelard’s; as for her own, she has not

removed her blemishes, and it is hard to see why she should

add to them. Nor does she give the impression that she was a

woman who easily changed her mind. At the end of the

collection of letters, someone—possibly Heloise herself—added

additional rules and texts for the discipline of the nuns, and

these additions have been preserved in one of the best

manuscripts of the letters that we have. In this form the letters

remained (as I picture it) at the Paraclete unknown to the

outside world till nearly the end of the thirteenth century, when

perhaps a chance visitor from Paris or a renewed interest in

Abelard brought the correspondence to a wider public and

made it part of the world’s literature." (p. 103)

40. Sweeney, Eileen C. 2007. "Abelard's Historia Calamitatum and

Letters: Self as Search and Struggle." Poetics Today no.

28:303–336.

Abstract: "In this essay, I offer an interpretation of Abelard’s

Historia Calamitatum and letters exchanged with Heloise,

arguing that both are informed by the attempt to look below the

surfaces of language, self, and action to a reality beneath and to

achieve authenticity, by which I mean coherence between

surface and depth. This reading shows an emerging sense of

self and self-knowledge based on the relationship between

external act and internal intention. While using traditional

medieval narrative forms, I argue, Abelard gives his story a

modern-sounding autobiographical twist: that its moral is

about matching outer to inner self. While the project is never

complete, the search itself becomes an identity; Abelard

achieves authenticity in his rejection of all the models of it that

were available to him. This is not done to unmask a self without

place or parallel but to make the case for a new way of life in a

new community for the inner self who is truly seeking God.

Thus, like Augustine before and Rousseau after him, Abelard

writes about his own life with a philosophical aim: to display

the nature of what it is to be human and to make claims about

how human life ought to be lived."

41. Synan, Edward A., and Jeauneau, Édouard. 1995. "Some

Remarks on the Muckle Translation of Abelard's Adversities."

Mediaeval Studies no. 57:337–343.

"The late J. T. Muckle, C.S.B., has made a substantial

contribution to our understanding of the celebrated letters of

Peter Abelard. This contribution has been especially valuable in

the case of Abelard's Historia calamitatum, for this scholar has

given us both an edition of the Latin text and a splendid

translation of that text into English, the latter enhanced by

Etienne Gilson's preface.(1) Our intention here is to provide, in

the interest of precision and clarity, four "remarks" on that text

and on its translation.

Although we have consulted on all four "remarks," the first two

were raised originally by E. A Synan and the last two by E.

Jeauneau." (p 337)

(1) J. T. Muckle, "Abelard's Letter of Consolation to a Friend

(Historia Calamitatum)," Mediaeval Studies 12 (1950): 163-

213 [hereafter, ALC]; idem, The Story of Abelard's Adversities:

A Translation with Notes of the "Historia calamitatum," with a

preface by Etienne Gilson, Mediaeval Sources in Translation 4

(Toronto, 1954, revised 1964) [hereafter, SAA, pagination of the

1964 edition]. The other letters edited by Muckle are in "The

Personal Letters Between Abelard and Heloise: Introduction,

Authenticity and Text," Mediaeval Studies 15 (1953): 47-94.

42. Waithe, Mary Ellen. 1989. "A History of Women Philosophers:

Volume II: Medieval, Renaissance and Enlightenment Women

Philosophers A.D. 500-1600." In, edited by Waithe, Mary Ellen,

67–83. Dordrecht: Kluwer.

"IV. Summary

Dronke, referring to the Problemata, says that(32)

... Heloise should be considered not only in relation to Abelard,

as has always been customary, but also in relation to other

medieval women writers, to see precisely in what ways a

womanly awareness comes to be expressed - and to be called in

question - in her writings, and how her self-understanding

compares with that of other medieval women who have left us

written testimonies.

Prudence Allen(33) studies Heloise's views on women. In

Allen's view, Heloise represents a curious contrast. One of the

best educated and intellectually accomplished women of her

time, her words clearly express views of women's inferiority to

men, even though that view becomes modified over time. Yet,

we can assess what Heloise says and contrast what she says to

what her words reveal about her and about Abelard. Her letters

reveal her teacher, her husband and her religious superior to be

a man of enormous gifts and enormous shortcomings. The

most brilliant philosopher of his day, Abelard could not live by

the very principles he taught to Heloise. As his student, Heloise

not only lived by those principles, but would have been

disillusioned to realize that Abelard did not live by them. The

man who fathered her child and became her husband against

her better judgement cloistered his wife when marriage no

longer served his career needs, and ignored her when he could

no longer advantage himself of her sexually. The priest who was

Heloise's religious superior had to be scolded into finally

attending to the needs of the nuns of the Paraclete.

Heloise's comments about the inferiority of women to men are

explicit. But we must remember that those comments came

from a philosopher who held Ciceronian views on love, and who

shared Abelard's "ethic of intent." In light of her philosophical

views, and in light of the life which she had led consistent with

those views, Heloise's comments ought to be understood as

placing a high moral value on humility expressed as so-called

"feminine inferiority". (pp. 81-82)

(32) Dronke, Peter. Women Writers of the Middle Ages,

Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, (1984), p. 54.

(33) Prudence Allen, The Concept of Woman: The Aristotelian

Revolution 750 BC-AD 1250. Montreal: Eden Press, 1985, p.

291-292.

43. Ward, John O., and Chiavaroli, Neville. 2000. "The Young

Heloise and Latin Rhetoric: Some Preliminary Comments on

the "Lost" Love Letters and Their Significance." In Listening to

Heloise: The Voice of a Twelfth-Century Woman, edited by

Wheeler, Bonnie, 53–119. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

"Assuming that the "epistolae duorum amantium" are indeed

the letters of Abelard and Heloise, this essay argues that studies

in the trivium meant for Heloise a passport to an intellectually

fulfilling life involving sex and children but not marriage, a

package that Abelard could not comprehend." (p. 53)

(...)

"Conclusion:

Heloise the Arts Student, or Heloise the Anomaly?

We are compelled, we believe, to see Heloise not as the

surviving member of a larger class of females attending the

proto-university cathedral schools of Paris more or less on the

same terms as males but as a rara avis, a young woman

attracted to the environment of the city's schools by exceptional

circumstances, circumstances not unrelated to her obvious

literary talents but not a direct consequence of them. Once

there she seems to have become renowned for her literary

talents, but without formally enrolling as a student in any one

of the masters' schools that were available at the time.

(...)

She must have been, as it were, "partially" in circulation, but

not so fully as to make opportunities for acquaintance easy for

Abelard. Nevertheless, some chance opportunities to see her

would not have been unexpected, and, as he tells us, "bane

igitur, omnibus circunspectis que amantes allicere solent,

commodiorem censui in amorem mihi copulare." (240) He goes

on, in famous lines, to say he felt her love for and knowledge of

letters [litterarum scientiam] would facilitate his conquest.

(...)

Heloise's attempt to sort out her own emotions, the

relationship between letters and love, between Abelard and the

rest of her life, are vividly recalled in the de Vepria collection,

but we are forced to conclude that what Abelard and Heloise

taught each other or learned from each other belonged in the

main to a world that was passing, the world of the Loire

monastic verse friendship ambience. Transferred though this

clearly was to the much more dynamic environment of the early

twelfth-century Paris schools, fused with a genuine and

relatively unrestricted physical relationship, and translated (for

the most part) into prose of a unique and varying pattern, it is

nevertheless observable that Heloise does not seem to have

shared in the intellectual activities of the schools in her district.

While not excluded from discussions with Abelard on various

terms and positions that must have fallen within the fields of

rational and moral philosophy, their mutual reading and

"exercises" clearly fell more within the field of"grammar,"

sensitive reading and imitation of the prescribed auctores,

exploration of the literary dimensions of amicitia as an

alternative to nuptiae as a foundation for a sexual relationship,

of amor as "a creative and complex natural force expressed in

the sweetness of lovers' intimacy." (242) In all these respects

the de Vepria collection does not so much change our picture of

Heloise and Abelard in the second decade of the twelfth

century, as sharpen it immensely and reveal its tragic

poignancies, the shortcomings of the male and the infinite

flexibility and optimism of the female, laying all the while a

much firmer basis of understanding of the later, more

celebrated letter collection and its vain but moving demand for

a resumption of the dialogue that has been preserved for us in

the "lost" letter collection." (pp, 81-82)

44. Wheeler, Bonnie, ed. 2000. Listening to Heloise: The Voice of a

Twelfth-Century Woman. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Contents: Series Editor's Foreword IX; Acknowledgments X;

Chronology XI; Abbreviations XIII; Bonnie Wheeler:

Introduction: Listening to Heloise XVII-XXII;

Chapter 1 Mary Martin McLaughlin: Heloise the Abbess: The

Expansion of the Paraclete 1; Chapter 2 John Marenbon:

Authenticity Revisited 19; Chapter 3 Constant J Mews:

Philosophical Themes in the Epistolae duorum amantium: The

First Letters of Heloise and Abelard 25; Chapter 4 John 0.

Ward and Neville Chiavaroli: The Young Heloise and Latin

Rhetoric: Some Preliminary Comments on the "Lost" Love

Letters and Their Significance 53; Chapter 5 Katharina Wilson

and Glenda McLeod: Textual Strategies in the Abelard/Heloise

Correspondence 121; Chapter 6 Phyllis R. Brown and John C.

Peiffer II: Heloise, Dialectic, and the Heroides 143; Chapter 7

Jane Chance: Classical Myth and Gender in the Letters

of"Abelard" and "Heloise": Gloss, Glossed, Glossator 161;

Chapter 8 Linda Georgianna: "In Any Corner of Heaven":

Heloise's Critique of Monastic Life 187; Chapter 9 Peggy

McCracken: The Curse of Eve: Female Bodies and Christian

Bodies in Heloise's Third Letter 217; Chapter 10 Donna Alfano

Bussell: Heloise Redressed: Rhetorical Engagement and the

Benedictine Rite of Initiation in Heloise's Third Letter 233;

Chapter 11 Morgan Powell: Listening to Heloise at the

Paraclete: Of Scholarly Diversion and a Woman's "Conversion"

255; Chapter 12 Alcuin Blamires: No Outlet for Incontinence:

Heloise and the Question of Consolation 287; Chapter 13 Brian

Patrick McGuire: Heloise and the Consolation of Friendship

303; Chapter 14 juanita Feros Ruys: Quae maternae immemor

naturae: The Rhetorical Struggle over the Meaning of

Motherhood in the Writings of Heloise and Abelard 323;

Chapter 15 Deborah Fraioli: Pierre Bayle's Reflections on a

Much Discussed Woman: The HELOISE Article in the

Dictionnaire historique et critique 341; Contributors 361;

Bibliography 365; Index 391-394.

45. Ziolkowski, Jan M. 2004. "Lost and Not Yet Found: Heloise,

Abelard, and the Epistolae duorum amantium." The Journal of

Medieval Latin no. 14:169–200.

"The outstanding editio princeps of the Epistolae had been

published thirty years ago by Ewald Könsgen. The Epistolae,

amounting to 113 items in Könsgen’s edition, are extant in a

unique manuscript, Troyes, Bibliothèque municipale, MS 1452,

with the incipit “Ex epistolis duorum amantium.” MS 1452 is a

paper manuscript, written in the second half of the fifteenth

century by a monk named Johannes de Vepria (also known as

Jean de la Véprie and as Jean de Woëvre, ca. 1445–ca. 1518)

when he was roughly twenty-five years old, long before he

became prior of Clairvaux (1480–1499). The last element in his

name is the Latin for La Voire or La Woëvre, near Verdun." (p.

171)

(...)

"My sense is that professional Latinists remain unconvinced

that sufficient proofs on behalf of the ascription to Heloise and

Abelard have been presented. I place myself squarely among

those who believe that Könsgen went as far as due caution

would allow in printing the Epistolae with the subtitle (and the

punctuation thereof) he used, and that Mews and his

supporters have gone too far.(76) Once again, the study of

Abelard and Heloise is embroiled in controversy." (p. 199)

(76) On the punctuation, I can do no better than repeat the

words of Jean Jolivet more than twenty-five years ago in

appraisal of Könsgen’s edition: “Le point d’interrogation du

sous-titre a toute sa valeur. Quoi qu’il en soit ce texte mérite

d’être lu pour lui-même.” See Jean Jolivet, “Abélard entre chien

et loup,” Cahiers de civilisation médiévale, Xe–XIIe siècles 20

(1977), 307–22, at p. 312, n. 20.

Bibliographia. Annotated bibliographies

Raul Corazzon || rc@ontology.co || Info

Bibliography on the Philosophy of

Peter Abelard: English Studies

(First part)

Bibliography A - L

1. "Peter Abelard." 2007. American Catholic Philosophical

Quarterly no. 81:162–338.

Special Issue edited by Jeffrey E. Brower.

Contents: Jeffrey E. Brower: Editor's Introduction 162; Peter

King: Abelard on Mental Language 169; Ian Wilks: Abelard on

Context and Signification 189; Andrew Arlig: Abelard's Assault

on Everyday Objects 209; John Marenbon: Abelard's Changing

Thoughts on Sameness and Difference in Logic and Theology

229; Jeffrey Hause: Abelard on Degrees of Sinfulness 251; Sean

Eisen Murphy: "The Law was Given for the Sake of Life": Peter

Abelard on the Law of Moses 271; A. L. Griffioen: "In

Accordance with the Law": Reconciling Divine and Civil Law in

Abelard 307; Margaret Cameron: Abelard (and Heloise?) on

Intention 323-338.

2. Allen, Julie A. 1998. "On the Dating of Abailarďs Dialogus: A

Reply to Mews." Vivarium no. 36:135–151.

"More recently, Constant Mews has argued that both the

Dialectica and the Dialogus should be dated much earlier in

Abailard's life than has hitherto been thought.(21) Mews

maintains that Abailard composed the Dialogus around 1125

while he was teaching at the Paraclete. In this paper I chal lenge

the validity of this claim." (p. 138)

(...)

"Only one conclusion clearly emerges from our survey of

conflicting evidence. A definitive case has not been made for

either side of the traditional debate. There are considerations

which corroborate Robert and Thomas' arguments in favour of

a date following the council of Sens, just prior to Abailard's

death in 1142. On the other hand, the many and varied parallels

between the later portions of the Dialogus and Abailard's moral

positions in the Ethica support Buytaert and Luscombe's

suggestions that the two works were produced in close

proximity." (p. 151)

3. Arlig, Andrew W. 2022. "Abelard and Other Twelfth-Century

Thinkers on Social Constructions." Philosophies no. 7:1–12.

Abstract: "This article aims to supplement our understanding

of later developments within European universities, that is,

Scholastic thought, by attending to how certain pre-Scholastics,

namely, Peter Abelard and other twelfth-century philosophers,

thought about artifacts and social constructions more generally.

It focuses on the treatment of artifacts that can be cobbled

together out of Abelard’s Dialectica. The article argues that

Abelard attempts to sharply distinguish the world of things

from the world of human-made objects. This is most apparent

in his treatment of creation and human acts of making. Yet

there are places in his thought where we see some hesitancy.

Many of Abelard’s peers seem to have drawn on the reasons

why Abelard hesitates, and they blur the line between human-

made objects such as houses and substances such as rocks and

humans. Others seem to go further than Abelard—perhaps

inspired by some of the thoughts that Abelard also entertains

about social constructions such as days and speeches—and

assert that even houses are merely convenient fictions."

4. Benton, John F. 1975. "Philology's Search for Abelard in the

Metamorphosis Goliae." Speculum no. 50:199–217.

"The investigation which lies behind this article began as a

search for twelfth-century material which would show whether

the image of Heloise presented in the correspondence and the

Carmen ad Astralabium accords with other contemporary

evidence. Pope Adrian IV, Peter the Venerable, and that curious

correspondent, Hugh Mete!, were prepared to write in glowing

terms about her character. If the famous love-letters of Heloise

to Abelard and the Carmen are genuine, we know something

about her innermost thoughts which was hidden from the

world of her day. The Metamorphosis Goliae tells us something

of Abelard's reputation in the schools of Paris, but it provides

us with no information at all about Heloise. Whatever we con -

clude about Heloise and her longing for Abelard will have to be

based on other evidence." (p. 217, two notes omitted)

5. ———. 1975. "Fraud, Fiction and Borrowing in the

correspondence of Abelard and Heloise." In Pierre Abélard -

Pierre le Vénérable. Les courants philosophiques, littéraires et

artistiques en Occident au milieu du XII siècle, edited by

Jolivet, Jean and Louis, René, 471–506. Paris: Éditions du

Centre national de la recherche scientifique.

Résumé . "Cette communication tente de contester

l’authenticité de la correspondance d’Abélard et d’Héloïse et de

proposer une hypothèse en vue de déterminer l'objet et les

moyens de cette fabrication.

Des documents émanant du Paraclet indiquent que c’était un

monastère double où l’abbesse exerçait son autorité sur un petit

groupe de moines, avec des institutions assez semblables à

celles de Fontevrault. La Règle attribuée à Abélard (Ep. VIII) ne

semble pas avoir été suivie au Paraclet aux XIIe et XIIIe siècles;

elle diffère des institutions établies, notamment quand elle

prescrit que les moniales soient sous l’administration du

prepositus monachorum d’une abbaye avoisinante et que la

communauté puisse manger de la viande trois fois par semaine.

^L'Historia Calamitatum elle-même contient de nombreux

passages qui semblent inexacts ou anachroniques.

Comme explication des passages authentiques dans la

correspondance, cette hypothèse suggère qu’un faussaire ait

emprunté à l'Exhortatio ad fratres et commonachos perdue et

peut-être aussi à une Exhortatio ad sorores, autrement

inconnue. Elle suggère aussi qu’on ait écrit l'Historia

Calamitatum au XXe siècle ; comme une fiction littéraire ; il se

peut qu’on y ait ajouté quelques passages .au XIIIe siècle. Le

principal bénéficiaire de la correspondance fabriquée aurait èté

le supérieur des moines du Paraclet. L’énumération des

qualités requises - pour une abbesse laissent supposer qu’une

Règle frauduleuse aurait été façonnée à. l’occasion d’une

élection contestée, peut-être celle qui eut lieu vers 1288. Selon

cette hypothèse, la correspondance renferme des parties

véritablement écrites par Abélard (principalement Ep. VI-VIII),

une section inauthentique du XIIe siècle (la majeure partie de

l'Historia Calamitatum), et certaines parties probablement

remaniées au XIIIe siècle."

6. Bloch, R. Howard. 1983. "Etymologies and Genealogies: A

Literary Anthropology of the French Middle Ages." In. Chicago:

The University of Chicago Pree.

Chapter Four: Poetry, Philosophy, and Desire.

Philosophy and the Family: Abelard, pp. 141-149.

"If I have insisted upon Abelard’s denial of the reality of

universals and his redirection of metaphysics toward problems

of signification, it is because this aspect of his thought is of a

piece with the legend of his castration; and it points, once

again, to the monumental role of the philosopher whose

genealogy is supposedly disrupted in the disruption of an

intellectual genealogy itself predicated on such linguistic and

ontological continuities. He to whom paternity is denied, and

who becomes the central symbol of such a denial, is, ironically,

the one whose ruptured heritage—heritage of rupture—will

prevail. For Abelard’s theory of signs points in the direction of,

and in fact sets the tone for, the radical reorientation of

linguistics of the High Middle Ages." (p. 149)

7. Brower, Jeffrey E., and Guilfoy, Kevin, eds. 2004. The

Cambridge Companion to Abelard. Cambridge: Cambridge

University Press.

Contents: List of contributors XI; Method of citation and

abbreviations XIV; Acknowledgments XVII; Chronology XVIII;

Jeffrey E. Brower and Kevin Guilfoy: Introduction 1; 1. John

Marenbon: Life. milieu, and intellectual contexts 13; 2.

Winthrop Wetherbee: Literary works 45; 3. Peter King:

Metaphysics 65; 4. Klaus Jacobi: Philosophy of language 126; 5.

Christopher J. Martin: Logic 158; 6. Kevin Guilfoy: Mind and

cognition 200; 7. Jeffrey E. Brower: Trinity 223; 8. Thomas

Williams: Sin, grace and redemption 258; 9. William E. Mann:

Ethics 279; 10. Yukio Iwakuma: Influence 305; List of Abelard's

writings 336; Bibliography 341; Index 357-362.

8. Buckley, Ann. 2005. "Abelard's Planctus virginum Israel super

filia Iepte Galadite and Li Lais des puceles." In Études de

langue et de littérature médiévales: offertes à Peter T. Ricketts

à l'occasion de son 70ème anniversaire, edited by Buckley, Ann

and Billy, Dominique, 544–569. Turnhout: Brepols.

"It has been noted by several scholars, among whom the first

appears to havebeen Hans Spanke (1938, 25ff), that the

metrical and melodic schemes of Li Lais des Puceles and

Planctus virginum Israel super fihe Iepte Galadzte, are similar

in form and structure. Furthermore, Planctus virginum Israel,

along with the five other surviving planctus presumed to be the

work of Peter Abelard, provides a vital link between Latin and

vernacular song repertories, connecting also with older Latin

songs such as the lays which are found in the Cambridge

Songbook (CUL MS Gg.v.35, mid 11th century).' The issue of

common ground keys therefore into a much larger area,

namely, that of the relation between Latin and vernacular lais

and other sequence-type

songs - a topic which has been alluded to, in addition to

Spanke, by Wolf (1841/1965), Gennrich (1932), Handschin

(1929-31; 1949-51), Maillard (1963), and Stevens (1986). The

purpose of this article is to compare the lai and the planctus by

analysing the form and structure of their texts, and the musical

material at our disposal. As we shall see, the similarity

identified by Spanke exists in part only, the planctus being

more elaborate than the lai, thus containing additional

elements not found in the latter." (p. 544)

References

Gennrich, F. 1932. Grundriss einer Formenlehre des

mittelalterlichen Liedes als Grundlage einer musikalischen

Formenlehre des Liedes. Halle (Saale).

Handschin J. 1929-31. « Uber Estampie und Sequenz »,

Zeitschrift für Musikwissenschaft 12 (1929), pp. 1-20; 13 (1930-

-1931), pp. 113-32.

Maillard, J. 1963. Evolution et esthetique du lai lyrique des

origines à la.fin du XIV siecle. Diss. Universite de Paris: Faculté

des Lettres, Seminaire de Musicologie.

Spanke, H. 1938. « Uber das Fortleben der Sequenzenform in

den romanischen Sprachen », ZfrPh 51, pp. 309-34 ; repr.

Aarburg 1977, pp. 36-61.

Stevens, J. 1986. Word and Music in the Middle Ages: Song,

Narrative, Dance and Drama, 1050-1350. Cambridge.

Wolf, F. J. 1965. Über die Lais, Sequenzen und Leiche.

Heidelberg 1841 ; repr. Zeller.

9. Burnett, C. S. F. 1984. "Notes on the tradition of the text of the

Hymnarius Paraclitensis of Peter Abelard." Scriptorium no.

38:295–302.

"This brief article unites two items. In the first part a detailed

analysis is given of the readings of one of the two manuscripts

which are our principal witnesses to the text of Abelard's

Hymnarius Paraclitensis. In the second part the evidence of a

hitherto unused manuscript for the text of three of the hymns is

assessed." (p. 295, a note omitted)

10. Burnett, Charles S. F. 1988. "A new text for the "School of Peter

Abelard" Dossier?" Archives d'Histoire Doctrinale et Littéraire

du Moyen Âge no. 55:7–21.

"This article seeks lo introduce an unstudied Summa of

theology which will be shown lo be heavily indebted lo the

leaching of Abelard and may be based on lectures by the

Parisian

Master himself.

Written in a hand of the late thirteenth century on fols. 59r-64v

of ms. Florence, Biblioleca Medicea Laurenziana, cod. XXXVII

bibl. Aedilium, in an ink which is flaking off the page, is a work

entitled Summa senlenliarum ab Alberico magislro

Vangadiliensi collectarum. (2) The lack of another manuscript

of this work or a comparable work prevents one from telling

whether this Summa is a resume of a larger collection of

sentences made by a certain 'Albericus', or is Alberic's own

compendium of sentences. Provisionally, the author will be

assumed to be Alberic. But the question of which of the many

recorded Alberics, if any, this author is, awaits investigation.

The epithet 'Vangaditiensis' suggests that he was a monk at the

Benedictine abbey of Polesine in the Veneto, (3) and a topical

reference within the work contrasting 'here' with 'in Rome'

would seem to confirm the North Italian origin of the work, as

does the provenance of the manuscript." (pp. 7-8)

(2) The description by A. M. Bandinus in Biblioltheca

eopoldina Laurenliana ... (Florence, 1791), I, pp. 51-5 has been

corrected and amplified by P. Ilarino da Milano in "Fr. Gregorio

O.P., Vescovo di Fano, e la 'Disputatio inter catholicum et

paterinum hereticum' ", Aevum, 14 (1940), pp. 85-140, see pp.

103-4. The manuscript is composite, but the portion with which

we are concerned also includes two works relating to the

Paterine heresy which were not written before the late

thirteenth century.

(3) L. H. Cottinau, Répertoire lopo-bibliographique des

Abbayes et Prieurès, Macon, 1937, II, col. 3294, s.v.

Vangadizza.

11. Buytaert, Eligius M., ed. 1974. Peter Abelard: Proceedings of

the International Conference: Louvain, May 10-12, 1971.

Leuven: University Press.

Contents: Preface VII Programme VIII; List of members XI-

XIV; G. Verbeke: Introductory Conference: Peter Abelard and

the Concept of Subjectivity 1; L. Engels: Abélard ecrivain 12; T.

Gregory: Abélard et Platon 38; D. E. Luscombe: The Ethics of

Abelard: Some Further Considerations 65; M. Kurdzialek:

Beurteilung der Philosophie im "Dialogus inter Philosophum,

Iudaeum et Christianum" 85; R. Thomas: Die meditative

Dialektik im "Dialogus inter Philosophum, Iudaeum et

Christianum" 99; R. Peppermüller: Exegetische Traditionen

and theologische Neuansätze in Abaelards Kommentar zum

Römerbrief 116; E. M. Buytaert: Abelard's Trinitarian Doctrine

127; M. T. Beonio-Brocchieri Fumagalli: La relation entre

logique, physique et théologie 153; J. Jolivet: Comparaison des

théories du langage chez Abélard et chez les Nominalistes du

XIVe siècle 163; Index Auctorum 179-181.

12. Clanchy, Michael T. 1990. "Abelard's mockery of St Anselm."

The Journal of Ecclesiatical History no. 41:1–23.

Abstract: "Every reader of Abelard's Historia Calamitatum, the

‘story of his misfortunes’, knows how he mocked his master,

Anselm of Laon. What has not been made clear is that he

mocked in a comparable way a master of even greater standing,

St Anselm, archbishop of Canterbury. The reason why this

latter attack has not been emphasised is that it appears in one

version only of Abelar's Theologia, and its interpretation as

mockery depends on detailed scrutiny. Abelard delighted in

jokes, particularly when they were dangerous. ‘He cannot

restrain his laughter,’ St Bernard warned, ‘listen to his guffaws.’

Jokes depend so much for their effect upon tone and context

that it is difficult for an historian to keep an ear out for them

when he only has formal texts as evidence; furthermore, a joke

loses its cutting edge once it has been laboriously explained.

Nevertheless, Abelar's mockery of St Anselm does have to be

explained step by step if it is to be appreciated at all. The

circumstances are as follows."

13. ———. 2003. "Documenting the self: Abelard and the individual

in history." Historical Research no. 76:293–309.

Abstract: "Were medieval people aware of themselves as

individuals? The history of self-consciousness begins with the

Italian Renaissance, Burckhardt argued. Against this,

medievalists have often cited Abelard’s Historia calamitatum

(his ‘story of calamities’). This article argues that Historia

calamitatum is a history of Abelard’s feelings, especially of his

need for fame, and in this way it documents the self.

But Historia calamitatum presents two Abelards: he is the

‘Palatine’ – courtly, jesting and formidable – and he is equally a

humble monk and Christian apologist.

How did a medieval individual propagate such persistent and

contradictory public images of himself?"

14. ———. 2008. Abelard: A Medieval Life. Malden: Blackwell.

Contents: Preface XI; Map of France in Abelard's time XIV;

Map of Paris in Abelard's time XVI; 1. The Story of Abelard 1;

Part I. Scientia - 'Knowledge'. Chronological table 1079-1117 24;

2. Scientia - 'Knowledge' 25; 3. Literate 41; 4 Master 65; 5.

Logician 95; Part II. Experimentum - 'Experience'.

Chronological table 1117-1118 120; 6. Experimentum -

'Experience' 121; 7. Knight 130; 8. Lover 149; 9. Man 173; Part

III. Religio - 'Religion'. Chronological table 1118-1142 204; 10.

Religio - 'Religion' 207; 11. Monk 220; 12. Theologian 264; 13.

Heretic 288; 14. Himself 326; Who's Who 336; Abbreviations

Used in the Notes 336; Notes 345; Suggestions for Further

Reading 396; Index 399-416.

On the logic see in particular Part I: Scientia - 'Knowledge' pp.

24-118.

"The Structure of This Book.

This book discusses Abelard's roles one by one in successive

chapters (Literate', 'Master', 'Logician', and so on) in order to

build up a composite portrait of him. The sequence of chapters

accords very roughly with the chronology of Abelard's life: from

his precocious success in the schools (chapters 3-5), through

his affair with Heloise (chapters 8-9), to his controversial

career as a monk and theologian (chapters 11-13). Two chapters

are devoted to his affair with Heloise because this was the

turning point of his life, even though the events it comprised

were concentrated in not much more than a single year (1117 or

1118). The concluding chapter (14), entitled 'Himself', centres

on the Delphic subtitle he chose for his book on ethics: 'Know

Thyself'. Overarching the fourteen chapters are the three parts,

with their Latin titles, into which the book is divided: Scientia

(`knowledge' or `science'), Experimentum (`experience' or

'experiment') and Religio (`religion' or `monasticism'). These

three parts characterize Abelard's successive approaches to life

and they function at the same time as an introduction to

medieval culture in the period of the twelfth-century

Renaissance. In Part I, Abelard expounds the 'science' which

the Middle Ages had inherited from classical antiquity. In his

native Loire valley he had begun his road to knowledge as a

'Literate' (chapter 3), that is, as a literatus and Latinist; then in

Paris he had been acknowledged as a `Master' (chapter 4) of

students. He 'who alone knew whatever was known' was a

'master' also in the sense of magus. His wisdom and magic

comprehended all the knowledge of the ancient Greeks in

philosophy and logic (chapter 5), the queen of the sciences.

Contrasting with this theoretical and scholastic knowledge is

Experimentum (Part II): learning not from books, but from

experiencing life in the raw. Theory and fact, reflection and

action, contrast - and often conflict - in Abelard's life, as they do

in medieval culture as a whole. In his book on ethics, he had

argued that actions in themselves are indifferent; only the

intention of the actor makes them right or wrong. Abelard

'experimented' with sex and violence. He compared himself to a

knight (chapter 7), conducting feuds and mock battles in the

schools, and then suddenly he found himself up against Fulbert

and Heloise's other kinsmen in a real feud. In castrating

Abelard, they took no account of his good intentions, but only

of his action in putting Heloise into a convent. Because the

Church put such value on celibacy, Abelard's castration had the

peculiar effect of converting him to 'religion' (Part III), in the

sense that it made him become a monk. Such was the attraction

of monasticism in the twelfth century that the adjective

religiosus (chapter 10) was synonymous with 'monastic', as if

there was no religion outside the cloister. Abelard made

repeated efforts to be a good monk (chapter 1), but he never

could reconcile the exclusiveness of monasticism with his broad

vision of theology (chapter 12), in which good pagans

worshipped the true God and acknowledged the Trinity. He was

not only a failed 'religious', St Bernard taunted, he was .1

blasphemer and a heretic (chapter 13).

(...)

Abelard's writings fill a whole volume (no. 178) of Migne's

Patrologiae:Series Latina comprising about 800,000 words.

His Theologia in its various versions (Abelard kept revising it

over the decades 1120-40) contains more than 200,000 words;

Sic et Non has 130,000, his sermons 115,000, the commentary

on St Paul's Epistle to the Romans 90,000; for Heloise he

wrote another 70,000 words. Migne's volume does not include

Abelard's writings on logic: one big book, Dialectica, survives

(though it is not complete) in addition to other commentaries

and lectures. It is certain that some works have been lost, like

the commentary on the Prophet Ezechiel which Abelard says he

wrote in Paris and the love songs which he reminded Heloise

were still being sung in the 1130s. As his surviving writings

amount to about 1 million words, his total output must have

considerably exceeding that." (pp. 19-22).

15. ———. 2012. "Abelard: Celebrity and Charisma—A Response to

Dickson." Religions no. 3:1140–1143.

Reply to G. Dickson, Charisma, Medieval and Modern, same

journal.

Abstract: "One might think that Peter Abelard (1079?–1144?)

would be the best example of a medieval charismatic teacher.

But his rival and prosecutor St Bernard of Clairvaux (1090?–

1153) fits the criteria rather better. Unlike Bernard, Abelard

denied that he had sought out disciples. Nevertheless, he can be

shown to have had student followers, even though some of

them repudiated him. Abelard is most important as a public

intellectual who depended on public institutions (the incipient

university of Paris) rather than on private or monastic

patronage."

16. ———. 2014. "Was Abelard Right to Deny that He Had Written

a Book of ‘Sentences’?" In Rethinking Abelard: A Collection of

Criticai Essays, edited by Hellemans, Babette, 105–118.

Leiden: Brill.

"Is it likely that Abelard would have put on hold his

fundamental thinking about logic, ethics and Christian doctrine

in order to make a summary of his theological teaching for

students in the form of the Epitome? Perhaps he might have

done so.

(...)

Perhaps therefore Abelard might have written something as

simplistic in appearance as the Epitome with its lucid

propositions which succinctly bring together Abelard’s teaching

on the Trinity, the nature of God and Redemption in Christ,

and the Sacraments. Alternatively, it is possible that the

Epitome was assembled by students who combined some texts

of Abelard’s with what they had heard of his oral teaching.

(63()These students might well have described the little book

which they put together as The sentences of Master Peter

Abelard, where ‘sentences’ meant the master’s essential

teachings.

The production and copying of this book of Abelard’s

‘sentences’ did not mean that he had personally written it or

dictated it. He may never even have seen it or known of its

existence. This would explain why he was astonished by

Bernard’s attribution of it to him and why—in good faith—he

could deny that any such book had ever been ‘written by me’.

The book could indeed contain ‘sentences’ of Abelard’s without

him ever having written it or approved it." (p. 118)

17. Clanchy, Michael T., and Smith, Lesley. 2010. "Abelard’s

Description of the School of Laon: What Might it Tell us About

Early Scholastic Teaching?" Nottingham Medieval Studies no.

54:1–34.

Abstract: "Peter Abelard, in criticizing his master, Anselm of

Laon, c. 1114, describes how theology was taught at Anselm’s

school, which was the most influential teaching institution in

Latin Europe. Abelard provides information in particular about

the commentaries or glosses — both oral and written — on the

books of the Bible, which were Anselm’s speciality. These

established themselves as the Ordinary Gloss, comprising a

commentary on the whole Bible, which remained a standard

work until the seventeenth century. Through biblical

commentaries like Anselm’s, theological questioning was

developed and students began to depend on the textbooks of

their masters rather than on hearing them lecture and

remembering their traditional wisdom. The conflict of Anselm

and Abelard marks the beginnings of universities in France."

18. Colish, Marcia L. 1992. "Peter Lombard and Abelard: The

opinio nominalium and divine transcendence." Vivarium no.

30 (1):139–156.

"This paper has a double inspiration. One is my own

investigation of Peter Lombard's doctrine of God, as part of a

larger study of his theology. The second is the discovery, on the

part of William J. Courtenay, following Artur Michael Landgraf,

Marie-Dominique Chenu, and Johannes Schneider, of the fact

that the Lombard appeals to an argument derived from the

Nominales of the early twelfth cen- tury. Citing this argument,

whose earliest expression he traces to Peter Abelard, Courtenay

describes it as "the principal opinio Nominalium , namely, that

whatever God at one time knew, willed, or was able to do, He

always knows, wills, or is able to do. By the third quarter of the

twelfth century, this theory had been reduced to the axiom:

once it is true, it is always true {semel est verum , semper est

verum)."1 As Courtenay points out, this principle, stated in

Abelardo Theologia "scholarium", rests on the idea that nouns

have a unitary signification, although they also have other

consignifications when they are used in propositions that

include verbs in different tenses, voices, or moods. In the

Theologia "scholarium", Abelard uses this notion to support

one of his most notorious ideas, the claim that God cannot do

better, or other, than He does." (p. 139)

(1) Courtenay 1990, 46. I have capitalized "He" in referring to

the deity in this quotation for the sake of consistency.

(2) Ibid., 46-50.

References

Courtenay, W.J., 1990, Capacity and Volition. A History of the

Distinction of Absolute and Ordained Power. Bergamo.

19. Compayré, Gabriel. 1893. Abelard and the Origin and Early

History of Universities. New York: Charles Scribner.

"Abelard was born in 1079; he died in 1142. The University of

Paris was not formally constituted until sixty years later, in the

first years of the thirteenth century. And yet Abelard has been,

and should be, considered as the real founder of this university,

which served as model and prototype of most of the other

universities of the Middle Ages. There is here an apparent

paradox which must first be resolved and explained, if the title

given to this treatise is to be justified.

Let me begin by establishing the fact that I am in accord with

all serious authorities in attributing to Abelard a pre-eminent

part in the foundation of the great Parisian University. "The

man," Victor Cousin has said, "who, by his qualities and his

defects, by the audacity of his opinions, the éclat of his life, his

inbom passion for controversy, and his rare talent for

instruction, contributed most to increase and expand the taste

for study and that intellectual movement from which the

University of Paris issued in the thirteenth century, was Peter

Abelard.(1) In England the same opinion is held. "The name of

Abelard is closely associated with the commencement of the

University of Paris," says Cardinal Newman in his interesting

essay on the Strength and 'Weakness of Universities.(2)" (pp-3-

(1) Ouvrages inédits d'Abélard, publiés par V. Cousin, 1836.

Introduction.

(2) Cardinal Newman, Historical Sketches, vol. III, p. 189,

London 1889.

20. Dickson, Gary. 2012. "Charisma, Medieval and Modern."

Religions no. 3:763–789.

Abstract: "Popularized by the mass media, Max Weber‘s

sociological concept of charisma now has a demotic meaning

far from what Weber had in mind. Weberian charismatic

leaders have followers, not fans, although, exceptionally, fans

mutate into followers. This essay aims to trace some of the

dimensions of Weberian charismatic religious leadership in

comparative perspective, medieval and modern. Examples

include: preachers, ―"double charisma," professors,

―"collective charisma," religious radicals, the economy of

charisma, transgressive sexuality, demagogues, living saints."

21. Dronke, Peter. 1968. The Medieval Lyric. New York: Harper &

Row.

Chapter 2: The Rise of Religious Lyric; § 4: Twelfth-century

France, pp. 51-57.

"Paris in the early twelfth century was dominated by the

personality of Abelard, its most spectacular poet as well as

philosopher and theologian—and its most romantic legend. The

love-songs that he composed for Héloise have not survived,

songs that, in her own words, ‘were so lovely in words and tune,

and so often sung, that the name of Abelard was on everybody’s

lips, and even the unlearned could not forget him, being

charmed by his melodies’. However, we still have two sacred

song-cycles that he wrote in the 1130s, after the tragic

separation from his beloved. The larger is a complete Liber

Hymnorum, adapted to the hours of the divine office and the

major feasts of the church year, composed at Héloise’s wish for

the use of her convent of the Paraclete.

Abelard’s covering letter shows his fine critical understanding

of the older hymnic tradition, and many of his songs are

deliberately cast in a traditional mould." (pp. 51-52)

22. ———. 1970. Poetic Individuality in the Middle Ages: New

Departures in Poetry 1100-1150. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Peter Abelard - Planctus and Satire, pp. 114-149.

"For Abelard the poet there was a fertile challenge in choosing

themes to which he had a unique relation, and where the

possibilities of a truly personal thematic development were

latent.

At the same time, as the opening of the last planctus suggests,

his songs are dolorum solatium: even if they cannot ‘give his

laments and tears rest’, they can subsume them in a creation

that gives them objective dignity—no longer the private,

helpless laceration of one or two human beings, but the

meaningful sorrow of the artist’s persona, the dramatic creation

that can enfold the private thoughts and yet as artefact can take

its place in the outer world in its own right." (pp. 118-119)

23. ———. 1980. "Heloise's Problemata and Letters: Some

Questions of Form and Content." In Petrus Abaelardus (1079-

1142). Person, Werk und Wirkung, edited by Thomas, Rudolf,

53–73. Trier: Paulinus-Verlag.

Summary; "The author emphasizes the individuality of the

literary style of Heloise's letters, in contrast to Abelard's

epistolary style. An analysis of the rhythmic cadences shows

that Heloise primarily prefers the "cursus tardus" to the "cursus

velox" and even surpasses Abelard in this respect. Adalbertus

Samaritanus, in particular, taught this style, and his Praecepta

dictaminum came to France after 1115. Both Abelard and

Heloise were influenced by this style. The questions that

Heloise poses, especially in the second letter and in the

Problemata about sin, repentance, and marriage, are not

abstract discussions, but arise from her personal distress. The

author paints a picture of Heloise that, in contrast to other

assessments, presents her as a personality of high intelligence

and moral maturity."

24. Erismann, Christophe. 2012. "Latin philosophy to 1200." In

The Oxford Handbook of Medieval Philosophy, edited by

Marenbon, John, 166–191. New York Oxford University Press.

"Peter Abelard combines particularist theses with a semantic

account of universality. Abelard’s solution is interesting in that

it avoids attributing the being of a thing ( res ) to universals (he

only ascribes universality to words). He does this by

introducing two notions into his ontology: that of ‘condition’,

‘state’ ( status ), and that of ‘what a statement says’ ( dictum

propositionis ). None of these notions refer to a thing, but they

are not nothing ( nihil ) either; they have being in thought

(which is not the being of things—Abelard denies the existence

of propositions—nor that of names); they are non-thing items.

These two notions allow Abelard to provide an answer to the

two main questions of his ontological particularism: (1) What

underlies the resemblance between two individuals of the same

species or possessing the same property? And (2) what grounds

the predication of the common name ‘man’ as to its subjects?

The answer holds in the following position. Socrates and Plato

are alike in being men. Abelard holds that Socrates and Plato

come together in this, that they are men ( in esse hominem );

they agree in the status of man. This ‘ esse hominem ’ expresses

the status, the fact that Socrates and Plato are both men (its

closest contemporary philosophical equivalent is the notion of a

state of affairs). This status grounds both resemblance and

predication. The common causes of the imposition of universal

words are status." (pp. 175-176, a note omitted)

25. Evans, Gillian Rosemary. 1980. Anselm and a New Generation.

Oxford: Clarendon Press.

"Anselm’s writing is pervaded by an overwhelming sense that

the glory of God is inaccessible to human understanding, and a

concomitant belief that it is that very inaccessibility which

ought to cause us to stretch our minds upwards in search of

him. In Anselm himself, this view of things imposes a

philosophical direction upon his thinking as well as a direction

of spiritual aspiration. Anselm felt equally strongly the double

imperatives of obligation and inability which he expresses so

fervently in the first chapter of the Proslogion; ‘[Your exile]

longs to reach you, and your dwelling-place is beyond reach.'(3)

comparison, Abelard perhaps resembles the fallen angel of St.

Bernard’s sermon in having his wings as a thinker unbalanced.

(4)

In him the sense of obligation to learn about God sometimes

has an air of sheer intellectual curiosity. His feelings of

inadequacy are less often in evidence than a solid confidence in

his own powers of mind. He flies, by choice, a less uniformly

upward course than Anselm attempted to fly on his own

‘spiritual wings’.(5) If few of Abelard’s contemporaries matched

him in intellectual self-confidence, many of them shared with

him a readiness to consider intellectual curiosity valuable

which is perhaps the most significant new attitude of twelfth-

century scholars. It sometimes seems that Abelard is inclined to

look God in the eye more boldly than Anselm does. He is, as we

have seen, ready to question points of doctrine which Anselm

thought were settled for ever. Twelfth-century scholars like him

were beginning to think about God with curiosity as well as

awe." (p. 194)

(3) S, 1.98.10-11,

(4) Sancti Bernardi Opera, ed. J. Leclercq and H. Rochais

(Rome, 1968), V, 311-14, Sermon for the first Sunday in

November.

(5) S, 2.7.9-10.

References

S = Anselmi Opera Omnia, ed. F. S. Schmitt (Rome/Edinburgh,

1938-68), 6 vols.

26. Ferguson, Chris B. 1983. "Autobiography as Therapy: Guibert

de Nogent, Peter Abelard and the Making of Medieval

Autobiography." Journal of Medieval and Renaissance Studies

no. 13:187–212.

27. Gasper, Giles, and Kohlenberger, Helmut, eds. 2006. Anselm

and Abelard: Investigations and Juxtapositions. Toronto:

Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies.

Contents: Foreword VII; Note on the Edition of Anselms'

Works IX; Anselm. Intellectual context. 1. Toivo J. Holopainen:

Logic and theology in the Eleventh century: Anselm and

Lanfranc's heritage 1; Structures of thought. 2. Klaus Kienzler:

Anselm von Canterbury (1033-1109): Theologie wird

Wissenschaft 17; 3. Christian Brouwer: Ratio et intellectus:

l'unité de l'oeuvre d'Anselme de Canterbury 31; 4. M. B.

Pranger: Anselm, Marion and the refusal of Gift 48; Individual

works. 5. Thomas H. Bestul: Uncertainty in the Meditation on

Human Redemption 56; 6. Ian Logan: Anselm and Thidricus:

revisiting MS Bodley 271 67; Subsequent interpretations; 7.

Rega Wood: Richard Rufus's response to Saint Anselm 87; 8.

Giles E. M. Gasper: An Anglican Anselm 103; Anselm and

Abelard. Comparisons and contrasts. 9. Coloman Viola: Saint

Anselme et Abélard: auteurs de deux théologies? 118; 10.

Helmut Kohlenberger: Die Wahrheit des Dialogs:

Anmerkungen bei Anselm und Abälard 133; 11. Matthia

Perkams: Rationes necessariae - rationes verisimiles et

honestissimae: Methoden philosophischer Theologie bei

Anselm und Abälard 143; 12. Stephan Ernst: Grundlegung der

Ethik bei Anselm von Canterbury und Peter Abälard 155; 13.

Hiroko Yamazaki: Anselm and Abelard on original sin 172; 14.

Tetsuro Shimitzu: Word and Esse in Anselm and Abelard 179;

Context. 15. Constant J. Mews: Saint Anselm and the

development of philosophical theology in Twelfth-century Paris

196; 16.Markus Enders: Die Entwicklung der christlichen

Auseinandersetzung mit dem Judentum und dem Islam von

Anselm v. Canterbury bis Peter Abäilard 223; List of

Contributors 249; Index 251-256.

"At the end of June 2004, the conference, of which this

collection is a part-product, took place to celebrate and explore

the thought and careers of both Anselm and Abelard, as well as

wider aspects of intellectual change from the early eleventh

century onwards. The papers we have collected from the

conference concentrate on the figures of Anselm and Abelard in

contrast to the broader and more diffuse nature of the

conference. The papers here fall into two sections. The first

deals with Anselm, and from a variety of perspectives: the

intellectual context for his achievements, the structures

underpinning his thought, particular works, including his letter

collection, and later interpretations of his thought. The second

section takes on the question of the relationship between

Anselm and Abelard. Networks of connection between early

scholastic figures are explored, before comparisons and

contracts between Anselm and Abelard are addressed. Finally

some of the wider implications of the changes occurring in the

period between Anselm and Abelard are examined." (From the

Foreword)

28. Gill, Harjeet Singh. 1991. Mental Images and Pure Forms:

Study in Abelardian Theory. New Delhi: Bahri Publcations.

29. ———. 2023. Abelardian Theory of Mental Images and Pure

Forms. Delhi: Askar Books.

Contents: Pierre Abelard 7, Abelardian Linguistics 13; Abelard

on Language 39; Abelardian Theory of Mental Images and Pure

Forms 48; Abelardian Discourse 67; Abelardian Tradition 89-

128.

"We can summarise Abelardian reflections on the nature and

function of language as a human institution where the words

are imposed on things by human will, by human convention. At

this stage they may be considered arbitrary but in the

evolutionary process, the words not only refer to things, but

also, and at times primarily, to their concepts, hence, they are

not so arbitrary. Their semantic ranges are extended on the

basis of analysis and analogy. These analogies are based on our

perception of similarities as “soft” in soft wood, soft iron, soft

cotton, soft drink, soft colour etc. We always begin from a

physical sensuous experience which is then reorganised,

rearranged in the domain of imagination. It is this

imaginatively reconstituted concept of the thing (experience)

that is the object of our intellection. Our expressions have three

levels of articulation: the physical, the grammatical and the

conceptual. We first proceed from the physical to the

conceptual as we call “mother” Ganges on the basis of a certain

perception of our own mother, then reciprocally, our mother

acquires the characteristics of mother Ganges. Furthermore, all

conceptual relations are reciprocal as father and son derive

their “fatherhood” and “son-hood” from each other, or

metonymic and metaphoric relations where chronological,

syntagmatic, sequential and non-sequential, metaphorical

concepts play a major role. Finally, language is a vehicle of

communication between thinking beings where the

interlocutors exchange words or expressions which are the

resultants of their mental activity. They represent conceptual

realities which are different from both Platonic universal

realism and Aristotelian individual nominalism." (pp. 37-38)

30. Grane, Leif. 1970. Peter Abelard: Philosophy and Christianity

in the Middle Ages London: George Allen & Unwin.

Translated by Frederick and Christine Crowley; bibliography

and notes by Derek Baker.

"While Abelard was waiting at Cluny with sharpened pen,

preparing what he certainly hoped would be the literary

destruction of Bernard, his opponent's express messenger was

hastening towards Rome with the letters, which this time had

the intended effect. As early as July 16th, not quite a month and

a half after the synod, Pope Innocent II despatched two letters:

to the Archbishops of Rheims and Sens and to the Abbot of

Clairvaux. In one of these he confirmed the verdict of the synod

on the nineteen capitula and himself condemned Abelard as a

heretic, forbidding him to continue writing; all his followers,

including expressly Arnold of Brescia, were excommunicated.

In the other letter, the pope gave orders for Abelard to be

placed in the custody of a monastery and for his books to be

burnt wherever they were to be found. It was left to Bernard

and the archbishops to decide upon Abelard's place of

confinement.(1) Geoffrey of Auxerre writes that the pope

himself set up a stake in St Peter's

for the burning of the books.(2) However, not all Abelard's

books within the area of Rome were burnt, for Pope Celestine II

was able a few years later to present his native town with copies

of them! He knew what he was about, since he was none other

than Abelard's old benefactor, Guy of Castello.(3)" (p. 150)

(...)

"Abelard submitted without argument as a dutiful son of the

Church. In this difficult situation he did not forget Heloise. It is

in a letter to her that he writes the often-quoted words: 'I do not

wish to be a philosopher by dissociating myself from Paul; I do

not wish to be an Aristotle by separating myself from Christ,

since there is no other name under heaven by which I can be

saved'." (p. 151)

(1) Migne CLXXIX, cols 515-517.

(2) In a letter to a cardinal, see Abaelardi Opera, I, p. 70.

(3) See Borst, p. 523.

References

[A.] Borst, ['Abalard and Bernhard], Historische Zeitschrift,

CLXXXVI (Munich 1958), pp. 497-526.

31. Häring, Nikolaus M. 1975. "Abelard yesterday and today." In

Pierre Abélard - Pierre le Vénérable. Les courants

philosophiques, littéraires et artistiques en Occident au milieu

du XII siècle, edited by Jolivet, Jean and Louis, René, 341–403.

Paris: Éditions du Centre national de la recherche scientifique.

Abstract: "This presentation, entitled "Abelard Yesterday and

Today," provides a brief overview of the manuscripts containing

works composed by Abelard, as well as an inventory of the

printed editions, the first of which dates from 1616. The history

of the transmission of the manuscripts of his writings would

tend to cast serious doubt on Abelard's popularity among

twelfth-century scholars. The fact that, with one exception, only

a single manuscript of his philosophical commentaries has

survived testifies that his contemporaries had no desire to

obtain copies. To a somewhat lesser extent, the same is true of

the transmission of the manuscripts of his theological works. In

the latter case, we discover a singular phenomenon. For

example, there are three manuscripts of the Theologia

Christiana, but all three contain such significant variations that

historians speak of three redactions made by Abelard. The

scarcity of manuscripts is attributable partly to Abelard's

inability to complete his works, and partly to the appearance of

more systematic and better organized theological works. This

scarcity should not be attributed to suspicions about Abelard's

orthodoxy; indeed, his philosophical writings were not subject

to such suspicions. Abelard remained almost entirely forgotten

during the Middle Ages. His star began to shine with the arrival

of the printing press, which allowed historians to study the

ideology of an innovator who, by no means a rationalist,

combined an intensive examination of the available works of all

Christian and non-Christian authors with a deep and sincere

love of God and the Church."

32. Hellemans, Babette, ed. 2014. Rethinking Abelard: A

Collection of Critical Essays. Leiden: Brill.

Contents: Preface VII, Note on Contributors VIII; Babette S.

Hellemans: Introduction 1;

Part 1 Abelard in Context 9;

Constant J. Mews: Abelard, Heloise, and Discussion of Love in

the Twelfth-Century Schools 11; Eileen C. Sweeney: Abelard

and the Jews 37: Julian Yolles: Divine Omnipotence and the

Liberal Arts in Peter Damian and Peter Abelard 60; Ineke van ’t

Spijker: Conflict and Correspondence. Inner and Outer in

Abelard and Hugh of Saint Victor 84;

Part 2 Controversy and Exchange 103;

Michael T. Clanchy: Was Abelard Right to Deny That He Had

Written a Book of ‘Sentences’? 105; Lesley-Anne Dyer: Veiled

Platonic Triads in Abelard’s Theologia ‘Summi Boni’ 119;

Part 3 Shaping Life 153;

William Flynn: Abelard and Rhetoric: Widows and Virgins at

the Paraclete 155; Wim Verbaal: Trapping the Future: Abelard’s

Multi-Layered Image-Building 187; Taina M. Holopainen:

Intentions and Conscious Moral Choices in Peter Abelard’s

Know Yourself 213; Juanita Feros Ruys: ‘He who kills himself

liberates a wretch’: Abelard on Suicide 230;

Part 4 Poetics and Poetry 251

Eileen F. Kearney: Peter Abelard’s Planctus ‘Dolorum

solatium’: A New Song for David 253; Peter Cramer: Abelard on

the First Six Days 282; Babette S. Hellemans: Abelard and the

Poetics of Ingenium 298

Bibliography 322; Index 350-356.

33. ———. 2023. Varieties of the Self: Peter Abelard and the

Mental Architecture of the Paraclete. Leiden: Brill.

"One of the points made in this book, however, is that we

cannot really speak of the ‘invention of the individual’ in this

period, nor of the ‘discovery of the self’, because this may

suggest that authors in Antiquity, or early Christian thinkers

like Saint Augustine, did not understand their own subjective

worlds, which would be a foolish statement."

(...)

"The approach of this book is not philosophical or theological,

in the sense of addressing philosophical and theological

questions about individuality in relation to intentionality that

are prompted by faith, logic, or language in the work of Peter

Abelard. Instead, a historical-anthropological view is adopted,

with its attention to the way cultural and religious beliefs and

values were organized according to a generally coherent world

view in the past. This implies a monastic view on the world,

more specifically of the community of the Paraclete, which was

founded around the year 1129. Out of necessity to find a new

place to shelter a group of nuns, this place called ‘our’ or ‘my’

oratory by Abelard (oratorium nostrum), was created by

Abelard for Heloise, his former student, lover, and the mother

of his son.(10) As we shall see more in detail, the name of the

Paraclete, given later by Abelard, expresses the manifestation of

the Holy Spirit." (pp. 2-3)

(10) Throughout this study I use the most recent letter

collection edited by David Luscombe, The Letter Collection of

Peter Abelard and Heloise (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2013).

This is a revised translation of the version published in 1974

and revised in 2003 by Michael Clanchy and Betty Radice, The

Letters of Abelard and Heloise (London and New York:

Penguin Classics, 2003, rev. ed.). The reference to Abelard’s

oratorium nostrum can be found in Luscombe, Letter

Collection, 84–85.

34. Howlett, David. 1992. "Some criteria for editing Abaelard."

Archivum Latinitatis Medii Aevi no. 51:195–202.

"Despite the gap between the date of composition and the dates

of the earliest manuscripts the text of Abaelard's Historia

Calamitatum is fairly secure. By attending to some previously

unnoticed structural features we may enhance that security, at

once ascertaining the textual integrity of the work, acquiring

new insights into the author's thought and art, and improving

presentation of the text for future readers.

The following text of title, exordium or chapter I, and chapter II

may be compared with the recent editions by Muckle and

Monfrin(1) .

The title is my reconstruction." (p. 195, a note omitted)

(1) J .T . Muckle (ed.), `Abelard's Letter of Consolation to a

Friend (Historia Calamitatum)', Mediaeval Studies XII (1950)

163-213. S. Monfrin (ed.), Abélard : Historia Calamitatum, 3d

ed. (Paris, 1967) .

35. Kaldramova, Elitza. 2019. "Peter Abelard’s Conceptualism and

Its Influence." Archive for Medieval Philosophy and Cultur no.

25:71–81.

Abstract: "The problem of the universals is associated with the

universals’ existence and reasons for classifying objects as one

species or genus. It inquires what notions and their features

are. The problem’s importance is related to the detailed study

of dialectics and the notion. The latter is the link between

sensible objects and the mind and is essential for building

sentences and propositions. Abelard’s conceptualism is

moderate position considering universals as notions and

focusing on the linguistic and logical aspects of the problem.

The ontological aspect is not excluded which is evident due to

the notion of status. The influence of Abelard’s conceptualism

in modern times is associated with the theory of direct

reference for nouns, the account of formal validity and the

theory of propositional content. Common features between

Abelard’s conceptualism and Rand’s objectivism are also

discussed such as the abstraction, the important role of reason,

the individual and the subjective element."

36. King, Peter. 1992. "Peter Abelard." In The Dictionary of

Literary Biography, edited by King, Peter, 3–14.

"Peter Abelard was the teacher of his generation: preeminent as

a philosopher, theologian, poet, and musician, he captured the

imagination of almost all with whom he came into contact. His

fame as a teacher was unequalled; students travelled from all

over Europe to hear him speak, crowds of ordinary people

attended his public lectures wherever he went, and it has been

said that he was indirectly responsible for the founding of the

University of Paris by creating a permanent ‘deposit’ of

students in the city. As a philosopher, he brought the

investigation of the “old logic” (logica vetus) to its heights; as a

theologian, he championed the use of reason and intellect in

matters of faith, putting the word theology into use with the

meaning it still has today. In philosophy and theology,

Abelard’s constant and unremitting use of the tools of logic or

‘dialectic’—argument, objection, example, counterexample, and

the like—helped define the Scholastic method, of which an early

example is his Sic et non [“Pro and Con” ca. 1117–1128]. As a

poet and musician, Abelard was renowned for his verses, both

secular and sacred, composed in the vernacular and in Latin.

He is responsible for some of the earliest extant pieces of

“authored” music. Abelard’s natural talents alone were

formidable. Combined with his quick tongue, undeniable

brilliance, sharp wit, dialectical acumen, encyclopædic

memory, and flavoured with a large dose of arrogance, the force

of his personality impressed itself vividly on all his

contemporaries. Even his critics and detractors (whom Abelard

always referred to as his “enemies”) admitted that he never lost

an argument, and only those who avoided debating him could

ever gain the upper hand over him. And, apart from his

intellectual achievements, his luckless affair with Héloïse made

him a tragic figure of romance. Abelard seemed larger than life

to his contemporaries, and he is all the more so in retrospect."

(p. 3)

37. Little, Edward F. 1969. "The Status of Current Research on

Abelard; Its Implications for the Liberal Arts and Philosophy of

the XIth and XIIth Centuries." In Arts libéraux et philosophie

au Moyen Age, 1119–1124. Paris: Vrin.

"In the last decade of the eleventh and in the first half of the

twelfth century questions were asked and argued about the

unity and trinity of God, which attracted great attention and led

to an independent, autonomous study of theology in the due

course of time. Leaders in this movement were Anselm,

Roscelin and Abelard. Abelard re-introduced the term

"theology" to popular use. Roscelin and Abelard also debated

questions which are still considered philosophical, but at the

early date even their questions of divinity, or of theology, were

not differentiated, other than potentially. The written

arguments remaining in our hands today are firmly based in

dialectical and logical and linguistic operations. In short they

are trivial, in a sense of the word which has gone out of use. In

Abelard's case, which concerns us here, it seems for this reason

that all his work should be taken into account in a treatment of

the liberal arts and philosophy in this period, -- even the

"theologies."

What seems needed most of all at the present time is a review

of the state of our knowledge of Abelard's work. The present

paper is directed to this question. After a quick review of

modern scholarship, it will note the work being done at the

present time and some appealing lines for future activity. It

should become clear that, while research of the twentieth

century has emphasized Abelard's theology, it has rediscovered

the logical, dialectical, and linguistic foundation of that

theology. A tendency is to examine it no longer strictly upon its

own doctrinal merits, but upon its experimental, logical and

philosophical character. This seems appropriate

chronologically, in that it evaluates these works within the loose

and formative context of their own time and aims. While this

article is addressed specifically to this conference, it is also

intended to be of use to the general student of Abelard." (p.

1119)

38. Luscombe, David Edward. 1966. "Nature in the Thought of

Peter Abelard." In La Filosofia della Natura nel Medioevo. Atti

del Terzo Congresso Internazionale di Filosofia Medioevale,

314–319. Milano: Vita e Pensiero.

"In his Commentary on the Hexameron Abelard tells us that at

the time of the creation a certain force, vis quaedam, was

granted to what was then created. This was the force of nature,

vis naturae, which was bestowed upon creation once and for all

time. This force is also a capacity, facultas, by which the things

created during the six days were made capable of development

and especially of multiplication (1). The writer of the Book of

Genesis tells us that the earth germinated even before the

creation of the sun (2). Abelard attributes this germination to

the workings of the vis naturae in its original freshness and

strength (3). There is a natural process at work in the world, a

pattern of causes and effects, as, for example, in the influence

of the stars upon the climate of the earth. By the study of the

stars we can predict the course of natural events (4), for

astronomy is a species of the philosophy of the nature of things.

This is not to say that we can also predict events contingent

upon the human free will (5). But there is a determinism in the

work of nature; if God interfered with this He would be acting

contra naturam, because the force of nature has now been

substituted for the divine will in the sense that nature preserves

and continues the original work of the Creator (6)." (pp. 314-

315)

(...)

"In Abelard’s Dialogus the imagined philosopher who appears

before Abelard in a dream, describes himself as content with

the possession of the natural law alone. He professes no written

law and investigates the truth and the high questions of moral

philosophy by using his reason (28). He deprecates those

Christians and Jews who rely only upon Scripture. But the

philosopher says that Abelard’s own Theologia is representative

from the Christian point of view of the two approaches, the

philosophical and the theological, the natural and the revealed,

of utraque doctrina (29). This claim, or boast, is highly

significant. It has always been understood that Abelard applied

reason in the study of theology. It is perhaps less realized that

Abelard held a kind of double source theory of revelation. Not

only the written law but the law of nature and reason as well

were the utraque doctrina which the best men accepted and

studied. The significance of Abelard’s doctrine of nature is that

it leads us to consider Abelard as a thinker who found God

revealed not only in the Word, but also in the world, with its

perfection and rationality, and in the divinely given reason of

man.

(1) « Nihil nunc naturam aliud dicimus, nisi vim et facultatem

illis operibus tunc collatam, unde illa sufficerent ad efficiendum

haec quae postmodum inde contigerunt ». Expositio in

Hexameron, J.-P. Migne, Patrologia Latina (= P.L.) tom. 178,

749 C.

(2) Genesis, I, 11-12.

(3) In Hexaemeron, P.L., 178, 749 BC.

(4) I.e. « naturalia futura » - « quae causam aliquam naturalem

sui eventus habent, ut ex his quae praecedunt tamquam

quibusdam naturalibus sui causis contingerr habeant», In

Hexaemeron, P.L., 178, 754 A.

(5) In Hexaemeron, P.L., 178, 753 D - 4 D. Cf. Abelard,

Dialectica, ed. L. M. De Rijk (Wijsgerige Teksten en Studies, I.

Assen 1956), pp. 216-7.

(6) In Hexaemeron, P.L., 178, 746 C - 7 A.

(28) Dialogus (1619 C et seq.)

(29) Op. cit. (1613 C)

39. ———. 1969. The School of Peter Abelard. The Influence of

Abelard's Thought in the Early Scholastic Period. Cambridge:

Cambridge University Press.

Contents: Preface IX-XI; List of Abbreviations XII-XIII; I. The

Literary Evidence 1; II. Abelard's Followers 14; III: The

Diffusion of Abelardian Writings 60; IV. The Condemnation of

1140 103; V. The Theological Writings of Abelard's Closest

Disciples 143; VI. The School of Laon 173; VII. Hugh of St

Victor 183; VIII. The Summa Sententiarum 198; IX: Abelard

and the Decretum of Gratian 214; X. Abelard's Disciples and

the School of St Victor 224; XI. Peter Lombard 261; XII. Robert

of Melun 281; XIII. Richard of St Victor 299; XIV. Conclusion

308; Appendices 311; Bibliography 316; Index of Manuscripts

347; General Index 350-360.

"This book represents an historian's attempt to discern the

ways in which Abelard's thought reached and influenced his

contemporaries and successors. The subject has attracted

historical study for nearly a century if we take as a starting

point the classic article by Heinrich Denifle entitled 'Die

Sentenzen Abaelards und die Bearbeitungen seiner Theologia

vor Mitte des 12. Jahrhunderts' which appeared in the Archiv

fur Literatur- und Kirchengeschichte des Mittelalters in 1885.

Since that time much further knowledge of Abelard's school

and of his disciples has accumulated and in addition a vast

amount of scholarly energy has been devoted to the task of

understanding and of bringing to life twelfth-century thought

and learning in its many aspects and moods. With respect to

Abelard's following it is perhaps a fitting time to draw together

some threads and to offer an interpretation of its place in the

evolution of the early scholastic movement.

The principal sources of this study are literary, biographical,

palaeographical and doctrinal. The occasional surviving literary

references to Abelard which were made in the twelfth century

and later are numerous enough to convey the intensity and the

scale of the disagreements which existed concerning his

personality and achievement. The names of several of his

disciples and hearers are also known and an examination is

here attempted of heir relationships to Abelard as well as of

their reactions to his work and thought. However, information

concerning twelfth century personalities is seldom abundant

and much can also be gained from studying the codicology of

Abelard and his school.

The surviving or known manuscripts of writings by Abelard and

by his disciples offer further knowledge of Abelard's readership

and following and therefore also of the general history of

formative period in medieval thought Abelard's public career

was closed in 1140 by an ecclesiastical condemnation. As a

condemned heretic whose errors had been vigorously

denounced by, among others, Bernard of Clairvaux, Abelard's

influence upon his age was limited and tainted. That he was

survived by disciples is an established fact, but what was done

by these disciples to develop or to qualify his teaching still

requires examination. It seems that the condemnation of 1140

raised as many questions as it solved and that the conflicts

between Abelard's critics and his defenders in the schools

entailed serious disagreements not only over outlook and

method but also over specific teachings which continued to be

debated in the years that followed. The stimulus which Abelard

gave to the study of particular ideas and themes outlived the

condemnation of 1140 and some of the criticisms which were

levelled against Abelard at this time were an insufficient guide

to his contemporaries. Already within the school of Hugh of St

Victor a more sophisticated and refined study of Abelard's

thought was in progress, and it was this which provided the

springboard for many future doctrinal developments.

Throughout the 1130s, 40s and sos the interaction of the rival

traditions of the schools of Abelard and of Hugh is a striking

feature of theological discussion. If the Sentences of Peter

Lombard, which enjoyed such a prolonged influence

throughout the medieval period, may be regarded as the climax

of continuous activity by schoolmen during the first half of the

twelfth century, then it is clear that Abelard, for all his

exaggerations and errors, was a major and continuing stimulus

to debate and thought.

I have tried in the following pages to illustrate primarily the

development of theological thought in approximately the first

half of the twelfth century by reference not only to Abelard's

disciples but also to major teachers of the various schools of the

period such as Gratian of Bologna, Hugh and Richard of St

Victor, Peter Lombard and Robert of Melun. I have not tried to

be exhaustive and much could be said about the relationship

between Abelard and other writers; the Porretans in particular

are little mentioned. So much is added yearly to knowledge of

the literature and thought of this period that much of what

appears below will soon be subject to modification and

revision." (from the Preface, IX-X).

40. ———. 1972. "Peter Abelard: Some Recent Interpretations."

Journal of Religious History no. 7:69–75.

"A quiet revolution in the study of Peter Abelard has taken

place in the past forty years. Its roots are numerous editions

and studies by Cottiaux, Grabmann, Landgraf, Leclercq, Minio-

Paluello, Monfrin, Muckle, Ostlender, D. Van den Eynde and

others. Its main monument is being erected and is the elaborate

edition of Abelard’s theological writings by E. M. Buytaert.(1)

This ferment has reached its highest level of intensity and of

brilliance in the last three years, and it is desirable that this

climactic activity should be well known. To survey it

comprehensively would be premature, although a bibliography

containing 150 items up to 1967 has been issued by Buytaert in

the first volume of his editions and a further bibliography is

promised for the fifth and final volume. My purpose here is to

draw attention to three recent discussions, each of a different

kind, by offering just a glimpse of a very busy scene; others will,

I hope, be encouraged to take a longer look." (p 69)

(1) Petri Abaelardi Opera Theologica, Corpus Christianom,

Continuatio mediaevalis, vols xi ff., Turnhout, 1969 ff. Two

volumes have appeared to date.

41. ———. 1979. Peter Abelard. London: Historical Association.

Contents: Introduction 5; The Rise to Fame 7; From Marriage

to the Monastery 12; The Foundation of the Paraclete 18; The

Final Years of Teaching 29; Abelard’s Achievement 34;

Bibliographical 38-40.

"Abelard stands out in the twelfth century as a great

philosophical thinker in a roughly similar way to that of John

the Scot in the ninth century or René Descartes in the

seventeenth. His strength of mind contemporaries of all shades

of opinion were ready to acknowledge; his achievements are

given major attention in histories both of European thought

and of European society in general. Abelard’s career as a monk

has been judged somewhat less interesting. He was an unusual

monk for he was married and a eunuch and he also remained

keen to teach. But he was an abbot and he founded a new

religious order that deserves a place in any history of medieval

religious orders that tries to indicate the variety of new

approaches to the monastic life that appeared in the eleventh

and twelfth centuries.

For over a hundred and fifty years scholars have raised, and

still raise, doubts regarding the genuineness of his writings,

particularly the letters. If the letters are an outright forgery,

then much of our direct knowledge of Abelard, and to a greater

extent of Heloise, is gravely shaken. But even if they are not,

questions remain regarding the circumstances and motives of

their composition. It is not enough to try to survey Abelard’s

career and thought in the light of the different interpretations

to which his teachings have given rise; questions regarding the

origins and reliability of the evidence we have interact

repeatedly with the opinions one forms regarding Abelard’s

aims and achievements." (p. 6)

42. ———. 1988. "Peter Abelard." In A History of Twelfth-Century

Western Philosophy, edited by Dronke, Peter, 279–307.

Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Chapter 10.

"Abelard's logical writings are concerned with seven basic texts:

the Isagoge of Porphyry; the Categories and De interpretatione

of Aristotle; and the De syllogismo categorico, De syllogismo

hypothetico, De differentiis topicis and De divisione of

Boethius. Only to a limited degree did Abelard use the Prior

Analytics and Sophistici elenchi of Aristotle. Not without

reason was he called the Peripatetic from Le Pallet, his

birthplace (Peripateticus Paiatinus)." (p. 280)

(...)

"Abelard also wrote a major, independent, and unified treatise

of logic which was free of the gloss form, although it

nonetheless uses fully the seven ancient textbooks of Aristotle,

Porphyry, and Boethius. The only known manuscript of this

work, the Dialectica, is in Paris, Bibliotheque Nationale lat.

14614, but it lacks both the beginning and the end of the text.

The editor, L. M. de Rijk, dates the composition of the final

revision of the Dialectica to Abelard's last years.(10)

Abelard may have written a work called Rhetorika and one

called Grammatica, but neither has been identified in any

manuscript.(11) Sentences containing an analysis of a

paralogism and of the use of totum have been tentatively

ascribed to him and printed under his name.(12) Claims have

been put forward for Abelard as author of other works of logic

which betray many similarities with his known writings and

teachings. These include a short treatise De intellectibus(13)

and another gloss on the Isagoge known as Secundum uocales.

(14)" (pp.281-282)

(10) De Rijk 1970, pp. xxi-xxiii. The dating of the supposed

versions of the Dialectica is muchdebated. Sec further E. M.

Buytaert in his general introduction to Abelard's Opera

theologica 1, CC, CM xi (Turnhout 1969}, p. xxv n. 45. C. Mews

now suggests ca. 1117: 'On Dating the Works of Peter Abelard',

AHDLMA LII (1985) 73-134, at pp. 95-104.

(11) Buytaert 1969, p. xxi; Mews 1985, pp. 92-3.

(12) Secundum Magistrum Petrum Sententie, ed. Minio-

Paluello 1958. These Sentences may have been a part of a lost

work on fallacies to which Abelard refers in his Dialectica, ed.

de Rijk 1970, p. 448.3—4 {primus Fantasiarum nostrarum

liber). See L. M. de Rijk, Logica Modernorum I (Assen 1962),

109-12.

(13) Ed. L. U. Ulivi, La psicologia di Abelardo e il 'Tractalus de

Intellectibus' (Rome 1976); also Petri Abaelardi Opera, ed. V.

Cousin, 11 (Paris 1859) 733-53. Both these editors favour the

attribution of the treatise to Abelard; Ulivi examines the

possibility very thoroughly.

(14) Glossae super librum Porphyrii secundum vocales, ed. C.

Ottaviano, Un opuscolo di Abelardo, Testi medioevali inediti,

Fontes Ambrosiani in (Florence 1933), pp. 106-207. Extracts

were edited by Geyer 1973, pp 581-8. Geyer (pp. 610-12) notes

the close similarities between these Glosses and those found in

Abelard's Logica, but concludes that they are a compilation by

a follower of Abelard. C. J. Mews presents new arguments in

favour of Abelard's authorship in 'A Neglected Gloss on the

"Isagoge" by Peter Abelard', Frreiburger Zeitschrift fur

Philosophie und Theologie xxxi (1984) 35—55. The gloss

'Secundum vocales' is found in the same Milan MS which

contains the 'Ingredientibus' glosses (on fols. 72v-8iv).

43. ———. 1992. "The School of Peter Abelard Revisited." Vivarium

no. 30:127–138.

"My concern in this paper is not with works of logic associated

with Peter Abelard but with writings of a theological kind

containing material which is similar to that also found in

Abelard' s own writings.(1) To these works of theology, largely

collections of sentences but also including some works of

biblical commentary, I gave attention in a book which I

published in 1969 under the title The School of Peter Abelard

and with the sub-title The Influence of Abelard's Theology in

the Early Scholastic Period.(2) After the passage of more than

twenty years I welcome Professor Courtenay's mandatum to me

to revisit what I called, following a well-established convention,

the school. Whether or not this school looks any different now

than it did two decades ago is one legitimate concern of this

colloquium which seeks to raise new questions and to explore

different possibilities than I have previously done." (p. 127)

(1) See Julia Barrow, Charles Burnett, David Luscombe 1984-5,

183-302. Part 3 of this Checklist (259-261) gives information

about a few works which put forward doctrine identifiable as

Abelard's; Part 2 gives information about Abelard's own

writings (240- 258). See also Luscombe 1969: chapter 3 ('The

Diffusion of Abelardian Writings', 60-102) includes some

details of writings on logic and theology inspired by Abelard as

well as of those written by him; chapters 5 and 10 (143-172,

224-260) examine works of theology from Abelard's school.

(2) See n. 1 above.

References

Barrow, J., Burnett, C. & Luscombe, D., 1984-85, A checklist of

the manuscripts containing the writings of Peter Abelard and

Heloise and other works closely associated with Abelard and

his school , in: Revue d'histoire des textes, 14/15, 183-302.

Luscombe, D., 1969, The School of Peter Abelard. The

Influence of Abelard's Thought in the Early Scholastic Period.

Cambridge Studies in Medieval Life and Thought, ed. D.

Knowles, new series 14. Cambridge; repr. 1970.

44. ———. 1996. "Peter Abelard and the Arts of Language." In

Media Latinitas: A Collection of Essays to Mark the Occasion

of the Retirement of L. J. Engels, edited by Nip, R. I. A., 101–

116. Turnhout: Brepols.

45. ———. 1997. "Peter Abelard's Carnal Thoughts." In Medieval

Theology and the Natural Body, edited by Biller, Peter and

Minnis, A. J., 31–37. Rochester: York Medieval Press.

"Abelard, for whatever reason, was not interested in the idea of

the two cities, but he was intensely interested in Augustine's De

civitate Dei and especially in the investigations made by

Socrates and the Platonists into the summum bonum. Book II

of his Theologia christiana manifests this interest,(14) but

nowhere is it more in evidence than in the Dialogus that he

wrote in which a Philosopher and a Christian debate between

themselves the nature of supreme goodness and of supreme

evil. It is the Philosopher who turns to the De civitate Dei

where in Book VIII Augustine records that some pagan

philosophers call the supreme goodness virtue and others

pleasure or voluptas.(15)

(...)

"As the debate between the Philosopher and the Christian

reaches its climax, the Philosopher states his agreement with

the Christian that, properly and absolutely speaking, the

supreme good is God and the supreme good for man is the

vision of God which makes man truly happy. But the

Philosopher asks why, if this vision of God is enjoyed through

the eyes of the mind and is not a physical sight, Christians

proclaim the doctrine of the resurrection of the bodies of the

saints in heaven? What is the point of the souls of the just in

paradise having their bodies restored to them when the lack of

bodies does nothing to lessen the happiness of the angels? To

this the Christian replies that everything God does is done not

to increase our happiness but his glory. The resurrection of our

bodies does not increase the happiness of thesaints but it is not

without purpose since God is glorified when what were once

weak instruments beset by passion become indissoluble and

immune to passion.(18)

However, after the resurrection, bodies are, in a certain way—

quodammodo subtle, spiritual things, just as Christ's body

became an immortal and impassible body after his

resurrection.(19) There is no activity left for the senses since all

desires are satisfied by the vision of God.(20)" (pp. 36-37)

(14) Theologia christiana ii.329.(...) Petri Abaelardi Opera

theologica, II, ed. E. M. Buytaert, CCCM 12 (Turnhout, 1969),

pp. 145-6.

(15) Petrus Abaelardus. Dialogus inter Philosophum, Judaeum

et Christianum, ed. R. Thomas (Stuttgart and Bad Cannstatt,

1970), 1. 1525. There exists an English translation by P. J.

Payer, Peter Abelard. A Dialogue of a Philosopher with a Jew

and a Christian, Medieval Sources in Translation 20 (Toronto,

1979).

(18) Dialogus, ed. Thomas, 11. 2584-621.

(19) Dialogus, ed. Thomas, 11. 2667-76.

(20) Dialogus, ed. Thomas, 11. 290-647

46. ———. 2001. "Peter Abelard and the Poets." In Poetry and

Philosophy in the Middle Ages: A Festschrift for Peter Dronke,

edited by Marenbon, John, 155–171. Leiden: Brill.

"Over twenty years ago Jean Jolivet discussed the presentation

by Peter Abelard of the philosophers of antiquity, their

personalities and their teachings(1). Jolivet explored the

relationships which Abelard

forged with these figures in the light of his Christian faith. By

their reason and by the uprightness of the lives which they led,

the philosophers of antiquity had come to a knowledge of God.

Unlike the prophets of the Old Testament they did not know

the written law, but they had knowledge of the natural law.

Albeit obscurely and unwittingly, their writings bore witness

and provided premonitions of the divine Trinity. They also

promoted virtue and the particular qualities which Christians

associate with the requirements of the monastic life: poverty,

solitude, study and continence. Ranged alongside them were

Biblical figures such as Solomon, a sage, and Job, a pagan.

Moreover, the philosophers included poets." (p, 155)

(1) 'Doctrines et figures de philosophies chez Abelard' in Petrus

Abaelardus (1079—1142). Person, Werk und Wirkung, ed. R.

Thomas (Trier 1980), Trierer theologische Studien 38, pp. 103-

20.

47. ———. 2002. "Scientia and disciplina in the correspondence of

Peter Abelard and Heloise." In "Scientia" und "Disciplina".

Wissenstheorie und Wissenschaftspraxis im 12. und 13.

Jahrhundert, edited by Berndt, Rainer, Lutz-Bachmann,

Matthias, Stammberger, Ralf M. W. and Niederberger,

Andreas, 79–89. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter.

"In his letters Abelard uses the word "disciplina" in a number of

different ways.

Learning or studying a branch of organised knowledge is one

such use: "ingenio exstiti AD LITTERATORIAM DISCIPLINAM

facilis."(2) Abelard claims to have a natural facility for the study

of letters which was realised during his early education, which

took place either in a school or through private tuition.(3) He

mentions education in boyhood again in his Dialectica in the

course of discussing the different kinds of comparison." (P. 79)

(...)

"One of Abelard's persistent appeals is for the promotion of a

knowledge of letters. He admired the "litteratoria scientia"

possessed by Heloise and so rarely found among women:

quo bonum hoc LITTERATORIE scilicet SCIENTIE in

mulieribus est rarius, eo amplius puellam commendabat, et in

toto regno nominatissimam fecerat.(29)

)

In Epistola IX he appeals to the nuns of the Paraclete to study

languages and literatures for the neglect of either has, since

Jerome's day, brought about the decline of both:

Defecit iam dudum hoc peregrinarum linguarum in uiris

Studium et cum negligencia litterarum, SCIENCIA periit

earum.(30) (p. 84)

(2) Abaelardus Historia calamitatum, 12-13.

(3) Abaelardus Historia calamitatum, 13-17:(...)

(29) Abaelardus Historia calamitatum, 286-288.

(30) Abaelardus Epistolae (Smits), IX (p. 236 = PL 178, c.

335A-336A).

48. ———. 2014. "Peter Abelard and "lingua nostra"." In

Philosophie et langage ordinaire : de l'Antiquité à la

Renaissance, edited by Counet, Jean-Michel. Louvain: Peeters.

49. ———. 2019. Peter Abelard and Heloise: Collected Studies.

New York: Routledge.

Contents: Preface; Abbreviations; Bibliography

1. From Paris to the Paraclete: The correspondence of Abelard

and Heloise (1989);

Peter Abelard: Philosopher

2. Peter Abelard (1988); 3. Nature in the thought of Peter

Abelard (1966); 4. Peter Abelard and the arts of language

(1996); 5. Scientia and disciplina in the correspondence of

Peter Abelard and Heloise (2002), 6. 'The sense of innovation

in the writings of Peter Abelard (2005); 7. Peter Abelard and

the poets (2001); 8. The school of Peter Abelard revisited

(1992); 9. The Bible in the work of Peter Abelard and his

"school' (1996); 10. Peter Abelard and the creation of the world

(2000); 11. Peter Abelard's carnal thoughts (1997); 12. St

Anselm and Abelard: A restatement (2002); 13. A new student

for Peter Abelard: The marginalia in British Library MS Cotton

Faustina A.X (with Charles Burnett; 2005); 14. Berengar,

defender of Peter Abelard (1966);

Peter Abelard and Heloise

15. The Letters of Heloise and Abelard since "Cluny, 1972"

(1980); 16. Peter Abelard and the abbey of the Paraclete

(2003); 17. Excerpts from the letter collection of Heloise and

Abelard in Notre Dame (Indiana) MS 30 (1983);

Peter Abelard Monk

18. Peter Abelard and monasticism (1975); 19. Monasticism in

the lives and writings of Heloise and Abelard (1991);

20. Supplementary notes;

Index; Index of Manuscripts.

"I have from time to time been asked to make a collection of

some of studies of Peter Abelard and Heloise which were

published in widely scattered and not always easily accessible

volumes. The present book brings to and reprints nineteen of

these essays with very few and only very small amendments but

with a common format and new pagination. Some of these

essays were published before the arrival of new editions of the

writings of Abelard and Heloise." (from the Preface)

Bibliographia. Annotated bibliographies

Raul Corazzon || rc@ontology.co || Info

Bibliography on the Philosophy of

Peter Abelard: English Studies

(Second part)

Bibliography M - Z

1. Marenbon, John. 1992. "Abelard's Concept of Natural Law." In

Mensch und Natur im Mittelalter. 2. Halbband, edited by

Zimmermann, Albert and Speer, Andreas, 609–621. Berlin:

Walter de Gruyter.

"To understand Abelard's views about natural law it is

necessary to begin, not with his own writings, but those of his

teachers, Anselm of Laon and William of Champeaux, and their

followers in the School of Laon. They were the first thinkers

since the Fathers to consider natural law explicitly and in

detail, and they provided the context for Abelard's own

thoughts on the subject. Only when it is read within this context

does the subtlety and originality of Abelard's treatment become

clear." (p. 609)

(...)

"At first sight, Abelard's treatment of natural law looks

disconcertingly close to the ideas of the School of Laon: not

only is the terminology similar, but also the problems tackled

are much the same. Could it be that Abelard copied the ideas of

the two masters with whom he had ostentatiously quarelled,

and those of their obedient pupils? More careful comparison

shows, rather, that here — as in many other areas of his work —

Anselm, William and their followers provided Abelard with a

set of terms and starting-points, from which he developed his

own, very different views. A striking example is provided by

Abelard's treatment of the Golden Rule." (pp. 612-613)

2. ———. 2004. "Life, milieu, and intellectual contexts." In The

Cambridge Companion to Abelard, edited by Brower, Jeffrey

E. and Guilfoy, Kevin, 13–44. Cambridge: Cambridge

University Press.

"In the first section, “Life and works,” I give a very brief sketch

of Abelard’s life, and then of his works, and try to show the

main direction of his intellectual interests in a career which, as

I shall argue, falls into two distinct halves. In Section ii, I add a

little detail to this bare account, by considering (in very roughly

chronological order) the various cultural settings in which

Abelard worked. Three of them are particular milieus to which

he belonged: the logical schools at the beginning of the twelfth

century, the world of twelfth century monastic thinking and

reform, and the Paris schools, logical and theological, of the

1130s. One is a cultural setting in rather a different sense:

Abelard’s reading. In Section iii, I have chosen two topics

through which to examine more precisely, and very selectively,

aspects of Abelard’s relation to earlier and contemporary

medieval philosophers: Abelard’s nominalism, and his

treatment of Plato’s idea of a World Soul." (p. 13)

3. ———. 2007. "Peter Abelard and Platonic Politics." In The

Political Identity of the West: Platonism in the Dialogue of

Cultures, edited by van Ackeren, Marcel and Seummrell, Orrin

Finn, 133–150. Bern: Peter Lang.

4. ———. 2015. Pagans and Philosophers: The Problem of

Paganism from Augustine to Leibniz. Princeton: Princeton

University Press.

Chapter 5: Abelard, pp. 73-94.

"The first impression from the Theologia Christiana, the

Collationes and many of his other works is that Abelard is a

sort of counter-Augustine in his attitude to pagans, despite the

extensive use he makes of Augustine’s works in discussing this

theme. Where Augustine rejects pagan salvation and pagan

virtues out of hand, Abelard appears to be arguing strongly for

both of them. But this judgement is true only in part.

On examination, Abelard’s views turn out to be not entirely

consistent, both less and more audacious than they seem

initially. Their relation to Augustine’s position is much more

complex than simple opposition. It is easiest to disentangle the

various threads by starting with Abelard’s view on pagans’

knowledge of God, before looking at his treatment of the

salvation of pagans and then the question of their virtues." (p.

4, a note omitted)

5. McCabe, Joseph. 1901. Peter Abélard. London: Duckworth.

"The author does not think it necessary to offer any apology for

having written a life of Abelard.

The intense dramatic interest of his life is known from a

number of brief notices and sketches, but English readers have

no complete presentation of the facts of that remarkable career

in our own tongue. The History of A.bailard of Mr. Berington,

dating from the eighteenth century, is no longer adequate or

useful. Many French and German scholars have re-written

Abelard's life in the light of recent knowledge and feeling, but,

beyond the short sketches to be found in Compayre, Poole,

Rashdall, Cotter Morison, andothers, no English writer of the

nineteenth century has given us a complete study of this unique

and much misunderstood personality. Perhaps one who has

also had a monastic, scholastic, and ecclesiastical experience

may approach the task with a certain confidence." (Preface, p.

6. McDonough, Christopher J. 1986. "Hugh Primas 18: A Poetic

Glosula on Amiens, Reims, and Peter Abelard." Speculum no.

61:806–835.

"The poem numbered 18 in the collection known as the Oxford

poems was written a little before the middle of the twelfth

century.(1) Composed in rhyming octosyllabic verse, the poem

has three parts. It begins by praising the bishop and clergy of

Amiens for an act of charity on behalf of the destitute poet. It

continues with a celebration of the cathedral school of Reims

under Master Alberic. It concludes with a biting attack upon an

anonymous teacher who is unfit to be heard by the students of

Reims. The author calls himself Primas, incorporating this

name as an internal signature within the body of the poem.

Primas has been identified with a certain Hugh of Orleans, who

in his day enjoyed a reputation for wit and humor. A. firm

terminus ante quem for the poem's composition is 1136/37, for

at that time Alberic was translated from Reims to the see of

Bourges, where he lived out his days. In fact the poem was

probably written a few years earlier." (p. 806)

(...)

"Poem 18 is in many ways elusive for the modern reader. In

recent years two problems in particular have claimed scholarly

attention: the identity of the man ridiculed at the close, and the

coherence of the poem's form with its content.4 I shall

reexamine both questions. My first aim will be to demonstrate

that Peter Abelard was the object of the poet's abuse. This

identification provides a new perspective on the relationship

between the second and third parts of the poem, and I shall

proceed to reconsider the structure of the poem and the literary

achievement of its author. Primas's poem is not only a histor-

ical document that sheds light on the turbulent academic and

theological life of the time, but also a work of literature, notable

for the degree to which it compels awareness of its existence as

a commentary and reflects upon the process of writing." (pp.

806-807, some notes omtted)

(1) (,,,) Citations of the text of the poem are from C. J.

McDonough, ed., The Oxford Poems of Hugh Primas and the

Arundel Lyrics (Toronto, 1984), pp. 61- 65. The text and a

German translation can be found in Karl Langosch, Hymnen

und Vagantenlieder (Basel, 1954), pp. 148-53.

7. McLaughlin, Mary Martin. 1967. "Abelard as Autobiographer:

The Motives and Meaning of His “Story of Calamities”."

Speculum no. 42:463–488.

"Although Abelard's Story of Calamities (Historia

calamitatum) has long been regarded as the most original and

significant of mediaeval autobiographies, it has also remained

in many ways the most perplexing and the most often

misunderstood. Setting out ostensibly to console an

unidentified friend by writing about the calamities he himself

had suffered, Abelard surveyed in his letter the most important

phases and events of his career, from his early years to what

seemed to him the unparalleled series of misfortunes that

formed the pattern of his later life. In the course of his "story,"

he told us more about himself, more deliberately, than any

other Western thinker between St Augustine and Petrarch, and

much, incidentally, about the world in which he moved. For

these reasons, Abelard's autobiographical letter is, as Knowles

remarks, "a work of the highest value for its historical,

psychological and human interest," indispensable, in fact, to all

students of the intellectual and spiritual life of his age. Yet at

the same time, as Knowles goes on to say, the Story of

Calamities presents most acutely, "as might be expected from

its author's character and career, all the difficulties of

interpretation which are inseparable from the autobiographical

form.(1)"

(1) D. Knowles, Evolution of Medieval Thought (London,

1962), pp. 116-117.

8. Mews, Constant J. 1986. "On Dating the Works of Peter

Abelard." Archives d'Histoire Doctrinale et Littéraire du

Moyen Age no. 60:73–134.

Reprinted as Essay VII in: Constant J. Mews, Abelard and his

Legacy, Aldershot: Ashgate 2001.

"Any attempt to assess the evolution of the thought of Peter

Abelard (1079-1142) must be based on a firm grasp of the

sequence of his various writings on logic and theology. The

studies which follow concentrate on two works: the Dialectica

and the Dialogus inter philosophum, Iudaeum et Christianum

or Collationes. While a number of scholars have attempted to

date individual works of Abelard, there has not yet emerged any

clear consensus of opinion about the overall chronology of his

writings.

By looking again at the Dialectica and the Dialogus in relation

to his other writings on logic and theology it is hoped to gain a

clearer picture of the development of his thought and so

provide a perspective which is not to be found in the Historia

Calamitatum(2)." (pp. 73-74, a note omitted)

"From this study of the evolution of Abelard’s terminology and

thinking about language, we can suggest the following

chronological sequence for his writings:

Ed. sup. Por.; sup. Cat.; sup. Per.; de divisionibus;

Introductiones parvulorum; liber fantasiarum. [lost]

Dialectica.

Glosse sup. Por.; sup. Pred.; sup. Per.; Gl. sec. voc.; sup. Top.

TSum (perhaps before sup. Per. and sup. Top.). Rhetorica (?);

Grammatica; Tract. de int. Glossule. TChr.

The sequence proposed here is only tentative, as the evidence is

often inconclusive." (p. 94)

(2) The authenticity of the Historia Calamitatum was doubted

by R. Benton, ‘Fraud, fiction and borrowing in the

correspondence of Abelard and Héloise’, Pierre le Vénérable.-

Pierre Abélard, p. 469-506, but largely re-affirmed in his later

communication, ‘A reconsideration of the authenticity of the

correspondence of Abelard and Heloise’, Petrus Abaelardus,

Trier, pp. 41-52. Although Benton’s earlier position is still

supported by H. Sitvestre, ‘Pourquoi Roscelin n’est-il pas

mentionné dans l’Historia Calamitatum?’, RTAM [Recherches

de théologie ancienne et médiévale] 48 (1981), 218-24 and in

Bull. TAM 13 (1983), 420-23, no solid arguments have yet, in

the author’s opinion, been put forward to justify the hypothesis

of a forgery. In consequence its authenticity is accepted.

9. ———. 1986. "The Sententiae of Peter Abelard." Recherches de

Theologie et Philosophie Médievales no. 53:130–184.

Reprinted as Essay VI in: Constant J. Mews, Abelard and his

Legacy, Aldershot: Ashgate 2001.

"Conclusions

The liber sententiarum magistri Petri is only one of a number

different collections of Abelard’s sententie. It can be compared

most closely to the Sententie Abaelardi in the precision with

which his argument is presented—part of its discussion of the

redemption is identical to the quaestio on the subject in

Abelard’s commentary on Romans, in the same way as the

Sententie reproduce parts of a draft of the Theologia

“Scholarium”. Both may have been compiled by an

amaneuensis either from dictation or from Abelard’s lecture

notes (or from both).

(.,,(

The Ethica developed that part of his teaching about charity,

while the Anthropologia (if completed) would have covered

that about redemption.

The Sententie Florianenses, Sententie Abaelardi, Sententie

Parisienses and liber sententiarum magistri Petri (in that

chronological order) do not belong to his strictly literary

compositions, but they should be differentiated from those

texts which combine ideas of Abelard with those of other

teachers. To group all such works under the loose umbrella of

‘‘the school of Peter Abelard” is to misunderstand the

significance of those which reproduce his teaching alone. The

four texts mentioned shed important light on the ideas of

Abelard about faith in God and in Christ, the sacraments and

morality, not on the thinking of his disciples." (pp. 173-174)

10. ———. 1995. Peter Abelard. Aldershot: Ashgate.

Authors of the Middle Ages. Vol. II n° 5-6.

Contents: 5. Constant J. Mews: Peter Abelard 1-88; V.I.J. Flint:

Honorius Augustodunensis 89-183.

Reprint: New York: Routledge 2016.

"Interest in Abelard as a philosopher has tended to develop

separately from analysis of his theology. In the Anglo-American

analytic tradition, there has been a concentration on Abelard's

doctrine of universals for its critique of traditional ontology.

Rather different is the perspective of Jolivet, who has studied

Abelard's ideas on universal categories as a part of a wider

critique of language. Unease with the traditional nominalist

label and the tendency to discuss Abelard's logic without

reference to his theology, led him to suggest an underlying

tendency in Abelard's thought to 'dereify' language. In more

recent writing, Jolivet has examined the coexistence of

Platonist semantics with Aristotelian categories in Abelard's

thought. Comparing the thought of Roscelin, Abelard and

Gilbert of Poitiers, he has suggested that 'realist' and

'nominalist' labels might be inadequate to describe the different

strategies each formulates to the question of universals. From a

different standpoint, Courtenay and Normore have identified

Abelard as the central stimulus for the nominalist school.

However, as Jolivet has pointed out, it is misleading to

understand Abelard as a nominalist in the fourteenth-century

sense. While he has a sharp sense of physical reality and of the

artificial nature of human statements, he never doubts that

there is a reality beyond language, insisting only that this

reality can never be fully defined. His dialectic seeks to show

that images and definitions of truth are always of human origin,

and thus transient in nature. It moves within a tradition shaped

by Plato, Augustine and Boethius, although transformed by

Aristotelian thinking about language in a particular way," (pp.

30-31, notes omitted)

11. ———. 2001. Abelard and His Legacy. Aldershot: Ashgate.

Collection of essays previously published.

Contents: I. The development of the Theologia of Peter

Abelard; II. A neglected gloss on the Isagoge by Peter Abelard;

III. Man's knowledge of God according to Peter Abelard; IV.

The lists of heresies imputed to Peter Abelard; V. Peter

Abelard's Theologia Christiana and Theologia 'Scholarium' re-

examined; VI. The Sententie of Peter Abelard; VII. On dating

the works of Peter Abelard; VIII. Aspects of the evolution of

Peter Abaelard's thought on signification and predication; IX.

Un lecteur de Jérôme au XIIe siècle: Pierre Abélard; X. Peter

Abelard and the Enigma of Dialogue; Addenda; Indexes.

12. ———. 2002. "The Council of Sens (1141): Abelard, Bernard,

and the Fear of Social Upheaval." Speculum no. 77:342–382.

"The Council of Sens, held on May 25-26, 1141, was most widely

remembered through collections of the letters of Bernard,

assembled soon after 1153. These letters do not give the full

story, however, of the circumstances that provoked Abelard to

ask the archbishop of Sens if he could defend himself at this

council against the claims being made by Bernard of Clairvaux.

While the theological differences between the two men should

not be minimized, Bernard's anxieties about the dangerous

implications of Abelard's teachings also have much to do with

the increasingly polarized political situation facing the Latin

church after the Second Lateran Council in April 1139.

(...)

Bernard himself did not originally wish to attend the council

and came only because of pressure placed on him by certain

powerful individuals, quite possibly Suger of Saint-Denis. As a

leading adviser to the young Louis VII, it was in Suger's interest

to support the cause of Samson, the newly appointed

archbishop of Reims, a city whose commune was crushed

sometime in 1140 or early 1141.

(..)

The fact that Arnold of Brescia, a notorious critic of episcopal

and papal power, attached himself to Abelard helped make

Abelard's theological critique of traditional understanding of

divine omnipotence appear to be subversive thinking. As R. I.

Moore has argued, the confrontation at Sens was part of a

larger process by which new structures of authority came to be

imposed.(155) Papal authority was now being invoked as the

principal arbiter of orthodoxy. Social tension within urban

communities undoubtedly inflamed the way Abelard's theology

was perceived. For all his desire to overcome conflict through

rational analysis, Abelard was unable to overcome an extremely

polarized political situation. Perhaps the real victor of that

confrontation was Suger of Saint-Denis. The construction of a

magnificent new church provided, outwardly at least, a far

more effective vehicle for creating social cohesion than either

the theology of Peter Abelard or the interior conversion

preached by Bernard of Clairvaux." (pp-379-380, a note

omitted)

(155) R. I. Moore, The First European Revolution, c. 970-1215

(Oxford, 2000), with comment on the confrontation with

Bernard at Sens (dated to 1140), although not in relation to

Arnold of Brescia, pp. 124-25, 158, and 190.

13. ———. 2006. "Faith as Existimatio rerum non apparentium:

intellect, imagination and faith in the Philosophy of Peter

Abelard." In Intellect et imagination dans la philosophie

médiévale / Intellect and imagination in medieval philosophy

/ Intelecto e imaginação na filosofia medieval / Actes du XIe

Congrès international de philosophie médiévale de la Société

internationale pour l'Étude de la philosophie médiévale

(S.I.E.P.M.): Porto, du 26 au 31 août 2002. Vol. 2, edited by

Pacheco, Maria Cândida and Meirinhos, José 915–926.

Turnhout: Brepols.

"At the outset of the Theologia ‘Scholarium’ Peter Abelard

introduces a definition of faith that some of his contemporaries

found rather alarming: «Faith is estimation (existimatio) of

things that do not appear, that not apparent to the bodily

senses»(1). Both William of Saint-Thierry and Bernard of

Clairvaux considered this definition to contradict that

attributed to St Paul (Hebrews 11:1): «Est autem fides

sperandorum substantia rerum argumentum non parentum»

(Faith is the substance of things hoped for, the argument for

what does not appear(2). If, like William and Bernard, we look

only at that bare sentence at the outset of his Theologia about

faith as existimatio of things unseen, without any knowledge of

Abelard’s theory of language, we might well remain similarly

puzzled at this bare definition of faith. How is it connected to

Abelard’s broader understanding of language, intellect and

imagination, themes of this congress?" (p. 915)

(...)

"Faith is thus not an abstract gift, a form of knowledge quite

distinct from human knowledge. Abelard’s understanding of

faith as an estimation of what not appear to the senses is

necessarily shaped by his understanding that what is said by a

proposition is never a thing or res in itself, with some extra-

linguistic existence.

(...)

Ultimately faith will give way to a knowledge that is beyond all

imagination, and that will endure." (p. 926)

(1) Theologia ‘Scholarium’ [TSch] 1.1, E.-M. Buytaert and CJ.

Mews (eds.), Corpus Christianorum Continuatio Mediaeualis

[CCCM] 13, Tumhout 1987, p. 318.

(2) William of Saint-Thierry, Disputatio Adversus Petrum

Abaelardum, P.L. vol. 180, c. 249; Bernard of Clairvaux, Letter

190, Sancti Bernardi Opera, Rome 1957-77, 8:78.

14. ———. 2009. "William of Champeaux, Abelard and Hugh of

Saint-Victor: platonism, theology and scripture in early 12th

century France." In Bible und Exegese in der Abtei Saint-Victor

zu Paris: Form und Funktion Eines Grundtextes im

Europaischen Raum. Band 3, edited by Berndt, Rainer, 131–

163. Münster: Aschendorff.

15. ———. 2009. "Peter Abelard." In The History of Western

Philosophy of Religion. Vol. 2: Medieval Philosophy of

Religion, edited by Oppy, Graham and Trakakis, N. N., 97–108.

Stocksfield: Acumen.

"Peter Abelard (1079–1142) introduces a new perspective into

the philosophy of religion in the Latin West through his

emphasis on the common source of pagan and religious

philosophical insight. Although not the first person to argue

that pagan philosophers shared some understanding of truths

manifest through divine revelation to Jews and then to

Christians, Abelard was one of the first teachers to create a

coherent synthesis of theologia in which this insight was the

driving principle.

Boethius (c.476–c.525) had pursued philosophical enquiry into

orthodox Christian doctrines relating to the Trinity, but never

reflected explicitly on the relationship of pagan philosophy to

Christian revelation. Rather than commenting on the Opuscula

sacra (Sacred works) of Boethius, Abelard decided to create his

own independent synthesis on the subject, a treatise about the

Trinity, now known as the Theologia ‘summi boni’ (hereafter

TSum). After the work was condemned as heretical at the

Council of Soissons in 1121, he revised it in the early 1120s as

his Theologia Christiana (Christian theology; hereafter TChr),

transforming it yet again into his Theologia (the Theologia

‘scholarium’; hereafter TSch) by the early 1130s. This final

version was identified by the famous Cistercian abbot, Bernard

of Clairvaux, at the Council of Sens, held on 25 May 1141, as

containing many heresies (Mews 2002)." (p. 97)

References

Mews, C. J. 2002. Reason and Belief in the Age of Roscelin and

Abelard. Aldershot: Ashgate,

16. ———. 2011. "William of Champeaux, the Foundation of Saint-

Victor (Easter, 1111), and the Evolution of Abelard's Early

Career." In Arts du langage et théologie aux confins des XIe et

XIIe siècles, edited by Rosier-Catach, Irène, 83–104. Turnhout:

Brepols.

"The common understanding of Parisian intellectual life in the

twelfth century as dominated by an on-going conflict between

the traditionally minded William of Champeaux and a

philosophically radical Peter Abelard, has long been dependent

on how we interpret Abelard account of their interaction in the

Historia calamitatum." (p. 83)

(...)

Bautier's proposed dating of Abelard’s early career needs

revision [*]. Rather than assuming that Abelard studied under

William for just two years, it is more likely that he remained at

the cathedral school for at least four years (1100-1104 ?), before

deciding to establish his own school at the royal palace of

Melun (c. 1104-1106 ?) and then at Corbeil (c. 1106-1107 ?). His

decision to return home, ostensibly to recover from a period of

overwork (c. 1107-1111 ?), thus occurred when William of

Champeaux was becoming active as an archdeacon in Paris,

and possibly was was helped by some assistant, who could

communicate and expand upon his master’s teaching on these

subjects.

(...)

This revised chronology has implications for understanding the

evolution of Abelard's writings on dialectic. Having spent at

least four years studying under William, Abelard may have

started to compose his Dialectica even before he returned to

Paris in 1111. While Abelard did not accept William's original

understanding of a universal as a substance or material essence

independent of differentiae, this did not stop him from using

the phrase res universalis on three separate occasions within

the Dialectica. After the unfolding of his affair with Heloise in

1117, Abelard started to adopt a more radical perspective. He

now argued that a universal was not any kind of thing. He also

had to counter the views of a much wider range of teachers than

just William of Champeaux. (pp. 103-104, notes omitted)

[*] Bautier, Robert-Henri. 1981. "Paris au temps d'Abélard." In

Abélard en son temps. Actes du Colloque international

organisé à l'occasion du IXe centenaire de la naissance de

Pierre Abélard (14-19 mai 1979), edited by Jolivet, Jean, 21-77.

Paris: Les Belles Lettres.

According to Bautier "Abelard studied under William for only

two years (1100-1102), before starting to teach at Melun c. 1102

and at Corbeil c. 1104, but returned to Paris in 1108, after

perhaps three years recovering from overwork. We shall

present evidence for considering that William moved to Saint-

Victor at Easter 1111." (p. 83)

17. ———. 2013. "Patristic notions of «caritas» in the writings of

Abelard and Heloise and their contemporaries." In Les

réceptions des Pères de l'Église au Moyen Age. Le devenir de

Ja tradition ecclésiale, edited by Berndt, Rainer and Fédou,

Michel, 689–706. Münster: Aschendorff.

"Love can be understood in many different ways. Augustine

defined caritas in consciously theological terms in the De

doctrina Christiana, as a movement of the spirit to enjoy God

for his own sake and one’s neighbour for the sake of God.(1) By

contrast, Abelard’s mature understanding of love in the

Theologia ‘Scholarium’ suggests that he preferred a definition

shaped more by Ciceronian ideals of friendship. In this paper, I

explore the evolution of Abelard’s understanding of love in

relation to that of the Fathers, and the possible influence on

him of his contemporaries, in particular of Heloise. A number

of distinguished scholars have commented on the possible

impact of her ideas, including Matthias Perkams in an excellent

monograph on the notion of love in Abelard’s theological

system. This study offers a further reflection on this theme

explored not just through his theological teaching, but through

his early exchanges with Heloise as well as in the thinking of

some of their contemporaries." (p. 689)

(1) Augustinus De doctrina Christiana, 3, 10, p. 89 : “Caritatem

uoco motum animi ad fruendum deo propter ipsum et se atque

proximo propter deum; cupiditatem autem motum animi ad

fruendum se et proximo et quolibet corpore non propter

deum.”

(2) Gilson 1934, p. 183–189; Marenbon 1997, p. 300; Perkams

2001, p. 267–268.

References

Etienne Gilson: La théologie mystique de Saint Bernard, Paris

1934.

John Marenbon: The Philosophy of Peter Abelard, Cambridge

1997.

Matthias Perkams: Liebe als Zentralbegriff der Ethik nach

Peter Abaelard (BGPhThMA. NF 58), Münster 2001.

18. ———. 2019. "Peter Abelard, Anselm of Havelberg, and

Nicholas of Cusa: Sources of an Ecumenical Tradition." In

Inventing Modernity in Medieval European Thought, ca.

1100–ca. 1550, edited by Nedermann, Cary J. and Koch,

Bettina, 155–170. Berlin: de Gruyter.

"Nicholas of Cusa never identifies by name Abelard, Thierry of

Chartres or Anselm of Havelberg in his writing. Nonetheless,

each of these three figures of the twelfth century offered ideas

to Nicholas of Cusa quite different from the most widely copied

theologian of the twelfth century, namely Peter Lombard. As is

evident from the contents of the library at Cusa (of which

Abelard’s Theologia was originally part), Nicholas was aware of

the diversity of medieval thought, in particular of the twelfth

century, to a much greater degree than most of his

contemporaries. Yet Nicholas was also influenced by later

writers, such as Ramon Lull and Meister Eckhart, that I have

not touched on here. The originality of Nicholas is such that his

ideas cannot be traced back to any single literary source.

Nonetheless, this little glimpse into one corner of his library

enables us to see that he was always fascinated by how other

writers handled the same problems of diversity and concord

with which he was engaged." (pp. 165-166)

19. Mews, Constant J., and Jolivet, Jean. 1990. "Peter Abelard and

His Influence." In Contemporary Philosophy. Vol. 6.1:

Philosophy and Science in the Middle Ages, edited by Guttorm,

Floistad, 105–140. Amsterdam: Kluwer.

"This chronicle is based on one prepared by Jean Jolivet,

reviewing literature on Abelard up to 1972; I have updated it to

take into account publications which have appeared 1972-1985"

(p. 105).

20. Monagle, Clare. 2021. "Introduction: Communities of Learning

– Constant J. Mews." In The Intellectual Dynamism of the

High Middle Ages, edited by Monagle, Clare, 9–22.

Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press.

Abstract: "This chapter articulates a number of key

contributions made by Constant J. Mews to the field of

Medieval Studies over the course of his career. In particular, it

focuses upon his expertise in Abelard and Heloise, his insights

into musicology and musical communities, and his

groundbreaking work in the study of women intellectuals in the

Middle Ages. All of his scholarly work, the chapter argues,

should be understood in the frame of his devotion to the

communities of learning, both of the past and in the present."

21. Murray, A. Victor. 1967. Abelard and St. Bernard: A Study in

Twelfth Century "Modernism". Manchester: Manchester

University Press.

"The actual quarrel between Abelard and St Bernard does not

appear to have been viewed in any very serious light by their

contemporaries. John of Salisbury, the scholar, and Otto of

Freising, the wordly churchman, see little more in it than a

clash between two temperaments, in which there was a good

deal to be said on both sides, but in which, on the whole,

Abelard suffered by reason of his opponent’s powerful position

and diplomatic unscrupulousness. It was a rather glaring

instance of something which was going on all the time, namely,

St Bernard’s insistence on having his own way in spite of either

opposition or proper evidence. Inevitably it involved

ecclesiastical party politics — the French, under the earnest

reformative leadership of Bernard, against the Italians, in

whom familiarity with Papal machinery had bred a measure of

indifference to the deeper issues of faith, and who were willing

to study the works of Abelard and see what he had to say. That

Rome itself was not disturbed by these ‘novelties’ which

Bernard declared were so heinous, is shown by the fact that a

follower of Abelard was raised to the Papacy only a year after

the Council of Sens." (p. 159)

22. Normore, Calvin G. 2005. "Who is Peter Abelard?" In

Autobiography as Philosophy: The Philosophical Uses of Self-

Presentation, edited by Mathien, Thomas and Wright, D. G.,

64–75. New York: Routledge.

"If the tale I have sketched here is correct, Abelard’s Historia

calamitatum can indeed be seen as a letter of consolation, for it

is a tale of how God can make good out of evil. It is also a

genuine work of philosophy in the tradition of the slogan of

Augustine and of Anselm of Canterbury, fides quaerens

intellectum. Abelard discerns and presents in the Historia a

pattern to the calamities of his life that he can best understand

by seeing them as part of a grander providential scheme and

seeing himself as a latter-day Jerome. It is a pattern which he

cannot demonstrate in the sense of prove, but which he can

demonstrate in the sense of point out to us, and it is a pattern

which he thinks shows how Christian faith both transcends and

perfects the philosophy of the Ancients." (p. 74)

23. Novikoff, Alex J. 2014. "Peter Abelard and Disputation: A

Reexamination." Rhetorica no. 32:323–347.

Abstract: "This paper examines Abelard’s engagement with

disputation (disputatio) from the vantage point of twelfth-

century scholasticism. Eschewing the well-worn details of

Abelard’s personal life and philosophical positions, analysis is

instead focused on two parallel dimensions of his career: the

manner in which he attempted to face-off with his adversaries

through public debate and his underlying theory of disputation.

It is argued that Abelard’s theory is to be found not in his

theological or logical works, but in his polemical letters and his

ethical dialogue, the Collationes, which together offer a

coherent hermeneutical strategy for discerning truth.

Abelard’s contribution to the art of disputation needs to be

assessed in light of his broader involvement in the scholastic

method and contemporary Jewish-Christian relations."

24. Orlandi, Giovanni. 2001. "On the Text and Interpretation of

Abelard's Planctus." In Poetry and Philosophy in the Middle

Ages: A Festschrift for Peter Dronke, edited by Marenbon,

John, 327–342. Leiden: Brill.

"The path towards a full appreciation of the literary value of

this cycle of six rhythmical compositions, put together by

Abelard for Heloise and her nuns of the Paraclete, was opened

up only in the 1960s by two scholars of distinct generations,

Wolfram von den Steinen and Peter Dronke. It is thanks to

them that we now recognise to its full extent the originality of

Abelard's Planctus in comparison with their direct sources:

their biblical counterparts along with their currently circulating

commentaries.

To turn now to the piece which has a specific interest for the

present discussion, the Planctus uirginum Israel super filia

lepte Galadite: after a paper published by Dronke in 1965,

which is the first substantial

contribution to the understanding of this kind of poetry,(3) von

den Steinen(4) demonstrated that, until the twelfth century, the

commentaries on Abelard's source, Judges 11, 29—40, treated

only the doctrinal

and juridical side of the story or its spiritual (that is 'typical' or

'figural') interpretation; nobody showed any real interest in the

personality of the two figures featuring in this drama: Jephtha,

who rashly promised God, if he gave him the victory over his

enemies, to sacrifice the first member of his family he would

encounter returning from the battle, and his unnamed

daughter, innocent victim of such a rash vow. And it is precisely

on this aspect—the two figures of the story, their emotions and

thoughts—that Abelard focuses his poem; still more, in this

recreation of the myth the daughter rises to the status of

protagonist of the entire drama. After a fascinating chapter on

these poems, in a book of 1970, dealing in particular with the

planctus for Samson,(5) Dronke, in a second, more complex

article of 1971, written in collaboration with Margaret Alexiou,

(6) refined and deepened his analysis of the piece on Jephtha's

daughter and, above all, carried out fresh researches about

sources and parallels in various epochs and areas, focusing on

the final, extraordinary episode of the wedding/execution

ceremony and showing how many cultural streams might have

crossed together in Abelard's poetry without impairing at all its

original flavour." (pp.327-328)

(3) P. Dronke, 'Medieval Poetry—I: Abelard', The Listener 74

(1965), 841-45.

(4) Die Planctus Abaelards—Jephthas Tochter',

Mittellateinisches Jahrbuch 4 (1967), 122~44. Another

important paper, concerning the whole cycle, was printed in

Wolfram von den Steinen, Menschen im Mittelalter (Bern and

Munich 1967), pp. 215-30.

(5) Peter Abelard: Planctus and Satire' in Poetic Individuality

in the Middle Ages (Oxford 1970), Chapter 4, pp. 14—49. There

has been a second, enlarged edition of this book (London 1986)

(Westfield Publications in Medieval Studies 1).

(6) 'The Lament of Jephtha's Daughter: Themes, Traditions,

Originality', now in Dronke, Intellectuals and Poets in

Medieval Europe (Rome 1992) (Edizioni di storia e letteratura,

Studi e testi 183), pp. 345-388.

25. Otten, Willemien. 1997. "The Bible and the Self in Medieval

Autobiography: Otloh of St. Emmeram (1010-1070) and Peter

Abelard (1079-1142)." In The Whole and Divided Self: The

Bible and Theological Anthropology, edited by McCarthy, John

and Aune, David, 130–157. New York: Crossroad Publishing

Company.

"When one thinks about models of Christian autobiographical

writing, the example that invariably comes to mind is that of

the Confessions.

This work's fascinating narrative in which the early Christian

bishop Augustine describes the chastening struggle to shape his

self to God continues to attract attention. It has even

transcended the boundaries of the Christian tradition in that it

has come to define the archetype of Western autobiography.(1)

In this essay I want to study two Western autobiographies from

the medieval period to see how they elaborate on the same

Christian theme of a self that understands itself explicitly as

restless in its struggle to find the fullness of a life in God. Before

examining them, however, I will make a few comments on the

self in medieval autobiography and on the role and function of

the Bible in the two autobiographical documents under review

here." (p. 130)

(1) An authoritative essay on the autobiographical genre in the

West that generally seems to hold this view is K J. Weintraub,

The Value of the Individual: Self and Circumstance in

Autobiography (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978),

esp. p. 1.

26. ———. 2007. "The Poetics of Biblical Tragedy in Abelard’s

Planctus." In Poetry and Exegesis in Premodern Latin

Christianity: The Encounter between Classical and Christian

Strategies of Interpretation, edited by Otten, Willemien and

Pollmann, Karla, 245–261. Leiden: Brill.

"While the rhetorical identification with biblical figures may

astound if not confuse our modern theological sensibilities

because of its fresh irreverence,(21) the complications that can

arise out of such biblical role playing are even more striking in

the case of poetic exegesis. As a case in point I will now turn to

Abelard’s planctus. Whereas my advice above was not to take

the biblical inerrancy of the scholastic era overly seriously, as it

does not rule out creative exegetical interpretation, in the

discussion that follows I want to demonstrate that we should

also not exaggerate Abelard’s poetic license in dealing with

Scripture, as he may be less concerned with the details of his

personal life than is often expected." (pp. 252-253)

(21) A case in point is Abelard’s identification with Christ in his

correspondence with Heloise for which even contemporary

scholarship criticizes him. See my analysis in ‘The Bible and the

Self in Medieval Autobiography: Otloh of St. Emmeram (1010–

1070) and Peter Abelard (1079–1142)’, in: D.E. Aune and J.

McCarthy (eds), The Whole and Divided Self. The Bible and

Theological Anthropology, New York 1997, 130–157, esp. 138–

146. See also D. Frank, ‘Abelard as Imitator of Christ’, Viator 1

(1970) 107–113.

27. Presutti, Fabio. 2011. "Realism and Ontology in Spinoza,

Abelard and Deleuze." Journal of the British Society for

Phenomenology no. 42:209–222.

Abstract: "Deleuze’s relation to Spinoza’s philosophy is a

detailed investigation of the ontology of immanence. This

article presents an interpretation of Spinoza’s definition of

substance’s essence based on Deleuze’s own original ontology

of the virtual. It will do so by analysing the concepts of

difference and expression as co-extensive with the more

historically dated but philosophically actual concept of realism.

Spinoza’s realist account of substance’s essence does not define

a form of a transcendent universal, but an ‘immanent’

conception of universality: a universal whose logical

independence from any thinking activity coincides with its own

ontological (existential) self-sufficiency. To investigate the

relation between ‘immanence’ and ‘realism’ in Spinoza’s

philosophy requires us to undertake a parallel outline of Peter

Abelard’s reformulation and solution of the problem of

universals."

28. Ruys, Juanita Feros. 2002. "Planctus magis quam cantici: The

generic significance of Abelard’s planctus." Plainsong and

Medieval Music no. 11:37–44.

Abstract: "What did the planctus mean to Abelard? During the

1130s Abelard was rethinking this musical genre and its

potential for expressing personalized, dramatic lament.

Abelard’s relationship with Heloise at this time (and indeed her

own literary output) ay have provoked a reaction to the generic

features of the planctus."

29. ———. 2008. "Peter Abelard's Carmen ad Astralabium and

Medieval Parent-Child Didactic Texts: The Evidence for Parent-

Child Relationships in the Middle Ages." In Childhood in the

Middle Ages and the Renaissance: The Results of a Paradigm

Shift in the History of Mentality, edited by Classen, Albrecht,

203–227. Berlin: de Gruyter.

"Peter Abelard's Carmen ad Astrolabium

What I would like to do now is to examine in greater detail one

of these parental didactic texts, Abelard's Carmen ad

Astralabium, to determine what it can tell us of medieval views

of children. Abelard was intensely interested in the human

condition. He addressed questions of the biological sex

differences between males and females in his exegesis of the

sixth day of creation in his Expositio in Hexaemeron, and the

more complex questions of the gender implications associated

with these biological differences absorbed and perhaps even

perplexed him throughout his writing career, recurring

particularly in the texts he wrote for Heloise and the nuns of

the Paraclete, but remaining there largely unresolved.(43)

In terms of life-span, Abelard was interested in the human body

from the moment of conception (which he dealt with in detail

in his solution to Heloise's Problem 42), and from its earliest

infancy to the point of death and purgation (which he

particularly treated in his Collationes) and beyond. What then

does his poem of advice to his son tell us about his impression

of childhood and youth?" (pp. 214-215)

(...)

"Abelard's Carmen ad Astralabium must make us think again

about the nature of parent-child relationships in the Middle

Ages and the medieval view of children.

Clearly childhood was perceived as a separate stage of life

possessing its own typical behaviors and requiring its own

forms of instruction. Nevertheless, childhood was not for this

reason sentimentalized in a fashion that would become

synonymous with the nineteenth century, nor did authors

condescend to children with simplistic texts or diluted

concepts. There appears to be an understanding that

instruction was a serious matter that required advanced forms

of comprehension which children had to learn to develop for

themselves. It is not true that familial feeling is completely

absent from Abelard's text: on the contrary, at certain points in

the text the power of Abelard's love for his son, and his desire

that Astralabe should similarly comprehend his mother's love

for him, shine through. Yet these sentiments are on the whole

subordinated by Abelard to the more important task of

equipping his son to lead a moral, ethical, and spiritual life that

would avoid the many pitfalls and mistakes of which Abelard

was able to warn him, both through the observations of a full

and active life, and quite often too through bitter personal

experience. In this we see, as with the other medieval parental

authors who wrote didactic texts for their children, medieval

parental instruction as an indicator of parental love." (pp. 226-

227)

30. ———. 2014. The Repentant Abelard. Family, Gender, and

Ethics in Peter Abelard's Carmen ad Astralabium and

Planctus. New York: Palgrave Macmillam.

"This book offers a complete study of Abelard’s Carmen ad

Astralabium and Planctus. It begins with a literary and

conceptual analysis of these texts, taking into account how they

reflect Abelard’s thought as evidenced elsewhere in his

writings, as well as how they extend, question, and complicate

his earlier ideas.

For the Carmen I explore issues of theme and style in order to

counter the popular perception that this poem is merely a

meandering collection of unremarkable sentential advice. On

the contrary, I argue that it constitutes a compact summary of

the ethical thought of an original and innovative thinker, its

ideas woven intimately together, flowing through and more

often over the traditional elegiac hexameter form of its verse.

To this end, I indicate how it differs in significant ways from

other didactic compositions and compilations circulating in late

eleventh- and early twelfth-century Europe. Throughout

chapter 1, my major focus is on the Carmen as a didactic text,

including how it was received as such in the Middle Ages. I

suggest that one of the shorter recensions of the Carmen

arising and circulating later in the twelfth century gives

evidence of a Cistercian origin and ask what this might indicate

regarding a Cistercian career for Astralabe. In particular, I

explore how the Carmen was transmitted, read, and used

through medieval paratexts such as the interlinear glosses and

marginal manuscript annotations it accrued, the additional

sentential verses it attracted in manuscripts, and the excerpts of

it included in florilegia. The chapter concludes with brief

considerations of the Carmen’s modern title and the historical

reasons that led to questions about its authenticity." (p. 5)

31. ———. 2021. "Carnal Compassion: Peter Abelard’s Conflicted

Approach to Empathy." In The Intellectual Dynamism of the

High Middle Ages, edited by Monagle, Clare, 25–42.

Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press.

Abstract: "Abelard addresses the cognitive-affective concept of

empathy (compassio) across a range of his writings. He

questions its ethics in his philosophical writings, taking his lead

from Seneca’s De clementia in viewing empathy as a

femininized emotional response lacking in judgment. This

Stoic-inspired understanding of empathy becomes more

personal in his first-person life writing, the Historia

calamitatum, where Abelard explores the negative impact of

empathy on his own life as both feeling subject and recipient.

Then in seeking to displace himself as the subject of Heloise’s

sympathetic identification of suffering in favor of Christ and his

Passio, Abelard conceptualizes the redemptive love of Christ

that will infuse his theological writings, leading to a rejection of

the ransom theory of the Crucifixion and presaging the affective

piety of the later Middle Ages."

32. S., Kaufmann. Linda. 1986. Discourses of Desire: Gender,

Genre, and Epistolary Fictions. Ithaca: Cornell University

Press.

Chapter 2: The Irremediable: Heloise to Abelard, pp. 63-90.

33. Schepers, Kees. 2017. "Abelard’s Exegesis of the Song of Songs

in his Second Letter to Heloise." The Journal of Medieval Latin

no. 27:107–131.

Abstract: "In this paper I am making the argument that the

brief excursus on the Song of Songs in Abelard’s second letter

to Heloise (the fifth in the Correspondence) contains exegesis

of a few phrases of this biblical book that is so far out of the

ordinary that it cannot be taken seriously and was not intended

to be. This argument is based on the following observations: the

lines presented as being from the Song of Songs are not really

biblical verses; no remotely comparable exegesis of these

phrases exists in earlier and contemporaneous exegesis; the

literal interpretation that Abelard applies besides an allegorical

reading was expressly forbidden by authorities both old and

new; and finally Abelard’s alleged exegesis conflicts absolutely

with his own exegesis of the same elements in authenticated

works."

34. Sikes, Jeffrey Garrett. 1965. Peter Abailard. New York: Russell

and Russell.

"Seven years ago, while studying St Bernard under the direction

of Dr Coulton, I looked for some biography of Abailard which

would incorporate the recent work of modern scholarship. No

single volume was available except the writings of Deutsch.

Excellent though these are, much research and criticism has

been done since their appearance. Dr Geyer has edited the

Logica ‘ Ingredientibus ’, which gives a fuller account of

Abailard’s logical theories, while only last year Ruf and

Grabmann published a new fragment of his Apologia to St

Bernard. Abailard’s theological writings, however, still await an

editor, and it is to be hoped that in more settled conditions the

appearance of a critical text will be possible. But in the

meantime there seemed to be room for a new study of

Abailard’s life and thought. In preparing this I have attempted

to trace wherever it seemed possible the sources of his ideas,

and to compare these with those of his contemporaries,

especially with the theological standpoint of St Bernard."

(Autjords' Note, p. IX)

References

Samuel Martin Deutsch, Peter Abälard: Ein kritischer

Theologe des zwölften Jahrhunderts, Leipzig: von S. Hirzel

1883.

35. Smalley, Beryl. 1957. "Prima Clavis Sapientiae: Augustine and

Abelard." In Fritz Saxl, 1890-1948: A Volume of Memorial

Essays from His Friends in England, edited by Gordon, D. J.

London: Thomas Nelson and Sons.

Reprinted in B. Smalley, Studies in Medieval Thought and

Learning From Abelard to Wyclif, New York: Bloomsbury

Academic 19841, pp. 1-8.

"Abelard's prologue to his Sic et non was regarded at one time

as the most significant and daring of his writings.

Modern scholarship has softened the colours. He was not

original in pointing out the conflicting opinions among his

authorities or in wishing to harmonise them by means of

dialectic. The quaestio, by means of which a difficulty would be

raised and solved, went back to patristic literature and earlier;

(1) it had been used in conjunction with dialectic of a simple

kind by Abelard's master in theology, Anselm of Laon.(2) Today

attention is shifting to the contents of the Sic et non as distinct

from its prologue. Abelard provided students in theology with a

formidable instrument de travail, a compilation of authorities

where they could look up the various opinions held by the

Fathers on topics disputed in the schools.(3) This was a solid

and lasting contribution to research, the prologue standing for

the hors-d'oeuvre.

But when all has been said, the prologue remains a forceful

defence of doubt as a method of enquiry. Abelard meant to

carry the use of dialectic further than his predecessors had

done." (p. 1 of the repritnt)

(1) G. Bardy, "La littérature patristique des Quaestiones et

responsiones sur l'Écriture sainte," in Revue Bibtique, XLI

(1932), pp. 210 ff., 341 ff., 515 ff.; KLII (1933), pp. 14 ff., 211 ff.,

328 ff-

(2) O. Lottin, "Nouveaux fragments thélogiques de l'£cole

d'Anselme de Laon. Conclusions et tables,'' In Recherches de

Théologie Ancienne et Médiévale, XIV (1947), pp. 157 ff. ;

"Manegold de Lautenbach, source d'Anselme de Laon," ibid., p.

222.

(3) See the discussion and bibliography in J. de Ghellinck, Le

Mouvement Théologique du XIIe Siècle, Bruges [etc.] 1948, pp.

149-80-

36. Stammberger, Ralf M. W. 2002. ""De longe ueritas uidetur

diuersa iudicia Parit": Hugh of Saint Victor and Peter Abelard."

Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia no. 58:65–92.

Abstract: "The relations of William of Champeaux, who began

the founding of the abbey of Saint Victor in Paris, and Peter

Abelard are known from the Historia calamitatum which the

peripateticus palatinus wrote years after the event. We have no

historical report that Abelard ever met Hugh of Saint Victor but

already their contemporaries brought together their works in

the manuscripts into which they copied them. A detailed

analysis of their writings reveals that they had much more in

common than is generally believed. They both use the terms

'potentia ', 'sapientia' and 'benignitas' to refer to the three

persons of the Trinity, and together with Walter of Mortagne

they both deal with the wisdom ('sapientia') of the incarnated

sec ond person. Also, together with Bernard of Clairvaux they

discuss the necessity of baptism for salvation. All these

questions are linked to the question of universals for which

Abelard is a famous protagonist and the comparison reveals

that Hugh's position, to which we have only indirect access, is

quite close to Abelard's in its nominalist orientation but differs

because he has a different concept of how we achieve

knowledge about God.

Hugh also develops a special position - not to be found in other

authors of his day - on how words signify things in the Sacred

Scriptures."

37. Starnes, Kathleen M. 1981. Peter Abelard: His Place In

History. Washington, D. C.: University Press of America.

"Peter Abelard epitomized the intellectual vitality of the twelfth

century renaissance. He was a master of dialectic who dared to

apply Aristotelian logic to both philosophy and theology. Under

his influence and example, Medieval realism gave way to a

modified nominalism, and rationalism was injected into

theology. Neither of these incursions into the realms of Plato

and the Church was welcomed, and thus the man who laid the

foundation for the University of Paris and provided the impetus

for scholasticism became persecuted by scholars who could not

combat his logic and by theologians who saw his rationalism as

a desecration of faith. Although Abelard was not so much

concerned with the subject matter as with the excitement of the

debate, he nevertheless exercised a profound influence and

acted as a catalyst in the transition of the twelfth century

schools of thought from a traditional to an analytical

methodology." (Preface, pp. IX-X)

38. Stewart, Marc, and Wulstan, David, eds. 2003. The Poetic and

Musical Legacy of Abelard and Heloise: An Anthology of

Essays by Various Authors. Ottawa: The Institute of Mediaeval

Music.

Contents: Michael Clanchy: Foreword V; Introduction VIII;

Short-title references IX; Editorial conventions XI; Chronology

XII; Map showing places mentioned in this book XIV; Family

Tree of Peter Abelard XV; 1 David Wulstan: Abelard's Paraclete

Hymnal and its Rhythms 1; 2 Constant J. Mews: Liturgy and

Identity at the Paraclete: Heloise, Abelard and the Evolution of

Cistercian Reform 19; 3 David Wulstan: Secular Lyrics from

Paris and the Paraclete 34; 4 Ann Buckley: Abelard's planctus

and Old French lais: melodic style and formal structure 49; 5 S

Anneus Wouters: 'Abner fidelissime': Abelard's version of a

biblical lament 60; 6 David Wulstan: Heloise at Argenteuil and

the Paraclete 67; 7 Juanita Feros Ruys: Hearing Mediaeval

Voices: Heloise and Carmina Burana 91; 8 Constant J. Mews:

Heloise, the Paraclete Liturgy and Mary Magdalen 100; 9 David

Wulstan: Sources and Influences: lyric and drama at the

'School of Abelard' 113; 10 Brenda M. Cook and Others: Some

additional notes and comments 140; II Translations of texts in

the music examples 157; About the contributors 164.

39. Sweeney, Eileen C. 2006. Logic, Theology, and Poetry in

Boethius, Abelard, and Alan of Lille. Words in the Absence of

Things. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Chapter 2: Abelard: a Twelth-Century Hermeneutics of

Suspicion pp. 63-126.

"If Boethius's goal in his logical commentaries is to distinguish

in order to unite, Abelard's goal seems simply to distinguish.

Boethius's construction of a narrative from Aristotle's cryptic

remarks in the Peri hermeneias is one Abelard follows carefully

and also criticizes, finding Boethius's connections more a

confusion than a synthesis of the elements in Aristotle's text.

He argues that Boethius constructs a unity that is inauthentic,

which asserts a happy ending, a union between language,

understanding, and the world that is not quite achievable. His

own corpus of commentaries breaks down this narrative to

consider its parts much more carefully.

Abelard's perception of gaps in Boethius's narrative and his

desire to take it apart is signaled in many ways. It comes across

at a general and formal level in his account of the relationship

between the Categories and Peri hermeneias in his later glosses

on Porphyry (known as the Logica nostrorum petitioni

sociorum). In these later glosses, he argues that Aristotle's two

works are not two pieces of a single narrative, an account of

words leading to one of sentences, as Boethius claims (and as

was a tradition Abelard himself Follows in his earlier glosses),

but the separate consideration of words insofar as they signify

things (the Categories) and words insofar as they signify

intellectus (the Peri hermeneias) (LNPS 508. 32-37). Beginning

with this division, then, I would like to consider Abelard's

account of the distinction between words and things in the

earlier Glosses on Porphyry and the later gloss on Porphyry,

and between words and understanding in the Commentary on

the Peri hermeneias. (10) I will attempt to examine the kind of

a narrative Abelard constructs, insofar as he constructs any, of

the processes of abstraction and sentence construction." (pp.

66-67)

(10) See Constant Mews, "On Dating the Works of Peter

Abelard," ADHLMA 52 (1985): 73-134; Marenbon, Peter

Abelard, pp. 40-53; and L. M. de Rijk, "Peter Abelard's

Semantics and His Doctrine of Being," Vivarium 24, 2 (1986):

103-108. It is widely agreed that the Glosses on Porphyry and

Commentary on the Peri hermeneias, both part of the Logica

ingredientibus, are earlier (1118-20) than the later glosses on

Porphyry (here: LNPS) and De intellectibus (from the mid-

1120s).

40. ———. 2014. "Abelard and the Jews." In Rethinking Abelard: A

Collection of Critical Essays, edited by Hellemans, Babette S.,

37–50. Leiden: Brill.

"I begin with Abelard’s theologies, where Abelard compares the

Jews to the philosophers both in knowledge of the divine

nature and the Trinity, as well as in their ethical principles and

behavior.(4) I turn next to Abelard’s Collationes in the dialogue

between the Philosopher and the Jew, connecting and

comparing it to the Commentary on Romans; both these texts

are concerned as well with the comparison between Jews and

gentiles in relation to reason and righteousness.

An examination of these texts and the role of Jews and Judaism

as Abelard understands them show, first, that Abelard’s

reflections on the Jews are reflections of his own thought and,

second, that they have a role to play in the shifting ground of

Christian anti-Jewish polemic in the twelfth century.

Abelard’s Commentary on Romans and his Collationes are

struggling with the same issues and with the same ambivalence

about the Jews and their relative goodness compared to the

gentiles, the same problematic that motivates the discussion of

the Jews in his theologies. Paul’s letter to the Romans

compares the situation of the Jews and gentiles on the gap

between their knowledge of and righteousness toward God."

(pp. 37-38)

(4) Abelard essentially rewrote and reworked his work of

systematic theology a number of times in response to

condemnations and criticisms. I refer here to the three main

rewritings, known as the Theologia ‘Summi Boni’ [TSB],

Theologia Christiana [TC], and Theologia ‘scholarium’ [TSch].

Buytaert’s critical edition notes the passages in common

between the different versions. For their dates of composition,

see Mews, “On Dating the Works of Peter Abelard,” Archives

d’histoire doctrinale et littéraire du moyen âge 52 (1985), 73–

134.

41. Tweedale, Martin. 1998. "Abelard, Peter (1079–1142)." In

Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy: Volume I, edited by

Craig, Edward, 196–226. New York: Routledge.

"Abelard stands out as a consummate logician, a formidable

polemicist and a champion of the value of ancient pagan

wisdom for Christian thought. Although he worked within the

Aristotelian tradition, his logic deviates significantly from that

of Aristotle, particularly in its emphasis on propositions and

what propositions say.

According to Abelard, the subject matter of logic, including

universals such as genera and species, consists of linguistic

expressions, not of the things these expressions talk about.

However, the objective grounds for logical relationships lie in

what these expressions signify, even though they cannot be said

to signify any things. Abelard is, then, one of a number of

medieval thinkers, often referred to in later times as

‘nominalists’, who argued against turning logic and semantics

into some sort of science of the ‘real’, a kind of metaphysics. It

was Abelard’s view that logic was, along with grammar and

rhetoric, one of the sciences of language.

In ethics, Abelard defended a view in which moral merit and

moral sin depend entirely on whether one’s intentions express

respect for the good or contempt for it, and not at all on one’s

desires, whether the deed is actually carried out, or even

whether the deed is in fact something that ought or ought not

be done.

Abelard did not believe that the doctrines of Christian faith

could be proved by logically compelling arguments, but rational

argumentation, he thought, could be used both to refute attacks

on Christian doctrine and to provide arguments that would

appeal to those who were attracted to high moral ideals. With

arguments of this latter sort, he defended the rationalist

positions that nothing occurs without a reason and that God

cannot do anything other than what he does do." (p. 196)

42. Valente, Luisa. 2015. "Happiness, Contemplative Life, and the

tria genera hominum in Twelfth-Century Philosophy: Peter

Abelard and John of Salisbury." Quaestio. Yearbook of the

History of Metaphysics no. 15:73–98.

"In the first section of this article I will provide an outline of the

substantial discussion about true happiness as beatific vision as

is found in Peter Abelard’s Collationes or Dialogus inter

philosophum, iudaeum et christianum. In the following

sections, I will present some twelfth-century triads of genera

hominum,

in which the ideal of the philosophical life plays a significant

role." (p. 74)

43. ———. 2015. "Aliquid amplius audire desiderat: Desire in

Abelard’s Theory of Incomplete and Non-Assertive Complete

Sentences." Vivarium no. 53:221–248.

Abstract: "One of the peculiarities of Peter Abelard’s analysis of

incomplete and non-assertive sentences is his use of the notion

of desire: in both Dialectica and Glosses on Peri hermeneias

the terms desiderium and desidero move to the foreground side

by side with optatio, expectatio, suspensio and the related

verbs. Desire plays a structural role in Abelard’s descriptions of

the compositional way in which the linguistic message is

received, changing step by step from incomplete to complete:

the person who receives the incomplete message (e.g.,

‘Socrates’ or ‘Socrates legens’) desires to get further

information through other words since he knows that the

purpose of such words or sequences of words (their causa

inventionis) is to combine with other words in order to form a

complete sentence. On the other hand, the expression of the

speaker’s attention to his inner affections renders the same

semantic content a different complete sentence (injunction,

prayer, or desiderativa oratio)."

44. ———. 2024. "“Lovers of Wisdom”: Etymology in the Service of

Philosophy and Christianity in Peter Abelard’s Writings."

Cahiers de l'Institut du Moyen-Âge Grec et Latin no. 93:80–

110.

Abstract: "My contribution investigates how Peter Abelard

considers and uses etymology in his writings. I will start with

some general considerations about the notion of etymology in

the early Middle Ages, while the following two parts will

concern Peter Abelard’s reflections on, and use of, etymologies

in his logical and theological works respectively."

45. Verball, Wim. 2005. "The Council of Sens Reconsidered:

Masters, Monks, or Judges?" Church History no. 74:460–493.

Extract: "The Council of Sens (May 25, 1141), during which the

teaching of Peter Abelard († 1143) was condemned by an

ecclesiastical court, has long been one of the most disputed

subjects in twelfth-century scholarship. The outcome of the

Council, understood as a victory for Bernard of Clairvaux (†

1153) over master Abelard, bequeathed us centuries of distorted

historical interpretation. For far too long, understanding of

what happened was firmly based on the account given by

Bernard's biographers, in the first place his secretary (and

adoring admirer) Geoffrey of Auxerre, who related the

confrontation between Bernard and Abelard in his contribution

to the hagiographical biography of the abbot. Not unnaturally,

the Vita places Bernard at the center of his time, making him

the dominant figure of the twelfth century. Thus no doubt was

admissible concerning Abelard's heresy and Bernard's right and

justice in condemning him."

46. Vitz, Evelyn Birge. 1989. Medieval Narrative and Modern

Narratology: Subjects and Objects of Desire. New York: New

York University Press.

Chapter 1: Abelard’s Historia calamitatum and Medieval

Autobiography, pp. 11-37.

47. Wade, Francis C. 1963. "Abelard and Individuality." In Die

Metaphysik im Mittelalter: ihr Ursprung und ihre Bedeutung.

Vorträge des 2. Internationalen Kongresses für

mittelalterliche Philosophie, Köln, 31. August-6. September

1961, edited by Wilpert, Paul, 165–171. Berlin: Walter de

Gruyter.

"Peter Abelard, in his Logica Ingredientibus proposed to

inquire into and solve "diligenter et perquiramus et solvamus"

(1) the questions concerning genus and species, which Porphyry

had refused to answer in

his Introduction to the Categories of Aristotle. Abelard states

his intention: "and since it is known that genera and species are

universals and in them Porphyry touches on the nature of all

universals generally, let

us inquire here into the common nature of universals by

studying these two (genus and species), and let us inquire also

whether they apply only to words or to things as well."(2)

The thesis of this brief paper is that Abelard, in spite of his

diligent inquiry, could not explain genus and species owing to

his unanalyzed conception of an individual." (p. 165)

(...)

"Abelard's failure, therefore, is that of a logician who tried to

account for the validity of universal knowledge with no

metaphysical doctrine about the constitution of the individual.

With no adequate analysis of the individual, it was impossible

to give a better answer than he did. His failure thus points up

one demand, that one first explain diversity before he try to

understand how different things agree, seeing that agreement is

between things that are diverse. And yet, in one sense Abelard

did not fail. He did not fail philosophy; rather he lived the two

commitments that make philosophy a worthwhile human

venture. First, even when he could not explain them, he held

firmly to the data — that we have universal knowledge, and that

existents are individuals. Secondly, though unsuccessful in his

own explanation, he never hesitated to affirm that universal

knowledge was valid knowledge" (p. 171(

(1) Logica Ingredientibus, 913. All references to Abelard will be

made to B. Geyer, Peter Abaelard's Philosophische Schriften,

in: BGPhMA. 21, Münster, H. 1 1919, H. 2 1921, H. 3, 1927, H. 4

1933.

(2) Log. Ingred. 913~17, trans, by R. McKeon, Selections from

Medieval Philosophers, I, New York: Scribner's Sons, 1929,

221.

48. Weinrich, Lorenz. 1969. "Peter Abelard as musician - I." The

Musical Quarterly no. 55:295–312.

"While we can precisely trace discussions of his theological-

philosophical works, the source history of his melodies has

been poorly explored.

For a long time one could not form an independent evaluation

but could only lament the loss of his music.(2)

But a small ray of light has been shed on Abaelard's sacred

songs; since the discovery of the planctus by Carl Greith in 1838

and the hymns by Emile Gachet in 1840, we have possessed at

least the texts of these

songs. And now that we have the music for one hymn and two

manuscripts containing the melody for a planctus, we may

attempt to determine more precisely than before Abaelard's

position in the history of

music.

It is perhaps strange that nowhere in his theological and

philosophical works does Abaelard express himself on musical

matters. In his letters there are only a few scattered remarks

that are at all informative and that contribute anything to an

attempt to construct a chronology.

Two phases of musical activity need to be distinguished in

Abaelard's life ( 1079-1142): (1) the period of his love poems,

circa 1115, and (2) the period of his preoccupation with sacred

songs, 1130-1135. But

it must be pointed out that there is no direct source tradition

for the first phase, and that we are informed about the early

songs only by remarks made at a later time." (p. 296)

(2) J. T. Muckle, ed., "Abelard's Letter of Consolation to a

Friend (Historia Calamitatum)," Mediaeval Studies, XII

(1950), 184 (cap. 6).

49. ———. 1969. "Peter Abelard as musician - II. The Neumes of the

Manuscripts of Planctus VI." The Musical Quarterly no.

55:464–486.

"To summarize: two different developments can be

distinguished.

Abaelard's planctus, which were religious elegies in content and

sequences in form, in one instance found a position in the

liturgy and served as a model for the Marian Planctus, a

sequence not belonging to the Mass. In another instance both

the music and rhythmic structure were used in a French secular

lai, a love song. Two new important poetic idioms thus took

advantage of Peter Abaelard's bold creations.

But Abaelard's musical oeuvre remained alive in its own right

as well. After the early love songs for Heloise had been

forgotten, a planctus of Abaelard's continued to be heard." (p.

485)

50. Wetherbee, Winthrop. 2004. "Literary works." In The

Cambridge Companion to Abelard, edited by Brower, Jeffrey

E. and Guilfoy, Kevin, 45–125. Cambridge: Cambridge

University Press.

"Though the main concern of this volume is Abelard’s work in

philosophy and theology, he made important and original

contributions in a number of fields. His substantial essays in

apologetic and biblical exegesis are discussed in other

chapters.1 Studies still in progress are revealing his extensive

and wide-ranging activity as a liturgist, and seeking to recover

concrete evidence of his work as a composer of music. But his

most remarkable non-philosophical role is as a literary artist, a

master of narrative and lyric form who produced art of a high

order out of his own complex and tormented life." (p. 45)

51. Wilks, Ian. 2011. "Peter Abelard." In Encyclopedia of Medieval

Philosophy: Philosophy between 500 and 1500, Second

Edition, edited by Lagerlund, Henrk, 1406–1413. Dordrecht:

Springer.

Abstract: "The characteristic doctrines of Peter Abelard (1079–

1142) can be arranged under the headings of logic, metaphysics,

and ethics.

Abelard rejects the position that logical theory deals with

universals taken as things (res).

It deals with words, whose signification is explained by their

association with thoughts stripped of individuating detail. His

account of propositions is shaped by his distinction between

propositional force and propositional content, and by his

notion of the dictum, the causally efficacious non-thing which

is what a proposition says. His account of inference is especially

focused on the nature of conditionals and the sorts of

relationships between terms that can be used to verify them.

Abelard’s most characteristic metaphysical view is that the only

things which exist are individuals. Forms exist as individual to

the things they inhabit, not as shared between things. Material

objects are indeed matter/form composites, but their forms are

simply arrangements of underlying matter; material objects are

thus usefully subject to mereological analysis (i.e., analysis in

terms of part/whole relations). Humans, but not animals, have

immaterial souls, and are capable of freedom. By contrast God

is not free; he can only do the things he does.

Abelard’s most characteristic ethical view is that it is the

consent, not the action, that is to be judged as sinful or

meritorious. A sinful consent is marked by contempt for God,

and is formed explicitly in violation of God’s law.

Law is itself revealed both in the Old and New Testament –

yielding Old and New Law, respectively – but is also innately

present to humans in the form of natural law. Meritorious

consent is marked by love of God – in other words, by charity.

Charity is the theological equivalent of justice, which itself

holds central place among the cardinal virtues. Justice and

charity both enjoin regard for the interests of others, but

charity additionally does this as a product of the love of God,

and for that reason counts as a more fundamental virtue than

justice."

52. Williams, Carol J. 2021. "The Emotional Landscape of Abelard

’s Planctus David super Saul et Ionatha." In The Intellectual

Dynamism of the High Middle Ages, edited by Monagle, Clare,

99–127. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press.

Abstract: "In Abelard’s Letter 16 addressed to ‘Héloise, sister to

be revered in Christ and loved’, he refers to a set of six planctus

or laments written in the voices of a number of Old Testament

characters. The last of these, Planctus 6, in which David

laments for Saul and Jonathan, is probably the most famous

and is the only one for which a reliable, original music setting

survives.

The laments are all in the first person and provide a deeply

personal reflection on the tragic events which inspired them;

they are virtuosic in language and almost shockingly intense in

emotional range. This study examines Planctus 6 considering

the link between Abelard’s language and the expression of

specific emotions and, wherever possible, examines how music

serves to intensify that expression."

53. Wulstan, David. 2002. "Novi modulaminis melos: the music of

Heloise and Abelard." Plainsong and Medieval Music no. 11:1–

23.

Abstract: "Recent developments have uncovered the early

correspondence of Heloise and Abelard.

This discovery has allowed the identification of a number of

‘lost’ lyrics by Abelard and has revealed that Heloise, too, was a

lyricist of great stature. This article reviews some of their works

and touches upon their connection with the ‘goliardic’ tradition,

the Carmina Burana, and their influence upon Walther von der

Vogelweide and other poets. The sequences and liturgical

dramas of Heloise survive with music of an individual style. The

dramas, moreover, are of notable originality: they influenced

the later history of the genre (including the Carmina Burana

Easter dramas) to a considerable and enduring extent.(1)"

(1) This article is necessarily a compression of a rather larger

body of material. A fuller discussion will be found in The Poetic

and Musical Legacy of Heloise and Abelard [2003]; (hereafter

The Poetic and Musical Legacy) and Music from the Paraclete

(hereafter MP), both to be published by the Plainsong and

Mediaeval Music Society. Despite the title, MP will include all

the secular songs that can be ascribed to Heloise and Abelard.

54. Ziolkowski, Jan M. 2007. "Peter Abelard as Textual Critic and

Historian." The Journal of Medieval Latin no. 17:361–371.

"As a letter writer Peter Abelard is known best for the

autobiographical Historia calamitatum, which presents itself

ostensibly as a consolatoria [epistola] to an unnamed friend,

and his correspondence with Heloise, which amounts to seven

letters, often subsumed into the so-called Personal Letters

(Letters 2–5) and the so-called Letters of Direction (Letters 6–

8)." (p. 361)

(...)

"Less studied have been at least a half dozen other letters,

among which are Letters 9–14, which were edited definitively

by the late Edmé Smits (1950–1992).(3) These other writings

have the disadvantages of not being as closely associated with

the personal engagement of Peter Abelard and Heloise, of

having separate addressees, and of being transmitted

separately rather than in an organic collection. But several of

them stand out for being as extraordinary in their own right as

is the personal correspondence, and they hold the potential to

repay the effort of close examination. In this case I would like

to probe two of them to glean insights into Peter Abelard’s

practice as a historian and as a textual critic.

Letters 11 and 10 will be treated chronologically, not according

to the traditional numbering." (pp. 361-362)

(3) Edmé Renno Smits, ed. Letters IX–XIV. An Edition with an

Introduction (Groningen, 1983).

Bibliographia. Annotated bibliographies

Raul Corazzon || rc@ontology.co || Info

Pierre Abélard. Bibliographie des

études en Français sur sa

philosophie et théologie

Bibliographie

1. Alverny, Marie-Thérèse d'. 1975. "Abélard et l'astrologie." In

Pierre Abélard - Pierre le Vénérable. Les courants

philosophiques, littéraires et artistiques en Occident au milieu

du XII siècle, edited by Jolivet, Jean and Louis, René, 611–628.

Paris: Éditions du Centre national de la recherche scientifique.

2. Ávalos Soto, Ángela Beatriz. 2016. "La personne et ses modes

chez Pierre Abélard." Philonsorbonne no. 10:9–28.

3. Bautier, Robert-Henri. 1981. "Paris au temps d'Abélard." In

Abélard en son temps. Actes du Colloque international

organisé à l'occasion du IXe centenaire de la naissance de

Pierre Abélard (14-19 mai 1979), edited by Jolivet, Jean, 21–77.

Paris: Les Belles Lettres.

4. Beonio Brocchieri Fumagalli, Maria Teresa. 1974. "La relation

entre logique, physique et théologie." In Peter Abelard.

Proceedings of the International Conference: Louvain, May

10-12, 1971, edited by Buytaert, Eligius M., 153–163. Leuven:

Leuven University Press.

5. ———. 1980. "Concepts philosophiques dans l' Historia

Calamitatum et dans les autres oeuvres abélardiennes." In

Petrus Abaelardus (1079-1142). Person, Werk und Wirkung,

edited by Thomas, Rudolf, 121–124. Trier: Paulinus-Verlag.

6. Biard, Joël. 2003. "Logique et psychologie dans le De

Intellectibus d'Abélard." In Pierre Abélard. Colloque

international de Nantes, edited by Jolivet, Jean and Habrias,

Henri, 309–320. Rennes: Presses Universitaires de Rennes.

7. Blomme, Robert. 1957. "À propos de la définition du péché chez

Pierre Abélard." Ephemerides theologicae Lovaniense no.

33:319–348.

8. ———. 1958. La doctrine du péché dans les écoles théologiques

de la première moitié du XIIe siècle. Paris: Duculot.

9. Bourgain, Pascale. 2005. "L'art poétique d'Abélard dans

l'Hymarius paraclitensis." In Itinéraires de la raison. Études

de philosophie médiévale offertes à Maria Cândida Pacheco,

edited by Meirinhos, José Francisco, 147–162. Louvain-la-

Neuve: Fédération Internationale des Instituts d'Études

Médiévales.

10. ———. 2012. "Héloïse, vie et oeuvres." Cahiers de recherches

médiévales et humanistes no. 23:211–222.

Résumé : "On a beaucoup écrit sur Héloïse, mais sans toujours

faire la part du peu de choses que l’on connaît avec certitude et

de ce qui relève de la reconstruction hypothétique. En tenant

compte des recherches les plus récentes, cet article fait une

mise au point précise sur ce que l’on peut savoir de sa vie, de sa

famille, de son milieu et de ses oeuvres, en abordant des

questions encore débattues par les spécialistes, telles que celles

de sa date de naissance, de sa famille, del’authenticité des

lettres qu’elle aurait échangées avec Abélard et des différentes

oeuvres que l’on peut lui attribuer, dont l’auteur exclut les

Epistole duorum amantium récemment redécouvertes. Il

s’efforce de mieux dessiner la personnalité complexe de cette

grande intellectuelle qui fut une remarquable abbesse, se

signalant par son indépendance d’esprit, et dont les lettres

témoignent d’une profonde culture et d’un art d’écrire très sûr."

11. Brumberg-Chaumont, Julie. 2007. "Sémantiques du nom

propre: sources anciennes et discussions médiévales à l'époque

d'Abélard." Histoire Épistémologie Langage no. 29:137–166.

Résumé: "La question de la signification des noms propres joue

un rôle de révélateur dans l'analyse médiévale du problème des

universaux et de l'individuation. À la jonction de la grammaire

et de la logique, elle hérite des Institutions de Priscien et des

commentaires sur l'Organon de Boèce un ensemble d'éléments

doctrinaux, plus ou moins convergents ou contradictoires, à

partir desquels elle construit une sémantique originale, qui

culmine avec l'oeuvre d'Abélard. Cette approche inédite, fondée

sur une réélaboration des relations entre substance, qualité,

signification et nomination pose essentiellement la question du

rôle de la qualité particulière, souvent appelée « platonitas » et

pensée comme une collection d'accident, dans la signification

des noms propres de substances individuelles."

12. ———. 2008. "Le problème du substrat des accidents

constitutifs dans les commentaires a l' Isagoge d'Abélard et du

Pseudo-Raban (P3)." In Compléments de Substance. Études

sur les propriétés accidentelles offertes à Alain de Libera,

edited by Erismann, Christophe and Schniewind, Alexandrine,

67–84. Paris: Vrin.

"Comme l'a souligné A. de Libera (L'Art des géneéralités, Paris,

Aubier 1999, p. 319-329), Abélard critique dans les Gloses sur

Porphyre la théorie de l'essence matérielle (notée TEM) en

soulignant son incapacité à répondre à la question du sujet

d'inhérence des propriétés constitutives, qu'il s'agisse de

l'espèce (et donc, des différences spécifiques) ou des individus

(et donc, des accidents individuels). Un autre commentaire à

l'Isagoge, souvent associé à la TEM et attribué au Pseudo-

Raban (alias P3), tente de répondre à cette double difficulté.

Nous proposons d'étudier les solutions que ce texte tente

d'apporter, car elles permettent, selon nous, de mieux

comprendre la réfutation d'Abélard, et de prendre la mesure de

la pertinence de ses attaques." (p. 67)

13. Brunner, Fernand, ed. 1981. Abélard. Le 'Dialogue'. La

philosophie de la logique. Neuchâtel: Secrétariat de

l'Université.

Actes du Colloque de Neuchâtel 16-17 novembre 1979.

Table des matières: Introduction 1; I. Maurice de Gandillac: Le

"Dialogue" 3; II. Sofia Vanni Rovighi: Intentionnel et universel

chez Abelard 21: III. Jean Jolivet: Abélard et Guillaume

d'Ockham, lecteurs de Porphyre 31; IV. Alain de Libera:

Abélard et le dictisme 59; V. Guido Küng: Abélard et les vues

actuelles sur les universaux 119; Index des noms 129-131.

14. Carra de Vaux Saint-Cyr, M.-B. 1963. "Disputatio catholicorum

patrum adversus dogmata Petri Abaelard." Revue de Sciences

Philosophiques et théologiques no. 47:205–220.

15. Charrier, Charlotte. 1933. Héloïse dans l’histoire et dans la

légende. Paris: Champion.

16. Chatillon, Jean. 1981. "Abélard et les écoles." In Abélard en son

temps. Actes du Colloque international organisé à l'occasion

du IXe centenaire de la naissance de Pierre Abélard (14-19 mai

1979), edited by Jolivet, Jean, 146–158. Paris: Les Belles

Lettres.

17. Coloman, Viola. 2006. "Saint Anselme et Abélard : auteurrs de

deux théologies ?" In Anselm and Abelard: Investigations and

juxtapositions, edited by Gasper, Giles and Kohlenberger,

Helmut, 118–132. Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval

Studies.

18. Constable, Giles. 2001. "Sur l'attribution des Epistolae duorum

amantium." Comptes rendus des séances de l'Académie des

Inscriptions et Belles-Lettres no. 145:1679–1693.

"[Les erudits] ne devraient pas davantage perdre de vue

l'intérêt que présentent ces lettres, indépendamment de leur

attribution en tant qu'oeuvre d'art dont la seule valeur réside

dans le nom ou les noms qui leur sont attachés. Même si les

lettres ne furent pas rédigées par Abélard et Héloïse, cela

d'enlèverait rien de manière significative à leur intérêt,

puisqu'elles n'ajoutent que relativement peu de chose à ce que

l'on sait déjà d'Abélard et Héloïse. De fait, l'attribution est

presque tout entière fondée sur la

connaissance que nous avons provenant de travaux qui peuvent

leur être attribués avec plus d'assurance. Quoi qu'il en soit, les

Epistolae présentent un intérêt pour elles-mêmes. Les avis des

érudits peuvent différer en ce qui concerne leur auteur, leur

date,

leur style, et leur qualité, mais elles constituent sans aucun

doute une addition remarquable au corpus médiéval des lettres

d'amour." (pp.1692-1894, une note omise)

19. Cottiaux, Jean. 1932. "La conception de la théologie chez

Abélard." Revue d'histoire ecclésiastique no. 28:247–295; 533–

551; 788–828.

20. Dalarun, Jacques. 2005. " Nouveaux aperçus sur Abélard,

Héloïse et le Paraclet." Francia – Forschungen zur

westeuropäischen:19–66.

21. Dambska, Izydora. 1977. "La sémiotique des "dictiones

indefinitae" dans la Dialectique d'Abélard." Cahiers de I

´lnstitut du Moyen Age Grec et Latin no. 21:10–20.

22. Déchanet, Jean Marie. 1939. "L'amitié d'Abélard et de

Guillaume de Saint-Thierry." Revue c’Histoire Ecclésiastique

no. 35:761–774.

23. Decorte, Jos. 1999. ""Sed quoniam Platonis scripta nondum

cognovit Latinitas nostra...": que faire en l'absence d'une

traduction?" In Tradition et traduction. Les textes

philosophiques et scientifiques grecs au moyen age latin.

Hommage a Fernand Bossier, edited by Beyers, Rita, Brams,

Jozef, Sacré, Dirk and Verrycken, Koenraad, 69–87. Leuven:

Leuven University Press.

24. Delhaye, Philippe. 1980. "Quelques points de la morale

d'Abélard." In "Sapientiae Doctrina": Mélanges de théologie et

de littérature médiévales offerts à Dom Hildebrand Bascour

O.S.B. Leuven: Imprimerie orientaliste.

25. Deproost, Paul-Augustin. 2023. "La Correspondance d’Héloïse

et Abélard : Un chemin de rédemption ?" Folia Electronica

Classica no. 46:1–24.

26. Engels, Lodewijk. 1974. "Abélard écrivain." In Peter Abelard.

Proceedings of the International Conference: Louvain, May

10-12, 1971, edited by Buytaert, Eligius M., 12–37. Leuven:

Leuven University Press.

27. Erismann, Christophe. 2014. "Paternités multiples. Les débats

sur les relatifs entre Anselme et Abélard." Medioevo. Rivista di

Storia della Filosofia Medievale no. 39:11–30.

28. Gandillac, Maurice de. 1975. "Intention et loi dans l'éthique

d'Abélard." In Pierre Abélard - Pierre le Vénérable. Les

courants philosophiques, littéraires et artistiques en Occident

au milieu du XII siècle, edited by Jolivet, Jean and Louis, René,

585–610. Paris: Éditions du Centre national de la recherche

scientifique.

29. ———. 1980. "Notes preparatoires a un debat sur le

«Dialogus»." In Petrus Abaelardus (1079-1142). Person, Werk

und Wirkung, edited by Thomas, Rudolf, 243–246. Trier:

Paulinus-Verlag.

30. ———. 1981. "Le "Dialogue"." In Abélard. Le "Dialogue", la

philosophie de la logique, 3–20. Neuchâtel: Secrétariat de

l'Université.

31. Gilson, Etienne. 1939. "Dix variations sur un thème d'Héloïse."

Archives d'Histoire Doctrinale et Littéraire du Moyen Âge no.

12:387–399.

32. ———. 1997. Héloïse et Abélard. Paris: Vrin.

Troisième édition revue.

33. Giraud, Cedric. 2024. "Auteur collectif or exégète singulier.

Abélard et la Bible." Artes no. 3:93–100.

Abstract: "The paper analyzes the importance of Peter Abelard

in twelfth-century biblical exegesis.

Abelard distinguished himself as an innovative young teacher

when he decided to explain the book of Ezekiel independently,

rather than following the traditional approach of his master

Anselm of Laon. Although his commentary on Ezekiel has been

lost, his other exegetical works, such as sermons, commentaries

on the Hexameron and Epistle to the Romans, and Problemata

Heloissae, demonstrate his significant contribution to exegesis.

Historical criticism has underestimated Abelard’s role as an

exegete, however, focusing more on his correspondence and

theologies. This study proposes to reevaluate Problemata

Heloissae in light of how Abelard addresses the exegetical

questions posed by Heloise: he employs a method combining

tradition and originality, thereby showing that his exegesis is

both collective and singular."

34. Gomes, João. 2008. "Pierre Abélard et la question de l’individu

: conscience et mémoire individuées." Bulletin du centre

d’études médiévales d’Auxerre | BUCEMA no. 2:1–20.

35. Gregory, Tullio. 1974. "Abélard et Platon." In Peter Abelard.

Proceedings of the International Conference: Louvain, May

10-12, 1971, edited by Buytaert, Eligius M., 38–64. Leuven:

Leuven University Press.

Publié aussi dans Studi medievali, 13, 1972, pp. 539-562.

36. ———. 1975. "Considérations sur ratio et natura chez Abélard."

In Pierre Abélard - Pierre le Vénérable. Les courants

philosophiques, littéraires et artistiques en Occident au milieu

du XII siècle, edited by Jolivet, Jean and Louis, René, 569–584.

Paris: Éditions du Centre national de la recherche scientifique.

Repris dans T. Gregory, Mundana Sapientia. Forme di

conoscenza nella cultura medievale, Roma, Edizioni di storia e

letteratura, 1992, pp. 201-217.

37. Grellard, Christophe. 2003. "Fides sive credulitas. Le problème

de l'assentiment chez Abélard, entre logique et psychologie."

Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du Moyen Âge no.

70:7–25.

Résumé: "Cette étude recherche comment Abélard approche la

question de l’assentiment, l’acte par lequel l’esprit donne son

accord à une proposition. Le De intellectibus examine parmi les

actes mentaux l’estimation ou appréciation subjective. Le

processus d’assentiment est décrit comme accord (susceptible

de degrés) entre la réalité et la vérité de l’intellection.

Mais ce sont les traités de logique qui examinent les modalités

de production de la confiance, dans une logique de la

persuasion et de la vraisemblance qui trouve son application en

théologie."

38. ———. 2012. "Scepticisme et incroyance. La querelle entre

Abélard et Guillaume de Saint Thierry sur le statut de la foi."

Citeaux - Commentarii cistercienses no. 63:245–262.

Résumé : "Dans la Disputatio adversus Petrum Abaelardum,

qui contribua à déclencher le concile de Sens, Guillaume de

Saint-Thierry qualifie Abélard de Academicus, c’est-à-dire

sceptique.

Le but de cette étude est de chercher à comprendre ce que

recouvre ce qualificatif. a partir d’une analyse du premier

chapitre de la Disputatio, complétée par certains éléments du

Speculum fidei, on cherche à montrer que Guillaume a perçu, à

tort ou à raison, dans la théorie d’Abélard une réduction à sa

seule dimension cognitive et subjective, en rupture avec les

théories de la foi comme vertu théologale. L’examen des

séquelles de la querelle dans la seconde moitié du XIIe siècle

semble confirmer ces analyses."

39. ———. 2021. "Abélard et la justice. Aequitas, utilitas, caritas "

Recherches de Théologie et Philosophie médiévales no. 88:47–

88.

Abstract: "The aim of this study is to identify the conceptions of

justice that structure Peter Abelard’s theory of divine justice,

i.e., the rewarding of merits and the punishment of sins, as well

as his theory of human justice. Adopting a chronological

approach to Abelard’s work, the study documents the way that

Abelard moves from a philosophical conception of justice

(where celestial and human justice are strongly connected) to a

more legalistic conception of justice. Indeed, in the last stage of

his thought, Abelard offers a view of human justice as purely

pragmatic, useful for the protection of the commonwealth,

whereas God alone can ground His justice on equity and

charity."

40. Grondeux, Anne. 2011. "Guillaume de Champeaux, Joscelin de

Soissons, Abélard et Gosvin d'Anchin: étude d'un milieu

intellectuel." In Arts du langage et théologie aux confins des

XIe et XIIe siècles, edited by Rosier-Catach, Irène, 3–44.

Turnhout: Brepols.

41. Hamelin, Guy. 1995. "Raison et foi dans l'Ethica d'Abélard." In

Les philosophies morales et politiques au Moyen Âge. Tome I.

Actes du IXe Congrès international de philosophie médiévale,

Ottawa, du 17 au 22 août 1992, edited by Bazan, B. C., Andujar,

E. and Sbrocchi, L. G., 486–500. New York: Legas.

42. ———. 1996. L'origine de la doctrine de la vertu comme

habitus chez Pierre Abélard, Université du Quebec à Trois-

Rivières.

Disponible sur Intenet à l'adresse:

core.ac.uk/download/pdf/51243132.pdf

43. ———. 2006. "La psychologie de la connaissance chez Pierre

Abélard arrive-t-elle à une impasse?" In Intellect et

imagination dans la philosophie médiévale / Intellect and

imagination in medieval philosophy / Intelecto e imaginação

na filosofia medieval / Actes du XIe Congrès international de

philosophie médiévale de la Société internationale pour

l'Étude de la philosophie médiévale (S.I.E.P.M.): Porto, du 26

au 31 août 2002, edited by Pacheco, Maria Cândida and

Meirinhos, José F., 883–894. Turnhout: Brepols.

44. ———. 2013. "L'influence du stoicisme chez Pierre Abélard : la

notion de consensus." Patristica et Mediaeualia no. 34:3–15.

Abstract: "Medieval thinkers have been inspired by different

ancient philosophical theses, which they have partially

modified and adapted to their Christian belief.

Abelard is certainly no exception, since he has been under the

most various pagan influences of his time without abandoning

his own religious convictions.

Abelard's philosophy consists mainly of ancient borrowings,

which corne more often from indirect sources. The authority of

Plato and Aristotle is obvious in almost all phi!osophical topics

developed by Abelard. It is however more Jess known that

Stoicism bas also played an important role in his thought,

especially in ethics with notions like consensus (συγκατάθεσις;)

or actions moralJy indifferent (αδιάφορος - ουδέτερος). Stoic

physics has also influenced his moral doctrine with the concept

of affinity or preservation (οικεῖοσις) which refers to a certain

innate capacity in man to observe the natural Jaw and, before

the advent of Jewish and Christian laws, to progress toward his

own salvation. Finally the famous precept dear to all Stoics of

living in agreement with nature (ομολογουμένως τη φύσει ζην)

has received a favorable reception in Abelard's ethics, as well as

the attitude of serene detachment (ἀπάθεια - ἀταραξία), which

he has encouraged in its Plantus.

In the present paper, the objective is to expound the influence

of the Stoic notion of assent (συγκατάθεσις), its equivalent

consent (consensus), on Abelard's ethics, which serves hirn as a

fondamental component to define moral trespass. More

specifically, we first see Abelard's definition of sin, found in his

Ethica, which represents a decisive step in clarifying what really

constitutes this notion in the history of ideas. We examine after

that the main usages made by the Stoics of the term assent. We

can then realize that the passage of this Stoic concept from the

epistemological sphere to the ethical bas been recuperated by

some Latin authors like Augustine, who uses the term in both

areas, and later by Abelard himself, who restricts its usage to

ethics by using instead consensus. We finally arrive at the

conclusion that Abelard's ethics has not only been influenced

by the most notable religious and philosophicaJ thinkers, like

Plato, Arîstotle, Jerome and Augustine, but also by some Stoic

philosophers, who were relatively unknown at the time and

sometimes accessible only by some obscure intermediaries."

45. ———. 2015. "Volonté et habitus chez Pierre Abélard : un

double héritage." Quaestio. Journal of the History of

Metaphysics no. 15:363–372.

46. Huglo, Michel. 1979. "Abélard, poète et musicien." Cahiers de

civilisation médiévale no. 22:349–361.

47. Iwakuma, Yukio. 1999. "Pierre Abélard et Guillaume de

Champeaux dans les premières années du XIIe siècle: une

étude préliminaire." In Langage, sciences, philosophie au

XIIème siècle, edited by Biard, Joël, 93–123. Paris: Vrin.

48. Jeauneau, Édouard. 1991. "Note critique sur une récente

édition de la Theologia 'Summi Boni' et de la Theologia

'Scholarum' d'Abélard." Revue des Etudes augustiniennes no.

37:151–158.

49. Jolivet, Jean. 1963. "Abélard et le Philosophe. (Occident et

Islam au XII siecle)." Revue de l'Historie des Religions no.

164:181–189.

Repris dans: J. Jolivet, Aspects de la pensée médiévale:

Abélard. Doctrines du langage, pp. 53-61.

50. ———. 1963. "Sur quelques critiques de la théologie d'Abélard."

Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du Moyen Âge no.

30:7–51.

Repris dans: J. Jolivet, Aspects de la pensée médiévale:

Abélard. Doctrines du langage, pp. 7-51.

51. ———. 1966. "Eléments du concept de nature chez Abélard." In

La filosofia della natura nel Medioevo. Atti del III Congresso

internazionale di filosofia medioevale, 297–304. Milano: Vita e

Pensiero.

Repris dans: J. Jolivet, Aspects de la pensée médiévale:

Abélard. Doctrines du langage, pp. 63-70.

52. ———. 1968. "Le traitement des autorités contraires selon le 'Sic

et non' d’Abélard." In L’ambivalence dans la culture arabe,

edited by Charnay, Jean-Paul and Berque, Jacques, 267–280.

Paris: Anthropos.

Repris dans: J. Jolivet, Aspects de la pensée médiévale:

Abélard. Doctrines du langage, pp. 79-92.

53. ———. 1969. Abélard ou la philosophie dans le langage. Paris:

Seghers.

Deuxième edition: Paris Éditions du Cerf 1994.

Choix de textes pp.111-206.

54. ———. 1969. Arts du langage et théologie chez Abélard. Paris:

Vrin.

Deuxième édition augmentée 1982.

Table des matières: Avant-propos 7; Abrévitations 11; I. Les

premisses d'une doctrine du langage 13; II. Signification et

ontologie 63; III. L'objet de la logique 117; IV. Style de pensée:

attitudes et procedés 175; V. le Trivium au service de la

théologie 229; Conclusion 337; Appendice: Description de la

connaissance d'après les Gloses 365; Eléments

lexicographiques 374; Ouvrages cités 375; Complément

bibliographique 383; Index des noms de personnes 385;

Notabilia 390.

55. ———. 1974. "Comparaison des théories du langage chez

Abélard et chez les Nominalistes du XIV siècle." In Peter

Abelard. Proceedings of the International Conference:

Louvain, May 10-12, 1971, edited by Buytaert, Eligius M., 163–

178. Leuven: Leuven University Press.

Repris dans: J. Jolivet, Aspects de la pensée médiévale:

Abélard. Doctrines du langage, pp. 109-125.

56. ———. 1975. "Notes de lexicographie abélardienne." In Pierre

Abélard - Pierre le Vénérable. Les courants philosophiques,

littéraires et artistiques en Occident au milieu du XII siècle,

edited by Jolivet, Jean and Louis, René, 531–543. Paris:

Éditions du Centre national de la recherche scientifique.

Repris dans: J. Jolivet, Aspects de la pensée médiévale:

Abélard. Doctrines du langage, pp. pp. 125-137.

57. ———. 1975. "Vues médiévales sur les paronymes." Revue

Internationale de Philosophie no. 113:222–242.

Repris dans: J. Jolivet, Aspects de la pensée médiévale:

Abélard. Doctrines du langage, pp. 138-158.

58. ———. 1977. "Abélard entre chien et loup." Cahiers de

civilisation médiévale:307–322.

Repris dans: J. Jolivet, Aspects de la pensée médiévale:

Abélard. Doctrines du langage, pp. 169-164.

59. ———. 1980. "Doctrines et figures de philosophes chez

Abélard." In Petrus Abaelardus (1079-1142). Person, Werk und

Wirkung, edited by Thomas, Rudolf, 103–120. Trier: Paulinus-

Verlag.

Repris dans: J. Jolivet, Aspects de la pensée médiévale:

Abélard. Doctrines du langage, pp. 185-202.

60. ———, ed. 1981. Abélard en son temps. Actes du Colloque

international organisé à l'occasion du IXe centenaire de la

naissance de Pierre Abélard. (14-19 mai 1979). Paris: Les

Belles Lettres.

Sur la philosophie d'Abélard: Jean Châtillon: Abélard et les

écoles, 146-158; Jean Jolivet: Non-réalisme et platonisme chez

Abélard. Essai d'interprétation, 175-195.

61. ———. 1981. "Non-réalisme et platonisme chez Abélard. Essai

d'interpretation." In Abélard en son temps. Actes du Colloque

international organisé à l'occasion du 9e centenaire de la

naissance de Pierre Abélard (14-19 mai 1979), edited by

Jolivet, Jean, 175–195. Paris: Belles Lettres.

Repris dans: J. Jolivet, Aspects de la pensée médiévale:

Abélard. Doctrines du langage, pp. 257-278.

62. ———. 1981. "Abélard et Guillaume d'Ockham, lecteurs de

Porphyre." In Abélard. Le "Dialogue", la philosophie de la

logique, 31–54. Neuchâtel: Secrétariat de l'Université.

Repris dans: J. Jolivet, Aspects de la pensée médiévale:

Abélard. Doctrines du langage, pp. 233-256.

63. ———. 1987. Aspects de la pensée médiévale : Abélard.

Doctrines du langage. Paris: Vrin.

Table des Matières: Sur quelques critiques de la théologie

d’Abélard 7; Abélard et le Philosophe 53; Eléments du concept

de nature chez Abélard 63; Quelques cas de « platonisme

grammatical » du VIIe au XIIe siècle 71; Le traitement des

autorités contraires selon le Sic et non d’Abélard 79;

Grammaire et langage selon Boèce de Dacie 93; Comparaison

des théories du langage chez Abélard et chez les nominalistes

du XIVe siècle 109; Notes de lexicographie abélardienne 125;

Vues médiévales sur les paronymes 138; L’enjeu de la

grammaire pour Godescalc 159; Abélard entre chien et loup

169; Doctrines et figures de philosophes chez Abélard 185;

Eléments pour une étude des rapports entre la grammaire et

l’ontologie au Moyen Age 203; Abélard et Guillaume d’Ockham,

lecteurs de Porphyre 233; Non-réalisme et platonisme chez

Abélard. Essai d’interprétation 257; L’intellect et le langage

selon Radulphus Brito 278; Rhétorique et théologie dans une

page de Gilbert de Poitiers 293-311.

64. ———. 1990. "Pierre Abélard et son école." In Contemporary

Philosophy. Vol. 6.1: Philosophy and Science in the Middle

Ages, edited by Guttorm, Floistad, 97–104. Amsterdam:

Kluwer.

Compte-rendu de la litérature sur Abélard jusq'à 1972; pour la

période 1972-1985 voir C. Mews, Peter Abelard and His

Influence (1990).

65. ———. 1992. "Trois variations médiévales sur l'universel et

l'individu: Roscelin, Abélard, Gilbert de la Porrée." Revue de

Mètaphysique et de Morale:111–155.

Repris dans: J. Jolivet, Perspectives médiévales et arabes,

Paris: Vrin, 2006, pp. 29-70.

"C'est un anachronisme que de vouloir qualifier de réalistes ou

nominalistes des philosophes qui ont travaillé deux cents ans

avant les mises en place doctrinales du xive siècle. D'autre part,

il est surprenant de voir leurs doctrines respectives de

l'individu se distribuer autrement que ne le feraient présumer

leurs vues sur l'universel. Ce point gagne en clarté quand on

l'aborde du côté de leurs sémantiques du nom, mais les cadres

de l'historiographie usuelle n'en restent pas intacts pour

autant." (p. 111)

66. ———. 1997. La théologie d'Abélard. Paris: Les Édiitons du

Cerf.

67. ———. 1999. "Sur les prédicables et les catégories chez

Abélard." In Langage, sciences, philosophie au XIIe siècle,

edited by Biard, Joël, 165–175. Paris: Vrin.

Repris dans: J. Jolivet, Perspectives médiévales et arabes,

Paris: Vrin, 2006, pp. 85-92.

68. ———. 1999. "Sens des propositions et ontologie chez Pierre

Abélard et Grégoire de Rimini." In Théories de la phrase et de

la proposition de Platon à Averroès, edited by Büttgen,

Philippe, Diebler, Stéphane and Rashed, Marwan, 307–321.

É É

Paris: Éditions Rue d'Ulm / Presses de l'École normale

supérieure.

Repris dans: J. Jolivet, Perspectives médiévales et arabes,

Paris: Vrin, 2006, pp. 103-116 et dans Mediaevalia et arabica,

Paris: Vrin, 2013, pp. 231-244.

69. ———. 1999. "Notes sur le "non-réalisme" d'Abélard." In Signs

and Signification. Vol. I, edited by Gill, Harjeet Singh and

Manetti, Giovanni, 7–15. New Delhi: Bahri Publications.

Repris dans: J. Jolivet, Perspectives médiévales et arabes,

Paris: Vrin, 2006, pp. 85-92 et dans Mediaevalia et arabica,

Paris: Vrin, 2013, pp. 223-230.

70. ———. 2002. "Sémantique et poésie chez Abelard." In

Rhétorique et Poétique au Moyen Âge, edited by Michel, Alain,

81–91. Turnhout: Brepols.

Repris dans: J. Jolivet, Mediaevalia et arabica, Paris: Vrin,

2013, pp. 215-222.

71. ———. 2003. "Á propos d'une critique abélardienne du

réalisme." In Pierre Abelard. Colloque international de Nantes,

edited by Jolivet, Jean and Habrias, Henri, 109–118. Rennes:

Presses Universitaires de Rennes.

Repris dans: J. Jolivet, Mediaevalia et arabica, Paris: Vrin,

2013, pp. 205-210.

72. ———. 2013. "Abélard et la proposition infinitive." In

Mediaevalia et Arabica, 245–251. Paris: Vrin.

73. Jolivet, Jean, and Habrias, Henri, eds. 2003. Pierre Abélard.

Colloque international de Nantes (3-4 Octobre 2001). Rennes:

Presses Universitaires de Rennes.

Sur la philosophie d'Abélard : Jean Jolivet : Avant-propos 9-14;

François Lejeune : Pierre Abélard et Jean de Salisbury:

"Metalogicon" II, 10 63-75; Jean Jolivet : À propos d'une

critique abélardienne du réalisme 109-118; Joël Biard : Logique

et psychologie dans le "De intellectibus" d'Abélard 309-319;

Paul Thom : La logique abélardienne des modales "de rebus"

321-337.

74. Jolivet, Jean, and Louis, René, eds. 1975. Pierre Abélard -

Pierre le Vénérable. Les courants philosophiques, littéraires et

artistiques en Occident au milieu du XII siècle. Paris: Éditions

du Centre national de la recherche scientifique.

Colloque International du Centre National de la Recherche

Scientifique, Abbaye de Clunu, 2 au 9 juillet 1972.

Section 3 : Abélard : l’homme.

David E. Luscombe : Pierre Abélard et le monachisme 271;

Louis Grodecki : Abélard et Suger 279; Mary M. Mc Laughlin :

Peter Abélard and the dignity of women: Twelth century «

feminism » in theory and practice 287; Jacques Vanuxem : La

mort et la sépulture d’Abélard à Saint- Marcel-lez-Chalon 335;

Nikolaus M. Häring : Abelard yesterday and today 341-403.

Section 4 : Pierre Abélard : l’écrivain

Jacques Vernet : La tradition manuscrite et la diffusion des

ouvrages d’Abélard (résumé) 405; Jacques Monfrin : Le

problème de l’authenticité de la correspondance d’Abélard et

d’Héloïse 409; Peter von Moos : Le silence d’Héloïse et les

idéologies modernes 425; John F. Benton : Fraud, fiction and

borrowing in the correspondence of Abélard and Héloïse 469;

Jean Charles Payen : La pensée d’Abélard et les textes romans

du XIIe siècle 513-521.

Section 5: Abélard : Le philosophe et le théologien.

Paul Vignaux : Note sur le nominalisme d’Abélard 523; Jean

Jolivet : Notes de lexicographie abélardienne 531; Lambert-

Marie De Rijk : La signification de la proposition (dictum

propositionis) chez Abélard 547; Rolf Peppermüller : Zum

Fortwirken von Abaelards Rômerbrief-kommentar in der

mittelalterlichen Exegese 557; Tullio Gregory : Considérations

sur ratio et natura chez Abélard 569; Maurice de Gandillac :

Intention et loi dans l’éthique d’Abélard 585; Marie-Thérèse

d’Alverny : Abélard et l’astrologie 611-628.

75. Kaiser, Émile. 1901. Pierre Abélard critique. Sa méthode

théologique. Ses résultats appliqués à la Trinité. Son influence.

Frobourg: Imnprimerie Librairie Catholique.

76. Karfíková, Lenka. 2013. "'Essentia' et 'substantia' chez Augustin

et Pierre Abelard " In Les réceptions des Pères de l'Église au

Moyen Âge. Le devenir de la tradition ecclésiale. Vol II, edited

by Berndt, Rainer and Fédou, Michel, 707–726. Münster:

Aschendorff.

77. Küng, Guido. 1981. "Abélard et les vues actuelles sur les

universaux." In Abélard: Le 'Dialogue'. La philosophie de la

logique. Actes du Colloque de Neuchâtel, 16-17 novembre 1979,

99–118. Neuchâtel: Secrétariat de l'Université.

78. Lafleur , Claude, and Carrier, Joanne. 2012. "Triple

signification des noms universels, intellection et abstraction

dans la "Logica 'ingredientibus': super Porphyrium" d'Abélard "

Laval théologique et philosophique no. 68:91–128.

Résumé : "Étude préliminaire à la nouvelle édition critique et à

la traduction inédite offertes, dans ce numéro thématique, du

début de la Logica « Ingredientibus » : Super Porphyrium

d’Abélard, cet article opère d’abord un survol d’ensemble du

texte, avec insistance sur l’exposé relatif aux universaux, et

approfondit ensuite trois points de doctrine difficiles, sur

lesquels l’historiographie récente a parfois hésité ou buté : la

troisième signification des noms universels; la conception

prisciano-platonicienne de la pensée divine; l’univocité de la

notion de status. Ce faisant, quant aux thèmes de l’intellection

et de l’abstraction en particulier, une attention constante est

portée au lien, parfois critique mais toujours fécond, existant

entre cette portion de la Logica « Ingredientibus » et sa source

principale, l’In « Isagogen » Porphyrii Commentorum Editio

secunda de Boèce, dont l’article précédent fournit une

présentation, le texte latin révisé et la première traduction

française."

79. Lafleur, Claude, and Carrier, Joanne. 2012. "Abélard et les

universaux: édition et traduction du début de la Logica «

Ingredientibus » : Super Porphyrium." Laval Théologique et

Philosophique no. 68:129–210.

"Appuyée sur une collation systématique — incluant

l’orthographe — de l’unique manuscrit subsistant (le ms.

Milano, Biblioteca Ambrosiana, M 63 sup., fol. 1ra-5rb), cette

nouvelle édition critique du début de la Logica «

Ingredientibus » : Super Porphyrium, accompagnée d’une

traduction française inédite et complétée par une abondante

annotation, rend ainsi accessible l’exposé le plus détaillé

d’Abélard sur les universaux, des pages célèbres où, dans une

approche sémantique non exempte de perspectives

métaphysiques, on trouve, comme l’étude précédente l’a laissé

voir, des développements philosophiques importants relatifs à

l’intellection et à l’abstraction."

80. Lejeune, François. 2003. "Pierre Abélard et Jean de Salisbury :

Metalogicon II, 10." In Pierre Abelard. Colloque international

de Nantes, edited by Jolivet, Jean and Habrias, Henri, 63–76.

Rennes: Presses Universitaires de Rennes.

81. Libera, Alain de. 1981. "Abélard et le dictisme." In Abélard. Le

"Dialogue", la philosophie de la logique, 59–97. Neuchâtel:

Secrétariat de l'Université.

82. ———. 1996. La querelle des universaux. De Platon à la fine du

Moyen Age. Paris: Éditions du Seuil.

Chapter 3. Le haut Moyen Age et la querelle des universaux

pp.128-175.

83. ———. 1999. L'art des généralités. Théories de l'abstraction.

Paris: Aubier.

Chapitre III. Pierre Abélard, pp. 281-498.

84. ———. 2002. La référence vide. Théories de la proposition.

Paris: Presses Universitaires de France.

La Théorie abélardienne du statut, pp. 120-130.

85. ———. 2002. "Des accidents aux tropes. Pierre Abélard." Revue

de Mètaphysique et de Morale:509–530.

86. Lobrichon, Guy. 2005. Héloïse: L'amour et le savoir. Paris:

Gallimard.

87. Marenbon, John. 1999. "Abélard, la predication et le verbe

"être"." In Langage, sciences, philosophie au XIIe siècle, edited

by Biard, Joël, 199–215. Paris: Vrin.

88. ———. 2005. Le temps, l'éternité et la prescience de Boèce à

Thomas d'Aquin. Paris: Vrin.

Chapitre III: Pierre Abélard pp. 55-91.

89. Mehl, Édouard. 2021. "La Puissance et son nombre, d'Abélard à

Kepler." Rivista di Storia Della Filosofia no. 4:668–685.

Abstract: "Power and its Number, from Abelard to Kepler.

Catholic theology has always held, contrary to what the

philosophers say, that God can do everything: his power is

infinite, he always has a reserve of power and this reserve is not

exhausted in the opus creationis. Thus, God's power is divine

because it is incomprehensible. Therefore, there is an essential

equivocity in the potentia Dei, which cannot be confused with

the power of nature. What are examined here instead are some

of the arguments in favor of the opposite thesis. Let us take

seriously a logical objection: by saying that divine power is

inexhaustible, is this not to assert the impossibility of its being

exhausted and, in so doing, to impose on it a limit which, by

definition, it cannot bear? Should not a consistent theology

refrain from considering the divine power according to

comparisons borrowed from the kingdom of created things?

Kepler's attempt to think of nature as a pure Trinitarian symbol

seems in this respect to deserve special attention."

90. Mews, Constant J. 1988. "Un lecteur de Jerome an XIIe siècle :

Pierre Abelard." In Jérôme entre l'Occident et l'Orient : XVIe

centenaire du départ de saint Jérôme de Rome et de son

installation à Bethléem : actes du colloque de Chantilly

(septembre 1986), edited by Duval, Yves-Marie, 431–444.

Paris: Études Augustiniennes.

Repris comme Essay IX in C. J. Mews, Abelard and His

Legacy, Aldershot: Ashgate Variorum 2001.

91. ———. 1999. "Thèmes philosophiques dans les Epistolae

duorum amantium : Premières lettres d’Héloïse et d’Abélard ?"

In Langage, sciences, philosophie au XIIe siècle, edited by

Biard, Joël, 23–38. Paris: Vrin.

92. Michel, Bruno. 2009. Abélard lecteur de Boèce. Entre réalisme

et nominalisme, la critique du « logicisme » boécien dans les

oeuvres logiques de Pierre Abélard.

Thèse soutenue à l'Université François Rabelais de Tours.

93. ———. 2011. "Abélard face à Boèce. Entre nominalisme et

réalisme, une réponse singulière au questionnaire de

Porphyre." Archives d'Histoire Doctrinale et Littéraire du

Moyen Age no. 78:131–178.

94. ———. 2016. "La logique d’Abélard conduit-elle à la

contradiction ? Les lectures in re et in voce des inférences et le

débat avec les Montani." Archives d'Histoire Doctrinale et

Littéraire du Moyen Age no. 83:33–64.

Résumé : "Dans l’historiographie récente, la logique d’Abélard a

été reconnue comme profondément novatrice par des auteurs

(C. Martin, J. Marenbon) qui soulignent qu’elle conduit

malheureusement aussi à la contradiction. Nous montrons ici

que cette conclusion n’est pas inévitable et que, si les deux

lectures in re (extensionnelle) et in voce (intensionnelle) des

inférences sont distinguées comme il convient, la réfutation par

les Montani de la théorie des inférences d’Abélard n’atteint

cette dernière qu’à la marge. Il existe une lecture – distinguant

impossibilité logique (in voce) et impossibilité ontologique (in

re) – qui préserve la non-contradiction de la théorie des

inférences d’Abélard."

95. Minois, George. 2019. Abélard, Héloïse et Bernard : passion,

raison et religion au Moyen âge. Paris: Perrin.

96. Monfrin, Jacques. 1975. "Le problème de l'authénticité de la

correspondance d'Abélard et d'Héloise." In Pierre Abélard -

Pierre le Vénérable. Les courants philosophiques, littéraires et

artistiques en Occident au milieu du XII siècle, edited by

Jolivet, Jean and Louis, René, 409–424. Paris: Éditions du

Centre national de la recherche scientifique.

97. Moos, Peter von. 2005. "Le silence d’Héloise et les idéologies

modernes." In Entre histoire et littérature. Communication et

culture au Moyen Âge, 3–43. Firenze: SISMEL - Edizioni del

Galluzzo.

Version remaniée d’un article publié la première fois dans

Pierre Abélard - Pierre le Vénérable (Colloque de Cluny, juillet

1972, Colloques internationaux du CNRS 546), Paris 1975, p.

425-468.

98. ———. 2005. "Les Collationes d’Abélard et la «question juive»

au XIIe siècle." In Entre histoire et littérature. Communication

et culture au Moyen Âge, 45–86. Firenze: SISMEL - Edizioni

del Galluzzo.

Cet article a été publié la première fois dans Studi medievali

41.2 (2000), 505-548.

99. Nicolau d'Olwer, Lluís. 1945. "Sur la date de la Dialectica

d'Abélard." Revue du Moyen Âge Latin no. 1:375–390.

100. Oberson, Roland Denise. 2010. Héloïse et Abélard. À singulière

esclave, maître spécial. Paris: Hermann.

101. Oursel, Raymond. 1959. La Dispute et la grâce : essai sur la

rédemption d'Abélard. Paris: Les Belles Lettres.

102. Panaccio, Claude. 1999. "Le Nominalisme au XIIe siècle." In

Signs and Signification. Vol. I, edited by Gill, Harjeet Singh

and Manetti, Giovanni, 17–33. New Delhi: Bahri Publications.

103. Payen, Jean Charles. 1975. "La pensée d'Abélard et les textes

romans du XIIe siècle." In Pierre Abélard - Pierre le Vénérable.

Les courants philosophiques, littéraires et artistiques en

Occident au milieu du XII siècle, edited by Jolivet, Jean and

Louis, René, 513–521. Paris: Éditions du Centre national de la

recherche scientifique.

104. Perkams, Matthias. 2025. "Les sentences abélardiennes, la

lettre d'Héloïse et le développement de la théorie de l'amour

d'Abélard." In L'amour au Moyen Âge. Est-il un, est-il pluriel

?, edited by Poirel, Dominique, 53–70. Turnhout: Brepols.

105. Pinel, Elodie. 2004. "La similitude dans la « Theologia Summi

Boni » d'Abélard." Revue des Sciences Religieuses no. 78:519–

537.

106. Piron, Sylvain, ed. 2005. Lettres des deux amants attribuées à

Héloïse et Abélard. Paris: Gallimard.

107. ———. 2011. "Héloïse et Abélard: l'éthique amoureuse des

Epistolae duorum amantium." In Histoires de l'amour :

fragilités et interdits, du Kâmasûtra à nos jours, edited by

Dakhlia, Jocelyne, Farge, Arlette, Klapisch-Zuber, Chrisitiane

and Stella, Alessandro, 71–94. Montrouge: Bayard.

108. ———. 2014. "La “collection” des lettres d’Abélard et Héloïse."

Cahiers de civilisation médiévale no. 57:337–342.

109. ———. 2018. "L’éducation sentimentale d’Héloïse." Clio.

Femmes, Genre, Histoire no. 47:155–166.

110. Poirel, Dominique. 2016. "Deux styles de vie et de pensée dans

la première moitié du XIIe siècle : Pierre Abélard et Hugues de

Saint-Victor." Bulletin de Philosophie Medievale no. 58:3–22.

Abstract: "It would be easy to oppose Peter Abelard and Hugh

of Saint-Victor as two opposed types of masters: on one side the

“intellectual,” in almost the modern sense of the word, and on

the other side, a representative of the humanist, clerical and

monastic tradition, soon to be effaced. In order to highlight the

real significance of their divergences and the profound

coherence of both historical and intellectual personalities, in

this article the author investigated their social origins, how

each one conceived the relation between the individual and the

group,and finally the way in which each appropriates earlier

texts. Thus, in many respects Abelard and Hugh appear as

opposite poles in the intellectual world of the twelfth century,

but in a different perspective, thanks to the synthesis

accomplished by their common students, as inseparable and

complementary sources of what became the Scholastic age."

111. ———, ed. 2022. Pierre Abélard, génie multiforme. Actes du

colloque international, organisé par l’Institut d’Études

Médiévales et tenu à l’Institut Catholique de Paris les 29-30

novembre 2018. Turnhout: Brepols.

Table des matières : Dominique Poirel; Introduction 5;

L’homme

Jacques Verger : Pierre Abélard et le mouvement scolaire de

son temps 13 Arnaud Montoux : Abélard et Cluny. La demeure

de Pierre 33; Guy Lobrichon : Le couple Pierre-Héloïse 49; Ana

Irimescu : Le portrait psychologique de Pierre Abélard à partir

de son autobiographie Historia calamitatum 59:

Le philosophe

Matthias Perkams : Pierre Abélard et l’invention de la

philosophie moderne occidentale 83; John Marenbon : Les

relations chez Abélard 105; Christophe Grellard : Le rôle des

normes positives dans l’éthique de Pierre Abélard 121;

Dominique Poirel : Pierre Abélard théologien ? 139; Pascale

Bourgain : Abélard poète 153; Alexis Grélois : Pierre Abélard et

la « règle » du Paraclet 179;

La postérité

Jean-René Valette : Abélard, Héloïse et les langages de l’amour

courtois 197; Laurent Avezou : Abélard dans la littérature

moderne et contemporaine ou le complexe d’Héloïse 215;

Index codicum 223; Index operum Petri Abaelardi 224; Opera

inauthentica 224; Index auctorum et operum anonymorum

225-232.

112. Rijk, Lambertus Marie de. 1975. "La signification de la

proposition (dictum propositionis) chez Abélard." In Pierre

Abélard - Pierre le Vénérable. Les courants philosophiques,

littéraires et artistiques en Occident au milieu du XII siècle,

edited by Jolivet , Jean and Louis, René, 547–555. Paris:

Éditions du Centre national de la recherche scientifique.

Publié aussi dans: Studia Mediewistyczne 16, 1975 pp. 155-161.

Reprinted as chapter IV in: L. M. de Rijk, Through Language

to Reality. Studies in Medieval Semantics and Metaphysics,

Edited by Bos Egbert, Northampton: Variorum Reprints, 1989.

"Cette communication se borne a un bref examen de la

signification de la phrase complète (propositio) dans la logique

de Pierre Abélard.

Il paraît utile de commencer par la définition du verbe signifier

(significare) chez ce logicien.

'signifier' dit des mots (dictiones) c'est produire une

intellection dans l'âme de l'auditeur (Logica ingredientibus

307, 30 ss.), tandis que le même verbe est également appliqué à

la dénotàtion des choses extérieures (ibid.); dans ce dernier

sens, le verbe est synonyme de appellare, nominare,

demonstrare, designare.

'signifier' dit des phrases complètes (propositiones) c'est

produire une intellection laquelle est formée par la liaison des

intellections de ses parties (dictiones)." p. 547

"On peut conclure que selon Abélard le dictum n'est pas un

objet qui serait indépendent de la pensée, mais plutôt le

contenu de la pensée, c'est-à-dire une intellection objectivée,

qui correspond soit à un état de choses réel, soit à un état de

choses seulement possible (Dial. II, 205, 28-30: id dicimus

quod id quod dicit hec propositio 'Socrates est homo', est unum

de his que natura patitur esse), soit un état de choses tout à fait

impossible (Dial. II, 158, 7-9: la proposition 'Socrates est lapis'

ne reflète pas une inherentia de Socrate et de pierre, ni

'Socrates non est lapis' leur rémotion).

(...)

Ainsi, l'existence qu'établit la proposition en parlant, n'est pas

une existence réelle, mais, pourrait-on dire, une existence

parlée, ou plutôt, une existence pensée ou logique.

Employant la distinction bien connue du XIV siècles (presentée

notamment par Jacques d'Ascoli, Thomas d'York, Pierre

Thomae):

res: 1) extra animam (chose extérieure); 2) in anima: a)

subiective ( = acte de l'intellection comme tel) b) obiective

(contenu de l'intellection).

on peut dire qu'Abélard a essayé, à sa façon, de montrer que le

dictum, de la proposition, loin d'être une chose extérieure (res

extra animam) est une chose qui doit son existence à l'âme ou a

l'intellection (res in anima), mais qu'il faut en même temps

bien le distinguer de l'acte de l'intellection pris comme tel (res

in anima subiective), et reconnaître, sa propre identité dans le

contenu objectif de l'intellection. Par là, le dictum du grand

logicien du XII siècle semble être d'une nature logique par

excellence." pp. 554-555. (notes omises)

113. Rival, Jérôme. 2021. "La condamnation de Pierre Abélard au

concile de Soissons (1121)." Mémoires de la Fédération des

Sociétés d’Histoire et d’Archéologie de l’Aisne no. 46:33–91.

114. Rivière, Jean. 1933. "Les « capitula » d'Abélard condamnés au

concile de Sens." Recherches de théologie ancienne et

médiévale no. 5:5–22.

115. Rompaey, Anja van. 2015. "Distinction mosaïque et hérésie :

Guillaume de Saint-Thierry versus Pierre Abélard." In Hérésies.

Une construction d'identités religieuses, 191–206. Bruxelles:

Éditions de l'Université de Bruxelles.

116. Rosier-Catach, Irène. 1999. "La notion de "translatio", le

principe de compositionalité et l'analyse de la prédication

accidentelle chez Abélard." In Langage, sciences, philosophie

au XIIe siècle, edited by Biard, Joël, 125–164. Paris: Vrin.

117. ———. 2000. "La sémantique d'Abélard en contexte (1) : la

notion de 'translatio'." Annuaire de l'Ecole Pratique des

Hautes Etudes (Section des Sciences Religieuses) no. 107:361–

367.

118. ———. 2001. "La sémantique d'Abélard en contexte (2) : sur le

verbe substantif et la prédication." Annuaire de l'Ecole

Pratique des Hautes Etudes (Section des Sciences Religieuses)

no. 108:361–367.

119. ———. 2003. "Variations médiévales sur l'opposition entre

signification "ad placitum" et signification naturelle." In

Aristotle's Peri hermeneias in the Latin Middle Ages. Essays

on the Commentary Tradition, edited by Braakhuis, Henk A.G.

and Kneepkens, Corneille Henri, 165–205. Groningen:

Ingenium Publishers.

120. ———. 2003. "Abélard et les grammairiens: sur la définition du

verbe et la notion d'inhérence." In La tradition vive. Mélanges

d'histoire des textes en l'honneur de Louis Holtz, edited by

Lardet, Pierre, 143–159. Turnhout: Brepols.

121. ———. 2003. "Abélard et les grammairiens: sur le verbe

substantif et la prédication." Vivarium no. 41:175–248.

122. ———. 2003. "Priscien, Boèce, les Glosulae in Priscianum,

Abélard : les enjeux des discussions autour de la notion de

consignification." Histoire Épistémologie Langage no. 25:55–

84.

Résumé : "Le terme syncategorema, traduit par

consignificantia, n’est attesté en grec que dans les Institutiones

en latin du grammairien Priscien, et ne s’introduit qu’au XIIe

siècle dans les commentaires grammaticaux, le couple

syncategorema / categorema datant de la fin du XIIe siècle. La

réflexion se mène d’abord autour des termes de la famille de

consignificare.

L’héritage antique est multiple et varié. Priscien utilise, de

manière contradictoire, un critère fonctionnel (est consignifiant

ce qui n’est pas une des parties principales), un critère

sémantique (être partie du discours c’est indiquer un concept

de l’esprit), un critère d’autonomie de signification (est

consignifiant ce qui n’est pas signifiant par soi-même). Boèce

utilise la notion en cinq acceptions, qui s’appliquent à des

catégories différentes de termes ou de morphèmes : les

prépositions et conjonctions, les parties du composé, le temps,

le verbe être, les quantificateurs. Les Glosulae sur Priscien à la

fin du XIe siècle, et surtout dans la révision ultérieure

attribuable à Guillaume de Champeaux, retiennent que les

parties consignifiantes signifient la chose signifiée par le mot

auquel elles sont adjointes. Abélard, lisant ces gloses, hésite : la

solution des grammairiens est problématique, mais si, comme

le veut Boèce, les parties consignifiantes n’avaient pas de

signification, on ne pourrait expliquer leur rôle sémantique

dans l’intellection totale de la proposition. À partir de là, il

proposera la solution, réellement novatrice, appliquée d’abord

à la copule et élargie aux autres parties consignifiantes, qu’elles

correspondent à un «acte de l’esprit»."

123. ———. 2004. "Les discussions sur le signifié des propositions

chez Abélard et ses contemporains." In Medieval Theories on

Assertive and Non-Assertive Language, edited by Maierù,

Alfonso and Valente, Luisa, 1–34. Firenze: Olschki.

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rebus." In Pierre Abelard. Colloque international de Nantes,

edited by Jolivet, Jean and Habrias, Henri, 321–338. Rennes:

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125. Turcan-Verkerk, Anne-Marie. 2016. "Note sur Troyes BM 1452,

témoin des

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126. Van den Eynde, Damien. 1961. "Les rédactions de la "Theologia

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241.

128. ———. 1961ì2. "Les écrits perdus d'Abélard " Antonianum no.

37:467–480.

129. Vanni Rovighi, Sofia. 1981. "Intentionnel et universel chez

Abélard." In Abélard: Le 'Dialogue'. La philosophie de la

logique. Actes du Colloque de Neuchâtel, 16-17 novembre 1979,

21–28. Neuchâtel: Secrétariat de l'Université.

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Abelard." In Philosophie im Mittelalter. Entwicklungslinien

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Georg, 87–101. Hamburg: F. Meiner.

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le cloître et l'école. Paris: Fayard-Mame.

132. Vignaux, Paul. 1930. "Nominalisme." In Dictionnaire de

théologie catholique: contenant l'exposé des doctrines de

théologie catholique, leurs preuves et leur histoire. Vol. 11,

edited by Vacant, Alfred and Mangenot, Alfred-Eugène, 717–

784. Paris: Librairie Letouzey et Ané.

133. ———. 1975. "Note sur le nominalisme d'Abélard." In Pierre

Abélard - Pierre le Vénérable. Les courants philosophiques,

littéraires et artistiques en Occident au milieu du XII siècle,

edited by Jolivet, Jean and Louis, René, 523–527. Paris:

Éditions du Centre national de la recherche scientifique.

134. Viri, Federico. 2024. Arts du langage et noétique : la notion

d’attentio chez Abélard. Paris: Vrin.

135. Wenin, Christian. 1982. "La signification des universaux chez

Abélard." Revue Philosophique de Louvain no. 80:414–448.

136. Zerbi, Paolo. 1979. "Guillaume de Saint-Thierry et son differend

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Bibliographia. Annotated bibliographies

Raul Corazzon || rc@ontology.co || Info

Pietro Abelardo. Bibliografia degli

studi italiani

Bibliografia

1. "Ricerche sul pensiero di Pietro Abelardo (1079-1142)." 1979.

Rivista critica di storia della filosofia no. 34:429–506.

Indice: Mariateresa Beonio Brocchieri: Sull'unità dell'opera

abelardiana 429; Mario Dal Pra: Sul nominalismo di Abelardo

439; Antonio Crocco: Le cinque regole ermeneutiche del "Sic et

Non" 452; Alessandra Tarabochia Canavero: La "ratio" nella

spiegazione del racconto biblico della creazione: "Spiritus Dei

ferebatur super aquas" 459; Giovanni Orlandi: Per una nuova

edizione del "Dialogus" di Abelardo 474; Constant Mews: The

International Conference Held in Trier(17-19 April 1979) on the

Nine Hundredth Anniversary of Abelard's Birth 495-506.

2. Allegro, Giuseppe. 1986. "La 'theologia' nei trattati trinitari di

Pietro Abelardo." Schede medievali no. 11:314–330.

3. ———. 1989. "La "theologia"come progetto speculativo.

Abelardo e la tradizione storiografica del rapporto teologia-

scienza nel XIII secolo." Giornale di metafisica no. 11:101–112.

4. ———. 1990. La teologia di Pietro Abelardo fra letture e

pregiudizi. Palermo: Officina di studi medievali.

5. ———. 1990. "L'analogia nei trattati trinitari di Pietro

Abelardo." In Knowledge and the Sciences in Medieval

Philosophy: Proceedings of the Eight International Congress

of Medieval Philosophy (SIEPM), Helsinki 24-29 August 1987.

Vol. 3, edited by Asztalos, Monika, 317–324.

6. ———. 2008. "Apologia della dialettica. L'Epistola XIII di

Pietro Abelardo. Introduzione, testo, traduzione." Pan no.

24:181–196.

7. ———. 2010. Teologia e metodo in Pietro Abelardo. Per una

lettura della dottrina delle appropriazioni. Palermo: Officina

di Studi Medievali.

Indice: Presentazione di Constant J. Mews 1; Prefazione 13;

Sigle e abbreviazioni 17; Introduzione 19; Nota bibliografica 27;

Cap. 1. La teologia come “sistema”: una summa theologiae

abelardiana? 31; Cap. 2. Metodo e dialettica 69; Cap. 3.

Potentia, sapientia, benignitas 103; Cap. 4. Stimma fìdei,

discretio proprietatibus e dottrina delle appropriazioni 149;

Cap. 5. Theologia e scienza aristotelica 233; Cap. 6 Discretio

proprietatibus e omnipotentia Dei 247; Cap. 7. Nota

conclusiva. La teologia abelardiana e il dibattito attuale sul De

Deo uno et trino 283; Bibliografia 291; Indice dei nomi 337-

343.

"L’analisi della teologia di Pietro Abelardo che questo saggio

intende affrontare parte dal presupposto che essa non vada

letta, anzitutto, come un’opera di discussione e di

rielaborazione di una serie di “contenuti” della tradizione

dottrinale, ma che debba essere piuttosto considerata sotto il

profilo di un disegno innovativo, di un progetto speculativo che,

da questo punto di vista, è praticamente inedito nella storia del

cosiddetto “pensiero cristiano”: il disegno di guadagnare,

nell’ambito della riflessione sul mistero divino - degli studi di

divinitas, come si diceva allora - un nuovo spazio concettuale,

un vero e proprio nuovo “sapere”, la theologia.

In questo senso, tenendo anche conto del primo impatto che gli

scritti trinitari abelardiani ebbero nel mondo intellettuale della

prima metà del XII secolo, bisognerà accostarsi alla teologia del

magister medievale in un’ottica che riprenda, in qualche modo,

il punto di vista dei suoi contemporanei, per cogliere in quei

testi, nella loro reale portata speculativa, gli aspetti di autentica

novitas, naturalmente, non con la diffidenza e il pregiudizio che

inficiarono le opinioni dei detrattori di allora, ma con un

atteggiamento di rinnovata curiosità e con l’interesse primario

di comprendere come si struttura il tentativo di discutere del

mistero trinitario in una maniera così diversa rispetto alle

consuete forme della sacra doctrina. ( Cosa che, agli occhi degli

avversari, ma anche degli estimatori e discepoli, faceva della

riflessione sulla fìdes catholica del nostro magister qualcosa di

talmente inusitato da poter essere indicato, appunto, come

nova theologia.

Queste considerazioni giustificano l’interesse di questo saggio

per i fondamenti metodologici ed “epistemologici” della nuova

scienza” teologica abelardiana. Non si tratta tuttavia di una

mera indagine di storia del metodo. L’interesse prioritario è

piuttosto quello di dare conto dello spessore speculativo del

pensiero di Abelardo, e di come la grandezza della sua

prospettiva teologica possa emergere direttamente dalla lettura

dei suoi scritti; una lettura che si estende anche a molti testi dei

teologi coevi, nella convinzione che la peculiarità della proposta

di Abelardo debba essere messa in risalto anche mediante il

confronto con le direzioni teologiche in quel momento più

rilevanti. Il lettore sarà quindi spesso chiamato, nelle pagine

che seguono, ad accostarsi con pazienza all’impegnativo

confronto con le opere del magister bretone e con quelle di

molti altri magistri della prima metà del XII secolo." (pp. 13-

14)

8. Ballanti, Graziella, ed. 1988. Un epistolario d’amore del XII

secolo (Abelardo e Eloisa?). Roma: Edizioni Anicia.

9. ———. 1995. Pietro Abelardo. La rinascita scolastica del 12.

secolo. Firenze: La Nuova Italia.

10. Beonio Brocchieri Fumagalli, Maria Teresa. 1969. La Logica di

Abelardo. Firenze: La Nuova Italia.

Seconda edizione; prima edizione 1964.

Indice: Premess VII; Introduzione 1; I. Ciò che Abelardo

intende per logica 15; II. Il problema del significato 33; » III. Il

significato dei nomi universali 48; IV. Il significato della

proposizione 79; V. L' « argumentatio » 89; Appendice -

Abaelardiana inedita 100; Indice dei nomi 111; Bibliografia 112-

113.

11. ———. 1969. "Note per una indagine sul concetto di retorica in

Abelardo." In Arts libéraux et philosophie au Moyen Age, 829–

832. Montréal-Paris: Vrin.

12. ———. 1974. Introduzione a Abelardo. Bari: Laterza.

13. ———. 1979. "Sull'unità dell'opera abelardiana." Rivista Critica

di Storia della Filosofia no. 34:429–438.

14. Bertola, Ermenegildo. 1960. "Le critiche di Abelardo ad

Anselmo di Laon ed a Guglielmo di Champeaux." Rivista di

Filosofia Neoscolastica no. 52:485–522.

15. Binini, Irene. 2017. "Contingenza e infallibilità divina nei testi

logici di Pietro Abelardo." In Libertà e determinismo.

Riflessioni medievali, edited by Leone, Marialucrezia and

Valente, Luisa, 111–141. Roma: Aracne.

Abstract: "Abelard takes the existence of contingent events as

an evident and indubitable feature of the way things are. As any

indeterminist, however, he must deal with several fatalist

arguments, aiming to prove that the inevitability of all future

events follows from the acceptance of some fundamental

principles of logic and theology. In the article, I focus on the

arguments for theological determinism that Abelard considers

in the Dialectica and the Logica ingredientibus. The purpose of

these arguments is to show that — because God has already

established a providential plan for the world and knows

everything that will occur — things cannot but happen in

conformity to his knowledge, which is infallible, and according

to his providential plan, which is unchangeable. Abelard rejects

these arguments as sophistical, and strives to maintain the

compatibility between God’s omniscience and the existence of

chance and free will.

Abelard’s strategy against theological determinism — which is

deeply indebted to the one developed by his master, William of

Champeaux — is built on a number of principles and rules of

inference that are taken from his logic for modal propositions,

such as the distinction between the de rebus and de sensu

interpretations of modalities."

16. ———. 2019. "Riflessioni sul concetto di necessità nella prima

metà del XII secolo." In Tra antichità e modernità. Studi di

storia della filosofia medievale e rinascimentale, edited by

Amerini, Fabrizio, Fellina, Simone and Strazzoni, Andrea,

1045–1088. E-theca OnLineOpenAccess Edizioni, Università

degli Studi di Torino.

Abstract: "In this essay, I consider some logical treatises and

commentaries from the first decades of the 12th century (many

of which are still unedited) which contain a discussion on

modalities and modal logic. After presenting a short catalogue

of these sources and a description of their common features, I

shall focus on some definitions of the modal term

“necessarium” which are provided in them. As we will see,

Abelard and logicians of his time advanced three different

characterizations of this term: necessity was either defined in

terms of unavoidability (ineuitabilitas), or in terms of

immutability and omnitemporality (impermutabilitas,

sempiternitas), or again in terms of absolute necessity as

opposed to conditioned one (necessitas absoluta vs.

determinata). I argue that the temporal understanding of

necessity in terms of omnitemporality, inherited from ancient

sources and extensively used by Abelard and others in the first

years of the twelfth-century, started to disappear in texts

datable from around the 1120, perhaps due to several

difficulties that were related to this definition when applied in

logical contexts. I also discuss how the notion of necessitas

determinata was used by Abelard’s contemporaries to qualify

the modal status of present and past events, which were

generally believed to be necessary only in a “weak” and

harmless sense that did not prevent them from being

contingent."

17. ———. 2021. "Pietro Abelardo." APhEx. Portle italiano di

filosofia analitica no. 24:1–27.

Sommario: "Questo profilo ripercorre la vita e le opere di Pietro

Abelardo (1079-1142), logico francese del XII secolo, mettendo

in risalto la profondità e originalità del suo pensiero filosofico,

in particolare nei campi della logica e della metafisica. Ampio

spazio sarà dato alle molte affinità – riscontrabili a livello sia di

contenuto che di metodo filosofico – tra la riflessione di

Abelardo e l’approccio analitico contemporaneo, in particolare

rispetto al ruolo di rilievo dato alla logica e allo studio del

rapporto tra linguaggio naturale e formale, nonché rispetto al

rigore dell’argomentazione e all’interesse per gli ambiti di

ontologia, semantica e filosofia del linguaggio."

18. Bonanni, Sergio. 1996. Parlare della Trinità. Lettura della

Theologia scholarium di Abelardo. Roma: Gregoriana.

19. ———. 2008. "Anselmo e Abelardo. La ratio della teologia tra

necessità e verosimiglianza." Gregorianum no. 89:473–500.

20. Brambilla Pisoni, Ester. 2005. "Recenti interpretazioni della

teologia di Pietro Abelardo." Rivista di Filosofia Neo-Scolastica

no. 97:691–700.

21. Calefato, Patrizia. 2006. "Dimensione semantica e problema

della comunicazione in Pietro Abelardo." In Linguistica

medievale. Anselmo d'Aosta, Abelardo, Tommaso d'Aquino,

Pietro Ispano, Gentile da Congoli, Occam, edited by Corvino,

Francesco. Bari: Adriatica.

22. Crocco, Antonio. 1979. "Le cinque regole ermeneutiche del Sic

et Non." Rivista critica di storia della filosofia no. 34:452–458.

23. D'Anna, Gabriella. 1969. "Abelardo e Cicerone." Studi

Medievali no. 10:333–419.

Sono esaminate tutte le citazioni dirette (pp. 335-357) ed

indirette (pp. 357-366) di Cicerone nelle opere di Abelardo.

24. Dal Pra, Mario. 1979. "Sul nominalismo di Abelardo." Rivista

Critica di Storia della Filosofia no. 34:439–451.

25. Dotto, Gianni. 2005. "Dialettica e dialogo nelle Collationes di

Pietro Abelardo." In La filosofia come dialogo. A confronto con

Agostino, edited by Alici, Luigi, Piccolomini, Remo and Pieretti,

Antonio, 263–291. Roma: Città nuova.

26. Dronke, Peter, and Orlandi, Giovanni. 2005. "New works by

Abelard and Heloise? Secoda parte: Epistulae." Filologia

mediolatina no. 12:146–177.

While this essay has been conceived as a collaborative effort,

Peter Dronke is principally responsible for the first section (in

Rnglish), Giovanni Orlandi for the second (in Italian).

27. Grabmann, Martin. 1980. Storia del metodo scolastico.

Firenze: La Nuova Italia.

Vol. II, Capitolo 2II: Pietro Abelardo.

28. Gregory, Tullio. 1973. "Considerazioni su "ratio" e "natura" in

Abelardo." Studi medievali no. 14:287–300.

29. Jolivet, Jean. 1993. "Paragone tra le teorie del linguaggio di

Abelardo e dei nominalisti del XIV secolo." In Logica e

linguaggio nel medioevo, edited by Fedriga, Riccardo and

Puggioni, Sara, 113–164. Milano: LED edizioni.

30. ———. 1996. Abelardo. Dialettica e mistero. Milano: Jaca Book.

31. ———. 2008. "Abelardo." In La fioritura della dialettica. X-XI

secolo, edited by Biffi, Inos and Marabellli, Costante, 323–388.

Milano: Jaca Book.

Figure del pensiero medievale. Vol. 2.

32. Lorenzetti, Eleonora. 2013. "Parole, concetti, cose: alcune

teorie semantiche tra Severino Boezio e Pietro Abelardo." In

Medioevo e filosofia: per Alfonso Maierù, edited by Lenzi,

Massimiliano, Musatti, Cesare A. and Valente, Luisa, 55–86.

Roma.

33. Magnano, Fiorella. 2022. "L' 'esegesi topica' di Pietro Abelardo

nel Commento all'Epistola ai Romani (11 , 16-24)."

Mediterranea. International 1ournal on the transfer of

knowledge no. 7:17–38.

Abstract: "Sebbene molti contributi abbiano posto in evidenza

la struttura dialettica presente nelle opere teologiche di

Abelardo, sorprende la completa assenza di studi relativi

all'impiego

dei luoghi dialettici a servizio del discorso teologico. Pertanto,

il presente studio intende avviare una riflessione in merito a

questo specifico aspetto dell'opera del maestro palatino, allo

scopo di illustrare la modalità con cui i luoghi dialettici esposti

in sede logica siano stati successivamente messi a servizio

dell'esegesi del testo sacro. Le mie conclusioni sono che

'l'esegesi topica' esprime lo spazio di autonomia assegnato alla

ragione umana in cerca di un fondamento, se non razionale

almeno ragionevole, dell'alto grado di verosimiglianza di

quanto trasmesso dalla Rivelazione."

34. Martello, Concetto. 2008. Pietro Abelardo e la riscoperta della

filosofia. Percorsi intellettuali nel XII secolo tra teologia e

cosmologia. Roma: Aracne.

35. Moresi, Alice. 2019. "Eloisa e Abelardo: l’Epistolario della

discordia." Dialegesthai no. 21:1–18.

36. Obertello, Luca. 1989. "Garlando Compotista, Abelardo e la

sillogistica ipotetica nel Medieoevo." In Boezio e dintorni.

Ricerche sulla cultura altomedievale, 179–199. Firenze:

Nardini.

37. Parodi, Massimo, and Rossini, Marco, eds. 2000. Fra le due

rupi. La logica della Trinità nella discussione tra Roscellino,

Anselmo e Abelardo. Milano: Unicopli.

38. Penna, Davide. 2017. "Summa illa dilectio in illa summi boni

fruitione. Happiness as Love in the Relational Ethics of Peter

Abelard." Revista Española de Filosofía Medieval no. 24:87–

96.

39. Perfetti, Stefano. 2007. "Legge naturale e analisi razionale

dell’appartenenza religiosa in Abelardo." Teoria no. 27:161–

173.

40. Pinzani, Roberto. 1983. "Homerus est poeta - An non.

Questioni di presupposizione esistenziale nella logica di

Abelardo." Annali di Discipline Filosofiche dell'Università di

Bologna no. 4:87–96.

41. ———. 1983. "Le "propositiones coniunctae temporales" nel De

Ypoteticis di Abelardo." In Atti del convegno internazionale di

storia della logica, edited by Abrusci, Michele, Casari, Ettore

and Mugnai, Massimo, 253–257. Bologna: CLUEB.

42. ———. 1986. "Temi filosofici nella logica di Abelardo." Annali di

Discipline Filosofiche dell'Università di Bologna no. 8:165–

188.

43. ———. 1989. "Un approccio semantico alla dialettica di

Abelardo." In Le teorie delle modalità. Atti del Convegno

internazionale di storia della logica, edited by Corsi, Giovanni,

Mangione, Corrado and Mugnai, Massimo, 265–270. Bologna:

CLUEB.

44. ———. 1991. "Oggetto e significato nella dialettica di Abelardo."

Medioevo.Rivista di storia della filosofia medievale no.

17:125–138.

45. ———. 1992. La grammatica logica di Abelardo. Parma:

Università degli Studi di Parma.

46. ———. 1992. "Linguaggio e teoria in Abelardo." Philo-Logica

no. 1:79–94.

47. ———. 1993. "La sintassi logica di Abelardo." Philo-Logica no.

2-3:91–112.

48. Podolak, Pietro. 2024. "Schemata Isagogica. Osservazioni sui

prologhi di alcuni commenti logici del XII secolo a Isagoge e

Categorie." Noctua no. 11:504–566.

49. Rossini, Marco. 2006. "Teologia della creazione o teologia della

conoscenza: riflessioni sulla teologia debole di Abelardo."

Rivista di storia della filosofia no. 61:67–92.

50. Sperandini, Matteo. 2024. "«Nulla succurri providentia

potest». Le critiche di Eloisa al concetto di provvidenza divina

nella lettera IV dell’Epistolario con Abelardo." Lo Sguardo no.

38:19–44.

Abstract: "In the conclusion of the Historia calamitatum

mearum, Abelard asserts that every human misfortune is part

of a divine design whose end is good. This observation lends

itself well to the consolatory nature of the epistle, addressed to

an anonymous friend to find solace for his misfortunes. Upon

coming into possession of the letter, Heloise reproaches

Abelard for never having addressed such consolation to her.

Between them, an intense confrontation opens up during which

Heloise repeatedly denies the concept of providence upheld by

Abelard in the Historia calamitatum. The paper aims to retrace

this unusual criticism through five courageous considerations

of Heloise present in letter IV: a) God’s design is unjust because

it brought misfortune when the relationship with Abelard had

been made chaste through marriage, showing that, if evil can be

resolved into good, even good can lead to evil; b) the memory of

love for Abelard preserves in her soul a peccandi voluntas

contrary to the design of God; c) God is cruel because he

initially punished only Abelard; d) she has no merit with God

because, enduring her misfortunes, she intends to please

Abelard rather than the Lord, bending to the will of the former

and not the latter."

51. Stella, Francesco. 2008. "Epistolae duorum amantium: nuovi

paralleli testuali per gli inserti poetici." The Journal of

Medieval Latin no. 18:374–397.

52. ———. 2008. "Analisi informatiche del lessico e individuazione

degli autori nelle Epistolae duorum amantium (XII secolo)." In

Latin vulgaire-latin tardif VIII. Actes du VIII colloque

international sur le latin vulgaire et tardif à Oxford du 6 au 9

septembre 2006, edited by Wright, Roger, 559–568.

Hildesheim: Olms-Weidmann,.

53. Tarascio, Emanuela. 2000. "Aspetti del significato di topos da

Boezio ad Abelardo." In Le parole per le parole. I logonimi

nelle lingue e nel metalinguaggio. Atti del convegno, Napoli,

Istituto Universitario Orientale, 18 - 20 dicembre 1997, edited

by Vallini, Cristina, 147–164. Roma: Il Calamo.

54. Tarlazzi, Caterina. 2017. "Osservazioni sulla recente edizione

delle Glossae super Peri Hermeneias di Pietro Abelardo

(Jacobi-Strub) e sul codice Milano, Biblioteca Ambrosiana, M

63 sup." Rivista di Storia della Filosofia no. 72:313–328.

55. Troncarelli, Fabio. 2017. "Abelardo, Eloisa e la paleografia

integrale." Litterae Caelestes no. 2:1–10.

56. Tweedale, Martin. 1993. "Logica: dalla fine dell'XI secolo al

tempo di Abelardo." In Logica e linguaggio nel medioevo,

edited by Fedriga, Riccardo and Puggioni, Sara, 71–112. Milano:

LED edizioni.

57. Urbani Ulivi, Lucia. 1976. La psicologia di Abelardo e il

"Tractatus de intellectibus". Roma: Edizioni di Storia e

Letteratura.

Indice: Prefazione di Sofia Vanni Rovighi 7; Introduzione 11; I.

Sensus e imaginatio 21; II. Existimatio, scientia, ratio 33; III.

Gli intellectus e le loro distinzioni 45; IV. Altri tipi di Intellectus

69; V. Sermo e significatio 85; Conclusione 95; Tractatus de

intellectibus [testo latino] 101; BIbliografia 129-137.

58. Valente, Luisa. 2014. "Il desiderio di filosofia nel pensiero

filosofico e teologico di Pietro Abelardo." In Il desiderio nel

Medioevo. Atti del convegno "Il desiderio nel pensiero

medievale", Trento 4-5 ottobre 2013, edited by Palazzo,

Alessandro, 185–206. Roma: Edizioni di Storia e letteratura.

59. Zerbi, Pietro. 2002. "Philosophi" e "Logici". Un ventennio di

incontri: Soissons, Sens, Cluny (1121-1141). Milano: Vita e

Pensiero.

60. Zerbi, Piero. 2002. "Philosophi" e "logici": un ventennio di

incontri e scontri: Soissons, Sens, Cluny, 1121-1141. Milano:

Vita e Pensiero.

Bibliographia. Annotated bibliographies

Raul Corazzon || rc@ontology.co || Info

Petrus Abaelardus: Ausgewählte

Studien in Deutsch

Bibliographie

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Mittelalter I. Münster: LIT Verlag.

Herausgegeben von Gert Melville.

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Religionsgespräche (Abélard, Lull, Cusanus) als Probleme

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den Spuren von Anton Wilhelm Amo: Philosophie und der Ruf

nach Interkulturalität, edited by Knauß, Stefan, Wolfradt,

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Zentralbegriff der Ethik nach Peter Abaelard." Bochumer

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Wirkung. Freiburg: Herder.

Inhalt: Ursula Niggli: Leben, Werk und Literatur Abaelards 1;

Werner Robl: Neues zur Familiengeschichte Heloisas mit

Ausblicken auf die Familie Peter Abaelards 25; Ursula Niggli:

Erotische Konfession und klösterliche Instruktion 91; Rolf

Peppermüller: Erlösung durch Liebe: Abaelards Soteriologie

115; Mattjias Perkams: Autonomie und Gottesglaube:

Gemeinsamkeiten der Ethik Abaelards mit der Immanuel

Kants 129;

Hans-Wolfgang Krautz: Zwischen Boethius, Lullus, Cusanus

und Lessing: Streiflichter auf Abaelards Collationes 151; Ursula

Niggli: Abaelards Ideen für die jüdische Religion und seine

Hermeneutik im Dialogus 169;

Hans J. Müller: Abaelards Weg in die Dialektik: der "Meister

des Scharfsinns" umreißt das Feld für den scholastischen

Wissenschaftsbetrieb 193; Ursula Niggli: Philosophischer

Scharfsinn in der theologischen Kritik 235; Werner Robl:

Goswin von Anchin, ein Widersacher Peter Abaelards 267;

Wener Robl: Petrus Venerabilis: Briefe zur Rettung Abaelards?

293; Ursula Niggli: Berengar von Poitiers: Verteidigung

Abaelards gegen Bernhard von Clairvaux 317; Ursula Niggli:

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Systematische Abaelard-Bibliographie ab 1988 375-399.

29. Pattin, A. 1971. "Petrus Abélard (1079-1142) als mens en als

Denker: Aantekeningen bij het lezen Van zijn werken."

Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie no. 33 (3):572 – 582.

30. Peppermüller, Rolf. 1972. Abaelards Auslegung des

Römerbriefes. Münster: Aschendorff.

31. ———. 1975. "Zum Fortwirken von Abaelards Römerbrief-

kommentar in der mitteralterlichen Exegese." In Pierre

Abélard - Pierre le Vénérable. Les courants philosophiques,

littéraires et artistiques en Occident au milieu du XII siècle,

edited by Jolivet, Jean and Louis, René, 557–567. Paris:

Éditions du Centre national de la recherche scientifique.

32. Reiners, Jos. 1910. Der Nominalismus in der Frühscholastik.

Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der Universalienfrage im

Mittelalter; nebst einer neuen Textausgabe des Briefes

Roscelins an Abälard. Ascvhendorff: Münster.

33. Rijk, Lambertus Marie de. 1980. "Peter Abälard (1079-1142),

Meister und Opfer des Scharfsinns." In Petrus Abaelardus

(1079-1142). Person, Werk und Wirkung, edited by Thomas,

Rudolf, 125–138. Trier: Paulinus-Verlag.

Nachdruck in: L. M. de Rijk, Through Language to Reality:

Studies in Medieval Semantics and Metaphysics, Edited by

Egbert Bos, Northampton: Variorum Reprints, 1989.

34. ———. 1992. "Peter Abaelard (1079-1142)." In Philosophy of

Language/Sprachphilosophie/La philosophie du langage.

Eine internationales Handbuch zeitgenössicher Forschung.

Vol. I, edited by Dascal, Marcelo, Gerhardus, Dietfried, Lorenz,

Kuno and Meggle, Georg, 290–296. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter.

1. Die Sprache als menschliche Ausdrucksweise; 2. Nomen,

Verbum, Oratio; 3 . Die prädikativ-kopulative Funktion des

Verbum; 4. Sememverschmelzung als Schlüsselverfahren in

Abaelards Semantik; 5. Die Enstellung Abaelards zur Sprache;

6 . Literatur in Auswahl.

35. Robl, Werner. 2013. Zwischen Gottfried Graumantel und Peter

Abaelard: Der Donjon von Le Pallet und seine Herren im

Spiegel der Zeitgeschichte. Neustadt.

36. Schnell, Rüdiger. 2022. Epistolae duorum amantium.

Parodien – auf ein berühmtes Liebespaar? Leiden: Brill.

37. Schüßler, Ursula. 1974. "Das Verhältnis der Dialektik Peter

Abaelards zur modernen Logik." Mittellateinisches Jahrbuch

no. 9:39–47.

38. Seewald, Michael. 2012. Verisimilitudo. Die epistemologischen

Voraussetzungen der Gotteslehre Peter Abaelards. Berlin:

Akademie Verlag.

39. Thomas, Rudolf. 1966. Der philosophisch-theologische

Erkenntnisweg Peter Abaelards im Dialogus inter

Philosophum, Judaeum et Christianum. Bonn: Röhrscheid.

40. ———, ed. 1980. Petrus Abaelardus (1079-1142). Person, Werk

und Wirkung. Trier: Paulinus-Verlag.

Trierer Theologische Studien. Band 38.

Herausgegeben von Rudolf Thomas in Verbindung mit Jean

Jolivet, D. E. Luscombe, L. M. de Rijk.

Inhaltsverzeichnis: Vorwort; Einfuhrung; Biographische Daten;

I. Die Gestalt und das Bild Abaelards.

D. E. Luscombe: The Letters of Heloise and Abelard since

'Cluny 1972' 19; John F. Benton: A reconsideration of the

authenticity of the correspondence of Abelard and Heloise 41;

Peter Dronke: Heloise's Problemata and Letters: Some

Questions of Form and Content 53; Peter von Moos: Post

festum -- Was kommt nach der Authentizitats-debatte uber die

Briefe Abaelards und Heloises? 75;

II: Abaelard, Philosoph und Logiker im 12. Jahrhundert.

Jean Jolivet: Doctrines et figures de philosophes chez Abélard

103; Mariateresa Beonio-Brocchieri Fumagalli: Concepts

philosophiques dans l'Historia Calamitatum et dans les autres

oeuvres abélardiennes 121; L. M. de Rijk: Peter Abälard (1079-

1142): Meister und Opfer des Scharfsinns / Offentlicher

akademischer Vortrag, gehalten am 18. April 1979 in der

Promotions aula der Theologischen Fakultät in Trier 125; L. M.

de Rijk: The semantical Impact of Abailard's Solution of the

Problem of Universals 139; Wolfgang L. Gombocz: Abaelards

Bedeutungslehre als Schlüssel zum Universalienproblem 153;

Klaus Jacobi: Diskussionen über Prädikationstheorie in den

logischen Schriften des Petrus Abaelardus. Versuch einer

Ubersicht 165;

III. Die Stellung Abaelards in der Geschichte der Theologie und

Liturgie.

Constant Mews: The development of the Theologia of Peter

Abelard 183; Eileen F. Kearney: Peter Abelard as Biblical

Commentator: A Study of the Expositio in Hexaemeron 199;

Heinz Robert Schlette: Aspiratio. Prareformatorische Akzente

in Abälards Erklärung der vierten Vaterunser-Bitte 211; Rolf

Peppermuller: Zu Abaelards Paulusexegese und ihrem

Nachwirken 217; Thaddaeus Kucia: Die Anthropologie bei Peter

Abaelard 223; Elisabeth Gossmann: Zur Auseinandersetzung

zwischen Abaelard und Bernhard von Clairvaux um die

Gotteserkenntnis im Glauben 233; Maurice de Gandillac: Notes

preparatoires a un débat sur le Dialogus 243; Lothar Steiger:

Hermeneutische Erwagungen zu Abaelards Dialogus 247;

Chrysogonus Waddell: Peter Abelard as creator of liturgical

texts 267; Rudolf Haubst: Marginalien des Nikolaus von Kues

zu Abaelard (oder: Abaelard, wie Cusanus ihn sah) 287; Ernst

Volk: Das Gewissen bei Petrus Abaelardus, Petrus Lombardus

und Martin Luther 297; Register zitierter Personen 331;

Autorenverzeichnis 333.

41. Weidemann, Hermann. 1981. "Zur Semantik der Modalbegriffe

bei Peter Abaelard." Medioevo.Rivista di storia della filosofia

medievale no. 7:1–40.

42. ———. 1993. "Modalität und Konsequenz. Zur logischen

Struktur eines theologischen Arguments in Peter Abaelards

Dialectica." In Argumentationstheorie. Scholastische

Forschungen zu den logischen und semantischen Regeln

korrekten Folgerns, edited by Jacobi, Klaus, 695–706. Leiden:

Brill.

43. Wöhler, Hans-Ulrich. 1979. "Zur philosophischen Position des

Nominalisten Petrus Abaelard. Aus Anlass seines 900.

Geburstag." Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie no. 27:673–

683.

Bibliographia. Annotated bibliographies

Raul Corazzon || rc@ontology.co || Info

Pedro Abelardo. Bibliografía de

estudios en español

Bibliografía

1. Bacigalupo, Luis E. 1992. Intención y conciencia en la Etica de

Abelardo. Lima: Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú.

2. Bertelloni, Francisco. 1986. "Pars destruens. Las críticas de

Abelardo al realismo en la primera parte de la Lógica

'Ingredientibus'." Patristica et Mediaevalia no. 7:49–64.

"This paper analyzes the first part of the "Logica

ingredientibus" of Peter Abelard. First the author intends to

show the triple structure of his philosophical method

(exposition, critique, and resolution). Secondly he expounds

the critical part of this structure. Thirdly an attempt is made to

outline the antirealists arguments of Abelard."

3. ———. 1987. "Pars construens. La solución de Abelardo al

problema del universal en la primera parte de la Lógica

`Ingredientibus' (Primera Parte)." Patristica et Mediaevalia

no. 8:39–60.

4. ———. 1988. "Pars construens. La solución de Abelardo al

problema del universal en la primera parte de la Logica

'Ingredientibus' (Secunda Parte)." Patristica et Mediaevalia no.

9:3–25.

5. ———. 1995. "Status... quod non est res: Facticidad del status

como fundamento de la universalización de lo real en Pedro

Abelardo." Mediaevalia. Textos e Estudos no. 7-8:153–175.

6. Castello Dubra, Julio A. 2004. "Ontología y gnoseología en la

Logica ingredientibus de Pedro Abelardo." Anales del

Seminario de Historia de la Filosofia no. 43:43–50.

Resumen: "El propósito de este trabajo es señalar algunos

aspectos de la ontología y la gnoseología de Pedro Abelardo en

el tratamiento del problema de los universales desarrollado en

la primera parte de su Logica ingredientibus, o Glosas a la

Isagogé de Porfirio.(1) Para ello, vamos a hacer, en primer

lugar, una breve recapitulación del contenido del pasaje central

en que Abelardo comenta las tres cuestiones de Porfirio (I).

Nuestro interés es destacar la relevancia que adquieren las

críticas a las doctrinas de Guillermo de Champeaux en la propia

configuración de la doctrina abelardiana del status rei (II), y la

paradójica ausencia, en este tratamiento de Abelardo, de una

teoría de la formación del concepto universal, a falta de la cual,

sólo hallamos una teoría de la “significación intelectual” de los

nombres universales (III).

Concluiremos señalando que la inicial limitación que en este

aspecto puede presentar la Logica ingredientibus se

corresponde, en verdad, con una visión de las limitaciones del

conocimiento intelectual humano (IV)."

(1) Petrus Abelardus, "Logica ingredientibus" (ed. Geyer) en

Beitrage zur Geschichte der Philosophie des Mittelalters XXI

(1919-1927) 1-3.

7. Daza y García, Rómulo Ramírez. 2017. "Dialéctica y razón

práctica en Pedro Abelardo: independencia o laberinto

intelectual." Sincronía. Revista de Filosofía y Letras no. 21 33–

72.

Resumen: "El panlogismo abelardiano filosóficamente

considerado coadyuvó de un modo positivo al campo dialéctico,

aunque metodológicamente desbocaría su elemento formal, con

patentes consecuencias éticas y teológicas, por ser los campos

en los que lo aplicó. La exploración de Abelardo y sus

incursiones intelectuales, le posicionan como uno de los más

grandes dialécticos de todos los tiempos, y una de las más

grandes luminarias de la filosofía medieval. Problematizar el

talante de su investigación, lleva a un franco balance tanto de lo

infortunado que sus conclusiones en materias aplicadas

pudieran tener, como de la pericia innegable de su polémica

intelectual, de claros frutos en el campo lógico. Se exploran

evaluativamente los alcances de este tipo de filosofía, y se

destaca su propia índole que, pese a la caída existencial de su

persona dado el contexto en el que se enmarcaba, y pese a su

espíritu contestatario y rebelde, su pujanza filosofante nos lleva

a considerar y a situar en un sutil encuadre, tanto las fortalezas

como las limitantes de su pensamiento."

8. García Cuadrado, José Ángel. 2005. "Lógica, gramática,

metafísica. La distinción 'nombre' y 'verbo' en Pedro Abelardo."

In Metafísica y antropología en el siglo XII, edited by Soto

Bruna, María Jesús, 153–194. Pamplona (Navarra): EUNSA.

9. Murillo, Ildefonso. 1995. "Actitud de Pedro Abelardo ante la

dialéctica en su carta XIII: relaciones entre dialéctica, teología y

ética." Cuadernos salmantinos de filosofía no. 22:159–174.

10. Peña, Lorenzo. 1980. Hay clases: Estudio sobre Abelardo y el

realismo colectivista. Quito: Pontificia Universidad Católica del

Ecuador.

11. Ramón Guerrero, Rafael. 1995. "La afirmación del Yo en el siglo

XII: Pedro Abelardo y San Bernardo." Anales del Seminario de

Historía de la Filosofía no. 12:11–32.

12. Santiago-Otero, Horacio. 1981. "El término "teología" en Pedro

Abelardo." In Sprache und Erkenntnis im Mittelalter. Band II,

edited by Beckmann, Jan P. et al. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter.

También publicado en la Revista Española de teología, 36,

1976, pp. 251-259 y en H. Santiago-Otero, Fe y cultura en la

Edad Media, Madrid: Consejo Superior de Investigaciones

Cientificas. Centro de Estudios Historicos 1988, pp. 243-251.

13. Svensson, Manfred. 2012. "Indiferencia, ambivalencia y tipos

de consentimiento: Agustín en el Scito te Ipsum de Abelardo."

Kriterion: Journal of Philosophy no. 53:103–118.

14. Washburn, Jimmy. 2010. "El papel de la razón en la moralidad:

El Caso de la ética abelardiana." Ideas y Valores no. 59:73–108.

Bibliographia. Annotated bibliographies

Raul Corazzon || rc@ontology.co || Info

Pedro Abelardo. Bibliografía dos

estudos em portugués

Bibliografia

1. Carvalho, Mario Santiago de. 2001. Lógica e paixão. Coimbra:

Minerva.

2. Cella, Mário. 1995. "Os elementos do conhecimento e a

significatio no De intellectibus, de Pedro Abelardo." In Lógica e

Linguagem na Idade Média. Atas do 4. Encontro de filosofia

medieval de Commissão de filosofia medieval do Brasil : Porto

Alegre, 8-12 de novembro de 1993, edited by De Boni, Luis

Alberto, 55–67. Porto Alegre: EDIPUCRS.

3. Chaves-Tannús, Marcio. 1994. "A Teoria da Predicação de

Pierre Abélard e a Semantica da Frase de Peter Von Polenz:

Uma Tentativa De Aproximação." Educação e Filosofia no.

8:229–237.

4. Dias, Cléber Eduardo dos Santos. 2011. "Vocabulário sobre a

natureza em Pedro Abelardo." In Pensar a natureza.

Problemas e respostas na filosofia medieval, séculos IX-XIV,

edited by Meirinhos, José Francisco Preto and Lázaro Pulido,

Manuel, 47–104. Porto: Faculdade de letras da Universidade do

Porto.

5. Estevão, José Carlos. 1995. "Sobre o dictum propositionis em

Abelardo e algumas questões de abordagem." In Lógica e

Linguagem na Idade Média. Atas do 4. Encontro de filosofia

medieval de Commissão de filosofia medieval do Brasil : Porto

Alegre, 8-12 de novembro de 1993, edited by De Boni, Luis

Alberto, 69–75. Porto Alegre: EDIPUCRS.

6. Hamelin, Guy. 2010. "As fontes aristotelicas e estoicas em

Abelardo: a nocao de "consentimento" (consensus -

sugkatathesis)." Veritas – Revista de Filosofia da Pucrs no.

55:176–193.

7. Hamelin, Guy, and Maia, Danilo. 2011. "Signum, significatio e

intellectus em Pedro Abelardo e Guilherme de Ockham."

Cadernos de Historia e Filosofia da Ciencia no. 21:373–416.

8. Leite Júnior, Pedro Gilberto. 2000. O problema dos

universais: a perspectiva de Boécio, Abelardo e Ockham. Porto

Alegre: EDIPUCRS.

9. Silva, Pedro Rodolfo Fernandes da. 2012. "O método dialético e

o Sic et non de Pedro Abelardo." Scintilla. Revista de Filosofia

e Mística Medieval no. 9:65–85.

10. Tursi, Antonio. 2011. "Las críticas de Pedro Abelardo al

realismo: dos lecturas de la Isagoge de Porfírio." In Lenguaje,

lógica y ontología en cinco pensadores medievales: Anselmo

de Aosta, Pedro Abelardo, Juan Duns Escoto, Guillermo de

Ockham y Nicolás d Cusa, edited by Corti, Enrique, Tursi,

Antonio, Pico Estrada, Paula and Fernández Walker, Gustavo,

63–109. Buenos Aires: Baudino.

Bibliographia. Annotated bibliographies

Raul Corazzon || rc@ontology.co || Info

Peter Abelard. Bibliography on His

theology and the doctrine of the

Trinity (A - Mea)

Bibliography

1. Bell, Thomas J. 2007. Peter Abelard after Marriage: The

Spiritual Direction of Heloise and Her Nuns Through

Liturgical Song. Kalamazoo: Cistercian Publications.

"The combined power of language and music forms the subject

of this book, especially when the two wielded by a master of

rhetoric, poetry, and melody the famous twelfth-century

philosopher Peter Abelard (1079-1142). Scholars have long

known of the liturgical sequences Virgines castae and

Epithalamica, but only recently has it been argued by

Chrysogonus Waddell that they are the work of Abelard.

Richly layered and polysemous, like much of medieval art,

these two sequences harmonize remarkably well in style and

content with the large body of extant compositions that Abelard

composed for his beloved Heloise (c. 1090-1164).

The two sequences, restored to their composer, offer us new

opportunity to explore the mature Abelard’s exegetical skills, to

witness his gifts as a liturgist, and to examine his role spiritual

adviser to Abbess Heloise. My work takes advantage this

opportunity by examining in detail the internal rhetoric

Virgines castae and Epithalamica. Abelard had a specific

vision for how Heloise should understand her role as abbess of

Paraclete community, her relationship to Christ, and her

feelings for Abelard himself. He displayed that vision to Heloise

and nuns through the rich tapestry of words and music that

form sequences. Virgines castae and Epithalamica speak

directly to life situation of the Paraclete abbess; their

significance reaches the way back to Abelard’s earliest relations

with Heloise." (Prologue, p. VII)

2. Bloch, R. Howard. 2022. "Syllogisms in Stone: Theophilus,

Stephen, Abelard on the Walls of Notre-Dame de Paris." In

Revealing New Perspectives: Studies in Honor of Stephen G.

Nichols, edited by Brownlee, Kevin and Brownlee, Marina S.,

75–103. New York: Peter Lang.

"The prime example of Abelard’s confrontation of an ancient

theological problem head on, without authority, is his

treatment in logical terms of the core theological issue of the

relationship of the Three to the One of the Trinity: “Now it

happened that I first applied myself to lecturing on the basis of

our faith by analogy with human reason, and composed a

theological treatise On the Unity and Trinity of God for the use

of my students who were asking for human and logical reasons

on this subject, and demanded something more intelligible

rather than mere words. In fact they said that words were

useless if the intelligence could not follow them, that nothing

could be believed unless it was first understood, and that it was

absurd for anyone to preach to others what neither he nor those

he taught could grasp with the understanding …”(24) Abelard,

who mentions in the Dialectics Aristotle, Porphyry, and

Boethius, seeks to introduce reason into faith; and he ends up,

finally, by inserting the question of the Trinity into the ancient

debate, revived in the late 11th century by his teacher Rocelin,

concerning the ontological status of universal terms. Abelard

maintains that the difference between Father, Son, and Holy

Spirit is either substantial or accidental.

If substantial, that is, real, then they cannot be three; if

accidental, then they are not one. His solution to this seemingly

intractable contradiction involves a third term between the two,

that they inhere as an idea of the mind, an intellectio, on the

model of the way that abstract nouns signify both the existence

of an ideal substance and its difference in material reality.

This outraged the ecclesiastical authorities. Bernard denounced

Abelard in 1141 to Pope Innocent II, whom he had helped

install against Anacletus II, which led to the Council of Sens.

Abelard recounts in the Historia calamitatum the story of the

Council of Soissons at which “they compelled me to throw my

book into the fire with my own hands.”(25)" (pp. 98-99)

(24) Abelard, Letters, 78.

(25) Abelard, Letters, 83.

References

The Letters of Abelard and Heloise, trans. Betty Radice

(London: Penguin Books, 1974).

3. Bond, H. Lawrence. 2007. "Another Look at Abelard's

Commentary on Romans 3:26." In Medieval Readings of

Romans, edited by Campbell, William S., Hawkins, Peter S. and

Schildgen, Brenda Deen, 11–32. New York: T&T Clark

International.

"A new generation of theologians has raised serious misgivings

about the classic and objective atonement theories that were

adopted by the Church, or perhaps one should say churches,

during the early, medieval, and Reformation eras. At the same

time, thoroughgoing reexaminations of the Pauline texts by

New Testament scholars have produced invigorating fresh

perspectives on Pauline theology. Abelard's commentary on

Paul's Letter to the Romans deserves the same question that

others have been asking of Paul's Letters: What did Abelard

really say? As with Pauline studies, the temptation is instead to

answer what one wants Abelard to have said.

Peter Abelard's Commentaria in Epistolam Pauli ad Romanos

should lend itself to a variety of treatments if for no other

reason than the diverse ways Abelard addresses and explicates

the Pauline text. This has not always been the case. At times it

has become commonplace to consider Abelard's commentary

on Romans 3:26 as if Abelard were saying one thing and one

thing only. This is one reason why some have often dismissed

his soteriological theologizing as merely exemplarist and

crypto-Pelagian. That sort of analysis of Abelard's atonement

theory almost always occurs outside the immediate textual

setting and with little or no reference to the exegetical style

Abelard employs or to the hermeneutical principles impelling

it." (p. 11)

(...)

"Abelard's comments here do not amount to a complete theory,

nor do the remarks in this essay tell the whole story of his

efforts to grasp the atonement. He addresses the question of

redemption in various other important places in his theological

writings that bear comparison and contrast with what he has

set forth in his exegesis of Rom. 3:26.

However, that would require not only several papers but also a

monograph or two.

This attempt to reopen the question of what Abelard really says

about the atonement focuses on only one very specific context.

It is much indebted to the superior efforts of other scholars,

especially Weingart, Quinn, Williams, Peppermiiller, and

Buytaert. It tries, however, to supplement them with additional

commentary and textual analysis, albeit limited to a small

compass." (p. 31)

4. Briola, Lucas. 2016. "A Case Study of Scholasticism: Peter

Abelard and Peter Lombard on Penance." Journal of Moral

Theology no. 5:65–85.

"Because an adequate theology of the sacrament was only

beginning to be formulated during this time, a study of this

time period elucidates some interesting and important points

for an adequate notion of penance.

Additionally, medieval scholastic theology cannot be

understood apart from its context, inarguably affected and

conditioned by other historical and cultural currents. Taking

this broader theo-cultural milieu into account, this essay deals

with two key scholastic debates over penance. First, I will locate

Abelard and Lombard as contritionalists—those who assert that

God’s forgiveness occurs at contrition rather than confession—

and consequently consider their respective views on the

necessity of confession. Second, since both acknowledge that

God’s forgiveness comes at contrition rather than confession, I

will examine how this position changes the role of priests for

the two thinkers, as priests are now considered judges or

doctors who need to develop suitable tools for these roles. The

guiding idea of both sections is simple—Abelard and Lombard

put forth theologies that overcome any overly routinized

understandings of penance, placing personal responsibility on

both penitent and confessor." (pp. 65-66)

5. Brower, Jeffrey E. 2004. "Trinity." In The Cambridge

Companion to Abelard, edited by Brower, Jeffrey E. and

Guilfoy, Kevin, 223–257. Cambridge: Cambridge University

Press.

"In this chapter, I show how Abelard’s treatment of a deep,

logical problem associated with the Christian doctrine of the

Trinity gives rise to important developments in his philosophy.

As will emerge, in addressing this problem he not only presents

a philosophically interesting account of the Trinity, but also

develops a highly sophisticated theory of identity or numerical

sameness, as well as a distinctive approach to issues now

generally recognized under the rubric “the problem of material

constitution”." (p. 223)

6. Brown, Stephen F. 1992. "Abelard and the Medieval Origins of

the Distinction between God’s Absolute and Ordained Power."

In Ad litteram. Authoritative Texts and Their Medieval

Readers, edited by Jordan, Mark D. and Emery, Jr. Kent, 199–

215. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press.

"In the Theologia Christiana, the Theologia 'Scholarium' and

in the Expositio in Hexaemeron Abelard argues from this same

Timaeus text [29D-30A)] that God could only create what in

fact he did create and could not produce a better universe than

he has produced.(7) For Abelard, God had to work in accord

with the full nature of his goodness. Goodness is for God not an

accidental quality. He is substantial goodness. So, when God

creates, he cannot be stingy or miserly. Just as the Father could

not spare himself in producing the Son and make the Son less

than the Son could be — otherwise he would be miserly (and

therefore not substantially good)—so the Creator could not hold

back something and not make the world the best that he could

make it be. For, in such a case, the Creator would be miserly.

Abelard further argued that whatever God does, he does for the

best and wisest reason—even if it be hidden from us. God’s

nature is such that he has thus to create what is wisest and best.

The world he actually created must be the best that the most

wise God could create. Otherwise, he could have planned in a

more wise manner, which is impossible because of his being

most wise. If one rejects this option, one falls back to the

previous dilemma-— that God planned most wisely, but he held

back on the side of his goodness - that is, he was selfish.

Or one might say that God is most wise, and most good, but not

most powerful—that he planned most wisely, and was generous

in his desire to share his goodness, but could not accomplish

his will." (pp. 200-201)

(7) Theologia Christiana 5.29-58 (Buytaert, 358-372; PL

178:1324-1330).

7. Burnett, Charles. 1986. "Peter Abelard, Confessio fidei

'Universis': A Critical Edition of Abelard's Reply to Accusations

of Heresy." Mediaeval Studies no. 48:111–138.

"In the Confessio fidei 'Universis Abelard replies to each of

seventeen of the capitula under which his heresies had been

listed in the Capitula haeresum xix attached to St. Bernard of

Clairvaux, Epistola 190 ad Innocentium papam, with a brief

statement of the orthodoxy of his belief. A much more detailed

and scholarly reply to the same capitula (in addition to the two

which have been omitted in the Confessio fidei 'Universis ')

appears to have been the subject of Abelard's Apologia, of

which we have only the opening section and fragments

preserved in Thomas of Morigny's answer to that work. The

verbal similarities between the two works suggest that they

were composed in the same circumstances. In both works

Abelard refutes the allegation in the Capitula haeresum xix that

the propositions listed are to be found in his Theologia, his

Scito te ipsum (Ethica) and his Sententiae (a work whose

composition he denies). In both works also he brings together

the same authorities to show that he has a right and a duty to

defend himself. However, there are important differences.

In the first place the Apologia is addressed directly to St.

Bernard."

(...)

"The Confessio fidei 'Universis ', on the other hand, while

referring obliquely to Bernard in perhaps an ironic tone as

amicus noster,1 is addressed to the church at large, against

which Abelard has no particular grudge." (pp. 111-112, notes

omitted)

8. Burnett, Charles S. F. 1985. "The 'Expositio Orationis

Dominicae' Multorum legimus orationes', Abelard's Exposition

of the Lord's Prayer?" Revue Bénédictine no. 95:60–72.

9. Buytaert, Eligius M. 1963. "Critical Observations on the

"Theologia Christiana" of Abelard." Antonianum no. 38:384–

433.

10. ———. 1963. "An Earlier Redaction of the "Theologia

Christiana" of Abelard." Antonianum no. 37:481–495.

11. ———. 1964. "The Greek Fathers in Abelards "Theologies" and

Commentary on Saint Paul." Antonianum no. 39:408–436.

12. ———. 1966. "The Greek Fathers in Abelard's "Sic et Non"."

Antonianum no. 41:413–453.

13. ———. 1968. "The Anonymous Capitula Haeresum Petri

Abelardi and the Synod of Sens, 1140." Antonianum no.

43:419–460.

14. ———. 1968. "Abelard's Expositio in Hexaemeron."

Antonianum no. 43:163–194.

15. ———. 1969. "Abelard's Collationes." Antonianum no. 44:18–

39.

16. ———. 1974. "Abelard's Trinitarian Doctrine." In Peter Abelard:

Proceedings of the International Conference, edited by

Buytaert, Éloi Marie, 127–152. Leuven: Leuven University

Press.

"An attempt will be made to show the evolution of Abelard's

doctrine, and, therefore, it is good to keep in mind the

chronological succession of our author's pertinent writings: the

Theologia 'Summi boni', two redactions, composed in 1118-

1120; the Theologia Christiana, first and second redactions,

written respectively in 1123- 1125 and 1134-1135; the first three

redactions of the Theeologia 'Scholarium'. 1134-1138. all after

the second redaction of the Theoologia Christiana; the third

redaction of the same Theologia Christiana, the fourth

redaction of the Theologia 'Scholarium', and the 'Apofogia

contra Bernardum,' all dating from the years 1139-1140. Both

the Theologia Christiana and the Theofogia 'Schofarium'. even

in their last redaction, remained unfinished, and of the

Apologia we have only (substantial) fragments. Yet. in these

sources enough elements are found to give us a fair idea of

Abelard's thinking on Blessed Trinity." (p. 127)

17. Cartwright, Steven Richard. 2001. The Romans Commentaries

of William of St. Thierry and Peter Abelard: A Theological and

Methodological Comparison, Western Michigan University.

"Having made these points in each of the major areas of

analysis, we can make comparisons and conclusions about the

commentaries as a whole and about w hat they contribute to

our understanding of the conflict between William and Peter.

Within the corpus of each writer’s works the commentaries

stand out as expositions of Scripture, different from yet

foundational to all their other theological works. They also

stand out among contemporary commentaries on Romans, and

among medieval Romans commentaries considered as a whole.

I would go so as far to call them the finest commentaries on

Romans written between the time of A ugustine and the

Reformation: William’s because of his excellent rhetoric and

spiritual program, and Peter’s because of his use of dialectic

and his bold, ground-breaking positions on various doctrines.

While grounded in the ancient tradition of Romans

interpretation begun with Origen, the two commentaries reflect

the modes of thought that make their authors stand out among

other twelfth-century theologians and commentators on this

epistle." (p. 286)

18. ———. 2013. "Twelfth-Century Pauline Exegesis: William of St.

Thierry's Monastic Rhetoric and Peter Abelard's Scholastic

Logic." In A Companion to St. Paul in the Middle Ages, edited

by Cartwright, Steven R, 205–234. Leiden: Brill.

"The Romans commentaries of William of St. Thierry and Peter

Abelard provide excellent examples of mature monastic and

early scholastic exegesis of St. Paul. Written probably

simultaneously in the mid-1130s, they reflect the culmination of

one tradition of exegesis and the development of another." (p.

205)

(...)

"The most famous question, and certainly the most frequently

and thoroughly analyzed,(71) is the question on redemption

found in Abelard’s comments on 3:26. The major question

subsequent generations have asked about this question is

whether Abelard taught a subjective, “exemplarist” theology of

atonement, emphasizing the devotion felt by the believer on

considering Christ’s demonstration of love, in distinction to the

traditional objective theologies that emphasized the work of

Christ on the cross. Space does not allow a complete analysis of

this matter; rather, we can only look briefly at what his

intention was in posing and resolving his own question: “What

is that redemption of ours through the death of Christ? or, how

does the Apostle say that we are justified in his blood, we who

seem worthy of a greater punishment, because we, unjust

servants, committed that deed on account of which the

innocent Lord was murdered?” (p. 226, a note omiited)

(71) See Cartwright, “Romans Commentaries,” 194–96, for a

summary of the earlier scholarly analyses; there are also two

more recent excellent discussions: H. Lawrence Bond, “Another

Look at Abelard’s Commentary on Romans 3:26,” in Medieval

Readings, 11–32, and Mark Reasoner, Romans in Full Circle: A

History of Interpretation (Louisville, 2005), 27–29.

19. Colish, Marcia L. 1992. "Peter Lombard and Peter Abelard: The

Opinio Nominalium and Divine." Vivarium no. 30:139–156.

Reprinted as Essay VI in: M. L. Colish, Studies in

Scholasticism, Aldershot, Ashgate, 2006.

"This paper supports the claim that what "nominalism" meant

to twelfth-century thinkers was the doctrine of the univocal

signification of nouns and verbs, with their oblique or tensed

forms conveying consignification of the things or actions they

signify in the nominative case or present tense, respectively.

The paper shows that both Peter Abelard and Peter Lombard

called upon this doctrine in their argument over whether God

can do better that He does, indicating that nominalism so

defined has a perceived utility for exponents of differing logical

and theological persuasions at the time."

"With respect to the Lombard's contribution to the history of

nominalism in the twelfth century, then, we may offer three

conclusions. First, from our consideration of Abelard's case, it

is clear that the opinio Nominalium could be, and was, yoked to

a post-Aristotelian kind of logic. From our consideration of the

Lombard's case, it is equally clear that the opinio Nominalium

could just as easily be yoked to a mode of reasoning deemed

capable of yielding cogent ontological conclusions. In this

respect, the fact that a twelfth-century thinker espouses the

opinio Nominalium does not mean that he is automatically or

necessarily required to embrace one rather than the other of

these different conceptions of logic. Second, it was not just the

fact that the Lombard was a theologian but his particular

agenda as a theologian who sought to affirm God's

omnipotence and God's essence as the transcendent

metaphysical reality that accounts for both his borrowings from

Abelard and his more fundamental hostility to Abelard in this

area. And, finally, thanks to the rapid and enduring success of

the Lombard's Sentences' as a textbook, he was able to place

both his position on divine transcendence, the distinction

between God's absolute and ordained power, and the opinio

Nominalium with which he bolstered these teachings squarely

before the eyes of his scholastic contemporaries and

successors." (pp. 155-156)

20. ———. 2005. "Abelard and Theology." In Medieval Paradigms:

Essays in Honor of Jeremy DuQuesnay Adams. Vol. I, edited

by Hayes-Healy, Stephanie, 3–12. Dordrecht: Springer.

Reprinted as Essay VII in: M. L. Colish, Studies in

Scholasticism, Aldershot, Ashgate, 2006.

Abstract: "As a theologian no less than as a logician, Peter

Abelard has been hailed as the father of scholasticism. Both in

the rules for critiquing authorities laid out at the beginning of

his Sic et non and in his challenge in the Dialogus, that

believers need to bolster their creeds with rational arguments,

he takes to the field as the emblematic opponent of Bernard of

Clairvaux, their standoff representing the last ditch effort of

monastic obscurantism to halt the advance of scholastic

enlightenment. In this essay, I wish to question this standard

picture of Abelard the theologian. Despite his insistence on the

need to apply reason and critical analysis to the Christian

tradition, his project turns out to be better stated in theory than

it was worked out in actual practice. And, in some of the

substantive areas where he is deemed the most radical, he

emerges as closer to the theological mainstream than is often

appreciated."

21. Cosgrove, Charles H. 2007. "Abelard's Interpretation of

Romans: Response to Jean Doutre." In Medieval Readings of

Romans, edited by Campbell, William S., Hawkins, Peter S. and

Schildgen, Brenda Deen, 135–141. New York: T&T Clark

International.

Reply to J. Doutre, Romans as Read in School and Cloister in

the Twelfth Century: The Commentaries of Peter Abelard and

William of St. Thierry, same volume.

"Even Peter Abelard, the most independent of the medieval

interpreters before us, takes pains to show agreement among

authorities. Doutre points out that he does so by using

dialectics, applying an Aristotelian logic to make fine

distinctions and thus allow apparently contradictory authorities

to agree." (p. 135)

(...)

"2. The Atonement

One way in which Abelard stands out from his contemporaries

is in his distinctive interpretation of the atonement. In his

comments on Rom. 3:25-26 Abelard rejects the notion that the

death of Jesus satisfies a debt to the Devil. Perhaps echoing but

not acknowledging Anselm, he argues that the Devil has no

rights before God and is owed nothing by God. Abelard goes on

to reject the idea that Christ's death satisfies God's wrath, as if

God could not be gracious without first being appeased. In an

oft-quoted rhetorical question, Abelard asks, "Did the death of

the innocent Son please the Father so very much that he was

reconciled to us through it . . . ? " (Abelard, 286-287).(8)

Abelard sees this whole idea as "cruel and unjust," an affront to

God's goodness (288-289). Abelard's own solution is that God's

exemplary love brings about our salvation. By assuming our

nature and proving his love through both word and example

even to the point of death, Christ saves us by awakening in us a

responding love toward God (288-291)." (p. 137)

(8) Here and in what follows I cite to the page numbers of

Peppermüller's edition. The English rendering is mine.

22. Cross, Richard. 2012. "Philosophy and the Trinity." In The

Oxford Handbook of Medieval Philosophy, edited by

Marenbon, John, 705–729. New York Oxford University Press.

"The notion of sameness-without-identity was systematically

applied in a Trinitarian context first of all by Abelard some 150

years before Henry [of Ghent], using the notion of material

constitution as an illustration of the kind of relation he has in

mind.

(Clearly the two relations are different: sameness-without-

identity is symmetrical; constitution is not.) Abelard argues

that there are cases in which two things can be numerically the

same—say, a lump of wax and a waxen image—but nevertheless

differ ‘in property’:

[The wax: viz. the] matter of the waxen image and what is made

from it do not share all their properties in common, since the

matter of the waxen image is not made from matter (that is, the

wax itself is not made from wax), just as what is made from the

matter in this case is not the matter (that is, the waxen image is

not the matter of the waxen image). (Abelard 1969, 248;

Theologia Christiana, l.3, c.140; translation from Brower 2004,

227)." (pp. 709-710)

References

Brower, Jeffey E. 2004. ‘Trinity’. In The Cambridge

Companion to Abelard, ed. Jeffrey E. Brower and Kevin

Guilfoy, 223–57. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Peter Abelard. 1969. Opera theologica, II, ed. E. M. Buytaert.

Turnhout, Belgium: Brepols (Corpus christianorum continuatio

mediaevalis, 12).

23. Cvetković, Carmen Angela. 2021. "Conflict and Authority:

William of Saint-Thierry and Peter Abelard as Readers of

Origen." Open Theology no. 7:531–554.

Abstract: "This study compares how two prominent twelfth-

century Latin authors and theological opponents, namely the

monastic author William of Saint-Thierry (c. 1080–1148) and

the school master Peter Abelard (1079–1142), variously

understood the authority of the controversial yet influential

Greek author Origen (c. 184–253) in their works. Modern

scholars who study the reception of Origen in the twelfth-

century Latin West have, to this point, spoken of an Origenian

revival in this period, concluding that Origen was especially

popular in the cloister, among Cistercian monks, such as

Bernard of Clairvaux and his followers, like William of Saint-

Thierry, based on the assumption that as monks they found his

writings more relevant. This study seeks to challenge this

scholarly narrative by focusing on two authors who are

perceived as typifying two different strands of theology, one of

a contemplative character developed in the cloister (William)

and one making use of dialectics and developed in the emerging

schools (Abelard). By demonstrating that the schoolmaster

Abelard drew on Origen to a greater degree and in a more

transparent manner than his monastic opponent, this study will

show that Origen’s popularity in the cloisters was not, as such,

a clear point of distinction between them and schools in the

way that has usually been claimed by modern scholarship."

24. Doutre, Jean. 2007. "Romans as Read in School and Cloister in

the Twelfth Century: The Commentaries of Peter Abelard and

William of St. Thierry." In Medieval Readings of Romans,

edited by Campbell, William S., Hawkins, Peter S. and

Schildgen, Brenda Deen, 33–57. New York: T&T Clark

International.

"I. Introduction

The context of the two commentaries

The commentaries on the Letter to the Romans by Peter

Abelard (1079-1142) and William of St. Thierry (1070/75-

1147/48) were written between 1133 and 1139 in the region of

Rheims, in France, before the letter and treatise against Peter

Abelard that led to the latter's condemnation at the Council of

Sens in 1140. Writing his Expositio in epistolam ad Romanos

in the monastery of Signy, which he entered after retiring as

Abbot of St. Thierry, William is one of the most important

twelfth-century figures rediscovered during the last sixty years.

(...)

The perspective of the author In this essay, we will not discuss

the different transformations that Romans undergoes when

interpreted in each commentary. Instead of making a

presentation of the different methodologies used by Abelard

and William, we will only focus on one important difference:

the way each commentator uses the Fathers. Then we will deal

with the different understandings of the figure of Paul which is

the first word of Romans.

We will also focus on the commentaries on Rom. 8:1-30

because the medieval commentators used this chapter to

present, expand, and develop many important and

characteristic aspects of their theology. Finally we will engage

the commentators on their own frame of interpretation.

Like other medieval commentators, both Abelard and William

rely on auctoritates.

Abelard quotes the Fathers: Bede, Florus of Lyons, Rhaban

Maur and the commentaries of Pelagius (under the name of

Jerome), the Ambrosiaster, and Aymon of Auxerre

(Peppermüller 2000, 21). To these he adds philosophers such

as the pseudo-Seneca (Comm Rom I, i, 109-128). Abelard freely

presents his own opinions along with those of the Fathers

(Comm Rom III, viii, verses 3-4). Moreover, he can be critical

of his sources." (p. 33, a note omitted)

25. Dunn, James D. G. 2007. "Romans in the Middle Ages: Some

Responses to the Essays of H. Lawrence Bond, Ian Christopher

Levy, and Thomas R. Ryan." In Medieval Readings of Romans,

edited by Campbell, William S., Hawkins, Peter S. and

Schildgen, Brenda Deen, 153–157. New York: T&T Clark

International.

"The question I ask, therefore, is whether Abelard intended that

allusion to Romans 8 or did he simply slip into biblical

language. For if he did indeed intend it, then the point is that

he thereby evoked one of the most important passages in Paul,

which speaks of the transformation process of "sanctification,"

if you will. The Spirit of adoption (not the spirit of slavery)

points us forward to the adoption still awaited — that is, "the

redemption of our bodies" (Rom. 8:23). The process between

these two "moments" of adoption is the process in which

creation shares — the groaning of childbirth. We are heirs

together with the Son, provided that we suffer with the Son,

share in his Passion.

The process, in other words, is the working out of Christ's death

in the believer; sanctification is a process of being conformed to

Christ's death (Phil. 3:10). This is miles away from a merely

exemplarist nderstanding of Christ's death.

In which case, such a deliberate allusion to Romans 8 certainly

seems to support Bond's exegesis." (p. 154)

26. Dyer, Lesley-Anne. 2014. "Veiled Platonic Triads in Abelard’s

Theologia ‘Summi Boni’." In Rethinking Abelard: A Collection

of Critical Essays, edited by Hellemans, Babette, 119–151.

Leiden: Brill.

"Here I will argue that Abelard’s theological appropriation of

the World Soul should be seen within the larger context of not

one, but two Platonic triads that were widely available and used

in the medieval tradition—the God-Mind-Soul triad and the

God-Archetype-Matter triad. These triads represent ‘textbook’

Platonism and as such became key centers for discussion. The

main text considered will be the earliest extant text of Abelard’s

theological works, the Theologia ‘Summi Boni’. Later revisions

will be referred to only when necessary because it has been

widely acknowledged that Augustine is one of the key sources

for this first edition and my argument addresses the nature of

Abelard’s use of Augustine when it comes to these triads.(5) In

addition, the kernel of most of Abelard’s theology can be found

in this first text.(6)" (p. 120)

(5) The introduction to the TSch [Theologia ‘Scholarium’], ed.

Buytaert and Mews (1987), 203–308 gives an extensive account

of the differences between recensions, including a chart that

shows where overlapping sections can be located in the

different versions. For the full citation, see infra. The

discussion of the TSB’s [Theologia ‘Summi Boni']

Augustinianism can be found on page 204.

(6) Willemien Otten has observed this point and writes that the

core of Abelard’s theological doctrines can be found in this first

theology in Willemien Otten, From Paradise to Paradigm: A

Study of Twelfth-Century Humanism, Brill’s Studies in

Intellectual History (Leiden: Brill, 2004), 149.

27. Elliott, Mark W. 2016. "Tracing the Romans commentary of

Origen in Abelard’s. Appearance and Reality." In Origeniana

Undecima: Origen and Origenism in the History of Western

Thought. Papers of the 11th International Origen Congress,

Aarhus University, 26-31 August 2013, edited by Jacobsen,

Anders Christian, 415–420. Leuven: Peeters.

"Haimo of Auxerre might well have played an important role in

linking Origen to Abelard((8). In his study of Abelard’s

commentary(9) Rolf Peppermüller seems quite aware of this

occurring at a number of points: on the setting and context of

the epistle (at p. 21, n. 127); on the question of Paul’s two

names (at p. 35, n. 212); on Rom 4,9-11 on the difference

between the visible signum and the invisible signaculum (at p.

109, n. 598); on Rom 8,2-4 where the idea is of a sacrifice for

sin allowing justifying love to spring up in people’s hearts (at p.

102, n. 273); Scriptural law (Torah) was for Israel only (p. 149);

true Jews follow the believing fathers such as Abraham (at p.

155 – Haimo has this too.)"(p. 417)

(...)

"However the aim of research in this paper is to examine the

debt of Abelard, not Haimo, to Origen. If we can focus more

closely on their respective Romans Commentaries, Scheck is

bold to claim: “On the other hand [in contrast to Aquinas],

Origen’s CRm is woven into the fabric of Peter Abelard’s

commentary on Romans”. However Scheck’s reference here,

which we might expect to substantiate this claim merely refers

the reader to Peppermüller’s edition of Abelard(11). No more is

done to make the case. Yet, perhaps surprisingly, and perhaps

tellingly, in his earlier work, Origen and the History of

Justification, Scheck took the road marked “William of St

Thierry” at this point and more or less avoided Abelard. Of

course the road from Origen passes through William too, but it

is arguably a less interesting one." (p. 418)

(11) T. Scheck, Origen’s Interpretation of Romans, in S.A.

Cartwright (ed.), A Companion to Paul in the Middle Ages,

Leiden, Brill, 2013, 15-49, p. 22, n. 42: “Cf. Peter Abelard,

Expositio in Epistolam ad Romanos / Römerbriefkommentar,

3 vols., Freiburg, Herder, 2000”. Also, T. Scheck, William of St

Thierry’s Reception of Origen’s Exegesis of Romans, in

Adamantius 10 (2004) 236-256, p. 237: “This irenic usage of

Origen’s Pauline exegesis during the Middle Ages suggests that

the clouds of suspicion that hungelsewhere over Origen’s

orthodoxy did not render suspect his CRm. As an exegete of

Paul, he was normally cited as a Catholic authority of good

faith”.

28. Ferrante, Mauro. 2017. "The word “Theology” from the

Presocratics to Peter Abelard: Philosophy and Science. Some

Remarks." Philosophy and Cosmology no. 18:219–228.

Abstract: "The purpose of this paper is to reconstruct, through

the analysis of some key moments, the evolution of the term

“theology” within the Western philosophical thought. Starting

with the first formulation by the Presocratics, the study takes

into consideration both the first attestation of the term by Plato

(in the second book of the Republic) and the role it plays in

Aristotle’s works (Metaphysics). In its second part,

the paper considers the importance of the term “theology” in

the Latin world, through the study of the Augustine’s critic

against the greek thinkers, which will lead to a further

development in the Middle Ages. The point of arrival is Peter

Abelard, who formulated a concept of “theology” conceived as a

science. At first, the term was tied to a pagan conception of

society and was devoid of any scientiic connotation. With the

advent of Christianity, it begins to take on an universalistic

character connected with the concept of an absolute truth. It is

here pointed out, through all of these antecedents, how, in the

Middle Ages, when the “theology” became an autonomous

science and responds to its own laws, how it is assumed and

used as an instrument to manage both science and truth.

Thanks to the contributions of the ancient philosophers,

developed by medieval thinkers, it was possible to subsequently

use the term “theology” also in a political sense. It also allows

us to extend it to other fields than its original one. Finally, this

paper wants to stress that it is necessary to first study the

evolution of the concepts of terminology, because it allows us to

better understand the concepts that are used in science."

29. Georges, Tobias. 2016. ""Summus christianorum

philosophorum": Origen as christian philosopher in Peter

Abelard." In Origeniana undecima: Origen and Origenism in

the History of Western Thought, Papers of the 11th

International Origen Congress, Aarhus University, 26-31

August 2013 edited by Jacobsen, Anders-Christian 431–440.

Leuven: Peeters.

Abstract: "While Bernard, abbot of Clairvaux, is famous for

using Origen in his sermons on the Song of Songs, Peter

Abelard is often quoted as a scholastic criticising Origen – in

the line of thought: During the 12th century, Origen was

appreciated by monastic exegesis, but not by scholastic

reflection. Indeed, in his “Theologia”, Abelard criticises Origen,

like many other authorities. But Abaelard can also call Origen

“a great” or even “the greatest Christian philosopher”, as he

does in his “Historia Calamitatum” and in his letter 8. This

seems to be meaningful, as Abelard understood himself as a

Christian philosopher. In letter 8, Abelard also quotes long

passages from Origen’s homilies 12 and 13 on Genesis (in

Rufinus’ translation). Hence the question: Is there an overall

attitude towards Origen to be found in Abelard, and how is

Abelard’s attitude situated in the context of his time? Based on

Abelard’s references to Origen, my paper shall scrutinize this

question."

30. ———. 2023. "From reading to understanding: Profectus in

Abelard and Origen." In Progress in Origen and the Origenian

Tradition, edited by Lettieri, Gaetano, Fallica, Maria and

Jacobsen, Anders-Christian, 127–140. Berlin: Peter Lang.

Abstract: "In the final passage of his letter 8 (“The rule”),

Abelard talks of “advancing by understanding” (intelligendo

proficiens) – meaning understanding the Scriptures.

It is argued that this formulation is strongly influenced by

Origen, namely his homily on Genesis 13. Abelard actually

seems to have had great sympathy for Origen’s focus on

understanding (intellectus) and rational perception

(rationabilis sensus).

However, the term profectus is not a key one for Abelard; and

when he refers to Origen as a role model for his theological

method of moving from reading to understanding the

Scriptures in letter 1 (Historia Calamitatum), it becomes

difficult to say where he is really influenced by Origen and

where he imagines it. Following Jerome, Abelard praises

Origen in the exegetical context, but in his “theological”

treatises, most of his – rare – references to him are polemic."

31. Georgianna, Linda. 1987. "Any Corner of Heaven. Heloise's

Critique of Monasticism." Mediaeval Studies no. 49:221–253.

"This article will explore the significance of Heloise's third and

most neglected letter, especially when viewed in the context of

contemporary controversies concerning the monastic life as

well as other forms of spirituality. This discussion should help

us to see that, in fact, Heloise's concerns in this letter rather

closely resemble ideas expressed in other letters. Although

primarily concerned with Heloise's third letter, the aim of this

essay throughout is to suggest that we can understand better

both Heloise and those aspects of twelfth-century spirituality

which she epitomizes if we treat her works as a coherent and

imaginative whole,

rather than as a disjointed series of documents, explicable only

in terms of forgery, interpolation, or repression." (pp. 224-225)

32. Häring, Nikolaus M. 1956. "A Third Manuscript of Peter

Abelard's Theologia 'Summi Boni' (Ms Oxford, Bodl. Lyell 49,

Ms. 101-128v)." Mediaeval Studies no. 18:215–224.

"In 1950, R. W. Hunt published a description of the mediaeval

manuscripts bequeathed to the Bodleian Library by James P. R.

Lyell.(2) The entry listed under no. 4n reads as follows:

Boethius, De Trinitate, with the commentaries of Remigius of

Auxerre (59) and Thierry of Chartres (81); P. Abailardus,

Tractatus de unitate et trinitate divina (101). Admont, no. 382.

Sheepskin binding, 15th cent. 12th cent. i+129 leaves: 235Xl50

mm.

The manuscript contains three distinct commentaries. on the

opuscula sacra of Boethius." (p. 215)

(...)

"On fols. 99v_100v of the Oxford manuscript we find the

fragment of a commentary on Boethius De Hebdomadibus,

written by the author of Librum hunc.

For some unknown reason it breaks off on fol. 100 after the

first word in the fifteenth line. The rest (seventeen lines) of the

folio is blank.

The same scribe wrote the Theologia 'Summi Boni', beginning

on fol. 101 without indication of its author. At a recent date a

librarian wrote the name Abälard on the margin. In point of

length, the Oxford copy agrees exactly with the Erlangen copy

of this work. We shall now use L (Lyell) to designate the

former, and shall follow both Stolzle and Ostlender in

designating the latter by E. B designates the Berlin manuscript

mentioned above. (pp.. 215-216)

(...)

"In view of such lively debates and rigorous demands,

Ostlender was well advised to pay more than usual attention

even to the position of words, but above all because of the close

textual relationship between the Theologia 'Summi Boni' and

the later Theologia christiana. Our list of variants sometimes

confirms and sometimes weakens Abelard's text as it is

published. It shows that in numerous instances EL are closer to

T than B which is Ostlender's basic manuscript. Hence there is

new evidence that the text as published is not final.

Of course, under the circumstances it was not meant to be final.

The day, we hope, will come when the discovery of yet another

manuscript will bring us another step closer to the original

Abelard." (p. 218)

(2) R. W. Hunt. "The Lyell Bequest", Bodl. Libr. Record, III

(1950), 68-100.

33. Hause, Jeffrey. 2007. "Abelard on Degrees of Sinfulness."

American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly no. 81:251–270.

Abstract: "Like many of his medieval successors, Peter Abelard

offers principles for ranking sins. Moral self-knowledge, after

all, requires that we recognize not just our sinfulness, but also

the extent of our offense. The most important distinction

among sins is that between venial and mortal sins: venial

sinners show less contempt and may also be victims of bad

moral luck, and so they are far less blameworthy. However, the

subjective principle which Abelard uses to protect the venial

sinner from blame appears to have absurd consequences: some

agents whom we intuitively find saintly turn out to be mortal

sinners, while other agents whom we intuitively judge wicked

turn out to be mere venial sinners. I argue that Abelard

suggests promising replies to these objections, but these replies

themselves depend on controversial views about moral

psychology."

34. Jaeger, C. Stephen. 1980. "Peter Abelard's Silence at the

Council of Sens." Res publica litterarum no. 3:31–54.

35. Johnson, Junius. 2016. Patristic and Medieval Atonement

Theory: A Guide to Research. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield.

Chapter 9: Peter Abelard (1079–1142): Moral Influence, pp.

119-124.

"Peter Abelard approaches theological topics with a more

stringently philosophical mind than any of the other authors we

are considering. He is concerned about justice and love and

feels that these two points often get obscured in traditional

discussions. Particularly, he feels that we often don’t make

subtle enough distinctions in our moral judgments and that we

don’t understand how deep divine love goes. His thoughts on

morality will be discussed on the basis of his book Ethics (also

titled Know Thyself), and his thoughts on divine love will be

illustrated from a section of his . The theory he develops is

often called either a moral influence theory or exemplarism: in

both instances, what is meant is that we are moved (influenced)

by Christ’s great action to a different manner of life." (p. 119)

(...)

"If we recall the distinction between actions and intentions in

the discussion of sin in Ethics and that it is intentions rather

than actions that are sin, then what Abelard is arguing here is

that it is intentions rather than works that save us. Works

would be outward actions: but a saving intention is a directing

of the heart to God, the opposite of the scorn that is the content

of sin. Abelard clearly is not impressed by Anselm’s arguments

about guilt, insult, or dishonor: whatever damage is done to

things by human guilt in sinning can be undone by God’s will

and so requires no special work. What humanity needs is not a

redeemer but a reminder of God’s great love." (p. 124)

36. Kaiser, Denis. 2009. The Doctrine of Atonement According to

Peter Abelard: A Literary and Historical Analysis. Aschen:

Grin.

"This study analyzes the writings of Peter Abelard with a special

focus on the Commentaria in Epistolam Pauli ad Romanos in

order to give a comprehensive view of his atonement theology

and the factors that may have influenced it.

First, I want to give a sketch of Abelard's life and a list of his

works in a probable chronological order. Both the biography

and bibliography, in drawing a picture of his personality,

behavior, actions, writings, and teachings, will help to provide

insight into Abelard's character, and eventually give reasons for

the inevitability of misunderstandings. Second, a survey

through the theology of atonement of the preceding centuries,

beginning with the Bible and the church fathers, and

concluding with Abelard's contemporary theologians will show

similarities and differences between Abelard's view and the

teachings of his predecessors and contemporaries.

Third, Abelard's writings on atonement are examined with a

special attention to his commentary on Romans. Further, I will

observe connections to other theological topics, and how they

possibly influenced his atonement theology." (pp. 2-3, a note

omitted)

37. ———. 2015. "Peter Abelard’s Theology of Atonement: A

Multifaceted Approach and Reevaluation." Journal of the

Adventist Theological Society no. 26:3–28.

"Cur Deus homo—Why God became man: The title of Anselm

of Canterbury’s famous book touches at the core of

Christianity’s foundational issues—the significance and

purpose of Christ’s incarnation, life on earth, and death on the

cross. The French philosopher, theologian, and logician Peter

Abelard (1079–1142), a contemporary of Anselm, resolved this

question in a manner that gave rise to theological discussions

and controversies among his contemporaries and numerous

generations of scholars. There are three main interpretations of

Abelard’s work. The first group of scholars concluded that this

medieval theologian-philosopher overemphasized the

moralistic or subjective aspect of Christ’s death, at the expense

of its substitutionary nature, and they concluded that Abelard’s

atonement theology was heresy. The second group of writers

agreed that Abelard overemphasized the subjective aspect of

the atonement, yet considered Abelard a genius and orthodox

theologian. The third group of theologians rejected both

assessments, suggesting that Abelard did not deny the

substitutionary aspect of Christ’s death at all. In other words,

various scholars have come to entirely opposite conclusions

about the central question of whether Abelard did or did not

reject the substitutionary aspect of Christ’s death. It is no

wonder that the French abbot Thomas of Morigny, one of

Abelard’s contemporary opponents, compared him with the

Homeric sea-god Proteus “who slips through our hands and

takes another shape before our description of him is complete,”

implying that Abelard is one of the most difficult persons to

assess.

The writer of this article sides with the third group. Yet one

may legitimately ask what statements from the writings of

Abelard gave rise to the conclusion that he denied the objective,

substitutionary aspect of the atonement. Thus this article looks

at the issue from various angles (historical, literary, and

theological) in order to clarify what Abelard’s view of

atonement was, why he presented it in such a way as he did,

and why it is so easy to misunderstand him." (pp. 3-5, notes

omitted)

38. Kearney, Eileen F. 1980. "Peter Abelard as Biblical

Commentator: A Study of the Expositio in Hexaemeron." In

Petrus Abaelardus (1079-1142). Person, Werk und Wirkung,

edited by Thomas, Rudolf, 199–210. Trier: Paulinus-Verlag.

"Until the past decade with the publication of R. Peppermüller’s

monograph Abaelards Auslegung des Römerbriefes, scholars

have focused on the philosophical and theological treatises of

Peter Abelard rather than on his scriptural commentaries(1).

Yet, our awareness of the role of Peter Abelard as theologian

depends upon our understanding of Abelard’s exegetical stance.

This is true not only because Abelard himself indicated the

correlation(2) but also because continuing research on the

development of theology as a science in the twelfth century

exposes a textual continuum between the divine science and

Scripture(3).

For this investigation of Abelard as biblical commentator, I

propose to examine Abelard’s interpretation of the creation

account from the opening chapters of Genesis, his Expositio in

Hexaemeron(4). With the exception of Buytaert’s essay which

deals with the manuscript tradition of the Expositio, there is no

comprehensive study of Abelard’s only extant Old Testament

commentary(5). More recently, reflections on the Expositio

have appeared within the context of research related to the

Masters of Chartres and to a consideration of nature and the

natural sciences that such investigation has engendered.(6)" (p.

199)

(1) R. Peppermüller, Abaelards Auslegung des Römerbriefes,

Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie und Theologie des

Mittelalters 10, (Münster 1972).

(2) Theologia ‘scholarium’ edited by E.M. Buytaert in Petri

Abaelardi opera theologica Il, Corpus Christianorum,

Continuatio mediaevalis, XI. (Turnhout 1969), ‘Prologus,’ 1, p.

401. Cf. J. P. Migne, Patrologia latina 178, 979A, (Paris 1844-

64).

(3) For example, M.-D. Chenu, ‘De la dialectique à la science,’

in La théologie comme science au XIIIe siecle, Bibliotheque

Thomiste 33 (Paris 1957), pp. 15-32.

(4) Expositio in Hexaemeron edited by J. P. Migne, PL 178,

731-784. Unless otherwise indicated, citations from the

Hexaemeron are from this source and will be indicated within

the essay itself by reference to the appropriate column number.

In addition to the Hexaemeron, there are three other extant

biblical commentaries by Abelard: the Expositio orationis

Dominicae, the Problemata Heloissae, and the Commentaria

in epistolam Pauli ad Romanos. Abelard’s Commentary on

Ezechiel has been lost. Cf. D. Van den Eynde, ‘Les écrits perdus

d’Abelard,’ Antonianum 37 (1962), 467-80.

(5) E.M. Buytaert, ‘Abelard’s Expositio in Hexaemeron,'

Antonianum 43 (1968), 163-194.

Four manuscripts are extant although none are complete. The

Migne edition follows the text of Martene-Durand (Paris 1717)

which relied on a single manuscript and ends in the midst of

Abelard’s exposition of Genesis 2:17. The remaining

manuscripts extend the commentary to Genesis 2:25. This

portion is edited by Buytaert in his essay.

(6) For example, J. M. Parent’s study La doctrine de la création

dans l’école des Chartres (Ottawa 1938), especially pp. 69-76.

The following essays from La filosofia della natura nel

medioevo (Milan 1966) are also pertinent: J. Jolivet, ‘Elements

du concept de nature chez Abélard', pp. 297-304, and D. E.

Luscombe, ‘Nature in the Thought of Peter Abelard,’ pp. 314-

319.

39. Knuutila, Simo. 1999. "Philosophy and Theology in Twelfth-

Century Trinitarian Discussions." Historisk-filosofiske

meddelelser no. 77:237–249.

Summary: "Peter Abelard’s theory of the identities and

differences applied to beings and non-beings and Gilbert of

Poitier’s conception of an individual person were new

philosophical ideas developed in theological contexts. How

much should those interested in medieval philosophy learn

about medieval theology? It is argued that paying attention to

the non-philosophical cognitive determinants of philosophical

arguments is philosophically motivated. According to the

suggested approach, philosophical studies of medieval

philosophy should include systematic and evaluative

discussions while the possibly relevant theological context may

be treated as a merely historical factor."

40. Kotsko, Adam. 2010. The Politics of Redemption: The Social

Logic of Salvation. New York: Bloomsbury.

Chapter 7: Abelard, pp. 150-170.

"The goal of this book is to bring to the surface the ontology

implicit within the tradition of theological reflection on the

question of why God became human, a tradition normally

called “atonement theory.” By ontology, I simply mean the logic

by which this tradition guides our thinking about the world and

our place in it. My contention is that all the major thinkers in

this tradition have been drawn, even if despite themselves, to

speak according to a certain social or relational logic in their

attempt to make sense of God’s saving work in Christ—and that

their departures from this logic represent steps along a path

that would ultimately render the Christian concept of salvation

incomprehensible and irrelevant." (p. 1)

(...)

"There has been a tendency to treat the short discussion in the

Romans commentary as a full-blown theory of the atonement

parallel to Anselm’s Why God Became Human, but Abelard

himself considered it only an initial indication of a position that

would be worked out in more detail in his Tropologia (ER 118)

—a work that has not come down to us and may never have

been completed. As his three theologies were all taken up with

the doctrine of the Trinity and the doctrine of God more

generally and do not address the question of Incarnation

directly, his commentary on Romans is thus, despite the

avowedly provisional nature of his remarks there, essentially

the only witness to Abelard’s thinking on atonement.

It also provides the only extended discussion of the first

Adam/second Adam schema, which I have argued is the basic

structure underlying all atonement theories and which in

Abelard’s medieval context immediately brought to mind the

doctrine of original sin.(2) The editor of the standard anthology

in which the discussion of the atonement is translated also

includes some supplementary passages from the Ethics,

presumably because of Abelard’s reputation as a theorist of

“moral influence,” but ironically the extant text of the Ethics is

almost entirely about sin, with only a few brief paragraphs of

the second book on virtues surviving.

The Romans commentary therefore remains basically the sole

source for the questions animating the present study—namely,

what it is about the structure of creation and particularly of

humanity that gives the Incarnation its sense and efficacy." (p.

151)

References

A Scholastic Miscellany: Anselm to Ockham, ed. and trans.

Eugene R. Fairweather (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1966).

ER = Petri Abaelardi Opera Theologica, vol. 1, ed. E. M.

Buytaert, Corpus Christianorum Continuatio Mediaevalis

series, vol. 11 (Turnholt: Brepos, 1969).

41. Kramer, Susan R. 2000. ""We Speak to God with our

Thoughts'": Abelard and the Implications of Private

Communication with God." Church History no. 69:18–40.

"This essay will examine some writings by Abelard that seem to

extol a very personal spirituality through their descriptions of

unspoken, even nonverbal communication with God. Such

direct communication with God was at the heart of Abelard's

description of prayer as well as his theories on sin and its

remission. I will also explore some of the implications of

Abelard's outlining such a private relationship by looking at

monastic and scholastic reactions to Abelard's theories on

penance and absolution—theories that were consonant with

Abelard's position that we communicate with God through our

thoughts. For if Abelard was an innovator in describing an

inner, hidden self known only to God, he also led the way to

exposing these secret things of the heart to others through his

theory of penance and the role of confession therein." (p. 23)

42. Krey, Philip D. W. 2007. "Response to H. Lawrence Bond, Ian

Christopher Levy, and Thomas F. Ryan." In Medieval Readings

of Romans, edited by Campbell, William S., Hawkins, Peter S.

and Schildgen, Brenda Deen, 158–163. New York: T&T Clark

International.

"Peter Abelard on Romans 3:26

Abelard described his own "reading" of Scripture as "glossing,"

and the chief point of glossing was to explain a text word by

word (Van Engen, 23). Bond's paper on Abelard's gloss on

Romans 3:26 follows this medieval gloss tradition and explains

Abelard's text word by word. His essay demonstrates how a

close and careful reading of Abelard, who was himself a close

reader of Paul, can yield new insights. Bond parses Abelard's

sentences as a careful Latinist and grammarian. Paul writes in

Romans 3:26, "It was to prove at the present time that he

himself is righteous and that he justifies the one who has faith

in Jesus." Bond notes, "At times it has become commonplace to

consider Abelard's commentary on Romans 3:26 as if Abelard

were saying one thing and one thing only. This is one reason

why some have often dismissed his soteriological theologizing

as merely exemplarist and crypto-Pelagian." None of these

commentators wanted to be Pelagian. Abelard was

fundamentally a teacher, and Bond points out that in his text

Abelard seems most interested in the question, "Why would the

Apostle Paul say that we are justified by Christ's death when a

command would do?" Bond notes that there are 117 lines

attributed to the question and only 28 to the solution. He

carefully investigatesparticular exegetical processes and

concludes that what is central to Abelard's interpretation is

God's own Son having taken on our nature. The place of the

words "by example" in Abelard's famous sentence in question

do not bear the emphasis they have been given by their readers.

Bond writes, "The loving death even of the best of us renders

only so much love and gratitude but neither justification nor

reconciliation. For death to effect the soul's atonement it has to

be the death of God in flesh, and not the death of a human

being, offered as propitiation to God. Christ's passion works

because it is not our passion but God's."

According to Bond, it is clear to Abelard how atonement does

not occur: neither because or when God has paid ransom to the

Devil nor because or when God finds divine justice to be

satisfied through the death of the innocent. For Abelard, God's

joining us with God, not Christ's example, is the atoning work.

Thus Bond argues with interpreters of Abelard who

overemphasize the exemplarism of Abelard's understanding of

the atonement." (pp. 159-160)

References

Van Engen, John. 1996. "Studying Scripture in the Early

University." Pp. 17-38 in Lerner, Robert, (ed.) 1996. Neue

Richtungen in der hoch-und spätmittelalterlichen

Bibelexegese. Schriften des Historischen Kolleges Kolloquien

32. Munich: Oldenbourg.

43. Love, Gregory Anderson. 2009. "In Search of a Non-Violent

Atonement Theory: Are Abelard and Girard a Help, or a

Problem?" In Theology as Conversation: The Significance of

Dialogue in Historical and Contemporary Theology. A

Festschrift for Daniel L. Migliore, edited by McCormack, Bruce

and Bender, Kimlyn, 194–214. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans.

"Peter Abelard rejected crusading and Anselm’s atonement

theology as unethical and unreasonable. Abelard had different

understandings of God’s character and of the source of divine-

human estrangement. Abelard perceived the divine as a God of

love and clemency, a merciful father rather than a stern lord of

judgment and punishment. Further, God’s love is eternally

boundless, even for sinful humanity. Such perfect love is not

diminished by sinful acts, nor in need of payment to restore its

honor; it is everlastingly complete and generous. The problem

is not sin’s accumulated debt, but its hardening effect upon the

human heart.

God saves by moving the human heart from fear to love, and

the death of Jesus makes this change of heart possible. While

God displays God’s compassion for humanity through Jesus’

words and actions, the death of Jesus creates a deeper love for

God than would have been possible without it. Jesus proves the

extent of his, and of God’s, love for humanity by his willingness

to endure anything on humanity’s behalf, including his

suffering and death.

Seeing Jesus as a victim undergoing unjust suffering, sinful

witnesses may feel compassionate pity for Jesus as tortured

victim, mixed with a sense of guilt for their role in his death,

plus a desire to seek forgiveness, and make amends and act

differently. Salvation thus occurs when compassion and

contrition before the flogged Christ move the sinner from self-

love to a pure, selfless love. Love is therefore defined as a

willingness to suffer unto death for the sake of the “other,” as

Christ did. God illumines the true nature of this love and

enkindles hearts for love by sending the Son not only to live

compassionately, but above all to die holding such a virtuous,

selfless love." (pp. 196-197, a note omitted)

44. Luscombe, David E. 1983. "St. Anselm and Abelard." Anselm

Studies.An Occasional Journal no. 1:207–229.

"In what ways and how extensively did Anselm of Canterbury

shape the thought and influence the writings of Abelard? No

adequate answer could be given to such a question, but useful

comparisons between the two men may be drawn and

differences may be noted. R. Thomas has skilfully and

profitably juxtaposed Abelard's views on logic and faith, as they

are found in his Dialogue, and Anselm's views on argumentum

and on faith as contained in the Proslogion.(1) Thomas rightly

emphasizes that Abelard was a younger contemporary of

Anselm: Abelard was born in 1079 when Anselm was Abbot of

Bec, and he was thirty years old when Anselm died.(2) One

could, in a similar way, study the affinities between statements

regarding the understanding of faith that Abelard made in his

Theologia and Anselm's own remarks in the Epistola de

incarnatione verbi and elsewhere." (p. 207)

(...)

"Before continuing we must look further at R.E. Weingart's

excellent study of Abelard's soteriology. Weingart's tragic death

removed all possibility that he might develop the views he

advanced so eruditely in his book, and in offering a

disagreement with one small part of his study I wish in no way

to subtract from my admiration for the rest. Weingart presents

Abelard's discussion of the necessity of the incarnation as a

critical reaction against Anselm's search for necessary reasons

why God became incarnate.(67) He reads Abelard's questions

not only as indications that Abelard is sceptical of talk about

necessity but also as direct attacks upon Anselm. Weingart

finds support for his interpretation of the direction of Abelard's

argument in the Theologia,(68) where he believes that Abelard

shows his objection to necessary reasons and indicates his

preferences for discovering 'worthy' reasons.(69) Therefore,

Abelard can be presumed to have regarded Anselm's Cur Deus

homo unfavourably in so far as Anselm had set out to prove the

necessity of Christ's death, whereas Abelard distrusted talk of

necessary reasons. Weingart further quotes a remark in

Abelard's Theologia Christiana: 'it is written that God could

have redeemed the human race in a way other than he did'.(70)

Abelard here produced quotations from Scripture which seem

to confirm this view.

Now, Weingart's interpretation of Abelard's anti-Anselmianism

appears to be wrong for two reasons. The first is that Abelard

and Anselm speak with a similar voice about divine necessity.

In the Cur Deus homo, Anseim himself defined necessity in the

sense of God's unalterable honestas rather than in terms of any

extrinsic constraint upon divine omnipotence or freedom.(71)

He admits that the word 'necessity' is only used' of God

improprie, in an ill-fitting way. He assesses the type of

necessity by which God acts; necessity in God means the

immutability of divine honestas. Anselm, therefore, is close to

agreement with Abelard in his application of a notion of

necessity to the Godhead.(72) Secondly, Abelard, far from

concluding that God might have redeemed man in a way other

than the way he chose, in fact argues the opposite. One of the

most salient features of Abelard's Theologia is the thesis that

God does not and cannot act in any other, way or in any better

way than the one in which he does act. The reason Abelard

gives for his view is that God, being supremely reasonable and

wise, chooses the most fitting way in which to act." (p. 216)

(1) R. Thomas, 'Anselms Fides Quaerens Intellectum im

Proslogion und Abaelards Rationibus Fides Astruenda Et

Defendenda im Dialogus Inter Philosophum, ludaeum et

Christianum. Eine Vergleichserörterung', Analecta

Anselmiana, 5 (1976), 297-310. This study also appeared under

the same title in the Bulletin de la Société academique,

religieuse et scientifique de l'ancien duché d'Aoste, 47 (1974/5),

297-310. On the links between Anselm's and Abelard's

discussions of logic, see D.P. Henry, The Logic of St Anselm

(Oxford, 1967), pp. 65-6, 89-90, 141-2.

(2) Ibid., pp. 297, 307.

(67) Weingart, [The Logic of Divine Love: A Critical Analysis

of Soteriology of Peter Abailard], pp. 91-93.

(68) Ibid., pp. 51-52.

(69) 'Magis autem honestis quam necessariis rationibus

nitimur . . Abelard, Theologia Christiana, 5.15, p. 353; Abelard,

Theologia 'Scholarium', 3.2, PL 178.1090C.

(70) Abelard, Theologia Christiana, 5.38, p. 364.

(71) Cur Deus homo, 2, 5, Ans. Op. Om., II, 100:20-8.

(72) cf. Peppermüller, Abaelards Auslegung des Römerbriefes,

p. 90, note 496, where he notes that Abelard means by

'necessity' either convenientia in God, i.e. what is fitting for

God, or our necessity, i.e. what is inescapable for man.

45. Marenbon, John. 2008. "Abelard on Angels." In Angels in

Medieval Philosophical Inquiry: Their Function and

Significance, edited by Iribarren, Isabel and Lenz, Martin, 63–

71. Aldershot: Ashgate.

"Abelard is not thought to have had any distinctive views about

angels, or to have been much interested in them. Abelard

specialists have never dedicated an article, or even a paragraph,

to this apparent non-subject, and Abelard’s name goes

unmentioned in discussions of twelfth-century angelology." (p.

63, a note omitted)

(...)

"Yet in fact, Abelard did have a highly distinctive and radical

theory about one aspect of angels, their corporeality and

relation to place. The topic is especially fascinating, because it

bridges twelfth-century concern with whether angels are

corporeal and the questions about angels and place which

would occupy thinkers in the universities. It has escaped

attention because it is expounded only in the Sententie, a report

of Abelard’s teaching now recognized as authentic, and fully

only in one particular version of the Sententie, the Sententie

Parisienses.(6) The main purpose of this article is to present

this theory and Abelard’s arguments for it, and to look very

briefly at their influence (§ II). But his view will be clearer if it is

seen against its background (§ I). What are its sources and its

relationship to other discussions from the same period? And

how did Abelard approach the sources before he arrived at his

own theory?" (pp. 63-64)

(6) On the authenticity of the Sententie, and the status of the

Sententie Parisienses, see below, n. 22.

(22) On Abelard’s Sentences, and the Sententie Parisienses in

particular, see C.J. Mews, ‘The Sententie of Peter Abelard’,

Recherches de théologie ancienne et médiévale, 52 (1985):

109–58 (reprinted in C.J. Mews, Abelard and his Legacy,

Aldershot and Burlington, Vermont: Ashgate, 2001), esp. pp.

155–63 and J. Marenbon, The Philosophy of Peter Abelard

(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), pp. 62–4.

46. Marmodoro, Anna, and Hill, Jonathan. 2010. "Peter Abelard’s

Metaphysics of the Incarnation." Philosophy and Theology no.

22:27–48.

Abstract: "In this paper, we examine Abelard’s model of the

incarnation and place it within the wider context of his views in

metaphysics and logic. In particular, we consider whether

Abelard has the resources to solve the major difficulties faced

by the so-called “compositional models” of the incarnation,

such as his own. These difficulties include: the requirement to

account for Christ’s unity as a single person, despite being

composed of two concrete particulars; the requirement to allow

that Christ is identical with the pre-existent Son, despite the

fact that the pre-existent Son is a (proper) part of the incarnate

Christ; and finally the requirement to avoid Nestorianism, i.e.,

the position that Christ’s proper parts are persons in their own

right. We argue that Abelard does have adequate solutions to

these problems. In particular, we show that his theories of

relations and predication can be put to use in defence of a

compositional account of the incarnation."

47. McCallum, James Ramsay. 1948. Abelard's Christian

Theology. Oxford: Blackwell.

"In the Christian Theology we are presented with an ordered

system of Christian thought. But associated with this system we

found not the desire to assert a set of dogmas that will

guarantee salvation. We discover rather the underlying faith of

the philosopher, the persuasion of the limited usefulness of a

system unless it is related to the mature experience and

comprehension of mankind. That this faith gave impetus to

composition we cannot doubt. It is the peak of interest to which

the treatise leads us up, in its fourth book. ‘Superest autem

novissima quaestio, quomodo scilicet hanc fidem Trinitatis soli

Christiani teneant et non etiam vel Judaei vel Gentiles.’ How

can the trinitarian philosophy be held by Christians alone if it is

comprehensible to all men? And the answer is precise:

'Hincautem facile occasionem sumi arbitror convertendi ad

fidem nostram quoslibet alienos si huiusmodi inductionibus

eos jam communem nobiscum fidei sensum habere

convincerimus.' There is a common ground of experience and

understanding in all men which should bring them to the

trinitarian faith if they see this faith aright and in the rational

meaning of the terms employed in it." (p. 3)

Bibliographia. Annotated bibliographies

Raul Corazzon || rc@ontology.co || Info

Peter Abelard. Bibliography on His

theology and the doctrine of the

Trinity (Mew - Z)

Bibliography

1. Mews, Constant J. 1980. "The Development of the Theologia of

Peter Abelard." In Petrus Abaelardus (1079-1142). Person,

Werk und Wirkung, edited by Thomas, Rudolf, 183–198. Trier:

Paulinus-Verlag.

Reprinted as Essay I in: Constant J. Mews, Abelard and his

Legacy, Aldershot: Ashgate 2001.

Abstract: "This treatise examines some problems concerning

Abelard's De Trinitate or Theologia "Summi boni," "Theologia

Christiana", and Theologia "Scholarium."

Abelard's initial discussion of the Trinity is set against the

background of his interest in logic and his writings on this

subject. All of these writings appear to belong to an earlier

period, including the Dialectica. There is no positive evidence,

but it should be noted that the criticism of the idea of the world

soul in the later work shows some retraction, since there is

complete compatibility with what Abelard says in the Theologia

"Summi boni."

Fr. E. M. Buytaert's hypothesis concerning the relationship

between the "Theologia Christiana" and Theologia

"Scholarium" and their simultaneous development has been

critically examined.

The mysterious abbreviated passages found in two manuscripts

of the "Theologia Christiana" (Montecassino, Bib. abbaz. 176

and Tours, Bib. mun. 85), whose identical complete texts in the

Theologia "Scholarium," cannot be explained as abbreviations

of that work, but rather as references that were part of

Abelard's personal plan for a future work. The abbreviations

indicate which sections of the "Theologia Christiana" he wished

to use. The various versions of the Theologia reveal how

Abelard's thought process developed from an early interest in

logic to a well-thought-out understanding of the nature of God

and his activity in the world."

"Study of the development of the Theologia of Peter Abelard

owes much to the work of a number of scholars of this century,

particularly H. Ostlender, D. Van den Eynde and above all the

late E. M. Buytaert(1). In this paper I would like to outline some

of the outstanding problems still posed by the many different

versions of the Theologia. The major issues that need to be

faced concern the establishment of the correct order of the

various versions of the Theologia, the degree of continuity

between these versions, and the extent to which the work

developed over the twenty years or so it was written and re-

written.

There are three major versions of the Theologia of Abelard, the

treatise De Unitate et Trinitate divina or Theologia ‘Summi

boni,’ the 'Theologia Christiana' and the Theologia

‘Scholarium’. Each of these works is extant in a number of

MSS., many of which themselves indicate Abelard was

continually involved in correcting and expanding what he had

said(2). Because almost every MS. is different from another, it

is crucially important that each MS. be correctly placed within

the overall development of the Theologia if a picture is to be

built up of the development of his thought." (p. 183, a note

omitted)

(2) There are some eighteen important MSS. of the Theologia

(,,,)

2. ———. 1985. "The Lists of Heresies Imputed to Peter Abelard."

Revue bénédictine no. 95:73–110.

Reprinted as Essay IV in: Constant J. Mews, Abelard and his

Legacy, Aldershot: Ashgate 2001.

"Despite the existence of at least forty-five manuscripts which

list heretical capitula imputed to Peter Abelard, none appears

to represent an official record of the council of Sens, held on 2

June 1140. Two lists have, from time to time, been identified

with an official list, one of fourteen, known as the Capitula

Haeresum XIV, the other of nineteen, most frequently found at

the end of Bernard’s epistolary treatise on the errors of Abelard,

Epist. 190.

(...)

Abelard defended himself against this list of nineteen capitula

in his Confessio fidei ‘Universis’ and in a more detailed manner

in his Apologia.(2) The most recent editor of the list of nineteen

capitula, J. Leclercq, has argued that the list was not the work

of Bernard of Clairvaux, but rather of the council of Sens itself.

The intention of this study is to look again at all the

manuscripts of these capitula, which vary considerably in

number, wording and sequence, in order to establish the

interrelationship between the various lists, who compiled the

Capitula Haeresum XIV and the list of nineteen capitula and

how these various lists entered into the corpus of Bernard’s

correspondence. A new critical edition of the nineteen capitula

is attached in order that the sources behind the list as well as

the variations within their manuscript tradition can be seen at a

glance." (pp. 73-74)

(2) Confessio fidei ‘Universis’, PL 178, 105-8; Apologia contra

Bernardum ed. E.M. Buytaert, CCCM XI (Turnhout, 1969), pp.

359-68.

3. ———. 1985. "Peter Abelard's (Theologia Christiana) and

(Theologia 'Scholarium') Re-examined." Recherches de

Theologie et Philosophie Médievales no. 52:109–158.

"The publication in 1969 of a critical edition, prepared by Ε. M.

Buytaert, of Abelard's Theologia Christiana and of the shorter

form of the Theologia 'Scholariumì marked an important

contribution towards a much-needed critical edition of

Abelard's Theologia(1). Unfortunately, Fr Buytaert died before

completing his projected edition of the two other versions of

the Theologia, the Theologia 'Summi boni' and the longer form

of the Theologia 'Scholarium, scheduled to appear within an

accompanying volume in the series Corpus Christianorum.

Continuatio Mediaeualis(2). The intention of the present

article is to review Fr Buytaert's published editions of the

Theologia Christiana (TChr) and of the shorter form of the

Theologia 'Scholarium' (tsch) and so provide both a guide for

their use and a foundation on which edition of the remaining

versions of the Theologia can proceed." (p.109)

(1) Petri Abaelardi Opera Theologica ii, Corpus Chrislianorum.

Continuatio Mediaevalis [= CCCM] 12 (Turnhout 1969).

(2) I am indebted to the editors of Corpus Chrislianorum for

allowing me access, through the mediation of Prof. D. E.

Luscombe, to Buytaert's typescript editions of TSum and TSch,

which remained incomplete at the time of his death in 1975. I

would also like to express my gratitude for assistance given by

D. E. Luscombe, C. S. F. Burnett, J. Barrow, numerous

librarians throughout Europe and the Hill Monastic

Manuscript Library, Collegeville, Minnesota, U.S.A.

4. ———. 1986. "Man's Knowledge of God According to Peter

Abelard." In L' Homme et son univers au Moyen âge : actes du

septième Congrès international de philosophie médiévale (30

août-4 september 1982). Vol. I, edited by Wenin, Christian,

419–426. Louvain-la-Neuve: Louvain-la-Neuve : Éditions de

l'Institut supérieur de philosophie.

Reprinted as Essay III in C. J. Mews, Abelard and His Legacy,

Aldershot: Ashgate 2001.

"In this paper I want to examine, not the frequently studied

theme of Abelard’s use of the secular arts, but what he has to

say about man’s knowledge of a transcendent, eternal truth —

how this knowledge was gained and what were its limitations.

Although there are many different works of Abelard in which

one could pursue this theme, I shall concentrate on just one,

the Theologia, the treatise which came under such criticism

during his lifetime. The work is of particular importance

because Abelard continued to revise its text over a period of

some twenty years, producing three major versions, known

successively as the Theologia «Summi boni», the Theologia

Christiana and the Theologia « Scholarium »(2). Although he

was principally concerned in the Theologia with the nature of

God and-how three persons could co-exist in—one God,

Abelard was also very much concerned with the nature of man’s

knowledge of the divinity and with his capacity to understand

the doctrine of Trinity. It is on this aspect of the Theologia that

I wish to concentrate." (p. 419)

(2) Theologia « Summi boni» (TSum), ed. H. OSTLENDER,

Beiträge zur Gesch. der Philos. und Theol. des Mittelalters, XX

XV, 2-3 (1939); Theologia Christiana, ed. E.M. BUYTAERT,

Corpus Christianorum Cont: Med., XII, Turnhout, 1969, pp.

71-372; Theologia «Scholarium», shorter recensions (tsch), ed.

E.M. BUYTAERT, op. cit., pp. 401-455; longer recension

(TSch), ed. V. Cousin, P. Abaelardi Opera, Il, Paris, 1859, pp. 2-

149. New editions of TSum and TSch begun by Buytaert before

his death are being completed by the author. References will be

to Buytaert’s edition of all three versions, with page references

to the editions of Ostlender and Cousin in brackets.

5. ———. 1986. "The Sententie of Peter Abelard." Recherches de

théologie ancienne et médiévale no. 53:130–184.

Reprinted as Essay VI in C. J. Mews, Abelard and His Legacy,

Aldershot: Ashgate 2001.

"What is the status of the text edited by F.H. Rheinwald under

the title Petri Abaelardi Epitome Theologiae Christianae,

frequently referred to as the Sententie Hermanni, and recently

re-edited by S. Buzzetti under the title Sententie magistri Petri

Abelardi?(1) What is its relationship to the Sententie

Florianenses, Sententie Parisienses and Liber sententiarum

magistri Petri, all conventionally attributed to the school of

Peter Abelard?(2) How are these different sentence collections

related to Abelard’s Theologia “‘Scholarium”? While the

appearance of Buzzetti’s new edition of the unjustly neglected

Sententie can only be welcomed, these questions remain to be

answered.

Buzzetti suggests that Abelard may be the author of these

Sententie, and that a pupil called Hermann later produced a

revision of the work(3). He does not explain the significance of

the many variations between the different manuscripts of the

Sententie, or comment on its relationship either to other

sentence collections or to the writings of Abelard(4).

This study, originally written quite independently of Buzzetti’s

research, is not intended to be a review of the new edition, but

rather to answer those questions which still need to be dealt

with." (pp. 130-131)

(1) Petri Abaelardi Epitome Theologiae Christianae, Anecdota

ad historiam ecclesiasticam pertinentia 2, Berlin 1835,

reprinted with Rheinwald’s introduction, PL 178, 1685-1758

and in part only by V. Cousin, Petri Abaelardi Opera 2, Paris

1859, p. 567-92; S. Buzzetti, Sententie magistri Petri Abelardi

(Sententie Hermanni), Florence 1983. (...)

(2) Sententiae Florianenses, ed. H. OSTLENDER, Florilegium

Patristicum 19, Bonn 1929; Sententie Parisienses, ed. A.

LANDGRAF, Ecrits théologiques de l’école d’Abélard, in

Spicilegium Sacrum Lovaniense. Etudes et documents 14,

Louvain 1934, p. 3-60; liber sententiarum magistri Petri, ed.

C.J. MEws, at the end of this study.

6. ———. 1998. "Peter Abelard and the Enigma of Dialogue." In

Beyond the Persecuting Society. Religious Toleration Before

the Enlightenment, edited by Laursen, John Christian and

Nederman, Cary J., 25–52. Philadelphia: University of

Pennsylvania Press.

Reprinted as Essay X in C. J. Mews, Abelard and His Legacy,

Aldershot: Ashgate 2001.

"His Dialogue of a Philosopher with a Jew anda Christian or

Collationes has been seen by some as a plea for intellectual

toleration.(2) Is this too idealistic a perspective? Was he

rejecting a contemporary trend toward exclusion of the

outsider, or did he in fact participate in that movement Anna

Sapir Abulafia [*] has identified as the Christianization of

reason in the twelfth century, by which Christian thinkers

found reasons for proving that Jews and pagans were blind to

the truth? In order to assess Abelard’s contribution to the idea

and practice of religious toleration, we need to relate his

Dialogus both to his other writings and to those of his

contemporaries, for whom dialogue was often a technique for

asserting the truth rather than for engaging in a listening

exercise." (p. 25, a note omitted)

[*] Christians and Jews in the Twelfth-Century Renaissance

(London: Routledge, 1995), 89-91, 124-25.

7. ———. 2002. "The Council of Sens (1141): Abelard, Bernard,

and the Fear of Social Upheaval." Speculum no. 77:342–382.

"While Bernard's suspicion of excessive reliance on reason has

frequently attracted comment, the political dimension of the

controversy surrounding Abelard's theology has attracted less

attention. In a classic study, published in 1980, Robert Henri

Bautier argued that the vicissitudes of Abelard's early career

were closely related to the political fortunes of Stephen of

Garlande, archdeacon of Paris, royal chancellor and seneschal

of France, 1120-1127/28. (6) The political context of Ab elard's

later career demands similar attention. The Council of Sens

needs to be seen as marking a key stage in the

institutionalization of the process by which heresy was

identified.(7) The circumstances surrounding the calling of the

council have never been fully clear, however, in part because of

uncertainty surrounding exactly when it took place." (p. 345)

(6) Robert-Henri Bautier, "Paris au temps d'Abelard," in Abéld

en son temps, ed. Jean Jolivet (Paris, 1981), pp. 21-77,

reprinted in Etudes sur la France capetienne: De Louis VI aux

fils de Philippe le Bel (London, 1992).

Jurgen Miethke considers this theme in his "Theologenprozesse

in der ersten Phase ihrer institu tionellen Ausbildung: Die

Verfahren gegen Peter Abaelard und Gilbert van Poitiers,"

Viator 6 (1975), 87-116; this theme is also implicit in the study

of Peter Godman, The Silent Masters: Latin Literature and Its

Censors in the High Middle Ages (Princeton, N.J., 2000).

8. ———. 2002. "Heloise and liturgical experience at the

Paraclete." Plainsong and Medieval Music no. 11:25–35.

Abstract: "This article considers Heloise’s activity as abbess of

the Paraclete, examining what contribution she may have made

to its liturgical practice. It relates the testimony of Peter the

Venerable and Hugh Metel to Heloise as inspirational leader

and author to what we can learn about her from Abelard’s

preface to the Paraclete Hymnal. In particular, attention is

directed to the understanding of Mary Magdalen at the

Paraclete by both Abelard and Heloise. This suggests, I argue

that ‘Epithalamica’ and the Easter plays are part of Heloise’s

literary output, and that she exercised a major influence on

Abelard."

9. ———. 2004. "Bernard of Clairvaux, Peter Abelard and Heloise

on the Definition of Love." Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia no.

60:633–660.

Abstract: "This paper examines the thinking of Bernard of

Clairvaux about love in relationship to the ideas of his two

famous contemporaries, Peter Abelard and Héloise.

It looks at Bernard's intellectual debt to William of Champeaux

on issues of sin and grace, and to William of Saint-Thierry for

ideas about how amor evolves into caritas.

Bernard makes a stronger link between amor and dilectio, and

introduces use of the Song of Songs, to explain how worldly

love can develop into spiritual love. The author also considers

the evolution of the ideas about love of Peter Abelard, observing

that he draws on the same definition of Cicero in the Sic et Non

and Theologia as underpins a rather crude attempt to define

love in the Epistolae duorum amantium, which the author of

the article thinks to be a record of the early letters of Abelard

and Héloise. Whereas Abelard always contrasts worldly and

spiritual love, the effort of Héloise to connect amor and dilectio

parallels that of Bernard."

10. ———. 2006. "Faith as 'existimatio rerum non apparentium':

Intellect, Imagination and Faith in the Philosophy of Peter

Abelard." In Intellect et imagination dans la philosophie

médiévale / Intellect and imagination in medieval philosophy

/ Intelecto e imaginação na filosofia medieval / Actes du XIe

Congrès international de philosophie médiévale de la Société

internationale pour l'Étude de la philosophie médiévale

(S.I.E.P.M.): Porto, du 26 au 31 août 2002. Vol. 2, edited by

Pacheco, Maria Cândida and Meirinhos, José F., 915–926.

Turnhout: Brepols.

"At the outset of the Theologia ‘Scholarium ’ Peter Abelard

introduces a definition of faith that some of his contemporaries

found rather alarming: «Faith is estimation (existimatio) of

things that do not appear, that not apparent to the bodily

senses»(1).

(...)

"Faith, at least in a Christian context, is often considered to lie

outside the realm of philosophical enquiry. The originality of

Abelard’s definition is not examined by John Marenbon, in his

otherwise very helpful analysis of the philosophy of Peter

Abelard, in which he argues that there is a significant rupture

between his critique of ontological realism in logic, dominant in

the earlier part of his career, and the ethical interests that

underpin his theological writings, composed after he became a

monk at Saint-Denis in 1117/18(3). I would argue, however,

that his logic is concerned not so much with ontology as with

analysis of discourse, in particular with the theory of argument,

and that he considered his reflection on language to be in

complete continuity with his analysis of theological discourse.

Abelard’s understanding of fides encapsulates the fundamental

continuum between his logic and his theology." (pp. 915-916)

(1) Theologia ‘Scholarium’ [TSch] 1.1, E.-M. Buytaert and CJ.

Mews (eds.), Corpus Christianorum Continuatio Mediaeualis

[CCCM] 13, Tumhout 1987, p. 318.

(3) J. Marenbon, The philosophy of Peter Abelard, Cambridge,

Cambridge University Press, 1997.

11. ———. 2009. "William of Champeaux, Abelard, and Hugh of

Saint-Victor: Platonism, theology, and Scripture in early

twelfth-century France." In Bibel und Exegese in der Abtei

Saint-Victor zu Paris: Form und Funktion eines Grundtextes

im europäischen Rahmen, edited by Berndt, Rainer, 131–163.

Münster: Aschendorff.

12. ———. 2011. "Bernard of Clairvaux and Peter Abelard." In A

Companion to Bernard of Clairvaux, edited by McGuire, Brian

Patrick, 133–168. Leiden Brill.

"The hostility that Bernard manifested towards Abelard in the

years 1140/41 cannot be disassociated from political tensions

first manifest in the early 12th century with the rise to influence

of Abelard’s patron, Stephen de Garlande (d. c.1147),

archdeacon of Paris from around 1095 and royal chancellor for

much of the reign of Louis VI (1108–37).

It was through Stephen’s help that Abelard set up his own

school at Melun and then Corbeil (probably c.1104–07), before

retreating to his home region on the border of Brittany and

Anjou, “to recover from overwork.”(7) Abelard’s decision to

start teaching outside of Paris coincided with the rise to

influence of a new bishop, Galo (previously successor to Ivo of

Chartres as provost of Saint Quentin, Beauvais), and the

promotion of William of Champeaux, sometime between 1103

and 1107, from teacher at the cathedral school to a canon of the

cathedral chapter and one of its three archdeacons. As

archdeacon in Paris, not replaced until 1112, William became

increasingly involved in the cause of implementing

ecclesiastical reform at a moment that Stephen de Garlande’s

influence was in temporary abeyance. This was the cause to

which Bernard was committed when he and thirty-odd

companions decided to join a new monastic community at

Cîteaux in 1112." (p. 136)

(7) The key influence of Stephen of Garlande in the evolution of

Abelard’s career was documented by Robert-Henri Bautier,

“Paris au temps d’Abélard,” in Abélard en son temps, ed. Jean

Jolivet (Paris, 1981), pp. 21–77.(,,,)

13. ———. 2013. "Patristic notions of «caritas» in the writings of

Abelard and Heloise and their contemporaries." In Les

receptions des Pères de l'Église au Moyen Age. Le devenir de la

tradilion ecclésiale, edited by Berndt, Rainer and Fédou,

Michel, 689–706. Münster: Aschendorff.

"Love can be understood in many different ways. Augustine

defined caritas in consciously theological terms in the De

doctrina Christiana, as a movement of the spirit to enjoy God

for his own sake and one’s neighbour for the sake of God.(1) By

contrast, Abelard’s mature understanding of love in the

Theologia ‘Scholarium’ suggests that he preferred a definition

shaped more by Ciceronian ideals of friendship. In this paper, I

explore the evolution of Abelard’s understanding of love in

relation to that of the Fathers, and the possible influence on

him of his contemporaries, in particular of Heloise. A number

of distinguished scholars have commented on the possible

impact of her ideas, including Matthias Perkams in an excellent

monograph on the notion of love in Abelard’s theological

system. This study offers a further reflection on this theme

explored not just through his theological teaching, but through

his early exchanges with Heloise as well as in the thinking of

some of their contemporaries.(2)" (p. 689)

(1) Augustinus De doctrina Christiana, 3, 10, p. 89 : “Caritatem

uoco motum animi ad fruendum deo propter ipsum et se atque

proximo propter deum; cupiditatem autem motum animi ad

fruendum se et proximo et quolibet corpore non propter

deum.”

(2) Gilson 1934, p. 183–189; Marenbon 1997, p. 300; Perkams

2001, p. 267–268.

References

Etienne Gilson, La théologie mystique de Saint Bernard, Paris

1934.

John Marenbon, The Philosophy of Peter Abelard, Cambridge

1997.

Matthias Perkams, Liebe als Zentralbegriff der Ethik nach

Peter Abaelard (BGPhThMA. NF 58), Münster 2001.

14. ———. 2014. "Abelard and His Contemporaries on Faith: From

the "Sic et non" to the "Theologia Scholarium" and Beyond " In

Fides Virtus: The Virtue of Faith from the Twelfth to the Early

Sixteenth Century edited by Forlivesi, Marco, Quinto, Riccardo

and Vecchio, Silvana, 137–150. Münster: Aschendorff.

15. ———. 2019. "Peter Abelard, Anselm of Havelberg, and

Nicholas of Cusa. Sources of an Ecumenical Tradition." In

Inventing Modernity in Medieval European Thought, ca.

1100–ca. 1550, edited by Nedermann, Cary J. and Koch,

Bettina, 155–170. Berlin: de Gruyter.

"Nicholas of Cusa never identifies by name Abelard, Thierry of

Chartres or Anselm of Havelberg in his writing. Nonetheless,

each of these three figures of the twelfth century offered ideas

to Nicholas of Cusa quite different from the most widely copied

theologian of the twelfth century, namely Peter Lombard. As is

evident from the contents of the library at Cusa (of which

Abelard’s Theologia was originally part), Nicholas was aware of

the diversity of medieval thought, in particular of the twelfth

century, to a much greater degree than most of his

contemporaries. Yet Nicholas was also influenced by later

writers, such as Ramon Lull and Meister Eckhart, that I have

not touched on here. The originality of Nicholas is such that his

ideas cannot be traced back to any single literary source.

Nonetheless, this little glimpse into one corner of his library

enables us to see that he was always fascinated by how other

writers handled the same problems of diversity and concord

with which he was engaged." (pp. 165-166)

16. ———. 2020. "Imagining Heloise as Abbess of the Paraclete."

Journal of Religious History no. 44:422–442.

Abstract: "This article argues that traditional presentations of

Heloise focus on her image as a heroine of love rather than

giving sufficient attention to her status as abbess of the

Paraclete. In particular, there has been unjustified neglect of

the final dossier in her exchange, known as the Institutiones

nostre, written in response to Peter Abelard's Institutio, or Rule

for the Paraclete. These observances were formulated to

establish uniform practices at both the Paraclete and its first

daughter-house at Trainel, dedicated to Mary Magdalen. This

neglect of Heloise's role as an abbess encouraged a tendency in

the late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries to focus on

themes of erotic rather than religious longing, as well as a

subsequent tendency to question the authenticity of the letters

of Heloise, without full appreciation of her role as abbess of the

Paraclete. A translation of the Institutiones nostre is included

as an appendix."

17. Mews, Constant J., and Perry, Micha J. 2011. "Peter Abelard,

Heloise and Jewish Biblical Exegesis in the Twelfth Century."

Journal of Ecclesiastical History no. 62:3–19.

Abstract: "This paper revisits the question of the influence of

Jewish biblical exegesis on Christian scholars in twelfth-

century France, by focusing in particular on Abelard’s response

to a question of Heloise in her Problemata about questions

raised by 1 Samuel ii.35–6 (=1 Regum ii.35–6) concerning ‘ the

faithful priest ’ prophesied as Eli’s successor, the meaning of ‘

will walk before my anointed ’ and the nature of the offering his

household should make. Abelard’s discussion of the views of an

unnamed Jewish scholar illustrates a consistent movement

evident in the late eleventh and twelfth centuries for certain

Christian exegetes to approach Jewish scholars to resolve

problems posed by the text of the Old Testament. While the

passage in 1 Samuel was traditionally interpreted in a

Christocentric fashion, Heloise implicitly supports a more

historical reading of the text in the question she puts to

Abelard. The Jewish scholar’s interpretation reported by

Abelard is very close to that of Rashi’s twelfth-century

disciples."

18. Mews, Constant J., and Posa, Carmel. 2015. "Heloise's

engagement with the Bible: A continuing journey." In The Bible

and Women: An Encyclopaedia of Exegesis and Cultural

History: Middle Ages and the Early Modern Era; Volume 6.2:

The High Middle Ages, edited by Borresen, Kari Elisabeth and

Valerio, Adriana, 127–147. Atlanta: SBL Press.

19. Moos, Peter von. 2003. "Literary Aesthetics in the Latin Middle

Ages: The Rhetorical Theology of Peter Abelard." In Rhetoric

and Renewal in the Latin West 1100-1540. Essays in Honour

of John O. Ward, edited by Mews, Constant J., Nederman, Cary

J. and Thomson, Rodney M., 81–98. Turnhout: Brepols.

"Abelard was also convinced that the study of philosophy led

naturally to philosophical reflection on the subject matter of

religious faith. His Theologia provided the sacred counterpart

to what he had attempted in his Dialectica, a systematic

treatise worthy of standing beside any writing by Augustine or

Boethius.

He emphasized that the propositions of the Church Fathers had

to be examined like any rhetorical argument, as expressions of

opinion, formulated through human imagination and intellect,

rather than as dialectical statements that were either true or

false. Again, Abelard’s intellectual ambitions outstripped his

capacity to complete the books that he promised his readers.

While writing his commentary on Romans, he reserved some

matters to ‘our Ethica’, also called Scito teipsum or ‘Know

thyself in the manuscript tradition.(91) We have no idea

whether his promise within his commentary on Romans to

consider certain matters in a forthcoming Anthropologia,

perhaps a treatise on the redemption paralleling the Theologia,

was ever fulfilled.(92)

Abelard’s planned Rhetorica was part of a much more

ambitious project, a set of independent treatises that

encompassed the spheres of both secular and sacred learning.

While he did not have the physical capacity or institutional

support to complete this ambitious project, he was very

interested in the philosophical foundations of all kinds of

argument. Understanding these principles deepened his grasp

of the writings of St Paul." (p. 53)

(91) Comm. Rom., II and IV, pp. 126 and 306; Peter Abelard,

Ethics, ed. by David E. Luscombe (Oxford: Clarendon Press,

1971); this latter work has been edited afresh by Rainer Ilgner

under the title, Scito te ipsum, CCCM, 190 (Tumhout: Brepols,

2001). At the outset of Book il (of which only the beginning

survives), Abelard refers to Book i as ‘Superior Ethice nostre

libellus’, Luscombe, p. 128, and Iligner, p. 85.

(92) Comm. Rom., Ill, p. 215; this may also be the same as ‘our

Tropologia’ referred to in Comm. Rom., ii, p. 118; Abelard

promised to write about the incarnation of the Word in

Theologia Christiana, I. 129, p. 128 and Theologia Scholarium,

I. 192, p. 401.

20. Muckle, Joseph Thomas. 1955. "The Letter of Heloise on

Religious Life and Abelard's First Reply." Mediaeval Studies

no. 17:240–281.

"I have numbered these letters, V and VI. The text of the first

four letters was published in Mediaeval Studies, (XV) 1953. I

also included there the text of the introduction of the first of the

letters which follow since it is of a personal character. In her

letter Heloise sets forth with some digressions the incongruities

of the Rule of St. Benedict when applied to women, and asks

Abelard to compose an adaptation of that rule for nuns. She

also asks Abelard to write for her and for her community a

history of religious life of women. In letter VI(1) Abelard sets

forth to answer the second request. In it he would trace

religious life of women back to Apostolic times. He displays no

knowledge of the rise of organized religious communities of

women in the East in the fourth century.

Abelard was a better dialectician than historian." (p. 240)

(1) A text of the Regula sanctimonialium, Abelard's second

reply, edited by T. P. McLaughlin C.S.B., will be published in

Mediaeval Studies, XVIII (1956) [pp. 241-292].

21. Murray, Albert Victor. 1967. Abelard and St. Bernard: A Study

in Twelfth Century 'Modernism'. Manchester: Manchester

University Press.

"Abelard was no apostle of pure reason; neither St Bernard nor

Mr Joseph McCabe was right in thinking of him in that way.

He knew that reason could not do everything, that faith was the

basis of rational inquiry just as much as it was the subject of it,

and that ultimately omnia exeunt in mysterium. This too was

Bernard’s belief, but whereas Bernard lived in a world in which

mystery was all around us and was a transcendence of human

knowledge and experience, to Abelard mystery was, as it were,

a territory in which as yet reason had obtained no foothold.

Accordingly, where Abelard felt baffled, Bernard felt exalted.

Moreover, to Bernard God was from time to time breaking

through this mystery and revealing Himself afresh in acts of

grace by which men were converted and kept in the faith. To

Abelard God had only to be apprehended by the human will in

order that the man himself may be drawn to Him by love. It is

here where the real difference arises between them.

(...)

Yet when Bernard said of Christ ‘Did he teach righteousness

and not bestow it, did He exhibit love and not inspire it’ he

showed one aspect of this difference, and he showed another

when he said ‘it is one thing to follow Jesus, another to hold

Him, and another to feed on Him’. It is the difference between

the position of the man who believes that God seeks him as

much as and more than he seeks God, and delivers him from

sin, and that of the man who believes simply that the highest

goal of life is to seek after God if haply he might find Him. It is

no question of heresy, for both positions are Christian, but one

of them contains the other. And this issue between an

experience of God which is incomplete because too subjective,

and an experience of God which is more than we can ask or

think or deserve, is an issue of the twentieth century no less

than of the twelfth." (pp. 162-163)

22. Nielsen, Lauge Olaf. 1982. Theology and Philosophy in the

Twelfth Century: A Study of Gilbert Porreta’s Thinking.

Leiden: Brill.

Part Two: The Theological Expositions of the Doctrine of the

Incarnation during the Period 1130-1180; Peter Abelard and

His School, pp. 214-242.

"In the work of the third of the great theological teachers to be

found in Paris in the 1130s, Peter Abelard, the doctrine of the

Incarnation is likewise dealt with.

But where both Gilbert [of Poitiers] and Hugh [of St. Victor]

provide a broad and comprehensive exposition, Abelard’s

formulation of the theory of the Incarnation consists in the

main of fragmentary passages and short sketches, which,

though suggesting wider issues, seldom draw the consequences

of the fundamental points raised.

It is therefore necessary on the one hand to avoid the error of

reading the systematized doctrine of the Incarnation of the

Abelard school into the master’s often somewhat indeterminate

explanations, while on the other hand it is just as necessary to

emphasize the passages in Abelard which at once comprise

what is characteristic of him and explain why the doctrine of

the Incarnation assumed a very definite character in his

school." (p 214)

23. ———. 2001. "Peter Abelard and Gilbert of Poitiers." In The

Medieval Theologians, edited by Evans, G. R., 102–128.

Malden: Blackwell.

"In the following the lives and the literary remains of the two

theologians will be outlined. After this, some of the main

features in the two theologians' works will be presented. In

view of the very different natures of their writings and the

complexity of their thought it is not particularly meaningful to

simply compare their divergent opinions on various issues of

importance in theology; this would inevitably result in a rather

shallow picture. Abelard's theology developed over a period of

twenty years, and the detailed charting of this development is

still outstanding.(4) Nonetheless, Abelard's method in theology

and the overriding direction of his thought are clearly visible

already in his first work of theology. Accordingly, an attempt

will be made to track the main line of argument in this work.

them." (p. 103)

(...)

"Assessment of Abelard)s exposition

Abelard's Theologia «Summi Boni» reads like a single

continuous argument even though it is true that the author

digresses and repeats himself on more than one occasion. On

the surface its goal is a fairly modest one, viz., to investigate the

meaning of God's personal names. However, seen against the

background of Abelard's conception of man's cognition of God

and the nature of theology, the task Abelard sets himself in the

Theologia «Summi Boni» takes on importance.

Human language reflects created reality and is badly suited to

talk about God; for this reason, an indispensable part of

theology consists in unravelling the import of statements about

God, and this can be accomplished solely by way of linguistic

analysis. In short, Abelard's Theologia «Summi Boni» is

intended as a model of genuine theology that is not limited to

merely repeating the formulas of tradition but attempts to elicit

their true meaning and thus to make the faithful understand

what they believe." (p. 114)

(4) Abelard's Theologia occupied him for the last twenty years

of his life. Though much of the groundwork has been laid by

Mews (198Sa), (1987a), and (1987b), a detailed interpretation

of the intellectual development reflected in the various

"redactions" of Abelard's Theologia has not been undertaken

yet.

Obviously, this is not the place to try to fill this gap, and it must

be granted that a presentation of Abelard's theology based

onlyon the first version of the work cannot do full justice to his

thought.

References

Abelard, Peter (1987a), Opera Theologica, vol. 3, cds. E. M.

Buytaert and C. J. Mews. Corpus Christianorum, Continuatio

MediaevaJis, vol. 13. Turnhout.

Mews, C. 1. (1985a), "Peter Abelard's (Theologia Christiana)

and (Theologia 'Scholarium') Reexamined." Recherches de

théologie ancienne et médiévale, tom. 52, Louvain, pp. 109-58.

Mews, C. J. (1987a), "Petri Abaelardi Theologia 'Summi Boni'.

Introduction," in Abelard (1987a), pp. 15-81.

Mews, C. J. (1987b), "Petri Abaelardi Theologia 'Scholarium'.

Introduction," in Abelard (1987a), pp. 203-308.

24. Otten, Willemien. 1997. "The Bible and the Self in Medieval

Autobiography: Otloh of St. Emmeram ( 1010-1070) and Peter

Abelard ( 1079-1142)." In The Whole and Divided Self: The

Bible and Theological Anthropology, edited by McCarthy, John

and Aune, David E. New York: Crossroad.

25. ———. 2002. "Fortune or failure: The problem of grace, free

will, and providence in Peter Abelard." Augustiniana no.

52:353–372.

Reprinted as Chapter Five in W. Otten, From Paradise to

Paradigm: A Study of Twelfth-Century Humanism, Leiden:

Brlll 2004, pp.182-214.

"To us it may seem odd that a logical mind like Abelard’s would

stoop to such a leap of faith. But perhaps we should turn this

around and conclude that new games like speculative grammar

and other experiments in medieval logic could ultimately only

be played because they somehow were still part of a larger

picture, the picture of remembering paradise. It fell specifically

to Peter Abelard, so it seems, that when the contours of

paradise began to fade, the parameters be drawn up for a new

language, one which accepted its flaws as ‘given’ but not

thereby ‘definitive’, as the hope for divine help in achieving

humanity’s moral and intellectual improvement never left him,

but increasingly inspired him to the point of complete

resignation.

Somewhere in this space between ‘given’ and ‘definitive’

Abelard seems to have situated his own project. That it would

soon be interpreted as scientific and hence ‘definitive’, is more

an error of historical judgment than that it represents a factual

situation, veiling Abelard’s intent to the point of lifting him out

of his twelfth-century context. A mind too great for his

surroundings, he is seen as neither monk nor scholastic. With

both verdicts simultaneously true and untrue, it is evident that

a fundamental ambiguity characterizes him and his age.

Complementing recent studies of Peter Abelard by Michael

Clanchy and John Marenbon, the two chapters devoted to him

here have only meant to put him back in the context where he

belongs." (p. 214)

26. ———. 2004. From Paradise to Paradigm: A Study of Twelfth-

Century Humanism. Leiden: Brill.

Chapter Four: Opening the Mind: Peter Abelard and the

Makeover of Traditional Theology, pp. 129-181.

27. ———. 2007. "The Poetics of Biblical Tragedy in Abelard’s

Planctus." In Poetry and Exegesis in Premodern Latin

Christianity: The Encounter between Classical and Christian

Strategies of Interpretation, edited by Otten, Willemien and

Pollmann, Karla, 245–261. Leiden: Brill.

"What then is the point that he is trying to make in these

laments?

As it is impossible to discuss them all individually, I see as my

main task in the remainder of this essay to find out whether

their complete cycle reflects the precise elaboration of one

overall exegetical program

or forms an incidental collage of lyrical elegies. Whatever the

final outcome of my reflection on these plaints, it is clear that

despite and underneath their dramatic appeal, Abelard displays

a great deal of emotional distance in them as the joint result of

rhetorical skill alongside a controlled dosage of exegetical

information. Rather than reading them as subjective outcries of

an emotional nature, therefore, we may want to study how

Abelard carefully balances his exegetical and his dramatic

interests, as it is in their poetic combination that his

contribution lies." (p. 253)

28. Perkams, Matthias. 2003. "Divine Omnipotence and Moral

Theory in Abelard's Theology." Mediaeval Studies no. 65:99–

116.

"One of the most provocative theses of Peter Abelard's theology

is the assumption that God cannot act otherwise than he does.

This thesis has been frequently discussed in recent scholarship,

especially in connection with Abelard's theory of modalities and

his views on predestination, both of which he discusses while

developing his thoughts about God's action. The best treatment

of the questions at hand is presented by John Marenbon in The

Philosophy of Peter Abelard, the first really comprehensive

book on the whole of Abelard's philosophical thought.(1) The

present article is an attempt to address the problem from

another point of view. It deals with the theological and

anthropological presuppositions which led Abelard to develop

such a bold theory regarding the restriction of God's

omnipotence.

On the basis of a close reading of Abelard's texts, I have found

that a certain set of presuppositions-the first formulations of

which already appear in many cases in his logical works-

underlies the whole of his thought. These fundamental

assumptions deeply influence Abelard's views on very different

topics. Knowing them is often necessary in order to understand

the genesis of the often remarkable theories our philosopher

propounds, and such knowledge offers an ideal starting point

for the correct interpretation of many of his central themes."

(pp. 99-100)

(1) John Marenbon, The Philosophy of Peter Abelard

(Cambridge, 1997), 233-50; cf also Stephen F. Brown, "Abelard

and the Medieval Origins of the Distinction between God's

Absolute and Ordained Power," in "Ad litteram ":

Authoritative Texts and Their Medieval Readers, ed. Mark D.

Jordan and Kent Emery, Jr., Notre Dame Conferences in

Medieval Studies 3 (Notre Dame and London, 1992), 199-215;

Marcia L. Colish, "Peter Lombard and Abelard: The Opinio

Nominalium and Divine Transcendence," Vivarium 30 (1992):

139-56; Hermann Weidemann, "Modalitat und Konsequenz:

Zur logischen Struktur eines theologischen Arguments in Peter

Abaelards Dialectica," in Argumentationstheorie:

Scholastische Forschungen zu den logischen und semantischen

Regeln korrekten Folgerns, ed. Klaus Jacobi, Studien und

Texte zur Geistesgeschichte des Mittelalters 38 (Leiden and

Cologne, 1993), 695-705.

29. ———. 2005. "The Origins of the Trinitarian Attributes

Potentia, Sapientia, Benignitas." Archa Verbi. Yearbook for

the Study of Medieval Theology no. 1:23–39.

"One major theme in 12th-century theological literature is the

discussion about the extent to which the Trinity can be

understood by human reason. A crucial point is the explanation

of the Trinity with the help of an image taken from the

perfection of God’s activity as creator of the world. This had a

vast influence on the medieval discussion of Trinitarian

theology: the three persons of the Trinity are compared to

God’s omnipotence, wisdom and benignity or goodness

respectively (potentia, sapientia, benignitas or bonitas in the

most usual terminology(2). This triad of concepts can be traced

back to Middle Platonic philosophical discussions and was first

used in a Christian context by Irenaeus of Lyon, who quotes it

as δύναμις, σοφία, ἀγαθότης(3). It is, however, a difficult

question, by what route the formula found its way to the

medieval discussions about the Trinity: the three concepts

cannot be derived directly from Irenaeus, because in the Latin

translation of his work they are rendered as virtus, sapientia,

bonitas. They are not found either, as one triad, in Augustine’s

Trinitarian theology, which was the main source for the

medieval discussion on this topic. It is hard to explain, then,

why the triad appears, in the form potentia, sapientia,

benignitas, around 1120 in the works of two leading

theologians of this time: in Peter Abelard’s Theologia ‘Summi

Boni’ and in Hugh of Saint Victor’s De tribus diebus.(4)

Because neither of these contemporaries cites the other, it is

not clear who was the first to introduce potentia, sapientia,

benignitas in the Trinitarian context in which it became so

important in the later tradition." (p. 23)

(2) On the variable terminology of Hugh cf. Poirel 2002, pp.

327–343; Abelard is generally more consistent, but he can also

use caritas instead of bonitas or benignitas regarding the Holy

Spirit, e.g. Tsum 1, 17, p. 92, 160f.

(3) Irenaeus Adversus haereses 4,38, 3; Whittaker 1987, pp.

282–287

(4) Tsum 1, 1–5, p. 86–88; Hugo trib. dieb. 1, pp. 4–6; with

explicit regard to the Trinity: ibid. 25, p. 64, 1131f.; 27, pp. 69f.

References

Dominique Poirel: Livre de la nature et débat trinitaire au

XIIe siècle. Le De tribus diebus de Hugues de Saint Victor

(Bibliotheca Victorina 14), Turnhout 2002.

30. ———. 2006. "The Trinity and the Human Mind: Analogies in

Augustine and Peter Abelard." In Intellect et imagination dans

la philosophie médiévale / Intellect and imagination in

medieval philosophy / Intelecto e imaginação na filosofia

medieval / Actes du XIe Congrès international de philosophie

médiévale de la Société internationale pour l'Étude de la

philosophie médiévale (S.I.E.P.M.): Porto, du 26 au 31 août

2002. Vol. 2, edited by Pacheco, Maria Cândida and Meirinhos,

José F., 903–913. Turnhout: Brepols.

"As is well known, one of the major topics of Augustine’s De

trinitate is a philosophical analysis of the human mind, the aim

of which is to make intelligible the Christian doctrine of the

Trinity. Hence books VIII to XIV are concerned with the search

for triadic structures, which can be detected in reflection on the

human soul, and which should help man to believe and to

imagine the Trinitarian structure of the divine being.

The aim of the present paper is to compare this Augustinian

discussion with the images Peter Abelard uses in his

explanation of the Trinity." (p. 903)

(...)

"In the first part of what follows, I shall sketch briefly the

Augustinian comparison between the human and the divine

mind. Then I shall give an account of Abelard’s argumentation

concerning this topic; finally, I will give an overview of the

differences in terminology and in the methodological role of the

analogies in both authors, and I will try to explain the historical

and systematic reasons which moved them to take their

different positions." (p. 904)

31. Pernoud, Régine. 1973. Heloise and Abelard. New York: Stein

and Day.

Translated from French by Peter Wiles.

"The Abelard who emerges from the Letter to a Friend must

have been exceptionally hard to get on with. He seems to have

been entirely lacking in empathy and to have shown no concern

for others - except perhaps his pupils, but here he was swayed

by vanity and the desire to strengthen his hold over them. It is

extraordinary that he should have been thrown into contact

with such an extreme ‘temperamental opposite’ as Peter the

Venerable, and even more extraordinary that it was Peter who -

quite literally, by publicly absolving him after death - had the

last word.

By the time the two met, however, Abelard had undergone an

inner change which opened his heart to Peter’s loving kindness

and enabled him to feel its benefits to a degree which would

have been wholly impossible at the time of Peter’s earlier

approach, soon after the Council of Soissons. But for the

ordeals which he had suffered in the intervening years he would

never have assented to the reconciliation with himself and

others which Peter urged upon him." (p. 224)

32. Quinn, Philip L. 1993. "Abelard on Atonement: "Nothing

Unintelligible, Arbitrary, Illogical, or Immoral about It." In

Reasoned Faith: Essays in Philosophical Theology in Honor of

Norman Kretzmann, edited by Stump, Eleonore, 281–300.

Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

"My conclusion is that an account along the Abelardian lines I

have been laying out shows a lot of promise of enriching our

understanding of the mystery of the Atonement. Part of that

promise stems from the fact that such an account's emphasis on

the inward transformation of sinners would be in tune with the

modern inclination to explain the Atonement largely in terms

of its psychological effects. Another part derives from the fact

that such an account would, by virtue of highlighting the

efficacy of the Atonement in improving the characters of

sinners, be better balanced than satisfaction-theoretic rivals,

such as those proposed by Anselm and Aquinas, which are

dominated by legalistic concerns with paying debts of honor or

punishment. It is not merely that, as Gunton suggests, we

should not deny the subjective implications or psychological

consequences of the Atonement. I would urge that we must in

an Abelardian spirit acknowledge that the transformation of the

sinful human subject wrought in large part by divine love

channeled to us through Christ is the most important purpose

the Atonement serves. Abelard's legacy is that this motif should

dominate our thinking when we reflect on the benefits

graciously made available to us through Christ's life, suffering,

and death." (p. 300, a note omitted)

References

Colin E. Gunton, The Actuality of Atonement (Grand Rapids,

Mich.: William B. Eerdmans, 1989).

33. Reasoner, Mark. 2005. Romans in Full Circle: A History of

Interpretation Louisville: Westminster John Knox Press.

Abelard, pp. 27-29,

"Abelard’s actual commentary on 3:21—26 moves efficiently

over the main questions this locus raises." (p. 27)

(...)

"Abelard’s solution is that Christ exemplifies God’s love for us.

Note the language of pedagogy in the long thesis sentence (60

words in Abelard’s text) of his “Solution” to the riddle of the

atonement: “By this we have been justified by the blood of

Christ and reconciled to God, that through this singular grace it

was shown to us that his son took our nature and in it while

instructing us as much by word as by example he endured to

death, binding us more through love to himself, so that by such

a favor, enlightened by divine grace, true love shrinks back and

no longer submits to one’s own concerns.“(43) When focusing

on the difficult question of how Christ’s death makes us

righteous, Abelard thus finds the ransom, expiation, and

redemption models inadequate and introduces Christ's death as

the supreme example for humanity. The binding love that

arises out of Christ’s supreme example of obedience is

Abelard’s extension of Augustine's doctrine of faith working

through love, now emphasized in such a radical way that the

forensic and sacramental dimensions of justification are

eliminated.(44)" (p. 29)

(43) Abelard, Expositio at 3:26 (Peppermüller 288.18—25).

(44) Carlson, Justification, 47-48.

References

Abelard, Expositio in Epistolam ad Romanos, ed. and trans.

Rolf Peppermüller, Fontes Christiani 26/1 (Freiburg im

Breisgau: Herder, 2000),

Charles P. Carlson Jr., Justification in Earlier Medieval

Theology (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1975).

34. Reynolds, P. L. 1992. "The Essence, Power and Presence of

God: Fragments of the History of An Idea, From

Neopythagoreanism to Peter Abelard." In From Athens to

Chartres: Neoplatonism and Medieval Thought, Studies in

Honour of Edouard Jeauneau, edited by Westra, Hijo Jan,

351–380. Leiden: Brill.

On Abelard see p. 367-379.

35. Schepers, Kees. 2017. "Abelard's Exegesis of the Song of Songs

in his Second Letter to Heloise." The Journal of Medieval Latin

no. 27:107–132.

Abstract: "In this paper I am making the argument that the

brief excursus on the Song of Songs in Abelard’s second letter

to Heloise (the fifth in the Correspondence) contains exegesis

of a few phrases of this biblical book that is so far out of the

ordinary that it cannot be taken seriously and was not intended

to be. This argument is based on the following observations: the

lines presented as being from the Song of Songs are not really

biblical verses; no remotely comparable exegesis of these

phrases exists in earlier and contemporaneous exegesis; the

literal interpretation that Abelard applies besides an allegorical

reading was expressly forbidden by authorities both old and

new; and finally Abelard’s alleged exegesis conflicts absolutely

with his own exegesis of the same elements in authenticated

works."

36. Schildgen, Brenda Deen. 2007. "Female Monasticism in the

Twelfth Century: Peter Abelard, Heloise, and Paul's Letter to

the Romans." In Medieval Readings of Romans, edited by

Campbell, William S., Hawkins, Peter S. and Schildgen, Brenda

Deen, 58–69. New York: T&T Clark International.

"Introduction

Abelard's Commentary on the Letter of Paul to the Romans,

dated between 1133 and I 139, only a few years before his death

c. 1142, represents the philosopher's mature work.

The approach adopted in this essay This essay, rather than

probing the central argument of the commentary, will discuss

Abelard and Heloise's use of Paul's Letter in the

correspondence regarding the Rule for nuns that Heloise

requested and Abelard then developed. Like Heloise in her

third letter to Abelard, where she substantially refers to

Romans, Abelard also uses Paul to analyze the meaning of Law

to the rules that govern nuns. The letters followed the Historia

Calamitatum (1132), with the correspondence dated two to

three years afterward (Muckle 1953, 48). Both the Commentary

on the Letter of Paul to the Romans and the letters thus were

written during approximately the same period." (p 58)

References

Muckle C.S.B., J. T. (ed.) 1953. "The Personal Letters between

Abelard and Heloise." Mediaeval Studies 15: 48-67.

37. Schrock, Chad. 2010. "The proportion of his purpose: Peter

Abelard's Historia calamitatum as sacred history." Archives

d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du Moyen Age no. 77:29–46.

Abstract: "The narrative of the Historia calamitatum depends

at a thematic level on a logical proportion that Peter Abelard

announces at the beginning of his letter of consolation. Abelard

proposes that the troubles suffered by the unknown reader of

his letter are to Abelard's troubles as Abelard's troubles are to

those of Christ and the Church Fathers. The distance between

each term in this proposition measures in effect the consolation

available to the sufferer."

38. Siekawitch, Larry. 2007–2008. "The Evolution of the Doctrine

of the Atonement In the Medieval Church. Anselm, Abelard,

and Aquinas." McMaster Journal of Theology and Ministry no.

9:3–30.

"Abelard held to several theories of the atonement. He was not

completely clear on the intricacies, but seemed to embrace a

penal substitutionary version of satisfaction along with an im-

parted righteousness or sanctification. His unique contribution,

the exemplarist theory, had an objective and subjective com-

ponent. Objectively he believed God’s love was imparted to the

soul when faith was expressed. His understanding of

“impartation” seemed to include the idea of imputation, though

he never used this terminology. Subjectively the believer would

see the love of Christ in a new way, which compelled him or her

to live out this love that was imparted. He held to a mystical

union or reconciliation that somehow infuses God’s love and

en-courages love to grow in the believer’s heart. He also

accepted the ransom theory, in which Christ’s death defeated

the devil and freed the believer from the slavery of sin." (p. 17)

39. Stammberger, Ralf M. W. . 2002. ""De longe ueritas uidetur

diuersa iudicia Parit": Hugh of Saint Victor and Peter Abelard."

Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia no. 58:65–92.

Abstract: "The relations of William of Champeau.x, who began

the founding of the abbey of Saint Victor in Paris, and Peter

Abelard are known from the Historia calamitatum which the

peripateticus palatinus wrote years after the event. We have no

historical report that Abelard ever met Hugh of Saint Victor but

already their contemporaries brought together their works in

the manuscripts into which they copied them. A detailed

analysis of their writings reveals that they had much more in

common than is generally believed. They both use the terms

'potentia', 'sapientia' and 'benignitas' to refer to the three

persons of the Trinity, and together with Walter of Mortagne

they both deal with the wisdom ('sapientia' of the incarnated

sec ond person. Also, together with Bernard of Clairvaux they

discuss the necessity of baptism for salvation. All these

questions are linked to the question of universals for which

Abelard is a famous protagonist and the comparison reveals

that Hugh's position, to which we have only indirect access, is

quite close to Abelard's in its nominalist orientation but differs

because he has a different concept of how we achieve

knowledge about God.

Hugh also develops a special position - not to be found in other

authors of his day - on how words signify things in the Sacred

Scriptures."

40. Vidu, Adonis. 2014. Atonement, Law, and Justice: The Cross in

Historical and Cultural Contexts. Grand Rapids: Baker

Academic.

Peter Abelard (1079–1142), pp. 62-69.

"Both the dramatic theory and the satisfaction theory are

usually described in theology textbooks as objective

understandings of the atonement. The principal benefit of the

atonement consists in some good that obtains irrespective of its

appropriation by believers. Both describe the work of the

atonement as something that is complete and, while it does

need to be appropriated in the life of the believer, can be

defined without appeal to the latter’s subjectivity.

In Abelard we encounter a so-called subjective theory. One

should not take these distinctions too rigidly, however. The

designation is justified inasmuch as Abelard stresses the

example that Christ sets as well as his moral influence.

Yet objective elements are not entirely lacking in his thinking.

Indeed, there are several traditional elements present in his

work, and these should not be overlooked. Moreover, all of the

three theories discussed so far involve a transaction of sorts,

and this entails something complete made available for

reception. The dramatic theory presents a completed victory of

Christ, which needs to be appropriated by the believer; the

satisfaction theory adduces the merits of Christ, in which we

ought to participate; finally, the moral influence theory

presents the demonstrated love of Christ, with which we are to

be infused." (p. 62)

41. Waddell, Chrysogonus. 1980. "Peter Abelard as creator of

liturgical texts." In Petrus Abaelardus (1079-1142). Person,

Werk und Wirkung, edited by Thomas, Rudolf, 267–286. Trier:

Paulinus-Verlag.

"There is, however, at least one significant area of Master

Peter’s activity which has so far escaped scholarly scrutiny.

Abelard’s contributions to the liturgical life of the Abbey of the

Paraclete were many and signal. Of these contributions, only

the hymns have received much attention, and then almost

exclusively from a purely literary point of view. Even less

favored have been the sermons?. There is, however, ample

evidence

pointing to the existence of a body of abelardian liturgica more

considerable than anyone heretofore has surmised. True, much

of this material is not yet recoverable in the present stage of

research, and all that can be done in many instances is simply

to add new items to the list of Abelard’s lost works. For our

consolation, however, a modest amount of such material is

recoverable. The purpose of this article, then, is to draw

attention to Master Peter’s efforts in the field of liturgical

composition, and to provide something of a prolegomenon to

further research." (p. 267)

42. Wąsek, Damian. 2013. "The Role of Dialectics in Peter

Abelard’s Concept of Theology." In Logic in Theology, edited by

Brożek, Bartosz, Olszewski, Adam and Hohol, Mateusz, 139–

158. Kraków: Copernicus Center Press.

"The aim of this study is to present, on the basis of Abelard’s

works, the multidimensionality of the term ‘dialectics’, and in

consequence, the diversity of its possible applications in the

creation of the theological system, as well as dangers resulting

from an overemphasis on the role of dialectics in the field of

faith.

The problem can be best expressed as a question: To what

extent and in what dimensions – according to Abelard – can

dialectics help in pursuing theology? In order to find an answer

to the above question, I will outline the theological-

philosophical context of Abelard’s hought, define the notion of

dialectics itself and its theological implications in his concept

and point to certain limitations of dialectics as a tool to explore

the truths of faith." (p. 140)

(...)

"What are current tasks for logic at the point where it meets

theology?

To what extent and in what dimensions can these disciplines

cooperate? The analyses presented above bring to mind two

fields of cooperation that seem very important from the

theological point of view. The first of them is concern for the

credibility of Christianity.

In order for religion – treated as a system of truths – to be

credible, it must form a coherent system. Logic makes it

possible to expose contradictions and find ‘weak points’ of the

doctrine in terms of methodological cohesion. Dialogue with

modern atheism (especially that based on empirical sciences) is

the other field of cooperation between logic and theology.

Logical instruments can be used to test, in terms of logical

veracity, conclusions formed by atheists and their charges

against the revelation, as well as to specify the competence of

the secular sciences in the field of theology." (p. 158)

43. Wasek, Damian. 2016. "Between Similarity and Non-similarity.

The Nature of Theological Language in the Thought of Peter

Abelard." Theological Research no. 4:75–87.

Abstract: "The aim of this paper is to answer to the following

question: How should theological propositions, originating

from the language used to describe creatures, be understood so

as to avoid idolatry, that is reducing God to the category of

contingent entities?

Using the theory of similarities formulated by Peter Abelard, I

pointed out that the risk of committing theological errors

decreases when language formulas are treated as models, and

their meaning is understood in a figurative way.

Such an attitude enables us to acknowledge the fact that

language can be only partially adequate to the subject under

discussion, and makes us aware that we describe only one

aspect of a given theological phenomenon, as the chosen model

may not correspond to other aspects.

Such understanding of the theological language calls for a

constant reinterpretation of theological propositions. If images

used in theology are linked to the structure of the world, each

change in the scientific understanding of this structure brought

by empirical sciences, should lead to changes in the language

used by theology. Lack of such changes in the system of

religious beliefs will lead to a decrease in the credibility of

theology and push its truths towards the category of myths and

fables."

44. Weingart, Richard E. 1970. The Logic of Divine Love: A Critical

Analysis of Soteriology of Peter Abailard. Oxford: Clarendon

Press.

"Abailard’s understanding of the theme of man’s redemption

suggests the title: The Logic of Divine Love. Even though the

theocentricity ofhis exposition of the meaning of the cross has

generlly been slighted, his attention to the revelation of divine

love has been emphasized by numerous interpreters. This part

of the title is self-explanatory. The use of the term ‘logic’ is not.

Logic, derived from logos, indicates both the nature of the

thinking process in reflecting on various phenomena and also

the inherent structure of those phenomena themselves. In the

first sense logic is basic to Abailard’s legacy in the development

of scholastic methodology as rational, scientifically systematic,

exposition of the divine revelation. In the second sense logic

refers to that which enables reflection. Thus to speak of ‘the

logic of divine love’ is to signify the revelatory constitution of

God’s historical manifestation in Jesus Christ for the

redemption of man. For Abailard both senses of logic have a

christological axis. It is, therefore, incumbent on the Christian

theologian to be logical, because he is reflecting on God’s

manifestation in Jesus Christ, the Logos incarnate in human

history, as the concrete disclosure of the logic of divine love.

Abailard’s desire is to explicate this logic." (Preface, p. VIII)

(...)

"Since Abailard explicates the many facets of the New Testa¬

ment doctrine of the dignity of Christ’s person and his saving

work, he offers no ‘theory’ of the atonement. No one biblical

metaphor or concept is chosen as the basis for a scientifically

de¬ veloped explanation of the atonement; no one statement in

his writings can be designated as a presentation of his position

suffi¬ cient in itself. The passage in the second book of the

Expositio in Epistolam ad Romanos, cited by both opponent

and friend(1) as the one statement of the Abailardian theory, is

but a summary and fragmentary outline ofhis understanding of

Christ’s redemptive work. His exposition of the logic of divine

love revealed in the work of the incarnate Lord must be studied

in the framework of the themes developed throughout his

writings." (pp. 201-202)

(1) For example, see Jean Rivière, Le Dogme de la redemption

[au debut du moyen âge. Bibliothèque thomiste 19, Paris,

1934], pp. 113-14; Hastings Rashdall, The Idea of Atonement in

Christian Theology (London, 1919), pp. 358-60; Hippolyte

Gallerand, ‘La redemption dans les Merits d’Anselm et

d’Abelard’, Revue de lìhistoire des religions 92 (1925), 232-3.

45. Williams, Thomas. 2004. "Sin, Grace, and Redemption." In The

Cambridge Companion to Abelard, edited by Brower, Jeffrey

E. and Guilfoy, Kevin, 258–278. Cambridge: Cambridge

University Press.

"One must distinguish, however, between the doctrine of the

Atonement and theories of the Atonement. Where the doctrine

simply states that the Passion of Christ effects a reconciliation

between God and human beings, theories of the Atonement try

to explain how the Passion has such an effect. Various theories

of the Atonement have been put forward, and none has ever

received the kind of broad and enduring support that would

entitle it to be regarded as the orthodox view. Nevertheless,

some theories have better credentials than others, and Abelard

got himself in trouble by revising or denying some well-

credentialed twelfth-century views and – according to his

detractors, at least – embracing a most unsatisfactory

alternative.

The best place to look for Abelard’s theory of the Atonement is

in his Commentary on the Epistle of Paul to the Romans. The

Commentary consists of verse-by-verse exposition of the literal

sense of Romans, with frequent excursuses or quaestiones on

theological or exegetical issues raised by the text.(2)" (pp. 258-

259)

(2) See Buytaert 1969, vol. XI, 17–20, for a catalogue of the

quaestiones.

References

Buytaert, E. M. ed. 1969. Opera theologica. Corpus

Christianorum. Turnholt: Brepols.

46. Yamazaki, Hiroko. 2006. "Anselm and Abelard on Original

Sin." In Anselm and Abelard: Investigations and

juxtapositions, edited by Gasper, Giles and Kohlenberger,

Helmut, 172–178. Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval

Studies.

"Conclusion

For Anselm, original sin is the absence of required original

justice. Original justice is given by God and if it is abandoned,

God is dishonored. Therefore, the honor of God is the criterion

for committing a sin. If order is violated, God is dishonored.

One is required to keep original justice, and ever since the first

parents’ sin God requires satisfaction from the sinner, because

human nature has incurred corruption. Corruption means

disorder.

Abelard emphasizes that consent, not action, is the criterion for

committing a sin. As a result, original sin, which is not

accompanied by the consent, is explained as punishment, not

sin.

Anselm’s understanding of original sin is characteristic of his

theology that the honor of God, keeping justice and the beauty

of order are connected with each other." (p. 178)

47. Yolles, Julian. 2014. "Divine Omnipotence and the Liberal Arts

in Peter Damian and Peter Abelard." In Rethinking Abelard: A

Collection of Critical Essays edited by Hellemans, Babette, 60–

83. Leiden: Brill.

Summary: "Any attempt to study Peter Abelard’s scholarly

identity vis-à-vis the liberal arts is fraught with difficulty due to

the complexity of his thought, the intricate ways in which he

reworks existing ideas and reacts against others, and the

haphazard survival of the works of his forbears and

contemporaries. One way to circumvent these issues is to take a

particularly well-documented line of argument in one of

Abelard’s works and to compare his methodology with that of

an intellectual before him. One such opportunity presents itself

par excellence in the analysis of what is called ‘divine

omnipotence’, that is the analysis by means of dialectic and

patristic authority of the problem of what it means for God to

be omnipotent, which takes place in the third book of Abelard’s

Theologia ‘scholarium’. This subject was put on the map as a

matter requiring careful analysis in an eleventh-century treatise

in the form of a letter by Peter Damian. It is for this reason that

Peter Damian will be the starting-point of our present

discussion—but a caveat must be made in doing so, however: in

comparing Peter Damian and Peter Abelard (and indeed any of

the later thinkers who will be discussed), one must keep in

mind that they were active in widely differing intellectual and

social environs, and that the comparative discussion is in no

way intended to suggest that the two are necessarily

commensurable.

In fact, it is the hope that the present discussion will bring out

both similarities and dissimilarities alike in a nuanced way in

order to get a better grip on the methodological idiosyncrasies

of these intellectuals, and on the cultural and intellectual

environments that shaped them. First, I intend to compare

Peter Damian and Peter Abelard’s approaches to the question

of divine omnipotence.

Second, it will be worthwhile to explore in brief the approaches

of the major theologians of the twelfth century on this matter,

to see whether either of the two intellectuals under discussion

had a significant impact on later treatments of this topic."

48. Zemler-Cizewski, Wanda. 1994. "From Metaphor to Theology:

Proprium and Translatum in Cicero, Augustine, Eriugena, and

Abelard." Florilegium no. 13:37–52.

"In his prologue to the Sic et non, Peter Abelard describes a

series of hermeneutical problems in the interpretation of sacred

texts, especially those texts that appear to be mutually

contradictory although equal in antiquity and authority. A

theme to which he returns repeatedly is the intractability of

language, and the struggles faced by a theologian who seeks to

use words with precision. Different words in the Latin language

may have the same meaning, while the same word may be used

in different senses, depending on the context (89). Moreover,

the use of a word may vary with the intention of the speaker

and the capacity of his hearers. Thus, for example, Abelard

contrasts the elaborately varied vocabulary of the careful stylist

with the “studied carelessness” of the impassioned orator or the

classroom teacher (90).

It is my intention in the brief investigation that follows, to take

up the hint offered by Peter Abelard and to trace certain

variations in the history of the words proprium and

translatum, key technical terms in Abelard’s theological

vocabulary." (p. 37)

References

Abelard, Peter. Sic et Non. Prologue. Ed. Blanche B. Boyer and

Richard McKeon. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1977.

49. Zerbi, Pietro. 1987. "William of Saint Thierry and His Dispute

with Abelard." In William, Abbot of St. Thierry: a colloquium

at the Abbey of St. Thierry, 181–203. Kalamazoo: Cistercian

Publications.

"The aim of this paper is not to present definite results, but,

much more modestly, to provide a status quaestionis on this

vast theme, and, at most, to suggest a few hypotheses. I hasten

to warn at the outset, as will be noted later, that certain

positions which seem to have been won, at least as reasonable

hypotheses, are beginning to waver after closer reflexion,

whereas others, once abandoned, are rising again with new

vigor." (p. 181)

(...)

"The Council of Sens has been at the focus of my studies for

many years. And I have not lost hope of soon being able to

publish a monograph which will bring together the fruit of

about twenty years of work. This explains the nature of the

present contribution, as well as that of a certain number of

other studies I have published during this period. Those are, so

to say, fragments provisionally detached from a building under

construction, In the following pages, not everything will be

discussed, proven, or exhaustively established. This can only be

done at the end, in the definitive work. Then there will be the

possibility of a comprehensive perception and a global

interpretative effort.

Let us further add that we will not be able to follow an orderly

and always coherent discourse on so complex a theme, without

having decided to make a few hypotheses, especially of a

chronological order, even if they are only temporary. For

example, did the Council take place in 1140 or in 1141? Once

one has opted for one of these dates, does the Lent during

which William of Saint Thierry sounded the alarm in extremely

well-known letter 326 belong to the same year when on the

eighth day after Pentecost the council was convened? Or does it

belong to the preceding year, 1139 or 1140? I will tell you what

my choices are for the moment: 1140 for the assembly at Sens,

Lent of 1139 for William’s initiative." (p. 182, a note omitted)

Bibliographia. Annotated bibliographies

Raul Corazzon || rc@ontology.co || Info

Peter Abelard. Bibliography on His

Ethics and Moral Philosophy

Bibliography

1. Abadal, Lily M. 2024. "Peter Abelard is not a Proto-Kantian."

Journal of Religious Ethics no. 5:8–25.

Abstract: "Though there has been much debate about whether

Abelard's ethics are dangerously subjective or surprisingly

absolutist, one thing is unanimous: they are intentionalist. The

goal of this article is to parse out what should be meant by this

claim, distancing his ethical account from the popular Kantian

appraisal. Though much of the secondary literature on Abelard

likens him to Kant, I argue that this is mistaken. For Abelard,

an agent's intentions are informed by their affections—whether

carnal or spiritual. This becomes clear when contextualizing

Abelard's use of intentio with a view to his Commentary on

Romans. Using the account of intention I suggest—one

nuanced by Abelard's own theological commitments and

biblical exegesis—it will be clear that Abelard's ethics is not a

case for the moral neutrality of the passions nor an ethic of

pure reason."

2. Adams, Marilyn McCord. 1995. "Introduction." In Peter

Abelard Ethical Writings: His Ethics or “Know Yourself” and

His Dialogue between a Philosopher, a Jew and a Christian,

edited by Spade, Paul Vincent. Indianapolis: Hackett.

"The Semantics of ‘Good’:

Both Philosopher [DPC (297)+(308)] and Christian [DPC

(395)-(424)] conclude that order cannot be brought out of the

confusion of this topic without clearly distinguishing different

ways in which the term ‘good’ is used.

‘Good’ (bonum) can occur as a neuter adjective, in which case it

can signify a good thing; or as an adjective modifying a noun (a

good F), in which case the criteria for goodness vary with the

noun in question; or as modifying the occurrences of things or

states of affairs (it is good that p). The Christian offers [D1] and

[D3] explicitly, [D2] by implication:

(D1.1) a good thing = that which, while it’s fit for some use,

mustn’t impede the advantage or worthiness of anything [DPC

(397)];

(D1.2) an evil thing = that which either is unfit for some use or

impedes the advantage or worthiness of something or both

[DPC (397)];

(D1.3) an indifferent thing = a thing that’s neither good nor evil

= a thing such that no good is necessarily delayed or impeded

by its existence [DPC (397)].

(D2) a good F = an exemplary member or version of F-kind

[DPC (396)].

(D3) it is good that p = it is necessary for filling out some

optimal arrangement of God’s even if that arrangement is

completely hidden from us [DPC (421)]." (p. XV)

References

DPC = Dialogus inter Philosophum, Iudaeum et Christianum.

3. Allen, Julie Anna. 1996. A Commentary on the Second Collatio

of Peter Abailard's "Dialogus": It's the Thought That Counts,

University of Toronto, Toronto.

Unpublished Ph.D dissertation.

Abstract: "This dissertation is a critical analysis of Peter

Abailard's account of the supreme good. Abailard develops a

forceful and innovative account of goodness and evil in the

second collatio of the Dialogue of a Philosopher with a

Christian and a Jew. In the Introductory Chapter I discuss the

interpretative obstacles which a student of the Dialogue must

overcome. Chapters one through three follow Abailard's

attempt to develop a definitive position on the supreme good of

man. The second collatio features two transitory positions and

a final doctrine which I identify and discuss in detail. These are:

the Original Philosophic position, the Pseudo-Christian

position and the Christian position. Each transitory position is

critically debated by the Dialogue's characters. Abailard levies

three criticisms against the original philosophic position. First,

he maintains that this view inappropriately locates the supreme

good in this life. Second, he rejects the claim that virtue is an

end in itself and finally, he rejects the Stoic's absolute

conception of "goodness". The "Pseudo-Christian position" is

rejected because it identifies the supreme evil as punishment

and this claim generates an insurmountable difficulty. These

objections direct the plot of the Dialogue, they highlight main

areas of contention between classical and Christian conceptions

of goodness and they inform Abailard's own account. According

to Abailard, the supreme good is ever-increasing love of God

and this end is attained by loving God. The supreme evil is a

degenerative and unrelenting hatred of God and sinners are

damned for the fault of contempt. Abailard's ultimate position

is not a complete departure from the views of the pagan

philosophers. Rather, Abailard imposes a series of

modifications and clarifications upon classical positions. This

process culminates in a doctrine which is uniquely Abailard's

but it is one which, nonetheless, bears a wide variety of family

resemblances. In Chapter Four, I subject the final "Christian

Position" to both an internal and an external assessment and I

conclude by considering the relationship between Abailard's

account of the supreme good and evil in the Dialogue and his

account of sin in the Ethics."

4. ———. 1998. "On the Dating of Abailarďs Dialogus: A Reply to

Mews." Vivarium no. 36:135–151.

"Abailard's corpus contains only two short works which deal

specifically with the subject of ethics.

These primary texts are: Dialogus inter Philosophum,

Judaeum et Christianum, and Scito Teipsum, which is also

known and referred to as the Ethica. A natural and perhaps

fruitful approach to the study of Abailard's moral philosophy

would be to assess the development of his thought based upon

a clear understanding of the sequence in which he issued these

works. Unfortunately, as I will argue, this approach is not

available to us in Abailard's case. The mysteries surrounding

the overall chronology of his writings are ones which continue

to resist solution. As Marilyn McCord Adams notes: 'the precise

chronology of [Abailard's] works remains a vexed question for

several reasons: their author repeatedly revised them; not

many manuscripts remain; and Abailard's own cross -

referencing is ambiguous.'(2)." (p. 135)

(...)

"An acceptance of Mews' early placement of the Dialogus

within the general chronology of Abailard's works generates a

number of serious problems. Primarily, Mews' timetable fails to

acknowledge the extent to which Abailard's conception of sin in

the Dialogus surpasses the account presented in the

Commentaria. If Mews is right, then Abailard wrote the

Dialogus before the Commentaria which was also prior to the

Ethica. If that is right, then we will be forced to conclude that

Abailard reverted to defin ing sin as a bad will in the

Commentaria after clearly arguing against this view in the

Dialogus. Thus, the text itself provides grounds for rejecting

Mews' most recent suggestion.

Only one conclusion clearly emerges from our survey of

conflicting evidence. A definitive case has not been made for

either side of the traditional debate. There are considerations

which corroborate Robert and Thomas' arguments in favour of

a date follow ing the council of Sens, just prior to Abailard's

death in 1142. On the other hand, the many and varied parallels

between the later portions of the Dialogus and Abailard's moral

positions in the Ethica support Buytaert and Luscombe's

suggestions that the two works were produced in close

proximity." (p. 151)

(2) Marilyn McCord Adams, Introduction to Peter Abelard,

Ethical Writings: His Ethics or 'Know Thyself' and His

Dialogue between a Philosopher, a Jew and a Christian, trans.

Paul Spade, Indianapolis 1995, viii.

5. Bejczy, István. 2003. "Deeds Without Value: exploring a Weak

Spot in Abelard's Ethics." Recherches de théologie et

philosophie médiévales no. 70:1–21.

Abstract: "In his ethical writings Peter Abelard declared the

accomplishment of good deeds irrelevant to a person’s merit.

Also, he denied that acts had any moral value in themselves.

The article argues that both theses are contradicted by the

purport of Abelard’s ethical teaching. If the opportunity to act is

present, good intentions must be followed by good deeds in

order not to lose their meritorious character. Moreover, the

intrinsic morality of intended acts determines the morality of

human intentions, whereas the moral evaluation of these acts

determines whether consenting to them is sinful. Good acts can

become neutral or bad on account of improper intentions, but

evil deeds always retain their evil character. In the early-

twentieth-century debate on Abelard’s alleged moral

subjectivism, both sides appear to have been at fault to a

certain degree. Those who charged Abelard with subjectivism

mistook his theses on the indifference of human actions for the

essence of his ethical teaching. Those who defended Abelard

against the said charge have pointed to his use of objective

criteria of right and wrong either with regard to intentions or

with regard to deeds. In the first case, they did not notice that

Abelard’s notion of objectively right or wrong intentions

implies a judgment on the intrinsic moral value of material

deeds; in the second case, they failed to account for the

inconsistency with Abelard’s theses on the moral indifference of

human actions."

6. Berges, Sandrine. 2013. "Rethinking Twelfth Century Ethics:

the Contribution of Heloise." British Journal for the History of

Philosophy no. 21:667–687.

Abstract: "Twelfth-century ethics is commonly thought of as

following a stoic influence rather than an Aristotelian one. It is

also assumed that these two schools are widely different, in

particular with regards to the social aspect of the virtuous life.

In this paper I argue that this picture is misleading and that

Heloise of Argenteuil recognized that stoic ethics did not entail

isolation but could be played out in a social context. I argue that

her philosophical contribution does not end there, but that she

departs from both the stoics and her teacher, Abelard, in her

defence of the ideal of moderation. By insisting that virtue must

strike a mean between two extremes, she shows that

Aristotelian virtue ethics were present in the intellectual life of

the twelfth century."

7. De Siano, Frank. 1971. "Of God and Man: Consequences of

Abelard's Ethic." The Thomist no. 35:631–660.

"Ethics is a suitable starting-point for investigating the

interrelationship between God and man in Peter Abelard.

Ethics must attempt to determine man's moral responsibility,

and this responsibility must entail a certain autonomy on man's

part. Autonomy means that man has an authentic role in

determining his actions and the moral quality o£ his actions

according to a consistent structure. This raises the question,

however, in a Christian context, about the relationship between

man's autonomy and God's autonomy.

How does man's activity fit into God's activity in the world?

How does man's determination o£ the good relate to God's

ultimate determination of the good? Does God's ultimate

autonomy leave room for man? Finally, does man's autonomy

restrict the autonomy of God?" (p. 631)

8. Decosimo, David. 2018. "Sin, Consent, and Apparent Confusion

in Abelard's Ethica." The Journal of Religion no. 98:29–58.

"Even after decades of renewed interest in Abelard’s work, our

grasp of Ethica and its central concepts remains somewhat

imprecise.

Broadly speaking, two approaches dominate. Sometimes

explicitly—occasionally without noting their departure—

interpreters “place . . . words on [his] lips,” offering rational

reconstructions that put aside the messiest details of an already

messy text. Often these reformulations involve comparison

with Kantian ethics. Frequently, they gloss over passages that

directly challenge their claims or that suggest that matters are

more complicated than they are letting on. While these

discussions are important and philosophically interesting, they

are of limited help in deciphering what exactly Abelard meant.

The primary alternative to such rational reconstruction neglects

the same issues for different reasons. Deeply valuable, this

culturally sensitive, historically detailed work typically

addresses Abelard’s ethics in relation to broader social themes

—interiority, selfhood, “ethics as poetry.” Understandably,

parsing the minute details of the consensus-voluntas relation is

not its interest.

Finally, even work like John Marenbon’s, which does centrally

seek to address the fine-grained details of Abelard’s moral

thought on its own terms, still tends to neglect some of the

most vexing difficulties and ostensible contradictions at the

text’s core—or so I argue.

This article aims to address these difficulties head on. I

elucidate Abelard’s conceptions of sin (peccatum) and consent

(consensus), the central concepts of his principal ethical work

and his primary contribution to medieval moral thought, and

examine their relations in the Ethics. I especially consider

formulations related to those conceptions that seem

contradictory, confusing, or otherwise problematic. Beyond

clarifying these difficulties, I aim to solidify—and in some cases

correct—our overall understanding of the notions of sin and

consent at the heart of Abelard’s moral thought. I begin by

sketching those notions before turning to these concepts and

the complex passages that relate to them—but first a word on

Abelard’s context." (p. 31, notes omitted)

9. Duran, Jane. 2011. "Heloise: A Christian View on Ethics and

Love." New Blackfriars no. 92:35–45.

Abstract: "The writings of Heloise are examined for their

philosophical content, with special reference to the notions of

friendship and love. The work of Mews, Dronke, Clanchy and

others is cited, and it is concluded that Heloise’s gifts as a

writer and thinker have been overlooked and merit more

careful examination."

10. Findley, Brooke Heidenreich. 2005. "Sincere hypocrisy and the

authorial persona in the letters of Heloise." Romance Notes no.

45:281–292.

"This article will examine Heloise's use of what is for her a

particularly crucial opposition, that between hypocrisy and

sincerity.(3) In her letters, Heloise repeatedly examines her

own sincerity and hypocrisy, ultimately refusing to decide

between the two and embracing the identity of the "sincere

hypocrite." Heloise's dismantling of the sincerity-hypocrisy pair

is an example of the rhetorical strategy that Kamuf has

described, but I believe its particular interest lies in the light

that it can shed on the construction of Heloise's authorial

persona. By simultaneously calling attention to her own

sincerity and casting it into doubt, Heloise also privileges and

interrogates the link between self and words.

Her discourse of sincere hypocrisy draws readers towards an

imagined author even as it suggests that this seductive figure

may be unreliable and illusory. In this case, the basilisk facing

readers of Heloise's letters turns out to be the paradoxical

authorial persona of Heloise herself." (p. 282)

(3) Kamuf does not include this pair in her analysis. However,

she does discuss Heloise's hypocrisy claim, stating that it

"formalizes [the] instability without reducing it," in other

words, that it embodies a contradiction of the type Heloise has

been discussing all along, here in the form of an irreducible

incongruity between appearance and reality (23). Kamuf's

observation is accurate; however, as I believe this essay will

show, much more can be said on the subject.

References

Kamuf, Peggy. Fictions of Feminine Desire: Disclosures of

Heloise. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1982.

11. ———. 2006. "Does the Habit Make the Nun? A Case Study of

Heloise's Influence on Abelard's Ethical Philosophy." Vivarium

no. 44:248–275.

Abstract: "A careful reading of Heloise's letters reveals both her

contribution to Abelard's ethical thought and the differences

between her ethical concerns and his. In her letters, Heloise

focuses on the innate moral qualities of the inner person or

animus. Hypocrisy—the misrepresentation of the inner person

through false outer appearance, exemplified by the potentially

deceitful religious habit or habitus—is a matter of great moral

concern to her. When Abelard responds to Heloise's ideas, first

in his letters to her and later in his Collationes and Scito te

ipsum, he turns the discussion away from her original interests.

He transforms her metaphor of the habitus as false appearance

into a discussion of another type of habitus, the habitual

process of acquiring virtue, and integrates her focus on the

animus into his developing ideas about sin as intention.

Examining the differences between Heloise's ethical thought

and Abelard's allows us to appreciate the distinct contributions

of both."

12. Godman, Peter. 2009. Paradoxes of Conscience in the High

Middle Ages: Abelard, Heloise, and the Archpoet. Cambridge:

Cambridge University Press.

"Fictio does not mean ‘fiction’. Rather theological than literary,

this term signifies feigning and falsification of conscience,

particularly in penance.

Penance was given the status of a sacrament during the twelfth

century, and confession was regarded as a test of spiritual

authenticity and religious sincerity.

A travesty of both, at the moment when sinners were expected

to be truest to God and to themselves, fictio challenged the

ethical imagination of Latin Europe. That challenge found a

response in the works of Abelard, Heloise, and the Archpoet.

Usually considered separately from one another, in terms of

such harmless but unhelpful anachronisms as ‘individuality’ or

‘renaissance’, all three of them reflected on issues of moral

identity posed by feigning and falsification of conscience.

Because the morality to which Abelard and Heloise subscribed

was, or became, monastic, their reflection also led them to

allied problems of lying, dissimulation, and hypocrisy in a

religious context. In the very different context of a German

schismatic’s court, opposed to Rome and hostile to monks, the

Archpoet took fictio to its limit. There the dividing-line between

irony and blasphemy blurred.

With a refined wit directed against ethical concerns of the

previous generation, this feigned penitent, in his ‘confession’,

created a new figure of spiritual sophistry," (Preface and

acknowledgements, pp. IX-X)

13. Griffioen, Amber L. 2007. "“In Accordance with the Law”:

Reconciling Divine and Civil Law in Abelard." American

Catholic Philosophical Quarterly no. 81:307–321.

Abstract: "In the Ethics, Abelard discusses the example of a

judge who knowingly convicts an innocent defendant. He

claims that this judge does rightly when he punishes the

innocent man to the full extent of the law. Yet this claim seems

counterintuitive, and, at first glance, contrary to Abelard’s own

ethical system. Nevertheless, I argue that Abelard’s ethical

system cannot be viewed as completely subjective, since the

rightness of an individual act of consent is grounded in

objective standards established by God. Likewise, any

particular civil government must derive its authority objectively

from the natural and/or Christian laws, which ground its

possibility and function. In this paper, I examine Abelard’s

explication of the natural law, discoverable through reason, and

the divine laws, knowable only through revelation, in order to

explore what form an adequate civil law would have to take

under which the judge could be said to have acted rightly."

14. Hamelin, Guy. 2021. "Abelard and the Contemporary Virtue

Theory." Doispontos no. 18:31–44.

Abstract: "Contemporary ‘Virtue theory’ emphasizes the need

to return to the moral formation of the individual, following the

ethical model provided by Aristotle. According to MacIntyre, an

important representative of this theory, Stoicism favored the

development of modern and contemporary ethics by

highlighting notions such as will, consent, and natural or divine

law. The development of the moral agent itself was

consequently neglected. In the twelfth century Abelard presents

a hybrid ethics, which maintains at the same time the

Aristotelian theory of virtue and elements of Stoic morality. In

the present study, we consider MacIntyre’s criticism of

Abelardian ethics, estimated to be at the origin of modern and

contemporary moral conceptions."

15. Hoffmann, Tobias. 2003. "Moral Action as Human Action: End

and Object in Aquinas in Comparison with Abelard, Lombard,

Albert, and Scotus." The Thomist no. 67:73–94.

"The purpose of this paper is to show how Aquinas develops an

ethic that puts the agent at the center of morality, by

considering the end as the chief factor in moral actions.

Consequently, at its very foundation, Aquinas's moral theory

understands moral action as human action. By contrast, if

ethics focuses primarily on the object and considers the end an

accidental feature of the act, it threatens to limit itself to the

question of what is allowed and what is not. Yet each person

desires to know primarily why to do things rather than what to

do. When I know why to do something, I then become

interested in what is the most fitting action to accomplish the

end.

In addition to looking at Aquinas, I will consider Abelard,

Lombard, Albert, and Duns Scotus-partly in order to put

Aquinas's account into its historical context and partly in order

contrast the differences between them and Aquinas." (p. 74)

(...)

"The true difficulty of Abelard's account is not his alleged

subjectivism, but rather the fact that he defines the objective

value of actions on the basis of the intention alone. This has two

problematic consequences: first, Abelard says little about what

actions are in fact to be done or to be avoided; second, he

overcharges the notion of intention by demanding that it not

only consist of a good motivation, but that it also contain the

right assessment of what is to be done, in accord with God's

will.(8)

Abelard clearly focuses on the agent, and secondarily on the

action; when he discusses the moral character of actions. The

moral value of actions arises from the will. Yet his account of

how it extends from the will to the entire spectrum of morally

relevant acts (i.e., other mental acts and external acts) is

problematic." (p. 77)

(8) Perkams, Liebe als 'Zentralbegriff der Ethik nach Peter

Abaelard, [Münster: Aschendorff 2001] 326.

16. Holopainen, Taina M. 2014. "Intentions and Conscious Moral

Choices in Peter Abelard’s Know Yourself." In Rethinking

Abelard: A Collection of Critical Essays, edited by Hellemans,

Babette, 213–229. Leiden: Brill.

"Peter Abelard was a remarkable twelfth-century promoter of

ethical thought.

Two of his works are dedicated to ethics. The earlier one is the

Dialogue between a Philosopher, a Jew, and a Christian, also

known as the Collationes, and composed some time between

1123 and 1135. The work consists of an imaginary dialogue, one

in which none of the characters directly represents Abelard’s

own position but through which it becomes clear that Abelard

had a high appreciation of philosophical ethics.(1) The later of

Abelard’s works on ethics is the treatise Scito te ipsum or Know

Yourself, also called the Ethica or Ethics.(2) The book is

undoubtedly one of the most important early medieval works in

theological or philosophical ethics. In the following article my

discussion on Abelard’s idea of moral action will be based on

this work. Abelard wrote his Ethics around the year 1138, only a

few years before his death in 1142. The treatise was meant to

consist of two books, of which the first was to discuss morally

bad acts, or sin, and the second morally good acts. Only the first

book has come down to us in full; we have just the very

beginning of the second. Therefore the examples available

mainly deal with morally bad acts. My topic, however, focuses

on the role of intention in morally relevant action and therefore

takes into account both morally good and morally bad acts." (p.

213, a note omitted)

(1) Coll., ed. and trans. Orlandi and Marenbon.

(2) Sc., ed. Ilgner (2001); and Sc., ed., trans., and notes

Luscombe (1971). The references are to Ilgner’s edition of the

Sc., unless otherwise indicated. Both Sc. and Coll. are available

in P. V. Spade, trans., Ethical Writings: His “Ethics” or “Know

Yourself” and His “Dialogue Between a Philosopher, a Jew and

a Christian,” intro. Marilyn McCord Adams (Indianapolis:

Hackett Publishing, 1995).

17. Kemeny, Paul C. 1991. "Peter Abelard: An Examination of His

Doctrine of Original Sin." The Journal of Religious History no.

16:374–386.

"Peter Abelard’s Scito te ipsum (Know Thyself) or Ethics is a

significant contribution to the development of ethics in the

twelfth-century renaissance. The most widely noted aspect of

the treatise is his definition of actual sin. For Abelard, sin is

consent to evil or contempt of God. Often overlooked, however,

is Abelard’s conception of original sin. Abelard departed from

the traditional Augustinian conception by denying that the guilt

(culpa) of the foreparents is transmitted to their posterity. He

also held that this inherited original sin lacked concupiscence

and ignorance.

Moreover, his moralistic emphasis on human responsibility

echoes a similar one in Augustine’s famous adversary, Pelagius.

The question arises: is Abelard’s doctine of original sin

Pelagian?(1) This examination will answer the question by first

determining Abelard’s exact doctrine, comparing it with that of

Pelagianism and Augustinianism and then determining the

reason(s) why Abelard held this position." (p. 374)

(1) Abelard had indirect access to Pelagius’ writings through

Augustine’s anti-Pelagian writings.

18. King, Peter. 1995. "Abelard's Intentionalist Ethics." The

Modern Schoolman no. 72:213–231.

"Abelard's ethical theory, as presented in his Ethics, is a version

of what I’ll call ‘intentionalism’: the view that the agent’s

intention determines the moral worth of an action.

Now even in Abelard’s day, the common understanding of

morality(2) seemed to endorse the following principle:

(P) An agent should intend to ' only if bringing about ' would be

good.

But Abelard replaces (P) with its obverse, a principle he

identifies as the rational core imbedded in traditional Christian

moral teaching:

(P*) An agent should bring about ' only if intending to ' would

be good.

Abelard’s arguments against (P) and in support of (P*) are

remarkably similar to those given by the most famous exponent

of intentionalism: Kant.

For Kant’s ethical theory, especially as he presents in the first

section of the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals,

identifies (P*) as the philosophical conception corresponding to

the “common rational knowledge of morals.” Abelard and Kant

locate moral worth in features of the way the agent

conceptualizes her performances, and each thinks that

goodness is characterizable in terms of the form such

conceptualization takes. Both are deeply indebted to Stoic

ethics, familiar to each largely through Seneca’s letters, and

they share a common project: ‘christianizing’ Stoic metaethics

so that the classical equation of virtue with happiness is revised

to leave room for God and the Afterlife.

I’ll proceed as follows. In §1, Abelard’s arguments against (P)

will be canvassed. In §2, I’ll look at his arguments in favor of

(P*) and a ‘mediæval categorical imperative’. In §3, a

comparison with Kant’s intentionalism should make the virtues

of Abelard’s theory apparent. In §4, I’ll discuss Abelard’s failed

attempt to baptize Stoicism. Finally, by way of conclusion, I’ll

offer a suggestion about why intentionalism, in any of its

versions, is an ethical theory to take seriously." (pp. 213-214,

two notes omitted)

(2) Despite widespread agreement on particular normative

principles in Abelard’s time, derived from the Bible, and

despite the then-current view that education dealt with the

formation of the moral character of the student, there was no

systematic treatise on ethics. The Church Fathers wrote about

theological virtues and their role with regard to grace and

salvation, but not about systematic ethics; Aristotle’s

Nicomachean Ethics would not be translated for another

century; the epistles of Seneca, who in the twelfth century was

mistakenly believed to be a correspondent of St. Paul (and so a

crypto-christian), offered a full range of moral advice with only

the sketchiest of hints about their underlying theoretical

structure. Abelard’s accomplishment is all the more impressive

in this light.

19. Luscombe, David Edward. 1965. "Towards a new edition of

Peter Abelard's Ethica or "Scito te ipsum": An introduction to

the manuscripts." Vivarium no. 3:115–127.

"The purpose of the present article is to introduce the known

MSS of Abelard's Ethica. Five copies made before içoo are

known at present." (p. 118)

(...)

"This is not the place to dwell on the significance of Abelard

Ethica in the history of ethics. But if, as all now agree, it

represents a great moment in the development of medieval

ethical thought, then the lack of a larger number of surviving

MSS may seem disappointing. From the twelfth century itself

only two copies survive and nowhere in modern France can a

copy from any medieval century be found today. The survival or

loss of MSS is, however, largely a matter of hazard. The Ethica,

moreover, did not belong to the class of work which became

indispensable in the schools, in the manner of the Sentences of

the Lombard or the Decretum of Gratian. It was a personal and

provocative treatise, which contained uncommon theological

opinions and in which ethics was considered as a subject set

apart from other kinds of theological enquiry. It neither sought

to compile systematically all the materials needed for ethical

discussion nor to integrate moral theology with the other

branches of contemporary theological enquiry." (p. 126)

(...)

"Nonetheless, the scarcity of surviving twelfth century copies is

a fact. No less remarkable, however, is the fact of survivals from

later centuries. The three copies of the fourteenth and fifteenth

centuries testify to the appeal made by the work some two or

three hundred years after the impulses which had promoted the

early scholastic theological movement had changed." (p. 127)

20. ———. 1971. "Peter Abelard and Twelfth-Century Ethics." In

Peter Abelard' Ethics, edited by Luscombe, David Edward,

XIII–XXXVII. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

"Ethics had found no place among the seven liberal arts as they

were described in the programmes of Boethius, Cassiodore, and

Isidore. In the twelfth century attempts were made to find a

place for it in systems of teaching. Some writers, such as

Honorius of Autun, Stephen of Tournai, and Godfrey of Saint-

Victor, freely appended ethics to the end of the list of the seven

arts.(1) Hugh of Saint-Victor sandwiched it, as a part of

practical philosophy, between logic (grammar, dialectic, and

rhetoric) and theoretical philosophy (theology, physics, and

mathematics).(2) William of Conches advised that after a

student had studied eloquence (grammar, dialectic, and

rhetoric) and before he approached theoretical philosophy (the

study of corporeal beings in mathematics and physics and of

incorporeal beings in theology) he should be instructed in

practical philosophy, in ethics, economics, and politics.(3)" (p.

XVIII)

(1) Cf. P. Delhaye, '"Grammatica" et "Ethica" au XII• siècle',

Recherches de théologie ancienne et médIévale, xxv (1958), 59-

110 here pp. 61-7.

(2) Didascalicon, vi. 14.(PL 176. 809-10). Cf. P. Delhaye,

'L'enseignement de la philosophie morale au XII siècle',

Medieval Studies, xi (1949), 77-99, here p. 77.

(3) 'Des commentaires inedits de Guillaume de Conches et de

Nicolas Triveth sur la Consolation de Boèce', ed. C. Jourdain in

Notices et extraits des manuscrits de la Bibliothèque imperiale,

xx. 2 (1862), 74. Cf. P. Delhaye, 'L'enseignement de la

philosophie morale', p. 77, and id., 'La place de l'éthique parmi

!es disciplines scientifiques au XII siècle' in Méelanges E. D.

Arthur Janssen, Bibliotheca Ephemeridum Theologicarum

Lovaniensium, series i, vol. 2 (Louvain, 1948), pp. 29-44, here

p. 37.

21. ———. 1974. "The Ethics of Abelard: Some Further

Considerations." In Peter Abelard: Proceedings of the

International Conference: Louvain, May 10-12, 1971, edited by

Buytaert, Eligius M., 65–84. Leuven: University Press.

"My purpose in this paper is to offer some considerations of the

Ethics which both amplify and modify what I wrote in the

introduction to my published edition of this work(1)." (p. 65)

(...)

"The Ethics presents therefore an apparent paradox. On the one

hand Abelard seems to curtail ecclesiastical power by arguing

that sins are remitted at the moment of contrition and not in

confession, and by arguing that the power of the keys cannot be

used by all bishops to remit sins but merely to declare with

uncertaio accuracy who has been bound in sin and who loosed

from it by God.

Throughout the Ethics Abelard always emphasises the role of a

man·sself-conscious decisions either to hold God in contempt

by consenting to evil or to obey him and thereby to win merit,

and he always emphasises God's unique capacity to judge

certainly the minds of men. Yet Abelard retains an important

role for human authority whether ecclesiastical or Jay. The

sacerdotal function is to uphold and to teach divine Law, and to

impose, with discernment and with knowledge of canon law,

works of satisfaction upon those thought to have been in sin.

Human judges may err but even their mistakes must be upheld.

Abelard writes with scant respect in his Ethics of the prelates

and nobles of France. But his hope is that they be made less

corrupt, Jess ignorant and more discerning.

Abelard writes in his Ethics both as philosopher and as social

reformer. Know thyself is also an appeal to know others.

As a book. however, the Ethics does not seem to have become

much known. lt was not replete with that wealth of practical

detail and of engaging anecdote which was later to enable the

writings of Peter the Chanter to enjoy great popularity. lt seems

to have been unfinished and was certainly felt to be

unorthodox. Jt could not serve as a text-book in the schools

because it was too polemical and untraditional. Yet it made a

mark, for the discussions of the masters who were prominent in

Paris after its publication reflect the sharpness of its impact."

(p. 84)

(1) Peter Abelard's Ethics. An edition with introduction,

English translatiion and notes. Oxford Medieval Texts (Oxford,

Clarendon Press. 1971).

22. Lutz-Bachmann, Matthias. 1995. "Modern Aspects of Peter

Abelard's Philosophical Ethics." The European Legacy no.

72:201–211.

"My purpose in this paper is to show some aspects of Peter

Abelard's ethics which are still relevant for ethical debate today.

Therefore I have titled my paper: "Modern Aspects of Peter

Abelard's Philosophical Ethics." I want to carry out my

intention in three steps. First I have to answer the question of

whether or not we are allowed to speak of a philosophical ethics

in the original meaning of the word "philosophy." In asking this

question I know that I presuppose a way of looking at a

problem which would not have been true for the twelfth

century. Nevertheless I suppose that we can find clues about

Abelard's position in that question. Secondly I shall give you a

short summary of the philosophical elements in Peter Abelard's

ethics. Doing this I refer to one of the last texts of Abelard, i.e.,

his Dialogus inter Philosophum, Judaeum et Christianum.(1)

Thirdly I want to present the modern aspects of Abelard's

philosophical ethics. In comparison with Immanuel Kant's

Critique of Practical Reason, we are able to demonstrate the

relevance of Peter Abelard, who with good reason has been

called by Marie Dominique Chenu "le premier homme

moderne"." (p. 201)

(1) Petrus Abaelardus, Dialogus inter Philosophum, ludaeum et

Christianum, ed. R. Thomas, Stuttgart — Bad Cannstatt 1970.

23. Mann, William E. 2003. "Happiness, Reason, and Sin in

Abelard’s Ethics." In Rationality and Happiness: From the

Ancients to the Early Medievals, edited by Liu, Jiyuan and

Gracia, Jorge J. E., 217–237. Rochester NY: University of

Rochester Press.

"According to that eminent Victorian moralist, Henry Sidgwick,

“A man’s future good on the whole is what he would now desire

and seek on the whole if all the consequences of all the different

lines of conduct open to him were accurately foreseen and

adequately realized in imagination at the present point of

time.”(2) Sidgwick’s definition is a classic expression of the

desire-satisfaction theory of a person’s good. The theory

supposes that there is nothing to the conception of a person’s

good apart from what would satisfy that person’s desires. But

not just any actual desire or suite of actual desires will count. A

person’s desires must be subjected to the test of vivid

foreknowledge of alternative possibilities: without this

requirement, a person might come to regret the fulfillment of

impulsive or incapacitating desires." (p. 217)

(...)

"Summing up. I began by pointing to a limitation, from the

point of view of Christian eschatology, of the desire-satisfaction

theory of a person’s good. We are not now cognitively equipped

to assess “all the consequences of all the different lines of

conduct” open to us, as Sidgwick’s definition requires. The

limitation is not due simply to the combinatorial explosion

involved in computing all the consequences. It is rather that the

outcome of one line of conduct open to us is a state—indeed,

the best state, according to the likes of Abelard—that only

beings holding a cognitive advantage over us can appreciate.

We can become those beings, not by disciplining our intellect,

however, but by conforming our will, through love, to God’s

will. In the process, Abelard claims that we can manage,

although only with great difficulty, to avoid all sins, as long as

“sin” is understood properly, as contempt of God (Ethics 68:19-

21; Ethics133). But we see all of this in a glass, darkly. A

partisan of Christian eschatology might say that even if

Sidgwick’s definition is correct, it can only be appreciated sub

specie aeternitatis. Exactly so."(p. 235)

(2) . H. Sidgwick, The Methods of Ethics, 7th ed. (1907; reprint,

New York: Dover Publications, 1966), 111-12. Sidgwick’s theory

is adopted in modified form by J. Rawls, A Theory of Justice

(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1971), chap. 7. For

criticisms of the theory see R. M. Adams, Finite and Infinite

Goods (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 84-93.

24. ———. 2004. "Ethics." In The Cambridge Companion to

Abelard, edited by Brower, Jeffrey E. and Guilfoy, Kevin, 279–

304. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

"Peter Abelard’s contributions to ethics are concentrated in two

works, his Ethics (or Scito te Ipsum) and his Dialogue between

a Philosopher, a Jew, and a Christian (or Collationes). There

are ethical insights to be found scattered elsewhere in his

works, but for the sustained presentation of an ethical theory,

one can only turn to these two works. The Dialogue is actually

two dialogues, one between a philosopher and a Jew, the other

between the philosopher and a Christian, debating the relative

merits of pagan philosophy, Judaism, and Christianity. The

Ethics concentrates on the development of a distinctively

Christian ethical theory. It was to have consisted of two books.

The unfinished second book of the Ethics begins with a

description of what Abelard takes himself to have accomplished

in the first book, namely, the provision of an understanding of

what sins are, how they are rectified, and how they differ from

vices (Sc. 128.1–4; Spade 1995, 226). The second book was

supposed to have taken up the topic of what it is to do good, or,

as he prefers to put it in his more careful moments, what it is to

do well (Coll. 163.3229–3230; Spade 1995, 404). The text was

abandoned after one page." (p. 279, a note omitted)

References

Spade, P. V., 1995. Peter Abelard, Ethical Writings: His Ethics

or “Know Yourself” and his Dialogue between a Philosopher, a

Jew, and a Christian. Indianapolis: Hackett.

25. Marenbon, John. 1992. "Abelard's ethical theory: two

definitions from the Collationes." In From Athens to Chartres:

Neoplatonism and Medieval Thought: Studies in Honour of

Edouard Jeauneau, edited by Westra, Haijo Jan, 301–314.

Leiden: Brill.

Reprinted as Essay XI in: John Marenbon, Aristotelian Logic,

Platonism, and the Context of Early Medieval Philosophy in

the West, Aldershot: Ashgate 2000.

"Although the best modern discussions of his ethics examine a

much wider range of Abelard’s writings, they do so in order to

throw light on the ideas about sin, intention and consent which

are treated in greatest detail in Scito teipsum. Is this emphasis

justified? Scito teipsum is (at least in surviving manuscripts) an

unfinished work: the first book, dealing with sin, is complete,

but only the opening paragraphs of the second, about virtue,

are extant. Abelard’s writings as a whole present a different,

more complex picture of his ethics, in which the notions of sin,

intention and consent no longer dominate, but are seen within

a broader structure of moral concepts. The aim of the following

pages is to give a glimpse of this wider and richer ethical theory

by looking in detail at just two passages defining fundamental

moral terms which are not treated in Scito teipsum. In the first

passage, the individual virtues and their subdivisions are

identified; in the second, the various uses of the word “good”

are distinguished and a general definition of “a good thing” is

proposed.

Both are taken from the second of the two dialogues which

make up Abelard’s Collationes." (pp. 301-302)

26. ———. 1997. The Philosophy of Peter Abelard. Cambridge:

Cambridge University Press.

Paperback edition, with corrections and bibliographical note,

1999.

"The plan is simple. Part I gives a general account of Abelard as

a whole: his life, his writings and teaching and the overall shape

and growth of his thought. Part II looks at the mainly coherent,

but unsystematic philosophy which he developed in close

connection with his study of logic. Part III examines the ethical

system which binds together his theology. (pp. 2-3)

"Alongside the characteristically Abelardian doctrines there

appear, though usually with less prominence, passages which

propose or imply the traditional ideas which they replace. For

instance, talking of babies who are damned because they die

unbaptized, Abelard explains that it is no wonder that they

should be punished whilst their parents are pardoned since the

sin is transferred to them through the wicked carnal desire in

their conception;(16) and he seems to consider that it was only

after Christ descended to Hell that good pagans were freed and

allowed to enter heaven.(17) Most strikingly, a large dossier can

be assembled of references to Christ's passion, not merely as

providing the supreme and necessary example of love, but as

objectively redeeming mankind.(18) From the point of view of

Abelard's theology, these inconsistencies are evidence either of

a strange carelessness or hesitancy, or perhaps of an anxiety to

qualify a line of thinking which might be judged heretical - even

a vain attempt by Abelard to safeguard himself against the

consequences of his doctrinal radicalism. From the point of

view of Abelard's ethics, however, they are of little relevance,

because they do not imply any positions incompatible with his

moral theory. What would make Abelard's ethical theories

untenable would be an admission that God allows moral

arbitrariness: that a man can except through his own free

choice be morally blameworthy. Abelard's theology is entirely

consistent in excluding this possibility." (pp. 330-331)

(16) Comm. Rom. 173: 664-6, cited by Peppermüller, Abaelards

Auslegung, p. 117.

(17) Comm. Rom. 250: 72-7; cf. 130: 251-4 and the other

references assembled by Peppermüller, Abaelards Auslegung,

p. 112, n. 611.

(18) See above, p. 323, n. 46 and cf. Peppermüller's judicious

summary {Abaelards Auslegung, pp. 118-21).

References

Peppermüller, R., Abaelards Auslegung des Römerbriefes

(Miinster, 1972) (BGPMA n.f. 10)

27. ———. 2011. "Peter Abelard’s Theory of Virtues and its

Context." In Knowledge, Discipline and Power in the Middle

Ages. Essays in honour of David Luscombe, edited by Canning,

Joseph, King, Edmund and Staub, Martial, 231–242. Leiden:

Brill.

"Peter Abelard seems to be a thinker who fully accepted natural

virtues.

Virtues, he thought, were acquired. Basing himself on

Aristotle’s Categories, he classifies them among settled states

(habitus), and a settled state is acquired “by care and

deliberation” (studio ac deliberatione conquisita).(12) In Book

II of the Theologia Christiana (c. 1125–7), Abelard eulogizes

the ancient pagan philosophers as both the theoreticians and

the practitioners of virtues, and they are praised especially for

some of the virtues like chastity and abstinence that are often

considered exclusively Christian.(13) And, in his Collationes—a

dreamvision dialogue between a Philosopher, a Christian and a

Jew—the Philosopher, who is presented as a Gentile, someone

without any written law, is allowed to present the virtues and

their classification, which are accepted by the Christian without

demur. Abelard believes, indeed, that it is normal practice for

Christians to accept the philosophers’ account of the virtues: “It

should be noted”, he says in the Sententiae, “that the Church

Fathers (sancti) did not change either the definitions of the

virtues stated by the philosophers or their divisions into

species. Rather, they took them from the philosophers, kept

them and expounded them carefully.”(14)" (p. 235)

(12) Peter Abelard, Collationes 111; ed. and trans. John

Marenbon and Giovanni Orlandi, OMT (Oxford, 2001), p. 128.

In the Sententiae 252, ed, Luscombe, p. 133, line 2997), he

explains how a virtue is a good quality of the mind that

becomes a settled state through ‘the attachment of our mind; cf.

256 (ed. Luscombe, p. 135, line 3036): qualitatem ex

applicatione uenientem). In Scito teipsum (ed. Luscombe, p.

128), he also describes virtues as coming through per

applicacionem nostrum—by ‘our attaching them to ourselves’.

See also the commentary on the Categories (c. 1118), Peter

Abaelards philosophische Schriften, ed. Bernhard Geyer,

Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie des Mittelalters 21

(Freiburg, 1919–33), p. 227.

(13) Theologia Christiana 2.27–115; ed. Eligius Buytaert, Petri

Abaelardi opera theologica 2, CCCM 12 (Turnhout, 1969), pp.

143–84.

(14) Sententiae 252; ed. Luscombe, p. 132, lines 2992–5; cf.

Theologia Christiana 2.27, ed. Buytaert, p. 143, lines 384–8.

28. ———. 2017. "Boethius, Abelard and Anselm." In The

Cambridge History of Moral Philosophy, edited by Golob,

Sacha and Timmermann, Jens, 125–137. Cambridge:

Cambridge University Press.

Chapter 10: Boethius 125-128; Anselm: 129-132; Abelard: 132-

135; Bibliography 136-137.

"The subjects of this chapter, Boethius (476–524/525), Anselm

(1033–1109) and Abelard (1079–1142) span six centuries, as

long as the whole period between Ockham in Chapter 14 and

Wittgenstein in Chapter 50. These pages can, therefore, offer

no more than three isolated flash photographs of figures in a

landscape which, because it lies in darkness, should not be

considered unpopulated. These pictures, moreover, will not be

portrait but detail mode, focusing in each case on a single,

philosophically interesting discussion. Their purpose, it might

seem, is to show that, contrary to the impression given by most

histories, moral philosophy was flourishing in the period from

Boethius to Abelard.(1) But that, as the closing remark will

explain, would be the wrong conclusion." (p. 125, a note

omitted)

(1) I use the term ‘moral philosophy’ – in line with the title of

this whole volume – to refer in general to philosophical

thinking about values in connection with the actions of rational

(and super-rational) beings. Were the distinction to be made, as

by Williams 2010, between ethics in general and morality as a

‘peculiar institution’, then ‘moral’ would need to be replaced

throughout by ‘ethical’, but this substitution would yield some

odd results (e.g. ‘ethical psychology’) and so it has been

avoided.

References

Williams, Bernard ([1985] 2010) Ethics and the Limits of

Philosophy, London and New York: Routledge (new edition).

29. McAleer, G. J. 1995. "Reason, the Ethical Subject and Sin in the

Thought of Peter Abelard." Mediaevalia. Textos e Estudos no.

7-8:177–198.

"Abelard has a lot to say about reason and its relation to

subjectivity.(8)

Through an examination of what Abelard says about the ethical

subject and sin I hope to approach Abelard's concept of reason.

ln Section I we shall see that Abelard has a very particular

notion of reason: while reason is the core of the ethical subject,

the role of belief, revelation, and affectivity in the exercise of

reason ensures that reason in the thought of Abelard has a

richer character than that which is presented in the Modem

tradition. During this discussion it will become clear that the

ontology and epistemology of the ethical subject in Abelard is

characterized by finitude. We shall see in Section II that

Abelard consistently argues that sin is not as pervasive as it

might seem - bis position is especially clear with respect to

original sin - and this precisely because of human finitude." (p.

179)

(8) Verbeke has commented that Abelard, «represents an

important stage in the progressive disclosure of subjectivity.»

(«Peter Abelard and the Concept of Subjectivity» p. 2, in Peter

Abelard, Mediaevalia Lovaniensia, ed. E. M. Buytaert, Leuven

University Press, 1974.

30. McMahon, Kevin A. 2009. "Penance and Peter Abelard's Move

Within." Saint Anselm Journal no. 6.2:1–7.

Abstract: "Peter Abelard is perhaps best known for having

taken the role of master in the schools to celebrity status. Yet

dramatically public as his life was, the analyses he develops in

his commentary on the letter to the Romans (c. 1134) and in the

Ethica (c. 1138) of moral action, sacramental efficacy, even the

atonement, center on interior subjectivity. The rightness of an

act is determined in the first instance by the agent's intention,

and ultimately by God's. The sacraments, such as baptism and

penance, represent what God is accomplishing through his

relation to the recipient, independently of the actions

themselves or the work of the priest. Further, just as sin

involves a turning away from God, so our redemption consists

in the love aroused in us by the sacrifice of his Son. All of this

displays Abelard's capacity for analytic nuance; but it

foreshadows, too, the shift that will divide Christian theology in

the sixteenth century."

31. Murphy, Sean Eisen. 2007. "'The Law was Given for the Sake of

Life': Peter Abelard on the Law of Moses." American Catholic

Philosophical Quarterly no. 81:271–306.

Abstract: "Abelard’s most famous spokesman for the ancient

and abiding moral and religious worth of the Law of Moses is

probably the character of the Jew, invented for one of two

fictional dialogues in the Collationes. The equally fictive

Philosopher, a rationalist theist who gets the last word in his

exchange with the Jew, condemns the Law as a useless addition

to the natural law, a threat to genuine morality with a highly

dubious claim to divine origin. The Philosopher’s

condemnation, however, does not go unanswered. Abelard

himself, writing in his own voice in two major treatments of the

Law, defends the ancient worth of the Law as a revolution in

moral understanding and a potential guarantor of salvation.

The Law is just and rational, he argues, in every one of its

precepts, even when interpreted according to the letter. As

such, the letter of the Law has been and ought to be retained in

Christianity: its moral precepts are binding everywhere and

always; its non-moral precepts are binding, when, in the

changing circumstances of the Church, they are found to be

useful and not conducive to scandal."

32. Normore, Calvin. 2004. "Abelard's Stoicism and its

Consequences." In Stoicism: Traditions and Transformations,

edited by Strange, Steven K. and Zupko, Jack, 132–147.

Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

"In this chapter I want to make one piece of what would have to

be a much more complex argument to be complete. My larger

thesis is that Peter Abelard is as close to Stoicism as a Christian

could be and that in his case this is not some independent

rediscovery of Stoic ideas but a self-conscious taking up of them

with profound consequences for later medieval philosophy. I

stake this claim as a claim about Abelard’s positions in a variety

of areas, including logic – hence my ambiguous title. Here and

now I want to focus just on one theme in Abelard’s ethics, to

discuss Abelard’s views on it, to argue that it is a Stoic theme in

a Stoic context, and to trace part of its fortuna into the

fourteenth century.

That there is some connection between Peter Abelard’s ethical

views and Stoicism is widely accepted. In his 1983 monograph,

The Presence of Stoicism in Medieval Thought, Gerard Verbeke

devotes a couple of pages to the comparison of Abelard’s views

with those of the Stoics. He finds that they agree on

emphasizing the role of internal factors in moral responsibility

and he finds that the Philosopher in Abelard’s Collationes holds

a largely Stoic brief, emphasizing the role of natural law, the

view that virtue is happiness, and the strict unity of the virtues.

Verbeke concludes, “Like so many other positions which he

develops, these views show that the Philosopher’s main

inspiration is Stoic.”(1) I want to take up Verbeke’s claim and to

make more precise the sense in which Abelard’s ethics is Stoic

by focusing on one central theme in it. First, then, one part of

Abelard’s ethics." (pp. 132-133)

(1) Verbeke 1983: 53.

References

Verbeke, Gerard. 1983. The Presence of Stoicism in Medieval

Thought. Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America

Press.

33. Otten, Williemien. 2005. "In Conscience’s Court: Abelard’s

Ethics as a Science of the Self." In Virtue and Ethics in the

Twelfth Century, edited by Bejczy, István and Newhauser,

Richard G. Leiden: Brill.

"Building on Clanchy’s and Marenbon’s analyses, I want to

undertake in this essay a further probing of the ethical nature

of Abelard’s thought situated not just against the broad

background of his own rational views, but also against the

backdrop of twelfth-century intellectual culture. More

specifically, I want to see how Abelard’s ethical interest fits in

with his reputation as moine manqué, or rather, I want to see

what provoked his choice to perceive himself as such.(7) That

he does so is crystal clear to me, even if the “why” is as yet

undetermined. One only needs to look at his final letter to

Heloise, in which he not only urges her to win the crown of

glory, to be the perfect nun and virgin, but also seems

convinced that she is fully capable of doing so.(8) The very

point of her monastic work (in the sense of opus dei) seems at

least in part to be that she thereby enhances his personal

chance of salvation. Even if her only deed were to accomplish

the setting free of his soul, the soul of her one and only soul-

mate, so the subtext of his exhortation reads, she will have

fulfilled her monastic duties uccessfully.(9) But what about his

monastic life, then? More concretely, what is the impact of

monastic life on his ethical thinking?" (p. 55)

(7) One could argue that in addition to a moine manqué,

Abelard is an abbé manqué as well, as was suggested to me

during the conference by Prof. Marcia Colish. In reference to

the analysis which my article “The Bible and the Self ” unfolds,

it is relevant to highlight that it analyzes Otloh’s and Abelard’s

autobiography by treating them as an “autohagiography” and

an “automartyrology,” respectively. In my “Autobiography and

the Dialectic of the Self,” Proceedings of the Patristic

Mediaeval and Renaissance Conference, Villanova University

19–20 (1994–96): 177–87, I have nuanced my position by

arguing that Abelard’s position oscillates in fact between

adopting an automartyrological and an autohagiographical tone

of voice.

(8) See Otten, “The Bible and the Self,” 142–46.

References

Willemien Otten, “The Bible and the Self in Medieval

Autobiography: Otloh of St. Emmeram (1010–1070) and Peter

Abelard (1079–1142),” in The Whole and Divided Self: The

Bible and Theological Anthropology, ed. David E. Aune and

John McCarthy (New York, 1997), 130–57.

34. Perkams, Matthias. 2001. Liebe als Zentralbegriff der Ethik

nach Peter Abaelard. Münster: Aschendorff.

35. Porter, Jean. 2000. "Responsibility, Passion, and Sin: A

Reassessment of Abelard's Ethics." Journal of Religious Ethics

no. 28:367–394.

Abstract: "This article reassesses Peter Abelard's account of

moral intention, or, better, consent, in light of recent work on

his own thought and on the twelfth-century background of that

thought. The author argues (1) that Abelard's focus on consent

as the determining factor for morality does not rule out, but, on

the contrary, presupposes objective criteria for moral judgment

and (2) that Abelard's real innovation does not lie in his

doctrine of consent as the sole source of merit or guilt, but,

rather, in his exploration of the ways in which this doctrine

affects our understanding of the objective criteria for moral

judgment. In particular, Abelard is led by his doctrine of

consent to a thoroughgoing reassessment of the moral

significance of the passions, which, in turn, leads him to reject

the view that actions should be evaluated in terms of the

praiseworthy or vicious character of the passions they express."

36. Pranger, M. B. 2005. "Medieval Ethics and the Illusion of

Interiority: Augustine, Anselm, Abelard." In Virtue and Ethics

in the Twelfth Century, edited by Bejczy, István and

Newhauser, Richard G., 13–32. Leiden: Brill.

"In conclusion I want to discuss briefly Abelard’s notion of

intentionality which seems to do away with the entire

Augustinian, and certainly with the Anselmian, setting.

On the face of it there is not so much cause for worry since

Abelard follows a long, patristic tradition which links sustained

acting (perseverantia) to willing: non incoepisse sed perfecisse

virtutis est. For Abelard, too, endorsing Hugh of Saint Victor,

action was part and parcel of a good will: perficere donum est

bonae voluntati factum adiungere, paraphrased by David

Luscombe as: “when the opportunity to act is present, there can

be no meritorious will which does not proceed to act.”(25)

There is one big stumbling block, however, and that is the

notion of intention as neutralising the objective good- or

badness of an act and making it dependent on a particular point

of view. Recently István Bejczy has pointed out the

inconsistencies in Abelard’s use of intention, in particular the

amorality of acts resulting from it on the one hand, and the bad

or good nature of acts on the other, thus making the morality of

the agent’s intention “depend on the morality of his act rather

than the reverse.”(26) This is a contradiction in terms that, as

Bejczy demonstrates with relentless logic, has been

insufficiently noticed, or smoothed over by many a respectable

scholar.

As far as intentionality is concerned, one cannot have one’s

cake and eat it too. Thus, it would seem inconsistent to

maintain that sin is a consent to evil without “presupposing a

notion of evil which is independent from consent itself and

hence from human intentions.”(27)

“Deeds cannot,” as some interpreters of Abelard have it, “be

objectively right or wrong but virtuous or sinful on account of

the agent’s intention since Abelard made no such

distinction.”(28)" (pp. 28-29)

(25) David E. Luscombe, The School of Peter Abelard

(Cambridge, 1969), 194; see also István P. Bejczy, “Deeds

Without Value: Exploring a Weak Spot in Abelard’s Ethics,”

Recherches de théologie et philosophie médiévales 70 (2003):

11.

(26) Bejczy, “Deeds Without Value,” 16.

(27) Ibid., 13.

(28) Ibid., 17.

37. Rijk, Lambertus Marie de. 1986. "Abelard and moral

philosophy." Medioevo no. 12:1–27.

"When speaking of ethics in this connection, we are not

referring to a 'doctrine on human behaviour'; rather it is to be

understood as the philosophical (or theological) pursuit

concerning the justification of such a theory. Beforehand it

must be said that Abelard's Ethica seu Scito te ipsum can be

regarded as a theological work in being part of the curriculum

presented in theological training. The central question this

work deals with can be expressed as follows: what are the exact

standards by which human behaviour is judged good or evil?

One should not ask whether Abelard's Ethics is a theological or

philosophical work, for that is not the point. As we have already

mentioned, ethics was part of theological enquiry and teaching.

This answer is not a final one, however. For Abelard's

conception of theology was such that philosophy, as an ultimate

rational justification, was certainly admitted to theology, but,

moreover, it even implied that philosophy was an essential

constituent of fundamental theological enquiry. We must

examine his Ethics in detail in order to see how Abelard in fact

discusses the issue." (p. 1)

38. Ruys, Juanita Feros. 2008. "Heloise, Monastic Temptation, and

Memoria: Rethinking Autobiography, Sexual Experience, and

Ethics." In Sexuality in the Middle Ages and Early Modern

Times: New Approaches to a Fundamental Cultural-Historical

and Literary-Anthropological Theme, edited by Classen,

Albrecht, 383–404. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter.

"Monastic temptation is discussed in a range of early patristic

writings (Paul, Augustine, Jerome, the Life of Antony, Gregory

the Great), but I believe Cassian is Heloise’s prime source.

Cassian was the medieval authority with regard to nocturnal

emissions,(9) and would have been entirely familiar to Heloise

since, according to the Benedictine Rule, nuns would hear a

daily reading from the Conferences prior to Compline.(10)

Moreover, as will be discussed in greater detail below, Heloise’s

statement of her temptation clearly parallels Cassian’s

confession of his own hankering after worldly stories, her

arguments on hypocrisy are drawn from his discussion in

Conference XII. XI “Quod multum intersit inter continentiam

et castitatem” (That there is a great difference between chastity

and continence), and when Abelard replies to Heloise’s claims

of sexual temptation and hypocrisy in his Ep. V, he takes

precisely the line articulated by Cassian in Conference XII. V,

thus indicating that both their arguments are founded in this

common monastic source." (p. 385)

(9) Kenneth C. Russell notes the statistic that around “ten

percent of Cassian’s total production” in the Institutes and

Conferences deals with issues of monastic sexual temptation,

“John Cassian on a Delicate Subject,” Cistercian Studies

Quarterly 27 (1992): 1–12; here 1, n. 1.

(10) RB 1980: The Rule of St Benedict, ed. Timothy Fry

(Collegeville, MN: The Liturgical Press, 1981), XLII, 242: “si

tempus fuerit prandii, mox surrexerint a cena, sedeant omnes

in unum et legat unus Collationes vel Vitas Patrum aut certe

aliud quod aedificet audientes . . . . Si autem ieiunii dies fuerit,

dicta vespera parvo intervallo mox accedant ad lectionem

Collationum, ut diximus.”

39. ———. 2014. The Repentant Abelard: Family, Gender, and

Ethics in Peter Abelard’s Carmen ad Astralabium and

Planctus. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

"The Structure of This Book

This book offers a complete study of Abelard’s Carmen ad

Astralabium and Planctus. It begins with a literary and

conceptual analysis of these texts, taking into account how they

reflect Abelard’s thought as evidenced elsewhere in his

writings, as well as how they extend, question, and complicate

his earlier ideas.

For the Carmen I explore issues of theme and style in order to

counter the popular perception that this poem is merely a

meandering collection of unremarkable sentential advice. On

the contrary, I argue that it constitutes a compact summary of

the ethical thought of an original and innovative thinker, its

ideas woven intimately together, flowing through and more

often over the traditional elegiac hexameter form of its verse.

To this end, I indicate how it differs in significant ways from

other didactic compositions and compilations circulating in late

eleventh- and early twelfth-century Europe.

(...)

For the Planctus, I concentrate on how the laments function as

a series of six in the Vatican manuscript in which they are

transmitted. As with the Carmen, my intention is to indicate

how Abelard modifies an existing genre to imbue it with new

thematic and stylistic possibilities. This necessitates a

consideration of what function these poems may have been

intended to have for Heloise—whether primarily personal or

liturgical—and indeed, whether their composition had any

particular meaning for Abelard himself in terms of consolation

for his own sorrows. Defending the order of the laments as they

appear in the sole existing manuscript of the series, I trace the

thematic developments that run through them, particularly in

terms of Abelard’s exploration of gender and the question of

vice and virtue. With regard to Abelard’s stylistic innovations in

the planctus genre, I consider the way he multiplies and

manipulates the speaking voices in his laments to convey his

difficult and complex messages. In conclusion, I suggest that

the Planctus as a whole express Abelard’s view that earthly

lamentation is ultimately futile and that consolation will be

found only in the next life.

(...)

In addition, I provide a line-by-line commentary for both the

Carmen and Planctus. My aims here are to explain concepts or

constructions whose meaning might not be readily apparent

and to highlight how these reflect, or perhaps refract, Abelard’s

thought as expressed elsewhere in his writings." (pp. 5-6)

40. Schultz, Janice L. 1996. "An Abelardian Reconstruction

Reconsidered." American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly no.

70:275–286.

"In an article in the ACPA Quarterly, "Abelardian Ethics

Reconstructed," Lance Simmons argues that the moral quality

of consent is determined by intention exclusively insofar as

intention consists in an

attitude of charity or cupidity.(4)That is, since works or deeds

are indifferent, they can morally specify neither consent nor

intention; since intention establishes the moral value of

consent yet cannot itself depend

upon the goodness or badness of actions, its moral quality must

be determined by whether or not one acts out of an attitude of

charity or cupidity." (pp. 275-276)

(...)

"Although such a position appears to conform to the spirit of

the claim that acts as such are indifferent, it not only falls prey

to the standard arguments against relativism; it also militates

against other claims proffered by Abelard." (pp, 276-277)

41. Simmons, Lance. 1993. "Abelardian Ethics Reconstructed."

Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical

Association no. 67:231–240.

"In this paper, I propose to set forth as clearly as possible

Abelard's moral theory, and in the process show that the most

common objection against the theory fails. I will argue that to

the extent that the negative modern consensus about

Abelardian ethics rests on this common objection, that

consensus is ill-founded. Any decisive rejoinder to Abelard

must go beyond the common objection.

In what follows, I will offer a sympathetic rational

reconstruction of Abelard's moral theory, rather than a

straightforward explication of the texts. My own exposition

thus remains grounded in but reorders and in some ways goes

beyond Abelard's own formulations. While this may give

Abelardian ethics the feel of something like an axiomatized

formal system, it will avoid many of the interpretive problems

that the original texts pose." (p. 231)

42. ———. 1996. "An Abelardian Reconsideration Rebutted."

American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly no. 70:287–289.

"Janice Schultz [*] criticizes my reconstruction of Abelardian

ethics on two counts: She claims that it is unduly subjectivist in

its own right, and that in any case it distorts the moral theory

actually held by Abelard (who was not as subjectivist as I

suppose). In this brief reply, I will show that Schultz offers

inadequate support for these two criticisms. I will show that the

first criticism misstates my views and that the second criticism

is based upon Schultz's own interpretation of the Scito te ipsum

rather than upon the text itself. Perhaps Schultz's two criticisms

can be justified in other ways, but as things stand they are not

justified." (p. 287)

[*] An Abelardian Reconstruction Reconsidered, same volume.

43. Sweeney, Eileeen C. 2016. "Abelard's Christian Socratism." In A

Companion to Medieval Christian Humanism: Essays on

Principal Thinkers, edited by Bequette, John P., 101–121.

Leiden: Brill.

"It was Etienne Gilson who coined the term “Christian

Socratism.” He did so not to apply it to Abelard but rather to

patristic and 12th century figures like Hugh of St. Victor.(1)

Hugh explicitly makes the Socratic maxim “Know Thyself” his

own at the opening of the Didascalicon, connecting self-

knowledge to knowledge of nature and God. On this view, the

vocation of the Christian is not to forsake self or nature for God

but rather to find God in self and nature. In this way, the works

of the pre-Christian world are integrated into the program of

Christian education and even Christian theology. Thus

“Christian Socratism” leads fairly directly to “Christian

humanism,” the subject of this volume.

Showing that Abelard is a humanist and Socratist might seem

an easy task. Abelard takes as the title of his ethics, “Know

Thyself,” and constructs an ethics that in an extreme way

focuses not on the external standards for moral action but on

the individual’s internal act as the core of moral value.

He clearly places great emphasis on the individual’s free

consent as conferring morality on the act and, indeed, moral

dignity on the person." (p. 101)

(1) Etienne Gilson, The Spirit of Medieval Philosophy, trans.

A.H.C. Downes (New York: 1936), 209.

I have also argued that, though in a different way, the term

could also be applied to Anselm.

See Eileen C. Sweeney, Anselm of Canterbury and the Desire

for the Word (Washington, D.C.: 2012), 35–36.

44. Tomasic, Thomas M. . 1972. "William of St. Thierry against

Peter Abelard: A dispute on the meaning of being a person."

Analecta Cistercensia no. 28:3–76.

"In 1138, William of Saint -Thierry interrupted the writing of

his Expositio super Cantica canticorum to pen one of the most

scathing and effective critiques in the Middle Ages, namely, the

Disputatio adversus Petrum Abaelardum ad Gaufridum

Carnotensem et Bernardum, which successfully initiated the

condemnation of Abelard's Theologia (in (William's words , the

« nova novi theologi theologia » ) at the Council of Sens in 1140

(1). The central concern of this paper is to discover why

William, who only three years earlier withdrew from the abbacy

of Saint-Thierry to become a secluded Cistercian at Signy,

should have been to terribly disturbed by the « new »

theological paths blazed by Abelard. Taken by itself, the

Disputatio does not provide the solution, the sufficient

explanation or motivation for its having been written; nor does

a careful reading of Abelard's Theologia, faithful to the Western

tradition in its treatment of faith and the Trinity, suggest any

solution.

There is nothing per se heretical in Abelard's teaching, yet the

divergence in theological positions is presented by William as

one of radical and irreconcilable opposition. What, then, is the

justification for William's writing the Disputatio ? Is it

sufficient an explanation to propose that the Disputatio is

simply another instance of monastic theology fighting a losing

battle for its life against scholastic theology ? Perhaps it may

not be altogether presumptuous to suggest that the Disputatio

does not occur in a vacuum, that it reflect, with great

impatience, some eighteen years of ascetical thought on

William's part and is meant, therefore, to defend negatively a

distinct theological frame of mind against an adverse mentality.

William's works, from beginning to end, form a consistent,

coherent program; thus, placed within the total context of

William's thinking, the Disputatio must be understood as a

defense, without explicit development in itself, of some

fundamental motif that underlies all his works. Hence, the

reason why William felt compelled to write the Disputatio

cannot be properly grasped without comprehending the

rationale of the De contemplando Deo, the De natura et

dignitate amoris ( c . 1120 ), the Meditativae orationes ( c .

1130 ), the Expositio in Epistolam ad Romanos (c . 1133 ), and

the Expositio super Cantica canticorum ( 1138 ) . And since

William did not intend the Disputatio to be his last word on the

nature of the controversy, it must be understood not only in the

light of these preceding works, but also in full view of the

Speculum fidei and the Aenigma fidei ( 1139 ), in which

William provides positive and extended articulation of his

position against Abelard." (pp. 3-4)

(1) Migne, PL 182, 531-533 and 180, 249-282.

45. Valente, Luisa. 2015. "Happiness, Contemplative Life, and the

tria genera hominum in Twelfth-Century Philosophy: Peter

Abelard and John of Salisbury." Quaestio. Journal of the

History of Metaphysics no. 15:73–98.

"In the first section of this article I will provide an outline of the

substantial discussion about true happiness as beatific vision as

is found in Peter Abelard’s Collationes or Dialogus inter

philosophum, iudaeum et christianum. In the following

sections, I will present some twelfth-century triads of genera

hominum, in which the ideal of the philosophical life plays a

significant role." (p. 74)

(...)

"The Abelardian thesis that the most speculative philosophical

life is the best and the happiest life is, as we can see, part of a

wider anthropology which grows from many different roots:

Platonic (Timaeus and Republic), Neoplatonist (Porphyrius

and Macrobius), roman-Stoic (Seneca), and Patristic

(Augustine in primis), to be more precise. Its basic intention

seems to reside not in a comparison or distinction between

Christian and pagan, i.e. religious and rational ideals of life and

happiness, but in an amalgamation of them through a

demonstration of their basic correspondence. The Christian

contemplative ideal is, according to Peter Abelard, the same as

that of the best amongst the ancient philosophers." (p. 82)

46. Verbeke, Gerard. 1974. "Peter Abelard and the Concept of

Subjectivity." In Peter Abelard. Proceedings of the

International Conference: Louvain, May 10-12, 1971, edited by

Buytaert, Eligius Marie, 1–11. Leuven: Leuven University Press.

"ln the framework of Abelard's ethics, self-knowledge certainly

becomes a basic rule of moral behaviour. Opposing the merely

external judgment of a moral act as it was usual in the Libri

poenitentiales; Abelard advocates the importance of the

internal disposition of the subject. lnstead of looking at a

behaving in its external perceptible structure, our author points

to the subjectivity of the acting individual; what matters in our

moral activity is essentially whether or not there was free

consent and whether our intention was right or wrong(5).

A mere tendency or inclination couldn't be really sinful, nor

could the moral character of a deed depend upon the result

taken its materiality(6) According to Abelard, moral

responsibility always involves free consent to what we are

doing: it is incompatible with compulsion or ignorance

concerning the real nature of our act. The question arises

whether it is possible to do something wrong with right

intention and whether this intention modifies the moral

character of our act to the extent that as a whole it becomes

good.

The answer obviously depends upon the meaning given to the

expression "a good intention": according to Abelard a good

intention is incompatible with a wrong act as far as it is known

to wrong; except the case of ignorance or mistake, a right

intention always refers to an act that is really valuable(7)" (pp.

4-5)

(5) Ethics (ed. D. E. Luscombe). p. 22,33-24. I.(...)

(6) O.c., p. 24, 1-2(...)

(7) O.c. p. 54, 20-21(...)

47. Vess, Deborah. 2000. "Abelard on Meaning and Usage: Some

Implications for the Ethics." The Modern Schoolman no.

77:217–234.

"Peter Abelard's brilliant critique of the realism of William of

Champeaux was so devastating that few indeed have dared

defend any of the versions then in circulation. Nevertheless.

William of Champeaux himself must have derived some

comfort from the tension between Abelard's thorough-going

logical nominalism, with respect to the signification of

universals, and his modified realism, with respect to their

initial cause of imposition. This tension is present throughout

Abelard's work; yet as his thought on meaning evolved, the role

of context and communal usage became increasingly

prominent. An examination of Abelard's development of

context and usage in the logical treatises helps to resolve some

of the more puzzling aspects not only of his logical treatises, but

also of his ethical and theological theories." (p. 217)

48. Wilks, Ian. 1997. "The Role of Virtue Theory and Natural Law

in Abelard's Ethical Writings." Proceedings of the American

Catholic Philosophical Association no. 71:137–149.

"If we completely reject the intuitive way of formulating moral

rules in terms of good actions and bad, where are we left? This

intuitive way affords at least a very objective starting point for

moral theory (since acts can be physically described, and so

good acts can be physically distinguished from bad), and it is

not immediately clear that an ethics of intention alone can do

the same. Say we accept that good and bad reside only in

intention; "What then," asks Gilson, "makes the intention itself

good? Is it our conviction that we do well, that in acting as we

do act we please God? These are certainly excellent and even

necessary dispositions, but ... we shall see that they do not

suffice."(10) If what matters for Abelard is not what we do, but,

as it were, the frame of mind in which we do it, there seems a

great danger that his theory may collapse into moral

subjectivism.

As it happens, there is much to be said against this line of

criticism. It seems to derive largely from an overly piecemeal

approach to Abelard's ethical writings, which arises from

excessive, if not exclusive, focus on the Ethica, and from

corresponding failure to afford proper consideration to the

Dialogus inter philosophum, Iudaeum et Christianum. In the

latter we find, among other things, an extended discussion of

virtue theory which fills some of the gaps that undoubtedly do

present themselves in the Ethica; it is only by studying these

two works side by side that we have a chance of extracting a full

and satisfying account of ethical theory from Abelard. (11)" (p.

138)

(10) Etienne Gilson, L'esprit de la philosophie médiévale, 2nd

ed. (Paris: 1. Vrin, 1944), 330; the translation is from A. H. C.

Downes, trans., The Spirit of Mediaeval Philosophy (New York:

Charles Scribner's Sons, 1940), 349.

(11) At first sight this may seem a rather unpromising

approach; Alisdair MacIntyre considers what he rightly calls

"Abelard's retreat into interiority" to be unfertile ground for the

development of virtue theory (After Virtue, 2nd ed., Notre

Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1984], 168, 170-71). As

I hope will become evident, Abelard's virtue theory is relevant

to his deontological ethics because of the significant role

attributed in the latter to human vice.

49. ———. 2012. "Moral Intention." In The Oxford Handbook of

Medieval Philosophy, edited by Marenbon, John, 588–604.

New York Oxford University Press.

"Two figures of that era achieve centrality in the history of this

matter: Peter Abelard and William of Ockham, who alike adopt

the strong position of claiming that only moral intention, not

ensuing action, is a suitable basis for moral judgement. This

shared thesis is pivotal in their respective moral theories and

produces between them what deserves to be considered a fairly

distinctive strand of moral theory within the larger setting of

medieval thought. When centuries later Immanuel Kant

famously claims that ‘a good will is not good because of what it

effects or accomplishes, because of its fitness to attain some

proposed end, but only because of its volition’ (Kant 1996 50),

he is revisiting this kind of Abelardian and Ockhamist outlook.

This outlook seems to belong neither to virtue theory nor

natural law theory—the two staples of medieval moral

speculation—and, in a Kantian setting, is not necessarily

associated with either. It will be the business of this chapter to

consider the early evidence of this strand of moral theory in the

writings of St Augustine and St Anselm, and then too bserve it

as it achieves full expression in the writings of Abelard and

Ockham." (p. 588)

References

Kant, Immanuel. 1996. ‘Groundwork of the metaphysics of

morals,’ trans. and ed. Mary J. Gregor. In Practical Philosophy,

ed. Allan Wood. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

50. Williams, Paul. 1980. The Moral Philosophy of Peter Abelard.

Lanham: University Press of America.

Table of Contents: I. Introduction 1; II. Abelard's Self

Presentation 11; III. The Realm of Reason; 45; IV. The

Goodness of God and the Dignit of man 63; V. The Gift of Grace

85; VI. The Trinity 91; VII. The Person of Christ 103; VIII. The

Vindication of Pagan Philosophy 111; IX. The Objective Basis of

Abelard's Subjective Ethics 125; X, The Meaning of Christ's

Work 151; Bibliography 173-185.

"It is the intended purpose of this study to approach Abelard’s

doctrine of Christ's work on its own terms and in context with

the general direction of his thought. But one can only

accomplish this by subterranean means, by probing beneath

the surface in order to uncover the motivating reason behind

his rejection of extreme realism and the doctrine of original sin,

as well as the fundamental intentionality behind his vindication

of pagan philosophy and the utilization of the dialectic. It is in

such acts of intention and meaning that the stance and selfhood

of a person are revealed. Selfhood, Robinson writes, is

constituted by a commitment to a context. (7) And Abelard

reveals himself as one committed to a strict following of all the

injunctions of the most uncompromising interpretation of the

Christian calling.

(...)

Abelard proceeds to the next stage of his thought which is an

elaboration of a rigorist system of ethics with its sharp

emphasis upon man's complete accountability for the character

of his life. Virtue, he argues in line with his logical conclusions,

is a natural quality acquired by human effort. It is not, as the

realists maintain, something synonymous with grace. A man

becomes virtuous by struggling to attain virtue, not by a passive

participation in this quality. Without the struggle, he

maintained, there can be no crown.

Abelard's charted course never alters. It is anchored in his rigid

commitment. Thus, he leads one step-by-step to the foot of the

cross and his "subjective" view of the Atonement which is the

final station of his thought." (pp. 4-5)

(...)

"And yet, his celebrated theory which has prompted pages upon

pages of exposition consists of only a few meager paragraphs in

his Commentary on Romans. Abelard never set out to fully

elaborate this doctrine, and, for this reason, it remained a brief

excursus on the question of redemption. And yet — as St.

Bernard rightly perceived — this is the very heart of

Abelardianism. His view of the Summum Bonum, his Logos

theology, his ethics, and even his logical views are knotted

together in these three terse paragraphs.[*] Abelard simply

could not mouth the Pauline view of Christ's work. And so, he

struggled to equate God's justice (iustitia) with His love

(charitatis) by a bizarre twisting of the apostle's words. He

writes: "Ad ostensionem suae iustitiae, id est charitatis, quae

nos, ut dictum est, apud eum iustificat, id est ad exhibendam

nobis suam dilectionem, vel ad insinuandum nobis quantum

eum diligere debeamus, qui proprio Filio suo non pepercit pro

nobis."(9) Christ died, he asserts, not to meet the demands of

God's justice, but to fulfill the demands of His love. His

intransigent moral sense necessitated his manipulation of the

apostle’s meaning. His moral perspective challenged the faith

which he cherished, and eventually caused his condemnation."

(p. 6)

(7) James M. Robinson, A New Quest of the Historical Jesus

(London: SCM Press, 1971), p. 46.

(9) Epist. ad Romanos, II, 833B.

[* See in particular the Question at 3.26, English translation:

Peter Abelard, Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans,

translated by Steven R. Cartwright, Washington, D.C.: The

Catholic University Press of America 2011, Book II, pp. 164-

168)

51. Zimmerman, Elizabeth. 2006. ""It is Not the Deed but the

Intention of the Doer". The Ethic of Intention and Consent in

the First Two Letters of Heloise." Forum for Modern Language

Studies no. 42:249–267.

"At a young age, Heloise’s supreme intellect ‘‘made her most

renowned throughout the realm’’,(99) while ‘‘as prioress of

Argenteuil, an ancient and royal convent, and then as abbess of

the successful new foundation of the Paraclete, Heloise had

reached the pinnacle of independence for a woman.’’(100) Her

letters demonstrate that Heloise did not leave off the

philosophical life even after the calamitous events which

followed her affair with Abelard. Rather, she closely examined

her life’s events through the lens of an ethic that she considered

and developed in her first two letters to Abelard. Through her

analysis and application of the ethic of intention, she contrasts

her intentions and inner truths with her actions and outward

appearance. While she concludes that the discrepancy between

these two leaves her a hypocrite, she also believes that she is

fundamentally innocent due to the purity of her intention. Her

experience and her understanding of it provide significant

insight into both the thoughts of a twelfth-century abbess

struggling with contemporary philosophical and theological

issues, as well as a woman attempting to make peace with a life

to which she did not fully consent." (p. 264)

(99) Historia Calamitatum, ed. Hicks, p. 10; trans. Radice &

Clanchy, p. 10.

(100) Clanchy, Abelard: A Medieval Life, p. 156.

Bibliographia. Annotated bibliographies

Raul Corazzon || rc@ontology.co || Info

Bibliography of the Medieval

Theories of Mental Language (First

part)

Studies in English (A- Kel)

1. Adams, Marilyn McCord. 1978. "Ockham's Theory of Natural

Signification." The Monist no. 61:444-459.

"Ockham is called a nominalist because he identifies universals

with names. But there are different kinds of names and a

variety of forms of nominalism. One sort says that universals

are names whose meaning is ultimately to be explained in

terms of the conventions of linguistic communities.

Ockham appears never to have taken such a "nominalism of

convention" very seriously.

(...)

Ockham himself distinguishes signs that signify by convention

from those that signify naturally. Conventional signs are

imposed to signify what the corresponding natural signs

signify. Hence, the ultimate explanation of why names signify

anything at all, and why they signify the things they do, is not to

be given in terms of conventions that depend upon the human

will and could have been otherwise than they are, but in terms

of a natural relation between concepts and things. In what

follows, I shall try to arrive at a fuller understanding of

Ockham's nominalism by investigating his theory of natural

signification." (p. 444)

(...)

"The proper names of Ockham's mental language are really

more analogous to Russell's logically proper names, since they

are the cognitions in which we apprehend or can apprehend

particulars immediately and for the first time. In Russell's

terminology, in such cognitions we know particulars "by

acquaintance" and "by description." Ockham allows that we can

compound various simple cognitions of imagination and

memory together to arrive at a composite concept that is proper

to Socrates and by means of which we conceive of him as

having a certain color, shape, location, etc.30 And these

concepts would be a closer analogue in Ockham's theory of

Russell's alleged truncated descriptions. And just as Russell

takes it for granted that such descriptions are very often

uniquely satisfied, so Ockham tacitly assumes that such

composite concepts are proper even though their simple

components are not, because many things may be actually

similar to one simple concept, while one actual thing is more

similar to the whole composite than any other actual thing is."

(p. 453)

2. ———. 1987. William Ockham. Notre Dame: University of

Notre Dame Press.

On mental languasge see pp. 71–141, 289–298 and 348–351.

"Chapter 9: Evaluation of Ockham's Ontological Program.

Ockham's notorious ontological program is supposed to "turn

things (res) into names.'' In the first and more famous half

(examined in chapters 1-4 above), he argues that universals are

nothing other than names-primarily concepts that naturally

signify many particulars indifferently. Then, turning to the

logically independent issue of how many fundamentally

different kinds of things there are, he argues that-from the

viewpoint of natural reason-nothing created is a thing (res)

really distinct from substances and qualities. His own thesis is

that Aristotle's ten categories classify not things, but names and

represent ten fundamentally distinct ways of· signifying

particular substances and qualities. Now that considerations for

and against distinct quantity- relation-, and quality-things have

been examined and weighed (in chapters 5-8 above), it is time

to consider two general objections to Ockham 's program and

its resultant ontology: the first, to the effect that its difficulties

are insuperable; the second that it carries no compensating

advantages. I shall argue that Ockham need not accept either

charge." (p. 287)

3. Amerini, Fabrizio. 2009. "William of Ockham and Mental

Synonymy: The Case of Nugation." Franciscan Studies no.

67:375-403.

"In recent years an important point of discussion among the

scholars of William of Ockham has been the possibility of

accounting for a reductionist interpretation of Ockham’s

mental language. Especially, the debate focused on the

legitimacy of eliminating connotative simple terms from mental

language by reducing them to their nominal definition. The

distinction between absolute and connotative terms plays an

important role in Ockham’s philosophy of language. Ockham

introduces it as a subdivision of the class of categorematic

terms, i.e. of the terms provided with signification, and such a

distinction overlaps that between concrete and abstract terms.

In the Summa Logicae, Part I, chap. 10, devoted to the

explanation of such a distinction, Ockham makes three major

claims concerning connotative terms." (pp. 375-376, two notes

omitted)

4. ———. 2013. "Thomas Aquinas on Mental Language."

Medioevo. Rivista di storia della filosofia medievale no. 38:77-

110.

Abstract: "Many scholars noted that Thomas Aquinas has been

very elusive about mental language. Neither a full-fledged

theory of mental language nor an accurate description of what

happens in our mind when we speak or we listen to a given

language can be found in his works. I fundamentally agree with

this judgment; nonetheless I think that Aquinas had something

important to say about mental language. My purpose in the

article is to show that Aquinas endorsed a version of the so-

called “Language of Thought Hypothesis”. Influenced by

Boethius, Aquinas seems to believe that our thought is

primitively linguistic and provided with a natural grammar that

is narrower than those of the different spoken and written

languages. If our thought had no language-like articulation,

Aquinas seems to argue, we could not be able to form and

proficiently speak any language. I give arguments to show, in

particular, that Aquinas adopted a functional explanation of the

acts of thought and a compositional description of their

contents. On Aquinas’ texts, mental language is articulated on

two-levels, i.e., that of the natural concepts derived, by

abstraction, from the extramental world and that of the logical

operations that our mind can carry out on such concepts.

Unlike Robert Pasnau, I think that Aquinas would be prepared

to accept that the mere possession of concepts and mental

operations is a necessary and sufficient condition to translate

immediately our thought into a spoken and written language."

5. ———. 2017. "Ockham on mental syncategoremata." In The

Language of Thought in Late Medieval Philosophy: Essays in

Honor of Claude Panaccio, edited by Pelletier, Jenny and

Roques, Magali, 149-168. Dordrecht: Springer.

Abstract: "Many scholars have argued that Ockham changes his

mind on the nature of mental syncategoremata when he moves

from his early to his late theory of concepts. If, in the first

theory (the so-called fictum theory), Ockham describes mental

syncategoremata as linguistic concepts that are abstracted from

spoken language, in the second theory (the so-called actus

theory), he describes them as signs of the mind, naturally co-

signifying the same things that the mental categoremata to

which they apply naturally signify. In this essay, I want to give

some arguments to prove that while Ockham indisputably

modifies his position on the nature of concepts, he does not

depart from his early explanation of the formation and function

of mental syncategoremata. I shall focus especially on his

Quodlibet IV, q. 35, which dates to a later period of his career.

It is a significant text, for in it Ockham reaffirms the view he

established in the early Ordinatio."

6. ———. 2022. "Ockham and Chatton on the Origin of Logical

Concepts." In Thinking and Calculating: Essays in Logic, Its

History and Its Philosophical Applications in Honour of

Massimo Mugnai, edited by Ademollo, Francesco, Amerini,

Fabrizio and De Risi, Vincenzo, 185-203. Cham (Switzerland):

Springer.

"In Ockham’s vocabulary, syncategoremata designate logical

operators: connectives (et, vel, sed, etc.), quantifiers (omnis,

quidam, aliquis, nullus, etc.), exceptive, exclusive, reduplicative

particles (e.g. preter, solum, in quantum, etc.), the copula (est),

adverbs and all the modes, grammatical as well as logical (e.g.

necessario, possibile, per se, formaliter, etc.), which affect the

semantics of terms and, in consequence, the truth-value of

propositions." (p. 185, a note omitted)

(...)

"I shall reconsider Ockham’s position in the first part of this

paper, while offering an overview of syncategoremata in

Ockham’s texts.(4) I shall argue that his early account of the

origin and nature of syncategorematic concepts may be

reconciled with his second theory of concepts. On the other

hand, someone who was not of this opinion was Walter

Chatton, a confrère of Ockham at London and Oxford. Chatton

vigorously reacted to Ockham’s early explanation of

syncategorematic concepts.)5) According to Chatton, such

concepts do not signify conventionally, but naturally. Chatton

considers the actus-theory of concepts to be incompatible with

the Ordinatio explanation of the origin and nature of

syncategorematic concepts. I shall reconstruct Chatton’s

criticism in the second part of this paper."

(4) In the first part, I draw upon and occasionally clarify or

expand what I said in Amerini (2017).

(5) For an introduction to Chatton’s life and works, see Keele

and Pelletier (2018).

References

Amerini, F. (2017). Ockham on mental syncategoremata. In J.

Pellettier & M. Roques (Eds.), The language of thought in late

medieval philosophy (pp. 149–168). Springer.

Keele, R., & Pelletier, J. (2018).Walter Chatton. In The Stanford

Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2018 Edition) (E. N. Zalta,

Ed.).

https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2018/entries/walter-

chatton/. Accessed 25 March 2022.

7. Ashworth, Earline Jennifer. 1981. "Mental Language and the

Unity of Propositions: A Semantic Problem Discussed by Early

Sixteenth Century Logicians." Franciscan Studies no. 41:61-96.

Reprinted as essay VI in: Studies in Post-Medieval Semantics,

London: Variorum Reprints 1985.

"Gregory of Rimini's influential Sentence Commentary was

written in the 1340s. One of the questions which he discussed

in his prologue was how it is that a mental proposition

functions as a united whole, with a force that its apparent parts

taken separately do not possess. (1)

In this article I intend to explore the reactions to Gregory's

arguments among a group of logicians who studied or taught at

Paris in the first three decades of the sixteenth century. The

most important of the authors I shall examine are three

Spaniards: Jerome Pardo (d. 1502 or 1505) whose Medulla

Dialectices was published in 1500 and again in 1505; Antonio

Coronel, whose Duplex Tractatus Terminorum was published

in 1511 and whose Prima Pars Rosarii in qua de Propositione

Multa Notanda was published at about the same time; and

Fernando de Enzinas, whose most noteworthy book for our

purposes was his Tractatus de Compositione Propositionis

Mentalis Actuum Sincathegoreumaticorum Naturam

Manifestans, first published in 1521, and reprinted in 1526 and

1528." (p. 61)

(...)

"In conclusion there are two points I would like to make. On

the one hand it is quite clear that when early sixteenth century

logicians were discussing mental language they took it that they

were concerned with philosophy of mind. In part this is the

natural result of their approach to signification as a causal

process. If one defines "signify" in terms of making known or

representing to the cognitive faculty, then the question of the

various effects of words upon the hearer's mind, and what they

reveal about the speaker's mind, will embrace both semantic

and psychological issues. One also has to bear in mind the part

played by speaker intentions in endowing linguistic aggregates

with their propositional force.(134) At this level the study of

language cannot be separated from the study of mental

attitudes and processes. On the other hand, if one isolates the

part of the discussion which was devoted to purely semantic

issues, then it is no longer necessary to postulate mental

language as such. Everything that was said about the semantic

function of syncategorematic acts, subject and predicate, the

unity of propositions and the equivalence between

propositions, could be described in neutral terms as the study

of semantic structure leaving it quite open what the

relationship is between the semantic structure of a given

utterance and the psychological states of the speaker. Nor does

there seem any genuine need to postulate a naturally

meaningful language in addition to conventionally meaningful

language, since a given speaker's psychological states can be

adequately described in terms of conventional language, and

since synonymy can be redefined for conventional languages.

Indeed, one can argue that the notion of a naturally meaningful

mental language is without any function, since we have no

criteria for identifying it or its structures. But this is to go far

beyond Gregory of Rimini and sixteenth century reactions to

his arguments." (pp. 95-96)

(1) Gregory of Rimini, Gregorii Ariminensis O.E.S.A. Super

Primum et Secundum Sententiarum (Reprint of the 1522

edition: St. Bonaventure, N.Y.: The Franciscain Institute;

Louvain: E. Nauwelaerts; Paderborn: F. Schöningh, 1955), fol.

3va-5rb.

(134) But Michael Dummett, Frege: Philosophy of Language

(London: Duckworth, 1973, p. 311, reminds us that "linguistic

acts should be classed as conventional actions, not as the

external expression of interior states. Assertion, for example, is

to be explained in terms of the conventions governing the use of

those sentences which are understood as having assertoric

force, not as the utterance of a sentence with the intention of

expressing one's interior act of judgment (or interior state of

belief) that it is true."

8. ———. 1982. "The Structure of Mental Language: Some

Problems Discussed by Early Sixteenth Century Logicians."

Vivarium no. 20:59-83.

Reprinted as essay V in: Studies in Post-Medieval Semantics,

London: Variorum Reprints 1985.

"Preface.

As is well known, late and post-medieval logicians shared the

belief that were three types of language, spoken, written, and

mental. (1) Spoken and written languages had conventional

meaning, and were in fact, though not necessarily so, different

for different groups of people. Mental language, on the other

hand, was thought to have natural meaning and to be common

to all men. The obvious question to ask about mental language

concerns its structure and how this relates to the structure of

spoken or written languages, especiallyLatin. Ockham's

position on the matter has been investigated by more than one

author; (2) so in this paper I intend to focus on the views held

by logicians in early sixteenth centuryParis, and by some of

those earlier logicians who most influenced them. I shall leave

firmly aside the obvious philosophical question of what criteria

could possibly be used in determining a structure for mental

language which is independent of spoken or written language.

Sufficeit to say that late medieval logicians saw no problem

here.

The main issues concerning structure arose from a

consideration of the categorical proposition.This was taken to

be the simplest kind of proposition, which at its most basic

displays a subject and a predicate, both in the nominative case,

and the copula "is" or "are". To these ingredients may be added

quantifiers such as "all" and "some", negation signs, adjectives,

adverbs, and other modifiers. Two kinds of problem are

presented by this account. First there is the question of what to

say about spoken or written propositions which do not fit the

standard mould.I include here such sentences as "Pluit"/"It is

raining" which do not have a subject; sentences displaying so-

called adjectival verbsuch as "runs" in "Socrates runs" which do

not have a separate copula and predicate; and sentences

containing pronouns and demonstrative terms such as "I am

running"and "This is white", whose subject is given only by the

context of the utterance. Second, there is the question of how to

account for certain features of those spoken and written

propositions which do fit the standard mould, namely such

features as syncategorematic terms, tense variations (which will

not be discussed in this paper) and variations of number, case

and gender. It was in their discussion of these issues that

Parisian logicians gave their most detailed account of the

structureof mental propositions." (pp. 59-60)

(...)

"It seems that the road was left open to considerable variation

in mental language. Two speakers could perfectly well utter

sentences which were logically equivalent and which picked out

the same state of affairs without using the same mental

propositions.As a result,one can suggest both that it is

consistent with the post-medieval view that sentences in

different languages may be equivalent and translatable without

exhibiting precisely the same deep structure, and that there is

no reason why one should speak of mental language as

containing "the forms that are necessary for any true

description of the world", as Trentman put it in his account of

Ockham's view of mental language. (110) Ockham may have

had an ideal language in mind; Enzinas and his contemporaries

did not. (111)". (p. 82)

(1) See Gabriel Nuchelmans, (1) Theories of the Proposition.

Ancient and Medieval Conceptions of the Bearers of Truth and

Falsity, Amsterdam/London 1973 and (2) Late Scholastic and

Humanist Theories of the Proposition, Amsterdam, Oxford,

New York 1980, passim.

(2) For a discussion of Ockham's views, see Peter Geach,

Mental Acts, London 1957, pp. 101-104 and John Trentman,

"Ockham on Mental", in: Mind, 79 (1970), 586-590.

(110) Trentman, p. 589, my italics.

9. ———. 2004. "Singular Terms and Singular Concepts: From

Buridan to the Early Sixteenth Century." In John Buridan and

Beyond: Topics in the Language Sciences 1300-1700, edited by

Ebbesen, Sten and Friedman, Russell L., 121-151. Copenhagen:

C. A. Reitzel.

Summary: "This article considers medieval treatments of

proper names and demonstrative phrases in relation to the

question of when and how we are able to form singular

concepts. The logical and grammatical background provided by

the authoritative texts of Porphyry and Priscian is examined,

but the main focus is on John Buridan and his successors at

Paris, from John Dorp to Domingo de Soto. Buridan is linked to

contemporary philosophers of language through his suggestion

that, although the name 'Aristotle' is a genuine proper name

only for those who have the appropriate singular concept

caused by acquaintance with Aristotle, it can be properly

treated as a singular tem by subsequent users because of their

beliefs about the original imposition of the name."

10. Biard, Joël. 2021. "Mental Language." In The Routledge

Companion to Medieval Philosophy, edited by Cross, Richard

and Passch, J. T., 306-314. New York: Routledge.

"The idea that thought is like a dialogue of the soul with itself

dates back to Plato.(1) But talking about mental language in the

strict sense implies the fact that the field of intellections or

concepts is made of meaningful units carrying semantic

properties and being articulated in a certain syntactical

structure. Such an approach goes beyond the idea of talking

with oneself; it is neither, strictly speaking, that of Aristotle, in

his fundamental works on which medieval logic and semantics

were built, even more so in his psychology.

(...)

The full notion of mental language was developed at the end of

a long genealogy which reworked all these elements. In

antiquity, there was much interest in the composition of mental

acts. The Middle Ages witnessed many debates about concepts

and their status as sign or signified.

In the thirteenth century, the notion of a mental word was

strongly embedded in reflections on language and knowledge.

However, the theory of mental language in the strict sense is

fully developed only in the fourteenth century, especially with

William of Ockham. Mental language then comes to the

forefront of logic, as it becomes the language par excellence, the

one that is used to assess the meaning and truth value of

spoken expressions. The theory of mental language then left a

deep mark on late medieval semantics, even though, from its

very beginnings, it provoked questions and discussion." (p.

306)

11. Boehner, Philotheus. 1943. "The Notitia Intuitiva of Non-

Existents according to William Ockham." Traditio no. 1:223-

275.

Reprinted in: P. Boehner, Collected Articles on Ockham, pp.

268-300.

12. Boler, John. 1972. "Ockham's Mental Language (Abstract)."

Journal of Philosophy no. 69:676-676.

"Ockham uses 'mental' in two contexts about language: (1) he

adopts the well-entrenched metaphor that thought is "inner

speaking"; but (2) his primary use of 'mental language' is as a

conceit for expressing a non-conventionalist, non-

inscriptionalist attitude toward logic. There may be reason to

extend the latter concern to a theory about the "form" of

language, but that is not to be identified with a theory of

knowledge. The idea that mental language is exclusively

"interior" is not, I suggest, a matter of privacy, but only a

variant on Ockham's insistence that universals "cannot exist

outside the mind." The simplicity of mental language is

evidence that it is not introspectable. The association with

Augustine's theory of knowledge is purely honorific."

13. ———. 2003. "Ockham on the Concept." Medieval Philosophy

and Theology no. 11:65-86.

"It is a commonplace of Ockham commentary that he changed

his position on what concepts are. While I see no reason to

question the general lines of the familiar story, I do think there

are some interesting details along the way which are not always

emphasized and which raise (for me at least) the question of

whether we understand just what was going on.

The development of Ockham’s thought on the topic divides, I

think, into two unequal stages, the first of which can again be

divided into three.

(1) He began by favoring a sort of double aspect scheme. The

act of thinking itself is a real, individual quality existing

“subjectively” in the mind. But as representative, we might say,

it requires an object. In his early account, Ockham posits the

concept as the object of our thinking, holding that of itself it

must, like a fictional entity or fictum, have merely “objective”

existence and not real or “subjective” existence.3 Call this the

fictum theory. After a short time—the whole story takes place in

about eight years—Ockham decided that it would be equally as

probable to hold a theory that simply identifies the concept

with the act of thinking. Call this the mental-act theory. And (3)

Ockham soon enough comes to favor it over the fictum theory.

(...)

In the immediately following sections, I provide more detail on

Ockham’s developing position. In Section 4, I discuss the

“Terminator Principle,” which, I think, carries the weight in

both his early and later positions.

In Section 5, I develop an analogy from art to bring out what I

think is peculiar to Ockham’s account of ficta. Section 6 offers a

guess at what is going on in the first stage of his thought.

Section 7 sets out my guess about what is going on in the

second or ultimate stage in Ockham’s account of the concept.

Finally Section 8 provides a summary and conclusions." (pp.

65-66, notes omitted)

14. Bos, Egbert Peter. 1997. "Speaking About Signs: Fourteenth-

century views on suppositio materialis." Amsterdamer

Beiträge zur älteren Germanistik no. 48:71-86.

"The principal questions in my paper are the following: How

did the medieval semanticists indicate the autonymous use of

words? Does the subject term in such a proposition express a

linguistic item (itself, or its likes) because of the determination

by the predicate? Or is it dependent on the will or intention of

man, the voluntas utentium, as Ockham calls it?

Or is it a convention that determines the use of terms? Is a

signum materialitatis (a sign, or mark, indicating material

supposition) necessary? To what extent do the Medievals

distinguish the autonymous use of language from other uses?

Or is this kind of language meaningless?

There is hardly any secondary literature on this subject. (*)" (p.

75)

(*) M. Bochenski, Formale Logik (München 1970 (1956). 188-

193; CA. Dufour, Die Lehre der Proprietates Terminorum. Sinn

und Referenz in mittelalterlicher Logik

(München/Hamden/Vv'ien 1989). 172-188. (Dufour tries to

reconstruct the medieval theory of the properties of terms with

the help of modern formal logic. This very interesting study did

not obtain the attention it deserves, I feel). E. Karger, 'La

supposition matérielle comme supposition significative: Paul

de Venise, Paul de Pergola', in English Logic in Italy in the

14th and 15th Centuries. Acts of the 5th European Symposium

on Medieval Logic and Semantics, Rome, 10-14 november

1980, ed. by A. Maierù (Napoli). 331-342. In a penetrating

analysis, Karger discusses the difficulties arising from the

'mentioning' of terms in relation to the general semantical

theory of a philosopher.

15. Bottin, Francesco. 2010. "Ockham and Oratio Mentalis." In

Logic in Religious Discourse, edited by Schumann, Andrew,

132-162. Frankfurt: Ontos Verlag.

Abstract: "Ockham was the first to carry out a complete process

of grammaticalization of mental language carefully outlining

distinct specific rules for the written, spoken and mental

language. From a formal point of view Ockham’s program

appears to many contemporary scholars as incomplete and

inadequate, particularly when he attempts to eliminate

equivocity and synonymy in mental language. But, on the

ground of the Augustinian epistemology, the Franciscan

logician seems to be stating that mental language is not devoid

of ambiguities because it is a perfect language, even if it is a

language devoid of the unclearness due to the will to deceive, as

it is the expression of the inner Self."

16. Broadie, Alexander. 1990. "Act and Object in Late Scholastic

Logic." In Estudios de Historia de la logica. Actas del II

simposio de historia de la lógica, Universidad de Navarra,

Pamplona, 25-27 de mayo de 1987, edited by Angelelli, Ignacio

and D'Ors, Angel, 103-124. Pamplona: Ediciones Eunate.

17. Brower-Toland, Susan. 2007. "Intuition, Externalism, and

Direct Reference in Ockham." History of Philosophy Quarterly

no. 24:317-335.

"In recent years, a number of Ockham's commentators have

been converging around a broadly externalist reading of his

theory of mental content. Noting the emphasis he places on the

role of (efficient) causation in his account of concept formation

and mental representation, these commentators argue that, on

Ockham's view, the content of a given mental state is

determined, at least in part, by its causal connections to objects

in the environment.(1) The aim of this paper is to challenge this

increasingly prominent interpretation by focusing on Ockham's

account of singular thought-or what he himself refers to as

'intuitive cognition.'

This focus makes sense because those who defend the

externalist reading of Ockham's theory of content typically

build their case on his account of intuitive cognition. Nor is it

hard to see why. Ockham not only places particular stress on

the role of causality in his account of intuitive states, but also

assigns a foundational rol e to intuition in his broader account

of mental content. Any grounds for rejecting an externalist

interpretation of Ockham's theory of intuitive cognition will,

therefore, count likewise against the externalist reading as

whole." (p. 317)

(1) 1. See, for example, Peter King, "Rethinking Representation

in the Middle Ages," in Representation and Objects of Thought

in Medieval Philosophy, ed. H. Lagerlund (Hampshire: Ashgate

Press, 2007); Peter King, "Thinking about Things: Singular

Thought in the Middle Ages," in Intentionality, Cognition, and

Representation in the Middle Ages, ed. G. Klima (Bronx:

Fordham University Press, forthcoming [2015]); Calvin

Normore, "Burge, Descartes, and Us," in Reflections and

Replies: Essays on the Philosophy of Tyler Burge, ed. M. Hahn

and B. Ramberg (Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 2003);

Calvin Normore, "Ockham on Mental Language," in Historical

Foundations of Cognitive Science, ed. J.C. Smith (Dordrecht:

Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1990); Claude Panaccio,

"Ockham's Externalism," in Intentionality, Cognition, and

Representation in the Middle Ages, ed. G. Klima (Bronx:

Fordham University Press, forthcoming [2015]).

18. ———. 2015. "How Chatton Changed Ockham’s Mind. William

Ockham and Walter Chatton on Objects and Acts of Judgment."

In Intentionality, Cognition, and Mental Representation in

Medieval Philosophy, edited by Klima, Gyula, 204-234. New

York: Fordham University Press.

"Recent scholarship has begun to uncover the nature and

extent of the reciprocal—and typically adversarial—relationship

between William Ockham (d. 1347) and Walter Chatton (d.

1343). We now know, for example, that Chatton, a slightly

younger contemporary of Ockham, is both enormously

influenced by and, at the same time, highly critical of his older

colleague. Chatton often takes up precisely those questions

Ockham treats (and likewise the terminology and conceptual

framework in which he expresses them) only to reject Ockham’s

conclusions. We also know that Chatton’s criticisms leave their

mark on Ockham.

Ockham frequently rehearses and responds to Chatton’s

objections, occasionally refining or even altogether revising his

views in light of them. Perhaps the best-documented case of

such infl uence concerns Ockham’s developing views of

concepts, where, in direct response to Chatton’s criticisms,

Ockham famously abandons his early “fictum” theory of

concepts in favor of Chatton’s own “mental act” account.

Although this may be the best-documented case, it is by no

means the only example of such influence—a handful of others

have been discussed in the literature.(3) In this essay, I hope to

extend our current understanding of the relationship between

these two Franciscan thinkers by looking in some detail at a

debate between them over the objects of judgment." (pp. 204-

205, two ntes omitted)

(3) 3. Joseph Wey provides a list of places in Ockham’s

Quodlibetal Questions in which Ockham explicitly rehearses

arguments or objections offered by Chatton. In addition to

these, Wey also fi nds some 68 other textual parallels between

Ockham’s Quodlibeta and Chatton’s writings. (...)

19. Brown, Deborah J. 1996. "The Puzzle of Names in Ockham's

Theory of Mental Language." The Review of Metaphysics no.

50:79-99.

"In his writings on semantics and logic, William of Ockham

combines two very strong claims about mental language: that

mental terms are naturally prior to and determinative of the

signification of conventional signs and that mental language

contains neither synonymous nor equivocal terms. (1) The first

claim represents the role mental language has in explaining the

origins, structure, and content of thought and language.

Ockham was, as many commentators have observed, a

conceptual empiricist but it would be a mistake to think that he

was primarily concerned with the psychological processes that

underlie our representational system. The second claim

indicates that the theory of mental language is primarily a

theory of signification or a semantics. The notion of a

redundancy-free mental language is an idealization crafted for

its explanatory role in Ockham's semantics.

The notion of a mental language devoid of synonymous and

ambiguous terms raises puzzles which threaten the internal

coherence of the project. These puzzles concern a species of

categorematic terms in mental language, Ockham's absolute

terms, and are not unlike the puzzles about proper names in

Kripkean semantics. Although I am skeptical that Ockham's

theory is adequate to the dual tasks of being a semantics as well

as a psychological thesis, I shall argue that the wrong response

to these puzzles is to forfeit the theory's status as a semantic

theory by giving up the commitment to parsimony." (p. 79)

(1) Ockham's most sustained development of the theory of

mental language is in Summa Logicae I, in Opera Philosophica

I, ed. Philotheus Boehner, Gedeon Gal, Stephen S. Brown (St.

Bonaventure, NY: The Franciscan Institute, 1974).

20. Cesalli, Laurent. 2016. "Pseudo-Richard of Campsall and

Richard Brinkley." In A Companion to Responses to Ockham,

edited by Rode, Christian, 79-108. Leiden: Brill.

"Unlike Ockham’s other opponents such as the Dominicans

Hugh Lawton and William Crathorn, both contemporaries of

the author of the LCO, Pseudo-Campsall and Brinkley accept

that there is a mental language and that its terms are natural

signs of extra-mental things.(58) Furthermore, Brinkley and

Pseudo-Campsall endorse the thesis of the semantic

subordination of extramental to mental language.(59) In spite

of this fundamental agreement, one can point at some

divergences between Ockham and its eponymous opponents."

(p. 94)

(58) Lawton rejects mental language altogether, while Crathorn

accepts it in a very peculiar sense: there are mental sentences,

but these are nothing but mental images of extramental (i.e.

linguistic) sentences. See D. Perler, “Crathorn on Mental

Language,” in Vestigia, Imagines, Verba. Semiotics and Logic

in Medieval Theological Texts (xiith-xivth century), (ed.) C.

Marmo (Turnhout, 1997), 337–354 as well as M. Lenz, Mentale

Sätze. Wilhelm von Ockham’s Thesen zur Sprachlichkeit des

Denkens (Stuttgart, 2003), esp. 173–176.

(59) Without being as explicit as Brinkley who, as we saw, uses

subordinari, Pseudo-Campsall is nonetheless quite clear on

that point: “[…] vni proposicioni in voce correspondet vna

proposicio in mente […] vna proposicio que significat idem et

pro eisdem verificatur de quibus verificatur proposicio vocalis

et pro tanto dicitur quod proposicio formata in voce prius

formatur in mente […]” (LCO 13.11, 117).

Abbreviations

LCO = Pseudo-Campsall’s Logica contra Ocham

21. Chalmers, David. 1999. "Is There Synonymy in Ockham's

Mental Language?" In The Cambridge Companion to Ockham,

edited by Spade, Paul Vincent, 76-99. Cambridge: Cambridge

University Press.

"My argument for synonymy is largely theoretical, although it

also has a textual element. The theoretical case has a positive

and a negative part. On the positive side, I will argue that there

are several reasons mental synonymy might exist and that a

mental language without synonymy would be relatively clumsy,

with several ad hoc features. On the negative side, I will address

various arguments that have been put forward against the

possibility of synonymy and will try to show they are not

conclusive. Textually, I will argue that, although Ockham

appears to deny the possibility of synonymy in mental

language, he also makes remarks that commit him to that

possibility. I do not think my arguments are entirely conclusive,

but I hope to demonstrate that the possibility of mental

synonymy is not as implausible as has sometimes been

thought." (p. 77)

22. Cross, Richard. 2009. "The Mental Word in Duns Scotus and

Some of His Contemporaries." In The Word in Medieval Logic,

Theology and Psychology, edited by Shimizu, Tetsuro and

Burnett, Charles, 291-332. Turnhout: Brepols.

"All of the thinkers whom I consider here hold that there are

dispositional cognitions—cognitive habits—and that these

dispositions are related in some way or other to the occurrent

cognitions in which I am interested.

Some of these thinkers hold that such dispositional cognitions

should be thought of as what are known as ‘intelligible species’:

abstract general notions of a particular or set of particulars,

contents stored in the mind prior to, and explanatory of, actual

cognition of such universal contents.

The species is not an occurrent cognition; it is the stored

content that we can use in generating such cognitions. As we

shall see, thinkers differ on the extent to which we can think of

the intelligible species as itself an object of cognition: to some

extent, this difference explains differences in the theories of the

mental word. Something has to happen when we actually

cognize an object: when we form occurrent acts of cognition on

the basis of our dispositional cognitions. Specifying what that is

will be part of my aim here. But as we shall see, an important

by-product of this discussion will be to highlight a covert debate

about the nature of the intelligible species." (p. 293)

23. ———. 2014. Duns Scotus's Theory of Cognition. New York:

Oxford University Press.

Chapter 9: Mental Language and the Nature of Conceptual

Content, 171-181.

"I have argued in Chapter 8 that Scotus believes conceptual

content to be grounded in the real structure of a cognitive act,

such that it is the real structure of the act that explains its

having the content that it has; and in Chapter 10 I argue that

this content is in fact to be ontologically reduced to the real

structure of the act: the content is nothing over and above the

real act itself. (It is not, for instance, some kind of spooky

unreal being.) In the current chapter, I want to examine the

nature of conceptual content. As I try to show, Scotus conceives

of it not imagistically but rather linguistically. Scotus does not

make the point explicitly; it has to be inferred from other things

he says about the nature of thought.

Following Augustine, the medievals thought of conceptual acts

as mental words, and while this in itself is not sufficient to show

that conceptual content is linguistic, I believe that Scotus holds

that there are mental acts with genuine syntactic structure,

suggesting that Scotus thinks of conceptual content as linguistic

in nature.

I thus argue that Scotus has an inchoate account of mental

language. I begin with a brief general discussion of some

medieval views on the mental word, and then turn to consider

Scotus's discussion of those mental acts that have syntactic

structure (syntactically complex combinations of different

mental acts)." (p. 171)

24. Doig, Jaames C. 2000. "O’Callaghan on Verbum Mentis in

Aquinas." American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly no.

77:233-255.

Abstract: "The essay's point of departure is O'Callaghan's

insistence that verbum mentis is for Aquinas not a

philosophical doctrine, but "a properly theological topic." The

principal evidence for this interpretation consists in the

functioning of verbum mentis in certain theological passages as

well as its absence in others characterized as philosophical. The

essay proceeds by situating Aquinas's doctrine of verbum

mentis within the tradition from which the expression is drawn

and by examining the nature of the Summa theologiae.

Consequently, Aquinas is seen to espouse a philosophical

doctrine of verbum mentis whose presence or absence in a

particular passage is a function of both the passage's goal and

the nature of the audience for whom the passage was originally

intended."

25. Duncombe, Matthew. 2016. "Thought as Internal Speech in

Plato and Aristotle." Logical Analysis and History of

Philosophy / Philosophiegeschichte und logische Analyse no.

19:105-125.

Abstract: "Scholars often assert that Plato and Aristotle share

the view that discursive thought (dianoia)is intemal speech

(TIS). However, there has been little work to c1arify or

substantiate this reading. In this paper I show Plato and

Aristotle share some core commitrnents about the relationship

of thought and speech, but cash out TIS in different ways. Plato

and Aristotle both hold that discursive thinking is a process

that moves from a set of doxastic states to a final doxastic state.

The resulting judgments (doxai) can be true or false. Norms

govern these final judgments and, in virtue of that, they govern

the process that arrives at those judgments. The principal norm

is consistency. However, the philosophers differ on the source

of this norm.

For Plato, persuasiveness and accuracy ground non-

contradiction because internal speech is dialogical. For

Aristotle, the Principle of Non-Contradiction grounds a

Doxastic Thesis (DT) that no judgment can contradict itself.

For Aristotle, metaphysics grounds non-contr~diction because

internal speech is monological."

26. Dutilh Novaes, Catarina. 2003. "Ockham on Supposition and

Equivocation in Mental Language." Proceedings of the Society

for Medieval Logic and Metaphysics no. 3:37-50.

"medieval combination of Aristotelianism with Christianity,

namely theories of supposition. I say that theories of

supposition are a hybrid between Aristotelianism and

Christianity for the following reason: it seems that the historical

starting point of theories of supposition were the so-called

theories of fallacies, whose main source was Aristotle’s De

Sophisticis Elenchis (cf. De Rijk [Logica Modernorum] 1967),

but they were developed in view of the conceptual framework of

commentary and interpretation of authoritative and sacred

texts, which constituted the core of intellectual activity in the

Christian world.(1)

In this paper, I will analyze Ockham’s theory of supposition,

focusing on the notions of mental language and equivocation.

My main contention is that Ockham’s supposition theory as it is

formulated implies that there is equivocation in mental

language, and that this fact has problematic consequences for

his supposition theory itself and for his notion of mental

language. But besides outlining the internal tensions in

Ockham’s system, this discussion will bring some positive

results as well; it is to be hoped that it will shed light on the

nature of written and spoken language, on the concept of

mental language and its role for logical investigations, and on

the general purpose of theories of supposition" (p. 37)

(1) Indeed, the rarified considerations concerning the Holy

Trinity in medieval theology are simply not understandable

without the logical distinctions between the supposita and

significata, and different modes of supposition and

signification of Trinitarian terms.

27. ———. 2012. "Ockham on Supposition Theory, Mental

Language, and Angelic Communication." American Catholic

Philosophical Quarterly no. 86:415-434.

Abstract: "In my previous work on Ockham's theory of

supposition, I have argued that it is best understood as a theory

of sentential meaning, i.e., as an apparatus for the

interpretation of sentences. In this paper, I address the

challenge posed to this interpretation of Ockham's theory by

the (presumed) existence of different kinds of supposition in

mental language through the lenses of Ockham's theory of

angelic communication. I identify two potentially problematic

implications of Ockham's account of mental language as

allowing for different kinds of supposition: the existence of

non-significative supposition in mental language; and the

possibility of ambiguous mental sentences. I then turn to

angelic communication and examine these two issues from that

point of view, concluding that there cannot be non-significative

supposition in mental language, but also that there may still be

room for sentential ambiguity in mental language."

28. Edwards, M. J. 2000. "Clement of Alexandria and His Doctrine

of the Logos." Vigiliae Christianae:159-177.

"In the first part I shall argue that the classic formulation of the

"two-stage" theory, in which an outgoing word or logos

prophorikos supervenes upon an immanent word or logos

endiathetos, was not a universal datum in the time of Clement.

In the second I shall challenge the philological and

philosophical arguments that have been adduced to prove that

he held the theory; then, examining the testimony of Photius in

the third part, I shall give reasons for suspecting a

misquotation. Finally, in defending the authenticity of another

disputed passage, I shall propose that Clement taught the

eternal generation of the Logos, and that he may have framed

this doctrine as an antidote to the teaching of the Valentinian

school." (pp. 159-160)

29. Friedman, Russell L. 2009. "Mental Propositions before Mental

Language." In Le langage mental du Moyen Âge à l'âge

classique, edited by Biard, Joël, 95-116. Louvain: Peeters.

"My topic in this paper is early fourteenth-century discussions

of mental propositions. I won't be dealing much at all with

mental propositions as used by thinkers who developed a full-

fledged theory of mental language - rather, I am going to focus

on some material from the early 1310s that I believe we need to

integrate into the "prehistory" of medieval ideas on mental

language. To begin, then, I want to make clear why the material

examined here is worthy of consideration, and particularly why

it is worthy of inclusion in a book devoted to medieval and early

modem theories of mental language." (p. 95)

(...)

"Now, in this paper I will return to Buridan, but I will mainly be

looking at the premental language history of the type of

"compositional" theory of the mental proposition that Buridan

held (i.e. that the mental proposition is composed of parts), as

well as the rival "unity" theory of the mental proposition. Both

these views in fact came up in a later-medieval debate that was

high-profile at the time, but is now basically forgotten, a debate

between the French Dominican Durand of St. Pourçain (d.

1334), on the one band, and the English secular Thomas

Wylton (d. ca. 1327), on the other, while both were holding

chairs of theology at the University of Paris in 1312 or 1313. The

debate between Durand and Wylton centered on the question

of whether the intellect can entertain more than one act at any

one time. Wylton - as far as I know for the first time in the

medieval university discussion - answered this question in the

affirmative: we human beings can and do have more than one

intellectual act at once.

Durand argued for the negative view. In what follows, then, I

want to discuss Durand and Wylton's controversy and the role

played in it by mental l propositions." (p. 96)

(...)

"The written remains of the debate between Durand and

Wylton are edited in P. T. Stella, "Le 'Quaestiones de libero

arbitrio' di Durando da S. Porciano", Salesianum 24 (1962), p.

450-524." (p. 96 note 3)

30. Friedman, Russell L., and Pelletier, Jenny. 2014. "Mental

Words and Mental Language in the Later Middle Ages." In

Sourcebook for the History of the Philosophy of Mind:

Philosophical Psychology from Plato to Kant, edited by

Knuuttila, Simo and Sihvola, Juha, 379-399. Dordrecht:

Springer.

"It is now a well known and increasingly well studied episode in

medieval philosophy of mind that William of Ockham in the

first quarter of the fourteenth century developed a genuine

theory of mental language, in which the mind builds up mental

propositions out of component concepts. Although one can find

hints of the idea of mental speech, as distinct from spoken or

written speech, already in Plato, Aristotle, and the Stoics,

nevertheless for the later scholastic discussion, it was

Augustine’s treatment of the verbum cordis in especially book

fifteen of his De trinitate that set the agenda." (p. 379)

(...)

"In the fourteenth century Ockham develops a highly complex

and sophisticated notion of a mental language which is, in

principle, the universal language of thought for all human

beings. Ockham famously changed his mind on the ontological

status of concepts. Initially advocating an act-object theory,

superficially similar to Peter Auriol’s, Ockham ultimately

endorsed an act theory on which the concept is simply the

intellectual act itself. These mental concepts, conceived of as

natural signs of things, are the elemental semantic units of

mental language. They are combinable into syntactically

structured and semantically rich mental propositions in which

they figure as subject and predicate terms, supplemented by

logical particles known as ‘syncategoremata’. A mental

proposition, according to the mature Ockham, is an organised

composite of many, discrete intellectual acts; for this reason,

Ockham appears to hold a version of [Thomas] Wylton’s

‘compositional’ theory of the mental proposition. Both the

terms and propositions of mental language are prior to and

underlie all spoken and written languages. Following in

Ockham’s footsteps, John Buridan continues to develop an

elaborate understanding of mental language, with some salient

differences concerning the function and reference of concepts.

Further, Buridan agrees with Wylton and Ockham that the

mental proposition is composed of many acts.

In contrast, Gregory of Rimini supported Durand’s unity theory

of the mental proposition where the mental proposition is

produced all at once in a single act.

The debate on the ontological structure of the mental

proposition would remain prominent into the early modern

period (...)." (pp. 381-382)

31. Garcia-Carpintero, Manuel. 2022. "Aristotle and Inner

Awareness." JoLMA. The Journal for the Philosophy of

Language, Mind and the Arts no. 3:119-134.

Abstract: "Recent debates on phenomenal consciousness have

focused on the idea that conscious experience includes an

experience of the self, whatever else it may present the self

with. When a subject has an experience as of a pink cube, she is

not just aware of the world as being presented in a certain way

(a pinkish, cubic way in this case); she is also aware of the fact

that it is presented to her. According to Victor Caston, Aristotle

defended an interesting version of this view in De Anima, later

developed in different directions by many other philosopher s –

outside current research in the Analytic tradition, particularly

in Phenomenology and the Heidelberg school. My goal in this

paper is to locate Aristotle’s views, as interpreted by Caston, in

the context of the current debate, and to offer some

considerations in favour of a view like Aristotle’s, also following

Caston."

References

Caston, V. (2002). “Aristotle on Consciousness”. Mind, 111, 751-

815.

32. Gaskin, Richard. 2001. "Ockham's Mental Language,

Connotation, and the Inherence Regress." In Ancient and

Medieval Theories of Intentionality, edited by Perler, Dominik,

227-264. Leiden: Brill.

"Aristotle does not speak of the affections of the soul as

themselves constituting a language but, as is familiar, this sort

of terminology was used by Augustine in his De Trinitate.(20)

and by Boethius in his commentaries on the De

Interpretatione, where, following Porphyry, he speaks (in his

second commentary) of three orationes, one written down, one

produced in the voice, and one put together in the mind.(21)

In the medieval Aristotelian tradition there was widespread

(though not universally)(22) acceptance of the view, articulated

in its most systematic and influential form by Ockham, that

there is such a thing as mental language.(23)

Ockham conceives of mental language as a kind of simplified

version of spoken or written language, containing only

semantically essential features of the latter , according to a

certain conception of what counts as semantically essential-

namely, one which recognises as semantically essenti al only

what affects the truth or falsity of sentences.(24)

Thus mental language is said, for example, to contain nouns

which are marked for number and case, but not for gender or

declension."

More importantly, it contains no synonymy."(p. 230)

(20) 20 XV, 10.19; 12.22; 27.50.

(21) Editio Secunda, 24.21-27; 29.16-2 1; 30.3- 10; 36.10- 14.

Cf. Editio Prima, 42.11- 43.13 (note here especially the idea that

a propositio can be formed "in cogitatione" : 43.2).

(22) Gelber, [., "I Cannot Tell a Lie: Hugh Lawton's Critique of

Ockham on Mental Language", Franciscan Studies 44 (1984),

141-179] 156-160.

(23) See especially Summa Logicae I, 12 (...).

(24) Summa Logicae I, 3 (OPh I, 13.57- 68). (...)

33. Geach, Peter Thomas. 1957. Mental Acts: Their Content and

Their Objects. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.

Section 23 Dangers of the "Inner Language" Analogy, pp. 101-

106.

"The important thing about analogical extensions of a concept

is that we should know (in practice at any rate) how far to carry

the analogy. Som« people have certainly carried the analogy of

thought to language too far. Thus, for William of Ockham,

besides the spoken, conventional, languages, all men have a

common, natural, language; for convenience, I shall call it

"Mental". The grammar of Mental turns out to be remarkably

like Latin grammar. There are nouns and verbs in Mental;

nouns have cases and numbers, and verbs have voice, mood,

tense, number, and person.

On the other hand, there is nothing in Mental corresponding to

the different Latin declensions and conjugations; nor are there

any deponent verbs in Mental.

Ockham's criterion for transferring Latin grammatical terms to

Mental was very simple-minded. Nouns of different

declensions, or verbs of different conjugations, may be

synonyms, and then presumably correspond to the same

Mental noun or verb; so there is no reason to ascribe

differences of declension or conjugation to Mental words. But a

change of case or number or voice may quite alter the sense of a

Latin sentence; so Mental words must have case, number, and

voice.

Without being able to say just how far the analogy of inner

language can be carried, I think men of good sense would see

immediately that Ockham carries it much too far. He merely

transfers features of Latin grammar to Mental, and then

regards this as explaining why such features occur in Latin -

they are needed there if what we say inwardly in Mental is to be

outwardly got across to others in Latin. But clearly nothing is

explained at all. Presumably Ockham's reasons for thinking

that the supposed grammar of Mental had explanatory force

were that Mental is a natural and universal language, and that

Mental words, unlike Latin words, are immaterial entities. But

if all men had a natural and universal spoken language, that

would not mean that its grammar was any more self-

explanatory than Latin grammar. And what carries significance

in a language is its structure, not its medium - the structure

that can be transferred from spoken to written language and to

Morse code; but Ockham takes for granted the grammatical

structure of Latin, and supposes that Mental, unlike Latin, is

intrinsically intelligible, simply because its medium is not

material but spiritual. In point of fact, any problems that arise

as to the significance of a grammatical device will arise equally

for the alleged Mental uses of this device; and Ockham's saying

that the words of Mental are immaterial would merely raise

such footling problems as how something immaterial can be in

the genitive case, without throwing any light on the use of the

genitive. To do Ockham justice, he wastes little time on such

futilities; most of his, often acute, enquiries into the logical

syntax of Latin are undisturbed by the reflection that Latin is

really an imperfect reproduction of the Mental original, which

on his view is the proper study of a logician." (pp. 101-103)

34. Gelber, Hester Goodenough. 1984. "I Cannot Tell a Lie: Hugh

Lawton's Critique of Ockham on Mental Language." Franciscan

Studies no. 44:141-179.

"Much research lies ahead, both on Ockham himself and on the

views of his successors, before the story will finally be told of

how Ockham's fruitful new position on mental language

affected his contemporaries.

We do know some of the chapters. Ockham is justly famous for

having perceived mental as an ideal logical language." (p. 142,

one note omitted)

(...)

"There are more chapters of the story yet to be written,

however.

Ockham's position on mental language set off an immediate

controversy, not just among his fellow Franciscans, but also

among th e Dominicans studying at Oxford at Blackfriars

during the 1320's and 1330's. One of those Dominicans, Hugh

of Lawton, writing in the 1320's, must be numbered among

Ockham's earliest critics on the question of mental language.

Lawton rejected the idea that mental activity constituted any

sort of language. Only externalized spoken and written

expressions were properly called language, and, therefore, there

could be no such thing as a mental proposition. Propositions, as

far as Lawton was concerned, existed only in spoken and

written form.

Lawton's response to the proponents of mental language

involved a surprisingly nominalist propositional theory." (pp.

143-133, two notes omitted)

(..)

"Lawton's intuition that some form of the liar, that recalcitrant

difficulty which afflicts complex linguistic systems, would also

intrude into mental language, is borne out. Ockham's

dialectical line not only fails to protect against such intrusion, it

seems even to generate it.

Although Lawton's skepticism about mental language served to

pose difficult questions for his contemporaries, I know of no

converts to his position among them. Ockham's views, in

amended and extended form, continued to hold sway. However,

it was incumbent on anyone wishing to defend the idea of

mental language to give an account for the sorts of issues

Lawton raised. Fourteenth-century scholastics went far towards

doing so, but perhaps not quite far enough." (p. 174)

35. Gibson, Joan. 1976. The Role of Mental Language in the

Philosophy of William of Ockham, University of Toronto.

Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation available at Pro Quest

Dissertation Express n. NK36658.

"Throughout his career William of Ockham refers to thoughts

as mental‘ words spoken in a mental language.

The purpose of this thesis is to explore the implications of this

view in Ockham's philosophy especially as it relates to his

theories of epistemology and metaphysics.

These.aspects of the theory have often been overlooked in

favour of a concentration on the relation between Ockham's

logic and his theory of mental language. In this thesis I contend

that thinking is a real language, that is, a system of

communication. Consequently, it is not possible to understand

fully the role of mental language using only the logical

approach.

At different times in his own development Ockham preferred

different explanations of the metaphysical status of the concept.

These explanations are correlated with different views of how

concepts signify extramcntal things. Such-considerations affect

Ockham's emphasis on what it means for something to be a

mental word or a mental language.

In- this thesis, I explore two particular theories of the status of

the concept, namely tlie fictum theory and the intellectio

theory. Special attention is paid to the fictum theory, since it is

in this context that Ockham first develops a theory of mental

language, and in which the philosophical implications of ihis

theory arc most systematically examined. The.role of mental

language as formulated in the fictum theory is then compared

with later work based on the intellectio theory." (From the

Abstract, pp. 1-2)

36. Goehring, Bernd. 2011. "Henry of Ghent on the Verbum

Mentis." In A Companion to Henry of Ghent, edited by Wilson,

Gordon A., 241-272. Leiden: Brill.

"Conclusion

Throughout his career Henry of Ghent seeks to develop a

comprehensive account of the mental word. To this end Henry

reinterprets Augustine’s views on the mental word. Henry takes

Augustine to imply that in forming a mental word we do not

merely actualize cognitive content; rather, we progress towards

a more complete, explanatory conception of a given object.

Henry asks how we can acquire the sort of conceptual content

that is deeply explanatory of the things that we cognize, and

that can figure in our theoretical knowledge and understanding

of reality. In Henry’s view cognition begins with a receptive

stage; thus a cognizer can only have representational content if

some object initially acts on her (sensory) capacities. But Henry

realizes that it is the agent’s active, constructive abilities that

allow for the formation of concepts that are more distinct and

explanatory than initial concepts abstracted from

representational content in phantasms. In developing his

mature account of the mental word Henry stresses these

abilities to explicate how a cognitive agent re-constructs an

extramental object’s essential structure: the agent engages in an

intellectual, discursive inquiry into a thing’s essence by working

with genera, kinds, and specific differences. Henry considers

this inquiry as the cognizer’s approaching a full definitional

account of some object. It is driven by a rational desire for

complete understanding that comes to rest only in a perfect

mental word that adequately matches and represents a thing’s

essential nature. Moreover, our ability to actualize mental acts

of this kind requires not only an awareness of the acts or their

conceptual content, or both, but also selfreflexivity that enables

a cognizer to understand herself as the subject of her mental

acts." (p. 272)

37. Hagedorn, Eric W. 2012. The Language of Scientia: Ockham’s

Mental Language as the Subject Matter of Aristotelian

Science, Notre Dame, Indiana.

Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation available at Pro Quest

Dissertation Express n. 3578935.

Abstract: "William of Ockham's theory of mental language is

among the most studied aspects of his thought; yet,

surprisingly, there is little scholarly consensus on just what it is

supposed to be a theory of. The most widely held view today is

that Ockham's mental language is intended to be an account of

human cognitive operations, akin to the Language of Thought

Hypothesis held by some contemporary cognitive scientists. In

this dissertation, I first raise a series of objections to this

interpretation, both philosophical and textual: Ockham refrains

from endorsing the key doctrines this interpretation attributes

to him, and his actual discussions of mental language seem

disconnected from the theory of cognition he does indeed hold.

I then proceed to sketch an alternative interpretation, which

takes as its starting point the sole argument that Ockham

provides for positing mental language. On this interpretation,

Ockham posits mental language in order to provide a collection

of entities which are both compatible with his nominalist

ontology and sufficient to fulfill the strictures of the Aristotelian

account of scientific practice that he endorses."

38. ———. 2015. "Ockham's Scientia Argument for Mental

Language." Oxford Studies in Medieval Philosophy no. 3:145-

168.

"William of Ockham famously held that, in addition to written

and spoken language, there exists a mental language, a

structured representational system common to all thinkers

(human and angelic), containing both atomic representations

(so-called “mental terms”) and molecular representations

(including “mental sentences” and “mental syllogisms”).

Ockham’s account of mental language has been much studied,

but there has been very little discussion of Ockham’s reasons

for positing mental language in the first place. In what follows,

I present a line of argument by which Ockham seeks to

establish the existence of mental language, an argument which

to this point has been uniformly overlooked by the secondary

literature. In the first half of the paper I briefly present

Ockham’s account of mental language and examine a set of

texts which, when taken together, show Ockham arguing that

positing a mental language is the only way a nominalist can

meet certain ontological constraints imposed by Aristotle’s

account of scientific demonstration. In the second half of the

paper, I discuss and evaluate Ockham’s argument in greater

detail." (p. 145, two notes omitted)

39. Hochschild, Joshua P. 2004. "Does Mental Language Imply

Mental Representationalism? The Case of Aquinas's Verburn

Mentis." Proceedings of the Society for Medieval Logic and

Metaphysics no. 4:12-17.

"In his recent book, Thomistic Realism and the Linguistic

Turn, O’Callaghan marshals some of the resources of analytic

philosophy’s “linguistic turn” to recover some of the sense of

Aquinas’s “realism” in logic and psychology (I don’t dare say

“philosophy of mind”).(1)"

(..)

!I agree with O’Callaghan’s account of Aquinas’s treatment of

acts of intellect and their objects, and I further agree with the

corresponding treatment of Thomistic semantics in light of this

account."

(...)

"As indicated, with these general and very basic points I am in

complete agreement, and it is against this background of

agreement that I want to carve out a modest area of

disagreement. I want to defend, against O’Callaghan, the

appropriateness of attributing a theory of “mental language” to

Aquinas, or, at least (and even more modestly), the possibility

of an authentically Thomistic theory of “mental language.”

There are in fact two reasons that O’Callaghan thinks it is

inappropriate to associate a theory of mental language with

Aquinas. The first, not explored so much in his book but argued

at length in a separate paper,(2) is that a particular part of the

Thomistic vocabulary which might suggest a theory of mental

language, the “verbum mentis,” has no genuine philosophical

import at all, and functions solely as a theological metaphor.

The second is that a theory of mental language necessarily

implies the mental representationalism from which

O’Callaghan has worked so hard to separate an authentically

Thomistic account of cognition. I will address these two points

in turn." (pp. 12-13)

(1) John O'Callaghan, Thomistic Realism and the Linguistic

Turn: Toward a More Perfect Form of Existence, (University

of Notre Dame Press, 2003)

(2) John O'Callaghan, “Verbum Mentis: Philosophical or

Theological Doctrine in Aquinas?”, Proceedings of the

American Catholic Philosophical Association, 74 (2000): 103-

119

40. ———. 2015. "Mental Language in Aquinas?" In Intentionality,

Cognition, and Mental Representation in Medieval

Philosophy, edited by Klima, Gyula, 29-45. New York: Fordham

University Press.

"It would be anachronistic, at the very least, to attribute to

Aquinas a theory of mental language. As historians of

philosophy seem to agree, and I will not question, it is only

after Aquinas that thinkers elaborated theories of mental

language, or of a “language of thought,” with attempts to

provide a linguistic (especially semantic and syntactic) analysis

of cognition: first within the project of later medieval

nominalism, and more recently (and apparently independently)

by thinkers in contemporary analytic philosophy (foremost

Jerry Fodor).(1)

Nonetheless, allowing that we do not find a recognizable theory

of mental language to Aquinas, I want to consider the sense in

which it is appropriate toattribute to Aquinas some conception

of “mental language,” and then to explore whether, given that

conception, a Thomistic theory of mental language would be

possible, and, if so, what it might look like and how it would

differ from more familiar versions.

(...)

"I will begin, then, with a brief review of some of the features of

mental language theory as developed explicitly in medieval

nominalism and in contemporary analytic philosophy, in

relation to which we can then better appreciate the

distinctiveness of Aquinas’s own attention to the language-like

features of thought." (p. 83)

(1) An exception to this general historical consensus is Peter

King, “Abelard on Mental Language,” American Catholic

Philosophical Quarterly 81 (2007): 169–187. Claude Panaccio

has responded to this in “Mental Language and Predication:

Ockham and Abelard,” Analytica 14 (2010): 183–194.

41. Holopainen, Toivo. 2011. "Mental Word/Concepts." In

Encyclopedia of Medieval Philosophy: Philosophy between

500 and 1500, edited by Lagerlund, Henrik, 1169-1174.

Dordrecht: Springer.

Abstract: "The medieval thinkers did not have any one agreed-

upon term for concept as a mental entity, but it was generally

assumed that there are some such units and they were often

viewed as mental words of some kind. In contrast to the words

of spoken languages, which vary from nation to nation, the

concepts were taken to be the same for all people. Issues related

to concepts or mental words were discussed in several fields of

inquiry, including logic, theology, and philosophical

psychology.

In logic, concepts were traditionally called “understandings”

(intellectus), and they were supposed to have a mediating role

between words and things in signification. This view goes back

to Aristotle’s De interpretatione and Boethius’ commentaries

on it. In theology, the mental word (verbum) was a prominent

theme because Augustine had elaborated an analogy between

the human interior word and the Word, that is, the second

person of the Trinitarian God. In the tradition of philosophical

psychology starting from Aristotle’s De anima, the acquisition

of concepts was a central theme. These and other influences led

to intricate discussions in the medieval universities about what

kind of entities in the mind relating to concepts one should

postulate and how they should be described. Thomas Aquinas

developed a model that includes a distinction between the

intelligible species, the act of understanding, and the concept

proper. There was extensive dispute about issues related to

concepts in the late thirteenth and early fourteenth century,

and much of it revolved around ideas presented by Aquinas.

William of Ockham developed an alternative to the De anima-

based approach on the basis of his nominalist philosophy. The

concept or mental word, identified as an act of understanding,

became the basic unit in the theory of mental language that

Ockham advocated." (pp. 1169-1170)

42. ———. 2014. "Concepts and Concept Formation in Medieval

Philosophy." In Sourcebook for the History of the Philosophy

of Mind: Philosophical Psychology from Plato to Kant, edited

by Knuuttila, Simo and Sihvola, Juha, 263-279. Dordrecht:

Springer.

"The thought of William of Ockham opens a new phase in

medieval discussion on concepts. He developed an alternative

to the De anima approach on the basis of his nominalist

ontology. Ockham rejected the idea that intellectual cognition

requires the presence of the object’s form in the intellect, and

he rejected the doctrine of species in all its forms, including

intelligible species. He criticised the species as speculative and

unnecessary and as a representationalist hindrance to direct

realism in concept formation. This criticism was put forward

earlier by Olivi, Durandus and others; however, for Aquinas

and Scotus, the species in the intellect is an activator of the

power of understanding, rather than its object. For Ockham,

concepts are acts of understanding. More precisely, concepts

are abstractive acts of understanding, as opposed to intuitive

acts. An intuitive act of understanding is about a present

particular object as existing, whereas the abstractive act of

understanding does not require the presence of the object and

is universal in the sense that it is applicable to many objects

(say, to all the members of a species). In Ockham’s view, the

human mind is so constructed that it is capable of forming

concepts of the things it encounters under suitable conditions.

Ontologically, concepts are qualities: they are states in which

the intellect can be. There is a strong emphasis on the

viewpoint of logic and semantics in Ockham’s approach. He

developed a theory of mental language, and concepts or mental

words are among the basic units of that language: they are

terms of the mental language. As terms of a language, the

concepts are signs, and they have the kind of semantic

properties that terms have." (p. 265)

43. Hughes, Robert D. 2017. "Oratio, Verbum, Sermo and “Les

paraules de sa pensa”: Internal Discourse in Ramon Llull

(1271/1272-1290), its Sources, Implications and Applications."

Studia lulliana no. 57:3-61.

Abstract: "At a time when technology companies are talking

about «silent speech interfaces», it is particularly important, I

believe, to look back at what the medievals said about «internal

discourse» and the significatory power of concepts. In this vein,

then, as much as being an «art of conversion» via dialectical

argumentation and a means whereby to unite all branches of

knowledge under a set of ultimate principles, Ramon Llull’s Art

is an «art of contemplation», born of prayer and internal

discourse at the highest levels of intellect, not least in the first

phase thereof (i. e. before 1290). His Art is, therefore, the

technological interface whereby internal discourse can be

encoded and transmitted. By examining potential antecedents

(including Aristotle, St Anselm, St Augustine, Boethius, Hugh

of St Victor, St Irenaeus of Lyon, St John of Damascus, St

Maximus the Confessor, Peter of Spain, Priscian, St Thomas

Aquinas and William of Sherwood), as well as consequents

(such as William of Ockham and Erasmus of Rotterdam), I

attempt to construct a literary topography wherein to situate

the statements made by Llull on the topic of internal discourse

and whereby to understand how the latter, in its pre-eminent

angelic form, helped to shape his thinking about the superiority

of thought over the spoken and written word, a position which

might suggest the presence of conceptualist elements within the

realism for which he is well-known."

44. Karger, Elizabeth. 1996. "Mental Sentences According to Burley

and to the Early Ockham." Vivarium no. 34:192-230.

"The intellectual relationship between Walter Burley and

William Ockham was a remarkable one. Though Ockham

relentlessly criticized those who, such as Burley, admitted of

common natures, he was nevertheless, in mat- ters of logic,(2)

heavily indebted to the same Burley, whose early works

preceded his own by some fifteen years. Burley, on the other

hand, though he, of course, regarded Ockham's rejection of

common natures as a major mistake, nevertheless incorporated

in his later works some of Ockham's own views and analyses.(3)

As a way of gaining a better understanding of both authors, it

may, then, prove useful to compare their thinking, at least on

some points of doctrine. I propose we do so on a subject to

which both authors made an important contribution, that of

mental sentences-" (p. 192, a note omitted)

(2) Thanks to S. Brown, the editor of Burley's Tractatus de

suppositionibus (see Brown 1972) and to the authors of the

introduction to Ockham's Summa logicae (see Gàl & Brown

1974), we know that Ockham practically copied from Burley's

Tractatus de suppositionibus the chapter which, in the Summa

logicae, deals with the supposition of relative pronouns and

that he was heavily indebted to him for the chapters dealing

with obligations and with insolubles.

(3) W. Courtenay, in Courtenay 1987, sees in the structure of

Burley's De puritate artis logicae an influence of Ockham's

Summa logicae . R. Wood, in Wood 1984, has pointed out that

Burley, when expanding his pre-1316 commentary on

Aristotle's Physics, which he did after Ockham had written his

own commentary of that text in 1324, often relie on Ockham's

commentary more than on his own earlier one. On the

relationship between Burley and Ockham, on how they shared

some basic views in spite of obvious disagreements, L. Baudry

is still well worth reading (Baudry 1934).

References

L. Baudry 1934 - Les rapports de Guillaume d'Occam et de

Walter Burleigh, in: Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire

du Moyen Age, 9 (1934), 155-73.

S. Brown 1972 - Walter Burleigh's Treatise De Suppositionibus

and its influence on William of Ockham, in: Franciscan

Studies, 32 (1972), 15-64-

W. J. Courtenay 1987 - The reception of Ockham' s thought in

Fourteenth-century England in: A. Hudson & M. Wilks (eds.),

From Ockham to Wyclif, Oxford 1987, 89- 107.

Gài & Brown 1974 - Introduction to Guillelmi de Ockham :

Summa Logicae, eds. Ph. Boehner, G. Gài, S. Brown, St.

Bonaventure, N.Y. 1974, 7*-73*.

R. Wood1984 - Burley's Physics commentaries, in: Franciscan

Studies, 44 (1984), 275-303.

45. Kärkkäinen, Pekka A. 2011. "Mental Language." In

Encyclopedia of Medieval Philosophy: Philosophy between

500 and 1500, edited by Lagerlund, Henrik, 1160-1165.

Dordrecht: Springer.

Abstract: "William of Ockham has been considered the first

thinker to develop a theory of mental language with

grammatical structures. Ockham’s early views built upon

Augustine’s and Boethius’ twofold concept of a mental word: a

concept common to all people and a resemblance of words to

actual spoken and written languages. Ockham understood

mental language to be identical with thinking. The spoken and

written words are subordinated to their mental counterparts

and therefore share their signification. According to Ockham,

mental language does not contain figurative speech,

grammatical genders, synonyms, or equivocations but does

contain most other features of external languages, including

suppositions of terms and certain fallacies related to the

suppositions. John Buridan diverged from Ockham’s view at

this point and used the notion of modes of thinking to discuss

related problems. Gregory of Rimini modified the view of

mental language in several respects.

He considered the major part of mental language to consist of a

mentalized conventional language, with only the act of

assenting to a mental proposition, which he considered to be

the mental proposition itself, being independent of

conventional languages. Peter of Ailly further developed

Gregory’s and Ockham’s ideas. In Italy, Peter of Mantua and

Paul of Venice discussed the problems of word order and

mental language that William of Heytesbury had raised earlier.

The former was mainly critical of Heytesbury, while the latter

for the most part shared Heytesbury’s views.

Several later fifteenth- and sixteenth-century logicians

continued the discussions." (pp. 1160-1161)

46. Kelley, F.E. 1978. "Some Observations on the "Fictum"Theory

in Ockham and Its Relation to Hervaeus Natalis." Franciscan

Studies no. 38:260-282.

"It is not clear whether or not William of Ockham, the Oxford

Franciscan, ever read what Hervaeus Natalis,1 the Paris

Dominican, had to say a decade or so earlier about the

universal. Codex Vat. Pal. lat. 998 includes two short questions

dealing with Hervaeus' doctrine regarding the ens rationis

which fall between some logic commentaries belonging to

Ockham and a "Quaestio de universali secundum viam et

doctrinam Guillelmi de Ockham/'2 This juxtaposition may

indicate someone's interest in the comparative views of

Ockham and Hervaeus on the topic, or may even be a reflection

of Ockham's own familiarity with Hervaeus' work. Be that as it

may, the thought of these two men who wrote in the early years

of the fourteenth century on this question reveal some

remarkable similarities." (p. 260)

(...)

"While it may be the case that William of Ockham never

examined what Hervaeus Natalis wrote regarding the universal,

it is safe to suppose that he would have found his work

interesting reading. One major difference between the two men

can be noted. In contrast to Ockham' s hesitation and shifting,

Hervaeus presents a single analysis without reversals. The

curious blend of resemblances and differences in their

respective accounts makes it all but impossible for us to

imagine what might have been Ockham's assessment, had he

made one. Being the critic that he was, it is hardly likely that

the Venerable Inceptor would have found himself cornered,

without room to argue further. This sort of debate, as we know,

had a way of going on." (p. 279)

Bibliographia. Annotated bibliographies

Raul Corazzon || rc@ontology.co || Info

Bibliography of the Medieval

Theories of Mental Language

(Second part)

Studies in English (Kin - O'Ca)

1. King, Peter. 2004. "Scotus on Mental Content." In Duns Scot à

Paris, 1302–2002: Actes du colloque de Paris, 2-4 septembre

2002, edited by Boulnois, Olivier, Karger, Elizabeth, Solère,

Jean-Luc and Sondag, Gérard, 65-88. Turnhout: Brepols.

"I shall examine what Scotus had to say in Paris about what we

now call ‘mental content’: the feature of mental acts in virtue of

which each has the character it does qua mental act. When I

think about Socrates, the content of my thought is Socrates,

which is what makes my act of thinking be about Socrates

rather than about Plato; since Socrates may not exist when I

happen to think of him, there must be some feature of the

mental act that goes proxy for him in my act of thinking, and

this feature is ‘mental content’ properly so-called(2). Scotus

offers some “startlingly new ideas about cognition,”(3) making

a radical break with his predecessors and contemporaries, in

his proposal that mental content is a (perhaps complex)

internal constituent of an act of thinking. More succinctly,

Scotus invents the notion of mental content.

I will begin by looking at psychological theory at the time

Scotus took up these issues in Paris (§ I), turning thereafter to

his account (§ II) and its foundations (§ III), closing with a look

at Scotus’s attempt to provide a solid metaphysical footing for

his account (§ IV)." (pp. 65-66)

(2) This is not to hold, though it is compatible with holding,

mental content to be the (intentional) object of thought or the

item of which we are immediately aware in thinking. It merely

asserts that there must be some feature of the mental act rather

than of the world that makes the act have the character it does,

that is, to be about what it is about. Mental content in the strict

sense, then, is more fundamental than intentionality and may

explain it.

(3)3 Contrary to R. Pasnau, “Cognition”, in The Cambridge

Companion to Duns Scotus, ed. T. Williams, Cambridge,

Cambridge University Press, 2003, p. 285 : “As in most

matters, John Duns Scotus does not distinguish himself in

cognitive theory by adopting a radically new perspective...

Scotus is interesting, then, not because he offers any startlingly

new ideas about cognition, but because he gives a careful and

penetrating analysis of the field”.

2. ———. 2007. "Abelard on Mental Language." American

Catholic Philosophical Quarterly no. 81:169-187.

Abstract: "I argue that Abelard was the author of the first

theory of mental language in the Middle Ages, devising a

"language of thought" to provide the semantics for ordinary

languages, based on the idea that thoughts have linguistic

character. I examine Abelard's semantic framework with

special attention to his principle of compositionality (the

meaning of a whole is a function of the meanings of the parts);

the results are then applied to Abelard's distinction between

complete and incomplete expressions, as well as the distinction

between sentences and the statements which the sentences are

used to make. Abelard's theory of mental language is shown to

be subtle and sophisticated, the forerunner of the great theories

of the fourteenth century."

3. ———. 2007. "Rethinking Representation in the Middle Ages: A

Vade-Mecum to Medieval Theories of Mental Representation."

In Representation and Objects of Thought in Medieval

Philosophy, edited by Lagerlund, Henrik, 81-100. Aldershot:

Ashgate.

"The Christian Aristotelianism of the High Middle Ages had the

conceptual resources to explain the representationality of

mental representation – that is, the feature or features in virtue

of which a mental representation represents what it represents

– in four separate ways:

(R1) The mental representation and the represented item have

the same form.

(R2) The mental representation resembles, or is a likeness, of

the represented item.

(R3) The mental representation is caused by the represented

item.

(R4) The mental representation signifies the represented item."

(...)

"A rough approximation of what I want to argue for here is that

in the course of the High Middle Ages an important shift takes

place in the theory of representation, namely a shift from

accounts of representation that favor (R1) and (R2) to accounts

that favor (R3) and (R4). This is all the more surprising in that

(R1) and (R2) are clearly Aristotle’s preferred account of

representationality, if anything is. The trajectory of the debate

begins with Thomas Aquinas and is epitomized, as so many

medieval philosophical discussions are, in William of Ockham.

In the spirit of Fodor (1985) and Haugeland (1990), I’ll take a

top-down approach to the historical sources, concentrating on

the logic of the positions and their development. My account

will therefore track mainstream medieval philosophy of

psychology. Richard Rufus’s attack on naive

representationalism, for example, won’t be considered here

since it appears not to have affected the course of the debate,

interesting though his arguments were. My focus is rather on

scholastic ‘common wisdom’ about mental representation, to

the extent there was any, in the High Middle Ages." (pp. 81-82,

notes omitted)

References

Fodor, J. (1985), ‘Fodor’s Guide to Mental Representation’,

Mind, 94, 55–97; reprinted in A Theory of Content and Other

Essays, Cambridge: MIT Press 1990, 3–29.

Haugeland, J. (1990), ‘The Intentionality All-Stars’, in James A.

Tomberlin (ed.), Philosophical Perspectives 4: Action Theory

and Philosophy of Mind, Ridgeview Publishing Company, 383–

427.

4. ———. 2015. "Thinking About Things: Singular Thought in the

Middle Age." In Intentionality, Cognition, and Mental

Representation in Medieval Philosophy, edited by Klima,

Gyula, 104-121. New York: Fordham University Press.

"For difficulties in explaining how it is we can think about

things posed a challenge to the working paradigm of cognitive

psychology, prompting a variety of responses and spurring

innovative theories, fragmenting the initial consensus on an

Aristotelian approach to the philosophy of mind. In what

follows, I will sketch the main lines of the mediaeval debates:

Aquinas presenting the dominant paradigm for cognitive

psychology (§1), the initial challenges to the paradigm over the

question of singular thought (§2), Scotus devising a “hybrid”

account in response (§3), and Ockham proposing a radically

different approach to psychological explanation altogether

(§4)." (p. 104)

5. Klima, Gyula. 2004. "Tradition and innovation in medieval

theories of mental representation." Proceedings of the Society

for Medieval Logic and Metaphysics no. 4:4-11.

"In his recent book, Thomistic Realism and the Linguistic Turn,

O’Callaghan marshals some of the resources of analytic

philosophy’s “linguistic turn” to recover some of the sense of

Aquinas’s “realism” in logic and psychology (I don’t dare say

“philosophy of mind”)(1)

(...)

"I agree with O’Callaghan’s account of Aquinas’s treatment of

acts of intellect and their objects, and I further agree with the

corresponding treatment of Thomistic semantics in light of this

account."

(...)

!As indicated, with these general and very basic points I am in

complete agreement, and it is against this background of

agreement that I want to carve out a modest area of

disagreement. I want to defend, against O’Callaghan, the

appropriateness of attributing a theory of “mental language” to

Aquinas, or, at least (and even more modestly), the possibility

of an authentically Thomistic theory of “mental language.”

There are in fact two reasons that O’Callaghan thinks it is

inappropriate to associate a theory of mental language with

Aquinas. The first, not explored so much in his book but argued

at length in a separate paper,2 is that a particular part of the

Thomistic vocabulary which might suggest a theory of mental

language, the “verbum mentis,” has no genuine philosophical

import at all, and functions solely as a theological metaphor.

The second is that a theory of mental language necessarily

implies the mental representationalism from which

O’Callaghan has worked so hard to separate an authentically

Thomistic account of cognition. I will address these two points

in turn." (pp. 12-13)

(1) John O'Callaghan, Thomistic Realism and the Linguistic

Turn: Toward a More Perfect Form of Existence, (University

of Notre Dame Press, 2003)

6. ———. 2004. "John Buridan and the Force-Content

Distinction." In Medieval Theories on Assertive and Non-

Assertive Language edited by Maierù, Alfonso and Valente,

Luisa, 415-427. Firenze: Leo S. Olschki.

"Introduction: the «Frege Point»

Perhaps, the best way to motivate the force-content distinction

is with reference to what Peter Geach called the «Frege point».

As he wrote:

A thought may have just the same content whether you assent

to its truth or not; a proposition may occur in discourse now

asserted, now unasserted, and yet be recognizably the same

proposition. This may appear so obviously true as to be hardly

worth saying; but we shall see it is worth saying, by contrast

with erroneous theories of assertion, and also because a right

view of assertion is fatal to well-known philosophical views on

certain other topics.

I shall call this point about assertion the Frege point after the

logician who was the first (so far as I know) to make the point

clearly and emphatically.(1)

For his part, Buridan was fully aware of the «Frege point», of

course, without being aware of Frege. But then he was also fully

aware of the De Morgan Laws without being aware of De

Morgan, etc. - as we know, such designations are but common

symptoms of what may be diagnosed as the chronic historical

amnesia of the modern mind.

But this is not the point I wish to make here. In this paper, I

will rather attempt to show how Buridan’s awareness of the

«Frege point» and of the force-content distinction in general

enable him to avoid the philosophical evils Geach alluded to in

this passage, and how this awareness is consistent with his

general nominalist stance on propositions and what they signify

both in the mind and in external reality." (p. 415)

(1) P. T. Geach, Assertion, in Id., Logic Matters, Berkeley-Los-

Angeles, UC Press, 1980, p. 254-269, p. 254-255.

7. ———. 2006. "The Universality of Logic and the Primacy of

Mental Language in the Nominalist Philosophy of Logic of John

Buridan." Mediaevalia philosophica Polonorum no. 35:167-

177.

8. ———. 2009. "Two Brief Remarks on Calvin Normore’s Paper."

Proceedings of the Society for Medieval Logic and

Metaphysics no. 9:53-54.

On C. G. Normore, "Externalism, Singular Thought and

Nominalist Ontology".

"Since at the meeting we ran out of time and I did not have a

chance to offer my comments on Calvin Normore’s extremely

stimulating paper, let me offer them here.

(1) “If a whole just is its parts then a difference of parts should

make for a different whole and if each material object is such a

whole then for numerically the same material object to persist

through time it must not gain or lose parts over time.” (p. 45

above)

(...)

With this comment, I would actually like to caution people who

want avoid nominalism, simply because (on the strength of the

fallacious aporia quoted above) they tend to think that the

equation of wholes with their parts is some dangerous

“reductionism”, which one can get rid of only if we deny this

(otherwise perfectly plausible) claim.

"(2) As for the final question of the paper, I would say that

pushing the issue to its ultimate consequences as Buridan is

doing it in this question (and in this one alone, as far as I can

tell) would lead to a conception of natural science as the science

of natural substances pretty much like the contemporary

chemistry of elements, where the periodic table provides the

quidditative definitions of various kinds of substances, and the

laws of quantum physics and chemistry dictate what pertains to

each by natural necessity" (pp. 53-54)

9. ———. 2009. John Buridan. New York: Oxford University

Press.

Chapter 3: The Primacy of Mental Language: 27; Chapter 4:

The Various Concepts and the Idea of a Mental Language 37-

120.

"So how can Buridan be both an antiskeptical essentialist and a

nominalist? To many contemporary philosophers, the phrase

“essentialist nominalism” may appear to be an oxymoron. After

all, essentialism is the doctrine that things come in natural

kinds characterized by their essential properties, on account of

some common nature or essence they share. But nominalism is

precisely the denial of the existence, indeed, the very possibility

of such shared essences. Nevertheless, despite the intuitions of

such contemporary philosophers, John Buridan was not only a

thoroughgoing nominalist, as is well known, but also a staunch

defender of a strong essentialist doctrine against certain

skeptics of his time. But then the question inevitably arises:

could he consistently maintain such a doctrine?" (p. 259)

(...)

"In fact, from this case-study of Buridan’s essentialism, I think

we can eneralize the following conclusions. If one is trying to

avoid the inconsistencies of naïve ontological realism,(12) one

has to deny the existence of universal entities. Yet, if one is

unwilling to accept the apparent skeptical consequences of this

denial, and wants to stay a scientific realist, one has to opt for

some form of logical essentialism. But logical essentialism is

predicated on a plausible account of our ability to acquire

substantial concepts grounding our semantics of essential

predicates. However, this account, to avoid the epistemological

mysticism of innate or infused ideas, has to show how these

concepts can be acquired from our limited experience. But if

the previous objection to Buridan’s account is right, then it

seems that this can only be done by recourse to some form of

“moderate realism” in one’s semantics, namely, one that

accounts for our substantial common terms and concepts as

representing particulars in respect of their essential

similarities, while abstracting from their accidental

dissimilarities." (p. 266, a note omitted)

(12) By “naïve realism”, I mean the version of Plato’s theory of

Forms found to be inconsistent already by Plato himself in his

Parmenides, as well as the theory of universals found to be

inconsistent by Boethius in his second commentary on

Porphyry’s Isagoge.

10. ———. 2012. "Ontological Reduction by Logical Analysis and

the Primitive Vocabulary of Mentalese." American Catholic

Philosophical Quarterly no. 86:40'3-414.

Abstract: "This paper confronts a certain modern view of the

relation between semantics and ontology with that of the late-

medieval nominalist philosophers, William Ockham and John

Buridan. The modern view in question is characterized in terms

of what is called here “the thesis of ontosemantic parallelism,”

which states that the primitive (indefinable) categorematic

concepts of our semantics mark out the primary entities in

reality. The paper argues that, despite some apparently

plausible misinterpretations to the contrary, the late-medieval

nominalist program of “ontological reduction” was not driven

by considerations that try to “read off” ontology from semantic

analysis or those that try to identify semantic primitives in their

search for ontological primitives. The medieval authors

presented a much more flexible, dynamic view of “Aristotelian

naturalism,” which challenges both of the unappealing modern

alternatives of “conceptual tribalism” and “conceptual

imperialism”."

11. ———, ed. 2015. Intentionality, Cognition, and Mental

Representation in Medieval Philosophy. New York: Fordham

University Press.

Contents: Acknowledgments XI; Gyula Kima: Introduction:

Intentionality, Cognition, and Mental Representation in

Medieval Philosophy 1; Stephen Read: Concepts and Meaning

in Medieval Philosophy 9; Joshua P. Hochschild: Mental

Language in Aquinas? 29; Martin Pickavé: Causality and

Cognition: An Interpretation of Henry of Ghent’s Quodlibet V,

q. 14 46; Giorgio Pini: Two Models of Thinking: Thomas

Aquinas and John Duns Scotus on Occurrent Thoughts 81;

Peter King: Thinking About Things: Singular Thought in the

Middle Ages 104; Henrik Lagerlund: Singular Terms and Vague

Concepts in Late Medieval Mental Language Theory: Or, the

Decline and Fall of Mental Language 122-140; Russell L.

Friedman: Act, Species, and Appearance: Peter Auriol on

Intellectual Cognition and Consciousness 141; Claude Panaccio:

Ockham’s Externalism 166; Elizabeth Karger: Was Adam

Wodeham an Internalist or an Externalist? 186; Susan Brower-

Toland: How Chatton Changed Ockham’s Mind: William

Ockham and Walter Chatton on Objects and Acts of Judgment

204; Christophe Grellard: The Nature of Intentional Objects in

Nicholas of Autrecourt’s Theory of Knowledge 235; John

Zupko: On the Several Senses of “Intentio” in Buridan 251; Olaf

Pluta: Mental Representation in Animals and Humans: Some

Late Medieval Discussions 273; Stephan Meier-Oeser: The

Intersubjective Sameness of Mental Concepts in Late Scholastic

Thought 287; Gyula Klima: Mental Representations and

Concepts in Medieval Philosophy 323; Bibliography 339; List of

Contributors 355; Index 357-359.

"The essays in this volume explore the intricacies and varieties

of the conceptual relationships among intentionality, cognition,

and mental representation as conceived by some of the greatest

medieval philosophers, including Aquinas, Scotus, Ockham,

and Buridan, and some of their lesser-known but in their own

time just as infl uential contemporaries. The clarification of

these conceptual connections sheds new light not only on the

intriguing historical relationships between medieval and

modern thought on these issues, but also on some fundamental

questions in the philosophy of mind as it is conceived today."

(p. 1)

12. ———. 2015. "Mental Representations and Concepts in

Medieval Philosophy." In Intentionality, Cognition, and

Mental Representation in Medieval Philosophy, edited by

Klima, Gyula, 323-337. New York: Fordham University Press.

"Talking about mental representations and concepts in

medieval philosophy, one should probably start with clarifying

these terms in the way medieval philosophers used and

understood them. However, the phrase repraesentatio

mentalis is rarely, if ever, used by medieval philosophers:

“mental representation” is rather a term of art of modern

philosophy of mind. Furthermore, although the term conceptus

is widely used by medieval philosophers, its meaning and

reference seem to vary widely among them, depending on their

particular theories.

Indeed, to complicate matters, many authors would use other

terms, such as intentio, intellectus, notitia, or even ratio or

verbum mentis, let alone fictum or idolum mentis or conceptus

obiectivus or species impressa, on one hand, and intellectio,

conceptus mentalis, conceptus formalis, or species expressa on

the other, to designate what we would want to name “concept”

and what other (or even the same) medieval authors would also

be willing to call “conceptus.”

Having in this way successfully muddied the terminological

waters, I should probably first clarify what I will mean by the

English terms in the proposed title, and explain my

understanding of the relevant Latin phrases as used by various

medieval authors in relation to this meaning." (.p. 323)

13. ———. 2017. "Intentionality and Mental Content in Aquinas,

Ockham, and Buridan." In Universals in the Fourteeenth

Century, edited by Amerini, Fabrizio and Cesalli, Laurent, 65-

87. Pisa: Edizioni della Normale.

"As we all know, Buridan is usually billed as a nominalist,

indeed, an 'Ockhamist' nominalist. Of course, by and large this

is true, especially, as far as Buridan’s logic is concerned. But we

also know that the devil is in the detail. Received orthodoxy

concerning Buridan’s‘Ockhamism’ has recently been

challenged, or at least qualified, time and again.

In this paper, I wish to add to those qualifications with regard

to Buridan's cognitive psychology. In particular, I will argue

that in some important respects Buridan’s positions in his

psychology are closer to Aquinaas' than to Ockham’s, indeed,

possibly at the expense of the consistency of his own doctrine,

even if it was possibly devised to avoid some of the problems of

Ockham’s account.

In order to make this argument, I will first sketch Aquinas’

doctrine of intentionality and mental representation. Next, I

will contrast it with Ockham's radically different doctrine,

pointing out some of the difficulties that may have motivated

Buridan’s departure from Ockham. Finally, | will call attention

to those points of Buridan’s doctrine in which he seems to

depart from Ockham and move in the direction of Aquinas,

briefly evaluating the consistency of the resulting doctrine." (p.

65)

14. Klima, Gyula, and Hall, Alexander W., eds. 2011. Mental

Representation: Proceedings of the Society for Medieval Logic

and Metaphysics 4. CambridgE: Cambridge Scholars

Publishing.

Table of Contents: Gyula Klima: Tradition and Innovation in

Medieval Theories of Mental Representation 4; Joshua P.

Hochschild: Does Mental Language Imply Mental

Representationalism? The Case of Aquinas’s Verbum

Mentis.12; Claude Panaccio: Concepts as Similitudes in William

of Ockham’s Nominalism18; Henrik Lagerlund: Vague

Concepts and Singular Terms in a Buridanian Language of

Thought Tradition 25; Gyula Klima: The Demonic Temptations

of Medieval Nominalism: Mental Representation and “Demon

Skepticism” 37; Olaf Pluta: Mental Representation in Animals

and Humans – Some Late-Medieval Discussions 45; Susan

Brower-Toland: Against Ockham? Walter Chatton on Objects of

Propositional Attitudes 59 (*)

"The papers presented in this volume will be published in an

expanded form, along with a number of other papers, in a new

volume to be published by Fordham University Press:

Intentionality, Cognition and Mental Representation in

Medieval Philosophy [edited by Gyula Klima, New York:

Fordham University Press 2015]

It is supposed to be common knowledge in the history of ideas

that one of the few medieval philosophical contributions

preserved in modern philosophical thought is the idea that

mental phenomena are distinguished from physical phenomena

by their intentionality, their directedness toward some object.

As is usually the case with such commonplaces about the

history of ideas, especially those concerning medieval ideas,

this claim is not quite true. Medieval philosophers routinely

described ordinary physical phenomena, such as reflections in

mirrors or sounds in the air, as exhibiting intentionality, while

they described what modern philosophers would take to be

typically mental phenomena, such as sensation and

imagination, as ordinary physical processes. Still, it is true that

medieval philosophers would regard all acts of cognition as

characterized by intentionality, on account of which all these

acts are some sort of representations of their intended objects.

The essays of this volume explore the intricacies and varieties

of the conceptual relationships between intentionality,

cognition and mental representation as conceived by some of

the greatest medieval philosophers, including Aquinas, Scotus,

Ockham and Buridan, and some of their lesser known

contemporaries. The clarification of these conceptual

connections sheds new light not only on the intriguing

historical relationships between medieval and modern thought

on these issues, but also on some fundamental questions in the

philosophy of mind as it is conceived today." (p. 2)

(*) Editor’s Note: The contribution that originally appeared

here has been removed at the Author’s request, as she has

radically changed her mind about the main thesis of the paper.

The revised version of the paper will appear in print in the

volume forthcoming at Fordham University Press.

15. Kneepkens, Corneille Henry. 1990. "Erfurt, Amol Q 70A: A

Questiones-Commentary on the Second Part of Alexander de

Villa Dei's Doctrinale." Vivarium:26-54.

"To sum up, the present state of research allows the following

remarks. The second part of the manuscript Erfurt, Ampl., Ç)

70A has preserved a collection of Quaestiones on the second

part of Alexander's Doctrinale. The terminus post of the origin

of these quaestiones is derived from Thomas of Erfurt's

teaching activities, i.e. the first decade of the fourteenth

century. The collection features two rather unreliable

ascriptions in the manuscript: one to a master Marcilius (sic!)

and the other to a master Simon. Further, it has to be examined

whether the Dutch scholar Marsilius of Inghen, who died on

August 20, 1396, could be considered a serious candidate for

the authorship." (p. 27)

(...)

!The author holds what Hübener has called a grammatical

Ultramentalismus(36) and argues that incongruency and

congruency are

not dependent on the spoken or written language, but are

rooted in mental language(...)" (pp. 36-37)

(...)

!With this view the master of the quaestiones proves to be a

follower of William of Ockham, who in the beginning of his

Summa Logicae laid the foundations of the late-mediaeval

nominalistic doctrine of mental language(37). However, the

theory brought forward in the first quaestio is not identical with

Ockham' s in every respect. Actually, it shows greater

resemblance to the theory of mental language that we find in

the writings of Pierre d'Ailly, especially in his early Conceptus,

written in Paris in 1372(38), and his Destructiones modorum

significandi(39). Unlike Ockham, who is mainly interested in

the truth and falsity of the mental proposition, and who does

not give serious attention to the problem of linguistic

congruency and incongruency as such(40), both our author and

Pierre d'Ailly emphasize the primacy of congruency and

incongruency on the level of mental language(41)." (p. 37, some

notes omitted)

(39) This work must have been written before 1395 (...)

16. Knuuttila, Simo. 2009. "Ockham on Fallacies and Mental

Language." In Le langage mental du Moyen Âge à l'âge

classique, edited by Biard, Joël, 135-144. Louvain: Peeters.

"The theory of fallacies was an important part of medieval logic,

and Aristotle's work On Sophistic Refutations was the basic text

in this context since the twelfth century. Sorne Aristotelian

types of fallacy were also discussed separately on the basis of

Boethius's remarks in the commentaries on De interpretatione.

(...)

My aim is to discuss some ideas in Ockham's theory of the

fallacies and their relation to his reflections on mental

language. I mainly refer to his commentary on the On Sophistic

Refutations. There is also a section on fallacies in the Summa

logicae which is based on what is said in the commentary with

some minor changes(3). As for the theory of mental language,

Ockham saw its elements in Aristotle's remark that spoken and

written words signify things in the world through the affections

of the soul and in Boethius's division between three sorts of

discourse, spoken, written and mental(4).

While these ideas were generally known ideas among medieval

logicians, Ockham was the first to sketch a theory of mental

language as the universal medium of thinking with signifying

signs and syntactic structures.

As distinct from the words of natural language which signify on

the basis of conventional agreements, the basic units of mental

language as the acts of intellection signify naturally. These are

the same for all informed intellects, as are the syncategorematic

logical terms. The syntax of mental language is more ascetic

than that of natural language because its rules are restricted to

those which are necessary for signification." (pp. 135-136, a

note omitted)

(3) 3 Summa logicae, ill-4, p. 749-849.

(4) 4 See Aristotle, De interpretatione 1, 16 a 6-7; Boethius,

Commentarii in Aristotelis Perihermeneias II, L1 p. 29, 1. 26-

30, 1. 10; Ockham, Summa logicae I, ch. 3, 1. 100-102, p. 14; I,

ch. 12, 1. 8-28, p. 41-42.

17. ———. 2014. "Early Modern Psychology of Language." In

Sourcebook for the History of the Philosophy of Mind:

Philosophical Psychology from Plato to Kant, edited by

Knuuttila, Simo and Sihvola, Juha, 401-412. Dordrecht:

Springer.

"While the medieval doctrine of speculative grammar was

known in the sixteenth century through several prints of

Thomas Erfurt’s Grammatica speculativa and some other

medieval treatises, it was of little importance in philosophical

discussions.

William of Ockham argued that thinking had the structure of

non-conventional mental language which was explanatorily

prior to spoken and written language.

This theory was influential in late medieval philosophy and

continued to be discussed by authors of the second

scholasticism. The notions of mental discourse and mental

words were employed in the psychology of language even later

when the conception of a detailed mental language had lost its

attraction. Hobbes, Locke and many other seventeenth-century

philosophers who spoke about mental discourse or mental

propositions assumed that there was a mental power for

thinking and another ability for ordinary language which

presupposes the previous one." (pp. 401-402)

18. Lagerlund, Henrik. 2003. "Representations, Concepts and

Words: Peter of Ailly on Semantics and Psychology."

Proceedings of the Society for Medieval Logic and

Metaphysics no. 3:15-36.

"Peter of Ailly (1350-1420) was a very influential person. He

had a distinguished career both within the University of Paris

and in the Catholic Church.

(...)

In the present study, I attempt, in some small ways, to remedy

this by giving a unified account of his views on the semantics

and psychology of mental language.(2)" (p. 15)

(...)

"The philosophical treatise of foremost interest to us in the

present study is, of course, the Conceptus, and it is exactly what

its title suggests – a work on mental terms, that is, a work on

mental language. It is believed to have been written in 1372,

which would make it a very early work by Peter. It was

published and reprinted several times in the late fifteenth and

early sixteenth century – always together with his treatise on

insolubles.(3) Besides these two works, we will use the

Destructiones modorum significandi and the Tractatus

exponibilium as sources for Peter’s treatment of the semantics

of mental language. The psychological aspects of mental

language are treated by Peter in the Conceptus, of course, but

also in his commentary on Peter Lombard’s Sentences and in

the Tractatus de anima(4).

The Destructiones modorum significandi seems to be the

earliest of these works, followed closely by Conceptus et

insolubilia and Tractatus exponibilium. They are, however,

earlier than Peter’s commentary on the Sentences, which was

supposedly written between 1376 and 1377, and the Tractatus

de anima, which was completed between 1377 and 1381.(5)

Since the Tractatus de anima is the latest of these works, I will

assume that it represents Peter’s most mature thoughts, but the

Conceptus will otherwise be my main source.

I will argue that Peter develops a highly original theory of

language and thought, which in details will differ from both

William Ockham’s and John Buridan’s theories. It is, of course,

true that he is deeply influenced by Ockham and Buridan, but

he seems to develop their views in a new direction, particularly

in light of some deep problems facing their theories." (pp. 15-

16)

(2) Peter’s views on semantics and mental language have

previously been treated in Spade (1980), Biard (1989), Spade

(1996) and Bakker (1996).

(3) See Spade (1980).

(4) See Pluta (1987).

(5) See Chappius et al. (1986).

References

Bakker, P. (1996) ‘Syncatégorèmes, concepts, équivocité: Deux

questions anonymes, conservées dans le ms. Paris, B.N., lat.

16.401, liées à la semantique de Pierre d’Ailly (c. 1350-1420)’,

Vivarium 34, 1: 76-131.

Biard, J. (1989) Logique et théorie du signe au XIVe siècle,

Paris: J. Vrin.

Chappuis, M., Kaczmarke, L., Pluta, O. (1986) ‘Die

philosophischen Schriften des Peter von Ailly: Authentizität

und Chronologie’, Freiburger Zeitschriften für Philosophie und

Theologie 33: 593-615.

Pluta, O. (1987) Die philosophische Psyschologie des Peter von

Ailly, Amsterdam: B.R. Grüner.

Spade, P.V. (1980) Peter of Ailly: Concepts and Insolubles,

Dordrecht: Reidel.

Spade, P.V. (1996) Thoughts, Words and Things: An

Introduction to Late Medieval Logic and Semantic Theory,

published on Internet. See https://pvspade.com/Logic/.

19. ———. 2004. "Vague Concepts and Singular Terms in a

Buridanian Language of Thought Tradition." Proceedings of

the Society for Medieval Logic and Metaphysics no. 4:25-36.

"William Ockham and John Buridan are in agreement on basic

ontological and epistemological principles, and can therefore be

said to belong to the same late medieval philosophical

tradition, but they differ in the ways that they spell out and

develop these shared presuppositions. They both want to

explain human thinking by a language of thought hypothesis,

and they thus argue that thinking is a combination of mental

acts, which function as terms in a language. This mental

language also functions as a semantics for our spoken and

written languages. Ockham argues that the acquisition of the

terms of the mental language happens through intuitive or

abstractive cognitions. An intuitive cognition, which is primary,

is a direct acquaintance with an external object. The object acts

on us and produces an act in the mind, which is a

representation of the object by standing in for the object in the

mind, and hence the object and the mental act can be said to

co-vary. The mental act is thus also a sign, which plays a

linguistic role in the so-called language of thought.(1)" (p. 25)

(...)

"Buridan’s solution to the problem of the generality of sense

representation is quite interesting. By putting things in

prospect or by attending to some thing in a representation we

always understand particularly before we understand

universally. Always ‘that cup’ before ‘cup’. This is a singular

cognition, since it is of one particular individual, but it is in a

sense a common cognition as well, since the cognition is not

uniquely determining. This implies, I will argue, a huge

difference between Ockham’s and Buridan’s theories of singular

thought, and when this example and this theory is combined

with a language of thought hypothesis, as it is in Buridan and

his nominalist followers, something new emerges that will

affect the structure of the mental language tremendously, since

whatever it is I first singularly cognize it seems not to be

something simple – ‘that thing’, ‘that animal’ and ‘that cup’

seem all semantically complex. Buridan calls these concepts

that are first acquired and from which all others are derived

vague or confused concepts. The rest of my paper will be about

these concepts and about how the tradition after Buridan saw

them." (p. 27)

(1) The most thorough study of Ockham’s theory so far is

Panaccio 2004. See also Lagerlund 2004 for the context and

background of the theory.

References

Lagerlund, H. (2004) “Mental Representation in Medieval

Philosophy”, in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy

(Summer Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL =

https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2004/entries/represe

ntation-medieval/

Panaccio, C. (2004) Ockham on Concepts, Aldershot: Ashgate.

20. ———. 2006. "What is Singular Thought? Ockham and Buridan

on Singular Terms in the Language of Thought." In Mind and

Modality: Studies in the History of Philosophy in Honour of

Simo Knuuttila, edited by Hirvonen, Vesa, Holopainene, Toivo

J. and Tuominen, Miira, 217-237. Leiden: Brill.

"Calvin Normore argues in a forthcoming article that William

Ockham, in the early fourteenth century, invented the notion of

singular thought.(1) The thesis is not that Ockham was first in

the history of philosophy to think that humans can think about

a singular object—he was most certainly not—but the point is

instead that he was first to think that singular thought is

primary and the foundation of more general thought. Ever

since Aristotle, it had been the other way around, namely, that

thinking is primarily universal and that we somehow think

about singulars in terms of universals.

Normore wants to reject this and pejoratively notes that

philosophy has always had a preference for the universal." (p.

217)

(...(

"The theory Ockham developed was incredibly influential and

became the foundation of a family of theories of thought that

were dominant well into the sixteenth and seventeenth

centuries, and it can, in many ways, still be said to be the

dominant theory of thought.(2) In Normore’s article, he also

claims that thinkers following in Ockham’s footsteps radically

misunderstood the notion invented by Ockham; Normore is

primarily considering John Buridan. These two thinkers did

not disagree on the notion that singular thought is somehow

primary, but they instead disagreed on what singular thought

is. Normore claims, further, that Buridan got it all wrong. In

this article, I would like to investigate the relation between

Ockham and Buridan further and explain why Buridan ends up

with the view he defends. I furthermore would like to present a

defense of Buridan’s notion of singular thought." (p. 218)

(1) See Normore (forthcoming).[The Invention of Singular

Thought (2007)]

(2) For studies of the medieval part of this tradition, see

Lagerlund (2003), Lagerlund (2004b), and Lagerlund

(forthcoming a). For a study of the continuation of this

tradition in early modern thought, see Lagerlund (forthcoming

b). See also Fodor (2003) for an example of the importance of

this view today.

Rferences

Fodor, J. (2003), Hume Variations (Oxford: Clarendon Press).

Lagerlund, H. (2003), “Representations, Concepts and Words:

Peter of Ailly on Semantics and Psychology,” Proceedings of the

Society for Medieval Logic and Metaphysics 3, 15–36.

Lagerlund, H. (2004b), “Vague Concepts and Singular Terms in

a Buridanian Language of Thought Tradition,” Proceedings of

the Society for Medieval Logic and Metaphysics 4, 25–36.

Lagerlund, H. (forthcoming a [2007]), “Making Aristotle

Modern: John Buridan on Psychology and Language,”

J.M.M.H. Thijssen & P.J.J.M. Bakker (eds.) Mind, Perception,

and Cognition: The Commentary Tradition on Aristotle’s De

anima (Aldershot: Ashgate).

21. ———. 2007. "The terminological and conceptual roots of

representation in the soul in late ancient and medieval

philosophy." In Representation and Objects of Thought in

Medieval Philosophy, edited by Lagerlund, Henrik, 11-32.

Aldershot: Ashgate.

"An important aspect of the history I am trying to sketch here is

terminology, but it seems to me that the concept of

representation as it is introduced into the history of philosophy

is intrinsically tied to the term ‘representation’, and a necessary

part of the history of the concept is therefore the history of the

term. Part of my task of answering the above questions will

hence be tackled by tracing the usage of the Latin terms

‘repraesentare’ and ‘repraesentatio’ in late ancient and

medieval philosophy. It will then become evident that the usage

of representations in the soul become a part of philosophical

psychology at about the same time as the concept of ‘intentio’ is

introduced, namely the answer to the two questions just posed

is the Latin translation of the works of Avicenna. By using these

Latin terms to translate several Arabic terms used by Avicenna

the translators are forming or creating the concept of internal

and mental representation. Interestingly, however, it is

primarily imagination that Avicenna talks about as being

representational in nature and not concepts. Thinking about

concepts as representations comes into philosophy in a slightly

different way and much later." (p. 13)

22. ———. 2007. "Making Aristotle Modern. John Buridan on

Psychology and Language." In Mind, Cognition and

Representation: The Tradition of Commentaries on Aristotle’s

De anima, edited by Bakker, Paul J. J. M. and Thijssen,

Johannes M. M. H., 69-85. New York: Routledge.

"There are, at least, two distinct views of the mind in medieval

philosophy. On one view the mind is literally nothing before it

thinks of something. In analogy with perception, the mind

takes on the form of the object thought about, i.e., thinking is

having the form of some object in the mind.Thinking is also on

this view, in the first instance, universal. On the second view

thinking is constituted by a concept inhering or modifying the

mind. Thinking is, furthermore, language like, i.e., a language

of thought hypothesis usually accompanies this view of the

mind. It also holds that thinking is, in the first instance, of

particular individuals.

John Buridan’s theory of the mind, which is the topic of the

present chapter, belongs to the second of these two views.

(...)

This chapter will give a detailed presentation of how Buridan

thinks sensitive and intellective cognition works and how

concepts are acquired. By looking at how he approaches this

problem and compare what he has to say with Ockham’s

discussions of the same problem, the dual aspect of Buridan’s

project will become clear.

Although he adheres to Ockham’s theory of mental language,

he also accepts a thoroughly Aristotelian conception of sense

cognition, which is not easily compatible with this new theory

of thought.The result of this analysis will be a much more

complicated structure of the mental language." (p. 69)

23. ———. 2009. "John Mair on Concepts." In Le langage mental

du Moyen Âge à l'âge classique, edited by Biard, Joël, 205-220.

Louvain: Peeters.

"John Mair (c. 1470-1550) is little known but he was in fact one

of the most influential thinkers in the beginning of the

sixteenth century. He was originally from Scotland, but studied

in Cambridge and Paris. He graduated in Arts in 1495 in Paris

and became master at the Montaigu College in 1499. Mair

subsequently continued his career in Paris and took his

doctorate in theology in 1501." (p. 205)

(...)

"Mair's views about concepts and their acquisition should be

seen in the context of a long tradition starting with William

Ockham in the early fourteenth century. Much has already been

said before Mair in this tradition and it is often claimed that he

did not contribute many new ideas to it. He is instead seen as

an important transition thinker for the spread of these ideas

into the early modern world. The aim of this article is to show

that this is a misconceived view and that Mair in fact is a very

original thinker. I do this foremost by relying on three of Mair' s

many works, namely his Sentence commentary, De anima

commentary, and a logic work called Summulae logicales. I

have divided the sections of the article below according to the

three main philosophical questions surrounding concepts,

namely (i) what is their ontological status? (ii) what

psychological or epistemological role do they play? and (iii)

what semantical role do they play? I hence start in section one

by presenting Mair's view of concepts as qualities of the mind

and I will then also talk about his view of the soul in general,

and then I deal with his view of the acquisition of concepts.

Finally, I present his view of the signification of concepts. As

will be clear from this outline Mair is much more original than

previously thought." (p. 206, note omitted)

24. ———. 2011. "Mental Representation." In Encyclopedia of

Medieval Philosophy: Philosophy between 500 and 1500,

edited by Lagerlund, Henrik, 1165-1169. Dordrecht: Springer.

Abstract: "The concept of mental representation played an

important role in late medieval cognitive theories.

It was primarily introduced in the Latin translation of Avicenna

and became a central concept by the mid-thirteenth century. It

was developed in several ways and all the features we now

attribute to this concept were more or less already present in

the Middle Ages." (p. 1165)

25. ———. 2015. "Singular Terms and Vague Concepts in Late

Medieval Mental Language Theory: Or, the Decline and Fall of

Mental Language." In Intentionality, Cognition, and Mental

Representation in Medieval Philosophy, edited by Klima,

Gyula, 122-140. New York: Fordham University Press.

"Since they [Ockham and Buridan] agree that everything

existing is individual or singular, it is quite surprising that they

disagree about singular concepts. The reason for this is that

they have different views about how the basic signifi cative

constituents of the mental language are acquired. Ockham

argues that the fi rst concepts acquired are simple and singular,

primarily since they are caused through the simple act of

cognition of a singular object. Buridan, on the other hand,

argues that the first concepts acquired are singular, but

complex, since they are caused by a species or similitude in the

soul. Buridan calls these concepts vague singulars, since they

might signify different things in different circumstances.

As will hopefully become clear in the course of this article, this

difference between Ockham and Buridan has a profound effect

on the theory of mental language as it is further developed by

their followers in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. In

struggling to hold on to some of Ockham’s basic ideas and to

incorporate Buridan’s view on singular concepts, these

followers radically change the theory into one that no longer

takes a mental language hypothesis as its basis, but that it

seems to me instead bears many similarities to the theory of

thought defended by René Descartes in his Meditations on

First Philosophy.

In this essay, I start by outlining the difference between

Ockham and Buridan on singular concepts, and I then discuss

the development of Buridan’s ideas in Nicholas Oresme (d.

1382), Marsilius of Inghen (d. 1396), Peter of Ailly (d. 1420)

and Gabriel Biel (d. 1495). I conclude by spelling out the

consequences of this discussion as I see them." (pp. 122-123)

26. Lecq, Ria van der. 2009. Mental language: a key to the

understanding of Buridan’s Semantics.

Available on Academia.edu.

27. Lenz, Martin. 2008. "Why Is Thought Linguistic? Ockham’s

Two Conceptions of the Intellect." Vivarium no. 46:302-317.

Abstract: "One of Ockhams fundamental tenets about the

human intellect is that its acts constitute a mental language.

Although this language of thought shares some of the features

of conventional language, thought is commonly considered as

prior to conventional language. This paper tries to show that

this consensus is seriously challenged in Ockhams early

writings. I shall argue that, in claiming the priority of

conventional language over mental language, Ockham

established a novel explanation of the systematicity of thought -

an explanation which anticipates the idea that thought becomes

systematic through the acquisition of conventional language."

28. ———. 2012. "Mental Language." In The Oxford Handbook of

Medieval Philosophy, edited by Marenbon, John, 363-382.

New York: Oxford University Press.

"Unless one argues that the mind employs equivalents of such

features naturally (whatever that might mean), it seems that

the Augustinian model has a clear advantage in claiming that

proper mental sentences

are unstructured, whereas the linguistic and logical features we

seem to employ in thought appear only in improper mental

language, that is, internalised language, and are thus derived

from conventional language.

In the following paragraphs, then, I would like to show how this

structural problem takes shape in the medieval debates on

mental language (debates in which Ockham still deserves a

prominent role, not as the inventor of a ‘standard theory’ but

rather as someone who successfully imparted deep and fruitful

worries). I shall argue that the variants of the received

‘standard theory’ face quite powerful competitors in medieval

adherents of the Augustinian model, which compelled later

theorists to rethink the relation between thought and language.

Before looking at the discussion of structure, I (1) introduce the

main ingredients of the rival theories and (2) show how they

lead to competing views on the priority question. After setting

out the ‘standard theory’ as an answer to this question, (3) I will

take a look at competing

solutions of the structure problem in more detail, while hinting

at parallels in contemporary discussions." (p. 365)

29. Magee, John. 1989. Boethius on Signification and Mind.

Leiden: Brill.

Contents: Acknowledgements IX; Sigla X; Abbreviations and

Editions XI; Introduction 1; I. Aristotle: Peri Hermeneias I,

16a3-9; 7; II. Boethius’ Translation 49; III. Orandi Ordo 64; IV.

Cogitabilis Oratio 93; Afterword 142; Bibliography 150; Index

Locorum 155; Index Nominum et Rerum 162-165.

"The present work is divided into four chapters, taking as its

starting point the lines of Aristotle’s Peri Hermeneias around

which Boethius’ theory of signification turns. The first chapter

of the study plunges in medias res, and for that the reader’s

patience is requested. The Greek text is both difficult and

compressed, and necessarily brings into consideration

questions of the history of transmission and commentary, as

well as numerous aspects of Aristotle’s thought both in this and

in other works. But since Boethius translated either all or part

of the Peri Hermeneias before commenting upon it, and then

revised the translation for the second commentary; and since in

his translation, as in all translations, there is an element of

“commentary” upon the meaning of the original, it has been

thought necessary to come to a clear understanding of what

Aristotle wrote before proceeding to the translation and

commentaries. After careful examination of the Greek passage

and of the questions it poses, there follows in the second

chapter an analysis of Boethius’ Latin translation of the same,

and of the interpretation implicitly contained therein. The third

and fourth chapters treat of Boethius’ commentaries on the

passage, as seen from two points of view: (a) from the way in

which Boethius thinks Aristotle to have disposed or ordered the

four things (res, intellects, vox, litterae) laid down in the

context of the doctrine of Peri Hermeneias 16a3-9; (b) from the

point of view of the theory of cognition Boethius develops in

support of the above. The question Boethius ultimately poses

for our consideration is: How are the operations of the passive

mind converted into words and statements that can be spoken

aloud? If his commentaries allow no certain answer to this

question, important ground will nevertheless have been gained

in studying carefully the way in which Boethius introduces the

problem, and then in suggesting the solution which seems most

consistent with what is said in his commentaries." (pp. 1-2)

30. Maierù, Alfonso. 2004. "Mental Language and Italian

Scholasticism in the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Centuries." In

John Buridan and Beyond: Topics in the Language Sciences,

1300-1700, edited by Friedman, Russell and Ebbesen, Sten, 33-

67. Copenhagen: C. A. Reitzel.

Summary: "Italian universities of the fourteenth and fifteenth

centuries took part in the scholastic debate concerning mental

language, which first arose at the universities in Oxford and

Paris in the early fourteenth century. Peter of Mantua (d. 1400)

and Paul of Venice (d. 1429) were the prominent Italian

masters in this respect; their opinions continued to be cited at

the European universities of the early modern period. Two

main conclusions are reached here: that there is an obvious

continuity between medieval and modern ideas concerning

mental language; and that further research is needed in order

to establish the respective roles of Paris and Oxford in the

development of the debate at the beginning of the fourteenth

century."

31. Maurer, Armand. 1981. "William of Ockham on Language and

Reality." In Miscellanea Mediaevalia, edited by Beckmann, Jan

P., 795-802. New York: Walter de Gruyter.

Translated in Italian in: Logica e linguaggio nel medieoevo,

edited by Riccardo Fedriga and Sara Puggioni.

"In the first chapter of his Summa Logicae, Ockham describes

three kinds of language {oratio): written, spoken, and mental.

Written language, he says, is composed of words inscribed on

some material and visible to the eye. Spoken language is made

up of words uttered by the mouth and audible to the ear.

Mental language is different from both of these because it has

no material or outward expression. Rather, it is composed of

mental words which, as St. Augustine says, belong to no tongue,

for they remain entirely within the mind and are incapable of

external expression(2).

In these brief lines Ockham sketches three systems of

communication that make possible an interchange of ideas,

feelings, and desires. Each language is a complex set of signs

with its own properties and place in human communication.

The terms of written and spoken language are conventional

signs, varying from people to people, and having no natural

likeness to the things they signify. The terms of mental

language are signs of an entirely different sort: they are mental

names {nomina mentalia) or thoughts functioning as natural

signs of things(3)." (p. 795)

(2) Ockham, Summa logicae, P. I, c. 1; Opera philosophica, I

(Franciscan Institute: St. Bonaventure, New York, 1974), p. 7.13

—25. For the references to St. Augustine, see p. 7, n. 3.

(3) Ockham, ibid. On Ockham's notion of mental language, see

John Trentman, "Ockham on Mental," Mind, 79 (1970), 586-

90; Joan Gibson, The Role of Mental Language in the

Philosophy of William of Ockham (unpublished doctoral thesis,

University of Toronto, 1976).

32. Meier-Oeser, Stephan. 1999. "Thinking as Internal Speaking:

Some remarks on the conceptual changes in the relation

between language and thinking from Middle Ages to Condillac."

In Signs and Signification. Vol. I, edited by Gill, Harjeet Singh

and Manetti, Giovanni, 175-194. New Delhi: Bahri Publications.

Summary: "Traditionally the two main paradigms for

describing and explaining processes of thought and mental

representation have been thought as image and thought as

language. Whereas in present-day debates these paradigms are

treated as mutually exclusive, in scholastic theories of cognition

and mental language they were often amalgamated in various

ways. By tracing pertinent discussions from the fourteenth to

the seventeenth centuries, the article points to some

consequences of this amalgamation both for the notions of

image and of likeness and for approaches to thought as

language."

33. ———. 2004. "Mental Language and Mental Representation in

Late Scholastic Logic." In John Buridan and Beyond: Topics in

the Language Sciences, 1300-1700, edited by Friedman,

Russell and Ebbesen, Sten, 237-265. Copenhagen: C. A. Reitzel.

Summary: "Traditionally the two main paradigms for

describing and explaining processes of thought and mental

representation have been thought as image and thought as

language. Whereas in present-day debates these paradigms are

treated as mutually exclusive, in scholastic theories of cognition

and mental language they were often amalgamated in various

ways. By tracing pertinent discussions from the fourteenth to

the seventeenth centuries, the article points to some

consequences of this amalgamation both for the notions of

image and of likeness and for approaches to thought as

language."

34. ———. 2015. "The Intersubjective Sameness of Mental Concepts

in Late Scholastic Thought." In Intentionality, Cognition, and

Mental Representation in Medieval Philosophy, edited by

Klima, Gyula, 287-322. New York: Fordham University Press.

"The short introductory remarks of Aristotle’s De

interpretatione, as unimposing as they may appear, have

provided the starting point of some of the most intense and

long-lasting debates in the history of semantics and

epistemology.(1)

Quite a number of these discussions are more or less closely

related to the Stagirite’s well-known statement that “mental

concepts are the same for all” (eaedem omnibus passiones

animae sunt). What at a first glance might appear to be but an

arcane issue in the scholastic exegesis of Aristotle, i.e. the

attempt to provide a reasonable interpretation and account of

his thesis of the intersubjective sameness of concepts

(henceforth referred to as ISC), on a closer look, turns out to be

historically connected with topics that, from different points of

view and different perspectives, have been identifi ed as crucial

for the foundation of modern semantics as well as for the origin

of modern analytical philosophy" (p. 287)

(1) I am referring especially to De interpretatione I, 16a2–8:

“Now spoken sounds are symbols of affections in the soul, and

written marks symbols of spoken sounds. And just as written

marks are not the same for all men, neither are spoken sounds.

But what these are in the first place signs of—affections of the

soul—are the same for all; and what these affections are

likenesses of—actual things—are also the same.” The Complete

Works of Aristotle, ed. Jonathan Barnes, vol. 1 (Princeton:

Princeton University Press, 1984).

35. Normore, Calvin Gerard. 1990. "Ockham on Mental Language."

In Historical Foundations of Cognitive Science, edited by

Smith, J. C., 53-70. Dordrecht: Kluwer.

"Thanks largely to the work of Noam Chomsky, we have

witnessed over the last thirty years a revival of interest in two

closely related ideas: that there is a universal grammar, a set of

structural features common to every human language, and that

the exploration of this grammar is, in part, an exploration of

the structure of thought.

Fourteenth century grammarians and philosophers were also

interested in this complex of questions, and debate about them

raged as vigorously then as now. One tradition in this debate

grew out of thirteenth century terminist logic and seems to

have been given a distinctive shape by William Ockham This

tradition posited a fully-fledged language of thought common

to all rational beings and prior to al linguistic convention. In

this essay I will attempt to outline Ockham's account of this

mental language, to consider some fourteenth century

objections which lead to the refinement of the account by

others in the fourteenth century, and finally to suggest that

Ockham's approach has something to contribute to current

debate about the relationship between the theory of meaning

and any language of thought.

At the very beginning of his Summa Logicae Ockham claims

that there are three distinct types of language: written, spoken,

and mental. He insists that written and spoken language are

distinct in kind and that there is a type of language whose terms

are concepts and which exists only in the mind. (1)

Ockham's mental language plays several distinct roles within

his philosophy. On the one hand, mental language figures

crucially in the semantics of spoken and written language. On

the other hand, mental language is a fully articulated language

which is suited to be spoken by natural telepaths and is spoken

by the angels. These two kinds of role require very different

features of mental language, features which, as we shall see,

sometimes pull its structure in opposite directions."

(1) Cf. W. Ockham, Summa Logicae I. C. 1 in P. Boehner, G.

Gal, S. Brown (eds.), Opera Philosophica (St. Bonaventure, NY:

The Franciscan Institute, 1974).

36. ———. 1997. "Material Supposition and the Mental Language of

Ockham's Summa Logicae." Topoi. An International Review of

Philosophy no. 16:27-33.

"William Ockham begins his Summa Logicae by dividing

language into three types, written, spoken and “conceived,

having being only in the understanding”. He goes on to argue

that this conceived language or ‘mental’ (mentalis) language, as

he frequently calls it, is in some ways the most basic type. It is

composed of terms which are natural whereas spoken and

written language are instituted ad placitum. Spoken and

written terms have their signification because of their

subordination to the terms of mental language which play very

much the roles Frege attributes to senses (Sinne).

Ockham’s views about mental language seem to have developed

considerably during the part of his life in which he wrote

extensively about issues in the philosophy of language. I will be

concerned here only with what might be thought his ‘mature’

view as this is presented in the (relatively) late Summa Logicae.

In this work the terms of the mental language (concepts

(conceptus) as he also calls them) are acts of the mind and the

formation of a mental sentence is some kind of production of

such acts." (p. 27, a note omitted)

37. ———. 2007. "The Invention of Singular Thought." In Forming

the Mind: Essays on the Internal Senses and the Mind Body

Problem from Avicenna to the Medical Enlightenment, edited

by Lagerlund, Henrik, 109-128. Dordrecht: Springer.

"Little is known of the views about singular thought there were

in the period between 1150 and 1225 though it is clear that

Avicenna’s “floating man” thought experiment from the De

Anima, a thought experiment which is designed to show that

we have immediate intellectual contact with our selves, was

taken up and reflected upon by several thinkers who were also

well–aware of Augustine’s similar views. The period between

1225 and 1325 is much better served. Thanks largely to the

pioneering work of Camille Bérubeé who both surveyed the

terrain himself and suggested research programmes to others

we have not only a number of studies of the relevant views

particular thinkers in this period but something like a

consensus on the general contours of the development of theory

on the subject. Bérubeé distinguished several rough periods.

Between 1225 and 1250 we find, he suggested, little recognition

of intellectual contact with material singular. Between 1250 and

1275 we find the development (notably in Aquinas) of a picture

according to which there is no direct intellection apprehension

of a singular but there are cognitive mechanisms for somehow

combining intellections (which are themselves general) with

the deliverances of sense to get cognition (in some general

sense) of the singular. After 1275, the consenus has it, things

began to change and we begin to find theories which propose

direct intellectual contact with singulars albeit of a complex

kind. Matthew of Aquasparta, Roger Marston, Peter John Olivi

and Vital du Four are Franciscan masters who have received

attention in this connection as has the secular master Henry of

Ghent.)6) Finally after 1300 we begin to find in Scotus, in

various Scotists and eventually in Ockham, the development of

the concept of and a rich theory of intuitive cognition." (p. 115)

(...)

"I propose first to argue that it is issues about singularity and

not about existence with which the mature Ockham is

fundamentally concerned in giving singular thought pride of

place." (p. 116)

(...)

"Although the role that singularity as contrasted with existence

plays in Ockham’s picture has not, to my knowledge, been

much emphasized in previous discussions, Ockham’s picture

has long been acknowledged as a clear case of the view that

thought can be singular. What has typically been debated is

whether and if so to what extent his views on this were

anticipated. What has been less debated but is of interest is

whether and if so to what extent his views were taken up. In the

remainder of this paper it is these issues to which I turn." (p.

122)

(1) For a good account of much recent discussion (and one

which illustrates the bias to which I allude) cf. Lawlor [New

thoughts About Old Things: Cognitive Policies as the Ground

of Singular Concepts, Garland Press] (2001).

(6) Notable studies here include Bérubé [La connaissance de

l’Individuel au Moyen Age, Montreal and Paris: Presses de

l’Université de Montréal et P.U.F.] (1964), Putallaz [Le sens de

la réflexion chez Thomas D’Aquin, (Études de philosophie

Médiévale LXVI), Paris: Vrin] (1991).

38. ———. 2009. "Externalism, Singular Thought and Nominalist

Ontology." Proceedings of the Society for Medieval Logic and

Metaphysics no. 9:45-52.

"The 14th century nominalistae each held a number of theses,

among them

(1) that there is a language of thought the grammar of which is

shared by all humans.

(2) that the terms of spoken language are signs of whatever the

terms of mental language with which they are correlated are

signs.

(3) that the primitive terms of mental language are concepts.

(4) that the most basic concepts are of particular material

substances and that all other concepts are acquired either by

abstraction from these or by combining concepts previously

acquired.

(5) that generality is a feature only of signs – terms of some

language – and not of anything non-linguistic.

(6) that a whole just is its parts.

(7) that only spirits – human souls, angels and God – lack

parts.

(8) that material objects persist through time.

Some of these theses are striking and one might wonder

whether even those that concern ontology are mutually

consistent. If a whole just is its parts then a difference of parts

should make for a different whole and if each material object is

such a whole then for numerically the same material object to

persist through time it must not gain or lose parts over time.

Since this happens at most rarely it would seem there are few if

any persisting material objects. Hence it seems that the thesis

that a whole just is its parts is in some tension with the thesis

that it persists through time. Moreover if our primitive

concepts are concepts of ordinary objects and such objects do

persist through time despite changing parts there must be

identity conditions for such objects built into such concepts.

These conditions will have to be expressed in concepts

previously acquired and so our concepts of ordinary objects

cannot be basic after all. Hence it seems that the thesis that our

basic concepts are of ordinary objects conflicts with the thesis

that ordinary objects persist through time." (p. 45)

39. ———. 2009. "The End of Mental Language." In Le langage

mental du Moyen Âge à l'âge classique, edited by Biard, Joël,

293-306. Louvain: Peeters.

"The hypothesis that thought is explanatorily prior to any

spoken or written language and yet has the syntactic and

semantic structure of a natural language has emerged at least

twice in the history of philosophy.

The best known forms of the hypothesis, that advocated by

William Ockham in the fourteenth century and that advocated

by Jerry Fodor in the late twentieth, have remarkable and

salient similarities, similarities strong enough that it is

plausible to think of Fodor's and Ockham's theories as variants

of a single picture of the relation between thought and language

- the Mental Language Hypothesis. The Mental Language

Hypothesis in various fairly closely related forms was the

dominant account of the relation between thought and

language throughout the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries but

by the twentieth century even the memory of it was so

restricted to a handful of specialists that neither Fodor nor

Chomsky were aware of its fourteenth century development.

Why did the Mental Language Hypothesis disappear, what

replaced it and how did the transition corne to pass? To fully

answer any of these questions is beyond the scope of a single

paper. My hope here can only be to make some small progress

toward answers." (p. 293)

40. Nuchelmans, Gabriel. 1980. Late-Scholastic and Humanist

Theories of the Proposition. Amsterdam: North-Holland.

41. ———. 1992. "Some Remarks on the Role of Mental Sentences

in Medieval Semantics." Histoire, Épistémologie, Langage no.

14:47-59.

Abstract: "After introducing the notion of mental language as it

was developed especially by William of Ockham this article

focuses on the role of mental sentences in the logical

interpretation of belief-ascriptions. First, the divergent

positions advocated by Frege and Searle are outlined. Next, it is

asked how the fourteenth-century Parisian logician Jean

Buridan might hare handled such statements as 'The sheriff

believes that Mr. Howard is an honest man'. It is concluded

that in spite of many superficial differences, at bottom

Buridan's view is rather similar to Searle's account. In

particular, both authors hold that in reported speech the words

'Mr. Howard is an honest man' keep their usual meaning as far

as reference and predication are concerned."

42. O'Callaghan, John P. 1997. "The Problem of Language and

Mental Representation in Aristotle and St. Thomas." The

Review of Metaphysics no. 50:499-545.

"In the opening passages of his De interpretatione,(1) Aristotle

provides a simple summary of how he thinks language relates

to the mind and the mind to reality, a sketch which has often

been called his "semantic triangle." (p. 499)

(...)

"It has been called a triangle because of the three vertices,

words, affections of the soul, and actual things. It is semantic

because it has been interpreted to be providing a sketch of the

meaning of words, and how they relate to things. As Norman

Kretzmann points out, in the form of Boethius's sixth-century

Latin translation, this passage "constitute[s) the most

influential text in the history of semantics,"(3) having an

enormous influence on the subsequent philosophical tradition

of reflection upon the interrelations of language, mind, and the

world, or as Hilary Putnam often puts it, "how language hooks

onto the world." This is particularly true of the Middle Ages,

but also beyond into modern philosophy." (pp. 499-500)

"In fact, St. Thomas's account of Aristotle's semantic triangle

avoids the main thrust of the contemporary criticism. To show

this, I will focus upon Putnam's criticism. However, my

purpose is not to evaluate the soundness of Putnam's larger

argument with mental representationalism, but rather to test

its adequacy as an argument addressed to Aristotle and St.

Thomas. Consequently, I will do four things. First, I will give a

brief account of Aristotle's remarks in the De interpretatione,

and of St. Thomas's understanding of them. Next, I will provide

a sketch of the historical context in which Putnam's criticism

should be understood. I will then examine directly Putnam's

criticism.[*]

Finally, I will indicate why this criticism does not, in fact, "cut

at the joints" of St. Thomas's interpretation of Aristotle." (p.

504)

(1) The Greek title is Peri hermeneias.

(3) Norman Kretzmann, "Aristotle on Spoken Sound Significant

by Convention," in Ancient Logic and Its Modern

Interpretations, ed. John Corcoran (Dordrecht, Holland: D.

Reidel Publishing Company, 1974), 3-21. Norman Kretzmann,

"Semantics, History of," in vol. 7 of The Encyclopedia of

Philosophy, ed. Paul Edwards (New York: Macmillan

Publishing Co., 1967), 367.

[*] Hilary Putnam, "Meaning, Other People, and the World," in

Representation and Reality (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1988).

43. ———. 2000. "Verbum Mentis: Philosophical or Theological

Doctrine in Aquinas?" Proceedings of the American Catholic

Philosophical Association no. 74:103-119.

44. ———. 2003. "More Words on the Verbum: Response to Doig."

American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly no. 77:257-268.

Bibliographia. Annotated bibliographies

Raul Corazzon || rc@ontology.co || Info

Bibliography of the Medieval

Theories of Mental Language

(Third part)

Studies in English (Pan - Z)

1. Panaccio, Claude. 1990. "Connotative Terms in Ockham's

Mental Language." Cahiers d'Épistémologie:1-22.

2. ———. 1992. "From Mental Word to Mental Language."

Philosophical Topics no. 20:125-147.

"One of William of Ockham' s most striking tenets in

philosophy of mind is that there is in each of us, prior to any

external speech or action, an "oratio mentalis," a mental

discourse composed of inner natural signs, the concepts, and

endowed with an elaborate syntax very much like that of the

external languages we use to communicate with each other, but

semantically purer and structurally common to all human

beings. This is a theme that became common in post-

Ockhamistic philosophy at least up to the end of the sixteenth

century, a fact which, among others, of course, seems to

strongly testify to Ockham's crucial importance in the history of

late medieval and early modem philosophy. But wasn't it

already in his own time a very old concept? Ockham himself,

after all, insists in the first chapter of his Summa logicae that

these mental terms and propositions he is now talking about

are nothing but the "mental words" (verha mentalia) which

Augustine had extensively discussed in his De trinitate; and the

idea of an internal oratio was also found, as Ockham readily

acknowledges, in Boethius's detailed commentary on Aristotle's

Perihermeneias.(4) These were very well-known texts all along

in the Middle Ages and widely used by philosophers and

theologians. What's so new, then, with Ockham's treatment of

the topic? That is precisely the general question that lies behind

the present paper.

I will attack this question here from one specific angle by

concentrating on the doctrinal and historical relations between

the Augustinian theme of the inner word as it was understood

in thirteenth-century thought especially by Thomas Aquinas-

and Ockham's idea of mental discourse.

The differences, as we shall see, are deeply significant. And we

will replace them in the context of a crucial shift that occurred

in the decades between Aquinas and Ockham: the shift from

theology to logic as providing the main inputs and stimulations

for the development--on an Aristotelian basis, of course--of a

radically new sort of philosophy of mind." (pp. 125-126, two

notes omitted)

(4) William Ockham, Summa Logicae I, 1 (St. Bonaventure,

N.Y.: Franciscan Institute Publications, 1974), 7.

3. ———. 1997. "Angel's Talk, Mental Language, and the

Transparency of the Mind." In Vestigia, Imagines, Verba.

Semiotics and logic in medieval theological texts (XIIth-XIVth

century). Acts of the XIth Symposium on Medieval logic and

semantics. San Marino, 24-28 May 1994, edited by Marmo,

Costantino, 323-335. Turnhout: Brepols.

4. ———. 1999. "Grammar and Mental Language in the Pseudo-

Kilwardby." In Medieval Analyses in Language and Cognition:

Acts of the Symposium: The Copenhagen School of Medieval

Philosophy, 10-13 January, 1996, edited by Ebbesen, Sten and

Friedman, Russell, 397-413. Copenhagen: C. A. Reitzels.

Summary: "In his commentary on the Priscianus Major, the

author known as the Pseudo-Kilwardby proposed inner speech

as the proper object for scientific grammar. It is shown here

that this sermo in mente is something quite different from

William of Ockham's later oratio mentalis it is a mental

representation of words and not of things in general. The

Pseudo-Kilwardby, in effect, delineates a purely intellectual

level of linguistic representation, with a universal deep

structure richly furnished. This doctrinal development is

situated in its context, against the background of the increasing

popularity of Aristotle's Posterior Analytics at the mid

thirteenth-century university."

5. ———. 1999. "Semantics and Mental Language." In The

Cambridge Companion to Ockham, edited by Spade, Paul

Vincent, 53-75. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

"At the outset of SL [Summa Logicae], Ockham endorses

Boethius’s old distinction between three sorts of discourse:

written, spoken, and mental. The first two, he explains, are

physically perceptible, whether by the eye or by the ear, and are

made up of conventional signs. The units of mental language,

by contrast, are concepts. They are internal to thinking minds,

and their signification is natural rather than conventional.

Being mental, they are not directly perceptible – at least not in

this world – to anybody but the person who internally produces

them in the course of his or her private thinking. But being

originally acquired as the result of a natural process, they are

nevertheless strongly similar – and identically organized –

from one human being to another.

Although it is not a public medium of communication, mental

language is potentially common to all. Mental language is prior

to, and underlies, every reasonable speech utterance and

provides it with meaning. Ockham’s semantical theory, as

presented in SL and elsewhere, is primarily an explication of

the various ways in which the natural conceptual signs that

constitute the language of thought are linked with their external

referents; and secondarily, of the ways in which conventional

discourse is derived from this mental language." (p. 53)

6. ———. 2001. "Aquinas on Intellectual Representation." In

Ancient and Medieval Theories of Intentionality, edited by

Perler, Dominik, 185-201. Leiden: Brill.

"Many recent commentators on Thomas Aquinas have insisted

that his theory of intellectual cognition should not be seen as a

brand of representationalism.

(...)

My point here will be that such characterizations are in need of

important qualifications: there is, as I will endeavour to show

by reviewing a number of relevant texts in Aquinas's work, a

perfectly acceptable sense in which his theory of intellectual

intentionality is basically representationalist.

By representationalism, I will mean, in this context, any theory

of cognition which attributes a crucial and indispensable role to

some sort of mental representation. And by mental

representation, I will mean any symbolic token existing in some

individual mind and endowed within this mind with a semantic

content. A mental representation, in this vocabulary, is a

mental token referring to something else, something

extramental in most cases. What I would like to say, then, is

that Aquinas's theory does attribute a crucial and indispensable

role to such intermediate mental entities in the very process of

understanding.

First, I will briefly recall both the prima facie case for seeing

Aquinas's theory of intellectual cognition as a brand of direct

realism, and the prima facie case for seeing it as a brand of

representationalism as well. And second, I will explore ways of

reconciling these two opposite trends in Aquinas's thought. My

main point, then, will be that the representationalist aspect of

the theory must prevail In the last analysis. (pp. 185-186)

7. ———. 2003. "Debates on Mental Language in the Early

Fourteenth Century." In Aristotle's Peri hermeneias in the

Latin Middle Ages Essays on the Commentary tradition,

edited by Braakhuis, Henk A.G. and Kneepkens, Corneille

Henry, 85-101. Groningen: Ingenium Publishers.

"A complete assessment of William of Ockham' s originality and

importance in the history of philosophy of mind and

epistemology should certainly take into account his theory of

mental discourse (oratio mentalis). This is a central topic in his

writings, and it is well-known that it has also come to be central

in the philosophical discussions from the 1320s until far into

the fifteenth century, and even later. But what was the situation

on this before Ockham? This is the general question I would

like to contribute to in this paper.

Across the Latin Middle Ages, the idea that thought is a sort of

inner discourse or mental speech has been conveyed in two

different textual traditions, one theological and one logical. The

former has to do with Augustine's notion of mental word

(verbum mentis), which he develops mainly in his De Trinitate,

and which was extensively discussed during the scholastic

period, usually in distinction 27 of the commentaries on the

First Book of Peter Lombard's Sentences, and in many

quodlibetal questions as well. This theological tradition I have

dealt with elsewhere(2) and I will here leave it (almost)

completely aside. The other medieval face of the mental

language theme, the logical one, is embedded in the

terminology of 'oratio mentalis' or 'oratio in mente', which

comes from Boethius distinguishing in his Second

Commentary on the Perihermeneias between three sorts of

oratio: spoken, written, and mental; a distinction which he

attributes to Porphyry and to the Peripateticians, and which,

one must say, he doesn't make much of finally.(3) This is what I

will call the triplex oratio theme.

Ockham, for one, plays it when he wants to introduce his own

notion of mental language. But, contrary to what might have

been expected, the theme occurs rather rarely in the thirteenth

century Perihermeneias literature.

It is absent, for example, from such influential commentaries as

Robert Kilwardby's and Albert the Great's, as well as from those

of many lesser authors such as, to name but a few, Peter of

Hibernia, Peter of Auvergne, Martin of Dacia, or Simon of

Faversham.(4)" (p. 85, a note omitted)

(2) Panaccio (1992b) and Panaccio (l999a), in particular ch. 2,

3, 5, and 6.

(3) See Boethius, In Peri hermeneias, ed. lla, rec. Meiser

(1880), 29-30; 35-6; and 42.

(4) It must be mentioned, though, that the enunciatio in mente

is identified in Scotus' questions on the Perihermeneias as the

very subject of Aristotle's book; see his In Primum Librum

Perihermeneias Quaestiones, Opus I, q. 1, ed. Wadding, 186

(ed. Vives, Paris 1891, 539b). See Panaccio (1999a), 237-41.

References

Panaccio, C. (1992b) "From Mental Word to Mental Language",

in: Philosophical Topics, 2012 (1992), 125-47.

Panaccio, C. (1999a) Le discours interieur. De Platon a

Guillaume d'Ockham (Paris 1999)

8. ———. 2003. "Ockham and Locke on Mental Language." In

Metaphysics and Modal Theory, 1400-1700, edited by

Friedman, Russell and Nielsen, Lauge, 37-52. Dordrecht:

Kluwer.

"What is extremely striking, though, at the present state of our

knowledge, is that all this interest in mental language abruptly

cools down towards the middle of the sixteenth century, leaving

apparently but few

traces in the thought of the seventeenth and eighteenth

centuries. I say "leaving apparently but few traces" because

there is some uncertainty here.

There are, after all, interesting, if scattered, occurrences of the

theme of the mental language in the seventeenth century.

Thomas Hobbes, for one, in chapter III of the Leviathan,

speaks of what he calls 'mental discourse' (discursus mentalis

in the latin version).(3) And most notably, John Locke

sometimes speaks of mental propositions, which, he thinks, are

prior to and underlie spoken sentences. Intriguing questions

thus arise about the connections between these seventeenth

century developments and the late scholastic ideas of oratio

mentalis or propositio mentalis. My limited aim in the present

paper is to contribute to the discussion of these questions by

comparing John Locke and William of Ockham on mental

propositions with the goal of identifying the main doctrinal

similarities and differences between these two great thinkers."

(pp. 37-38)

(3) See on this Pecharman ['Le discours mental selon Hobbes',

Archives de philosophie 55, 553-573] 1992.

9. ———. 2003. "Connotative Concepts and Their Definitions in

Ockham's Nominalism." In La tradition médiévale des

Catégories (xiie-xve siècles), edited by Biard, Joël and Rosier-

Catach, Irène, 141-155. Louvain: Peeters.

"William Ockham, as is well known, thinks of Aristotle’s theory

of the ten categories as a classification not of things in

themselves, but of signs of external things. Ontologically

speaking, things, in his view, are either singular substances

(horses, for example), singular qualities (whitenesses, for

example), or essential parts of substances (namely: singular

substantial forms and parcels of prime matter), and nothing

else(1). No isomorphism is taken to hold between this rarefied

ontological domain and the array of simple first-order general

terms with which the Aristotelian classification is thought to be

concerned. This discrepancy between signs and things gives

rise, at the heart of Ockham’s thought, to a nominalist program

with respect to the categories, that of showing how all these

various kinds of terms which are distributed among the

Aristotelian ten categories need be referentially connected with

nothing but singular substances, qualities, and essential parts

of substances.

What does this program amount to exactly? What, in the end,

should ockhamism show in order to make its point about the

categories? This question crucially lurks in the background of

much recent discussion on Ockham’s semantics, on his theory

of mental connotation in particular. What I would like to do

here is to explain what I take Ockham’s nominalist program to

be with respect to connotative terms, and to clarify in so doing

the role he attributes to nominal definitions in this program, a

point which has become crucial in the recent literature on

Ockham." (p. 141)

(1) A detailed ptesentaliun ot Ockham's ontology is found in

M.M. Adams, William Ockham. Notre Dame, Ind., I997, pp. 3-

313, and a summarized on in C. Panaccio, "William of

Ockham", § 2-3, in Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, vol

IX, London, 1998. For Ockham's insistence on the reality of

form and matter, see A. Goddu, The Physics of William of

Ockham, Leiden, 1984, pp. 95-111.

10. ———. 2004. Ockham on Concepts. Aldershot: Ashgate.

"It should be mentioned that some of the developments to be

read here partly correspond to previously published papers of

mine:

• Chapter 1 is closely based on an article originally written in

French ('Intuition, abstraction et langage mental dans la

théorie occamiste de la connaissance', Revue de Metaphysique

et de Morale, 97/1, 1992, pp. 61-81).

• A preliminary version of chapter 4 has circulated for quite

some time among specialists in an informal 'prepublication'

format ('Connotative terms in Ockham's mental language',

Cahiers d' epistémologie, no. 9016,

Montreal, Universite du Quebec a Montreal, 1990, p. 21), and a

slightly different one later appeared in French in an Italian

journal ('Guillaume d'Ockham, les connotatifs et le langage

mental', Documenti e studi sulla tradizione filosofica

medievale, 11, 2000, pp. 297-316).

• Chapter 5 freely makes use of ideas about nominal definitions

that I originally presented at the XIIIth European Symposium

for Medieval Logic and Semantics held in Avignon in June

2000, in a contribution that was subsequently published in the

acts ('Connotative concepts and their definitions in Ockham's

nominalism', in La tradition medievale des Catégories, Joel

Biard and Irene Rosier-Catach, eds, Leuwen: Peeters, 2003, pp.

141-55).

• Section 1 of chapter 9 is a revised version of a recent paper in

French ('Guillaume d'Ockham et les syncategoremes mentaux:

la première theorie', Histoire, Epistemologie, Langage, 25/2,

2003, pp. 145-'60)." (p. IX)

"This book is an exercise in interpretation. My background

conviction is that William of Ockham's nominalism, even if

elaborated in the distant context of the early fourteenth

century, still provides a challenging and fruitful body of theory

to be in dialogue with today. In philosophy of mind and

language, in particular, Ockham's obstinate refusal to

countenance anything but concrete singular beings in the real

world, and the way he knits together on this basis an intriguing

array of theses and arguments about mental language,

intentionality, and reference, could have, I suspect, a healthy

counterbalancing effect against the prevailing fondness in these

fields for abstract entities of all sorts: general properties,

natural kinds, linguistic types, Fregean propositions, and what

not ... But surely, the prerequisite for these appealing virtues to

be actualized is that the theory be well understood! And there

still exists, I am afraid, wide disagreements among specialists

as to what exactly Ockham's nominalistic programme amounts

to, especially with regards to cognition.

This is what I want to address here.

The focus will be on concepts - conceptus in Ockham's

vocabulary - taken by him as the basic units of mental

representation. Several discussions have been going on around

Ockham's theory of concepts in the last fifteen years or so, in

the aftermath of the remarkable critical edition of his

philosophical and theological writings completed at St.

Bonaventure University in the late 1980s, and of the

publication in 1987 of Marilyn Adams's landmark synthetical

study, William Ockham. My aim in the present work is to

propose a thorough presentation and defence of how I

understand Ockham's positions on the matter in the light of

these recent developments." (p. 1)

11. ———. 2006. "Conceptual Acts." In Intellect et imagination

dans la philosophie médiévale / Intellect and Imagination in

Medieval Philosophy / Intelecto e imaginação na filosofia

medieval, edited by Pacheco, Maria Cândida and Meirinhos,

José Francesco, 37-51. Turnhout: Brepols.

Actes du XIe Congrès international de philosophie médiévale

de la Société internationale pour l'Étude de la philosophie

médiévale (S.I.E.P.M.), Porto, du 26 au 31 août 2002, vol. I.

"Two kinds of links were standardly made in medieval

philosophy between thought and action. There is, on the one

hand, the connection between internal thought and the actions

which mental deliberation brings about, sometimes, as an

outward result of the practical conclusions reached by the

intellect. The very idea of a mental discourse, actually, was best

illustrated, for many medieval authors, by the craftsman’s

mental planning of what he or she is about to doi. So here is the

first connection : inner thought is taken to manifest itself in

external actions. And this already raises, undoubtedly,

fascinating philosophical issues about which much is to be

found in medieval texts. But what I will be interested in is the

other general sort of connection that came to be regularly

discussed in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries between

the theme of mental discourse and that of actio or actus.

Something philosophically important, I think, took place

exactly there and this is what I would like to draw attention to

on the present occasion." (p. 37)

12. ———. 2007. "Mental Language and Tradition Encounters in

Medieval Philosophy: Anselm, Albert and Ockham." Vivarium

no. 45:269-282.

Abstract: "Medieval philosophy is often presented as the

outcome of a large scale encounter between the Christian

tradition and the Greek philosophical one. This picture,

however, inappropriately tends to leave out the active role

played by the medieval authors themselves and their

institutional contexts. The theme of the mental language

provides us with an interesting case study in such matters. The

paper first introduces a few technical notions-'theme',

'tradition', 'textual chain' and 'textual borrowing'-, and then

focuses on precise passages about mental language from

Anselm of Canterbury, Albert the Great and William of

Ockham. All three authors in effect identify some relevant

Augustinian idea (that of 'mental word', most saliently) with

some traditional philosophical one (such as that of 'concept' or

that of 'logos endiathetos'). But the gist of the operation widely

varies along the line and the tradition encounter is staged in

each case with specific goals and interests in view. The use of

ancient authoritative texts with respect to mental language is

thus shown to be radically transformed from the eleventh to the

fourteenth century."

13. ———. 2010. "Mental Language and Predication: Ockham and

Abelard." Analytica. Revista de Filosofia no. 14:183-194.

Abstract: "One of the main tenets of my book Le discours

intérieur. De Platon à Guillaume d’Ockham was that strictly

speaking, the idea of mental language originated with William

of Ockham in the late 1310s and early 1320s.

In a recent paper, however, Peter King claims that “Abelard was

the author of the first full-fledged theory of mental language in

the Middle Ages”. In this paper I would like to reply to King’s

claim, and to point out the very significant differences that exist

between Abelard and Ockham on mental language."

14. ———. 2015. "Ockham’s Externalism." In Intentionality,

Cognition, and Mental Representation in Medieval

Philosophy, edited by Klima, Gyula, 166-185. New York:

Fordham University Press.

"Externalism in recent philosophy is the idea that the internal

states of an agent do not suffi ce in general to determine the

content of what she thinks, or knows or does not know, or the

meaning of what she says. Under one guise or another,

externalism has been defended by some of the most prominent

analytic philosophers of the last three or four decades,

including Hilary Putnam, Saul Kripke, Tyler Burge, Jerry

Fodor, Donald Davidson, Ruth Millikan, David Armstrong, and

Alvin Goldman. What I would like to show here is that there

was already an important externalist drive in William of

Ockham’s theory of language and mind in the early fourteenth

century." (p. 166, a note omitted)

15. ———. 2016. "Ockham on Nominal Definitions, Synonymy and

Mental Language." In Formal Approaches and Natural

Language in Medieval Logic: Proceedings of the XIXth

European Symposium of Medieval Logic and Semantics,

Geneva, 12-16 June 2012, edited by Cesalli, Laurent, Goubier,

Frédéric and Alain, de Libera., 393-416. Barcelona - Roma:

Fédération Internationale des Instituts d’Études Médiévales.

"The one point I wish to develop further in the present context

is the matter of synonymy, which still seems to be

controversial. I have argued in this regard for three

interpretative thesis: (1) Ockham’s conception of

nominal definitions does not require them to be synonymous

with their definienda; (2) they usually cannot be synonymous

with their definienda; and (3) Ockham explicitly acknowledges

on at least one occasion that nominal definitions and their

definienda are not always synonymous(9).

From a semantical point of view a connotative term for Ockham

as I understand him is not a mere abbreviation for its nominal

definition. He does accept the possibility of abbreviations in

conventional language

admittedly(10) –and surely such abbreviations, when they

occur, are totally equivalent semantically with the

corresponding abbreviated phrases–, but my contention is that

this is not in general the situation we have with nominal

definitions. This claim having recently been challenged on the

basis of detailed textual counterevidence(11), I need to revisit

the matter and this is what I aim to do in this paper." (pp. 395-

396)

(9) [Panaccio, Ockham on Concepts] ch. 4, esp. pp. 69-73.

(10) See Ockham, SL I, 8, OPh I, pp. 29-30: «Possunt enim

utentes, si voluerint, uti una dictione loco plurium».

(11) See F. Amerini, «William of Ockham and Mental

Synonymy. The Case of Nugation», Franciscan Studies, 67

(2009) 375-403.

16. ———. 2017. Mental Language: From Plato to William of

Ockham. New York: Fordham University Press.

Translation of Le discours intérieur. De Platon à Guillaume

d'Ockham, by Joshua P. Hochschild and Meredith K. Ziebart.

Contents; Editorial Foreword IX; Preface XI; Introduction 1:

Part I: The Sources; 1. Plato and Aristotle 11; 2. Logos

endiathetos 28; 3. Verbum in corde 58; 4. Oratio mentalis 78;

Part II: Thirteenth-Century Controversies; 5. Triple Is the

Word; 6. Act versus Idol 121; 7. Concept and Sign 140; 8. What

Is Logic About? 159; Part III: The Via moderna; 9. Ockham’s

Intervention 179; 10. Reactions 198; Conclusion 217; Postscript

to the English-Language Edition (2014) 229; On the ancient

and patristic sources, 229; On Augustine and Boethius, 234; On

Abelard and the twelfth century, 236; On Aquinas and the

thirteenth century, 238; On Ockham and the late medieval

period, 247; Bibliography 259; Index of Names 277-283.

"Since the original French version of this work in 1999, quite a

lot of research has been done on the history of the idea of

mental language, especially in the Middle Ages. As far as I can

see, however, very little of what I wrote here needs to be

withdrawn, and since no other monographical survey has

covered the same ground in the meanwhile, the publication of

an integral translation seemed appropriate. The material, on

the other hand, can be updated, and I will address this briefly in

the present postscript.

Comprehensiveness cannot be hoped for—it would require

another volume, I am afraid—but I will at least react to

published discussions of various parts of the book, while

expressing along the way a few scattered aft erthoughts

prompted by recent research in the f1ield." (p. 229)

17. ———. 2017. "Linguistic Externalism and Mental Language in

Ockham and Buridan." In Questions on the Soul by John

Buridan and Others: A Companion to John Buridan’s

Philosophy of Mind, edited by Klima, Gyula, 225-237. Cham,

Switzerland: Springer.

"Linguistic externalism, as I understand the label, is—in Hilary

Putnam’s famous words—the thesis that linguistic meanings

“just ain’t in the head” (1975, 227)." (p. 225)

(...)

"If I am right that Ockham was strongly, and to some extent

self-consciously, committed to linguistic externalism, it seems

interesting from the point of view of the history of philosophy

to ask what happened to the thesis after Ockham. In recent

philosophy, linguistic externalism, as promoted by Hilary

Putnam and Saul Kripke, has been considered a major turn in

philosophy of language, sometimes even a genuine revolution.

Did anything of the sort happen in fourteenth century

philosophy of language on the heels of Ockham? My own

expectation was that the main nominalist leaders after Ockham

would have also endorsed the thesis. As far as I can see at this

point, however, this does not seem to be the case. Adam

Wodeham, for one, disagreed with Ockham on this issue and

defended—explicitly against Ockham—a version of linguistic

internalism.(2) The question I want to raise here is: What about

Buridan? My claim will be that despite some appearances to the

contrary, Buridan’s considered position on linguistic meaning

is a form of internalism rather than externalism.

I will first briefly recall what the case is for interpreting

Ockham as a linguistic externalist; I will then turn to Buridan."

(2) See Panaccio (2012)

References

Panaccio, C. (2012). Le nominalisme du xiv e siècle et

l’universalité des concepts. In A. Musco et al. (Eds.),

Universalità della ragione. Pluralità delle filosofie nel

Medioevo (pp. 481–488). Freiburg: The International Society

for the Study of Medieval Philosophy.

Putnam, H. (1975). The meaning of ‘Meaning’. In Mind,

language and reality. Philosophical papers (Vol. 2, pp. 215–

271). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

18. ———. 2023. Ockham’s Nominalism: A Philosophical

Introduction. New York: Oxford University Press.

"This book is about William of Ockham’s views on universals,

relations, and quantities. The underlying conviction is that his

ideas on these matters are still of interest for today’s

philosophical discussions and that taken together they

constitute a rich network of positions and arguments that

deserve to be taken into consideration in metaphysics,

epistemology, and philosophy of language."

(...)

"The focus will be on three central Ockhamist theses that can be

brought together under the label of “nominalism.” Here they

are in preliminary formulations:

(1) Everything in the world is singular; generality is a semantic

feature, not an ontological one: universals are nothing but

signs.

(2) Relations are not a special kind of beings; relational signs

are special indeed, but this is a matter of the distinctive ways in

which they refer to non-relational things.

(3) Quantities, such as numbers and geometrical dimensions,

are not a special kind of beings either; quantitative signs are

special, but this is also a matter of the distinctive ways in which

they refer to things in the world." (pp. 1-2)

19. ———. 2023. "Four Notes on the Grammar of Ockham’s Mental

Language." In Metaphysics Through Semantics: The

Philosophical Recovery of the Medieval Mind. Essays in Honor

of Gyula Klima, edited by Hochschild, Joshua P., Nevitt,

Turner C., Wood, Adam and Borbély, Gábor, 207-219. Cham

(Switzerland): Springer.

One of the main points of this book of mine [Mental Language:

From Plato to William of Ockham] is that while the idea of

mental discourse was present in Greek and medieval

philosophy since Plato at least, William of Ockham

accomplished a genuine revolution in the philosophy of mind

by taking the linguistic model for human thought with utmost

seriousness. Ockham purpose fully transferred the categories of

Latin grammar and medieval logic to the fine-grained analysis

of intellectual thought and this move had a major impact for

the next two centuries at least. In the recent literature about

Ockham the accent has been on his use of the logical theory of

the “properties of terms” in developing this linguistic

conception of thought (see e.g. Panaccio 1999a, b; Schierbaum

2014). The approach clearly presupposes, however, that human

thought be endowed with a syntax and for this, Ockham turns

to grammar rather than logic. Which grammatical categories

exactly, he asks, should be transferred to the analysis of

thought?

Two parallel passages in his works are dedicated to this

question: Quodlibeta V, 8 (Ockham 1980, 508–513) and

Summa logicae I, 3 (Ockham 1974, 11–14). His answer is

roughly the same in both: since mental language must have at

least as much expressive power as any conventional language,

the grammatical distinctions that are liable to make a

difference in the truth-value of spoken or written sentences

must be reflected somehow in the syntax of human mental

language." (pp. 207-208)

References

Ockham, William, 1974. Summa logicae. In Guillelmi de

Ockham opera philosophica, ed. P. Boehner, G. Gal, and S.

Brown, vol. I. St. Bonaventure: The Franciscan Institute.

———. 1980. Quodlibeta septem. In Guillelmi de Ockham opera

theologica, ed. J.C. Wey, vol. IX. St. Bonaventure: The

Franciscan Institute.

Panaccio, Claude 1999a. Le discours intérieur: De Platon à

Guillaume d’Ockham. Paris: Éditions du Seuil.

———. 1999b. Semantics and mental language. In Spade 1999,

53–75.

Schierbaum, Sonja. 2014. Ockham’s assumption of mental

speech: Thinking in a world of particulars. Leiden: Brill.

Spade, Paul V., ed. 1999. The Cambridge companion to

Ockham. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

20. Pasnau, Robert. 1997. "Aquinas on Thought’s Linguistic

Nature." The Monist no. 80:558-575.

"Thomas Aquinas gives us many reasons to think that

conceptual thought is linguistic in nature. Most notably, he

refers to a mental concept as a verbum or word. He further says

that such concepts may be either simple or complex, and that

complex concepts are formed out of simple ones, through

composition or division. These complex concepts may either

affirm or deny a predicate of a subject."

(...)

"In this paper I will focus on two such accounts, each of which

finds some support in Aquinas's work. One is the claim that the

content of our thought is in some way linguistic. I will be

considering a number of ways in which this might be so. In

every case the guiding idea will be that there is a match

between what we are thinking and what we express (or might

express) in our own spoken language. I'll refer to this as the

thesis of semantic likeness."

(...)

"Thought might be like language in another way if thought were

structurally linguistic. By this I mean that thoughts would be

language-like in their underlying form-complex thoughts would

be formed out of simpler conceptual units, in accord with some

kind of syntax. This thesis points to the medium as distinct

from the content of thought. I 'II be referring to this as the

thesis of syntactic likeness between thought and language. This

thesis is what has come to be known in recent philosophy as the

language-of-thought hypothesis;(4) it was, as we shall see, also

defended by some scholastic philosophers. I will argue that

Aquinas defends the syntactic-likeness thesis in part, but at a

crucial point stops short of a full defense." (pp. 559-560)

(4) One classic discussion is Jerry Fodor's The Language of

Thought (New York: Thomas Crowell, 1975). For an

introductory treatment see J. Christopher Maloney, The

Mundane Matter of the Mental Language (Cambridge:

Cambridge University Press, 1989).

21. Pasquier, Anne. 2013. "Parole intérieure et parole proférée chez

Philon d’Alexandrie et dans l’Évangile de la Vérité (NH I,3)." In

Gnosticism, Platonism and the Late Ancient World: Essays in

Honour of John D. Turner, edited by Corrigan, Kevin, Rasimus,

Tuomas, Burns, Dylan M., Jenott, Lance and Mazur, Zeke, 199-

208. Leiden: Brill.

"Bien que l’on puisse trouver précédemment ce thème chez

Platon et Aristote, la terminologie spécifique, c’est-à-dire les

occurrences les plus anciennes de l’expression logos

endiathetos, se distinguant du logos prophorikos, datent du Ier

siècle de notre ère.(10) Une étude approfondie sur le thème du

langage mental et proféré, celle de Claude Panaccio, met bien

en lumière les contextes dans lesquels se développe ce thème

qui devient, à partir du Ier siècle de notre ère, une idée

commune de la philosophie grecque(11).

La majorité des occurrences connues, souvent d’inspiration

platonicienne, conduisent directement ou indirectement soit

vers Alexandrie, soit l’Asie mineure. Cette terminologie est bien

présente chez Philon d’Alexandrie et on en trouve une mention

unique à la même époque chez un certain Héraclite, un

allégoriste tout comme Philon(12). Le fait que les deux auteurs

anciens soient des allégoristes révèle d’emblée le principal

contexte d’apparition.

Alors que peu à peu, dans les écoles philosophiques des IIe et

IIIe siècles, ces occurrences ne concernent plus nécessairement

l’exégèse allégorique, chez les premiers écrivains chrétiens en

revanche, on y reste attaché.

Au Ier siècle, en effet, le couple verbe intérieur et verbe

extérieur entre dans le vocabulaire courant de l’exégèse

allégorique, que celle-ci porte sur Homère, Hésiode, les mythes

grecs ou encore sur la Bible." (pp. 201-202)

(10) Platon, Phileb. 39A; Theaet. 189E5; Aristote, Cat. 6 4B34;

An. post. 1.10 76B24.

(11) Voir Panaccio [Le discours intérieur de Platon à Guillaume

d’Ockham. Paris: Seuil] 1999.(...)

22. Pelletier, Jenny. 2018. "William Ockham on the Mental

Ontology of Scientific Knowledge." In The Ontology,

Psychologyand Axiology of Habits (Habitus) in Medieval

Philosophy, edited by Faucher, Nicholas and Roques, Magali,

285-299. Cham (Switzeand): Springer.

Absract: "It has long been acknowledged that one of the most

original aspects of Ockham’s account of knowledge is his

contention that bodies of scientific knowledge are aggregates

but without much explanation as to why he holds this view. In

this chapter, I argue that a plausible philosophical motivation

lies in the inner structure of his mental ontology, namely, in the

intellect’s habits, acts, and their objects, which are the true and

necessary principles and conclusions of demonstrations.

Ockham upholds what I call a “Principle of Object-Act-Habit-

Specification,” according to which kinds of habits and their acts

are determined by the objects they grasp. This principle entails

that if a body of scientific knowledge contains two or more

sentences, it can only have aggregate unity. Furthermore, I look

at the logical and determinate orders that gather together the

sentences of various aggregate bodies of scientific knowledge."

23. Pelletier, Jenny, and Roques, Magali, eds. 2017. The Language

of Thought in Late Medieval Philosophy: Essays in Honor of

Claude Panaccio. Dordrecht: Springer.

Contents: 1 RETRACTED CHAPTER: Magali Roques and Jenny

Pelletier: An Introduction to Mental Language in Late Medieval

Philosophy 1 (The authors have retracted this chapter [1]

because of significant textual overlap with a number of sources.

All authors agree to this retraction. Magali Roques accepts

responsibility for introducing this overlap into the text.); 2

Jenny Pelletier and Magali Roques: An Interview with Claude

Panaccio 27;

Part I Ockham

3 Aurélien Robert: A Crucial Distinction in William of

Ockham’s Philosophy of Mind: Cognitio in se/cognitio in alio

39; 4 Susan Brower-Toland: Causation and Mental Content:

Against the Externalist Reading of Ockham 59; 5 Calvin G.

Normore: Likeness Stories 81; 6 Magali Roques: Ockham’s

Semantics of Real Definitions 95; 7 Jenny Pelletier: Is There a

Metaphysical Approach to the Transcendentals in Ockham?

The Case of the Good 111; Sonja Schierbaum: 8 Intellections

and Volitions: Ockham’s Voluntarism Reconsidered 125; 9

Ernesto Perini-Santos: The Metatheoretical Framework of

William of Ockham’s Modal Logic 137; 10 Fabrizio Amerini:

Ockham on Mental Syncategoremata 149;

Part II Ockham and His Contemporaries

11 Frédéric Goubier: The Role of the Speaker in Roger Bacon

and William of Ockham’s Supposition Theories: A Contrast

169; 12 Martin Pickavé: Peter Auriol and William of Ockham on

a Medieval Version of the Argument from Illusion 183; 13

David Piché: Raisons de croire et vouloir croire: le débat entre

Durand de Saint-Pourçain, Gauthier Chatton et Guillaume

d’Ockham 201; 14 Catarina Dutilh Novaes: The Syllogism as

Defined by Aristotle, Ockham, and Buridan 217; 15 E. Jennifer

Ashworth: Burley, Ockham, and English Logicians on Impositio

as a Type of Obligatio 233;

Part III Ockham in His Broader Context

16 Irène Rosier-Catach: Understanding as Attending.

Semantics, Psychology and Ontology in Peter Abelard 249; 17

Claude Lafleur and Joanne Carrier: La triade farabienne du

logos, son parallèle grec et son écho latin chez Arnoul de

Provence 275; 18 Sten Ebbesen: Psammetichus’s Experiment

and the Scholastics: Is Language Innate? 287; 19 Antoine Côté:

James of Viterbo on Universals 303; 20 Peter King: The

Science of Psychology in Ockham’s Oxford 315; 21 Peter John

Hartman: Durand of St.-Pourçain and Cognitive Habits (Sent.

A=B III, d. 23, qq. 1–2) 331; 22 Gyla Klima: Thought-

Transplants, Demons, and Modalities 369; 23 Jack Zupko:

Sensory Awareness and Self-Awareness in Buridan and Oresme

383; 24 Joël Biard: Évidence et raisons probables: Pierre d’Ailly

et la scientificité de la théologie 397; 25 Alain de Libera:

Présentation et représentation. Aux origines du

“représentationnalisme” 417;

Part IV Conclusion

26 Claude Panaccio: Grasping the Philosophical Relevance of

Past Philosophies 439;

Correction to: Ockham’s Semantics of Real Definitions C1;

Retraction Note to: An Introduction to Mental Language in

Late Medieval Philosophy C3;

Index 453-463.

24. Perala, Mika. 2014. "Ancient and Early Medieval Theories." In

Sourcebook for the History of the Philosophy of Mind:

Philosophical Psychology from Plato to Kant, edited by

Knuuttila, Simo and Sihvola, Juha, 359-378. Dordrecht:

Springer.

"There were two ancient traditions on signs and language

which played a significant role in medieval discussions: the

Aristotelian tradition deriving from Boethius’s second

commentary on the De interpretatione, and the Augustinian

tradition (with some Stoic influences), which was important to

early medieval theorists such as Anselm of Canterbury and

Peter Abelard. These two traditions remained separate in many

contexts, but there were also authors who drew from both

sources, raised further questions, and opened up perspectives

in entirely new directions." (p. 359)

(...)

"Higher education started with logic, in accordance with all

major schools of philosophy: the Peripatetic, Stoic, and the

Platonist. A common conception was that although grammar

was a product of human art, the basic partitions into the parts

of speech were constrained by nature, and thus grammar, as an

art, imitated nature. Some new ideas were put forward in the

late thirteenth century by the ‘modists’ who argued that

grammar should be regarded as a science rather than an art. On

their view, all spoken languages are based on a universal

grammar.

What was characteristic of their view was the assumption that

there is a structural analogy between the ‘modes of being’, the

‘modes of understanding’, and the ‘modes of signifying’ which

are common to all languages. The critics of the modists, of

whom the most distinguished were mental language theorists

such as William of Ockham, did not oppose the assumption of a

universal grammar as such, but the assumption concerning the

structural analogy between speech, understanding, and reality,

and the assumption that in each linguistic expression, there

inheres a mode of signifying." (p. 361)

25. Pérez-Ilzarbe, Paloma. 2009. "Jerónimo Pardo on the unity of

mental propositions." In Le langage mental du Moyen Âge à

l'âge classique, edited by Biard, Joël, 185-204. Louvain:

Peeters.

"Pardo' s views on mental language reflect an advanced status

of the discussions on this issue. Almost two centuries have

passed since Ockham's innovative theses were delivered, and

since the reactions of his contemporaries which followed. Given

this distance from the original controversy, Pardo does not

address the problem of mental language as an independent one,

but rather he uses the notion of a mental language (which he

takes for granted) when he needs it, either to solve some logical

difficulty or to substantiate some of his semantic theses.

Pardo's logical work (Medulla Dyalectices: Paris, 1500, 1505) is

constructed around a core issue, namely, the problem of truth.

All his analyses are directed to finding out what it is that truth

and falsity depend on.

In this approach, propositions (and also mental propositions)

become the focus of the majority of Pardo's reflections. I have

chosen the question of the unity of mental propositions,

because it is extensively treated by Pardo, so that the detailed

discussion allows him to bring into play his whole theory of

language and thought." (p. 185, a note omitted)

26. Perini-Santos, Ernesto. 2016. "The Underdetermination of

Mental Language in William of Ockham and John Buridan." In

Formal Approaches and Natural Language in Medieval Logic:

Proceedings of the XIXth European Symposium of Medieval

Logic and Semantics, Geneva, 12-16 June 2012, edited by

Cesalli, Laurent, Goubier, Frédéric and de Libera, Alain, 417-

434. Barcelona - Roma: Fédération Internationale des Instituts

d’Études Médiévales.

"The central theoretical role of mental language is to explain

the intentionality of conventional languages. This thesis is

usually accepted by medieval philosophers, and it follows from

Aristotle’s De Interpretatione,

I, 16 or at least from Boethius’ interpretation of it(1). However,

the idea of a mental language has been fully developed only in

the XIVth century, by William of Ockham, as Claude Panaccio

has shown in his seminal work(2): Ockham was the first to

apply the apparatus of supposition theory to mental sentences,

thereby building a structured language in the mind, as opposed

to isolated concepts, on the one hand, and to mental

counterparts of conventional languages, on the other."

(...)

"Geach’s criticism[3] John Trentman’s answer to it, comparing

Ockham’s ML [=mental language] with «slightly old-fashioned

ideal languages of twentieth-century philosophers»(4) may

seem both a bit outdated now. There is a criterion guiding the

description of ML in Ockham’s philosophy, and Geach’s charge

doesn’t seem to be justified. However, the parallel with ideal

languages suggested by Trentman is also far-fetched, the

proposed criterion is not enough to fully determine the syntax

of mental sentences.

Some of the most able interpreters of Ockham have proposed

different solutions to deal with this underdetermination, and

(at least some of them) think that it prevents Ockham’s theory

to fulfi ll all the expectations raised by the very project of a ML.

I will examine two strategies, proposed by Marilyn Adams and

Calvin Normore, to deal with this issue. My aim is to show that

both proposals are wanting –and I hasten to say that I don’t

have another way out of this quandary, if quandary it is." (pp.

417-418)

(1) Aristotle, De Interpretatione I, 16a3-9, Transl. J. L. Aclrill,

Clarendon Press, Oxford 1963. For Boethius’ interpretation, see

J. Magee, Boethius on Signification and Mind, Brill, Leiden –

New York 1997.

(2) C. Panaccio, Le Discours Intérieur, Seuil, Paris 1999, and

Ockham on Concepts, Ashgate, Aldershot – Burlington 2004.

(3) P. Geach, Mental Acts, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London

1957, p. 102.

(4) J. Trentman, «Ockham on Mental», Mind, 79 (1970) 588.

27. Perler, Dominik. 1997. "Crathorn on Mental Language." In

Vestigia, Imagines, Verba. Semiotics and logic in medieval

theological texts (XIIth-XIVth century). Acts of the XIth

Symposium on Medieval logic and semantics. San Marino, 24-

28 May 1994, edited by Marmo, Costantino, 337-354.

Turnhout: Brepols.

28. Pini, GIorgio. 1999. "Species, Concept, and Thing: Theories of

Signification in the Second Half of the Thirteenth Century."

Medieval Philosophy and Theology no. 8:21-52.

"The standard reconstruction of the medieval debate on

signification goes as follows. Until the end of the thirteenth

century, the discussion over signification is dominated by the

Aristotelian theory as interpreted by Boethius. This theory,

which can be labeled as the traditional theory of signification,

distinguishes between primary and secondary signification.

Names primarily signify concepts in the mind. Since concepts

are representations of extramental things, extramental things

are secondarily signified by the names that primarily signify

concepts.6 Around the end of the thirteenth century, however,

the traditional theory of signification is challenged by a new

theory. According to this new theory, names primarily signify

extramental things. By contrast, concepts are not what names

primarily signify but, at best, a necessary condition for their

signification. The new theory of signification provides an

interpretation of Aristotle different from that of Boethius, but it

obviously has some difficulties in explaining Aristotle’s text in a

convincing way. In fact, the new theory of signification seems to

be a real departure from the mentalistic theory of signification

based on Aristotle." (p. 22)

(...)

"In what follows, I first show how Scotus understands the

question concerning signification. Second, I briefly introduce

the notion of intelligible species. Third, I analyze Scotus’s

account of a first opinion on signification.

(...)

The conclusions I draw are that Scotus himself cannot be

regarded as one of the first supporters of the theory of the

primary signification of the extramental thing, and that he

cannot be regarded as an original figure in the controversy over

the signification of words, since he is merely expounding

positions that are already old when he refers to them. I hope

that this analysis of Scotus’s treatment of signification in his

two commentaries on Peri hermeneias will provide a clearer

and more accurate understanding of two of the most influential

semantic views held at the end of the thirteenth century, that is,

the view that names primarily signify intelligible species and

the view that they primarily signify things." (p. 24)

29. Pizzone, Aglae. 2022. "Emotions and λόγος ἐνδιάθετος. Πάθη

in John Sikeliotes’ Commentary on Hermogenes’ On Types of

Style." In Emotions through Time: From Antiquity to

Byzantium, edited by Cairns, Douglas, Hinterberger, Martin,

Pizzone, Aglae and Zaccarini, Matteo, 141-156. Tübingen: Mohr

Siebeck.

"In ancient Greece the very first systematic theorization of the

emotions famously came to be in Aristotle’s treatise on rhetoric.

The nexus between rhetoric and affective response has been

inextricable ever since. It is therefore all the more surprising

that, despite both the interest in the history of the emotions in

Byzantium(1) and the strong emotional overtones of much of

Byzantine rhetoric, no consideration has hitherto been given to

the theorizations of the emotions in Byzantine rhetorical

treatises. My contribution aims to address this topic, taking its

cue from the commentary on Hermogenes’ treatise On Types of

Style authored in the eleventh century by John Sikeliotes." (p.

141)

(...)

"This contribution will therefore investigate the discursive

definition of πάθη provided by Sikeliotes. A full understanding

of such a definition is crucial, as it represents the cornerstone of

subsequent reflections on the nature and function of the

emotions in rhetoric. In order to explore the meaning and

relevance of πάθη in John’s commentary, however, it is

necessary to take a step back and look first at some aspects of

Sikeliotes’ philosophy of language. Πάθη are in fact discussed

by John mostly in connection with μέθοδος, or approach, one

of the eight components through which speech is created:

thought or content, approach, diction, figures of speech,

clauses, word order, cadence, and rhythm.(12) Πάθη, qua

movements of the soul, are seen as the equivalent of approach

specifically when John discusses Hermogenes’ λόγος

ἐνδιάθετος. That is why we must first dive into the meaning of

λόγος ἐνδιάθετος in Sikeliotes’ commentary and into the thorny

question of the difference between λόγος προφορικός (uttered

or outer speech) and λόγος ἐνδιάθετος (internal speech). This

discussion will in turn raise further questions on the linguistic

– or non-linguistic – nature of the emotions and on their status

within Christian discourse. If emotions – experienced and

elicited – are seen not just as a powerful tool to manipulate the

audience, but, rather, as ontologically connected with innate

and truthful speech, their ethical value becomes

unquestionable. Emotions, in fact, characterize the most

preferable and best possible discursive type from a

quintessentially Christian point of view." (p. 143)

(To sum up: the complex theoretical framework advanced by

Sikeliotes in hiscommentary on Hermogenes, building on

classical heritage, gives the expression of emotions a consistent

ontological and psychological status, one that not only

legitimizes them from a Christian moral point of view but is

also in dialogue with Byzantine cultural practices well beyond

rhetoric." (p. 156)

(1) See the Introduction to this volume.

(12) On these elements see Patillon (1988) [La théorie du

discours chez Hermogène le rhéteur, essai sur la structure de

la rhétorique ancienne (Paris)]; [Kennedy, G. (1994) [A New

History of Classical Rhetoric Princeton)] 216

30. Read, Stephen. 2015. "Concepts and Meaning in Medieval

Philosophy." In Intentionality, Cognition, and Mental

Representation in Medieval Philosophy, edited by Klima,

Gyula, 9-28. New York: Fordham University Press.

"Mental language

The seeds were sown in Boethius’s commentary on Aristotle;

they were nurtured and developed in the thirteenth-century

discussions of the sign; but the full theory of a language of

concepts, a mental language, found its most famous (or

notorious) exponent in the fourteenth century, namely, William

of Ockham. A further inspiration for Ockham, and others, was

Augustine’s image, in his De Trinitate, of an inner language.

For Ockham, this fi nally broke the most important link in the

Aristotelian chain, that between spoken word and concept.

Ockham no longer describes this as a link of signifi cation.

Rather, the spoken word is subordinated to the corresponding

mental word, and the spoken proposition is subordinated to the

mental proposition. The mental word is a concept, a mental

item fi tted for inclusion in a mental proposition. This is the

primary language, what naturally has signification." (p. 18)

(...)

"Language is threefold (written, spoken, and mental), but the

focus is on mental language. Mental language is common to all,

whereas written and spoken languages differ between different

peoples, as Aristotle had observed. Mental language provides a

“universal semantics,”(30) a natural medium whose properties

of signifi cation arise naturally by a causal process. Having a

certain concept is not independent of having certain linguistic

abilities; it is an ability to exercise those concepts that confers

on written and spoken utterances the signifi cation which they

have." (p. 19?)

(30) The phrase is Nuchelmans’s. See G. Nuchelmans, Late-

Scholastic and Humanistic Theories of the Proposition

(Amsterdam: North-Holland, 1980), 4.

31. Robert, Aurélien. 2010. "William Crathorn on Predication and

Mental Language." Analytica. Revista de Filosofia no. 14:227-

258.

"Our Dominican can be considered to be a radical nominalist:6

there is no universal in reality but only singular things;

categories are only classes of names signifying singular entities;

the truth of propositions has to be analyzed through the

semantics of terms. But unlike Ockham, he does not accept the

Augustinian idea that there is a natural and universal mental

language comprised of natural representations perfectly shared

by the whole community of human beings. According to

Crathorn, the semantical properties of terms in the human

mental language are purely conventionnal.

Our aim in this paper is to understand this original theory of

language, and more precisely, its epistemological constraints.

(...)

"We will argue that Crathorn’s interpretation of language, and

in particular his refusal of Ockham’s theory of mental language,

makes such a contextual analysis impossible." (pp. 227-228, a

note omitted)

32. ———. 2016. "Crathorn Versus Ockham on Cognition,

Language, and Ontology." In A Companion to Responses to

Ockham, edited by Rode, Christian, 47-78. Leiden: Brill.

"From what has been presented above, it appears that William

Crathorn cannot support the same view on mental language.

The problem for Crathorn is that the human mind can only

have an intuitive cognition of internal or external sensible

qualities. As a consequence, if our mental language were

composed of natural signs of things, and if its terms were our

mental acts of cognition or their objects, there would be only

natural signs of qualities in it.

Therefore, in Crathorn’s theory, the only way for species in the

mind to be signs of something other than qualities is by

conventional signification. This is what Crathorn tries to show

in the entire Question 2 of his commentary on the Sentences:

(46) natural representations of qualities cannot explain the

signification of all the terms that can be expected in a mental

language naturally and universally shared by the whole human

community. For instance, as shown above, we cannot have

natural signs of substances, and neither can we have natural

signs of God and generally speaking of anything that is not

cognized intuitively. Nor can we form natural signs

corresponding to syncategorems (such as “some,” “all,”

“therefore,” etc.), nor to very general terms such as “being”

(ens), because we have no representations (species) of what

they signify.

Indeed, what could be a natural representation of being in

general or a representation of a quantifier?" (pp. 60-61, two

notes omitted)

(46) Esp. 167–188.

33. Roncaglia, Gino. 2003. "Mesino de Codronchi's Discussion on

Syncategoremata and Mental Language in his Quaestiones on

De interpretatione." In Aristotle's Peri hermeneias in the Latin

Middle Ages: Essays on the Commentary Tradition, edited by

Braakhuis, Henk A. G. and Kneepkens, Corneille Henry, 149-

163. Groningen: Nijmegen Publishers.

"Mesino de Codronchi was professor of logic at the University

of Bologna between 1382 and 1394; although he has received

little attention to date, we know that his works were highly

influential in Italy during the 15th century, and were

appreciated by philosophers such as Gaetan of Thiene."

(...)

Here I will give a little essential information on the manuscript

tradition, and in the main section of this paper I will deal more

extensively with Mesino's discussion of mental language,

focusing on his answer to the question of whether mental

language includes syncategoremata or not, and on his

treatment of the mental copula." (pp. 149-150)

(...)

"Our interest will focus on Mesino's discussion of the internal

structure of mental language, and on the presence in it of

syncategorematic mental terms. Before dealing directly with

Mesino's text, however, it may be useful to recall that according

to Ockham both categorematic and syncategorematic terms are

included in mental language:

Adhuc aliter dividitur terminus, tam vocalis quam mentalis,

quia terminomm quidam sunt categorematici, quidam

syncategorematici. (14)

But what precisely are syncategorematic mental terms? This

question was connected with at least two, more general

problems: on the one hand, that of the status of mental terms

tout court; on the other, that of the nature and meaning of the

propositio as a whole." (pp. 151-152)

(14) Ockham, Summa log., 1, 4, ed. Boehner e.a. (1974), 15, 4-5

(my italics); cf. ibid., 43; Ockham, Quodlibeta, IV, q. 35, art. 1,

ed. Wey (1980), 470, 23-37.

34. Roques, Magali. 2019. "Metaphor and mental language in late-

medieval nominalism." Bochumer Philosophisches Jahrbuch

für Antike und Mittelalter no. 22:136-167.

Abstract: "In this paper, I intend to examine the conception of

metaphor developed by fourteenth-century nominalist

philosophers, in particular William of Ockham and John

Buridan, but also the Ockhamist philosophers who were

condemned by the 1340 statute of the faculty of arts of the

University of Paris. According to these philosophers, metaphor

is a transfer of meaning from one word to another. This

transfer is based on some similarity, and is intentionally

produced by a speaker. My aim is to study whether this view on

metaphor is related to a specific view on the relation between

thought, language, and communication. With this case study, I

intend to argue that the view on the nature of thought one

holds does not necessarily determine what the nature and

function of metaphor are. I will show that the three

philosophical doctrines under study diverge in their

understanding of the mechanisms of a metaphor, while they

share the same view on the nature of thought, namely that

thought is a mental language."

35. Schierbaum, Sonja. 2014. Ockham's Assumption of Mental

Speech: Thinking in a World of Particulars. Leiden: Brill.

"I claim that it is correct to view AMS (oratio mentalis, for

short) as an attempt by Ockham to explain what thinking and

saying that p amounts to in a world inhabited by particular

things. I claim that the first and immediate purpose of the

mental-speech assumption is to provide an account of the

content of thought. Note that this interpretation complies with

Ockham’s tenet that mental speech is also a potential means of

communication.

I emphasize this point since the fourth assumption I want to

distinguish is that it seems accepted among scholars to view

Ockham’s assumption of mental speech as an ancestor of the

‘Language of Thought Hypothesis’ (LOTH), most ardently

defended since the 1970s by the American philosopher Jerry

Fodor.(17) Another scholar, Calvin Normore, has argued that

the assumption of mental speech disappeared at the beginning

of the 16th century, and was only to reappear in the guise of the

LOTH in the second half of the twentieth century.(18) However,

one has to be very clear about the exact limits of this similarity.

It is not unusual to view the mental-speech assumption as a

direct ancestor of LOTH, where the similarity is, rather tacitly,

taken to bear on the asymmetrical dependence of language on

thought: both Fodor’s LOTH and Ockham’s mental-speech

assumption are usually taken to imply that thought is

semantically and syntactically prior to natural languages such

as English or Latin." (p. 4)

(17) See Jerry Fodor, The Language of Thought, Cambridge,

Mass., 1975.

18 See Calvin Normore, ‘The End of Mental Language’, in J.

Biard (ed.), Le langage mental du moyen âge à l’âge classique,

Louvain-La-Neuve, 2009, 293–306. It should be clear from the

beginning that, although historical questions are of course of

considerable interest in their own right, I am not interested in

the historical reasons for the appearance and disappearance of

the assumption of mental speech.

36. Sirridge, Mary. 2000. "Augustine's Two Theories of Language."

Documenti e Studi sulla Tradizione Filosofica Medievale no.

11:35-57.

"It is a curious feature of the Augustinian influence upon

theories of language in the Middle Ages that it seems to give

rise to two very different ways of understanding the nature and

function of language. One approach stresses the conventional,

arbitrary character of linguistic signs; the other alleges some

natural or intrinsic connection between language and thought

or between language and the external reality it represents or

signifies. Not surprisingly, when we turn to Augustine's own

theory of language, we seem to find two quite different models

for understanding language, one the commonsense

conventionalist and radically 'volitional'(2) theory found

principally in De Doctrina Christiana, the other a more

intrinsicist theory which we find most clearly articulated in De

Trinitate and Tractates on the Gospel of John. I want to argue

two points in this paper. First, in the thought of Augustine, the

intrinsicist approach and conventionalism are not so much

diverse theoretical approaches as they are distinct emphases

within a more encompassing wiew of language, one which likes

the use of language by turns to the generation of the Son from

the Father, to the Incarnation, and to the divine creation of the

worId, Secondly, and perhaps more importantly, because the

philosophy of language is almost never Augustine's primary

focus, is approach to language is extremey contextual. For

Augustine, language is sometimes an illuminating model;

sometimes as in discussions of epistemology and philosophy of

mind, language is an as an important side-issue; and

sometimes Augustine is simply respondmg to the way in which

'vox' or 'verbum' is used in a particular passage of Scripture.

Ando so, just there are not two distinct Augustinian theories of

language, there are also not only two details and emphases of

his complex, but reasonably consistent, general conception of

language to the demands of particular theological philosophical

or exegetical contexts." (pp. 35-36, a note omitted)

(2) I have adopted 'volitional' to designate the view that the act

of speaking (or writing) is completely determined by an act of

will, by the intention to signify something.

37. Spade, Paul Vincent. 1980. "Synonymy and Equivocation in

Ockham’s Mental Language." Journal of the History of

Philosophy no. 18:9-22.

"in 1957 Peter Geach [*] argued that Ockham's theory of mental

language was too facile, that it made the grammar of mental

language look too suspiciously like that of Latin(...)"

(...)

!In 1970 John Trentman responded to this charge in a short

article that has since become very influential.(2) In that article

Trentman makes three claims among others:

1. Ockham thought of mental language as a kind of stripped-

down, "ideal" language, containing just those grammatical

features that affect the truth conditions of mental sentences.

2. There can be no synonymy in mental language.

3. There can be no equivocation in mental language.

It is the purpose of this paper to examine each of these claims

in turn. In so doing we shall discover that Ockham's theory of

mental language is not so neat and tidy as might have been

hoped. I shall argue that each of Trentman's three claims is

"correct" in the sense that Ockham either explicitly holds it or

else seems committed to holding it on the basis of other

features of his thought. Nevertheless, I shall maintain, each of

these claims also leads to difficulties for Ockham, either (with

respect to the first claim) because there are certain empirical,

linguistic reasons of a sort Ockham would accept for rejecting

the claim as it stands, or else (with respect to the second and

third claims) because it conflicts with things Ockham says

elsewhere. All this suggests that Ockham had not completely

thought out all the implications of what he wanted to say about

mental language. And that in turn suggests that, whatever is

true for other authors, the theory of mental language was

perhaps not as central to Ockham's own thinking as we have

come to believe." (pp. 9-10, some notes omitted)

[*] Mental Acts: Their Content and Their Objects (London:

Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1957), p. 102. Seealso the whole of sec.

23, pp. 101-6.

(2) 2 "Ockham on Mental," Mind 79 (1970): 586--90.

38. ———, ed. 1980. Peter of Ailly: Comcepts and Insolubles.

Dordrecht: Reidel.

Contents: Acknowledgments XIII; Paul Vincet Spade:

Introduction 1; Translation. Concepts 16; I. Introductory

considerations (pars. 1-9) 16; II. Mental terms (pars. 10-54) 18;

III. Spoken terms (pars. 55-88) 27; IV. Written terms and

mental terms improperly so called (par. 89)34.

Insolubles 35; Notes 95; Bibliography 162; Index 169-193.

"Peter of Ailly(1) [1350-1420] wrote his Concepts and

Insolubles,(2) according to the best estimate, in 1372.(3) He

was at that time only about twenty-two years old."(p. 1)

(...)

"The Concepts and Insolubles does indeed represent significant

developments in late mediaeval logic and semantic theory. It

concerns (I) the theory of 'mental language' and (II) semantic

paradoxes like the famous Liar paradox.

Aristotle was to some extent at the origin of both these late

mediaeval concerns. In a famous passage of his De

interpretatione, Aristotle suggested that the relation between

written language and spoken language is in some way like the

relation between spoken language and thought: "Now spoken

sounds are symbols of affections in the soul, and written marks

symbols of spoken sounds" (16a3-5).(22) This suggestion was

transmitted to the Middle Ages by Boethius, in his translation

of and commentaries on the De interpretatione.(23) If one

takes the suggestion seriously, then just as there is written

language the 'matter' of which (if I may call it that) is the

written mark, and spoken language the 'matter' of which is the

spoken sound, so too there is a mental language the 'matter' of

which is thought.(24)" (p. 2)

(...)

"Although in fact the Concepts and the Insolubles appear to be

distinct works, they complement one another nicely and may be

regarded as a unit. The focus throughout is on mental language;

although both tracts discuss spoken and written language, they

do so only to show how it differs from and is grounded in

mental language. The Concepts is about terms in general,

although as the name implies, it is primarily about mental

terms. The frrst two chapters of Insolubles are about mental

sentences.

Chapters Three and Four are applications of the general

principles of the first two chapters to the particular problem of

the paradoxes; it is only here that spoken and written sentences

are discussed. Thus the Concepts and Insolubles together

constitute a complete treatise on mental language, including

both terms and sentences." (p. 7)

(1) 'Petrus de Alliaco', often called 'Pierre d'Ailly' even in the

English secondary literature.

I prefer to Anglicize the name.

(2) Although these two tracts are always found together in the

early printed editions, they seem to be distinct works.(...)

(22) Ackrill translation [5]. See also 16a9-12: "Just as some

thoughts in the soul are neither true nor false while some are

necessarily one or the other, so also with spoken sounds. For

falsity and truth have to do with combination and separation."

(23) Boethius [17]. Boethius may have distorted Aristotle's

meaning; see Kretzmann [49].

(24) In addition to Aristotle, Augustine's De trinitate was also

an important source for the theory of mental language. See

Augustine [12], XV, 10.19-11.20, pp. 485-489 (translated in

[13], pp. 475-479).

References

(5) Aristotle, Aristotle's Categories and De Interpretatione, J.

L. Ackrill (tr.), Clarendon Aristotle Series, Clarendon Press,

Oxford 1963

(12) Augustine, De trinitate libri XV, W. J. Mountain (ed.),

Corpus Christianorum series latina, vols. SO & 50a, Typographi

Brepols Editores Pontificii, Turnholt 1968.

(13) Augustine, The Trinity, Stephen McKenna (tr.), The

Fathers of the Church, vol. 18, The Catholic University of

America Press, Washington 1963.

(17) Boethius, Anicli Manlii Severini Boetii Commentarii in

librum Aristotelis fIEPI EPMHNEIAΣ, Carolus Meiser (ed.),

Teubner, Leipzig 1877-1880.

[49] Kretzmann, Norman, 'Aristotle on Spoken Sound

Significant by Convention', in John Corcoran (ed.), Ancient

Logic and Its Modern Interpretations: Proceedings of the

Buffalo Symposium on Modernist Interpretations of Ancient

Logic, 21 and 22 April, 1972, Synthese Historical Library, vol.

9, D. Reidel Publ. Co., Dordrecht, Holland 1974, pp. 3-21.

39. Tabarroni, Andrea. 1989. "Mental Signs and the Theory of

Representation in Ockham." In On the Medieval Theory of

Signs, edited by Eco, Umberto and Marmo, Costantino, 195-

224. Amsterdam/Philadelphia: John Benjamins.

English translation of: "Segno mentale e teoria della

rappresentazione in Ockham". VS Versus. Quaderni di Studi

Semiotici, 38-39, 1984, pp. 63-90.

40. Tachau, Katherine H. 1988. Vision and Certitude in the Age of

Ockham: Optics, Epistemology and the Foundations of

Semantics 1250–1345. Leiden: Brill.

"This book charts the development of a complex of optical,

epistemological, and semantic ideas to which fourteenth-

century scholars in Oxford, London, and Paris contributed with

an originality and intelligence rarely equalled in the history of

western thought; to do so, however, they were required to

integrate questions which are today the preserve of the three

distinct, if overlapping, communities formed by historians of

medieval philosophy, of medieval science, and of medieval

intellectual life more generally." (Preface, XIII)

(...)

"The discussions traced in what follows indicate, rather, that

late medieval thinkers did not turn away from the more all-

encompassing goal pursued already by Roger Bacon, that is, of

developing new theories by appropriating as wide a range of

sources as could be put to use.

This realization is the starting point of the present study, which

therefore aims not to recount what did not occur, but to tell

instead what did.

If this book begins when medieval scholars initially sought to

realize the complex, perhaps impossible, task that they had set

themselves, it concludes with the generation of John of

Mirecourt and Gregory of Rimini, whose accounts of knowledge

exemplify the eventual confluence of the theoretical insights of

England and Paris. By ending this work with the Parisian

ferment of the 1340s, we merely reach an important watershed

in the creation of the rich noetic legacy that medieval

scholastics bequeathed to subsequent generations of

intellectuals and to culture more generally, as Chaucer's

remarks (quoted above, p. VII) signal. For us to reach the real

end of the story would require an examination of how this

legacy was transmitted to early modern philosophers and

scientists; nevertheless, it is my hope that the present work will

provide the historical framework and conceptual precision for

that further investigation." (p. XVII)

41. Toom, Tarmo. 2007. "The Potential of a Condemned Analogy:

Augustine on λόγος ἐνδιάϑετος and λόγος πϱοφοϱιϰός."

Heythrop Journal no. 48:205-213.

"This paper investigates Augustine’s Christological application

of the distinction between the internal and the expressed word

(λόγος ἐνδιάϑετος and λόγος πϱοφοϱιϰός).

Although both Plato and Aristotle employed the notion of

thought (νόημα) as a voiceless mental discourse,(2) the non-

theological distinction between the internal and the expressed

word had been traditionally

associated with the Stoics.(3) According to the Stoics, it was not

the uttered speech (λόγος πϱοφοϱιϰός) but the internal speech

(λόγος ἐνδιάϑετο) which differentiated human beings from

non-rational animals (Sextus Empiricus, M. 8.275–276). Mere

articulated sounds made by crows and parrots could not

express the λεκτόν, the semantic content carried by rational

thought.(4( Philo, in turn, invoked the internal/expressed word

distinction throughout his works as he made various points by

using figurative exegesis.(5) Eventually, Christian apologists

and authors found what was originally a non-theological notion

of a two-fold logos to be a useful conceptual category for

explaining the ‘second God’.(6) Indeed, the Prologue of the

Gospel of John had ‘theologized’ the distinction by boldly

employing it – or some variations of it – as the Word’s role in

creation and the Word’s ‘becoming flesh’.(7)

In the fourth century, certain controversial theologians were

adopting the internal/expressed word distinction as a paradigm

for Christology." (p. 205)

(2) 2 Plato, Tht. 190a; Sph. 263e; Aristotle, An. post. 76b24–25.

(3) M.C. Chiesa, ‘Le problème du langage intérieur chez les

Stoïciens’, Revue Internationale de Philosophie, 45 (1991),

301–321; K. Hülser, Die Fragmente zur Dialektik der Stoiker,

vol. 2 (Stuttgart: Frommann-Holzboog, 1987), frgs. 528–529a;

M. Mühl, ‘Der λόγος ἐνδιάϑετος und λόγος πϱοφοϱιϰός von der

ãlteren Stoa bis zur Synode von Sirmium 351’, Archiv für

Begriffsgeschichte 7 (1962): 7–16.

(4) M. Frede, ‘The Stoic Notion of a Lekton’, in Language, ed.

S. Everson, in Companions to Ancient Thought 3 (Cambridge:

Cambridge University Press,1994): 109–128; G. Verbeke,

‘Meaning and Role of the Expressible in Stoic Logic’, in

Knowledge Through Signs, ed. G. Manetti, Semiotic and

Cognitive Studies II, ed. U. Eco and P. Violi (Bologna: Brepols,

1996): 133–154. In De Dialectica 5, Augustine translates the

Stoic lekton as dicibile, but for him, an individual word rather

than a proposition is its carrier (mag. 7.19.15) (B. D. Jackson,

‘Semantics and Hermeneutics in Saint Augustine’s De doctrina

Christiana’ [PhD diss., Yale University,

1967], 132–134; J. Rist, Augustine: Ancient Thought Baptized

[Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994], 26 and 314–

316).

(5) Philo, Abr. 83; Mig. 71 and 78; Mos. 2.127–129; Som. 29;

Hülser, Die Fragmente zur Dialektik der Stoiker, frgs. 530–

534; A. Kamesar, ‘The Logos Endiathetos and the Logos

Prophorikos in Allegorical Interpretation: Philo and the D-

Scholia to the Iliad’, Greek, Roman, and Byzantine Studies, 44

(2004), 163–181; Mühl, 'Der λόγος ἐνδιάϑετος und λόγος

πϱοφοϱιϰός', 17–24.

(6) Theophilius of Antioch, Ad Autol. 2.10, 2.22; Hippolytus,

Noet. 10; Novatian, Trin. 31; M.J. Edwards, ‘Clement of

Alexandria and His Doctrine of the Logos’, Vigiliae

Christianae, 54/2 (2000), 159–177; R.E. Heine, ‘The

Christology of Callistus’, Journal of Theological Studies, 49/1

(April 1998), 64–68; C. Markschies, ‘‘‘Die wunderliche Mār von

zwei Logoi . . .’’ Clemens Alexandrinus, Frgm. 23 – Zeugnis

eines Arius ante Arium oder des arianischen Streits selbst?’ in

Logos: Festschrift für Luise Abramowski zum 8. Juli 1993, ed.

H. C. Brennecke (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1993): 214–216;

Mühl, 'Der λόγος ἐνδιάϑετος und λόγος πϱοφοϱιϰός', 25–32;

R.B.

Norris, ‘Logos Christology as Cosmological Paradigm’, Pro

Ecclesia, 5/2 (1996), 191–192.

(7) J. Gericke, ‘Dimensions of the Logos from Logos-

Philospphy to Logos-Theology’, Acta patristica et byzantina 11

(2000): 93–116, especially 108–111; Heine, ‘The Christology of

Callistus’, 67; L. Morris, The Gospel According to John, rev.

ed., in The New International Commentary on the New

Testament (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1995), 102–111; Mühl,

'Der λόγος ἐνδιάϑετος und λόγος πϱοφοϱιϰός', 33–43.

42. Trentman, John Allen. 1970. "Ockham on Mental." Mind no.

79:586-590.

"Ockham tought it possible to distinguish spoken and written

language from what he called mental language. Further, he

thought mental language is really of prior importance to spoken

or written language, and its structure is, in fact, the proper

subject for the logician to study. By mental language Ockham

meant simply a set of mental acts, or more properly, a set of

capacities for periforming mental acts (passiones or intentiones

animae). These acts, according to Ockham, are natural signs of

things (naturaliter significans); meaning or signification is a

relation that, strictly speaking, obtains between mental acts and

things, and in some way not further explicated (except through

analogies like smoke as a sign of fire) there is some natural

appropriateness about this relation. These capacities can also

be shared by all rational beings so that speakers of different

languages have something in common although the particular

marks or sounds they make to express these capacities differ,

being instituted by convention (secundum voluntariam

institutionem).(1)" (p 586)

(1) Sutmma totizts logicae, I, c. 1

43. ———. 1986. "Mental Language and Lying." In L'homme et son

univers au Moyen Age. Actes du septième congrés

international de philosophie médiévale (30 aout - 4 septembre

1982 (volume II), edited by Wenin, Christian, 544-553.

Louvain-la-Neuve: Editions de l'Institut Supérieur de

Philosophie.

44. ———. 1990. "Mental Reservation and Mental Language in

Suarez." In De Ortu Grammaticae: Studies in Medieval

Grammar and Linguistics Theory in Memory of Jan Pinborg,

edited by Bursill-Hall, Geoffrey L., Ebbesen, Sten and Koerner,

Konrad, 339-357. Amsterdam, Philadelphia: John Benjamins.

"We can now relate this brief account of concepts to the idea of

mental language. According to Suarez, mental words are to be

identified with formal concepts; these utterances, sayings in the

heart of what the mind thinks are particular mental acts.(14)

The universality of language derives from the capacity of

mental words to represent or intend what is universal or

common to many things. They can do this through their

capacity to intend objective concepts. Up to a point this looks

like Ockhamism, and I have pointed out elsewhere(15) that it is

very characteristic of Suarez's thought, together with that of

many like-minded late scholastics, to accept Ockhamist

presuppositions or Scotist presuppositions in the process of

attempting to refute Ockham or Scotus. Suarez's account is

different from Ockhamism, however. Ockham thought the

mental word, i.e., the mental act, could be universal simply in

that it referred to many externally existing things. According to

Suarez, the matter is not so simple. The mental word can

denote many external objects only because it intends a

universal objective concept. There is, of course, a corollary to

this in Suarez's general account of universals. The unity of the

universal is not, according Suarez, a real, i.e., extramental

unity. It is something mind-dependent, a so-called rational

unity. But minds are not completely free to do whatever they

please, independently of what is universal in thought. What is

universal in thought has an ontological grounding in things,

this is the point of the Suarezian concept cum fundamento in

re." (p. 350)

(12) Francisco Suarez, Disputaciones Metafísicas /

Disputationes Metaphysicae, ed. and transl., by Sergio Rábade

Romeo, Salvador Cabellero Sanchez & Antonio Puigcerver

Zanon, Disp. II, sec. 1, vol. 1, 360-62. Madrid: Gredos, 1960-66.

(14) See, e.g., Suarez 1960-66 [see note 12 (above)], Disp. VIII,

sec. 4.

(15). J.A. Trentman, "Scholasticism in the Seventeenth

Century." Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy ed.

by N. Kretzmann, A. Kenny & J. Pinborg, 818-38. Cambridge:

Cambridge Univ. Press, 1982.

45. Valente, Luisa. 2009. "Verbum mentis - Vox clamantis: The

Notion of the Mental Word in Twelfth-Century Theology." In

The Word in Medieval Logic, Theology and Psychology, edited

by Shimizu, Tetsuro and Burnett, Charles, 365-402. Turnhout:

Brepols.

"In studies on mental language in the Middle Ages, scholars

usually insist on the association of the patristic and medieval

notion of interior language with the mystery of the eternal

generation of the Son, on the one hand, and with the

incarnation of Christ, on the other. The fathers of the Church as

well as medieval scholars based these analogies on a “theo-

linguistical” interpretation of the prologue to St. John’s Gospel

(1:1 and 1:14): “In principio erat verbum et verbum erat apud

Deum et Deus erat verbum.... Et verbum caro factum est et

habitavit in nobis.” These scholars concentrated on patristic

elaborations of the notion of the inner word and on the

constitution, in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, of the

more complex theories of mental language of the logicians and

grammarians. These theories, in turn, were the result of a

convergence of Aristotelian logic (both the logica vetus and the

logica nova) and the Augustinian tradition.

In this essay I shall expand this analysis. First, I shall call

attention to the analogy which has been suggested not only by

the fathers but also by some twelfth-century masters between

the sensible expression of an inner word and two events of

sacred history: the creation and the preaching of John the

Baptist. Secondly, I shall stress the relevance of some twelfth-

century theological texts from the point of view of the

assimilation of theories coming from the logica vetus in a

theological context marked by the use of the notion of inner

word." (pp. 365-366, notes omitted)

46. Yrjönsuuri, Mikko. 1997. "Supposition and Truth in Ockham’s

Mental Language." Topoi no. 16:15-25.

Abstract: "In this paper, Ockham’s theory of an ideal language

of thought is used to illuminate problems of interpretation of

his theory of truth. The twentieth century idea of logical form is

used for finding out what kinds of atomic sentences there are in

Ockham’s mental language. It turns out that not only the theory

of modes of supposition, but also the theory of supposition in

general is insufficient as a full theory of truth. Rather, the

theory of supposition is a theory of reference, which can help in

the determination of truth values within the scope of simple

predications. Outside this area, there are interesting types of

sentences, whose truth does not depend on whether the terms

supposit for the same things or not for the same things."

47. ———. 2005. "William Ockham and Mental Language." In

Representation and Objects of Thought in Medieval

Philosophy, edited by Lagerlund, Henrik, 101-114. Aldershot:

Ashgate.

"In many different connections throughout his whole oeuvre,

William Ockham puts forward the program of an ideal mental

language. This language is presented as a universal

representative system in which all thinking takes place and

which lies at the background of all communication. In addition

to people, it is used by all possible thinking beings, angels as

well as the God. Most obviously, Ockham would have supposed

machines to use this language as well, if he had presented

fantasies of thinking machines. Also, Ockham clearly thought

that everything that can be expressed in any language could

also be expressed in the mental language. This is because all

expressions of the spoken languages are subordinate to

expressions of mental language, so that all meanings of spoken

words are derivative upon those of mental terms. My claim in

this chapter is that not only everything that there is in the

world, but also everything true or false that can be said about

the world, can be expressed in this language."

(...)

"In this chapter, I try to examine Ockham’s theory from

another kind of perspective – from the perspective of a

universal language. I want to sketch Ockham’s mental language

as an ideal representational system, and look how the program

would work for that purpose." (p. 101)

48. Zheng, Yiwei. 1998. "Metaphysical Simplicity and Semantical

Complexity of Connotative Terms in Ockham's Mental

Language." The Modern Schoolman no. 75:253-264.

Bibliographia. Annotated bibliographies

Raul Corazzon || rc@ontology.co || Info

Bibliography of the Medieval

Theories of Mental Language

(Fourth part)

Études en Français

1. "Le discours intérieur. Antiquité, Moyen Âge, époque

contemporaine : autour d’un ouvrage récent de Claude

Panaccio." 2001. Laval théologique et philosophique no.

57:207-276.

Sous la direction de Claude Lafleur.

Sommaire : Jean-Marc Narbonne : Circonstances et profil

d’une rencontre 207; Claude Lafleur : Présentation synoptique

du livre de Claude Panaccio : Le discours intérieur. De Platon à

Guillaume d’Ockham 209; Claude Lafleur : Questions de style

et de méthode. Claude Panaccio et l’histoire d’un thème

philosophico-théologique de l’Antiquité à la fin du Moyen Âge

213; Martin Achard : Philosophie antique. Logos endiathetos et

théorie des lekta chez les Stoïciens 225; Paul-Hubert Poirier :

Gnose et patristique. À propos de deux attestations du discours

intérieur 235; David Piché : Philosophie médiévale. Anselme de

Cantorbéry, Thomas d’Aquin et Guillaume d’Ockham sur le

thème du discours intérieur : quel est le problème ? 243; Marie-

Andrée Ricard : Herméneutique contemporaine. Le verbe

intérieur au sein de l’herméneutique de Hans-Georg Gadamer

251; Claude Panaccio : Réponses de l’Auteur. De quelques

variations sur un thème séculaire 261–276.

"Voilà un discours qui a fait du bruit ! Le discours intérieur de

Platon à Guillaume d'Ockham de Claude Panaccio a retenti

jusqu'à l'Académie des sciences morales et politiques de France

où il a été couronné d'un prix prestigieux, le prix

Grammaticakis-Neumann.

Convaincu d'emblée de l'importance de ce livre, notre distingué

collègue Claude Lafleur prit l'initiative de former à l'occasion de

cette parution une Table ronde spéciale (« Le discours intérieur

: Antiquité, Moyen Age, époque contemporaine. Autour d'un

ouvrage récent de Claude Panaccio », Québec, 4 décembre

2000) où plusieurs chercheurs de l'Université Laval purent

faire écho aux divers questionnements soulevés par cette étude.

Avec cet événement, organisé conjointement par la Faculté de

philosophie, l'Institut d'études anciennes et le Laboratoire de

philosophie ancienne et médiévale de l'Université Laval,

l'ouvrage trouvait ainsi un cadre d'échanges et de discussions

des plus privilégiés." (p. 207)

2. Amerini, Fabrizio. 2003. "Catégories et langage mental. Une

critique de François de Prato à Guillaume d'Occam." In La

tradition médiévale des Catégories (xiie-xve siècles), edited by

Biard, Joël and Rosier-Catach, Irène, 173-186. Louvain:

Peeters.

"Dans cet essai je voudrais présenter une partie des recherches

que j’ai faites sur le dominicain François de Prato, en

soulignant quelques aspects de sa pensée en tant qu’interprète

d’Aristote. Ensuite, je me limiterai au premier chapitre des

Catégories, dont je souhaite reconstruire l'interprétation

donnée par François et la critique qu’il propose de

l’interprétation ockhamiste. Mon but est de montrer comment,

d’une exégese réaliste du premier chapitre, peut découler une

critique de la théorie ockhamiste du langage mental." (p. 173)

(...)

"Quelles conclusions pouvons-nous tirer de tout cela ? D’un

point de vue historique, il y a encore beaucoup de travail à faire

pour connaître en détail le rythme et les modalités de

pénétration des idées ockhamistes en Italie, ainsi que les

modalités par lesquelles les doctrines thomistes ont été

adaptées par Hervé de Nédellec et par ses disciples. Dans cette

direction les ouvrages de François sont importants, car ils sont

un précieux témoignage de la tentative, qui fut réalisée dans ces

années-là par les lecteurs dominicains de la Province Romaine,

pour endiguer la diffusion très rapide de la philosophie de

Guillaume d’Ockham et pour defendre la philosophie de

Thomas d’Aquin, à travers une utilisation remarquable et

massive de l’appareil conceptuel tiré des écrits du Maître

Général dominicain. D’un point de vue philosophique, au

contraire, les critiques que François adresse à la théorie

ockhamiste des concepts et du langage mental ne rendent pas

entièrement justice à la complexité du système ockhamiste, en

se fondant souvent sur une compréhension mauvaise ou

superficielle de sa théorie sémantique. De plus, elles ne sont

pas entièrement originales. On peut trouver presque les mêmes

critiques parmi les dominicains et les franciscains anglais, tels

que Hugues Lawton, Richard Crathorn ou l’auteur anonyme de

la Logica contra Ockham (34) même si François ne semble pas

connaître directement leurs théories logiques et ontologiques.

Toutefois, la façon dont tout cela se passe est sûrement

originale. A ce propos, je voudrais terminer en soulignant ces

deux points : le caractère systématique de la critique de

François et sa rapidité par rapport aux temps de la diffusion des

doctrines et des œuvres ockhamistes en Italie(35)."

(34) Cf., à ce propos, C. Panaccio, Le discours intérieur. De

Platon à Guillaume d'Ockham, 1999, pp. 279-291.

(3) Pour les citations du De praedicamentis et de la Logica de

Français de Prato, je n’ai pu utiliser Pédition critique de C.

Rode (Stuttgart 2002), publiée après l'achèvement du présent

article. Je suis moi même en train de publier une deuxieme

édition de la Logica, avec les traités De voce univoca et De ente

rationis de François de Pralo et Etienne de Rieti.

3. Baudry, Leon. 1958. Lexique philosophique de Guillaume

d'Ockham. Étude des notions fondamentales. Paris:

Lethielleux.

"VERBUM MENTALE . - Dans Quodl. I, q. 6., Ockham entend

par verbe mental la pensée actuelle, cette parole intérieure que

nous prononçons intimement dans le coeur et qui, selon la

remarque de saint Augustin, n'est ni grecque ni latine, ni

d'aucune langue quelconque. « Verbum mentale est cogitatio

actualis . . . Verbum mentale est ipsa cogitatio ».

Dans I S. , d. 2 , q. 2 M. , Ockham distingue cinq sens de ce

terme.

1 ° Un sens très large, le verbe est l'acte d'intellection engendré

ou produit.

« Uno modo accipitur largissime et sic verbum est actus

intelligendi genitus vel productus ». Que ce sens ne fasse qu'un

avec celui que donnent les Quodlibets, c'est certain, puisque,

après avoir renvoyé à deux passages du De Trinitate XV, c. 10

et VIII, c. 10 , Guillaume conclut : « Notitia actualis (et non

notitia habitualis) est verbum. »

2 ° Toute connaissance complexe vraie ou fausse. « Aliquando

accipitur pro verbo complexa et sic omnis actus complexus

verus vel falsus est verbum. » (Ibid. ) C'est le sens que saint

Augustin donne à ce mot (De Trinitate, XV, c. 16,) dans un

passage d'où il résulte que, par verbe, il entend, à cet endroit,

tout acte complexe auquel on donne ou refuse son assentiment,

ce qui exclut la dubitatio, l'acte de douter.

3° Au sens strict, tout jugement vrai, qu'il s 'agisse d'un

jugement scientifique et évident ou d'une croyance. C'est le sens

admis par saint Augustin, (De Trinitate, XV, c. 10 et 12. ) «

Aliquando accipitur stricte pro verbo vero. ( (Ibid. cf. P.)

4° Dans un sens plus strict tout jugement vrai proféré avec

amour.

« A liquando accipitur strictius pro verbo vero cum amore

prolato ». (Ibid. M.)

On trouve également ce sens dans saint Augustin, (De Trinitate

IX, c. 8 et c. 10.) Le verbe se compose alors d'un acte de

l'intellect et d'un acte de la volonté. (Ibid. P.)

5° Tout concept, que ce concept existe dans l 'âme

subjectivement ou objectivement, qu'il soit ou qu'il ne soit pas

distinct de l'acte d'intellection.

« Aliquando accipitur verbum pro conceptu mentis, sive sit

subjective in anima sive objective tantum, sive etiam

distinguatur ab actu intelligendi sive non » .

(Ibid. M.) Ici encore Ockham renvoie au De Trinitate XV, c. 4

(Ibid. P.)

A la fin de son exposé, Ockham résume ainsi s a pensée.

'' Ipse (Augustinus) utebatur aliquando pro omni actu

intelligendi, aliquando pro actu judicativo, aliquando pro actu

veridico, aliquando pro actu veridico cum amore prolato. . .

aliquando pro omni cogitato quod sine cogitatione illa esse non

potest ». (Ibid. Q.)

Si l'on donne à ce mot les quatre premiers sens, le verbe est une

qualité inhérente à l'âme. Si on lui donne son cinquième sens,

le verbe n'est pas une qualité inhérente à l'âme, si on admet que

le concept n'existe qu'objectivement en elle. (Ibid. CC.)" (pp.

289-290)

Abréviations

S. = Questiones . . . in IV Sententiarum libros, Lugduni, 1495·

Quodl. = Quodlibeta septem, Parisiis, 1488.

S.A. = De Sacramento Altaris éd. Birch, Iowa, 1930.

D.P. = De praedestinatione divina . . . éd. Boehner, Saint

Bonaventure, N.-Y. , 1945·

D.S: = De successivis, éd. Boehner, Saint Bonaventure, N.-Y.,

1944.

E.A. = Expositio aurea . . . Bononiae, 1496.

El. = Tractatus super libros elenchorum. Paris Nationale, lat.

1472I.

S.L. = Summa totius logicae, Oxoniae 1675.

E.P. = Expositio super physicam Aristotelis, Berlin, cod. elect.

974.

S.P. = Summulae in libros physicorum, Romae, 1637.

S.Q. = Questiones in libros physicorum, Paris Nationale, lat.

17841.

4. Biard, Joël, ed. 2009. Le langage mental du Moyen Âge à l'âge

classique. Paris: Vrin.

Table des Matières: Joël Biard: Présentation V; Isabelle Koch:

Le verbum in corde chez Augustin 1; Bérangère Hurand: La

locutio mentis une version anselmienne du verbe intérieur 29;

Cyrille Michon: Les représentations rendent-elles indirecte la

connaissance des choses? 45; Irène Rosier-Catach: Une forme

particulière de langage mental: la locutio angelica selon Gilles

de Rome et ses contemporains 61; Russell Friedman: Mental

Propositions before Mental Language 95; Claude Panaccio: Le

jugement comme acte mental selon Guillaume d' Ockham 117;

Simo Knuuttila: Ockham on Fallacies and Mental Language

135; Aurélien Robert: Les deux langages de la pensée. A propos

de quelques réflexions médiévales 145; Joël Biard: Pierre

d'Ailly: langage, concept, représentation 169; Paloma Pérez-

Ilzarbe: Jeronimo Pardo on the unity of mental propositions

185; Henrik Lagerlind: John Mair on Concepts 205; Fosca

Mariani Zini: Topique et argumentation dans le premier

humanisme italien 221; Marie-Luce Demonet: Que reste-t-il du

langage mental dans les textes philosophiques français à la fin

de la Renaissance? 241; Martine Pécharman: De quel langage

intérieur Hobbes est-il le théoricien? 265; Calvin Normore: The

End of Mental Language 293; Jacob Schmutz: Quand le langage

a-t-il cessé d'être mental? Remarques sur les sources

scolastiques de Bolzano 307; Bibliographie 339; Index

Nominum 359-364.

"Après Guillaume d'Ockham, en effet, l'idée de langage mental

est certes une hypothèse qui a acquis force et consistance, mais

tous les problèmes liés à la structuration de la pensée et au

rapport entre le langage parlé et la pensée ne sont pas résolus.

Des questions surgissent sur la structuration même de ce

langage. L'unification ou du moins le rapprochement du

langage et de la pensée conduisent à modifier l'idée même de

représentation (Pierre d' Ailly). Mais il ne faudrait pas croire

que ce mode d'approche fait l'unanimité. Dès l'époque de

Guillaume d'Ockham, certains (comme Guillaume Crathorn),

non pas par ignorance de la problématique du langage mental

mais par refus délibéré, maintiennent l'existence d'une image

mentale du langage mais refusent celle d'un langage mental qui

serait premier par rapport au langage parlé. Peut-on postuler

une universalité du langage de la pensée ou la pensée est-elle

toujours structurée par notre langage, lequel est

irréductiblement pluriel ? La question est posée dès le XIV"

siècle, elle va courir durant les deux siècle suivants. La tradition

« nominaliste », buridanienne, va maintenir l'idée de langage

mental, mais dans d'autres champs, dans d'autres disciplines,

on constate une remise au premier plan du langage parlé dans

toutes ses dimensions. Par delà les critiques faisant la part belle

à la rhétorique ou aux belles lettres, par delà les échos de ces

discussions dans les manuels de philosophie, la question de

savoir si la représentation mentale doit plutôt être conçue

comme un langage ou plutôt comme un tableau reste encore

ouverte au XVII" siècle.

Le colloque organisé à Tours du 1er au 3 décembre 2005 sous

les auspices de la Fondation européenne de la science

(European Science Foundation) avait l'ambition de parcourir

ces questions en repartant d'Augustin qui est l'initiale

médiévale du problème, et en suivant cette histoire jusqu'à

l'aube des Temps modernes. Ce parcours historique donc fait

une part importante au Moyen Âge tardif, à la Renaissance et

au XVIIe siècle. En même temps, notre ambition était aussi

d'approfondir certains enjeux proprement philosophiques de ce

parcours. L'horizon général est la question: est-il possible de

considérer le domaine de la pensée comme étant structuré à la

manière d'un langage, et par quels moyens conceptuels penser

cela ?" (pp. VI-VII)

5. ———. 2009. "Verbe, signe, concept: L’effacement du verbe

intérieur au xive siècle." In The Word in Medieval Logic,

Theology and Psychology, edited by Shimizu, Tetsuro and

Burnett, Charles, 347-364. Turnhout: Brepols.

"Ce que l’on constate avec le tournant ockhamiste, c’est que le

Verbe est délaissé en raison précisément de ces schèmes

conceptuels qu’il véhicule et qui ne sont plus d’actualité ni dans

les textes logiques, ni chez certains auteurs marqués par la

révolution sémiologique. Évoqué pour mémoire au début de la

Somme de logique, le Verbe intérieur n’est plus à même

d’assurer une description satisfaisante de la pensée comme

langage mental. Le concept en revanche, en raison de la

dérivation sémantique vers l’idée de contenu ou d’acte mental,

voit son destin dissocié du verbe.

Mieux, en raison de l’usage scotiste, suivi sans hésitation sur ce

point par Guillaume d’Ockham, le domaine des concepts,

devenu le principal domaine de la logique, se soumet à l’analyse

logico-linguistique. Le verbe intérieur s’efface. Se déploie en

revanche l’analyse des concepts et de leur organisation en

langage mental." (pp. 363-364)

6. ———. 2009. "Pierre d'Ailly: langage, concept, représentation."

In Le langage mental du Moyen Âge à l'âge classique, edited

by Biard, Joël, 169-183. Louvain: Peeters.

"Dans une question des Quodlibeta, Ockham énumère

plusieurs sens de « représentation » et de « représenter »(3).

Mais cette mise au point ne débouche pas sur un usage

généralisé de la notion. Il en va différemment chez Pierre d'

Ailly. C'est chez celui-ci que s'explicite une sorte d'assimilation

tendancielle entre langage et représentation.

Chez lui, la représentation est à la fois une catégorie de pensée

d'usage très large, systématiquement employée là où d'autres

employaient d'autres expressions, que ce soit « connaître » ou «

concevoir » d'un

côté, « dire » ou « signifier » de l'autre, une catégorie qui par

conséquent va au premier abord se déployer en des sens

multiples qui concernent à la fois l'image, le mot ou le concept,

et une catégorie qui, à travers

ces usages, va être véritablement réfléchie, théorisée comme

telle, ce qui lui assigne un statut différent de ce que nous

pouvions trouver dans les textes de Guillaume d'Ockham ou de

Jean Buridan." (p. 170)

(3) Guillelmi de Ock:ham, Quodlibeta septem, IV, q. 3, ed. J. C.

Web, « Opera theologica » IX, Franciscan Institute, St.

Bonaventure, New York, 1980, p. 310. La notion de

representatio apparaît aussi dans un passage de !'Écrit sur les

Sentences, mais elle est alors réservée aux vestiges et images -

voir Scriptum in librum primum Sententiarum ordinatio, dist.

II-ID, éd. St. Brown, adlaborante G. Gal, « Opera theologica »,

II, 1970, dist. III, q. IX, p. 543-544.

7. Bos, Egbert Peter. 1987. "La théorie de la signification de la vox

significativa ad placitum (nomen, verbum, oratio) dans les

Introductiones Montane Maiores." In Gilbert de Poitiers et ses

contemporains. Aux origines de la "Logica Modernorun",

edited by Jolivet, Jean and Libera, Alain de, 73-90. Napoli:

Bibliopolis.

Actes du septième symposium européen d'histoire de la logique

et de la sémantique médiévales. Centre d' études supérieures de

civilisation médiévale de Poitiers 17 22 Juin 1985.

8. Demonet, Marie-Luce. 2009. "Que reste-t-il du langage mental

dans les textes philosophiques français à la fin de la

Renaissance ?" In Le langage mental du Moyen Âge à l'âge

classique, edited by Biard, Joël, 241-264. Louvain: Peeters.

"Trop abondantes ou trop vagues, les solutions apportées à la

question du langage mental sont traduites par une terminologie

en langue vulgaire qui élague les complexités scolastiques mais

fait également surgir d'autres notions complexes : la langue

française ordinaire et non technique favorise un terme

relativement nouveau, « pensée », qui est comme un doublet

synonymique (et économique) de « discours mental »,

contenant implicitement « mental ». Entre la pesée et la

croyance, ce nom dynamique t:ansfonne- [a conception d'un

langage mentaI comme structure linguistique en mouvement

d'évaluation du pour ou du contre, puis en mouvement simple

d un concept à l'autre, que Montaigne voyait désormais comme

une promenade du sens avant que « les pensées » ne

deviennent illustres avec les liasses de Pascal. II les associe

expressément au mouvement du corps : « Mes pensees

dorment, si je les assis »(64)" (pp. 263-264 notes omises)

(64) Montaigne, Essais, III, 3, 828b.

9. Fortis, Jean-Michel. 1996. "La notion de langage mental :

problèmes récurrents de quelques théories anciennes et

contemporaines." Histoire, Épistémologie, Langage no. 18:75-

101.

Résumé : "Nous nous efforçons ici de séparer plusieurs thèses

distinctes qui sont enveloppées dans l'hypothèse générale qu'il

existe un langage de la pensée. Nous donnons d'abord un

rapide exposé des bases historiques du concept de langage

mental. Nous distinguons ensuite un inscriptionnalisme

matériel (et ses diverses formes), qui postule que

l'individuation d'une représentation est accomplie par une

structure symbolique locale — et un inscriptionnalisme

sémantique, qui postule que la réalisation d'une formule

mentale suffit à la doter d'un contenu. Nous nous tournons

ensuite vers la gnoséologie contemporaine et montrons que ces

thèses dépendent et proviennent de conceptions encore plus

générales, et qui posent que (1) certaines représentations sont

intrinsèquement porteuses de signification, (2) la pensée est

par nature compositionnelle, (3) les énoncés d'attitudes

propositionnelles expriment adéquatement le contenu des

croyances. Nous mettons en doute la validité de ces

conceptions. Au cours de la discussion, nous signalons

quelques similarités frappantes entre certains problèmes

anciens et contemporains soulevés par la notion de langage

mental."

10. Gourinat, Jean-Baptiste. 2013. "Le discours intérieur de l'ame

dans la philosophie stoicienne." Χώρα no. 11:11-22.

Résumé : "Plusieurs auteurs anciens attribuent aux stoïciens

une distinction entre le logos endiathetos et le logos proféré

(prophorikos), qui est souvent assimilée à l’opposition entre le

langage proféré et la raison intérieure, et tend à confondre la

position stoïcienne avec l’identification platonicienne de la

pensée à un dialogue intérieur. Mais, tandis que le logos

endiathetos est clairement identifié à la capacité humaine de

raisonner, il n’est pas présenté comme un dialogue intérieur. Il

réside d’abord dans une certaine disposition de l’homme à

enchaîner des énoncés de manière logique, tandis que le

langage proféré des hommes repose sur la capacité d’attacher

un sens au mot, d’émettre le langage depuis la pensée. Par

ailleurs, Chrysippe semble bien avoir reconnu un langage

intérieur, mais celui-ci n'est pas identifiable au logos

endiathetos ni à la pensée, dont il est nettement distingué, et il

est encore moins un dialogue."

11. Hurand, Bérangère. 2009. "La locutio mentis : une version

anselmienne du verbe intérieur." In Le langage mental du

Moyen Âge à l'âge classique, edited by Biard, Joël, 29-43.

Louvain: Peeters.

"Il est courant de rapporter la locutio mentis anselmienne à une

notion augustinienne qui l'aurait préparée. Augustin et

Anselme auraient ainsi en commun d'imaginer un « verbe

intérieur » qui puisse fournir, à qui se rend attentif à l'activité

de son âme, un accès direct au Verbe et à la Vérité divine à la

ressemblance desquels il est formé." (p. 29)

(...)

"Les choses sont les similitudes de leur diction originaire, non

l'inverse ; et le verbe humain n'est pas comparable au Verbe de

Dieu, parce qu'il décompose, alors que Dieu pose sur les choses

un regard surplombant et

synthétique(44). Mais, le chapitre 10 du Monologion, en

indiquant l'existence d'une deuxième forme de locutio mentis,

nous renvoie à la gnoséologie anselmienne et à la fonction qu'il

attribue au langage : transmettre l'expérience intériorisée de la

res, et l'utiliser comme le matériau de la pensée. La similitude

est alors investie d'un sens nouveau : elle n'est pas tant le reflet

de la res que la matière de la créativité intellectuelle.

L'intuition est relayée par la discursivité. Pour s'intéresser aux

conditions logiques de la seconde, Anselme réunit la locutio du

coeur et la locutio linguistique qu'Augustin, bien que faisant de

l'une l'expression de l'autre, avait séparées. Ainsi, sans pouvoir

être qualifié de concept, le verbum anselmien en devient plus

proche que le verbum augustinien : il n'est pas tant le reflet de

la réalité que sa transposition sur un plan conceptuel." (p. 43)

(44) Cf. Proslogion, chap. 14 : l'intelligence divine est dite voir

« d'un seul regard, toutes choses qui furent faites, de qui, par

qui et comment elles furent faites de rien ».

12. Ildefonse, Frédérique. 1992. "Perception et discours dans

l'ancien stoïcisme." Histoire, Épistémologie, Langage no.

14:31-45.

Résumé : "Si les Stoïciens, particulièrement dans le statut

accordé à la représentation comprehensive, développent et

élaborent le lien entre perception et discours, la définition de la

représentation comme altération, plutôt que comme

impression, me paraît viser à sauvegarder la dimension d'une

multiplicité perceptive. Mon objet est d'examiner comment

cette multiplicité inhérente à la perception doit être transcrite

dans le discours, puis comment cette transcription nécessite la

distinction entre deux types de partition du discours,

répondant aux deux expressions de mérè tou logou d'une part,

sloicheia tou logou d'autre part."

13. Karger, Elizabeth. 1994. "Théories de la pensée, de ses objects

et de son discours chez Guillaume d'Occam."

Dialogue.Canadian Philosophical Review no. 33:437-456.

"En effet Occam ne rendra pas campte de la même faç:on des

actes d'intellection, particulièrement des actes d'intellection

abstractive, selon qu'il postulera ou non ces objets généraux

d'intellection que sont les ficta. II ne rendra pas campte non

plus de la même faç:on du discours mental, dont les termes, du

moins les termes généraux, sont des concepts, selon qu'il aura

on non identifié ceux-ci a des ficta. Ce n'est pas non plus le

même rôle qu'il assignera, dans Je savoir, aux propositions

mentales selon Ja fa ç:on dont il aura rendu campte du discours

mental.

En fait la plupart des doctrines occamistes portant sur l'esprit

et ses productions recevront ainsi deux versions différentes,

l'une presupposant l'hypothèse des ficta, l'autre non. C'est ce

que je me propose de mettre en evidence en dégageant des

textes pertinents ce que je designerai comme «deux théories

occamistes de la pensée, de ses objets et de son discours», l'une

s'inscrivant dans le cadre de l'hypothèse qu'il y a des ficta,

tandis que l'autre fait l'economie de celle-ci(2). Chacune de ces

théories inclura une théorie des actes intellectifs, une théorie

du concept et des universaux, une théorie des termes simples

du discours mental, et assignera un rôle aux propositions

mentales dans le savoir." (pp- 437-438)

(2) Le texte auquel je puiserai la premiere théorie, celle qui

contient l'hypothèse des ficta, est essentiellement le

Commentaire des Sentences et ceux auxquels je puiserai la

seconde, qui n'admet pas cette hypothèse, sont les Quodlibets,

la Somme de logique et les Questions sur la physique. Les

références a ces textes et a d'autres textes d'Occam seront

toutes a l'édition critique des oeuvres philosophiques et

théologiques d'Occam, publiée par le Franciscan Institute a

Saint-Bonaventure, NY, dont les differents volumes sont parus

entre 1967 et 1988 et dont on m'excusera de ne pas citer, pour

chaque volume, le nom du ou des éditeurs. L'abreviation

«OTh.» sera employée pour «Opera Theologica» et «OPh.»

pour «Opera Philosophical. Les textes d'Occam et des autres

auteurs latins qui seront cites le seront en francais, traduits par

moi.

14. King, Peter. 2005. "Le rôle des concepts selon Ockham."

Philosophiques no. 32:435-447.

"Il me semble donc que le rejet de la représentation mentale

par Ockham nous ouvre un chemin vers sa philosophie mature,

qui est plus radicalement anti-réductionniste que l’alternative

de Panaccio à l’interprétation standard et qui est également

anti-mentaliste. De la même façon que Panaccio s’éloigne de

l’interprétation standard sur la question (apparemment) étroite

de l’éliminabilité sémantique des termes connotatifs dans le

langage mental, je m’éloigne de Panaccio sur la question

apparemment étroite de la représentation mentale. Bien sûr,

même si j’ai insisté sur les différences, mon point de vue a

beaucoup en commun avec celui de Panaccio, et pas seulement

en ce qui concerne notre rejet commun de l’interprétation

standard. Ne serait-ce que parce nous sommes d’accord sur le

fait que, pour bien comprendre la philosophie mature

d’Ockham, on doit commencer avec sa philosophie de l’esprit –

ce qui, en fin de compte, implique de s’accommoder du double

rôle qu’Ockham assigne aux concepts." (p. 447)

15. Koch, Isabelle. 2009. "Le verbum in corde chez Augustin." In

Le langage mental du Moyen Âge à l'âge classique, edited by

Biard, Joël, 1-28. Louvain: Peeters.

"Pour décrire l'activité cognitive humaine, Augustin a recours à

deux modèles : l'un est visuel (penser, c'est voir par le regard

intérieur de l'esprit), l'autre, verbal (penser, c'est dire de façon

intérieure, parler dans son coeur). De ce second modèle relève

la notion de « verbe du coeur » (verbum cordis, verbum in

corde) ou de« verbe intérieur» (verbum intus).

Il ne s'agit pas là de simples métaphores : nos actes de pensée

sont réellement des visiones et des locutiones intérieures,

affirme Augustin. Cela implique une élaboration conceptuelle

des expériences concrètes de la vision (sensible) et du discours

(proféré) permettant de décrire exactement, et non de suggérer

simplement de façon imagée, ce qu'est un acte de pensée. Mais

pourquoi recourir à deux modèles, construits à partir

d'expériences concrètes très différentes ? C'est à travers cette

question que la théorie augustinienne du verbe intérieur sera ici

examinée." (p. 1)

16. Lafleur, Claude. 2001. "Présentation synoptique du livre de

Claude Panaccio : Le discours intérieur. De Platon à Guillaume

d’Ockham." Laval Théologique et Philosophique no. 57:209-

211.

"Pour permettre de situer plus facilement les contributions (sur

les aspects méthodologique, antique, médiéval et

contemporain) ainsi que les réponses autoritatives qui

constituent ce dossier dans le long parcours de l'enquête

diachronique de Claude Panaccio sur le thème du discours

intérieur, il s'agit simplement ici de donner d'emblée — sous

forme d'un compte rendu schématique — un aperçu d'ensemble

de la structure de l'ouvrage panaccien et une caractérisation

minimale de chacune de ses parties." (p. 209)

17. ———. 2001. "Questions de style et de méthode. Claude

Panaccio et l’histoire d’un thème philosophico-théologique del

l?Antiquité à la fin du Moyen Âge." Laval Théologique et

Philosophique no. 57:213-223.

Résumé : "On soulève ici, dans une réflexion sur la méthode et

le style opérant une fréquente comparaison avec les travaux

d'Alain de Libera, la question de savoir si le traitement du

thème du discours intérieur dans la longue durée par Claude

Panaccio rend adéquatement compte de l'inscription historique

et de l'inscription théologique du problème considéré. La

conclusion est positive quant au premier point, plus dubitative

quant au second lorsque l'interprétation de la pensée du

franciscain Guillaume d'Ockham est enjeu. La difficulté posée

par l'inscription institutionnelle de l'activité philosophique du

scolastique Guillaume d'Ockham et de ses pairs théologiens est

finalement brièvement évoquée."

18. Mariani-Zini, Fosca. 2009. "Topique et argumentation dans le

premier humanisme italien." In Le langage mental du Moyen

Âge à l'âge classique, edited by Biard, Joël, 221-239. Louvain:

Peeters.

"Je voudrais toutefois suggérer que l'humanisme italien du XV"

siècle, tout en reconnaissant que la pensée s'exerce toujours

dans des conditions historiques et des expressions

individuelles, a cherché à élaborer une topique de la mens,

caractérisée par une structure anticipative qui préoriente, selon

des dispositifs schématiques donnés par les relations topiques

et les états de cause, l'argumentation propre à l'espèce

humaine. Je reconnais aisément qu'il s'agit là d'une lecture qui

cherche, en adoptant un principe d'équité ou de charité, à

présupposer au préalable la cohérence la plus grande que des

éléments différents, sinon hétérogènes, caractérisant la

réflexion des humanistes, peuvent assumer dans un certain

parcours interprétatif. Je chercherai ainsi à montrer comment

l'exigence, propre à la philologie naissante, de comprendre le

discours d'autrui conduit les humanistes à faire l'hypothèse de

la constance de nos dispositifs argumentatifs, au-delà des «

idiotismes » linguistiques." (p. 222)

19. Michon, Cyrille. 1994. Nominalisme. La théorie de la

signification d'Occam. Paris: Vrin.

Chapitre IV: Le langage mental, pp. 143-172; Équivocité dans

le langage mental, pp. 232-236.

"Description du langage mental

Ce qui précède n’a été que l’élucidation, laborieuse, de la notion

de ‘signe linguistique (naturel) mental’. L’entreprise était exigée

par la notion première de ‘langage mental’. Si nous acceptons

l’analyse occamiste, nous sommes désormais en mesure

d’identifier la pensée à un langage, l’acte de penser à un parler

mental (mentaliter loqui), sans qu’il n’y ait là ni métaphore, ni

analogie, puisque la seule distinction essentielle est celle de

l’origine des signes (arbitraires ou naturels). Nous sommes

aussi en mesure, si l’analyse précédente nous paraît une

impasse, de rejeter cette identification et de n’y voir tout au

plus qu’une métaphore ou une analogie. Mais, dans les deux

cas, l’analyse du langage mental que fournit Occam a son utilité

propre. Dans l’hypothèse positive, elle vaut comme

l’achèvement de la réduction de la pensée à un langage ; dans

l’hypothèse négative, comme la contre-épreuve d’une théorie

erronée. La théorie du langage mental est bien connue, je me

contenterai d’une présentation sommaire, suffisante pour les

réflexions critiques qu’elle inspire.

Il existe un langage de la pensée - c’est là un point qui n’est pas

vraiment discuté. A toute proposition dans un langage

conventionnel (LC) correspond une proposition dans l’esprit,

donc dans le langage mental (LM). Occam ne donne pas de

justification à cette affirmation, puisqu’il prétend reprendre la

tradition augustinienne et même la uadition aristotélicienne du

texte du De Interpretatione sur les passions de l’âme(2). Mais il

est clair que la seule explication est l'exigence de

compréhension. La notion de proposition mentale n’est pas la

proposition des modernes, bien qu’elle lui ressemble. Elle

constitue le contenu exprimé par une phrase (sentence) dans le

LC, contenu qui demeure identique après une traduction dans

un autre LC, ou après des modifications grammaticales qui

n’altèrent pas le sens de la phrase (comme la conversion de

l’actif au passif). Mais c’est une autre phrase individuelle

(token), qui existe dans une âme individuelle.£ (pp. 160-161)

(2) Via Boèce dans son propre commentaire. C’est toujours le

texte de 16a 3-18.(...)

20. ———. 2009. "Les représentations rendent-elles indirecte la

connaissance des choses ?" In Le langage mental du Moyen

Âge à l'âge classique, edited by Biard, Joël, 45-60. Louvain:

Peeters.

"Le réalisme indirect soutient alors que nous avons une

connaissance des choses, mais une connaissance indirecte,

médiate : par le biais des représentations, dans un processus

qui pourrait être qualifié d'inférentiel.

Autrement dit, le réalisme indirect soutient que l'objet

immédiat de la connaissance, ce sont les représentations, et que

les choses en elles-mêmes ne peuvent l'être qu'en second lieu, à

partir de cette première connaissance.

Selon Panaccio, qui réactualise des critiques formées en leur

temps par des quasi-contemporains comme Pierre Olivi,

Durand de Saint-Pourçaint ou Guillaume d'Ockham, Thomas

est un représentationnaliste et un réaliste indirect. Je ne sais

pas si cette conjonction n'est pas une implication selon

Panaccio. En tout cas, je voudrais soutenir que Thomas est

peut-être représentationnaliste, mais qu'il n'est pas un réaliste

indirect. Pour ce faire, je devrai distinguer plusieurs sens du

représentationnalisme, et montrer que si Thomas tombe sous

l'un d'entre eux, il ne tombe pas sous le sens le plus fort, qui est

celui du réalisme indirect." (pp. 46-47, une note omise)

21. Narbone, Jean-Marc. 2001. "Circonstances et profil d’une

rencontre." Laval Théologique et Philosophique no. 57:207-

209.

"Convaincu d'emblée de l'importance de ce livre, notre

distingué collègue Claude Lafleur prit l'initiative de former à

l'occasion de cette parution une Table ronde spéciale (« Le

discours intérieur : Antiquité, Moyen Age, époque

contemporaine. Autour d'un ouvrage récent de Claude Panaccio

», Québec, 4 décembre 2000) où plusieurs chercheurs de

l'Université Laval purent faire écho aux divers questionnements

soulevés par cette étude. Avec cet événement, organisé

conjointement par la Faculté de philosophie, l'Institut d'études

anciennes et le Laboratoire de philosophie ancienne et

médiévale de l'Université Laval, l'ouvrage trouvait ainsi un

cadre d'échanges et de discussions des plus privilégiés." (p.

297)

22. Panaccio, Claude. 1992. "Intuition, abstraction et langage

mental dans la théorie occamiste de la connaissance." Revue de

Métaphysique et de Morale no. 97:61-82.

"En matière de théorie de la connaissance, Occam dispose, la

chose est frappante, de deux terminologies distinctes. D'un

côté, il recourt avec régularité au vocabulaire de la « notitia »

(ou « cognitio ») et à la distinction, qu'il adapte de Duns Scot,

entre « notitia intuitiva » « notitia abstractiva ». Mais en même

temps, il prend plus au sérieux que n'importe quel autre

penseur médiéval avant lui l'idée que la pensée se tisse en un

discours mental, une « oratio mentalis », à laquelle il applique

systématiquement le vocabulaire de la sémantique terministe

(« significatio », « suppositio », « connotatio », etc.) qui était

en usage depuis le XIIe siècle pour l'analyse logique du discours

oral écrit. Comment ces deux appareils s'articulent-ils l'un à

l'autre ? Il n'y guère là-dessus, assez curieusement, de

discussion très élaborée dans les textes mêmes d'Occam. La

plupart des passages qui emploient l'une des deux

terminologies ignorent tout à fait l'autre ou ne lui accordent, en

tout cas, qu'une place secondaire. Et ceux qui les mettent les

deux à contribution ne les organisent pas pour autant en une

théorie bien explicite. Non que Guillaume soit incohérent, loin

de là, mais une certaine reconstruction s'impose ici, à laquelle

justement j'entends me livrer dans cet article. Je montrerai en

particulier que la doctrine occamiste invite à traiter les actes

d'intuition et d'abstraction comme autant de termes signifiants,

capables de figurer, en personne pour ainsi dire, dans des

propositions mentales. Et je m'interrogerai sur les catégories

syntaxiques et sémantiques auxquelles on doit, dès lors, les

assigner. La distinction entre connaissance intuitive et

connaissance abstractive sera ainsi mise en correspondance

avec l'opposition, au niveau des éléments simples du langage

mental, entre les termes singuliers et les termes généraux." (pp.

61-62)

23. ———. 1992. Les mots, les concepts et les choses. La

sémantique de Guillaume d'Occam et le nominalisme

d'aujourd'hui. Paris: Vrin.

"Quant à la forme, je présenterai ma reconstruction sous la

figure d’un système constructionnel de définitions et de règles.

L’étude se focalisera, au premier chapitre, sur la théorie

sémantique de mon auteur, assortie de quelques éléments

d’ontologie. C’est elle, surtout, que je voudrais exploiter par la

suite, quitte à la compléter au fur et à mesure par certains

autres modules théoriques, tirés, selon les besoins de la

discussion, de la théorie de la connaissance d’Occam ou de sa

métaphysique. Cette sémantique, je la réorganiserai en une

séquence de formules numérotées, chargées chacune d’en

représenter d’une manière précise une thèse ou une définition

caractéristique. On posera à la base du système certaines

relations primitives et l’on reconstituera à partir de là — et

toujours en exploitant de près les textes d’Occam — une théorie

nominaliste générale de la référence et des conditions de vérité.

Je soulignerai explicitement, à la fin du chapitre, les écarts —

relativement accessoires — que je me serai permis, ce faisant,

par rapport à la doctrine originale et j’en donnerai, à chaque

fois, les raisons.

J’explorerai, dans les trois autres chapitres, certains thèmes

philosophiques particuliers, liés à la problématique du

nominalisme et pour lesquels l’occamisme me semble

spécialement pertinent : la question du langage mental, celle

des rapports entre signification et vérité, et celle, enfin, de la

portée sémantique des prédicats généraux. Pour chacun de ces

thèmes, un auteur contemporain jouera dans mon texte le rôle

d’interlocuteur privilégié d’Occam: Jerry Fodor pour le

premier, Donald Davidson pour le second, Nelson Goodman

pour le troisième. J’interrogerai donc l’occamisme reconstruit

— et parfois complété en cours de route — pour voir comment il

réagit aux défis de ces trois dignes chevaliers de la philosophie

analytique actuelle : comment, sur tel point, sa démarche se

mesure à la leur; s’il est ébranlé ou conforté par leurs

arguments; s’il suggère, enfin, des solutions aux difficultés

qu’ils rencontrent. Ces questions clés guideront, pour chacun

des trois chapitres, la confrontation d’Occam avec une doctrine

aujourd’hui discutée et dont on verra, dans chacun des trois

cas, qu’elle s’apparente fortement à la sienne par certains

aspects importants."

24. ———. 1992. "Le nominalisme et la question du langage

mental." In Épistémologie et Cognition : Colloque de Cerisy,

edited by Andler, D., Jacob, P., Proust, J., Récanati, F. and

Sperber, D., 27-37. Liège: Mardaga.

25. ———. 1995. "Augustin, le verbe mental et l’amour." In Les

philosophies morales et politiques au Moyen Âge : actes du

IXe Congès international de Philosophie Médiévale, Ottawa,

du 17au 22 août 1992, edited by Bazán, Bernardo Carlos,

Andújar, Eduardo and Sbrocchi, L. G., 277-286. New York:

LEGAS.

26. ———. 1996. "Le langage mental en discussion: 1320-1335." Les

Études Philosophiques:323-339.

Résumé : "Guillaume d'Ockham fut l'initiateur principal d'une

approche sémantique aux phénomènes cognitifs : la pensée,

pour lui, est un discours intérieur et il propose de l'analyser

systématiquement à travers les catégories de la grammaire et

celles - surtout - de la .théorie nouvelle des « propriétés des

termes » (signiftcatio, suppositio ... ). On examine ici comment

cette suggestion fut reçue chez les philosophes anglais du temps

d'Ockham, en particulier : Gauthier Chatton, Hugues Lawton,

le Pseudo-Campsall, Crathorn, Robert Holkot et Adam

Wodeham."

27. ———. 1996. "Des signes dans l'intellect." Cahiers

d'Épistémologie:1-30.

Reprinted in: Harjett Singh Gill, Giovanni Manetti (eds.), Signs

and Signification, Vol. II. New Delhi: Bahri Publications 2000,

pp. 63-88."

"Existe-t-il un langage de la pensée, universel et antérieur à la

division des langues?

Un langage aux structures innées, que chaque être humain

utiliserait intérieurement dans ses computations mentales,

avant d'entrer en communication avec autrui, avant même

d'apprendre une langue quelconque? C'est là une idée, en tout

cas, qui, dans la foulée de la linguistique transformationnelle de

Noam Chomsky, est redevenue un philosophème respectable

dans la philosophie analytique des vingt dernières années. Elle

a été ardemment défendue, en particulier, par l'Américain Jerry

Fodor dans son livre de 1975, The Language of Thought, et

dans ses travaux ultérieurs(1). Elle est beaucoup critiquée,

certes, mais elle est défendue aussi par plusieurs auteurs(2) et

prise aux sérieux dans les débats actuels de la philosophie de

l'esprit en Amérique, où Fodor, il faut le dire, joue un rôle de

premier plan." (p- 1)

(1) Jerry A Fodor, The Language of Thought, New York,

Thomas Y. Crowell, 1975. Voir aussi du même auteur

Psychosemantics: The Problem of Meaning in the Philosophy

of Mind, Cambridge, MA, The MIT Press, 1987, et «Replies»

dans Meaning in Mind: Fodor and his Critics, sous la dir. de B.

Loewer et G. Rey, Oxford, Blackwell, 1991, pp. 255-319.

(2) Voir par exemple J. Christopher Maloney, The Mundane

Matter of the Mental Language, Cambridge, Cambridge

University Press, 1989.

28. ———. 1999. Le discours intérieur. De Platon à Guillaume

d'Ockham. Paris: Editions du Seuil.

Sur ce livre voir: Laval Théologique et Philosophique, vol. 57 n.

2 (June 2001).

Table: Avant-propos 13; Introduction 17; Première Partie: Les

Sources; 1. Platon et Aristote 29; 2. Logos endiathetos 53; 3.

Verbum in corde 94; 4. Oratio mentalis 120; Deuxième Partie:

Les controverses du XIII siècle; 5. Triple est le verbe 153; 6.

L'acte contre l'idole 177; 7. Le concept et le signe 202; 8. De

quoi la logique parle-t-elle? 228; Troisième Partie: La Via

moderna; 9. L'intervention d'Ockham 253; 10. 10. Réactions

279; Conclusion 305; Bibliographie 321; Index des noms 335-

342.

"Je me propose dans ce livre une autre interrogation encore,

plus proprement historique, mais suscitée par la même

coïncidence : comment la tradition philosophique médiévale en

est-elle venue à donner naissance à une théorie hautement

articulée du langage mental, comme celle d'Ockham? A la

faveur de quelles inspirations? Et pour résoudre quels

problèmes? Peut-on, six ou sept siècles après, retracer - et

comprendre - les discussions précises, souvent techniques, qui

ont conduit à ce développement doctrinal?" (p. 20)

(...)

"L'objectif, donc, est d'étudier l'émergence et la formation du

thème du discours mental dans la philosophie médiévale

jusqu'à Guillaume d'Ockham. La philosophie médiévale étant,

cependant, très dépendante de ses sources gréco-arabes et

chrétiennes, l 'histoire serait inintelligible à s'en tenir, vers

l'amont, aux frontières chronologiques du Moyen Age. Il nous

faudra remonter beaucoup plus haut, jusqu'à Platon et Aristote,

et repérer, à partir de là, les divers usages qui ont été proposés

de l'idée de discours intérieur jusqu'au XIVe siècle, que ce soit

chez les stoïciens, les néoplatoniciens, les Pères de l'Église, les

Arabes ou les scolastiques du Moyen Age même. Il s'agira,

chaque fois, d'identifier les problèmes que les auteurs

entendaient traiter à l'aide d'une telle notion et de décrire les

rôles précis qu'ils lui confiaient dans leurs discussions

théoriques. Sur le plan diachronique, j'essaierai de retracer, en

cours de route, les filières par lesquelles l'idée s'est transmise

au cours des siècles. On verra de la sorte le thème du langage

mental voyager d'un contexte à l'autre, chatoyer sous des

éclairages variés et s'affûter au fil des discussions impitoyables

que favorisait l'université médiévale. Accessoirement, cela

permettra d'évaluer l'originalité d'Ock:ham par rapport à ses

devanciers en cette matière." (p. 22)

29. ———. 2000. "Guillaume d'Ockham, les connotatifs et le

langage mental." Documenti e Studi sulla Tradizione Filosofica

Medievale no. XI:297-316.

Updated translation of: Connotative Terms in Ockham's

Mental Language.

30. ———. 2001. "Réponses de l’Auteur. De quelques variations sur

un thème séculaire." Laval Théologique et Philosophique no.

57:261-276.

Résumé : "Cet article répond aux questions soulevées par

Claude Lafleur, Martin Achard, Paul-Hubert Poirier, David

Piché et Marie-Andrée Ricard au sujet du livre de l'auteur, Le

discours intérieur (1999). Y sont successivement abordés : la

méthodologie de l'entreprise historique en philosophie (avec

référence aux idées d'Alain de Libera à ce sujet), le traitement

du logos endiathetos chez les Stoïciens, chez Philon

d'Alexandrie et chez Irénée de Lyon, les rapports de la

philosophie et de la théologie dans la scolastique médiévale, et

ceux de l'herméneutique avec la théorie augustinienne du verbe

intérieur."

31. ———. 2003. "Guillaume d'Ockham et les syncatègoremes

mentaux: la première théorie." Histoire, Épistémologie,

Langage no. 25:115-144.

"Dans un court passage de son Commentaire des Sentences

(Ordinatio I, dist. 2, quest. 8), Guillaume d’Ockham, en

réponse à une objection, expose une théorie de l’origine des

concepts syncatégorématiques dans l’esprit qui a beaucoup

étonné les commentateurs récents. Selon cette approche, les

concepts syncatégorématiques seraient dérivés des

syncatégorèmes linguistiques par un processus complexe de

réaffectation, qui prend sa source dans la représentation

mentale des mots. Ockham a par la suite abandonné cette

position, qu’il associait à sa première théorie des concepts en

général (la théorie dite des ficta), mais elle n’en est pas moins

remarquable sur le plan philosophique. On s’emploie ici à

élucider le mécanisme cognitif ainsi postulé par le venerabilis

inceptor, par un examen détaillé de l’unique développement

qu’il y ait jamais consacré."

32. ———. 2005. "Le paradoxe du menteur et le langage mental :

réflexions sur l'approche restrictionniste, Liber amicorum in

honorem Huberti Hubien." In Logique et ontologie :

Perspectives diachroniques et synchroniques, edited by Beets,

François and Gavray, Marc-Antoine, 55-71. Liège: Éditions

Université de Liège.

"Restrictionism is an approach to the Liar paradox and related

puzzles that was quite popular in the thirteenth and early

fourteenth century.

The idea is to resort to a rule restricting the reference of certain

terms (their 'suppositio') in certain propositional contexts. But

how are such apparently ad hoc rules supposed to govern

thought itself, or mental language? This objection was raised

against restrictionism by Thomas Bradwardine and John

Buridan (around 1330), and was considered decisive. The

present paper re-examines this discussion and re-evaluates in

consequence the prospects that remain for a defensible form of

restrictionism."

33. ———. 2009. "Le jugement comme acte mental selon Guillaume

d'Ockham." In Le langage mental du Moyen Âge à l'âge

classique, edited by Biard, Joël, 117-133. Louvain: Peeters.

"Ockham avait introduit cette notion d'acte judicatif dès le

Prologue de son Commentaire des Sentences, alors qu'il

souscrivait encore à la théorie dite du fictum, pour laquelle les

concepts et les propositions mentales sont des objets purement

idéaux produits par les actes mentaux(5).

• Mais il en conserve l'idée lorsqu'il passe progressivement,

dans les années 1320, à la théorie de l'actus. Sauf que les

choses, désormais, se présentent bien différemment : les

concepts et les propositions mentales étant eux aussi des actes

mentaux dans cette théorie, on se retrouve ainsi avec toute une

population d'actes dans l'intellect, dont certains sont des actes

conceptuels, d'autres des actes propositionnels, et d'autres

encore des actes judicatifs ; et la question se pose dès lors de

savoir comment tout cela tient ensemble dans le discours

intérieur, comment, en particulier, les actes judicatifs sont liés

dans l'esprit aux actes propositionnels. C'est ce problème que je

voudrais discuter ici." (p. 119)

(5) Pour l'introduction originale de l'actus iudicativus dans

l'oeuvre d'Ockham, voir: Guillelmi de Ockham, Scriptum in

librum primum Sententiarum. Ordinatio [dorénavant : Ord.],

Prologue, quest. 1, éd. G. Gal et S. Brown, « Opera theologica »

[dorénavant : O. Th.] I, Franciscan Institute, St. Bonaventure,

New York, 1967, p. 16-17.

34. Pécharman, Martine. 1992. "Le discours mental selon Hobbes."

Archives de Philosophie no. 55:552-573.

Résumé : "L'analyse hobbesienne du discours mental

s'inaugure par une réfutation de la substantialité de l'esprit. Le

discours mental n' y est conçu que comme un effet de la

sensation. Néanmoins, Hobbes n'adopte pas une

réductionnisme radical ; car le discours mental implique une

rupture avec la suite indéfinie des sensations. Il parvient même

à conquérir quelque autonomie par la persiststance des

phantasmes, qui sont la matière d'un raisonnement interne.

Hobbes échappe ainsi à une forme inverse de réductionnisme :

pas plus qu 'il ne s'identifie à la pure succession indéfinie des

sensations, le discours mental ne saurait étre ramené a une

suite de noms universels. Cependant il ne permet pas à lui seul

le savoir au sens stnct : il faut introduire la mémoire

sémantique par convention, et partant, les noms universels,

pour traduire ce discours mental en discours verbal, mais de

telle manière que l'hypothèse d'un langage privé soit rendue

impossible."

35. ———. 2009. "De quel langage intérieur Hobbes est-il le

théoricien? ." In Le langage mental du Moyen Âge à l'âge

classique, edited by Biard, Joël, 265-291. Louvain: Peeters.

"Il est un jeu qui consiste à rechercher, dans un groupe

d'éléments quelconques, celui de ces éléments qui n'est pas

réellement un membre du groupe en question, celui dont la

présence parmi les autres ne revient pas à une appartenance au

même groupe que les autres, celui qui n'est qu'un intrus. «

Cherchez l'intrus », cette invitation ludique me semble pouvoir

être aisément satisfaite au cours du présent Symposium :

l'intrus, c'est Hobbes, et à la question formant le titre de ma

communication, « De quel langage intérieur Hobbes est-il le

théoricien ? », je peux d'emblée répondre : « D'aucun ».

Hobbes n'est en aucune manière un théoricien du langage

intérieur." (p. 265)

36. Perini-Santos, Ernesto. 2007. "La structure de l'acte intellectif

dans les théories ockhamiennes du concept." Vivarium:93-112.

"William of Ockham held in his career two different theories

about the nature of concepts. According to the first theory,

concepts are forged by the mind and "terminate" the mental

acts which produce them. This so called "fictum"-theory was

abandoned, and Ockham held another theory, according to

which concepts are identified with the mental acts themselves.

While I think this is a correct description of the evolution of his

philosophy, there is one aspect that has gone so far (almost)

unnoticed : in his later theory, not only concepts do not

terminate mental acts, but nothing seems fit to play this role.

Mental acts are no longer "terminated" by anything. Therefore,

as the theory of concepts changes, there is also a change in the

theory of mental acts. This last change explains the

disappearance of the vocabulary associated with the verb

"terminare" in the exposition of the mental act theory."

37. Piché, David. 2001. "Philosophie médiévale. Anselme de

Cantorbéry, Thomas d’Aquin et Guillaume d’Ockham sur le

thème du discours intérieur : quel est le problème ?" Laval

théologique et philosophique no. 57:243-249.

Résumé : "La notion de discours intérieur (locutio mentis,

verbum mentis ou oratio mentalis), telle qu 'elle fut élaborée

au Moyen Age latin, a assumé, d'un auteur à l'autre, des

fonctions ou des finalités théoriques différentes. Le texte qui

suit adresse une question simple à Claude Panaccio : quel(s)

problème(s) Anselme de Cantorbéry, Thomas d'Aquin et

Guillaume d'Ockham cherchent-ils respectivement à résoudre

en faisant intervenir cette notion de discours intérieur ?"

38. Piech, Christian. 2001. "Langage intérieur et ontologie

linguistique à la fin du XIXe siècle." Langue française no.

132:26-47.

Abstract: "The problem of inner language originated from

classical Greek philosophy, then developped in medieval

thought. Its early nineteenth century renewal can be located in

the philosophical perspective of de Bonald and Gamier. This

trend is then being developped by Reigner and Chaignet in the

field of philology, while Egger (1881) opposes it. The latter

arguments are echoed by Darmesteter's, Bréal's and Henry's

semantic analysises whithin linguistics. In the domain of

psychology, they are also linked to Flournoy's work in the

context of his collaboration with F. de Saussure. The analysis of

oral utterance stands from heterogeneous view points, but

poses two questions: 1st, that of the connection between the

individual and social traits of language; 2nd, that of linguistic

ontology, i.e. the link of the speaking subjects to one self in the

realm of language."

39. Poirier, Paul-Robert. 2001. "Gnose et patristique. À propos de

deux attestations du discours intérieur." Laval Théologique et

Philosophique no. 57:235-241.

Résumé : "Cette communication examine deux attestations du

discours intérieur, chez Philon d'Alexandrie (Quaestiones in

Genesim V [IV], 96) et Irénée de Lyon (Adversus haereses II,

13, 2)."

"Philon d'Alexandrie

Je suis tout à fait d'accord avec l'interprétation des textes de

Philon d'Alexandrie que propose le prof. Panaccio aux pages

63-71 [de Le discours intérieur. De Platon à Guillaume

d'Ockham (1999)] ; les textes cités illustrent particulièrement

bien l'enracinement philosophique de sa pensée et de son

allégorie biblique.

Je voudrais simplement revenir sur la lecture d'un extrait des

Quaestiones in Genesim (V [IV], 96 ; Le discours intérieur, p.

70), texte auquel le prof. Panaccio accorde une certaine

importance. Comme on le sait, le maniement des Quaestiones

in Genesim et Exodum de Philon est assez délicat, car, comme

dans le cas de l'Alexander, il s'agit d'un écrit dont l'original grec

est perdu et qui n'est plus accessible que par une

traduction arménienne. Traduction fort heureusement très

littérale, qui permet dans une large mesure de recouvrer le

texte grec sous-jacent." (p. 236, une note omise)

(...)

"Irenée de Lyon et les gnostiques

Ma deuxième remarque touche la section de l'ouvrage, pages

84-90, où est invoqué le témoignage d'Irénée de Lyon, dans un

passage de l'Adversus haereses (II, 13, 2), qui, perdu en grec,

trouve heureusement un parallèle strict chez Maxime le

Confesseur et Jean Damascene." (p. 238)

40. Ricard, Marie-Andrée. 2001. "Herméneutique contemporaine.

Le verbe intérieur au sein de l’herméneutique de Hans-Georg

Gadamer." Laval Théologique et Philosophique no. 57:251-260.

Résumé : "Si le verbe intérieur ne joue qu 'un rôle périphérique

dans Vérité et méthode, tant la question de la vérité du langage

l'emporte sur celle du rapport du langage et de la pensée auquel

le thème du verbe intérieur est traditionnellement associé, voilà

qu 'il se porte au cours des dernières années à l'avant-plan des

réflexions de Gadamer et qu 'il semble renverser certaines

thèses majeures de son herméneutique. On tentera ici défaire le

point sur cette question en tâchant de déterminer la

signification que Gadamer accorde à ce fameux verbe."

41. Rijk, Lambertus Marie de. 1975. "La signification de la

proposition (dictum propositionis) chez Abélard." In Pierre

Abélard - Pierre le Vénérable. Les courants philosophiques,

littéraires et artistiques en Occident au milieu du XII siècle,

edited by Jolivet, Jean and Louis, René, 547-555. Paris:

Éditions du Centre national de la recherche scientifique.

Publié aussi dans: Studia Mediewistyczne 16, 1975 pp. 155-161.

Repris comme chapitre IV in: L. M. de Rijk, Through Language

to Reality. Studies in Medieval Semantics and Metaphysics,

Edited by Bos Egbert, Northampton: Variorum Reprints, 1989.

"Cette communication se borne a un bref examen de la

signification de la phrase complète (propositio) dans la logique

de Pierre Abélard.

Il paraît utile de commencer par la définition du verbe signifier

(significare) chez ce logicien.

'signifier' dit des mots (dictiones) c'est produire une

intellection dans l'âme de l'auditeur (Logica ingredientibus

307, 30 ss.), tandis que le même verbe est également appliqué à

la dénotàtion des choses extérieures (ibid.); dans ce dernier

sens, le verbe est synonyme de appellare, nominare,

demonstrare, designare. 'signifier' dit des phrases complètes

(propositiones) c'est produire une intellection laquelle est

formée par la liaison des intellections de ses parties

(dictiones)." p. 547

"On peut conclure que selon Abélard le dictum n'est pas un

objet qui serait indépendent de la pensée, mais plutôt le

contenu de la pensée, c'est-à-dire une intellection objectivée,

qui correspond soit à un état de choses réel, soit à un état de

choses seulement possible (Dial. II, 205, 28-30: id dicimus

quod id quod dicit hec propositio 'Socrates est homo', est unum

de his que natura patitur esse), soit un état de choses tout à fait

impossible (Dial. II, 158, 7-9: la proposition 'Socrates est lapis'

ne reflète pas une inherentia de Socrate et de pierre, ni

'Socrates non est lapis' leur rémotion).

(...)

Ainsi, l'existence qu'établit la proposition en parlant, n'est pas

une existence réelle, mais, pourrait-on dire, une existence

parlée, ou plutôt, une existence pensée ou logique.

Employant la distinction bien connue du XIV siècles (presentée

notamment par Jacques d'Ascoli, Thomas d'York, Pierre

Thomae):

res: 1) extra animam (chose extérieure); 2) in anima: a)

subiective ( = acte de l'intellection comme tel) b) obiective

(contenu de l'intellection).

on peut dire qu'Abélard a essayé, à sa façon, de montrer que le

dictum, de la proposition, loin d'être une chose extérieure (res

extra animam) est une chose qui doit son existence à l'âme ou a

l'intellection (res in anima), mais qu'il faut en même temps

bien le distinguer de l'acte de l'intellection pris comme tel (res

in anima subiective), et reconnaître, sa propre identité dans le

contenu objectif de l'intellection. Par là, le dictum du grand

logicien du XII siècle semble être d'une nature logique par

excellence." (pp. 554-555, notes omises)

42. Robert, Aurélien. 2009. "Les deux langages de la pensée. A

propos de quelques réflexions médiévales." In Le langage

mental du Moyen Âge à l'âge classique, edited by Biard, Joël,

145-168. Louvain: Peeters.

"Il s'agira donc ici de montrer qu'alors même que les théories

du langage mental dites « naturalistes » sont de plus en plus

raffinées à partir du XIV" siècle, la réflexion sur la dépendance

de la pensée structurée aux langues connaît elle aussi un nouvel

essor et donne lieu à des options philosophiques radicalement

opposées à celles d'Ockham. Dans ce geste critique, de

nouveaux problèmes émergent au sujet de l'universalité, de la

naturalité et de l'unité du langage mental. Comment expliquer à

partir des seules idées de signe naturel, de similitude ou d'acte -

comme le requiert le réductionnisme d'Ockham - la

construction sémantique et syntaxique de cette oratio mentalis

? La catégorie de signe naturel semble notamment montrer son

insuffisance pour expliquer la formation de certaines parties du

discours de la pensée. En particulier, plusieurs philosophes se

demanderont comment concevoir de manière purement

naturelle des syncatégorèmes dans l'esprit (quantificateurs,

copules, etc.). Au terme de ce parcours, on verra apparaître une

forme nouvelle de conventionnalisme qui ne nie pas l'existence

d'une pensée naturelle et universelle, tout en lui refusant le

statut de langage. On s'attachera donc, à travers quelques

sondages, à mettre en perspective le rôle de la distinction des

deux langages de la pensée, afin de montrer comment, pour

quelques philosophes de la fin du Moyen Âge, s'il existe un

langage de la pensée, c'est toujours au sens d'une

intériorisation des langues." (pp. 147-148, une note omise)

43. Schmutz, Jacob. 2009. "Quand le langage a-t-il cessé d'être

mental ? Remarques sur les sources scolastiques de Bolzano."

In Le langage mental du Moyen Âge à l'âge classique, edited

by Biard, Joël, 307-337. Louvain: Peeters.

"Au terme de ce parcours, il est possible de formuler deux

arguments, l'un historiographique, l'autre philosophique.

L'argument historiographique est que l'histoire scolastique du

langage mental ne s'arrête pas après 1530, et qu'il n'y a donc

pas eu ce « grand vide » qui n'aurait été comblé qu'avec la

naissance de la philosophie analytique du XIX" siècle. Au

contraire, la tradition scolastique médiévale a été poursuivie

par de multiples chemins : le vieux concept médiévistique de la

translatio studiorum se révèle d'une grande vertu, et peut être

appliqué bien au-delà de la ville de Paris si souvent vue comme

un point d'arrivée des savoirs anciens.

(...)

"L'argument philosophique est celui d'un changement de

perspective radical dans l'analyse des propositions, qui s'est fait

au gré d'un changement de discipline, passant de la logique à

l'ontologie : pour les auteurs scolastiques du XVIII" siècle, le

langage n'est pas d'abord mental, mais bien « réel ». Bolzano a

été formé dans une culture scolastique totalement épargnée par

la « révolution copernicienne » : connaître consistait encore

pour lui à découvrir et non à construire le monde. La définition

du connaissable est radicalement différente dans la perspective

kantienne et bolzanienne : alors que le premier y voit un

concept transcendantal ancré dans notre esprit (est

connaissable ce qui est appréhendable par les sens et

structurable par les catégories de l'entendement), Bolzano

estime que le connaissable ne dépend ni des sens, ni des

catégories de l'entendement.

La Erkennbarkeit (traduction de la cognoscibilitas latine) est

une propriété de la chose elle-même, en termes scolastiques

une « dénomination intrinsèque »." (pp. 334-335, notes

omises)

44. Trottman, Christian. 1997. "Verbe mental et noétique thomiste

dans le De verbo d’Hervé de Nédellec." Revue Thomiste no.

97:47-62.

Studi in Italiano

1. Bottin, Francesco. 2000. "Linguaggio mentale e atti di pensiero

in Guglielmo di Ockham." Veritas.Revista de Filosofia no.

45:349-359.

Abstract: "William Ockharn developed themes of epistemology

which place him in position which can easily be compared to

that of modem thinkers. Such is notably the case of his works

on mental language, for instance, which bring him closer to

certain theories elaborated by Hilary Ptnam, especially his

theory of representation."

2. ———. 2005. Filosofia medievale della mente. Padova: Il

Poligrafo.

3. Consiglio, Francesco. 2016. "Linguaggio mentale e

rappresentazioni mentali. Una breve diacronia da Platone a

Guglielmo d’Ockham." ALIA. Revista de Estudios

Transversales no. 5:39-62.

Abstract: "Il problema dell’esistenza di un linguaggio mentale

ha occupato le menti di molti filosofi dall’età classica fino ai

nostri giorni. Quando esprimiamo un concetto, per esempio

“un uomo corre”, seppure lo traduciamo in una lingua diferente

(e dunque lo esprimiamo con parole e fonemi diferenti),

notiamo al tempo stesso che permane immutato il contenuto

concettuale, ovvero il corrispettivo mentale delle parole che

pronunciamo. In sintesi, uno stesso stato mentale complesso

può essere espresso con parole diferenti. I fautori del

linguaggio mentale postulano delle rappresentazioni mentali

che siano differenti dalle parole delle singole lingue e che siano,

al contempo, dotate della possibilità di combinarsi tra loro in

vario modo, così che agli stati mentali viene attribuito un ruolo

semantico e una struttura composizionale, come quella delle

lingue naturali. Particolarmente, si conosce oggi Jerry Fodor

come il maggior sostenitore dell’esistenza di un linguaggio

mentale. Tuttavia, c’è chi, come Claude Panaccio, sostiene che

la nozione di language of thought che egli propone non sia così

diversa da quella di oratio mentalis, proposta nel XIV secolo da

Guglielmo d’Ockham.

Dopo una messa a fuoco del contesto storico che origina la

nozione di oratio mentalis, ci concentreremo sul problema

delle rappresentazioni mentali e della loro valenza cognitiva."

4. Laspia, Patrizia. 2019. "Discorso interiore/discorso esteriore. In

dialogo con Giovanni Manetti." In I segni fra teoria e storia per

Giovanni Manetti, edited by Gensini, Stefano and Prato,

Alessandro, 51-61. Pisa: ETS.

Abstract: "A partire da un contributo di Giovanni Manetti

(2016) si ripercorre la contrapposizione fra linguaggio esteriore

e linguaggio interiore nella tradizione filosofica greca. Si

delineano due posizioni di fondo: la posizione discontinuista,

rappresentata dagli Stoici, nega etica e razionalità agli animali,

perché privi di 'linguaggio interiore' (logos endiathetos), ossia

di ragione (logos), anche se capaci di imitare il linguaggio

proferito (logos prophorikòs). All'estremo opposto, la posizione

continuista, rappresentata dagli Accademici e dagli Scettici,

argomenta a favore di una continuità cognitiva fra uomo e

animale. Scopo dell'articolo è mostrare che la posizione

discontinuista non si origina da Platone e Aristotele, da

indagare alla luce della tradizione precedente. Nell'epos

omerico il linguaggio è visto insieme come uno (legein,

raccogliere) e molteplice. La molteplicità dei contenuti

enunciativi diviene manifesta solo nel linguaggio vocale. Una

sola voce possente (opa megale) si traduce infatti in una

molteplicità di detti (epea) 'numerosi come fiocchi di neve in

inverno'. Questo è il retroterra da cui si origina la fase aurorale

della riflessione greca sul linguaggio. Parmenide considera la

molteplicità sensibile 'nome' (onoma), ossia apparenza,

‘linguaggio esteriore’. Verità è solo la coincidenza fra 'dire'

(legein) e 'comprendere' (noein) che si manifesta nell'unità

assoluta dell'eon, l' 'è' della predicazione. Per Platone, il logos

vocale é fatto di nomi e verbi che sono eidola, immagini

deformate degli oggetti rappresentati. A un livello esteriore,

vocale, i contenuti corrispondenti a nomi e verbi sono

rappresentati come distinti; ma a un livello interiore – interiore

alla proposizione, prima che al singolo parlante – i contenuti

enunciativi si fondono in assoluta unità. Il logos infatti non

nomina (onomazei) soltanto, ma compie o delimita qualcosa (ti

perainei): e a quest'intreccio si dà il nome di logos (Soph. 262

d). Su questa linea si colloca la distinzione aristotelica fra

linguaggio esteriore ed interiore (Anal. II 76 b 24-27) e lo stesso

incipit del De interpretatione. La nozione di 'linguaggio

interiore' non tematizza dunque, in Aristotele, l'interiorità

dell'uomo, o la specificità della mente umana, ma l'interiorità

del linguaggio; il grado zero della sua articolazione."

5. Maierù, Alfonso. 1996. "Il linguaggio mentale tra logica e

grammatica nel medioevo: il contesto di Ockham." In Momenti

di Storia della logica e di storia della filosofia. Atti del

Convegno di Roma (9-11 novembre 1994), edited by Guetti,

Carla and Puja, Roberto, 69-94. Roma: Aracne Editrice.

"«Linguaggio mentale» è locuzione ricalcata sull’inglese mental

language (nella nostra tradizione filosofica, si è soliti parlare di

«linguaggio interiore»); la sua recente fortuna è collegata ad

un’effettiva ripresa d’interesse per la riflessione sul linguaggio

non proferito da parte dei filosofi anglo–americani dell’ultimo

quarantennio."

(...)

"Quanto agli studi di filosofia medievale, le discussioni sul

linguaggio mentale cominciano almeno con Peter Geach(5) che

rivolge a Ockham l’accusa di avere trasferito al piano mentale le

proprietà della grammatica latina e d’avere poi voluto spiegare

con ciò il fatto che tali proprietà appaiono nel latino. A Geach

risponde John Trentmann(6), che invece vede nell’opera di

Ockham una filosofia del linguaggio

ideale." (pp. 69-70)

(...)

"Come si può ricavare anche solo dai titoli dei lavori finora

ricordati, l’eroe di gran parte delle ricerche sul versante

medievale è Guglielmo d’Ockham(20). Ma egli non è il solo

pensatore medievale che si sia occupato seriamente di questo

tema, e anche per intendere correttamente le posizioni di

Ockham è necessario collocarle nel più ampio dibattito nei

confronti del quale egli ha preso posizione con la sua teoria. In

questa comunicazione mi propongo di esaminare brevemente le

fonti del dibattito scolastico, di richiamare poi il secolo XIII nel

suo versante filosofico–teologico e grammaticale (modismo), di

esaminare quindi il secolo XIV, con Ockham e i critici del

modismo, e di chiudere con un cenno alle posizioni delineatesi

dopo Ockham." (p. 71)

(5) Mental Acts. Their Content and their Objects, London 1957,

p. 102-

(6) Ockham on Mental, «Mind», 79, 1970, pp. 586–590.

(20) Naturalmente, le monografie su Ockham fanno spazio a

questa tematica: cfr. per tutti M. McCord Adams, William

Ockham, Notre Dame (Ind.) 1987, pp. 71–141, 289–298 e 348–

351.

6. ———. 2002. "Linguaggio mentale e sincategoremi nel secolo

XIV." In Chemins de la pensée Médiévale. Études offertes à

Zénon Kaluza, edited by Bakker, Paul J.J.M., Faye, Emmanuel

and Grellard, Christophe, 3-25. Turnhout: Brepols.

"Al fine di inquadrare le posizioni presentate dai nostri testi è

necessario richiamare alcuni dei temi proposti dalle riflessioni

di Guglielmo d’Ockham sul linguaggio mentale.(8)

Nella lunga tradizione che ha preso le mosse dal capitolo primo

del De interpretatione di Aristotele, si è affermata la tesi del

parallelismo tra il discorso scritto, quello proferito e quello

mentale, e si è sostenuto che a ciascun livello le proposizioni

sono composte di termini. Fra i tre piani del linguaggio corrono

rapporti di subordinazione per quanto riguarda la natura della

relazione di significazione: i termini del linguaggio mentale

sono segni naturali delle cose, mentre i termini del linguaggio

proferito e di quello scritto sono segni delle stesse cose, ma

convenzionali, istituiti dall’uomo; il linguaggio proferito è

subordinato a quello mentale, e quello scritto è subordinato al

linguaggio proferito.(9) Il parallelismo tra i piani linguistici fa

sì che ai termini mentali, proferiti e scritti vengano attribuite le

stesse proprietà logiche, e in primo luogo quella della

supposizione, in virtù della quale il termine in un contesto

proposizionale sta per ciò ch’esso significa; al linguaggio

mentale vengono attribuite anche quelle proprietà

grammaticali che hanno a che fare con la verità e la falsità delle

proposizioni." (p. 5)

(8) Una ricostruzione complessiva delle riflessioni sul

linguaggio mentale è offerta da C. Panaccio, Le discours

intérieur de Platon à Guillaume d ’Ockham, Paris 1999.

(9) Cfr. Guglielmo d’Ockham, Summa logicae, 1, 1, a cura di Ph.

Boehner, G. Gàl S. Brown, St. Bonaventure (ny) 1974 (Opera

philosophica, 1), 7-9 .

7. Tabarroni, Andrea. 1984. "Segno mentale e teoria della

rappresentazione in Ockham." Versus. Quaderni di studi

semiotici no. 38/39:63-90.

Deutsche Studien

1. Arens, Hans. 1980. "Verbum Cordis: zur Sprachphilosophie des

Mittelalters." Historiographia Linguistica no. 7:13-25.

Summary: "In the European Middle Ages, what is generally

called philosophy of language is represented by a philosophy of

the word, not only the scholastic one of the word as 'part of

speech', developed by the Modistae, but from the 4th century

onward, a patristic doctrine of the human word as compared

with the divine Logos. It is based on the idea of an original

'word', independent of language, which, as a part of inner

knowledge, is a formed thought. What is usually called 'word' is

only its rendering by the human voice: the outer word as

opposed to the inner word. The rudiments of this doctrine are

found in Irenaeus (2nd century), it is clearly formulated by

Basileios the Great (330-379), but philosophically founded,

developed, and defined in Augustine's (354-430) "De

Trinitate". Here the dichotomy of the intellectual and the vocal

word is expanded to a trichotomy, i. e., a triplicity of the word:

first the 'verbum cordis', a mentally envisioned element of

cognition, the real and proper word and causa efficiens of the

other verbal manifestations, i. e., second: the realization of the

mental concept in a human language, but only imagined, not

voiced, the proper vehicle of human thinking; and third: the

spoken word, which is the sensible transient sign of an

intelligible permanent idea. The 'verbum cordis' is essential and

self-sufficient; but as ideas are only communicable by means of

material signs the second and third words are necessary

contrivances. This Augustinian doctrine lived on for more than

800 years; during that period it was either repeated exactly or

with a somewhat different terminology or rendered with slight

notional modifications, first, in the 8th century, by John of

Damascus, then in the 11th century by Anselm of Canterbury,

and finally in the 13th century by Albertus Magnus,

Bonaventura, and Thomas Aquinas. Of all those followers

Thomas shows the profoundest and precisest conception of the

'verbum cordis', which remains the core of that impressive

abstract construction: the triple word theory."

2. Eckermann, Willigis. 1978. Wort und Wirklichkeit: das

Sprachverständnis in der Theologie Gregors von Rimini und

sein Weiterwirken in der Augustinerschule. Würzburg:

Augustinus-Verlag.

"Die innere Sprache", ss. 106-128.

3. Hackett, Jeremiah. 1981. "Verbum mentalis concepito in

Meister Eckhart and Jordanus of Quedlinburg. A Text Study."

In Sprache und Erkenntnis im Mittelalter. Akten des VI.

Internationalen Kongresses für Mittelalterliche Philosophie

der Société Internationale pour l'Etude de la Philosophie

Médiévale. 29. August - 3. September 1977 in Bonn, 2.

Halbband, edited by Kluxen, Wolfgang, 1003-1011. Berlin:

Walter de Gruyter.

"I conclude then by saying that the text of Jordanus [*] is

important for three reasons. First, it shows us the extent of his

quotation from Meister Eckhart.

Second, it shows us that Jordanus does criticise the work of

Meister Eckhart. Thus, one has to raise many questions about

the nature of the orthodoxy of Meister Eckhart. Third, the

Jordanus text is of great

importance in that it contains large references to the Vox

Spiritualis, some of which he received from Albertus of Padua."

(p. 1011)

[*] Jordan of Quedlinburg (Saxony), (1300-1380), (1370?),

Opus Postillarum et Sermonum de Tempore. Strasbourg, 1483,

in Münich Staatsbibliothek 2 JNC/CA 1343 Ab.

4. Hirsch, Emanuel. 1929. "Luther über die oratio mentalis."

Zeitschrift für Systematische Theologie no. 6:136-141.

5. Hübener, Wolfgang. 1981. ""Oratio mentalis" und "oratio

vocalis" in der Philosophie der 14. Jahrunderts." In Sprache

und Erkenntnis im Mittelalter. Akten des VI. Internationalen

Kongresses für Mittelalterliche Philosophie der Société

Internationale pour l'Etude de la Philosophie Médiévale. 29.

August - 3. September 1977 in Bonn, 1. Halbband, edited by

Kluxen, Wolfgang, 488-497. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter.

6. Leffler, Oliver. 1995. Wilhelm von Ockham. Die

sprachphilosophischen Grundlagen seines Denkens. Werl:

Dietrich-Coelde.

7. Lenz, Martin. 2003. Mentale Sätze: Wilhelm von Ockhams

Thesen zur Sprachlichkeit des Denkens. Stuttgart: Franz

Steiner Verlag.

8. ———. 2004. "Oratio mentalis und Mentalesisch. Ein

spätmittelalterlicher Blick auf die gegenwärtige Philosophie des

Geistes." In 'Herbst des Mittelalters'? Fragen zur Bewertung

des 14. und 15. Jahrhunderts, edited by Aertsen, Jan A. and

Pickavé, Martin, 105-130. New York: De Gruyter.

9. Mühl, Max. 1962. "Der λόγος ἐνδιάθετος und προφορικός von

der älteren Stoa bis zur Synode von. Sirmium 351." Archiv für

Begriffsgeschichte no. 7:7-56.

"Die von den Stoikern geschaffene Dichotomie λόγος

ἐνδιάθετος und προφορικός hat eine von ihnen ungeahnte

geistesgeschichtliche Bedeutung gewonnen. Die Formel lebte

und wirkte durch die Jahrhunderte fort und erfuhr schon durch

ihre enge Verknüpfung mit dem im Mittelpunkt aller

philosophischen Denkarbeit der früheren und späteren Antike

stehenden Logosbegriff in heidnischen Kreisen ebenso wie in

christlichen eine dem jeweiligen weltanschaulichen und

religiösen Standort angepaßte Auslegung.

Sie durchlief dabei einen Entwicklungsprozeß, der von einer

ursprünglich anthropologischen dialektischen Grundlage aus

eine Richtung in das Gebiet der religionsphilosophischen

Spekulation und der theologischen Exegese einschlug und auf

diesem Wege als zentraler Begriff schließlich in die Logosophie

des frühen Christentums einging.

Angesichts der Tragkraft und Tragweite dieses Begriffes des

zweigeteilten Logos ist es verwunderlich, daß eine dessen

bedeutungsgeschichtliche Entwicklung verfolgende Arbeit

bisher zu vermissen war. Wohl finden sich in

philosophiegeschichtlichen Werken im Verlauf der

Darlegungen über den griechischen Logos gelegentliche

Hinweise auf den λόγος ἐνδιάθετος und προφορικός

eingestreut; auch hat M. Pohlenz in einem Anhang seines

Aufsatzes über die Begründung der abendländischen

Sprachlehre durch die Stoa (s. unten)[*] diesem besonderen

Problem seine Aufmerksamkeit geschenkt; allein

Teilerörterungen solcher Art ergeben naturgemäß keine

ausreichende Vorstellung von der fortschreitenden inneren

Wandlung und Strukturveränderung des in Frage stehenden

Begriffes und vermögen, da nicht in einen großen

Zusammenhang hineingestellt, keinen Einblick in die im Laufe

von Jahrhunderten ihm zugewachsene religionsgeschichtliche

Bedeutung zu vermitteln. Ich habe deshalb den Versuch

unternommen, den Werdegang des Begriffspaares, soweit

dieses in der - auf Strecken hinaus versickernden -

Überlieferung greifbar wird, von seinem Ursprung im Schoße

griechischer Diskussionen bis zu seiner Verdammung auf der

Synode von Sirmium (351) nachzuzeichnen, und hoffe damit zu

erneuter Untersuchung der sich stellenden komplizierten

Fragen anzuregen." (è- 7)

[*] M. Pohlenz: ,,Die Begründung der abendländischen

Sprachlehre durch die Stoa" in „Nachr. d. Ges. d. Wiss. in

Göttingen", Neue Folge, Bd. III Nr. 6 (1939) S. 196 (Anhang).

10. Müller, Hermann-Josef. 1968. Die Lehre vom verbum mentis

in der spanischen Scholastik. Untersuchungen zur historischen

Entwicklung und zum Verständnis dieser Lehrer bei Toletus,

den Conimbricensern und Suarez, University of Münster,

Münster (Westfalia).

11. Perler, Dominik. 2002. "Discussionen über mentale Sprache in

16. Jahrundert." In Res et Verba in der Renaissance, edited by

Kessler, Eckhard and Maclean, Ian, 29-51. Wiesbaden:

Harrasowitz.

12. Pohlenz, Max. 1939. "Die Begründung der abendländischen

Sprachlehre durch die Stoa. Anhang: γόγος ενδιάθετος und

γόγος προφορικός." Nachrichten der Gesellschaft der

Wissenschaften zu Göttingen:151-198.

Neue Folge; Philologisch-Historische Klasse, Fachgruppe I,

Altertumwissenschaft, Bd. 3, Nr. 6.

Nachdruk in: M. Pohlenz, Kleine Schriften, Band I, Hildesheim:

Georg Olms 1965, ss. 79–86.

Éstudos en Portuguese

1. Perini-Santos, Ernesto. 2000. "Linguagem e interpretação: o

recurso à linguagem mental em Ockham." Veritas.Revista de

Filosofia no. 45:339-348.

"According to William Ockham's semantics it is crucial to resort

to mental language. In this article, having recourse to mental

language is examined so as to show one arrives at composed

sentences which signify without any commitment to the psychic

reality of the attained acts."

2. ———. 2005. "A composição real da proposição mental

ockhamiana." Analytica. Revista de Filosofia no. 9:67-92.

"Mental language explains the significative character of written

and spoken languages; its elements and structures are

identified by criteria that belong to a theory serving this

purpose. It seems that these criteria allow a certain

indeterminacy, if we expect to choose among different possible

canonical presentations of mental language.

But such a choice is not necessary at all for mental language to

serve its theoretical purposes. There is a kind a indeterminacy,

concerning tokens of mental propositions, that can really be

found in Ockham's texts: a mental proposition can be a simple

mental act, and have a compositional semantics. This

astonishing thesis reminds us that although semantical analysis

that identify structures of mental language describes a

psychological reality, the psychological description itself must

also take account of other domains of Ockham's philosophy, in

particular his theory of mental acts."

Estudios en Español

1. González Alió, J. L. 1968. " El entender como posesion: la

funcion gnoseologica del verbo mental." Sapientia no. 43:243-

268.

"Teniendo en cuenta la amplitud del tema planteado, en el

presente trabajo nos limitaremos a exponer la doctrina de

Santo Tomás sobre el verbo mental como medio in quo de

nuestro conocimiento intelectual, para estudiar más adelante

las otras cuestiones.

Ahora bien, el estudio de la doctrina del Aquinate sobre el

verbo mental presenta una doble dificultad: la primera surge de

su misma naturaleza,(4) la segunda de la gran evolución que se

dio en el pensamiento de Santo Tomás respecto del mismo.

En esta evolución se deben tener en cuenta las dos

características fundamentales del verbo mental —el ser "lo

expresado" y el ser "lo entendido" a—, pus en ambas se dio

dicha profundización, que en ocasiones tiene un cierto carácter

de ruptura, y además con un desfase temporal de la una

respecto de la otra. Todo lo cual se debe, en nuestra opinión, al

hecho de que el verbo mental era ajeno a la doctrina

aristotélica, que recibió Santo Tomás, y sin embargo el carácter

"autónomo" del mismo le venía requerido en razón de la

analogía agustiniana con el Verbo divino, Verbum procedents

distinto realmente del Padre." (p. 245)

4 Cfr. nota 1. (1 De natura verbi intel., proem. (n. 269).)

5 Cfr. De Ver., q. 4, a. 2, c; De diff. verbum div., et hum. (n.

289).

Studia Latina

1. Gál, Gedeon. 1967. "Gualteri de Chatton et Guillelmi de

Ockham controversia de natura conceptus universalis."

Franciscan Studies no. 27:191-212.

"Conceptus, utpote elementům primarium iudiciorum et

syllogismorum, fundamentum universae philosophiae

constituit. Proinde opinio quam quivis de eius natura tenet

totum systema philosophicum eiusdem auctoris non modicum

afficit immo quandoque velut in nucleo includit. Hoc imprimis

verum est de auctoribus qui prima medietate saeculi decimi

quarti floruerunt, ut de Guillelmo de Ockham et de eius

sequacibus. Nostra in hoc articulo intent io est eam

controversiam breviter illustrare quae de natura conceptus

universalis exorta est inter Venerabilem Inceptorem et

Gualterum de Chatton: ambo franciscani, ambo anglici, ambo

Universit atis Oxoniensis alumni primo, deinde lectores, qui

aliquo saltem tempore in eodem conventu Oxoniensi simul

commorabantur. Ipsi quidem Duns Scotum in scholis non

audierunt, magistros tamen tales habuerunt qui discipuli

fuerant Doctoris Subtilis, cuius auctoritas in scholis Fratrum

Minorum cum in Anglia tum in Gallia eo tempore iam

praevalere coepit. Gualterus huic auctoritati, ut plurimum,

libenter se submittit, Guillelmus econtra eidem, ut plurimum,

recalcitrat; et quoties Guillelmus opiniones Scoti impugnai fere

toties Gualterus easdem defendit." (p. 191, a note omitted)

Bibliographia. Annotated bibliographies
Raul Corazzon || rc@ontology.co || Info
Bernard Bolzano. Annotated
Bibliography on His Practical
Philosophy
Contents
On Bernard Bolzano the following pages are available:
Annotated Bibliography on His Practical Philosophy (Current page)
On the website "Theory and History of Ontology"
The Philosophy of Bernard Bolzano: Logic and Ontology
Selected bibliography on the Philosophical Work of Bernard Bolzano:
Studies in English (First Part: A - B)
Studies in English (Second Part: C - Geo)
Studies in English (Third Part: Gie - L)
Studies in English (Fourth Part: M - R)
Studies in English (Fifth Part: S - Z)
Bibliography of the English translations
Traductions et Études en Français (A - L)
Études en Français (M - Z)
Traduzioni e Studi in Italiano
Bibliographie der deutschsprachigen Studien
Vollständige Liste der Bände der Reihe Beiträge zur Bolzano
Forschung

Studies in English

1. Drozdek, Adam. 1998. "Infinity and Bolzano’s Eschatology."

Axiomathes no. 9:275-286.

"Bernard Bolzano is known today for his work in logic and

mathematics.

Paradoxes of the infinite is the only book from a vast body of

his writings that was translated into many languages. The rest

of his books and articles have only relatively recently being

republished in a collected edition of his works. In his time,

however, Bolzano was known mainly for his theological works

which were widely read and which stirred controversies

because of the many unorthodox views they contained. One

problem was that Bolzano was a Roman Catholic priest and

many of his views flew in the face of orthodox Christianity in

general and Catholicism in particular. One of the most

interesting works in this respect is his Athanasia, or the

grounds for immortality of the soul , which had two editions

during Bolzano's life (in 1827 and 1838). The goal of Athanasia

is to prove, with the power of reason and "truths that

observation of nature offers," that the soul is immortal (A 17)."

(p. 275)

2. George, Rolf, and Rusnock, Paul. 2006. "Bolzano’s Political

Philosophy." In The Austrian Contribution to Analytic

Philosophy , edited by Textor, Mark, 264-292. New York:

Routledge.

"Bolzano’s major work on political philosophy is a book called

On the Best State , which was written around 1830.(2) As its

title suggests, the work is concerned not with suggestions for

reforms of existing institutions, but rather the elaboration of an

ideal, namely, an organisation of civil society that maximises

the well being of its members. The approach of this work has

earned Bolzano the reputation of a utopian in political

philosophy, someone unconcerned with the practical, the here

and now, devoted instead to the passive contemplation of the

unattainable. This impression might easily be confirmed by the

knowledge that he never sought to publish his book, and

towards the end of his life actually resisted the attempts of

others to publish it for him.

But this view of Bolzano the political philosopher is completely

mistaken.

Indeed, it would be difficult to find an example of a philosopher

who had a greater impact on the political culture of his country.

An examination of the exhortations (Erbauungsreden )

Bolzano read weekly to the university students and educated

public of Prague shows him to have been one of the most

prominent advocates for reform of the time.

(...)

It is worth noting, too, that after a little over 150 years, a great

many ideas very like Bolzano’s have been implemented

somewhere or other – for better and for worse." (pp. 265-266)

(2) Von dem besten Staate , ed. by A. Kowalewski, Prague 1932.

New edition by Jaromir Louzil in the Bernard Bolzano

Gesamtausgabe (hereafter BBGA) Series IIA, Vol. 14.

3. Livingston, Paisley. 2014. "Bolzano on Beauty." British Journal

of Aesthetics no. 54:269-284.

Abstract: "This paper sets forth Bolzano’s little-known 1843

account of beauty. Bolzano accepted the thesis that beauty is

what rewards contemplation with pleasure. The originality of

his proposal lies in his claim that the source of this pleasure is a

special kind of cognitive process, namely, the formation of an

adequate concept of the object’s attributes through the

successful exercise of the observer’s proficiency at obscure and

confused cognition.

To appreciate this proposal we must understand how Bolzano

explicated a number of concepts (especially clarity, confusion,

and intuition) in his Wissenschaftslehre . I argue that Bolzano

was ahead of his time and anticipated some of the results of

recent empirical psychological research on the relations

between beauty, affect, and processing fluency. Bolzano’s

remarks on ugliness and on relations between pure and mixed

beauty are also of contemporary interest. The upshot is that

Bolzano’s account of beauty is neither as derivative nor ‘dark’ as

some of his commentators have claimed."

4. ———. 2015. "An Introduction to Bolzano's Essay on Beauty."

Estetika: The Central European Journal of Aesthetics no.

52:203-228.

Abstract: "A neglected gem in the history of aesthetics,

Bolzano’s essay on beauty is best understood when read

alongside his other writings and philosophical sources.(1)

This Introduction is designed to contribute to such a reading.

In Part I, I identify and discuss three salient ways in which

Bolzano’s account can be misunderstood. As a lack of

familiarity with Bolzano’s background assumptions is one

source of these misunderstandings, in Part II, I elucidate some

of his ideas about the psychological processes involved in the

contemplation and enjoyment of beauty. In Part III, I situate

Bolzano’s discussion of beauty within the more general

framework of his ideas about the nature of philosophy, the

relation between philosophy and aesthetics, and the place of

the concept of beauty within the latter. Part IV is devoted to

Bolzano’s discussion of some of his philosophical antecedents,

including Kant. In Part V, I raise some objections to Bolzano’s

account and indicate how his advocates might respond to

them."

(1) Bernard Bolzano, Abhandlungen zur Ästhetik: Erste

Lieferung; Über den Begriff des Schönen. Eine Philosophische

Abhandlung (Prague: Borrosch et André, 1843). The first half

of the essay (§§ 1–25) is translated as ‘On the Concept of the

Beautiful: A Philosophical Essay ’ in this issue of Estetika. In

what follows I cite this Borrosch et André edition as B, giving

paragraph and then page numbers, followed by those in the

Estetika translation. For background information about

Bolzano’s life and works, see Edgar Morscher, ‘Bernard

Bolzano’, in Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy , ed. Edward

N. Zalta, fall 2014 ed. (Stanford University, 1997–).

5. ———. 2016. "Bolzano on Art." British Journal of Aesthetics no.

56:333-345.

Abstract: "In his little-known essay published posthumously in

1849, Über die Eintheilung der schönen Künste (On the

Classification of the Beautiful Arts ), Bernard Bolzano proposes

an explication of the concept of beautiful art as well as a

classification of these arts. Bolzano’s divisions allowed him not

only to provide a principled and comprehensive classification of

actual, well-established arts, but also to anticipate kinds of

beautiful art that would not exist or be widely recognized until

decades after his death, such as moving pictures, abstract

paintings, and what he called ‘the arts of pure thought’."

6. ———. 2021. "Bernard Bolzano: (1781-1848)." In Aesthetics:

The Key Thinkers , edited by Giovannelli, Alessandro, 117-128.

New York: Bloomsbury.

Second edition.

"If asked to say which philosophers did significant work in

aesthetics in the nineteenth century, very few people-including

experts in the field-would be likely to mention Bernard

Bolzano, who is best known for his findings in mathematics and

logic. This is unfortunate, as Bolzano also made important

contributions to aesthetics. In an early sermon (Bolzano 1810),

he eloquently defended the traditional thesis that in

appreciating the beauty of nature we worship God and His

creation.

In the early 1840s, he planned to write a series of five

interrelated studies on topics in aesthetics, yet a fatal

pulmonary illness prevented him from realizing this ambition

(Winter 1949, 46-7). He did manage to complete the first part

of his planned series, an essay on beauty (Bolzano 2015) that

was published in his native Prague in 1843 as Über den Begriff

des Schonen. Eine Philosophische Abhandlung (On the Concept

of the Beautiful. A Philosophical Essay ; see also Bolzano 1972

and 2017). Bolzano also finished an essay on the fine arts,

which was published posthumously in 1849 as Über die

Eintheilung der schonen Kunste. Eine ästhetische Abhandlung

( On the Division of the Beautiful Arts. An Aesthetic Essay ).

These two published essays are the primary focus of this entry,

although some of Bolzano's other work will be mentioned

where relevant." (p. 117)

References

Bolzano, Bernard. 1810. "Uber denn Sinn für die

Naturschonheiten." (On the sense for natural beauty ) In

Erbauungsreden für Akademike (Exhortations for academics

), 262-285. Prague: Widtmann.

--- 1972. Untersuchungen zur Grundlegung der Asthetik

(Investigations into the foundations of aesthetics ). Dietfried

Gerhardus (ed.). Frankfurt am Main: Athenäum.

--- 2015. "On the Concept of the Beautiful: A Philosophical

Essay." Adam Bresnahan (trans.). Estetika: The Central

European ]oumal of Aesthetics , 52: 229-266. A translation of

the first half of the essay.

--- 2017. Ecrits ésthetiques. Carole Maigne, Nicolas Rialland,

and Jan Sebestik (trans. and eds.). Paris: Vrin.

Winter, Eduard. 1949. Leben und geistige Entwicklung des

Sozialethikers und Mathematikers Bernard Bolzano . Halle:

Niemeyer.

7. Löffler, Winfried. 2013. "Bernard Bolzano's Analytic Philosophy

of Religion." Philosophy no. 28:53-61.

"In this short paper, I want to give you an overview to the

thought of the perhaps most original, yet still widely unknown

Austrian philosopher: Bernard Bolzano (1781-1848)." (p. 53)

(...)

"Was he also a pioneer in modern analytic philosophy of

religion? There is surely no direct influence to current analytic

philosophy of religion, and Bolzano founded no “school” in that

field, but we find in his works some really excellent pieces of

analytic philosophy of religion, and all that around 1810. I will

just mention four of them: Firstly, Bolzano was a pioneer of the

“logic of religion”, i.e. the clarification of the structure, meaning

and justification of religious belief-systems. 130 years later,

Joseph Bochenski in The Logic of Religion of 1965 published a

similar approach.

Secondly, Bolzano formulated a logically sophisticated proof for

God’s existence. It follows the pattern of proof from the

contingency of things to God as their cause, but it is in detail

highly original and has no parallel in the literature, as far as I

can see. Thirdly, Bolzano brings a probabilistic analysis of our

reasoning about the credibility of historical testimony. This was

important for Christian theology, since the Christian religion is

a revealed religion: It claims to go back to certain extraordinary

historical events, and hence its rationality hangs on the

historical credibility of the testimonial accounts of these events.

Testimony is a huge topic also in current epistemology, but

Bolzano presents an early and sophisticated probabilistic

treatise on that – just a few years after Laplace. Fourthly, in

some of his sermons (“exhortations”) which he had to give each

Sunday and holiday for his students, he presents detailed

analyses of various speech-acts, e.g. of the exact difference

between “lying” and “deceiving”. In these sermons, Bolzano

anticipates Austin’s and Searle’s work on speech-act theory by

more than 100 years." (pp. 53-54)

(...)

"After explaining Bolzano’s overall project in his textbook in

section 2, I will pick out three interesting points in sections 3 to

5: His definition of religion, the question whether he was a total

non-cognitivist in religion, and whether he argued for a sort of

self-deception or self-persuasion in religious matters." (p. 55)

8. Lukasiewicz, Dariusz. 2007. "Logical and Metaphysical

Assumptions of Bernard Bolzano's Theodicy." Forum

Philosophicum: International Journal for Philosophy no.

12:33-56.

Abstract: "Bolzano's theodicy is a very good example of

Platonism in the philosophy of religion. Above all, Bolzano

believes that there obtains an ideal realm of truths in

themselves and mathematical objects, which are independent

of God. Therefore, we are allowed to conclude that God is only a

contractor; true, more powerful than Plato's demiurge because

He created substances (and matter) and sustains them in

existence, but God must follow a project which is independent

of Him. Since the world is determined, by the program and God

follows the program, then in fact the program is a god, or

better, there is no God (at least in the sense of the classical

Christian tradition).

Bolzano's project is not related to God's essence, since it is

external to God, and is not made by God. Thus, Bolzano's

theodicy is also the absolute opposite of the Cartesian theodicy.

God in the Cartesian theodicy can change all rules, all scientific

laws and, in consequence, He can create any world He wants.

Bolzano's God cannot change anything and cannot create a

different world than the world determined by the project, a

world different than the one He has created. The responsibility

of Bolzano's God for the evil in the world is limited by the

project of the world."

9. McCormick, Peter. 1981. "Bolzano and the Dark Doctrines: An

Essay on Aesthetics." In Structure and Gestalt: Philosophy and

Literature in Austria-Hungary and Her Successor States ,

edited by Smith, Barry. Amsterdam: John Benjamins.

§1. Kant and the subjectivisation of aesthetics; §2. Bolzano and

the theory of the beautiful; §3. Appraising Bolzano's aesthetics.

"In this paper however I want to look sympathetically yet

critically at the major feature of his most important reflections

on aesthetics, his theory of beauty.

In order to situate these reflections in the development of

modern aesthetics and to make their expression more

understandable, I propose in the first section of the paper to

review briefly several of the central difficulties in Kant's

aesthetic. In §2 I will then make use of Bolzano's criticisms of

Kant as an initial means of presenting Bolzano's own

philosophical concerns, before sketching further those themes

which are peculiar to Bolzano's work alone. Finally in §3 I will

suggest critical questions about Bolzano's theory which call for

further attention on the part of his interpreters and also on the

part of those interested in a certain strain of post-Kantian

aesthetics.

Although my purposes here remain largely critical ones, I have

tried to call attention to textual, historical and interpretative

points in some of the accompanying notes.

My larger purpose is to suggest in a general way only that

Bolzano's aesthetics, specifically his investigations into the

concept of the beautiful, represent more than just an important

and almost completely overlooked criticism of Kant's well-

known views; these investigations provide the basic link

between Kantian aesthetics and the work of the later Brentano,

Meinong, Husserl, and Ingarden. In short, Bolzano's aesthetics

include the initial elements of what might be called the realist

tradition in modern aesthetics." (pp. 69-70)

10. Mezei, Balasz. 2009. "Two Models of Radical Revelation in

Austrian Philosophy." European Journal for Philosophy of

Religion no. 1:99-120.

Abstract: "In this paper I highlight two opposing models of the

notion of divine revelation: the propositional and the radical.

The propositional understanding of revelation was central to

theology and philosophy until the 19th century. Since then, a

number of other models of revelation have emerged. I define as

radical the understanding of revelation which emphasizes two

features of revelation: 1) God’s existence is *per se* revelatory;

2) God’s revelation is *per se* self-revelation. I propose too an

assessment of the notion of propositional revelation as

presented by Richard Swinburne. And I offer detailed analyses

of two representatives of the early understanding of divine

revelation as self-revelation: the views of Bernard Bolzano and

Anton Günther. Bolzano, the renowned mathematician, was

also a philosopher of religion; and Günther, one of the most

ingenious writers in Austrian philosophy, was not only a

theologian but also a philosopher comparable to the important

figures of 19th century German thought."

11. Reicher, Maria E. 2006. "Austrian Aesthetics." In The Austrian

Contribution to Analytic Philosophy , edited by Textor, Mark,

293-323. New York: Routledge.

"In this chapter, however, the focus is on a number of lesser

known Austrian contributions to aesthetics. These

contributions concern the following, partly interrelated, central

problems of philosophical aesthetics:

I. The problem of the definition of beauty (i.e. What is beauty?

What does it mean to say of an object that it is beautiful?)

II. The problem of the ontological status of works of art (i.e.

What kinds of objects are works of art?)

III. The problem of the objectivity of aesthetic values (i.e. Do

we claim objective validity for aesthetic value judgements and,

if so, is this claim justified?)

This chapter will consider the answers of Bolzano, Meinong,

Witasek and Ehrenfels to these questions." (p. 294)

(...)

"The task of the essay ‘On the concept of the beautiful’ is to find

a definition for the concept of beauty. In the preface to this

treatise Bolzano states in a few sentences his views on what

philosophical aesthetics should do and how it should be done:

That I have filled so many pages with the analysis of a single

concept will necessitate an excuse in the eyes of some. I cannot

state anything but that I found this concept to be of particular

importance and that analysis of concepts is a business that

commonly demands somewhat lengthy investigations, if it

shouldn’t be just stated that one thinks of the concept as

consisting of these parts, but rather shown to the reader in an

at least fairly convincing way, which entails that one has to

demonstrate that the previously suggested, other explanations

have been more or less erroneous.(3) (CB, 3)

This passage shows clearly that Bolzano does not take

philosophical aesthetics to be a discipline that demands less

rigour than, say, epistemology and ontology. The task of

philosophical aesthetics is, according

to Bolzano, to clarify the basic concepts of aesthetic discourse

by means of meticulous analysis. The two perhaps most

prominent concepts of aesthetics are the concept of beauty and

the concept of art.

Consequently, Bolzano considers the clarification of these

concepts to be the most important task of philosophical

aesthetics." (p. 295)

(3) All translations in this chapter are mine.

References

Bolzano, B.: ‘Über den Begriff des Schönen. Eine

philosophische Abhandlung’, in D. Gerhardus (ed.) Bernard

Bolzano. Untersuchungen zur Grundlegung der Ästhetik ,

Frankfurt/Main: Athenäum, 1972, 1–118. (Originally published

1843.) (CB)

12. Rosenkoetter, Timothy. 2014. "Kant, Bolzano, and Moore on

the Value of Good Willing." In New Anti-Kant , edited by

Lapointe, Sandra and Tolley, Clinton, 235-271. London:

Palgrave Macmillan.

"Bolzano’s many achievements in mathematics, logic,

metaphysics, and epistemology, as well as the monumental

scope and ambition of his Theory of Science and Theory of

Magnitudes , make it easy to overlook his relatively brief

treatments of morality. Yet Bolzano took moral theory quite

seriously. (1) This carries over to Bolzano’s engagement with

Kant. Though only a small fraction of The New Anti-Kant (192–

202) is concerned with moral philosophy, Bolzano thinks that

the correction he is able to provide there is every bit as

important as his critical engagement with the central topics of

the first Critique . Thus, one purpose of this chapter is to place

that brief comparison with Kant’s moral theory within the

context of Bolzano’s most thorough defence of utilitarianism,

which is found in lectures that his students published as

Treatise on the Science of Religion .(2)" (p. 235)

(1) For historical background on how Bolzano endeavoured to

guide his life as a philosopher and public intellectual by

utilitarian principles, see Rusnock’s and George’s Introduction

to Bolzano (2007).

(2) This present essay is based on four sources: The New Anti-

Kant (“ NAK ”), Theory of Science , Science of Religion

(Bolzano 1994/1995, hereafter “ R ”), and “On the Right of the

Clergy”. The Rusnock/George translation of relevant sections of

the last two are available in Bolzano (2007). I frequently depart

from their translation of Science of Religion , using Bolzano

(1994/1995) as my basis. See Künne (1996, 325ff.) for a list of

inaccuracies in the latter edition.

References

Bolzano, Bernard. (1994/1995). Lehrbuch der

Religionswissenschaft , Erster Teil. In Bernard Bolzano-

Gesamtausgabe , Series 1, Vol. 6/1 and 6/2. Jaromir Louzil

(ed.). Stuttgart-Bad Canstatt: Frommann-Holzboog.

Bolzano, Bernard. (2007). Selected Writings on Ethics and

Politics . Paul Rusnock and Rolf George (eds), Amsterdam:

Rodopi.

Künne, Wolfgang. (1996). ‘Bolzanos Philosophie der Religion

und der Moral’, Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie , 78,

309-328.

13. Rusnock, Paul, and Šebestik, Jan. 2019. Bernard Bolzano: His

Life and Work . New York: Oxford University Press.

Chapter 2. Ethics 83-104; 3. Political Philosophy 105-138; 4.

Philosophy of Religion 139-166; 5. Catholicism and the Catholic

Church 167-186; 10. Aesthetics, the Science of Beauty 544-594-

14. Šebestik, Jan. 1994. "Prague Mosaic. Encounters with Prague

Philosophers." Axiomathes no. 2-3:205-223.

"In 1814, a young priest, professor of the "science of religion" at

Charles University and author of two mathematical pamphlets,

presented another mathematical booklet asking for the

admission to the Royal Society. His name was Bernard Bolzano

(1781-1848) and I am happy that I have the opportunity to

speak about him in the city which bears his name. He was, as I

think, the outstanding figure of Prague philosophy." (p. 209)

(...)

"Bolzano can be called the father of Austrian - or Central-

European - philosophy. Almost all Austrian philosophers have

acquired something of his method, of his way of thinking and of

his fundamental ideas. Austrian philosophy in the broad sense,

or rather Central-European philosophy, has always tried not to

separate philosophy and science (a large number of Austrian

philosophers are at the same time scientists or scientifically

trained), to identify scientific and philosophical method, to

concentrate on logical analysis, to avoid the tcmptation of

idcalism, to be attentive to language, and, last but not least, to

consider the public activity of a philosopher as a social rclbrmcr

to bc an integral part of his task. In this respect, Masaryk and

the Vienna Circle arc the true heirs of Bolzano." (p. 212)

15. Sirůček, Pavel, and Jaroslav, Šetekm. 2019. "Bernard Bolzano."

Acta Oeconomica Pragensia no. 27:95-104.

Abstract: "Bernard Bolzano was not merely a mathematician of

the European format. He was also a critical social thinker

whose work has distinct economic dimensions. This is why he

rightly appears in the overviews of the beginnings of Czech

economic thought. He began writing his work “About the Best

State” 210 years ago, which made him the most famous Czech

utopian. The half-forgotten Bolzano legacy, which is still alive

and ahead of its time in many respects, recalls this text."

16. Stern, J. P. 1989. "Language Consciousness and Nationalism in

the Age of Bernard Bolzano." Journal of European Studies no.

19:169-189.

"From the end of the eighteenth century an especially close,

complex and ultimately disastrous interrelationship develops in

Central Europe between language consciousness and

nationality. In this region, national and natural borders do not

often coincide for very long; and in this age, greater value is

ascribed to political notions of "natural" or "organic" han to

politics based on tradition and agreement bureaucratically

enforced. Here linguistic borders are endowed with the pathos

of national borders, national consciousness is identified with

language consciousness." (p. 169)

(...)

"The intensity of the Romantic apotheosis of das Volk together

with its new system of values is bound to escape Bolzano - this

is the pathos that will dominate the next hundred years of

Czech and Central European history. This omission is all the

more surprising since Bolzano (in contrast to Frege,47 and to

the young Wittgenstein) has a very clear understanding of the

social function of language; but since he fails to provide a

theoretical foundation for them, his insights do not go beyond

the practical concerns of daily life. He seeks to solve the

problem of the two languages in social and economic terms

leading to moral and spiritual improvement. But the

subsequent history of Bohemia as well of most other parts of

Central Europe has taught us that the appeal to a threatened

language consciousness can be politically effective even when it

entails social and economic deprivations; that nationalism is

stronger than Marxism. Languages - the two languages of

Bohemia - are indeed what Wittgenstein calls them: "forms of

life". The common humanity to which Bolzano appealed lies

behind this insight, buried beneath the antagonisms of two

nations once united by their common roots in one soil." (p. 187)

(47) See Dummett [Ursprunge der analytischen Philosophie ,

translated from the English by Joachim Schulte (Frankfurt/M,

I988)], 22.

17. Świętorzecka, Kordula. 2014. "An Argument for the Existence

of God by Bolzano. A Formalization with a DFistinction

between Menge and Inbregriff ." Bulletin of the Section of

Logic no. 43:155-172.

Abstract: "Bernard Bolzano is the author of a text considered by

him as an argument for the existence of God, originally

published in the "Lehrbuch der Religionwissenschaft" (1834).

His disquisition was formalized by H. Ganthaler and P. Simons

in 1987 who based their approach on the well-known set

theoretical interpretation of Bolzano's idea of multiplicity. The

authors formulated a theory expressed in set theoretical

language extended by some specific terms and constructed a

proof as a formalization of the reasoning given by Bolzano. A

problematic aspect of the proposal of Ganthaler and Simons is

that it passes over the distinction of two different types of

multiplicities which enable to point some interesting formal

and material details of Bolzano's revised argumentation. In the

frame of the presented proposal we invent two special

meanings of Bolzano's notion of multiplicity: distributive and

collective. In connection with this distinction we reconstruct

the argument analyzed by Ganthaler and Simons and discuss

the formal and philosophical power of the obtained

formalization. The inspiration for our approach comes from the

fact that Bolzano used in his text two terms Menge and

Inbegriff in probably different meanings. However the main

aim of this proposal is to take a new look at Bolzano's

argument, rather than to provide historical investigations."

References

H. Ganthaler, P. Simons, Bernard Bolzanos kosmo-logischer

Gottesbeweis , Philosophia Naturalis 24 (1987), pp. 469-475.

18. Synytsia, Andrii. 2021. "Bernard Bolzano’s Philosophical

Conception of Education from a Modern Standpoint." Journal

of Education Culture and Society no. 12:32-44.

Abstract: "Aim. The aim of the article is to analyse Bernard

Bolzano's philosophico-educational approach, given the

importance of his pedagogical legacy for further progress in the

held of education and training.

Methods. The research uses methods of historico-philosophical

reconstruction (to determine the foundations and features of

Bolzano's pedagogico-philosophical work), interpretation (to

characterise the still relevant ideas of the thinker in the held of

education) and critical analysis (to assess the significance of

Bolzano's legacy from the standpoint of modern educational

theory and to point out what remained out of the researchers'

attention).

Results. The study showed that Bolzano's pedagogical ideas

were not only in demand in the context of European culture of

the early XIX century, but also proved relevant today, especially

given the need for harmonious personal development, finding

sources of intrinsic motivation in students and improving their

logical thinking skills, the importance of the spiritual qualities

of the teacher and - in general - the assistance of the state in the

direction of the progress of education as the most effective

means of qualitative change in society.

Conclusion. Bernardo Bolzano's philosophical conception of

education was strongly influenced by religion, the ideas of the

late Enlightenment and the late Josefinist. This conception was

an integral part of his socio-political theory. Bolzano attached

great importance to the study of philosophy and the acquisition

of logical skills in education. He considered writing textbooks

to be one of the cornerstones of the educational process. This

made it possible to intensify communication between teachers

and students, to gradually involve everyone in education, and

thus to promote social progress in general."

19. Tapp, Christian. 2019. "Bolzano’s Concept of Divine Infinity."

In The Infinity of God: New Perspectives in Theology and

Philosophy , edited by Göcke, Benedikt Paul and Tapp,

Christian, 150-166. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame

Press.

"Infinity is central to each of the three areas in which Bernard

Bolzano (1781–1848) had expertise: mathematics, philosophy,

and theology. The Bohemian priest dealt with all the respective

concepts in these disciplines: quantitative infinity in

mathematics, qualitative infinity in philosophy and theology,

and some of their mutual interrelationships.

I focus on “infinite” used as a divine predicate. Since this use of

“infinite” is related to a quantitative use in several ways, we will

also dwell on these." (p. 150)

(...)

"Divine infinity is an integral part of Bolzano’s concept of God.

It is a test case for his broader claim that the concept of

quantitative infinity is more basic than all other concepts of

infinity; that all meaningful discourse about infinity

presupposes quantitative infinity. This thesis from §11 of the

Paradoxes of the Infinite must not be understood as

reductivist, as though Bolzano would only accept quantitative

infinity. He claims only that in each case in which we are

entitled to use qualitative concepts of infinity, which are vaguer

and more opaque, we must also be able to find aspects of the

subject matter that exhibit the more precise quantitative

infinity.

Ascribing to Bolzano a formal background conception of

infinity as limitlessness or unrestrictedness, as suggested by his

treatment of omnipotence, helps us to interpret his doctrine of

God in a coherent way.

However, what exactly it means to be unlimited, to suffer from

no limitations in a certain respect, remains a topic for further

philosophical analysis. Does every conception of “limits”

require a metric or at least a

total linear ordering? How can one align such a concept with

the mathematical way of speaking, according to which there are

unlimited finite magnitudes and also limited infinite

magnitudes? Finally, what “respects” are to be considered, in

the case of divine infinity, as unrestricted in certain, if not all,

respects?" (p. 166)

Studien in Deutsch

1. Blaukopf, Kurt. 1996. Die Ästhetik Bernard Bolzanos.

Begriffskritik, Objektivismus, “echte” Spekulation und Ansätze

zum Empirismus . Sankt Augustin: Academia Verlag.

Beiträge zur Bolzano-Forschung: Band 8.

Inhaltsverzeichnis: Vorbemerkung; 1. Bolzanos Verhältnis zu

den Künsten; 2. Herbartianer und Bolzanisten; 3.

Schwierigkeiten der Bolzano-Rezeption; 4. Echte und unechte

Spekulation; 5. Das Schönheitsurteil; 6. Verhältnis zu Herbarts

Ästhetik; 7. Begriffliche und empirische Wahrheiten; 8.

Kriterien der Einteilung; 9. Pfade zu empirischer

Kunstforschung; 10. Künste fürs Ohr; 11. Verbindung von Ton-

und Gedankenkunst;

12. Künste fürs Auge; 13. Augen- und Gedankenkunst; 14.

Ohren- und Augenkunst vereinigt; 15. Alle drei Hauptgattungen

vereinigt; 16. Blick in die Zukunft; Bibliographie;

Namensindex.

2. Ganthaler, Heinrich, and Neumaier, Otto, eds. 1997. Bolzano

und die österreichische Geistesgeschichte . Sankt Augustin:

Academia Verlag.

Beiträge zur Bolzano-Forschung: Band 6.

Inhaltverzeichnis: Vorwort 7; Wolfgang Künne: "Die Ernte wird

erscheinen ... " Die Geschichte der Bolzano-Rezeption (1849-

1939) 9; Peter Stachel: Die Bedeutung von Bolzanos

"Wissenschaftslehre" ftir die österreichische

Philosophiegeschichte. Ein Baustein zu einer Geschichte der

pluralistischen Tradition österreichischer Philosophie 83;

Edgar Morscher: Robert Zimmermann - der Vermittler von

Bolzanos Gedankengut? Zerstörung einer Legende 145; Kurt

Blaukopf: Im Geiste Bolzanos und Herbarts.

Ansätzeempiristischer Musikforschung in Wien und Prag 237;

Kurt F. Strasser: Bewegung und Verwandlung. Arnold

Schönberg 265-276.

3. Ganthaler, Heinrich von, and Simons, Peter. 1987. "Bolzanos

kosmologischer Gottesbeweis." Philosophia Naturalis no.

24:469-475.

"In seinem Lehrbuch der Religionswissenschaft kritisiert

Bolzano die „Fehlerhaftigkeit eines sehr gewöhnlichen

Schlusses für das Daseyn Gottes”, welcher u.a. von der

Voraussetzung ausgehe, “daß eine Reihe von Gründen (oder

auch von Bedingungen) nie in 's Unendliche fortgehen könne "

(1) Wie Bolzano anhand eines Beispiels zeigt, ist diese

Voraussetzung jedoch unhaltbar. So liegen auf einer gegebenen,

durch die Endpunkte A und B begrenzten Geraden unendlich

viele Punkte, die ein Körper, der sich von A nach B bewegt,

durchlaufen muß. Sofern das Durchlaufen der einzelnen Punkte

zwischen A und B eine notwendige Bedingung dafür ist, daß der

Körper in B eintreffen kann, gibt es für das Eintreffen des

Körpers in B sehr wohl “eine Reihe von Bedingungen, die in’s

Unendliche fortgehen"(2), ungeachtet dessen, daß die

Bewegung des Körpers einen Anfang hat.

Bolzano nimmt damit einen der Hauptkritikpunkte an den

aristo-telisch-thomasischen Gottesbeweisen vorweg, soweit

diese (wie etwa der Bewegungs- oder der Kausalitätsbeweis) auf

der erwähnten Voraussetzung der Unmöglichkeit eines

unendlichen Regresses beruhen.

Er selbst gibt in seinem Lehrbuch eine durchaus originelle

Version des kosmologischen Gottesbeweises, die, wie er eigens

hervorhebt(3), von der genannten Voraussetzung unabhängig

ist." (S. 469)

(1) Bolzano, Lehrbuch der Religionswissenschaft , I, § 68, p.

179f.

(2) A.a.O., § 68, p0. 181.

(3) A.a.O., § 68, p0. 181.

4. Künne, Wolfgang. 1996. "Bolzanos Philosophie der Religion

und der Moral." Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie no.

78:309-328.

"Bolzanos Philosophie der Religion hat ihr systematisches

Fundament in der Moralphilosophie.

Diese Tatsache wird durch den Aufbau des Lehrbuchs eher

verschleiert: Etwa in der Mitte befindet sich ein „Kurzer Abriß

der natürlichen Religion"; er besteht aus den Abschnitten

„Natürliche Dogmatik" und „Natürliche Moral". Eine theonome

Begründung der Moral lehnt Bolzano mit Entschiedenheit ab

(247 f.). Religiöse Überzeugungen sind in seinen Augen

entweder moralische Überzeugungen, oder sie müssen sich

dadurch ausweisen, daß sie der Stabilisierung moralischer

Überzeugungen dienen und ihre Motivationskraft verstärken.

In dieser Hinsicht konvergiert seine religionsphilosophische

Position - auch nach seinem Selbstverständnis - mit der

Neologie, die in der zweiten Hälfte des 18. Jahrhunderts die

protestantische Theologie weitgehend beherrschte und deren

Hauptwerke er schon in seiner Jugendeifrig studiert hatte. Für

Neologen wie J. J. Spalding und J. A. Eberhard war von der

christlichen Überlieferung nur das verbindlich, was vor dem

„moralischen Bewußtsein" Bestand hat und der „geistlichen

Aufbesserung" dient; sie erklärten die unter diesem

Gesichtspunkt irritierenden Züge des Neuen Testaments als

„Akkomodation", als pädagogisch gemeinte Anpassung Jesu

und der Apostel an damals verbreitete Vorstellungen, die sie

selber gar nicht teilten." (S. 311)

5. ———. 1997. ""Die Ernte wird erscheinen ..." Die Geschichte der

Bolzano-Rezeption (1848-1939)." In Bolzano und die

österreichische Geistesgeschichte , edited by Ganthaler,

Heinrich von and Neumaier, Otto, 9-82. Sank Augustin:

Academia Verlag.

Nachdruck: W. Künne, Versuche über Bolzano / Essays on

Bolzano , Sankt Augustin: Academia Verlag, 2008, S. 305-404.

6. ———. 2000. "Die Geschichte der philosophischen Bolzano-

Rezeption bis 1939." In Bernard Bolzano und die Politik. Staat,

Nation und Religion als Herausforderung für die Philosophie

im Kontext von Spätaufklärung, Frühnationalismus und

Restauration , edited by Rumpler, Helmut, 311-352. Wien:

Böhlau.

Beiträge des Bolzano-Symposions der Österreichischen

Forschungsgemeinschaft und der Internationalen Bolzano-

Gesellschaft 17./18. Dezember 1999, Wien.

7. ———. 2012. "Goethe und Bolzano." In Studien zu Geschichte,

Theologie und Wissenschaftsgeschichte , edited by Göttingen,

Akademie der Wissenschaften zu, 77-126. Berlin: Walter de

Gryter.

Inhalt: Erster Teil: „Ein kleines Werkchen von sehr

vorzüglichem Werthe und Geist.“ 79; Zweiter Teil: Böhmische

Bewunderer und Kritiker Goethes 89; Schluss: Sinnreiche

Sprüche 116; Anhang 1: Faksimile der Titelseite des Erstdrucks

119; Anhang 2: Johann Friedrich Reichardt, ‘Meeresstille’

(1796) 120; Anhang 3: Franz Schubert, ‘Meeres Stille’ (21. Juni

1815) 121; Anhang 4: Aus: Carl Friedrich Zelter, ‘Johanna Sebus

von Goethe’ (1810) 122; Bibliographie 123-126.

8. Künne, Wolfgang, and Piša, Peter. 2018. "Weil ich den

kirchlichen sowohl als weltlichen Behörden mißfiel": Bernard

Bolzano auf dem Index . Sankt Augustin: Academia Verlag.

Beiträge zur Bolzano-Forschung: Band 28.

9. Landerer, Christoph. 1993. "Bernard Bolzano, Eduard Hanslick

und die Geschichte des Musikasthetischen Objektivismus. Zu

einem Kapiterl (Alt)Österreichischer Geistesgeschichte."

Kriterion no. 5:16-38.

"Vorbemerkungen

Der allgemeine Trend zur Objektivierung der philosophischen

Kunstbetrachtung, der in der ersten Hälfte des 19.

Jahrhunderts einsetzt und schließlich zur Ausbildung spezieller

phänomenologischer und strukturalistischer Methoden (auf

deren grundsätzliche Ähnlichkeit(1). Hroch in einem in dieser

Nummervon Kriterion abgedruckten Artikel hinweist) führt,

markiert sicherlich einen der geistesgeschichtlich

bedeutendsten Einschnitte in der Entwicklung der

neuzeitlichen Ästhetik.

Als Gegenbewegung zur subjektivistisch-psychologischen

Kunstbetrachtung, die in Gestalt der Affektenlehre das Feld der

musikästhetischen Auseinandersetzung noch im 18. und frühen

19. Jahrhundert vollständig dominierte, sind sich sowohl

Phänomenologie als auch Strukturalismus darin einig, daß

philosophisch-ästhetische und psychologische

Betrachtungsweise streng voneinander geschieden werden

müssen. Wenn Jan Mukarovsky, das Haupt der tschechischen

Strukturalistenschule, betont, daß "das Kunstwerk ... sich

weder mit dem Seelenzustand seines Schöpfers noch mit

irgendeinem der Seelenzustände identifizieren [läßt], die es bei

den Subjekten hervorruft, die es wahrnehmen, wie die

psychologische Ästhetik dies wollte" I, so spricht er damit eine

Überzeugung aus, der sich auch die Vertreter einer

phänomenologisch orientierten Ästhetik verpflichtet fühlen.

Daß die tschechische Variante des Strukturalismus vor allem

auch in der Tradition der "Prager ästhetischen Fonnschule"

steht, die maßgeblich an Herbart anschließt, wird von Hroch

besonders hervorgehoben. Ich möchte hier versuchen zu

zeigen, daß die formal-objektive Betrachtungsweise, die in der

Ästhetik meist mit dem Namen Herbarts verbunden wird und

sich in Österreich durch die offizielle Förderung der

Herbartsehen Philosophie auf besondere Weise entfalten

konnte, daneben aber auch eine bedeutende und meines

Wissens völlig übergangene spezifisch österreichische, ja sogar

Prager Wurzel hat, die sich über Vermittlung der sicherlich

einflußreichsten musikästhetischen Schrift des 19.

Jahrhunderts, Eduard Hanslieks Vom Musikalisch-Schönen,

auf den Objekivismus Bemard Bolzanos zurückfuhren läßt und

damit die formalästhetische Betrachtung direkt mit der

Tradition phänomenologischer Forschung verbindet." (S. 16)

(1) J. Mukarosky, Die Kunst als semiologischesFaktum . In:

Kapitel aus der Asthetik . Frankfurt/M. 1970. s. 138.

10. ———. 2004. Eduard Hanslick und Bernard Bolzano.

Ästhetisches Denken in Österreich in der Mitte des 19.

Jahrhunderts . Sankt Augustin: Academia Verlag.

Beiträge zur Bolzano-Forschung: Band 17.

Inhaltsverzeichnis: Vorwort; 1. Einführung in die

Problemstellung; 2. Zur Forschungsgeschichte der

Problemstellung: Hanslick, Bolzano und Prag; 3. Biographische

Berührungspunkte: Hanslicks bolzanistisches Umfeld; 4. „Vom

Musikalisch-Schönen“: Eduard Hanslicks Ästhetik im

Überblick; 5. Begriff und Klassifikation des Schönen: Bernard

Bolzanos Ästhetik im Überblick; 6. Hanslick und Bolzano: Der

gemeinsame theoretische Boden; 7. VMS und die logisierende

Tradition in der österreichischen Philosophie: Einige

abschließende Bemerkungen; Literaturverzeichnis;

Personenregister.

11. Löffler, Winfried. 1999. "Bolzanos kosmologischer

Gottesbeweis im historischen und systematischen Vergleich."

In Bernard Bolzanos geistiges Erbe für da 21. Jahrhundert ,

edited by Morscher, Edgar, 295-316. Sankt Augustin: Academia

Verlag.

"Allgemeines zu Bolzanos Gottesbeweis(en)

An zumindest vier Stellen finden sich bei Bolzano Varianten

eines kosmologischen Gottesbeweises(1), die sich im

Grundgedanken zwar ähneln, in den Prämissen, der Weise der

Ableitungen und der Stärke der Konklusion aber

unterschiedlich ausfallen:

- in Teil I, § 67 des Lehrbuchs der Religionswissenschaft (RW )

von 1834,

- auf S.101r und den folgenden in der 1818 der

Studienhofkommission zur Prüfung vorgelegten Abschrift der

RW ,

- in Anmerkung 73 auf S. 321-326 der 2. Auflage der Athanasia

(Bolzano(9a)) von 1838,

- und (wenngleich nur in der Verwendung als Beispiel) in § 330

der Wissenschaftslehre (WL) von 1837.

Daneben läßt Bolzano in RW I, § 83 auch eine Form des

physikotheologischen Arguments gelten, ordnet ihm allerdings

nur sekundäre Bedeutung zu: Es "bestätigt" das Dasein und die

Eigenschaften Gottes aus der Erfahrung, die vorher "durch eine

Reihe apriorischer Schlüsse" aufgewiesen wurden.

(...)

Die folgenden Überlegungen widmen sich zunächst den

denkgeschichtlichen Hintergründen von Bolzanos

kosmologischem Gottesbeweis, insbesondere seinem Verhältnis

zu ähnlichen Argumentationsweisen

innerhalb der scholastischen Tradition (Kapitel 2 und 3). Eine

bis zur Halbformalisierung gehende Analyse einer der

erhaltenen Versionen des Beweises und der ihm

vorausgeschickten Hilfssätze (Kapitel 4 und 5) läßt zwei

systematisch-philosophisch interessante Punkte an Bolzanos

Beweis deutlicher hervortreten, nämlich die Rolle, die ein

"Inbegriff" (nämlich der der Welt) in dem Beweis spielt, und

Bolzanos (erst aus der Zusammennahme verschiedener Texte

erhebbare) Begründung der Einzigkeit Gottes (Kapitel 6)." (Ss.

295-296)

(1) Ich verwende das Wort Gottes-"Beweis" hier in dem

allgemeinen Sinne der Entfaltung von mittelbaren

Erkenntnisgründen für Gottes Existenz.

Nicht beansprucht wird damit, daß die Prämissen der

jeweiligen "Beweise" allgemein akzeptiert seien, und auch

nicht, daß die logische Gültigkeit der erwähnten "Beweise"

fraglos gegeben sei. Aus logischer Sicht handelt es sich also

eher um "Ableitungen" bzw. überhaupt nur um "Argumente für

die Existenz Gottes"; aus Gründen der Kürze verwende ich

jedoch öfters das Wort "Gottesbeweis(e)".

Literatur

Bolzano, Bernard.

(9) Athanasia oder Gründe für die Unsterblichkeit der Seele

(Sulzbach: Seidel, 1827).

(9a) 2. verbesserte Ausgabe (Sulzbach: Seidel, 1838).

(16) Lehrbuch der Religionswissenschaft , 4 Bde. (Sulzbach:

Seidel, 1834). [Zitiert als 'RW ' mit römischer Bandzahl und

Angabe der Paragraphen nach der Originalausgabe von 1834.]

(16d) Kritische Neuausgabe , Erster Te il, §§ 1-85, hg. von

Jaromfr Loufü (Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt: Frommann-Holzboog,

1994). [In: GA , Reihe I, Bd. 6, 1. Teil.]

(19) Wissenschaftslehre , 4 Bde. (Sulzbach: Seidel, 1837).

[Zitiert als 'WL' mit römischer Bandzahl und Angabe der

Paragraphen.]

12. ———. 1999. "Bolzanos Lehrbuch der Religionswissenschaft

und die Schultheologien seiner Zeit." In Bernard Bolzanos

geistiges Erbe für da 21. Jahrhundert , edited by Morscher,

Edgar, 317-344. Sankt Augustin: Academia Verlag.

"Das Hauptdokument für Bolzanos religionsphilosophische

und theologische Auffassungen, sein Lehrbuch der

Religionswissenschaft (im folgenden: RW ) von 1834 enthält

keine "Religionswissenschaft" im heutigen Sinne einer

vorwiegend deskriptiv-empirischen Darstellung verschiedener

Religionen sowie ihrer Unterschiede und gemeinsamen Züge,

sondern eine Wissenschaftstheorie der Theologie, eine

Religionsphilosophie und - im Großteil des Werkes -

systematische Theologie: Fundamentaltheologie, Dogmatik und

Moraltheologie, wie man im Sinne der heute gängigen

Klassifikation sagen würde. Wenngleich manche Passagen in

dem mehrbändigen Werk aus heutiger Sicht eher ermüdend

wirken, dürfte in der RW doch einiges von theologie-, und hier

vor allem rezeptionsgeschichtlichem Interesse verborgen sein,

vor allem aber enthält das Buch etliche Stücke origineller

analytischer Religionsphilosophie auf höchstem Niveau, die

auch für heutige Fragestellungen ein gewisses Interesse haben

könnten.

In den nachfolgenden Kapiteln widme ich mich zunächst

werkgeschichtlichen (Kapitel 1) und systematischen Fragen

(Kapitel 2 und 3) zu Bolzanos Religionsphilosophie;

abschließend verfolge ich einige denkgeschichtliche Spuren

zurück zu einem bisher eher wenig beachteten Quellenbereich,

nämlich der Studienliteratur, die Bolzano wahrscheinlich

verwendet hat, d.h. zu einigen theologischen Lehrbüchern aus

dem theresianisch-josephinischen Österreich (Kapitel 4 )." (S.

317)

13. ———, ed. 2002. Bernard Bolzanos Religionsphilosophie und

Theologie . Sankt Augustin: Academia Verlag.

Beiträge zur Bolzano-Forschung: Band 12.

Inhaltverzeichnis: Eberhard Herrmann: Die Kognitivität des

Glaubens in Bolzanos Religionsphilosophie bezogen auf die

Realismusdebatte in der neueren analytischen

Religionsphilosophie; Edgar Morscher: Bolzanos Logik der

Religion; Carsten Gieske: Grundlagen und

religionsphilosophische Aspekte der Hermeneutik Bernard

Bolzanos; Peter Walter: Bolzanos Konzeption vom Aufbau der

Theologie im historischen Vergleich; Wolfgang Künne: Die

theologischen Gutachten in den Verfahren gegen den Professor

und den Priester Bolzano; Henning Graf Reventlow: Ein

orthodoxer Liberaler: Bolzano und die Bibel: Peter M.

Schenkel: Theologische und religionsphilosophische Literatur

in Bolzanos Privatbibliothek; Winfried Löffler: Neues zu

Bolzanos Gottesbeweisen; Andrej Krause: Was bleibt von der

menschlichen Seele nach dem Tod? Bolzanos Antwort in der

Athanasia ; Gottfried Hornig: Zur Dogmatik und

Perfektibilitätstheorie Bolzanos; Roman A. Siebenrock: Bolzano

und die Unfehlbarkeit der Kirche. Zur Struktur einer

theologischen Position vor 1870; Kurt Strasser: Wohlthätige

Gährung im Schooße der Kirche. Zur Dynamik der Ansichten

des Katecheten Bernard Bolzano.

14. Morscher, Edgar, and Neumaier, Otto, eds. 1996. Bolzanos

Kampf gegen Nationalismus und Rassismus . Sankt Augustin:

Academia Verlag.

Beiträge zur Bolzano-Forschung: Band 4.

Inhaltverzeichnis: Vorwort; Bernard Bolzano: Erbauungsreden

gegen Nationalismus und Rassismus; 1. Über das Verhältniß

der beiden Volksstämme in Böhmen; 2. Von dem Betragen

gegen die jüdische Nation; 3. Über die Vaterlandsliebe; Eduard

Winter: Bernard Bolzano und die nationale Frage; Wolfgang

Künne: Bernard Bolzano über Nationalismus und Rassismus in

Böhmen.

15. Neumaier, Otto. 2011. "Bolzanos schönere Welt, oder: Die

Geburt der Utopie aus dem systematischen Denken." In

Bernard Bolzanos bessere Welt. Akten der Internationalen

Tagung Salzburg 27. und 28. Mai 2010 , edited by Strasser,

Kurt F., 135-172. Prague: L. Marek.

"Wer mit Bolzanos Philosophie vertraut ist, erwartet bei der

Rede von einer Utopie wohl am ehesten, dass sein »Büchlein

vom besten Staate« Gegenstand der Diskussion ist.(1)

Tatsächlich können wir in diesem Werk utopisches Denken im

Sinne des Entwurfs einer idealen Gesellschaft finden, die de

facto in keinem Land der Welt existiert, aber unter bestimmten

Bedingungen vielleicht verwirklicht werden könnte. Allerdings

müssen wir einerseits bedenken, dass der Utopie »Vom besten

Staate« eine moralische Haltung zugrunde liegt, die mit anders

ausgerichteten utopischen Überlegungen in Konflikt geraten

kann, andererseits aber, dass das Utopische für Bolzanos

Denken auch in anderem Sinne von Bedeutung ist, nämlich

dem des theoretischen Bemühens um die Feststellung oder

Bestimmung eines idealen Begriffs von etwas, das uns nicht nur

ein besseres Verständnis davon erlaubt, sondern auch die

Möglichkeit eröffnet, praktisch im Sinne der Suche nach einer

»besseren Welt« zu wirken." (s. 135)

(1) Bolzano schrieb am Büchlein vom besten Staate, oder

Gedanken eines Menschenfreundes über die zweckmäßigste

Einrichtung der bürgerlichen Gesellschaft über etliche Jahre:

Eine erste Fassung lag 1831 vor, die endgültige Fassung

entstand zwischen 1840 und 1846, wurde aber erst 1932 als

Band 3 der Schriften Bolzanos veröffentlicht; die maßgebliche

Ausgabe von Jaromír Loužil erschien in: Bernard Bolzano,

Sozialphilosophische Schriften , hg. von Jan Berg und Jaromír

Loužil (BGA, Reihe II A, Bd. 14), Stuttgart‐Bad Cannstatt:

Frommann–Holzboog, 1975, 7–144.

16. Rumpler, Helmut, ed. 2000. Bernard Bolzano und die Politik.

Staat, Nation und Religion als Herausforderung für die

Philosophie im Kontext von Spätaufklärung,

Frühnationalismus und Restauration . Wien: Böhlau.

Inhalt: Elemente der politischen Philosophie Bolzanos; Rudolf

Haller: Bolzano und die Entwicklung der österreichischen

Philosophie; Margret Friedric:h, Bolzanos Projekt der

Aufklärung. "Was zur Herbeiführung einer besseren Zeit schon

durch uns selbst geleistet werden könne"; Kurt Strasser: Cabale

und Liebe. Der politische Gehalt der "Erbauungsreden"

Bolzanos Konflikt mit der österreichischen

Restaurationspolitik; Günther Kronenbitter: "Freiheit" und

"Ordnung" bei Friedrich von Gentz; Rolf Decot, Klemens Maria

Hofbauer - Konservativer Erneuerer der Kirche in Österreich;

Jane Regenfelder: Der sogenannte "Bolzano-Prozeß" Bolzano

und die nationalliberale Bewegung im österreichischen

Vormärz; Jaromir Louzil: Bernard Bolzano, Josef Jungmann

und die Anfänge der tschechischen Nationalbewegung;

Manfried Welan: Bolzanos Lehre vom Staat Internationale

Wirkungen Bolzanos; Katrin Keller: Zur politischen Relevanz

des Bolzanismus in Sachsen: Das Beispiel des Hofpredigers

Emil Heine (1808-1873); Wolfgang Künne: Bolzano im Kontext

der politischen Philosophie des 19. Jahrhunderts.

Ėtudes en Français

1. Pégny, Gaëtan. 2013. "Bolzano : la liberté de penser entre État

et religion." Sens public – Érudit :1-27.

Résumé : "Dans ses écrits théologico-politiques, publiés ou pas,

avec ou sans nom d’auteur, Bernard Bolzano revient plusieurs

fois sur la question du rapport entre Église et État, avec une

alacrité plus ou moins vive. L’étude et la traduction d’un texte

de Bolzano publié sans nom d’auteur et jusqu’ici non étudié

permet de comprendre jusqu’où il a pensé leur articulation, et

de mettre au jour les points saillants d’une philosophie qui

vient bousculer les schémas mentaux associés à la laïcité à la

française comme à la sécularisation allemande."

2. Vesper, Achim. 2012. "Contempler, distinguer : Bolzano sur la

conceptualité de la perception esthétique." In Esthétique et

logique , edited by Morel, Charlotte, 51-70. Villeneuve d'Ascq:

Presses Universitaires du Septentrion.

"À en croire une caractérisation répandue, Bolzano serait l'aïeul

de la famille « philosophie analytique » (1) Cette caractérisation

vaut aussi pour son traité Sur le concept du beau (Über den

Begriff des Schonen ), où il se rapproche d'une représentation

commune de la philosophie analytique en menant une analyse

sémantique du concept du beau et en maintenant l'idée que «

l'usage linguistique ordinaire » décide de la justesse d'une

analyse conceptuelle (2).

Dans le détail, son enquête s'oriente vers le but suivant :

Je ne vise [ ... ] rien moins qu'à mettre en place ou à introduire

un nouveau concept, jusqu'alors inconnu des lecteurs, mais

seulement à indiquer les éléments constitutifs à partir desquels

ils ont eux-mêmes composé un concept, concept depuis

longtemps présent à leur conscience quoique peut-être ils

n'aient pas pris distinctement conscience de la façon dont ils

ont pour cela procédé - ou encore sans pouvoir présentement

s'en souvenir.(3)" (pp. 51-52)

(1) Michael Dummett, Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie

, Frankfurt / Main : Suhrkamp, 1988, p. 167.

(2) Bernard Bolzano, Wissenschaftslehre , in: Gesamtausgabe,

vol. I. 11: Wissenschaftslehre § 1-45, éd. Jan Berg, Smttgart-Bad

Cannstatt: Frommann-Holzboog, 1985, p. 133. Dans la citation

c'est Bolzano qui souligne.

(3) Bernard Bolzano, Über den Begriff des Schönen. Eine

philosophische Abhandlung [désormais cité : Begriff des

Schönen ], in : Gesamtausgabe, vol. I. 18 : Mathematisch-

physikalische und philosophische Schriften 1842-1843 , éd.

Gottfried Gabriel, Matthias Gatzemeier, Friedrich Kambartel,

Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt : Frommann-Holzboog, 1989, p. 97.

Les deux textes Über den Begriff des Schönen. Eine

philosophische Abhandlung et Über die Eintheilung der

schönen Künste. Eine ästbetische Abhandlung sont les sources

essentielles pour l'esthétique bolzanienne. Ces essais paraissent

de façon indépendante, respectivement en 1843 et 1849 puis

ensemble en 1851 dans les Abhandlungen der Königlichen

Böhmischen Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften . Le second texte

se propose une « application des principes théoriques du beau»

dans une théorie de l'art (Über die Eintheilung der schöinen

Künste , in: Untersuchungen zur Grundlegung der Asthetik

[désormais cité : Grundlegung der Àsthetik ], éd.

Dietfried Gerhardus, Frankfurt / Main : Athenaum, 1972, p.

122). Selon une déclaration épistolaire, Bolzano comptait

compléter ces deux traités par d'autres travaux ou

monographies esthétiques (passage reproduit dans : Eduard

Winter, Leben und geistige Entwicklung des Sozialethikers

und Mathematikers Bernard Bolzano 1781-1848 , Halle, 1949:

Niemeyer, p. 46-47. Sur la genèse de ces écrits voir par ailleurs

les indications données par Matthias Gatzemeier :

Gesamtausgabe , Bd. I. 18: Mathematisch-Physikalische und

Philosophische Schriften , op. cit. , p. 89-94.

Bibliographia. Annotated bibliographies

Raul Corazzon || rc@ontology.co || Info

From Greek to Latin. The

development of the Latin

philosophical vocabulary. First

part

Bibliography

English studies A - J

1. Adams, James N. 2003. "'Romanitas' and the Latin Language."

The Classical Quarterly no. 53:184-205

"In what ways (if any) could 'Romanness' be conveyed through

language? Was knowledge of the Latin language a defining

feature of being a Roman, and did Romans have any linguistic

policy which sought to enforce a view that Latin was a

component of their identity? Is it legitimate in this context to

talk of Latin as if it were a unity, or was Romanness associated

with a particular variety of the language? Did Romans practise

any sort of policy that might be labelled 'linguistic nationalism'?

These are questions that have been asked in different forms

before, if not explicitly with reference to the all but non-existent

term Romanitas. Here I offer a brief overview, concentrating on

selected primary evidence rather than attempting to

accumulate modern bibliography. (2)" (p. 184, a note omitted)

(2) There is of course a good deal of bibliography devoted to

some of the questions listed in this paragraph. A notable paper,

for example, is M. Dubuisson,'Y a-t-il une politique linguistique

romaine?', Ktema 7 (1982), 197-210. There is much of relevance

in J. Kaimio, The Romans and the Greek Language (Helsinki,

1979). Further material is cited and discussed in my book,

Bilingualism and the Latin Language (Cambridge, 2003).

2. ———. 2004. Bilingualism and the Latin Language.

Cambridge: Cambridge University Press

Chapter 3.III: Cicero Letters, pp. 308-347.

"Among educated Greek terms which filled a gap in the Latin

language were above all technical terms from philosophy and

rhetoric.

That is not to say that many such words could not have been

replaced by Latin equivalents. In the first century BC (as for

example the works of the anon. ad Herennium, Lucretius and

Cicero attest) much effort was devoted to establishing Latin

technical vocabularies, by calquing, loan-shifts, metaphor and

borrowing. But the business of finding Latin substitutes was a

burdensome one (see above on Suet. Tib. 71) as can be deduced

from discussions of the problem at the time (e.g. Lucr. 1.136-45,

Cic. Acad. 1.24-6). Whereas the effort might be worthwhile in a

formal philosophical or rhetorical treatise for public

consumption, in private letters it was simpler to use the Greek

terms themselves in addressing a sympathetic correspondent.

Sometimes Greek offered not merely a single word appropriate

to Roman concerns, but a whole group of cognate terms,

nominal, verbal, adjectival and adverbial, which allowed a topic

to be discussed in a more economical and varied way than

might have been possible in Latin." (p. 339)

3. Backman, Jussi. 2020. "Modernity in Antiquity: Hellenistic and

Roman Philosophy in Heidegger and Arendt." Symposium no.

24:5-29

Abstract: "This article looks at the role of Hellenistic thought in

the historical narratives of Martin Heidegger and Hannah

Arendt. To a certain extent, both see—with G. W. F. Hegel, J. G.

Droysen, and Eduard Zeller—Hellenistic and Roman

philosophy as a “modernity in antiquity,” but with important

differences. Heidegger is generally dismissive of Hellenistic

thought and comes to see it as a decisive historical turning

point at which a protomodern element of subjective willing and

domination is injected into the classical heritage of Plato and

Aristotle. Arendt, likewise, credits Stoic philosophy with the

discovery of the will as an active faculty constituting a realm of

subjective freedom and autonomy. While she considers

Hellenistic philosophy as essentially apolitical and world-

alienated—in contrast to the inherently political and practical

Roman culture—it nonetheless holds for her an important but

unexploited ethical and political potential."

4. Baldwin, Barry. 1992. "Greek in Cicero's Letters." Acta Classica

no. 25:1-17

"The purpose of this paper is not to inventory each and every

one of the 850 or so Greek words, phrases, and quotations in

Cicero's letters. Apart from the indexes provided in Shackleton

Bailey's editions,(1) that has been done, and on the whole well

done, at least twice this century, respectively by R.B. Steele(2)

and H.J. Rose.(3)." (p. 1)

(...)

"At the risk of doing a Queen of Hearts, I preface the analysis

with some general and suggestive conclusions. There are

around 100 Greek words, phrases, and quotations in Ad Fam.,

compared with over 700 in Ad Att.

Meaningless as it may be, one cannot help noticing the absence

of words beginning with β, ι, ξ, or ρ, whilst the only ones

beginning with φ or ω occur in quotations (1 each). Virtually no

single words are repeated in Ad Fam., albeit some phrases and

quotations are. In Ad Att. there are quite a few more

repetitions, but they are still a small proportion of the whole.

Cicero, then, does not have a large number of overworked

favourites, nor is there much by way of unconscious Greek style

into which he keeps slipping.

Only a dozen or so words, phrases, and quotations are shared

between Ad Fam. and Ad Att. Cicero employs Greek in letters

to almost 20 different correspondents, though to very different

degrees; he receives letters with Greek in them from about half

a dozen people. There is a good deal of Greek in the letters to

his brother Quintus, whereas those to Brutus contain but a

single word." (p. 2)

(1) Cicero's Letters to Atticus, Cambridge, 1965-70; Cicero:

Epistulae Ad Familiares, Cambridge, 1977. His notes provide

valuable remarks on many (by no means all) individual items;

cf. n. 5, below.

(2) 'The Greek in Cicero's Epistles,' The American Journal of

Philology 21 (1900) 387-410.

(3) 'The Greek of Cicero,' The Journal of Hellenic Studies 41

(1921) 91-116.(...)

5. Baltussen, Han. 2014. "Cicero's translation of Greek

philosophy. Personal Mission or Public Service?" In

Complicating the History of Western Translation: The Ancient

Mediterranean in Perspective, edited by McElduff, Siobhán

and Sciarrino, Enrica, 37-47. New York: Routledge

Volume first published by St. Jerome Publishing in 2011.

Abstract: "Cicero’s achievement of producing a stream of

philosophical works in the last few years of his life is as

remarkable as it is unusual. This activity constituted a heady

mix of linguistic skill, intellectual ambition and an attempt at

self-healing after his political and personal life had been hit by

disaster.

Cicero’s important role in the transformation of Greek

philosophy into Latin is well-known, but the linguistic and

cultural aspects of his translation activities have not received a

lot of attention. This paper explores the ways in which Cicero

attempted to transpose Greek philosophical thought into the

Latin language (Latine reddere) and examines how his

personal circumstances prompted this flood of translation in

his final years."

6. Barnes, Jonathan, and Griffin, Miriam, eds. 1989. Philosophia

Togata I. Essays on Philosophy and Roman Society. Oxford:

Clarendon Press

Revised reprint 1997 with an updated bibliography.

Table of Contents: 1. Miriam Griffin: Philosophy, Politics, and

Politicians at Rome 1; I.G. Kidd: Posidonius as Philosopher-

Historian 38; 3. Jonathan Barnes: Antiochus of Ascalon 51; 4.

David Sedley: Philosophical Allegiance in the Greco-Roman

world 97; 5. D. P. Fowler: Lucretius and Politics 120; 6. Julia

Annas: Cicero on Stoic Moral Philosophy and Private Property

151; 7. P. A. Brunt: Philosophy and Religion in the Late

Republic 174; 8. Christopher Pelling: Plutarch: Roman Heroes

and Greek Culture 199; 9. Elizabeth Rawson: Roman Rulers

and the Philosophic Adviser 233; Philippa Smith Revised by

Maddalena Bonelli and Ben Morison Bibliography 259; Indexes

289-308.

7. ———, eds. 1997. Philosophia Togata II. Plato and Aristotle at

Rome. Oxford: Clarendon Press

Contents: 1. Jonathan Barnes: Roman Aristotle ι; 2. Andrew

Lintott: The Theory of the Mixed Constitution at Rome 70; 3.

Miriam Griffin: From Aristotle to Atticus: Cicero and Matius on

Friendship 86; 4. David Sedley: Plato’s Auctoritas and the

Rebirth of the Commentary Tradition 110; 5. Thomas Tarver:

Varro and the Antiquarianism of Philosophy 130; 6. Simon

Swain: Plutarch, Plato, Athens, and Rome 165; 7. Leofranc

Holford-Strevens: Favorinus: the Man of Paradoxes 188: 8.

Michael Frede: Celsus’ Attack on the Christians 218; 9. Fergus

Millar: Porphyry: Ethnicity, Language, and Alien Wisdom 241;

Maddalena Bonelli and Benjamin Morison: Bibliography 263;

Index Locorum 287; Index of Names 293; General Index 297-

300.

8. Bell, Brenda. 1991. "Roman literary attitudes to technical

terms." Acta Classica no. 34:83-92

"Ancient theoreticians have virtually nothing to say on literary

attitudes to technical terms.(1) Yet it is commonly pointed out

by modern scholars that Latin writers with stylistic pretensions

deliberately avoid technical or official terminology.(2) This

paper seeks to explore the reasons for the apparently cautious

treatment of technical terms in Latin authors of the late

Republic and early Principate.(3) Were such terms intrinsically

suspect, considered unworthy of the higher genres of literature,

simply because of their technical nature? Or were they handled

with circumspection for other literary reasons." (p. 83)

(...)

"Complaints about the lexical poverty of Latin began with

Lucretius, who laments the 'patrii sermonis egestas'(32) when

faced with the practical prob lems of rendering Epicurean

terms in Latin for the first time. Cicero faced the same difficulty

of non-existent Latin terms when discussing philosophy and

rhetoric.(33) He complains of the 'inopia' of Latin (Fin. 3.51 cf.

15; Orat. 211). Marouzeau sees the reason for these complaints

as arising out of the fact that literary language at this stage had

not developed to its full powers of expression.(34) In particular,

it was lacking in abstract nouns. This is true, but the complaints

continue well beyond the time of Cicero. In looking for

resources to express the terms of Plato, Seneca laments, 'quanta

verborum nobis paupertas, immo egestas sit numquam magis

quam hodierno die in tellexi. Mille res inciderunt cum forte de

Platone loqueremur, quae nomina desiderarent nec haberent,

quaedam vero cum habuissent fastidio nostra perdidissent' (Ep.

58.1). As he says, 'quae philosophia fuit facta philologica est'

(Ep. 108.23). It is noteworthy that charges of lexical poverty

occur when the writer is declaring his need for neologisms.

They can be seen in fact as excuses or justification for new

coinages." (pp. 85-86.)

(1) Symptomatic is the fact that there is no entry under

'Technical' in the General Index of D.A. Russell and M.

Winterbottom (eds.), Ancient Literary Criticism: The Principal

Texts in New Translations, Oxford 1972. The later

grammarians and commentators in H. Keil's Grammatici

Latini (8 vols., Leipzig 1855-80, reprinted Hildesheim 1961) do

not yield anything of interest either. Nor is this surprising. The

grammarian's tradition remained remarkably stable. See R.A.

Raster, Guardians of Language: The Grammarians and

Society in Late Antiquity, Berkeley, Los Angeles, London 1988,

196f.

(2) e.g. R. Syme, Tacitus, Oxford 1958, 343; W. Kroll, Studien

zum Verständnis der römischen Literatur, Stuttgart 1964, 112-

4; F.R.D. Goodyear's commentary on Tacitus Annals, Vol. 1,

Cambridge 1972, 344f.

(3) Following the Cambridge History of Classical Literature 2

(ed. E.J. Kenney and W. V. Clausen, Cambridge 1982), I regard

the early Principate as ending with Gellius and Fronto. I am not

here concerned with later authors or Christian technical terms.

(32) Lucr. 1.832; 3.260 (with Kenney's note) cf. 1.136-9.

(33) On Cicero's difficulties in creating a satisfactory

philosophical vocabulary in Latin see Leeman [A.D. Leeman,

Orationis Ratio: The Stylistic Theories and Practice of the

Roman Orators Historians and Philosophers 1, Amsterdam

1963, 348-52] 1, 206-9.

9. Boys-Stones, George. 2013. "Seneca against Plato: Letters 58

and 65." In Plato and the Stoics, edited by Long, A. G., 128-146.

Cambridge: Cambridge University Press

"Seneca, I have argued, manifests an unqualified opposition to

Platonic metaphysics in Letters 58 and 65, and it is a stance

that defines his response to the Platonist movement which,

emerging in his day, differentiated itself from Stoicism

principally by its commitment to this metaphysics. (The attack

is, in this sense, a total attack on Platonism as a movement, not

a quibble over details.) But, as I noted in the Introduction,

Seneca also allows it to determine his philosophical opposition

to Plato. His argument might have been that Platonists were

wrong, that they misunderstood what Plato actually meant. But

it was not. As far as Seneca is concerned, the Platonists were

quite right about Plato – and so much the worse for Plato. And

in this retreat from the pro-Plato tendencies of the late

Hellenistic Stoa,(28) Seneca is consistent with all our evidence

for post-Hellenistic Stoicism.(29)" (pp. 142-143)

(28) I have in mind, most obviously, Panaetius and Posidonius;

but cf. also Antipater (SVF 3 (Antipater).56).

(29) Boys-Stones 2009 [‘Cornutus und sein philosophisches

Umfeld: der Antiplatonismus der Epidrome’ in A. Cornutus:

Die griechischen Götter. Ein Überblick über Namen, Bilder

und Deutungen, Scripta Antiquitatis Posterioris ad Ethicam

Religionemque, ed. H.G. Nesselrath. Tübingen, Mohr Siebeck:

141–61] is another case study of the phenomenon (dealing with

Cornutus). A possible exception is the mysterious Trypho,

‘Stoic and Platonist’, mentioned at Porphyry, Life of Plotinus

17.3

10. Cassin, Barbara. 1990. "Greeks and Romans: Paradigms of the

Past in Arendt and Heidegger." Comparative Civilizations

Review no. 22:1-26

Translated from the French by Jonathan Barnes.

"The thread I shall follow is the contrast between political

thought and professional thought or thought about thought.

And with its help I shall analyse more closely the different

dealings which Arendt and Heidegger have with the past.

We must, I think, begin with the most impressive piece of

evidence: Arendt and Heidegger refer to different pasts. Arendt

makes a double reference—to the Greeks and to the Romans.

For Heidegger there is only one reference point: the Greeks—

and again the Greeks.

One may say, with only a little exaggeration, that for Heidegger

the relation between Rome and Greece is one of translation and

betrayal. When Heidegger invokes Latin it is usually to show

how the translation of Greek terms betrays the Greek

experience of aletheia. Veritas bolts the door on aletheia, and

Heidegger's intellectual journey takes him "upstream" (by what

Rene Char calls a retour amont) from the Latins to the Greeks—

and then from the Greeks to what is more Greek than the

Greeks.

To indicate the tone and substance of this relation, one

quotation may suffice. It comes from Heidegger's essay "The

Origin of the Work of Art:"(5) "By these [Greek] determinations

. . . the Western interpretation of the Being of beings [is]

stabilized. The process begins with the appropriation of Greek

words by Roman-Latin thought. Υποκείμενον becomes

subiectum, ὑπόστασις becomes substantia, συμβεβηκός

becomes accidens. However, this translation of Greek names

into Latin is in no way the innocent process it is considered to

this day. Beneath the seemingly literal and thus faithful

translation there is concealed, rather, a translation of Greek

experience into a different way of thinking.

Roman thought takes over the Greek words without a

corresponding, equally original experience of what they say,

without the Greek word. The rootlessness of Western thought

begins with this translation." (p. 34)

(5) Poetry, Language, Thought, trans. A. Hofstadter (New

York, 1971), p. 23 (the essay dates from 1935/6).

11. Coleman, Robert. 1989. "The Formation of Specialized

Vocabularies in Philosophy, Grammar and Rhetoric: Winners

and Losers." Cahiers de l'Institut de Linguistique de Louvain

no. 15:77-89.

12. Copeland, Rita. 1991. Rhetoric, Hermeneutics, and Translation

in the Middle Ages. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press

Chapter 1: Roman theories of translation: the fusion of

grammar and rhetoric, pp. 1-8.

"The book begins by constructing a history of the interaction of

the disciplines of rhetoric and hermeneutics from late antiquity

through the Latin Middle Ages. Modern work on hermeneutics,

especially that of Gadamer, provides some valuable models for

theorizing the way in which exegesis appropriates the tools of

rhetoric. In the first chapter I consider how Roman disciplinary

debates and practice created a space in which a rhetorical

theory of translation could emerge; and the second chapter

considers how that space could be redefined in the early Middle

Ages by the force of new disciplinary directives. The rhetorical

value of translation is lost in the very discourses that carry over

Ciceronian theories of translation; but hermeneutical practice

itself takes over the functions of rhetoric and creates a new

context in which a rhetorical model of translation can emerge.

In order to establish the terms of this argument it is necessary

to examine the character of medieval hermeneutics, and in the

third chapter I show how exegesis assumes the force of

rhetorical performance and in fact supplants rhetoric as the

master discourse. My concern here and throughout is with

commentaries from the arts curriculum, not scriptural

exegesis." (p. 6)

13. D'Alisera, Alexander Amir. 2015. "Romanus Sum Ergo Sum:

Claims to Romanitas from Late Antiquity to the Dawn of

Humanism." Senior Projects Spring no. 130:1-94

"It should first be noted that I use the term Romanitas

anachronistically (in the vein of many contemporary historians)

in order to refer to feelings and evocations of Roman-ness and

Roman identity. Though the word itself is not found in classical

Roman sources and was invented by Tertullian in the late-

second or early-third centuries,[*] the concept of the cultural

identity implied by Romanitas is present throughout the Latin

corpus. The Aeneid of Virgil – the late-first century B.C.E. epic

poem and cornerstone of the western literary canon both in its

day and two thousand years later – carries the most cogent

evocations of Romanitas among these ancient sources." (p. 4)

(...)

"It is with the Virgilian understanding of classical Romanitas in

hand that my endeavor begins. Most generally, I seek to

examine later historical claims to Romanitas by individual

philosophers, political leaders, and literary figures whose actual

cultural identity was far removed from that of Augustus and

Virgil. In the broadest sense, my work stands as an intellectual

and cultural history, grounded in various responses to the

classical era by those individuals living and acting in decidedly

post-classical times.

I shall first examine the period of late antiquity, as seen

through (but not necessarily exemplified by) the writings of

Saint Augustine in the late 300s and early 400s.

(...)

"I follow my discussion of late antiquity with an examination of

the Romanitas found in the fragmentary period following

Augustine’s death, from the middle of the 400s to the late

900s."

(...)

"I end my macrohistorical examination with a nod towards

Petrarch’s transference of the Roman ideal into the proto-

Italian national ideal at the dawning days of the Renaissance,

before returning to Mussolini’s fascistic appropriation of

Romanitas as means of conclusion." (pp. 7-8)

[*] Tertullian, De pallio, IV, 1: "Quid nunc, si est Romanitas

omni salus, nec honestis tamen modis ad Graios estis?" (note

added)

14. De Graff, Thelma B. 1940. "Plato in Cicero." Classical Philology

no. 35

"It would seem well to remind ourselves at the outset of

Cicero's avowed aim, a highly laudable one. He wished to make

available to his fellow-countrymen, who regarded speculation

per se as a dangerous pastime,(4) the rich treasures of Greek

philosophy." (p. 143)

(...)

"The best method of throwing light upon this difficult but

fascinating problem would be to select some philosopher whose

works are extant, to examine carefully all of Cicero's works for

references to that philosopher or his writings, and to endeavor

to determine on the basis of the evidence amassed the degree of

success with which Cicero has approximated both the spirit and

the thought of his original. Our choice of philosopher is Plato,

perhaps the greatest of all philosophers, whom Cicero

reverenced and admired both for his beautiful literary style and

for his brilliant philosophical speculations.(7) To the writer's

best knowledge and belief all direct references in Cicero to

Plato or to any work of Plato have been included in this paper.

Moreover, since the personality of Socrates as created by his

most famous pupil is infinitely more vivid and more appealing

than that created by Xenophon and the lesser Socratici,(8) and

since, possibly by virtue of that fact, references to Socrates are

usually, though not invariably, to the Platonic Socrates, all

references to Socrates himself (including those not found in

Plato) have been assembled in similar fashion.

Finally, a number of probable references to Plato or to Plato's

works has been added." (p. 144)

(4) De orat. ii. 37. 156; Rep. i. 18. 30; Tacitus Agr. 4.

(7) Div. i. 30. 62; i. 36. 78; ii. 31. 66; Fin. v. 3. 7; Leg. i. 5. 15; iii.

1. 1; iii. 6. 14; Off. i. 1. 4; Rep. iv. 4. 4; Tusc. i. 10. 22; i. 21. 49; i.

32. 79; ii. 3. 8; v. 4. 11; v. 10. 30; v. 41. 119; Brut. vi. 24; xxxi.

121; De orat. i. 11. 47-49; iii. 4. 15; Opt. gen. v. 16-vi. 17; Orat.

iii. 12; ix. 62; xx. 67.

15. Deligiannis, Ioannis, ed. 2024. Cicero in Greece, Greece in

Cicero: Aspects of Reciprocal Reception from Classical

Antiquity to Byzantium and Modern Greece. Berlin: de Gruyter

Contents: Part I: Aspects of Greece and its World in Cicero’s

Works

Introduction 3; Georgia Tsouni: Athens’ Authority in Cicero’s

Philosophical Works 11; Gabriel Evangelou: Loss of Self,

Desperation, and Glimmers of Hope in Cicero’s Letters from

Exile 31; Ximing Lu: Mercatura Bonarum Artium. The Politics

of Marcus’ Study Abroad in Cicero’s De Officiis 55; Matilde

Oliva: Eloquence as Handmaiden of Wisdom. Hellenistic

Philosoph(ies) in Cicero’s Partitiones Oratoriae 73;

Part II: Aspects of the Reception of Cicero in the Greek-

Speaking World

Introduction 97; Fernanda Maffei: Preliminary Remarks on the

Technical Language of the Bilingual Glossaries of Cicero 103;

Tiziano F. Ottobrini: Cicero and Photius. An Analysis of the

Survival and Influence of Cicero on Photius’ Bibliotheca, at the

Crossroads between History and Drama 123; Vasileios Pappas:

Greek Translations of Cicero’s Works in the Nineteenth

Century 139; Ioannis Deligiannis: The First Greek Translation

of Cicero’s De re publica (1839) 171; Appendix: Modern Greek

Translations of and/or Commentaries on Cicero 203;

Abbreviations 227; Bibliography 229; List of Contributors 255;

Index Locorum 257; Index Nominum 267; Previous Volumes of

the Series 273.

16. Detreville, Eleanor. 2015. An Overview of Latin Morphological

Calques on Greek Technical Terms. Formation and Success

A Thesis Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of The University

of Georgia in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the

Degree Master of Arts.

Abstract: "This thesis investigates the composition and success

of Latin morphological calques on Greek technical terminology

in the vocabulary of poetry and literature, rhetoric, philosophy,

grammar, medicine, and early Christianity by studying the

construction of these calques, including their individual

morphemes and, where relevant, their Indo-European origins;

and it compares the composition of the corresponding Greek

terms. Considerable attention is given to trends in composition

in each terminology field, such as suffixes and types of

compound formations. Additionally, the study discusses those

factors which appear to have played the greatest role in the

success of morphological calques over competing Greek loan

words, semantic calques, and synonyms."

Chapter 4: Philosophical calques, pp. 50-59.

17. Douglas, Alan Edward. 1962. "Platonis Aemvlvs?" Graece &

Rome no. 9:41-51

"Having then considered the general character of Cicero's

sources, and the form in which he presented their works, we

may look more closely at his relation to those sources as

translator and adapter. How effectively does Cicero's Latin

convey the ideas of his originals? It is usually conceded, even by

those who find little other use for Cicero's philosophical

writings, that as a redactor of the original Greek sources Cicero

was competent, though not infallible, and that this competence

was no small achievement, for it involved the virtual creation of

a philosophical Latin.

But since this view is in danger of becoming a typical piece of

uncritically transmitted second-hand textbook lore, it is well

that it has recently been most penetratingly examined by

Professor P. Poncelet,(2) even if one cannot accept all his

conclusions. His argument is that Ciceronian Latin is an

extremely inadequate vehicle for philosophy, and this of its

nature-indeed the more faithful Cicero was to the genius of

Latin, the less adequately could he render the Greeks. Classical

Latin does not emerge well from Poncelet's rigorous and subtle

investigation, which ranges beyond the more obvious

deficiencies of Latin, e.g. the lack of the article, or the shortage

of participles, into the problems of metaphor and abstraction in

philosophical language, and much besides.

But there is something to be said on the other side. First, much

of Poncelet's case rests on a comparison with its original of the

surviving portion of Cicero's translation of Plato's Timaios, that

is, on the hurried rendering of an abstruse work by a man who

never claimed to be a scholar in the modern sense, working

centuries before modern criteria of translation came into

existence. Next, Poncelet often looks for philosophical

conclusions without dealing with the problem of translation in

general, that is, the extent to which thought is bound up with

the language in which it is expressed. In the end his book does

not prove much more than that Greek philosophy is best

expressed in the Greek language. It is by ignoring this that

Poncelet can see in Greek precision and flexibility, but in Latin

nothing but rigidity and vagueness. He does not adequately

distinguish the question of Cicero's faithfulness as a translator

from that of the value of Latin as a vehicle for thought." (pp.

48-49)

(2) Cicéron traducteur de Platon (Paris, 1957).

18. Dowson, Christopher. 2023. "The Social Networking Function

of Cicero’s Prefaces to the Philosophical Works." Philologus no.

167:22-45

Abstract: "The value of the prohoemia or ‘prefaces’ to Cicero’s

later philosophical works, composed in the last years of his life,

has not yet been settled. Two schools of thought have emerged

somewhat more clearly in recent times: one places a greater

value on the prefaces as tools for understanding Cicero’s

philosophica as a whole,the other applies a more skeptical

approach, using a degree of caution as to the nexus between the

prefaces and the treatises to which they were affixed. The

article advocates for the latter camp, however not only to

temper the recent emphasis the optimists have placed on the

prefaces as key interpretive elements to the dialogues, but to

refocus their importance as extensions of Cicero’s personal and

social networking with other Roman elites of his time. I rely on

two main lines of argument: the anecdotal evidence from

Cicero’s volumen prohoemiorum, “book of prefaces”,

mentioned in a letter to Atticus in 44 BCE, as well as a broader

analysis of a deeper disconnect between Cicero’s prefatory

rhetoric regarding Latin philosophical vocabulary compared

with Greek and his translation practices in his treatises."

19. ———. 2024. "Glossing as a Rhetorical Strategy: Seneca the

Younger's Use of Greek Loan-Words in his Philosophical

Works." In Recent Trends and Findings in Latin Linguistics:

Volume I: Syntax, Semantics and Pragmatics. Volume II:

Semantics and Lexicography. Discourse and Dialogue, edited

by Cabrillana, Concepción. Berlin: de Gruyter

Abstract: "This paper examines the Greek scientific and

philosophical vocabulary present in Seneca the Younger's

Naturales Quaestiones and the Epistulae Morales. I discuss the

function of Seneca's glossing of Greek terms and how they

formed part of a broader rhetorical approach to explicating

natural phenomena and philosophical concepts to his Roman

audience. I argue that, rather than coining new Latin terms ex

nihilo (neologisms) or extending the meaning or application of

existing terms (semantic extension), Seneca used variations of

specific rhetorical strategies such as praeteritio and captatio

benevolentiae, which could be employed to enhance his exposit

ion of technical expressions as well as to convey them more

ingeniously to his readers."

20. Dowson, Christopher J. 2022. "The Translation of Greek

Philosophical Terminology in Marius Victorinus’ Opera

Theologica: A Quantitative and Qualitative Study." Antichthon

no. 56:203-225

Abstract: "The article collects and analyses philosophical terms

formed in Latin by fourth-century rhetorician and philosopher

Marius Victorinus (c. 285–360s C.E.) as a result of his

translation from Greek sources. The study examines primarily

his theological treatises: the Ad Candidum Arianum (De

Generatione Divini Verbi) and the Adversus Arium. It

undertakes a quantitative and qualitative examination of these

terms by studying two linguistic mechanisms which constitute

‘term-formation’ in Latin: lexical innovation and lexical

augmentation. Both functioned as important linguistic and

conceptual devices in Victorinus’ translations. The article also

examines the theological contexts of certain metaphysical terms

to understand further their similarities and differences, not

only in Victorinus’ translations, but also in earlier uses of

central Latin philosophical terms, e.g., essentia and substantia.

The article concludes that Victorinus was more didactic than

his philosophical predecessors such as M. Tullius Cicero,

Seneca the Younger or Apuleius of Madaura, preferring literal

translation (particularly morphological calquing) rather than

semantic extensions or metaphorical usages (lexical

augmentation). By using neologisms formed using derivational

word-formation processes and, on rare occasions, loan-words

from Greek, Victorinus adopted an approach of adapting Greek

terminology with a high degree of precision in Latin, from a

range of sources including Christian, Neo-Platonist, and

Gnostic authors. He thereby introduced a new Christological

vocabulary in the Latin tradition, making him a significant

intellectual figure of the fourth and fifth centuries. Although by

no means as dominant as others, such as Augustine or

Boethius, Victorinus would nonetheless come to exert influence

over later Christian philosophers in the Latin West, particularly

during the Scholastic period of the Middle Ages."

21. ———. 2023. Philosophia Translata: The Development of Latin

Philosophical Vocabulary through Translation from Greek. A

Case Study Approach. Leiden: Brill

"This book is first and foremost an investigation of Latin

philosophical vocabulary that developed through a process of

translation from Greek sources over an extended period,

predominantly between the first century BC and the sixth

century AD. The book includes not only a collation of terms

which one might call ‘Latin philosophical vocabulary’, but

further analyses of the methods bywhich philosophical

expression was transferred, translated, or applied in new

contexts (hence translata) from Ancient Greek language and

culture into a new Roman context." (p. 1)

(...)

"A theme of this study is the interaction between Greek

philosophical terminology and Latin authors’ translation

choices in adapting them through certain formal

(morphological) and conceptual (semantic) parameters. These

choices required invention, not simply along formal dimensions

(what we might describe as ex nihilo: neologism; the creation of

new lexemes), but using the raw lexical materials within the

language as well, refashioning them into new meanings within

a philosophical literary genre (ex materia: e.g. semantic shifts,

extensions, metaphorical usages). ‘Innovation’, in either of

these cases, is often difficult to pinpoint given the lack of

textual evidence. Claiming, for instance, that Cicero was the

‘first’ author to use a term in Latin is fraught with speculation

unless a consistent methodology can be developed to

circumscribe the lexical evidence available (the sheer size of the

extant Ciceronian corpus alone dwarfs that of his predecessors

or near-contemporaries, for example).

To that end, the dual approach of ‘innovation’ versus

‘augmentation’, ‘neologism’ versus ‘semantic shift’, ‘ad sensum’

versus ‘verbum e verbo’, etc., is useful in conceptualizing

translation practices only in certain contexts.(2) This will form

one aspect of the analysis, which aids in categorizing the lexical

data collected throughout the case studies into certain types of

common translation practices." (pp. 2-3)

(2) In the conclusion of this study, I turn to these specific

contexts to elucidate certain findings along the lines of ‘literal’

and ‘non-literal’ translation practices These findings will be

discussed in more detail.

22. Erler, Michael. 2022. "On the Relationship between Auctoritas

and Philosophia in Greek and Roman Philosophy." In

Philodorema. Essays in Greek and Roman Philosophy in

Honor of Phillip Mitsis, edited by Konstan, David and Sider,

David, 411-425. Fonte Aretusa: Parnassos Press

"In my discussion, I illustrate that a process of re-coloring was

necessary during this conspiratio in unum [between Greek and

Roman literature and philosophy]. I do so by using a rather

minor example which nevertheless pertains to a concept of

great importance for Roman culture—the concept of auctoritas

and the part it plays in art, literature, and philosophy. It is

particularly the latter role, the impact of auctoritas on

philosophy, which Boethius addresses in a passage of the

Consolatio that is going to be of interest to us. At the outset of

his work, Boethius portrays philosophia as a woman endowed

with many impressive features, including auctoritas(.8) In

combining philosophia and auctoritas, Boethius not only

brings together different concepts from different spheres, one

Greek, the other Roman; he also introduces two concepts

which, ever since the acculturation of philosophy in Rome, have

formed a relationship characterized by tension or even

opposition, as becomes obvious, e.g., from the philosophical

writings of Cicero.(9)

It should be noted in what follows that Boethius evokes this

very discussion and that he takes a stand in the controversy, as

it were, by applying the Roman concept of auctoritas to the

Greek idea of philosophy. By no means does this kind of

approach have to be an impediment to independent thinking;

rather, it helps to set it free, thus rendering the notion of this

combination a useful tool for understanding the literary form of

Boethius’s writing. We should therefore start by taking a first

glance at the Consolatio and by reminding ourselves of the

Roman concept of auctoritas and the role it plays (as

auctoritas antiquorum) within the philosophical discourse of

Cicero. Additionally, it should be kept in mind that the notion

of “authority of the ancient” or “ancient wisdom” also played an

important part in Greek philosophical—especially Platonic—

discourse, where it emerges as a concept that does not inhibit

independent ideas, but rather creates the necessary free space."

(pp. 412-413)

(8) Cf. Cons. 1.1.13, 1.4.7, 5.1.2

(9) For Christian authors, see K.-H. Lütcke, Auctoritas bei

Augustin, mit einer Einleitung zur romischen Vorgeschichte

des Begriffs. Tubinger Beitrage zur Altertumswissenschaft 44

(Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1968), 51 ff., 64 ff.; K.-H. Lütcke, "Art.

Auctoritas,” Augustinus-Lexikon. Band 1, vol. 1, fasc. 1/2, ed. C.

Mayer (Basel: Schwabe, 1986), 86–1994.

23. Farrell, Joseph. 2001. Latin Language and Latin Culture: from

Ancient to Modern Times. Cambridge: Cambridge University

Press

"This grammatical geography is directly implicated in the

poverty topos. Cicero, in a certain mood, could invert the topos

completely. At one point he boasts that in writing philosophy

``we seem to have made such progress that the Greeks do not

surpass us even in vocabulary'' (De natura deorum 1.8); and

again, more generally, ``I have often observed that Latin is not

only not destitute (inopem), as is vulgarly believed, but that it is

even richer (locupletiorem) than Greek'' (De finibus 1.10). The

etymology of locuples refers to the extensive land holdings in

which honest Roman wealth traditionally consisted. It is

tempting to see an implied connection here (as of course there

was in fact) with the enormous personal estates acquired by the

Roman elite and the vast expansion of public holdings in the

form of provinces ± including, of course, Greece. But for

another purpose, Cicero would deploy the motif more

conventionally by linking territorial to linguistic poverty:

``Greek is read among practically all peoples; Latin is

contained within its own borders, and those quite small'' (pro

Archia 23)." (pp. 37-38)

(...)

"In his doxography Lucretius systematically debunks the idea

that Greek is superior to Latin as a medium for poetry and

philosophy on every score: its supposedly greater beauty and

mellifluous qualities, its larger vocabulary, the ease with which

it forms compounds, its capacity for subtle philosophical

expression, all are revealed as traps that lead to obscurity,

muddled thinking, silliness. Even the geographical extension of

the language is turned to its disadvantage, except as westward

colonization has brought about proximity to Lucretius' own

linguistic domain.

The ``poverty'' of Latin is thus revealed as a positive advantage.

We tend to take Lucretius' disclaimer about ``poverty'' too

literally, to interpret it simplistically, and to believe in it

implicitly; but we shouldnot. For that matter, we should be

careful of assuming too easily that poverty does in fact connote

inadequacy. In Epicurus' and therefore Lucretius' ethical

system it is strongly asserted that human wants are few, that

luxury corrupts and debilitates. In Latin culture too the praise

of an unassuming, even a hardscrabble way of life is a constant

theme, representing almost an article of faith. When Lucretius

refers to the poverty of the Latin language that forces him to

work hard at finding the right words to convey Epicurus'

message, there is no reason to assume that he sees the poem he

has labored to write as second best. In producing a Latin De

rerum natura, Lucretius was not attempting to supply a

surrogate Peri phuseos but rather to improve on the original as

only the specific resources of the Latin language would allow

him to do.

Even Epicurus, forced to contend with the luxuriance of the

Greek tongue, could not find a form adequate to his message;

this task was left to his greatest disciple, who was also one of

the greatest masters of Latin speech." (pp. 50-61)

24. Fögen, Thorsten. 2011. "Latin as a Technical and Scientific

Language." In A Companion to the Latin Language, edited by

Clackson, James, 445-463. Malden: Blackwell

"This overview of the technical and scientific elements of Latin

starts with a brief summary of modern definitions of “technical”

texts and languages and connects them with ancient

approaches to their description. It takes into account the

lexical, morphosyntactical, pragmatic and stylistic features of

Latin technical texts and devotes particular attention to the role

of Greek in the formation of Latin as a language for specific

purposes." (p. 445)

(..)

"Cicero has contributed a great deal to the formation of Latin as

a standard language, in particular its technical vocabulary. It is

one of his major achievements to have developed a complex

Latin terminology in the areas of philosophy and rhetoric.

Although he does not deny that his own treatises are indebted

to Greek thinking, he is one of the first Roman authors to

exhibit a hitherto unknown self- confidence that enables him to

create literary products of their own value and thus make a

significant contribution to Roman culture as a whole. When he

claims that there exist no noteworthy, stylistically

accomplished and sufficiently precise philosophical texts in

Latin before his own time (Tusc. 1.5–6), it becomes obvious

that Cicero follows a rigorous strategy of self- advertisement.

He even goes so far as to say that he was the first to have

created a philosophical terminology in Latin (Fin. 3.5). This in

turn is part of what he calls the extension or expansion of the

Latin language (Fat. 1: ugentem linguam Latinam), or, to be

more precise, the enlargement or enrichment of its vocabulary

(copia uerborum; cf. Ac. 1.26), which thanks to his personal

commitment can now compete with that of Greek and even

surpass it (N.D. 1.8; cf. Tusc. 2.35, 3.8–11, de Orat. 2.17–18,

Sen. 45)."

25. Fraño, Peter. 2020. "Cicero's Translations of the Stoic Term

συμπάϑεια into Latin." Graeco-Latina Brunensia no. 25:87-97

Abstract: "The present study analyses Cicero’s approaches to

translating the Stoic term συμπάϑεια into Latin. In his treatise

On Fate, the Roman author differentiates two types of situation

in which Stoic sympathy functions. In the scientific sense, the

word sympathy refers to mutual connections between physical

phenomena, such as the connections between the phases of the

moon and the alternating tides. In the divinatory sense,

sympathy acts in the connection between a prophecy and its

fulfilment, such as between the flight of birds and the start of a

war.

In Cicero’s view, only the scientific sense of sympathy should be

accepted. For this reason, in his treatise On Fate, he translates

the Greek term συμπάϑεια using the Latin word contagio (Cic.

Fat. 3, 5–6), since the verb tango means “to make or come into

physical contact with”. In contrast, he does not accept that

sympathy acts in a divinatory sense, explaining the connection

between a prophecy and its fulfilment as the result of chance."

26. Friedlander, Paul. 1944. "The Greek behind Latin." The

Classical Journal no. 39:270-277

"It would be interesting to expatiate upon an enterprise of such

far-reaching importance as Cicero's foundation of classical

prose literature, "the only work," as Seneca says, "which the

Roman mind produced worthy of the Roman Empire." Cicero

himself tells us what induced him to write Latin philosophy. He

wanted to oppose the conviction "that any Romans who were

learned in the teaching of the Greeks and who felt an interest in

philosophy would rather read Greek than Roman writings, and,

conversely, that if they shrank from the sciences and the

systems of the Greeks, they would not care even for philosophy

in Latin, which cannot be understood without Greek learning."

(5) He wanted to overcome this Roman contempt for Latin

writings: "Why should they dislike their native language for

serious and important subjects when they are quite willing to

read Latin plays translated word for word from the Greek? Why

should not Latin be read by Romans?"(6) Cicero could have

written on philosophy in Greek, as he wrote the memoirs of his

consulship in Greek, but he preferred to create, after Greek

models, the classical prose of Roman philosophy. Creative

philosophy, to be sure, had not very much to gain, but literature

and general culture were better off for such works as the

Platonizing De Re Publica, with the Somnium at the end, or the

Hortensius; i.e., the Romanized Aristotle." (pp. 273-274)

(5) Academica 11 2, 4.

(6) De Finibus 1, 2, 4.

27. Glucker, John. 2012. "Cicero's Remarks on Translating

Philosophical Terms - Some General Problems." In Greek into

Latin from Antiquity until the Nineteenth Century, edited by

Glucker, John and Burnett, Charles, 37-96. London: The

Warburg Institute

"In this study I shall discuss some general problems concerning

the general nature of the emarks made by Cicero himself, in

various places in his philosophical and rhetorical works, about

his translation of a Greek term into Latin. We have over two

hundred such remarks scattered throughout these writings.

Some of them are brief and give us only the bare facts about the

Latin word and its Greek original – e.g. Luc. 54, ‘ea dico incerta

quae ἄδηλα Graeci’. Some are longer, explaining the various

ways of rendering a Greek term into Latin, and the reasons for

Cicero’s preference for this or that Latin term. Some of these

remarks appear as part of a more general discussion of how one

should translate Greek words for abstract concepts. The

Appendix to this article is, to the best of my knowledge, the

second complete collection of all such Greek-into-Latin

remarks in Cicero’s philosophical and rhetorical works. The

only other collection I have encountered is Appendix I to

Christian Nicolas’s Sic enim appello.1 Nicolas’s collection of

these notes is ‘minimalist’, and does not include the larger

contexts of Cicero’s explanations, hesitations, and

methodological discussions." (p. 37)

(1) Christian Nicolas, Sic enim appello: Essai sur l’autonymie

terminologique Gréco-latine chez Cicéron (Louvain, etc.,

2005), pp. 315–25.

28. ———. 2015. "Cicero as Translator and Cicero in Translation."

Philologica no. 10:37-53

"My lecture will attempt to consider some aspects of the

influence of Cicero as translator from Greek on future

generations, in Latin and beyond Latin. The influence of

Cicero’s translations of works like Aratea and Timaeus was

restricted to the period in which there were Latin readers who

preferred, even if they knew some Greek, to read works of

philosophy in Latin, and when the classics of Greek philosophy

were still regarded as essential reading for philosophers and

philosophically-minded people. It is no accident, therefore, that

of Cicero’s translations of Greek works none has survived in a

complete form. Indeed, most of Cicero’s own philosophical

works were also hardly read in the Middle Ages, when the

Greek classics no longer stood at the centre of philosophical

studies in Latin Western Europe, and they were rediscovered in

manuscripts, mostly in isolated monastic libraries, by Italian

Renaissance scholars, as part of the Revival of Learning.

Cicero’s abiding influence, in Western civilization, as a

translator from Greek consists in the Greek terms –

philosophical and rhetorical – for which he was one of the first

to create Latin equivalents. Some of these equivalents, such as

qualitas, comprehensio, and individuum, have survived into

modern English, French, German and Italian, and have been

borrowed from them into other modern languages. Some of

these terms have kept their original Latin meaning, or a

meaning very close to it, in modern languages, while some have

acquired a new – usually more restricted – meaning. Quality

still has the same meaning as Latin qualitas (and Greek

ποιότης), while honest and honnête have a rather limited

meaning in modern English and French, as against the more

general Latin honestum – on which later." (p. 38)

29. Görler, Woldemar. 2017. "Roman Philosophy? A Ciceronian

Ambition." In For a Skeptical Peripatetic: Festschrift in

Honour of J. Glucker, edited by Liebersohn, Yosef, Ludlam,

Ivor and Edelheit, Amos, 2202-232. Sankt Augustin Academia

Verlag.

30. Guite, Harold. 1962. "Cicero's Attitude to the Greeks." Greece &

Rome no. 9:142-159

"The preface of the De Finibus, published in 45, is concerned to

defend the translation of Greek philosophy into Latin and takes

entirely for granted the value of the original. As in the other

philosophical works the exposition is punctuated by allusions

to Greek inferiority." (p. 156, anote omitted)

(...)

"Book III deals with Stoicism, and a prefatory reference to its

technical language brings Cicero back to his favourite theme of

Latin linguistic superiority." (p. 156)

(,,,)

In the last paragraph of the De Finibus Atticus congratulates

Cicero on the success of his enterprise: (...) Here equality with

the Greeks is high praise, and the praise depends on the

admission that pre-Ciceronian Latin was inadequate for the

exposition of philosophy." (p. 156)

(,,,)

"But whence the eclecticism? From the school in which he was

trained and which was old when he was born, the school that

confounded philosophy with rhetoric. If Cicero was no true

philhellene, it was partly because he loved the wrong Greeks."

(p. 159)

31. Halichias, Ana Cristina. 2012. "The Intellectual Vocabulary in

Latin Philosophical Prose." International Journal of Cross-

Cultural Studies and Environmental Communication no. 1:69-

Abstract: "The article analyses the terms that make up the

lexical field of intellectual traits in the philosophical works of

Cicero, Seneca and Apuleius. The research demonstrates the

fact that these authors use a rich vocabulary, expressing

different nuances of the positive and negative intellectual

capacities."

32. Henderson, John. 2006. "From ΦΙΛΟΣΟΦΙΑ into

PHILOSOPHIA: Classicism and Ciceronianism." In Classical

Pasts: The Classical Traditions of Greece and Rome, edited by

Porter, James I., 173-203. Princeton: Princeton University

Press

"The death of daughter Tullia figures as Cicero’s equivalent of

the death of Socrates in Platonic self-authorization; it opens a

wound between the performativity of mourning rites within the

norms of Romanness, and the therapeutic ambitions of

Hellenistic philosophy to regulate grief and condolence.

While vindicating the father’s humanity (and through her

infant son’s death, Tullia’s postpartum decease stands as

gentilician quasi-oblivion for M. Tullius Cicero), the personal

catastrophe challenges the philosopher’s capacity to handle his

own case. Some of Tully has died, his purer self, immaculate

love and self-love; and he has lived on to feel this death, the

pain, distress, stress, and menace to his manliness (uirtus).(4)

Mores and ethics pull in different directions: they were

supposed to; yet their friction powers an ongoing competition

in mutual intertranslatability: the crisis of bereavement was the

proving ground for tradition and radicalism, it brought the self

closest to sampling its own finitude.

In Latin culture, Greek thought met a massive limit to its

purchase on credibility insofar as that might depend on

generalizability across cultural divides. If applicability, let alone

universalizability, mattered to φιλοσοφία, then norms for grief

in bereavement posed amongst the stiffest of tests; if

philosophia were to matter “beyond Athens,” then it must

bridge the intercultural chasm, cross every impasse into the

empire of Latinity. Cicero staked out his own writerly self-cure

programme as a brainstorming thrash-out between the

imperatives of Rome and the Academy: life handed him an

eloquent mise-en-scène: a death." (pp. 173-174)

(4) For the conciliatory style of the philosophers figured as “a

young girl, innocent, modest, and somehow unspoilt”: Cicero,

Orator 64.

33. Hine, Harry. 2016. "Philosophy and philosophi: From Cicero to

Apuleius." In Roman Reflections: Studies in Latin Philosophy,

edited by Williams, Gareth D. and Volk, Katharina, 13-29. New

York: Oxford University Press

"The aim of this chapter is to trace the history of the use of the

Greek loan word philosophus (“philosopher”) in Latin from the

late Republic down to the time of Aulus Gellius and Apuleius in

the second century CE. Cicero and Seneca regularly describe

themselves as pursuing philosophia (“philosophy”), and they

apply the verb philosophari (“to philosophize”) to themselves,

but neither of them ever straightforwardly calls himself, or any

of his social and political peers, a philosophus, or expresses any

aspiration to be one; nor are they so labeled by any

contemporaries or near contemporaries.(1) This is because for

them a philosophus is a professional, typically someone who

offers teaching in philosophy to young men or offers public

lectures on philosophy, and usually someone of lower social

status, generally Greek. The first Latin writer known to us who

publicly declares himself to be a philosophus is Apuleius.

This chapter will first describe the usage of Cicero and Seneca

in more detail, then will look at Apuleius’s usage, and will offer

some remarks on the social and intellectual changes that

accompanied this shift in the application of the word

philosophus." (pp. 13-14)

(1) The adjectival use of philosophus is well established in

Christian Latin, but extremely rare in our period (see TLL

10.1.2038.68–2039.26).

(...)

In Greek, on the other hand, in our period φιλόσοφος is

regularly used as an adjective; and whereas the Latin adverb

philosophe is not found until much later (see TLL

10.1.2039.27–34), Greek writers do use φιλοσόφως (indeed

Cicero switches into Greek and uses the adverb at Att. 7.8.3 and

13.20.4).

34. Hoenig, Christina. 2018. Plato's Timaeus and the Latin

Tradition. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press

Contents: List of Tables IX; Acknowledgements I; List of

Abbreviations XIII; Introduction 1; 1 The Setting: Plato’s

Timaeus 14; 2 Cicero 38; 3 Apuleius 102; 4 Calcidius 160; 5 5

Augustine 215; Bibliography 285; Index Verborum Graecorum

305; Index Verborum Latinorum 306; Index Locorum 309;

Subject Index 315-331.

"As we turn to Cicero’s Timaean methodology, my aim is to

provide evidence for the agenda I believe him to have followed

in his Timaeus project: to present the Timaean creation

account as the cosmological theory that would have been

adopted by the sceptical Academy as the most probable

position.

I will go about answering these questions in several steps. In

the first part of this section, I illustrate how Cicero translated

Tim. 29b2– d3, the passage in which Timaeus reflects upon his

methodology as a narrator, by resorting to vocabulary

characteristic of the investigative methodology associated with

Philo’s sceptical Academy. At the same time, I shall emphasize

the extent to which Cicero stresses the rhetorical nature of the

sceptical investigative method, an aspect of his Latin

translation that has gone unnoticed thus far. Taking Cicero’s

translation of this passage to be representative of his overall

authorial approach, I shall argue that Timaeus’ speaking part

was most likely intended for Cicero himself. Finally, I shall

argue that Cicero found in Timaeus’ narrative at Tim. 29d7–

30c1 an argumentative pattern that, with the help of some

minor modifications of the Greek text, appeared rather like an

example for the application of sceptical– rhetorical

investigative method to a question of fundamental import, the

inquiry after the reason that induced the demiurge to create the

visible cosmos." (pp. 55-56)

35. ———. 2023. "Translation." In The Oxford Handbook of

Roman Philosophy, edited by Garani, Myrto, Konstan, David

and Reydams.Schils, Gretchen, 293-323. New York: Oxford

University Press

"It has become a commonplace observation, in the particular

case of Greek- Latin translation, that Roman translators

generally prioritized literary creativity, invention, and variatio

over authenticity and faithfulness. Yet, to appreciate their

contributions fully, we need to contextualize Roman translators

beyond customary references, for instance, to Horace’s warning

against the all- too- slavish “faithful interpreter” (fidus

interpres, Ars P. 133), or to Cicero’s maxim of translating not

“like an interpreter [he means by this ‘literally’], but like an

orator” (De optimo genere oratorum 14, see below). In addition

to adjusting our expectations with regard to the equivalence

between Greek source text and Roman translation, it is useful

to examine the specific manner in which a source text is

integrated into a new environment: what parts of the Greek text

are translated? Does the source text appear in a new genre? Are

speaking parts assigned to a specific character, fictional or

otherwise? Does the translation explicate, disambiguate, create

new associations, connotations, semantic relations? I shall

bring these and similar questions to bear on several writers of

Roman philosophy." (p. 294)

(...)

"We will witness the changing role of translation for Roman

philosophical literature as we look at the authors Cicero,

Lucretius, Apuleius, and Calcidius. For each of these authors,

we will find, translation is a defining factor in their engagement

with Greek philosophy." (p. 295)

36. Hösle, Vittorio. 2008. "Cicero's Plato." Wiener Studien no.

121:145-170

Summary: "The essay explores the relation of Cicero to Plato.

First, Cicero interprets Plato fundamentally as a sceptic (and so

in a way radically different fom Middle and Neoplatonism);

secondly, Cicero is proud of the superiority of the Roman

culture in various respects; thirdly, Cicero vies with the

dialogues written by Plato. The essay shows how even more

than the explicit statements on Plato, the indirect criticism in

the conception of Cicero's dialogues sheds light on his relation

to Plato. Cicero's insistence on Plato's Pythagoreanism must be

taken very seriously, since it does not fit well with his general

view of Plato.

37. Hutchinson, G. O. 2013. Greek to Latin: Frameworks and

Contexts for Intertextuality. New York: Oxford University

Press

"This book is designed in four growing parts; a prospective on

those parts may be helpful. Part I will look at Roman

conceptions of Greek and Latin literature in time. It will show

the notional separation in time of the two sequences of authors,

and the quasi-military conflict imagined between them. Part II

will set out the different places in which Romans would actually

encounter, or have experience related to, Greek literature both

classic and contemporary. Many kinds of performance and

interaction will show the intensity and liveliness of such

experience.

The panorama will bring out how Greek literature is both

integrated with Roman existence and conceived of as located

elsewhere. Part III will show Roman conceptions of the Greek

language as contrasting with Latin, aesthetically and morally.

Groups of related passages will be analysed closely, to see how

Latin exploitation of Latin differs from Latin exploitation of

Greek, and to see how Latin exploitation of Greek operates

within the framework of the pre-existing stylistic parameters

which are set by Latin author and period. Part IV will look at

interaction with Greek within large generic frameworks. Three

prose supergenres, philosophy, history, and oratory, are seen to

exhibit basic differences in their relation to Greek. The

hexameter super-genre will be explored in closer textual detail;

diverging relations to Greek will appear. These differences will

be seen to connect with material, period, author, text." (p. 2)

38. Inwood, Brad. 2007. "Seneca, Plato and Platonism: The case of

Letter 65." In Platonic Stoicism - Stoic Platonism: The

Dialogue between Platonism and Stoicism in Antiquity, edited

by Bonazzi, Mauro and Helmig, Christoph, 149-168. Leuven:

Leuven University Press

"I will be looking at one of the famous letters [Letter 65], whose

main theme is causation, neither as a mere source for the

recovery and reconstruction of middle Platonic doctrine nor as

a simple reaction to the evolving school culture of the day. It is

not as though we have any substantial body of evidence for

such schools which antedates Seneca and so might be thought

to have historical value greater than what we can infer from his

texts, which are themselves some of the earliest and best

evidence (best, if only because these are integral works not in

need of complex reconstruction) for the state of philosophical

life in Rome at the time.(4) I will be focussing on letter 65, but

this cannot properly be done in abstraction from its obvious

companion piece, letter 58 (which I believe helps to set the

scene for it in the larger economy of the collection of letters), or

from its immediate sequel, letter 66, which seems to be equally

though less overtly engaged with Platonic themes such as the

relation of body and soul to one another. One point for which I

wish to argue is that Seneca should be seen as reacting directly

to several Platonic dialogues and that we should not leap to the

conclusion that his main sources – if it is even right to think in

terms of ‘sources’ from which he might be supposed to have

copied rather than works of philosophical literature by which

he was influenced in some measure – were written works from

Platonist schools." (p. 150)

(4) Note, for example, the closing chapter of NQ VII.

39. Jocelyn, H. D. 1977. "The ruling class of the Roman Republic

and Greek philosophers." Bulletin of the John Rylands Library

no. 59:323-366

"What I am concerned with in this essay is a kind of activity

imported into Rome from those communities of Greek culture

which fell under Roman domination during the last three

centuries of the Republic and the degree to which this activity

affected the character of Roman society and the behaviour of

individual Romans. The formal study of logic, physics and

ethics, the three areas into which Greek φιλοσοφοι divided the

content of their teaching,(2) could be pursued seriously in an

ancient Mediterranean society only by men of considerable

wealth(3) and the modern student must bear in mind

constantly how few of the families which possessed the Roman

citizenship also possessed sufficient material resources to

permit an individual member to devote part of his life to an

activity like philosophical study. It is also important to

remember that not all wealthy families shared directly in the

governance of the Republican state. The senator is not to be

confused with the average Roman or even with the average

wealthy Roman." (p. 323, a note omitted)

(2) For the triple division see Cic. De orat. 1.68, Ac. 1.19, 2.116,

Fin. 4.4, Diog. Laert. 1.18,7.39,10.30.

(3) For the expensiveness of higher education see, for example,

Plat. Prot. 326 c, [Lysias] 20.11, Lucian, Somn. I.

40. Jones, David Mervyn. 1959. "Cicero as a Translator." Bulletin of

the Institute of Classical Studies no. 6:22-34

"The subject of Cicaro’s translations from Greek greatly exceeds

the range of a single paper. It cannot be cleanly severed from

topics of even wider scope, on the one hand the history of the

development of Latin as a medium of literary and intellectual

expression, on the other the history of Latin literature and

Cicero’s place in it. This paper, sketchy and superficial in

treatment as it is, and notwithstanding some adverse criticisms

of detail, is intended as a tribute to a genius notably creative in

tha field of language and style.

Considering the variety of works cited by Cicero in translation,

not all of which survive entire, it is remarkable that in the

overwhelming majority of cases the Greek of the translated

passages is known from one source or another. I therefore

mention now, since I shall disregard it in what follows, the

important passage of twenty-eight lines from Aeschylus’

Prometheus Liberatus (Tusc. 11.23).

I begin with a review of the translations and the various

motives which seem to have prompted them. They fall into two

main groups, each containing both verse and prose; the first

belongs to Cicero’s youth, and can be related to his education,

the second to the period of his philosophical writings. The

translations of Aeschines and Demosthenes occupy a place

apart." (p. 22)

Bibliographia. Annotated bibliographies

Raul Corazzon || rc@ontology.co || Info

From Greek to Latin. The

development of the Latin

philosophical vocabulary. Second

part

Bibliography

English studies K - Z

1. Kaimio, Jorma. 1979. The Romans and the Greek Language.

Helsinki: Societas Scientiarum Fennica

"The present work comprises the first part of a sociolinguistic

study of Rome and the Roman world, the theme of which is

concerned with the position and status of the Greek language

within this context.

(....)

The division of the study into two parts is of practical value; it is

based on the outstanding importance which Greek, as

compared with other languages except latin, had in different

spheres of Roman life. From the point of view of the whole

Empire this exceptional position can still be seen on the

linguistic map of Europe. Moreover, the problems involved in

the status of Greek and that of the other indigenous languages

are as different from each other as was the eventual outcome of

sociolinguistic development in the eastern and western parts of

the Empire." (p. 9)

(...)

Cicero considered himself a pioneer of Latin philosophy, and

together with M. Terentius Varro and M. Junius Brutus he

represents the only significant period of philosophical literature

in Latin before late Antiquity. But these writers, too, had to

defend their use of Latin, and their influence on contemporary

society remained small.(178) As the works of Varro and Brutus

are lost, we know only the apologies of Cicero, but interestingly,

one of these occurs in a conversation with Varro (ac. post. 1.4-

8), while another is addressed to Brutus (de fin. 1.1-5).

(...)

"The third century A.D. knows only few pagan philosophers,

and for our purpose, only one of them, Aemilius Gentilianus,

(215) is of any importance. He was from Etruria, a pupil of

Plotinus in Rome; he published a great number of Plotinus'

treatises as well as a large number of his own works, all in

Greek. One may assume that with such prominent figures as

Plotinus and Porphyrius, Greek invariably constituted the

language of the philosophical centre of Rome, irrespective of

the origin of the philosophers." (p. 248)

(178) ac. pos. 1.5; Tusc. 1.6; 2.7; 4.6; ad fam. 15.2; cf. Quint.

10.1.124.

(215) See Zeller,[The Philosophy of Greeks in their Historical

Development] IIL.2, 688—692.

2. Kotzia, P. 2007. "Philosophical Vocabulary." In A History of

Ancient Greek: From the Beginnings to Late Antiquity, edited

by Christidis, Anastassios-Fivos, 1089-1103. Cambridge:

Cambridge University Press

"The way philosophical concepts were formulated reflects the

structure of the Greek language, the nature of its syntax and

vocabulary, and its distinctive characteristics in general. The

classic example in almost all studies relating to the

development of philosophical termninology is the potential for

substantivization inherent in the definite article. In Ancient

Greek, apart from ''things'' in the narrowest sense, any of the

following can become the subject of a clause, and subsequently

a term: not only properties e.g., the substantivized adjective

ἀπείρων ''the unlimited'' for Anaximander's ''principle'';

compare Cicero's difficulty in rendering Socrates' τό άγαθων in

Latin, which has no definite article: id quod re vera bonum

est), but also infinitives, participles, prepositional, adverbial,

and pronominal phrases, and even entire clauses." (p. 1091)

3. Lampe, Kurt. 2014. "Greek Philosophy, Translation." In

Encyclopedia of Ancient Greek Language and Linguistics.

Volume 2 G-O, edited by Giannakis, Georgios K., 136-140.

Leiden: Brill

"My focus in this article is not the history of translation, but

rather the nature of translation and its consequences for Greek

philosophy. Because ‘translation theory’ encompasses

linguistics, analytical and continental philosophies of language,

and the broader context of semiotics (→ Ancient Philosophers

on Language), it raises possibilities of enormous diversity and

complexity. In the following I merely provide a preliminary

survey. At the most naive level we might formulate the aim of

translating as “saying the same thing in the target language as

the source text says in Greek”. We may then ask at what level

one should “say the same”: should one seek equivalences word-

by-word, phrase-by-phrase, or with greater latitude? Lexical

equivalence raises obvious problems. First, the target language

often lacks parts of speech present in Greek (Word Classes

(méré tot lögou), Ancient Theories of).

For example, Latin lacks articles, and English is short on →

particles. (The problem would be enormously greater in a

polysynthetic language like Navajo). Second, even where

grammatical forms coincide, it is frequently impossible to find

a word with the same connotation as the Greek word to be

translated. For example, the Cyrenaic philosophers designate

pönos as the greatest intrinsic evil. Pönos refers primarily to

bodily exertion and the discomfort associated with it. It is

usually translated in English as ‘pain,’ but this English term

does not connote exactly the same thing as the Greek original:

most importantly, ‘pain’ is only very weakly associated with

exertion." (p. 136)

4. Leeman, Anton Daniel. 1963. Orationis Ratio: The Stylistic

Theories and Practice of the Roman Orators Historians and

Philosophers. Amsterdam: Hakkert

"If historiography was to reach the level of the classical Greek

achievements only in the decades after Cicero’s death, it had at

least an ancestry reaching back well into the second century

B.C. The third genre [after oratory and historiography] of

literary prose that was recognized as such by the Romans,

philosophy, had a harder task yet in establishing itself at Rome,

though it reached a standard with which at least the Romans

themselves were satisfied already during the latter days of

Cicero. In the second century Rome remained almost totally a-

philosophical - the poet Ennius is of course a striking and

unique exception —, though some outstanding Greek

philosophers made their appearance there, together with

adventurous rhetoricians. A man like Panaetius was accepted in

certain quarters, mainly because he gave no offence and

supported the Roman political and moral views. But Carneades,

who did give offence, was told to leave the place at once. A

deeper interest in Greek philosophy as we find it in men like C.

Laelius ‘Sapiens’ and Q. Aelius Tubero, who failed to become a

praetor in 129 B.C. because of his Stoic convictions, seems to

have been exceptional. We have viewed the intimate relations

of the Gracchi with Greek philosophers in the light of an early

connection between ‘progressive’ politics and Graecophilia.

When Cicero decided to introduce philosophy into Latin

literature, he found the field virtually uncultivated; at the same

time he felt that he had to overcome a strong Roman prejudice,

even in the intelligentsia, against this most Greek of all Greek

activities. There is indeed a marked difference between his plea

for a high standard of historiography as we found it in our last

chapter, and the curious arguments which he put forward as a

defence of his turning philosopher at a time when we expected

him to become Rome’s first ‘literary’ historian. We find these

arguments scattered throughout the prologues of his

philosophica, but they are expounded nowhere in a more

significant manner than in the first prologue of the Tusculanae

disputationes, which is one of the most revealing documents

for the history of Latin culture and conceptions. Therefore we

shall have to deal with it at some length. It is addressed to

Brutus, who in this respect seems to have been of one mind

with him - and he seems to have been one of the very few

indeed." (p. 198)

5. Lévy, Carlos. 2003. "Cicero and the Timaeus." In Plato’s

Timaeus as Cultural Icon, edited by Reydams-Schils, Gretchen

J., 95-110. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press.

6. ———. 2022. "Cicero and the Creation of a Latin Philosophical

Vocabulary." In The Cambridge Companion to Cicero's

Philosopy, edited by Atkins, Jed W. and Bénatouïl, Thomas, 71-

87. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press

"It is both right and erroneous to say that Cicero was the

creator of Roman philosophical vocabulary. Before him, at the

outset of the Hellenization of Roman culture, poets like Ennius

(c. 240 - 170 BCE) and Lucilius (180/148? - 102/101? BCE)

began to give Latin equivalents of Greek concepts.

This task was brilliantly pursued by Lucretius, after the rather

disastrous attempts, at least according to Cicero (Acad. 15-6;

Tusc. 4.6), of Amafinius and Rabirius to propagate the

Epicurean doctrine. Lucretius was not only a great poet but also

a prodigious demiurge of the language, trying to remedy the

poverty of Latin, patrii sermonis egestas. He succeeded in

expressing a lot of Epicurean technical terms in Latin, though

the Latin vocabulary of his literary predecessors did not seem at

this time suited to accommodate an atomistic theory. By

comparison, Cicero’s originality lay in giving precise

translations of many Platonic, Academic, Stoic, and Peripatetic

concepts, in translating many Greek philosophical texts, and

above all in strongly asserting the right of Latin to become a

philosophical language. All those who pretend that Cicero

dramatically lacked originality in the field of philosophy ought

to imagine what a challenge it was to claim that there was no

structural reason preventing Latin from becoming a

philosophical language.." (p. 71, notes omitted)

7. Long, A. A. 2003. "Roman Philosophy." In The Cambridge

Companion to Greek and Roman Philosophy, edited by Sedley,

David, 184-210. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press

"Prior to Lucretius and Cicero, there had been no philosophical

writing of consequence in the Latin vernacular. This explains

Lucretius’ complaint in his poem about the ‘poverty’ of the

Latin language for rendering the obscure details of Epicurean

physics.

Cicero, writing a few years later, frequently finds it necessary to

coin Latin words for the Greek terms he needs to convey to his

readers. Hence we have, as English derivatives from Cicero’s

Latin, such words as ‘quality’ (poiotes). The Latin that he and

Lucretius inherited was ill-suited to expressing the nuances of

philosophical Greek. Yet, thanks to their remarkable initiative,

Latin was launched on the way to becoming the superb

instrument for scientific discourse that it would be for

Copernicus, Galileo, Descartes and Newton. Indeed, a large

part of our English philosophical terminology, although

ultimately derived from Greek, is most directly taken from

classical and mediaeval Latinizations of Greek terms, e.g.

‘virtue’, ‘substance’, ‘essence’, ‘element’, ‘principle’, ‘matter’,

‘form’, ‘potentiality’, ‘accident’, ‘efficient cause’, ‘final cause’,

etc. (cf. glossary, pp. 373–85, for details of these and others)."

(p. 185)

8. McElduff, Siobhán. 2009. "Living at the level of the word.

Cicero's rejection of the interpreter as translator." Trasnslation

Studies no. 2:133-146

Abstract: "This article argues that Cicero’s rejection of the

interpreter as a literal translator was not just a rejection of a

particular style of translation but an attempt to keep translation

of Greek literature in Rome an elite activity. I discuss the social

status and role of Roman interpreters and their repeated

association with limited education in our sources, finally

concluding that the interpreter is despised as a translator by

Cicero not necessarily because he translates literally, but

because he is a potential rival translator from a lower social

rank who may allow the spread of inappropriate translations of

Greek material to Rome."

9. ———. 2013. Roman Theories of Translation: Surpassing the

Source. New York: Routledge

Chapter 4: Cicero’s Impossible Translation: On the Best Type of

Orator and Beyond, pp. 104-121.

"Marcus Tullius Cicero (106–43 BCE) was Rome’s greatest

orator, as well as a prodigious translator of Greek thought and

texts into Latin. He was also Rome’s most famous writer on

translation.(1) It is a rare introduction to the history of

translation in the West that does not cite his comment that he

translated “not as an interpreter but as an orator” (On the Best

Type of Orator 14). Therein lies part of the problem: as

Frederick Rener pointed out, the endless repetition of this

formula tends to have a soporific effect on those who encounter

it [Rener, Frederick M. 1989. Interpretatio: Language and

Translation from Cicero to Tytler. Atlanta, GA: Rodopi,] 1989,

2. Familiarity has bred not so much contempt as a tendency to

switch off. As a result, Cicero’s comments on translation are

rarely situated within the context of his other works, his literary

and political aims, his personal circumstances, and the cultural

moment he inhabited and helped shape. His translation theory

needs to be seen as part of a larger cultural debate, not as a set

of sound bites isolated from the world of the Late Republic." (p.

96, a note omitted)

(1) I discuss here Cicero’s writing on translation, rather than his

translations, the latter being an enormous topic and outside the

scope of this work.(...)

10. Mohrmann, Christine. 1951. "How Latin Came to Be the

Language of Early Christendom." Studies: An Irish Quarterly

Review no. 40:277-288

"When the Gospel of Christ was brought to the Western part of

the Roman empire, the new thoughts and interests coming with

Christianity transformed the Latin language. A new spirit

moved the disciples of the new -doctrine and new necessities of

expression stimulated the creative powers of the early Christian

communities. In this way came into being a christianized Latin,

which survived antiquity: it survived in the Romance languages

and it survived also in medieval Latin. Expansion of Latin in

the early Middle Ages is expansion of Christianity: for

Christianity has Latinity in its train and the Northern peoples

adopted Latin with the Christian faith. Latin was the language

of Christianity and at the same time of civilization. In this way

medieval Latin became the mouth-piece of medieval Christian

civilization. The writers of the Middle Ages moulded the Latin

tongue to utter the various matters which moved their minds:

for medieval Latin was not an immutable and dead language,

even though it was not the mother-tongue of peoples and

nations. Under the two universal influences of Christianity and

antique culture medieval Latin will be for centuries and

centuries the repository of European thought. This evolution

has been possible because Latin had become, in the course of

the first centuries of our era, a Christian language: Latin had

been modified and reinspired and loosed in the bosom of the

Christian communities. It was inspired by the spirit of Christian

faith and it was modified by the exigencies of Christian life." (p.

277)

11. O'Sullivan, Neil. 2019. "Manuscript Evidence for Alphabet-

Switching in the Works of Cicero. Common Nouns and

Adjectives." The Classical Quarterly no. 68

"Of the hundreds of Greek common nouns and adjectives

preserved in our MSS of Cicero, about three dozen are found

written in the Latin alphabet as well as in the Greek. So we find,

alongside συμπάθεια, also sympathia, and ἱστορικός as well as

historicus. This sort of variation has been termed alphabet-

switching;(1) it has received little attention in connection with

Cicero,(2) even though it is relevant to subjects of current

interest such as his bilingualism and the role of code-switching

and loanwords in his works.3 Rather than addressing these

issues directly, this discussion sets out information about the

way in which the words are written in our surviving MSS of

Cicero and takes further some recent work on the presentation

of Greek words in Latin texts." (p. 498)

(1) J.N. Adams, Bilingualism and the Latin Language

(Cambridge, 2003), 71.

(2) S.C.R. Swain, ‘Bilingualism in Cicero? The evidence of code-

switching’, in J.N. Adams, M. Janse and S.C.R. Swain (edd.),

Bilingualism in Ancient Society: Language Contact and the

Written Text (Oxford, 2002), 128–67, at 156–7, and M.

Dubuisson, ‘Le grec da la correspondance de Cicéron: questions

préliminaires sur un cas de bilinguisme’, La Linguistique 41

(2005), 69–86, at 71–2, both mention it briefly.

12. ———. 2020. "Manuscript Evidence for Alphabet-Switching in

the Works of Cicero: Proper Nouns and Adjectives." The

Classical Quarterly no. 70

"Our manuscripts of Cicero contain dozens of Greek word sthat

are presented in some passages in Greek letters, and in others

are transliterated into Latin. In a recent paper I collected the

evidence for this phenomenon in connection with common

nouns and adjectives (for example ὑποθήκη vs hypotheca,

ἱστορικός vs historicus), surveyed scholarship to date and

posited an interpretative framework which is assumed in this

study also. Key components of this framework are the use of

mixed alphabets in surviving ancient documents (especially

inscriptions) and an awareness of the frequency with which

modern editors change the alphabets in the manuscripts when

dealing with Greek words—hence the importance of using the

apparatus critici, not just the printed text, of our editions. The

earlier paper was also strict in its exclusion of words in

continuous passages, and even short phrases, of Greek, since

that context excludes the option of transliteration for the

author. The major contention of that earlier study was that a

coherent pattern of use in the manuscripts can only really be a

reflection of Cicero's own considered choice of alphabets:

consistently inexplicable choice may indicate that Cicero

himself was indifferent to which alphabet he used for single

Greek words, or that our copyists paid no attention to this

aspect of their exemplars, or both." (p. 677

13. Powell, Jonathan G. F. 1995. "Cicero's Translations from

Greek." In Cicero the Philosopher: Twelve Papers, edited by

Powell, Jonathan G. F., 273-300. Oxford: Clarendon Press

"A number of passages in Cicero's philosophical works are

translated directly from Greek. Apart from this, Cicero devotes

considerable attention to the problems of rendering individual

Greek words and concepts in Latin. In this chapter I shall

examine these two aspects of Cicero's literary activity, with a

view to enabling the reader to assess more accurately Cicero's

contribution to the development of the Latin language as a

medium for the expression of abstract thought. I do not aim to

provide a commentary on the translated passages or to

catalogue in detail every item in Cicero's philosophical

vocabulary, but merely to identify the central issues and

suggest some possible lines of thought about them.(1)" (p. 273)

(1) In this chapter I have disregarded the poetic translations

which Cicero includes in the philosophical works.

14. ———. 2007. "Translation and culture in ancient Rome:

Cicero's theory and practice of translation." In Übersetzung -

Translation - Traduction. 2. Teilband: Ein internationales

Handbuch zur Übersetzungsforschung, edited by Kittel,

Harald, Frank, Armin Paul and Greiner, Norbert, 1132-1137.

Berlin: de Gruyter

"Cicero was well aware in practice that there was a wide

spectrum of different kinds of translation, from the most

pedantically literal (and hence inelegant or unidiomatic) to the

freest of literary adaptations. He himself was prepared to place

his own activities at different points on the scale according to

his purposes in writing. His tendency to self-justification, so

insistent in his public career, extended also to literary activities,

including translation, and we have a number of remarks from

his pen regarding the policy he was adopting in particular

instances.

These remarks should not, however, be overvalued. They do not

constitute a well thought out and rigorous 'theory of transla-

tion', but are largely practical and intuitive, responding to the

demands of the individual occasion. However, they do cast light

on his methods and assumptions, and may help to warn us

against judging his translations by in- appropriate criteria. (For

a fuller treatment see Powell [Cicero's Translations from

Greek] 1995.)" (p. 1134)

(...)

"Cicero has sometimes been credited (at least since Plutarch's

Life of Cicero) with a systematic intention to create Latin

equivalents for all the Greek philosophical terms, but he

himself does not quite claim this, and his actual practice does

not go so far. His feeling for elegance in Latin precluded too

much innovation in vocabulary. Cicero makes some suggestions

for new coinages, only to abandon them thereafter (e.g.

veriloquium for 'etymology').

Some of these (e.g. beatitudo 'blessedness', medietas 'median')

were rescued by subsequent generations of Latin speakers and

became current even in the colloquial spoken language, as

shown by their occurrence in Roman literature or by the

existence of derivatives in Romance languages (e.g. Italian

'meta' , French 'moitié', both meaning 'half', derive from

medietas). Indeed, some of Cicero's coinages became so well

established that they are now part of the common European

linguistic inheritance, albeit usually with their original meaning

much changed. One may instance qualitas (quality: it may be

that Varro had a hand in the invention of this item), moralis

(moral), evidentia (evidence), indifferens (indifferent)." (p.

1135)

15. Rawson, Elizabeth. 1985. Intellectual Life in the Late Roman

Republic. London: Duckworth

Part II: The Artes, § 19. Philosophy, pp. 282-297.

"Fundamentally the book is concerned with figures of the

second rank, and with general patterns. We read Cicero and

Lucretius ; we also read Catullus, Caesar (though not the

fragments of his De Analogia) and Sallust; but we tend to know

far too little of the intellectual, as opposed to the political,

background to these writers. The Romans of this period had

just learnt that, if one wishes to write about a subject, one must

begin by defining it. 'Intellectual life' is not altogether easy to

define. I had a number of definite questions in mind as I

worked, however. What were the basic opportunities and

constraints in intellectual activity? For example, where were

the books and otherdocuments, and who could use them? How

far could one do without written materials? Who were the men

who pursued the different branches of study - from what

backgrounds did they come and how were they financed?

Which scholars were Greek, which Roman - and is there a strict

dividing line? Which can be called professionals and which

amateurs ? What were the relations between these different

classes? The role of the many learned Greeks who worked in

Rome is, it emerges, not altogether easy to decide.

Furthermore, what sort of activity was there outside the city, in

the rest of Italy, and how closely integrated was any of it with

what went on in the capital ? While the last and most important

task is to discover what intellectual objectives were pursued,

irrespective of the breadth of the audience which might be

expected, it is also vital to see what that audience in any case

might be. And what changes came about in the period of over

half a century with which we are dealing? To answer these

questions at all it is necessary at present to turn to a farge

number of specialised studies, mostly not in the English

language. This book tries to draw the threads together and (to

change the metaphor) to draw as full a general picture as our

inadequate evidence allows." (pp. VVII-VIII)

16. ———. 1989. "Roman Tradition and the Greek World." In The

Cambridge Ancient History. Second Edition. Volume 8: Rome

and the Mediterranean to 133 B.C., edited by Astin, A. E.,

Walbank, F. W., Frederiksen, M. W. and Ogilvie, R. M., 422-

476

"The distance which Rome had travelled in less than a century

was enormous. But there was still a long way to go. In 148

probably no Roman, of the upper class at least, had thought to

pay an extended visit toAthens or Rhodes for serious study with

the best Greek masters of rhetoric or philosophy, or, unless he

happened to be there already on public business, had gone

sightseeing in Greece. Exiles withdrew to the cities of Latium or

Etruria, not to the Greek East. It was barely respectable for a

noble to write verse, certainly not for him to abandon public

ambitions altogether for a life of study, as a few men of

prominent family did in the first century. If philosophy was

beginning to be known, Academic Scepticism, Epicureanism

and Cynicism were probably still all distrusted. In 146, when

political developments disrupted the Museum at Alexandria, it

seems that none of the scholars who had worked there fled to

Rome, though we are told that 'Greece and the islands' were

filled with refugee intellectuals of every kind(230) (it is true

that there was an Alexandrian painter in Rome somewhat

earlier(231). It was not till the first century that, as Philodemus

shows, a visit to Rome became the normal ambition of a Greek

teacher,(232) partly owing to the extinction of the various royal

courts that had offered patronage, and to the impoverishment

of many Greek cities, partly perhaps to the fact that by now so

many famous Greek libraries had come to Rome, mainly as

spoils of war, that scholarly activity could be carried on there as

well as anywhere else, and Rome and Alexandria could be

spoken of in the same breath as intellectual centres.

(,,,)

But the earlier period, as we have seen, had laid the

foundations for most of these developments. Above all, it had

on the one hand provided the basis for a real civilization that

should be something more than a pale copy of a Greek model,

but should preserve and develop much that was genuinely

Roman or Italian. And, on the other, though it ultimately

distanced the educated or wealthy Roman from his humbler

fellow cuntrymen (not that all of these were completely

untouched by any sort of Greek influence), it allowed and

initiated that possibility of understanding and co-operation

between the Latin- and Greek-speaking elites, which was to be

one of the most important factors in the long survival of the

Roman Empire." (pp. 475-476).

(230). iv. 184D-C (from Andron of Alexandria and Menecles of

Barca).

(231) Diod. Sic. xxxi. 18; cf. Val. Max. v. 1 - a topographos,

either a scene-painter or one who painted the pictures of cities

etc. carried in triumphs.

(232 Phld. Rhel. 11.145 Sudhaus.

17. Rèe, Jonathan. 2001. "The translation of philosophy." New

Literary History no. 32:223-257

"The discrepancies which Greek philosophers identified within

their own language grew even clearer when their work became

an object of study for people whose first language was not

Greek but Latin. When Cicero decided to devote the last years

of his life to philosophical translation - "teaching philosophy to

speak Latin" - he was acutely conscious of the limitations of his

linguistic resources.(44) He had to force strange new

abstractions out of existing Latin words (humanitas from homo

for example), to institute a basic set of Greek-Latin

equivalences (natura for phusis, res publica for polis, ars for

techné), and invent new Latin words by transliteration (logica,

dialectica, dogma). He also created an array of loan-

translations, or caiques, analyzing Greek words and translating

them part by part (as with subjectum for hypokeimenon). By all

these means he created, in effect, a half-Greek enclave within

Latin, for the purpose of discussing philosophy.(45)

Purists could of course object to Cicero's brash translation

language, and three centuries later, when Plotinus spent

twenty-five years working in Rome, he refused· to teach in any

language but Greek. But it was a losing battle, and philosophy

in the mainstream Christian tradition from Augustine to the

Renaissance was conducted almost entirely in Latin." (p. 247)

(44) 44 Cicero, Oratio pro Archia Poeta, ix, 23.

(45) Paul Friedlander, "The Greek behind Latin," Classical

journal, 39 (February 1944), 270-77.

18. Reiley, Katharine G. 1909. Studies in the Philosophical

Terminology of Lucretius and Cicero. New York: The Columbia

University Press

"Cicero and Lucretius created a philosophical terminology for

the Latin language. They found their native tongue a clear and

vigorous medium for the expression of the energies of a

practical and objective people. They left it a fine instrument for

the discussions of abstract and speculative philosophy." (p. 1, a

note omitted)

(,,,)

"The scope of the comparison is narrower than we could wish,

for Lucretius concerned himself chiefly with the mechanical

and physical side of Epicureanism, while Cicero, whose

philosophical interests were largely ethical, passed over these

elements of the system in rapid summary. When, however, the

interests of the two thinkers touched, we see in full view, just as

in the processes of a laboratory, their terminology in the very

making. A study of the causes and influences operating to

determine their choice of identical or different terms to express

the same idea, should be full of informing interest alike for the

philosopher, the linguist and the psychologist." (pp. 2-3)

(...)

"It is the object of our investigation to examine, as far as the

necessary limitations of so large an inquiry may permit, the

degree of success attained by each philosopher in the creation

of a terminology and the manner in which he achieved it." (p. 7)

19. Reinhardt, Tobias. 2016. "To See and to Be Seen: On Vision and

Perception in Lucretius and Cicero." In Roman Reflections:

Studies in Latin Philosophy, edited by Williams, Gareth D. and

Volk, Katharina, 63-90. New York: Oxford University Press

"4.1. Introduction. There exist many stereotypes about what

Roman philosophical texts are, and some of these stereotypes

derive from the history of Roman philosophy as it is written

into the texts themselves; the notion of patrii sermonis egestas

(Lucr. 1.832, 3.260) is a case in point. What makes a language

poorly suited or poorly equipped to talk and do philosophy in

it? Surely not the absence of technical terms. The aim of my

chapter is to show that the texts written by Lucretius and Cicero

reveal profound reflection not only on the “content” to be

conveyed—the doctrines expounded in their Greek “sources”—

but also on the preexisting resources of the Latin language, and

that they engender the reader’s retracing of these reflections

and their pursuit beyond the boundaries of the written text." (p.

63)

(...)

"4. 5. Conclusion. I have, at the end of sections 4.3 and 4.4,

offered some concluding observations specific to Lucretius and

Cicero. Here I would like to discuss a feature that the two

authors share and that marks them out as pioneers in the

project of revealing the potential of the Latin language as a

medium for philosophical discourse. This feature is the fact that

both authors encourage and demand reflection on Latin usages

in a profound way." (p. 88)

20. Rigolio, Alberto. 2014. "Translation of Greek Texts in Late

Antiquity." In Encyclopedia of Ancient Greek Language and

Linguistics. Volume 3 P-Z, Index, edited by Giannakis,

Georgios K., 436-441. Leiden: Brill

"A crucial aspect of translation practice is the degree of

faithfulness to the original text. At the extremes of the spectrum

one finds, on the one hand, translations that are configured as

paraphrases and, on the other hand, translations that

compromise the structure of the target language in favor of

meticulous rendering of the original text. The degree of

faithfulness to the originals has been explained either through

the nature of the original texts or through the development of

particular translation techniques. Scholarship on the Syriac

tradition has proposed a conciliation of the degree of

faithfulness to the originals with the chronological development

of the translation technique, while scholarship on the Armenian

tradition has shown particular interest in the linguistic impact

of faithful translations on the target language.

A key concern of cultural-historical scholarship has been to

identify translation features that characterize the specific

historical and cultural milieu in which the translations were

composed. Translations can betray a particular understanding

and interpretation of the original texts and the choice of

particular philosophical or theological terminology, as well as

the use of loanwords, » calques, or idiomatic translations, can

reveal dependence on, or independence from, a philosophical,

theological or exegetical tradition. The recurrence of common

linguistic and textual features has been used to support the

assignment of translations to the same historical milieu or

intellectual school. Furthermore, the selection of the texts to

translate and the omissions, additions and changes carried out

on the texts, such as the Christianization of non-Christian

material, can reveal the implementation of a particular cultural

agenda. Also, there are anonymous works that have been

disguised as translations from Greek." (p. 436)

21. Robinson, Douglas. 2002. Western Translation Theory from

Herodotus to Nietzsche. New York: Routledge

First published 1997 by St. Jerome Publishing.

Marcus Tullius Cicero, pp. 6-12.

"Cicero is often considered the founder of Western translation

theory; certainly he is the first to comment on the processes of

translation and offer advice on how best to undertake them. His

remarks on the pedagogical use of translation from Greek to

Latin in the training of an orator were expanded by Horace,

Pliny the Younger, Quintilian, and Aulus Gellius in Rome,

adapted for medieval Christian theology by Jerome, and cited

repeatedly by Catholics and Reformers and Humanists in

support of their translatorial and pedagogical principles from

the fourteenth to the seventeenth centuries." (p. 7)

22. Rose, H. J. 1921. "The Greek of Cicero." The Journal of Hellenic

Studies no. 41:91-116

"My object has been, first, to give as complete and reliable a list

as possible of the words used by Cicero himself (not his

correspondents, though I have included half-a-dozen words

quoted from Atticus and Caesar), omitting literary quotations

of all sorts, including proverbs and the chapter-headings of the

Paradoxa, and taking account of all the works, whole or

fragmentary, which have come down to us. This list is my own

compilation, not taken over from the earlier ones, which, except

that of Merguet,(7) are not full alphabetical lists of all the

words, and include quotations as well as Cicero's own words.

Within its assigned limits it is, I think, fairly complete and in

accordance with up-to-date texts." (p. 91)

(7) Merguet, Lexikon zu den philosophischen Schriften, end.

(7)This gives the words in the philosophical treatises only.

23. Rosén, Hanna. 1983. "The Mechanisms of Latin

Nominalization and Conceptualization in Historical View." In

Aufstieg und Niedergang der römischen Welt, Teil II:

Principat, Band 29.1: Sprache und Literatur (Sprachen und

Schriften), edited by Haase, Wolfgang, 178-211. Berlin: de

Gruyter

See in particular: Specialized uses and names for nominal

concepts: Cicero's methods of innovation, pp. 204-209.

"For the largest part of his terminological innovations Cicero

proceeds by the method of calque, of lending to an existing

Latin word, again almost exclusively to substantives, the

meaning of the Greek original, or at least a new nuance, new to

Latin or marginal in the existing word. Here too he often sees

fit to mention the Greek original, either to clarify the special

nuance meant (uoluntas for Stoic βούλησις: est quae quid, cum

ratione desiderat Tusc. 4.12) or to avoid misunderstanding

through the general meaning of the Latin word.

In the domain of grammatical terminology, Cicero uses the

action noun casus (Plautus, Accius) in the terminological

meaning of grammatical (case) ending, under the pressure of

synonymous πτώσις; notio, an abstract living on as a

nominalization, is employed to render (together with

intellegentia, Fin. 3.21) έννοια; uisum is imbued with the

meaning of φαντασία, sumptio becomes, like λήμμα, a

"premise". Via, besides functioning as a suppletive verbal noun

of ire (see above, note 25), is used to translate μέθοδος. Causa

becomes, by lexical equation with αιτία, "accusation" as well as

"cause", status, the action noun of esse (see above, p. 184),

serves to translate the rhetorical term στάσις "issue, position of

a defendant", also "mood" (grammatical, in Quintilian). Two

concepts central to the Roman way of life come into being in

this way: Cicero forms a new abstract humanitas

(φιλανθρωπία) after having calqued on the adjective humanus

(φιλάνθρωπος "loving men", άνθρώπινος "human") the other

meaning of the Greek counterpart, viz., "civilized,

cultivated"113. Vrbanitas (also "city life" in Cicero) and

urbanus likewise became imbued with the meaning "refined,

cultivated, elegant"114 after Greek άστειος (and άστικός)." (p.

208)

24. Rowland Jr., Robert. 1972. "Cicero and the Greek World."

Transactions and Proceedings of the American Philological

Association no. 103:451-461

"So, culture, services (mutual and one-way, public and private),

and governmental efficiency provided the necessity and

purpose for Greeks to cultivate Romans and for Romans to

cultivate and utilize the Greeks. Because of the accidents of

literary survival, Cicero's friendships and the details of his

relationships and services given and received-although often

shadowy-are better attested than those of any other Republican

figure. Had he never engaged in politics and statesmanship, he

would undoubtedly have acquired iendships (granted the

frequent meaninglessness of that term) with powerful and

influential Greeks acquired by a new man in relatively brief

tours of duty abroad is an important testimony to the workings

of the Roman system of provincia! government -- in fact, to the

workings of the Roman system. " (pp. 459-460)

25. Schofield, Malcolm. 2002. "Cicero, Zeno of Citium and the

Vocabulary of Philosophy." In Le style de la pensée: Recueil de

textes en hommage à Jacques Brunschwig, edited by Canto-

Sperber, Monique and Pellegrin, Pierre, 412-428. Paris: Les

Belles Lettres.

26. ———. 2022. "Cicero and Plato." In The Cambridge Companion

to Cicero's Philosopy, edited by Atkins, Jed W. and Bénatouïl,

Thomas, 88-102. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press

"Cicero was not a “Platonist.” He hardly ever described himself

as a philosopher at all. But Plato, the writer and thinker

himself, was a presence of the greatest importance in Cicero’s

own writing and thinking.

“No other individual philosopher,” as A. A. Long has written, “is

cited by Cicero as fully and frequently.”(3) This chapter will not

attempt to describe or assess Cicero’s treatment of “Platonism”

as a system. He inherited from his philosophical teachers –

Philo and Antiochus – differing views of the overall stance from

which Plato philosophized; even in Antiochus’ version of

Academic history it was only subsequently that a “system” was

articulated (descriptio disciplinae: Acad. 1-17) invoking his

authority. Instead it will explore just what Plato himself meant

to Cicero: first in some of his letters of the period 54 - 49 BCE,

then in the dialogues of 55-51, and finally in the theoretical

writings of 46 - 44." (p. 88)

Much of the material presented in this chapter was first

published in Schofield [“Cicero’s Plato,” in From Stoicism to

Platonism, ed. T. Engberg-Pedersen. Cambridge: 47–66]

2017b.

(1) A contrary view has lately been revived by Altman [The

Revival of Platonism in Cicero’s Late Philosophy: Platonis

aemulus and the Invention of Cicero. Lanham, MD] 2016a.

(2) See Hine [“Philosophy and philosophi: From Cicero to

Apuleius,” in Volk, K. and Williams, G. (eds.) Roman

Reflections: Studies in Latin Philosophy. Oxford.] 2015, 14-19.

Plutarch, however, says that he would often tell his friends that

they should call him a philosopher, not an orator, oratory

merely being his instrument (Plu. Cic. 32.5).

(3) Long [“Cicero’s Plato and Aristotle,” in J. G. F. Powell,

Cicero the Philosopher: Twelve Papers. Oxford 1995, pp. 37-

61], 44.

27. Sedley, David. 1998. Lucretius and the Transformation of

Greek Wisdom. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press

"1. Lunguistic poverty

In the preceding chapter, we met at the end of Lucretius’ proem

his famous apology on behalf of the Latin language (I, 136-45)

which he laments the linguistic struggle that he faces (I, 136-9):

nec me animi fallit Graiorum obscura reperta

difficile inlustrare Latinis versibus esse,

multa novis verbis praesertim cum sit agendum

propter egestatem linguae et rerum novitatem.

Nor do I fail to appreciate that it is difficult to illuminate in

Latin verse the dark discoveries of the Greeks, especially

because much use must be made of new words, given the

poverty of our language and the newness of the subject matter.

In §§ 2-7 of this chapter I shall be considering how he handles

this task of Latinising the technical terms of Epicurean

philosophy. In §§ 8-13 I shall turn to his own poetic use of

Greek loan-words and idioms. The two practices will come out

looking antithetical to each other. At the end I shall suggest

how we are meant to interpret this antithesis. What may start

out looking like an issue of linguistic mechanics will turn out, if

I am right, to reveal a fundamental tension in Lucretius’

evaluation of his own poetic and philosophical task." (p. 35)

28. ———. 1999. "Lucretius' Use and Avoidance of Greek." In

Aspects of the Language Poetry, edited by Adams, J. N. and

Mayer, R. G., 227-246. Oxford: Oxford University Press

An enlarged version of the paper appears as Chapter 2 Two

languages, two worlds of D. Sedley, Lucretius and the

Transformation of Greek Wisdom, Cambridge, Cambridge

Univeristy Press 1998, pp. 35-61.

Summary: "Lucretius uses highly technical Greek Epicurean

sources, but his strategy is to replace technical terms with

complementary sets of metaphors and images. Above all, he

never merely transliterates a Greek philosophical term, unless

for the exceptional purpose of keeping the corresponding

concept at arm's length. His aim is to make Epicureanism

thoroughly at home in a Roman cultural context. In the first

half of the present chapter, this policy is illustrated with

examples such as his vocabulary for visual 'images' in book 4

(where, thanks to the accidental survival of two successive

versions of the book's programme of topics, his methods can be

observed in action).

The second half of the chapter examines the ways in which he

does nevertheless introduce numerous Greek loan-words into

his vocabulary, arguing that this is done in order to build up

contexts which convey an exotic and alien Greek world.

Why does Lucretius combine these two antithetical policies

towards the Greek language? He is drawing a cultural map in

which the Roman and the Greek are widely separated, but in

which Epicureanism can, uniquely, cross that divide, and thus

prove its true universality."

29. ———. 2013. "Cicero and the Timaeus." In Aristotle, Plato and

Pythagoreanism in the First Century BC: New Directions for

philosophy, edited by Schofield, Malcolm, 187-205. Cambridge:

Cambridge University Press

"The Timaeus is one of just two Platonic dialogues from which

Cicero translated wholesale. The other translation, that of the

Protagoras, is lost, but we are fortunate to possess, apart from

one or two lacunae, his translation of Timaeus 27c–47b." (p.

187)

(...)

"... Cicero’s project of cumulatively enriching the native Latin

philosophical vocabulary, by explicitly introducing new

renditions of Greek terms one by one as they cropped up, was

maintained in his Timaeus translation, in seamless continuity

with his other philosophical writings of the period. The present

example is one of six Greek terms whose renditions are

announced during the course of the translation.(7) Four of the

six are terms imported into physics from mathematics, namely

ἀναλογία, σφαιροειδές μεσότης, άρμονία. A fifth has a

specifically astronomical sense, namely what he (questionably)

interprets as a special use of κόσμος to indicate the heaven,

which he decides to translate ‘lucens mundus’, ‘the illuminated

world’ (35.10 = Ti. 40a6). Only one of the six, δαίμων, falls

altogether outside mathematics. Here we can see Cicero

seeking in his Timaeus translation to rectify the poverty of the

Latin mathematical vocabulary, which he had made Varro

lament at the beginning of the Academic Books (1.6). Varro had

made it clear there that his ensuing account of early Academic

physics – an account itself derived ultimately from the Timaeus

– would be compelled to omit the more mathematical aspects

of Platonic cosmology. It is above all this lack that his Timaeus

translation seeks to rectify." (p. 191)

(7) Cf. Lambardi [Il ‘Timaeus’ ciceroniano: arte e tecnica del

‘vertere’. Florence.]1982: 69–90.

30. Siebengartner, Andrew. 2012. "Stoically Seeing and Being in

Cicero's Aratea." In Greek into Latin from Antiquity until the

Nineteenth Century, edited by Glucker, John and Burnett,

Charles, 97-116. London: The Warburg Institute

"...focuses on the early translation of Aratus’s Phaenomena by

Cicero, who changed not only the title of the original ( Aratea)

but also added to it a Stoic tinge, absent from Aratus’s poem.

Analyzing a number of excerpts, the author describes how

Cicero’s use of second-person verbs related to vision and of

descriptions of stars and constellations enhanced by additional

actions and characteristics (which resemble those of the Stoic

god) transformed Aratus’s poem and its static style into a

dramatized poem in support of the Stoic cosmology. The author

briefly touches on the influence of the Stoic exegesis of Aratus’s

poem by Boethus of Sidon on Cicero’s translation and the

similarities between Aratea and Cicero’s De Natura Deorum II.

The essay offers a deep discussion of the relationship between

the original author and his audience and how this relationship

may change between the translation author and his audience."

(from Ioannis Deligiannis, Review of John Glucker, Charles

Burnett (eds.), Greek into Latin from Antiquity until the

Nineteenth Century. Warburg Institute colloquia, 18. London;

Turin: Nino Aragno Editore, 2012, Bryn Mawr Classical

Review).

31. Spanos, William V. 2001. "Heidegger’s Parmenides: Greek

Modernity and the Classical Legacy." Journal of Modern Greek

Studies no. 19:89-115

Abstract: "One of Heidegger’s most insistent assertions about

the identity of modern Europe is that its origins are not Greek,

as has been assumed in discourses of Western modernity since

the Englightenment, but Roman, the epochal consequence of

the Roman reduction of the classical Greek understanding of

truth, as a-letheia (un-concealment), to veritas (the

correspondence of mind and thing). In the Parmenides lectures

of 1942–43, Heidegger amplifies this genealogy of European

identity by showing that this Roman concept of truth— and

thus the very idea of Europe— is also indissolubly imperial.

Heidegger’s genealogy has been virtually neglected by Western

historical scholarship, including classical. Even though

restricted to the generalized site of language, this genealogy is

persuasive and bears significantly on the conflicted national

identity of modern, post-Ottoman Greece. It suggests that the

obsessive pursuit of the unitary cultural ideals of the European

Enlightenment, in the name of this movement’s assumed

origins in classical Greece, constitutes a misguided effort to

accommodate Greek identity to the polyvalent, imperial,

Roman model of the polity that informs European colonial

practice. Put positively, Heidegger’s genealogy suggests a

radically different way of dealing with the question of Greek

national identity, one more consonant with the actual

philosophical, cultural, ethnic, and political heterogeneity of

ancient Greece (what Martin Bernal has called the “Ancient

Model”) and, thus, one less susceptible to colonization by

“Europe.”."

32. Steele, R, . B. 1900. "The Greek in Cicero's Epistles." The

American Journal of Philology no. 21:387-410

"The use of Greek by Cicero represents two phases of the

influence of the Greeks upon the Romans: the natural

utilization of a small part of the Greek vocabulary, and the free

use of Greek in the social intercourse of the day. When the

Romans came in contact with the higher artistic development

of the Greeks, they were content to adopt Greek forms of

presentation, and thus Roman literature became, so far as it

was original, the embodiment of Roman thought fashioned

according to Grecian models. Along with the adoption of the

forms of presentation came the admission of Greek words to a

place in the Roman vocabulary, and the naturalization process

was carried on somewhat freely, Saalfeld (Tensaurus Italo-

graecus) [*] giving about eight thousand words borrowed

entire, or in which some part is derived from the Greek.

This introduction of Greek terms was not in all respects a loss

to the borrower, as it gave to Roman philosophers, physicians

and rhetoricians the same technical vocabulary as was used by

the Greeks, and enabled them to deal with like objects and like

phases of thought in terms common to both languages." (p.

387)

(,,,)

"Though Cicero's use of Greek was justified by the prevailing

communicational forms of the day, yet, apart from the use of

direct quotations, it may be considered, (i) partly as a mere

display of a knowledge of Greek, (2) partly as an attempt to

make up for some of the deficiencies of the Latin language by

the use of a word afterwards fully naturalized, or of a substitute

for some form not so well developed in Latin as in Greek." (p.

390)

[*] Günther Alexander Saalfeld, Tensaurus Italograecus:

Ausführliches Historisch-Kritisches Wörterbuch der

Griechischen Lehn-und Fremdwörter im Lateinischen, Wien,

1884.

33. Striker, Gisela. 1995. "Cicero and Greek Philosophy." Harvard

Studies in Philology no. 97:53-61

"Cicero seems to have been the first educated Roman who

developed a real flair for philosophy and a serious attachment

to it, considering it not just as an intellectual hobby or a kind of

spiritual support in times of personal or political turmoil, and

attempting in earnest to make it a part of Roman culture. I do

not mean, of course, to overlook the great poet Lucretius. But

Lucretius, perhaps precisely because he was a great poet, but

also because he adopted the tone of a fervent missionary, seems

to have remained an isolated figure, at least as far as

philosophy was concerned. It was Cicero who gained a lasting

place in the history of European philosophy by creating a

vocabulary in which Romans could debate philosophical

questions; not just read, but write and discuss philosophy. No

doubt Cicero's own auctoritas helped here, too.

Not quite a century later, in the works of Seneca, the "poverty

of the Latin tongue" (Lucr. 1.139, 832; 3.260) so eloquently

lamented by Lucretius seems to have been overcome." (p. 54)

34. Swain, Simon. 2002. "Bilingualism in Cicero? The Evidence of

Code-Switching." In Bilingualism in Ancient Society:

Language Contact and the Written Text, edited by N., Adams

J., Janse, Mark and Swain, Simon, 128-167

Abstract: "This chapter explores the problem of Roman Latin-

Creek bilingualism in the Late Republic. There is an abundance

of evidence to show that Romans at this time knew classical

Greek literature well enough. Some of them, like Cicero, knew

key parts of it extremely well. Cicero himself was able to

compose Greek prose and verse and to deliver set speeches in

Greek before a Greek audience. No one would deny that he

could speak Greek well. It is a commonly held view that Cicero’s

peers were fluent in Greek and regularly used it in conversation

with each other. There are, however, no grounds for the latter

belief. This chapter places Cicero’s choices against the general

background and function of bilingualism in Rome."

35. Swanson, Donald Carl. 1962. A Formal Analysis of Lucretius’

Vocabulary. Minneapolis: Perine Book Co.

36. Toohey, Peter. 1981. "How good was Latin? Some opinions

from the Late Republic and early Empire." Arethusa no. 14:251-

269

"The paper is concerned primarily with "literary" — scholarly,

quasi-scholarly, and artistic — opinion: above all, how

"intellectuals" allowed themselves to dissemble. Hence I have

paid very to social and linguistic analogues: the closely related

question of the extent of Roman bilingualism; the question of

the extent of the influence of Latin upon Greek (and Greek

upon Latin).

(...)

For those, such as Cicero, who desired a broader spectrum of

culture than Rome had to offer, a knowledge of the Greek

language was obligatory. (In fact the educational system, at

least in Cicero's day, encouraged bilingualism. At school Cicero

would have studied Greek first and then Latin.)(5) But such a

seeming philhellenism had an obvious peril: one avowed

intellectual subservience to a subservient people. The tension

produced by such an apparently contradictory attitude may in

no small part be responsible for the potentially prejudiced

responses which I hope to describe.

To return to the initial point: bilingualism, to a large extent,

creates the situation which I will endeavor to discuss. However,

a lengthy examination of this topic would obscure the major

purpose of the paper, which is to examine how - rather than

why - linguistic prejudice and, ultimately therefore, racial

prejudice is or is not embodied in the work of certain Roman

intellectuals." (pp. 251-252, some notes omitted)

(5) So Marrou [Histoire de I'éducation dans I'antiquité (Paris2

1960] 335.

37. Woolf, Greg. 1994. "Becoming Roman, staying Greek. Culture,

identity and the civilizing process in the Roman East."

Proceedings of the Cambridge Philological Society no. 40:116-

143

"The limits of Romanization in general have been accounted for

in terms of many factors, but most can be dismissed where the

east is concerned. The elites of the most prominent Greek cities

had sufficient contact with Romans and sufficient wealth to

adopt anything they desired in the way of Roman culture. Nor

were Greeks resistant to the practices which gave scope in the

west to the development of a Roman style:

competitive energetism, civic and cultic monumentality and the

enhancement of personal status and identity through the

acquisition and display of expensive possessions. These

institutions were common to west and east, but Greeks used

them to remain Greek. This paper takes an alternative

approach to the problem by focusing on the cognitive aspects of

these changes and on continuities of culture and identity.

There is a danger in approaching these issues through posing

questions such as How did Romans understand Romanization?

How did they regard Greek culture and their role in relation to

it? and How did Greeks understand these cultural changes?

Most obviously such questions might lead to over-simplistic

answers; answers that assume the existence of single unified

'Roman' and 'Greek' viewpoints and identities, without leaving

space for dissenting views, uncertainties and live debates. But it

is possible to describe central features of belief-systems without

either over-schematizing or engaging in collective

psychologizing. All belief systems include central features of

this kind that connect different sets of ideas, and frame and

structure debate so as to determine the parameters of

discourse. The notions at issue here are sufficiently central -

Roman notions of civilization and of their imperial mission on

the one hand, and on the other Greek notions of their identity -

for the attempt to be made. My argument, in brief, will be that

the peculiar features of Romanization in the east can be largely

accounted for in terms of these cognitive structures. To begin

with (section 2), Romans conceived of their cultural and moral

vocation in respect of the Greeks as different from, if

complementary to, their mission to the barbarians.

Furthermore (section 3), Greeks did not conceive of the

relationship between material culture and collective or ethnic

identity in the same terms as did Romans. Finally (section 4),

the nature of the interaction between the two sets of beliefs is

worth exploring in order to suggest some reasons for the

Greeks' remarkable preservation, almost but not quite unique

among Rome's subjects, of a sense of identity separate from any

that had been assigned by Rome." (pp. 117-118, notes omitted)

Bibliographia. Annotated bibliographies

Raul Corazzon || rc@ontology.co || Info

From Greek to Latin. The

development of the Latin

philosophical vocabulary. Non-

English studies

Bibliography

Études en Français

1. Aubert-Baillot, Sophie. 2021. Le grec et la philosophie dans la

correspondance de Cicéron. Turnhout: Brepols

"D’un point de vue thématique, l’alliance intime de la

philosophie et de la langue grecque, dont Cicéron était l’héritier

par sa formation intellectuelle et par sa culture de Romain

bilingue, avant d’entreprendre le projet audacieux d’exposer la

philosophie en latin, justifie que près du tiers des occurrences

totales de mots ou expressions grecs dans la correspondance

(258 sur environ 850, selon notre décompte) soient

susceptibles d’une lecture philosophique. Une telle alliance

était de surcroît renforcée par l’existence de modèles littéraires

qui nourrissaient la réflexion et la pratique de Cicéron, et qui

rassemblaient les trois fils que nous avons isolés plus haut, à

savoir le grec, la philosophie et le genre épistolaire : il s’agissait

de lettres écrites par des philosophes grecs, à l’époque classique

et hellénistique." (pp. 20-21)

(...)

"Dans une première partie, nous avons donc procédé à la

définition de notre corpus (chapitre I), que nous avons présenté

sous forme de quatre tableaux successifs récapitulant les mots

et expressions grecs analysés, qui étaient à notre sens dotés

d’une teneur explicitement ou implicitement philosophique.

Nous avons ensuite proposé une première approche formelle

du corpus obtenu, en livrant des analyses grammaticales,

syntaxiques et stylistiques des occurrences grecques, classées

en allusions, mentions, et citations, puis nous en avons dégagé

les principales fonctions, avant d’examiner les modalités

d’accès au savoir philosophique grec qui s’offraient à Cicéron,

par le biais d’un enseignement oral, de la fréquentation de

bibliothèques, de la consultation de livres sous forme intégrale

ou résumée (chapitre II). Il ne convenait pas pour autant de

négliger la dimension proprement humaine de notre sujet. Le

corpus épistolaire de Cicéron est composé de lettres

authentiques, envoyées à des destinataires souvent fort connus,

dont la vie, la carrière politique, le statut social, les cercles

amicaux, les goûts intellectuels influent fortement sur la

présence, la fréquence et la qualité du grec qui leur est adressé.

Aussi avons-nous rédigé une notice sur chacun des treize

correspondants de Cicéron qui avaient reçu une ou des lettres

renfermant un ou plusieurs termes grecs susceptibles d’une

interprétation philosophique. Nous y avons décrit leurs

identités, leurs fonctions et leurs langages, grâce à une

approche d’ordre à la fois prosopographique, politique,

linguistique et philosophique. En adaptant son mode

d’expression et ses références grecques à chacun de ses

destinataires, Cicéron se montre fidèle à l’enseignement du

Phèdre platonicien qui enjoint, pour semer les graines du savoir

à bon escient, de connaître la nature de l’âme à laquelle

s’adresse le λόγος(94) (chapitre III).

Dans une seconde partie, nous avons examiné les sources

philosophiques du grec figurant dans la correspondance

cicéronienne en leur consacrant quatre études successives. La

première porte sur Platon, les Socratiques – Xénophon et

Antisthène – et les Académiciens – Arcésilas, Carnéade, Philon

(chapitre I). La deuxième, plus brève, se concentre sur Aristote

puis sur les Péripatéticiens Théophraste et Dicéarque (chapitre

II). La troisième a trait à Épicure ainsi qu’à quelques

Épicuriens, dont le plus connu est Philodème de Gadara

(chapitre III). Enfin, la quatrième étude est consacrée aux

Stoïciens et se conclut sur deux études de cas d’« intraduisibles

», la φιλοστοργία (ou « amour parental pour sa progéniture »)

et l’εὐθυρρημοσύνη (« le parler droit ») (chapitre IV)." (pp. 30-

31)

(94) Platon, Phèdre, 277 b-c.

2. Boyancé, Pierre. 1954. "Le platonisme à Rome. Platon et

Cicéron." In Association Guillaume Budé. Congrès de Tours et

Poitiers. Actes du congrès 3-9 Septembre 1953, 195-221. Paris:

Les Belles Lettres

Repris dans P. Boyancé, Études sur l’humanisme cicéronien,

Bruxelles: Latomus. Revue d'études latines, pp. 222-247.

"Une première série de problèmes concerne la question de

savoir quel contact Cicéron a pris réellement avec les dialogues.

Il est assez difficile de la séparer des problèmes concrets relatifs

aux divers points de doctrine où Cicéron s’inspire de Platon et

les auteurs qui traitent ceux-ci sont amenés occasionnellement

à faire des remarques utiles et peut-être même décisives sur la

question générale que nous venons de poser. Rappelons que

dans les oeuvres philosophiques les échos faits à Platon vont de

références qui sont de simples allusions jusqu’à des traductions

littérales. Rappelons que Cicéron lui-même a souligné le plaisir

qu’il a pris à ces traductions, qu’il considère comme un

véritable ornement ajouté à ses dialogues (De finibus, I, 7). La

liste en est donnée en dernier lieu dans l’article déjà cité de

Mme De Graff (2)." (p. 229)

(,,,)

"Quels sont les écrits de Platon desquels nous avons des échos

dans Cicéron ? On en trouvera la liste dans l’article de Mme De

Graff. D’une manière générale on peut dire qu’il s’est attaché

d’abord à ceux qui avaient un rapport plus direct avec ses

préoccupations personnelles, soit rhétoriques, soit politiques.

On peut remarquer en outre que ce sont les oeuvres qui ont joui

aux temps hellénistiques de la plus grande faveur. Tel est le cas

par exemple du Timée, malgré la difficulté du sujet sur laquelle

Cicéron insiste dans tel texte du De finibus (1 2). Les dialogues

ignorés de lui sont surtout les grands dialogues métaphysiques

comme le Paménide, où la théorie des idées —qui elle-même

n’a pas retenu beaucoup l’attention de Cicéron —a été de la part

de Platon l’objet d’une critique et d’un dépassement dont

l’histoire moderne de la philosophie n’a elle-même compris

qu’assez tard le sens et la valeur. On ne peut aucunement en

vouloir à Cicéron s’il n’a pas reconnu à l’intérieur même du

platonisme l’évolution complexe qui conduit du socratisme aux

grands dialogues de la théorie des idées et de ceux-ci aux

dernières oeuvres à travers la théorie des Idées-nombres et

cette mystérieuse leçon sur le Bien qui intéresse tant nos

platoniciens.

Ce n’est sans doute pas dans ses oeuvres proprement

philosophiques, celles des années 46-44, composées sous la

dictature de César, que Cicéron s’est montré le plus un homo

platonicus. Ce ne sont pas, notons-le bien, ses oeuvres les plus

personnelles, celles où il a mis le plus de son expérience et de sa

réflexion. Celles qui méritent le mieux d’être considérées

comme telles, ce sont les dialogues du De oratore, du De

republica et du De legibus.

(2)[Plato in Cicero, dans Classical Philology, t. XXXV, 1940, p.

143-153], p. 146 (liste des traductions et paraphrases).

3. ———. 1956. "La connaissance du grec à Rome." Revue des

Études Latines:111-131.

4. ———. 1960. "Cicéron et les semailles d'âme du Timée (De

legibus, I, 24)." Comptes rendus des séances de l'Académie des

Inscriptions et Belles-Lettres:283-289

Repris dans P. Boyancé, Études sur l’humanisme cicéronien,

Bruxelles: Latomus. Revue d'études latines, pp. 294-300.

"Cicéron présente au premier livre du De legibus un véritable

résumé de philosophie, afin d’appuyer sa théorie de la loi

naturelle.

Il y a là des pages d’un intérêt très grand à la fois pour l’étude

de Cicéron lui-même et pour celle de l’histoire de la

philosophie, sans compter celle de l’histoire du droit. Par leur

date (1), ces pages sont à peu près certainement le premier

contact étendu de l’oeuvre cicéronienne avec les grands

problèmes, qu’il s’agisse de l’éthique, de ce que l’auteur devait

approfondir surtout dans le De finibus et le De officiis (2), qu’il

s’agisse de la « physique» et de la théologie, de ce à quoi il

devait consacrer notamment le De natura deorum. Leur intérêt

est de nous montrer comment s’est formée la culture

philosophique de Cicéron. Elle est pour l’essentiel fixée

quelques années avant le moment où il se mettra

systématiquement, sous la dictature de César et à la faveur des

loisirs forcés qu’elle lui créait, à composer ses traités." (P. 283,

notes omises)

5. ———. 1969. "Trois citations de Platon chez Cicéron." In

Hommages à Marcel Renard, edited by Bibauw, Jacqueline,

126-132. Bruxelles: Latomus, Revue d'études latines

Repris dans P. Boyancé, Études sur l’humanisme cicéronien,

Bruxelles: Latomus. Revue d'études latines, pp. 248-255.

"La première citation se trouve au paragraphe 12[*] : «Il fallait

en outre prêter attention dans la cité à ce que l’on trouve

exprimé divinement dans notre cher Platon : tels sont dans la

république les premiers citoyens, tels ont coutume d’être les

autres» (2). Sa place dans le contexte est quelque peu obscure.

Cicéron vient d’énumérer les raisons qui l’ont rapproché de

César : au premier rang le souhait de Pompée, mais aussi la

vieille amitié qui les lie, son frère et lui, à César et qui a été

ranimée dans ces derniers temps par son humanitas et sa

liberalitas (allusion des plus précises, si Ton songe que Cicéron

se laissa prêter de l’argent par César et se vit confier par lui la

direction des travaux de son forum) (3). Il y a également

l’intérêt public qui lui paraissait, surtout après les hauts faits de

César (en Gaule), exclure des querelles avec ces hommes (les

triumvirs évidemment)." (p. 248)

(...)

"Les deux autres citations de Platon se trouvent plus loin, au

paragraphe 18, et elles sont très rapprochées l’une de l’autre. Il

y a le Criton d’abord, la Lettre V ensuite." (p. 253)

[*] Lettre à Lentulus du 54, Fam. 1.9.12.

(2) Fam., I, 9, 24.

(3) (...) Lentulus Spinther était édile curule en 63.

6. Dubuisson, Michel. 1981. "Vtraque lingua." L'antiquité

classique no. 50:274-286

Résumé: "L'examen des attestations de utraque lingua, apparue

à l'époque de Cicéron, et qui désigne toujours le grec et le latin,

permet de conclure que son emploi correspond au désir des

Romains d'associer, en les plaçant sur le même pied, leur

langue à celle des Grecs, afin de faire sortir la première du

groupe des idiomes barbares et de la faire bénéficier du prestige

de la seconde.

C'est là une des manifestations du complexe d'infériorité qui

caractérise l'attitude des Romains à l'égard de la langue et de la

culture grecques."

7. ———. 1982. "Y-a-t-il une politique linguistique romaine ?"

Ktèma : civilisations de l'Orient, de la Grèce et de Rome

antiques no. 7:187-210

"Conclusion

Le problème de l’existence d’une politique linguistique romaine

du IIe siècle av. J.-C. au Ier siècle après peut donc être résumé

de la façon suivante.

1. Rien ne permet de penser qu'il y ait eu, à l’un ou l'autre

moment, un «impérialisme linguistique» romain, c’est-à-dire

des efforts pour imposer l’usage du latin aux pays conquis. La

romanisation a été un phénomène spontané ; l'impulsion est

venue, dans bien des cas, des peuples soumis eux-mêmes.

2. L’État romain ne semble pas avoir eu, à l’égard des langues

étrangères en général, d’attitude bien déterminée ; le pouvoir

n'a pas réagi autrement que l'ensemble de la société, où

dominait l'indifférence à l'égard des langues autres que le grec

et le latin.

3. Le grec constitue précisément un cas particulier. Principale

langue véhiculaire de la Méditerranée, instrument d’une culture

prestigieuse, il est d’autant plus ressenti comme une menace

que les membres des classes supérieures le pratiquent pour la

plupart aussi bien, voire plus spontanément que le latin, et que

nombre d’entre eux affectent même de considérer l’hellénisme

comme la seule culture digne de ce nom. Il était inévitable que

des mécanismes de défense apparaissent, inévitable aussi que

le mos maiorum soit appelé à la rescousse et que les magistrats,

plus que tout autre citoyen, se sentent tenus de prendre

position en la matière. Le texte de Valére Maxime [*] trop

souvent sous-estimé, est particulièrement clair : au-delà des

nécessités pratiques qui imposent évidemment, en Orient, une

large prépondérance du grec (reflétée dans les documents

épigraphiques et papyrologiques), on cherche à définir un

domaine réservé et à affirmer sur un point au moins la

primauté symbolique du latin. Il s’agit en somme bien plus de

protectionnisme que d'impérialisme : en fait, la politique

linguistique romaine est apparue, au contraire, pour défendre

le latin contre l’impérialisme linguistique et culturel du grec, ou

contre ce qui, en tout cas, était ressenti comme tel." (p. 209)

[*] Valére Maxime, Facta et dicta memorabilia II, 2, 2-3.

8. ———. 1985. "La place du grec dans la société romaine : à

propos d'un ouvrage récent(1)." Revue belge de philologie et

d'histoire no. 63:108-115

(1) Jorma Kaimio, The Romans and the Greek Language,

Helsinki, 1979, 379 pp. (Commentationes Humanarum

Litterarum, 64).

"Sïl y a un sujet à la mode dans les sciences humaines

d·aujourd·hui, c·est bien le bilinguisme (ou le multilinguisme)

et les problèmes qu ïl pose en théorie et en pratique." (p. 108)

(...)

"Il faudrait donc à la fois entreprendre une série d'enquêtes du

type le plus traditionnel (on n'a même pas, par exemple. de

traitement complet de la question des hellénismes dans le

vocabulaire latin) et repenser les données disponibles d'une

manière qui soit à la fois conforme à la méthodologie de

l'histoire ancienne et pertinente d'un point de vue

sociolinguistique. Ce travail, énorme, demandera sans nul

doute plusieurs années et le concours d'un grand nombre de

spécialistes.

Jorma Kaimio a choisi de tenter sans attendre une synthèse au

moins partielle (puisqu'elle ne porte que sur rune des faces du

problème, le grec à Rome, sans faire entrer en ligne de compte

la question, à mon sens indissociable, du latin des Grecs) et que

l'on taxera sans doute de prématurée. Comme toute entreprise

de ce genre, elle présente cependant le grand avantage

d'inventorier les lacunes de nos connaissances et de lancer le

débat ; ses défauts mêmes seront pour ses successeurs autant

d'incitations à la réflexion. Aussi les critiques formulées dans

les pages qui suivent se voudront-elles, dans la pleine acception

du terme, constructives." (pp. 110-111)

(,,,)

"Bien d'autres remarques pourraient encore être faites à propos

de cet ouvrage, qui a le grand mérite de montrer combien le

problème du grec et de l'hellénisme traverse toute l'histoire et

la culture romaines, combien aussi il reste, dans l'ensemble,

mal connu. La synthèse entreprise par J. Kaimio était sans

doute prématurée dans l'état actuel de nos connaissances; le

plus bel hommage qu'on puisse lui rendre est qu'elle facilitera

considérablement le travail des chercheurs qui reprendront le

problème, et que leurs conclusions, même si elles sont

diamétralement opposées à celles de l'auteur finlandais,

reposeront en fin de compte sur le matériel qu ïl a été le

premier à rassembler sur une aussi vaste échelle." (p. 115)

9. ———. 1985. Le latin de Polybe. Les implications historiques

d'un cas de bilinguisme. Paris: Klinksieck

"Le plus intelligent des historiens de Rome est un Grec. Sa

vision est donc celle d'un étranger. La question de savoir dans

quelle mesure sa connaissance des choses romaines est exacte

ou suffisamment précise doit être posée. D'autre part, son

interprétation des réalités romaines dépend nécessairement de

façons de penser grecques. Ce regard étranger peut être

déformant, ou au contraire éclairant, ou l'un et l'autre à la fois;

il faut en tout cas l'analyser lui-même avec attention. La lecture

de l'Histoire a tôt fait de montrer, cependant, que le problème

des relations de Polybe avec Rome a aussi une autre dimension.

Nombreux sont les passages où cet exilé semble épouser la

cause du vainqueur et renier ou accabler ses compatriotes. On

s'étonne aussi de lire, sous 1a plume d'un Grec, des jugements

reflétant un point de vue qui paraît typiquement romain." (p. 8)

(,,,)

"La solution serait peut-être de tenter d'abord une approche

plus limitée, mais qui permette de s'avancer sur un terrain plus

solide. La linguistique moderne établit un lien étroit entre

langue, vision du monde et mentalité; le biculturalisme

s'accompagne, dans l'immense majorité des cas, d'un

bilinguisme, dont il procède.

Serait-il possible, en étudiant de près le bilinguisme de Polybe,

de se faire une première idée de son biculturalisme, autrement

dit de tracer, grâce aux conclusions d'une étude sur la

latinisation de sa langue, une première esquisse de la

romanisation de sa mentalité ?

C'est ce que j'ai tenté de faire dans le présent travail." (p. 8)

(...)

"L'apport essentiel de cette étude découle cependant de son

objet même. Il a déjà été exposé; on peut le rappeler d'un mot.

Savoir désormais avec certitude (au lieu de se borner à le

soupçonner) que Polybe a subi l'influence de la langue latine et

de la mentalité des Romains, et avoir une idée plus ou moins

précise de la façon dont elle s'est exercée, c'est le voir désonnais

d'un tout autre oeil.

L'introduction de cette perspective nouvelle devrait avoir des

répercussions considérables sur l'ensemble de la recherche

polybienne - et donc de l'histoire de Rome." (p. 294)

10. ———. 1992. "Le grec à Rome à l'époque de Cicéron, extension

et qualité du bilinguisme." Annales. Economies, sociétés,

civilisations no. 47:187-206

"Il s'agit donc de décrire le bilinguisme romain classique le plus

exactement possible, en déterminant en particulier, du moins

dans un premier temps, son extension (qui - quels hommes,

quels groupes sociaux - parle le grec?) et sa qualité (quel grec

parle-t-on et comment?).

Les données utilisées appartiennent en majorité à l'époque de

Cicéron, qui est à la fois particulièrement bien documentée et

essentielle pour notre problème.

Cicéron lui-même est d'ailleurs, à ce point de vue comme à bien

d'autres, un symbole et un résumé de son temps, dont il vit en

lui-même la plupart des conflits : l'examen de son oeuvre sera

particulièrement éclairant.(6) Le cas échéant, le rappel de

certains aspects de la période précédente aidera à mieux

comprendre celle-ci. Le Haut-Empire fournira de son côté un

certain nombre d'indications complémentaires. L'étude n'en

reste pas moins purement synchronique et ne tentera pas de

traiter la question de l'origine du grec à Rome ni des

développements ultérieurs de son usage." (pp. 187-188, une

note omise)

(6) Cf. M. A. Trouard, Cicero's attitudes towards the Greeks,

Chicago, 1952; M. Ruch, « Nationalisme culturel et culture

internationale dans la pensée de Cicéron», dans REL, 36

(1958), pp. 187-204; N. K. Petrochilos, Roman attitudes ta the

Greeks, Athènes, 1974.

11. Gaffiot, Félix. 1934. "Note sur Cicéron traducteur du grec."

Revue des Études Grecques no. 47:21-25

"Dans l'explication des textes latins, les commentateurs ont très

légitimement recours aux sources grecques, le cas échéant,

pour déterminer le sens exact d'un passage, pour rendre

compte d'une tournure, ou pour appuyer une remarque

grammaticale.

Mais il y faut de la prudence et ce serait s'exposer parfois à des

mécomptes que de se fier aveuglément à un rapprochement du

latin avec l'original grec.

Çicéron, par exemple, prend de grandes libertés avec ses

modèles, môme quand il les traduit. On connaît du reste ses

idées sur la question : il les a exposées notamment dans le De

Optimo génère oratorum (§§ 14 et 23), préface de la traduction

— malheureusement perdue — qu'il avait faite des célèbres

discours prononcés par Eschine et Démosthène à propos de

Ctésiphon.

Dans cette traduction, il entendait, d'une part rendre les

pensées et leur tour propre, d'autre part conserver la valeur et

la force des termes, et le tout, sans jamais ni s'asservir au mot à

mot ni surtout manquer aux lois de la langue." (p. 21)

12. Lemoine, Michel. 1998. "Innovations de Ciceron et de Calcidius

dans la traduction du Timée." In The Medieval Translator –

Traduire au Moyen Age, vol. 6, edited by Ellis, Roger, Tixier,

René and Weitemeier, Bernd, 72-81. Turnhout: Brepols

"(...) il n'existe pas actuellement d'etude d'ensemble sur ce sujet

[la comparaison systématique de Cicéron et Calcidius]. Il

s'agirait, il est vrai, d'une vaste entreprise, puisqu'il faudrait

établir un lexique comparatif gréco-latin des principaux termes

de la philosophie grecque. On constaterait alors les differences

qui existent entre les deux versions, mais aussi, a l'intérieur de

chacune d'elles, les variations, les hésitations de traducteurs qui

n' ont pas encore choisi definitivement les équivalents latins de

certains termes clefs. Cette etude lexicographique, toutefois,

devrait etre prolongèe par une étude portant sur la syntaxe et le

style,

c'est-a-dire sur le fonctionnement de la langue de chaque

traducteur. Il serait alors possible de saisir comment chacun,

globalement, a transposé le texte original du Timée, de

comparer ces versions a d'autres temoins de la tradition latine

de Platon, de les situer, enfin, dans l'histoire du latin

philosophique.

De cette enquête, à laquelle j'espère apporter une contribution,

on ne trouvera ici qu'un chapitre préliminaire dans lequel je

voudrais mettre en valeur l'originalité des traductions de

Cicéron et Calcidius en m'attachant à ce qui en constitue

!'aspect le plus visible, sinon le plus important : les

néologismes."

13. Lévy, Carlos. 1992. "Cicéron créateur du vocabulaire latin de la

connaissance : essai de synthèse." In La langue latine, langue

de la philosophie. Actes du colloque de Rome (17-19 mai 1990),

91-106. Rome: École Française de Rome

Résumé : "La création par Cicéron du vocabulaire

philosophique latin a été un acte d'une grande audace

intellectuelle, à l'égard duquel Atticus et Varron ont d'abord été

très réservés, pour des raisons à la fois culturelles et

philosophiques. C'est l'élaboration dans les Académiques d'une

terminologie fort complexe, destinée à rendre les concepts

gnoséologiques stoïciens et académiciens, qui a renforcé la

confiance que Cicéron a toujours eue dans les possibilités

philosophiques de la langue latine. L'étude de ce vocabulaire

(έποχή, καταληπτόν, συγκατάθεσις, έννοια, πρόληψις) montre

que, si le principal souci de Cicéron était de concilier précision

et uarietas, il a néanmoins exprimé, par son choix ou sa

création de certains termes, une vision du monde qui ne

coïncidait pas nécessairement avec celle des philosophes grecs.

La construction du concept de «probable» à partir du πιθανόν

et de l'εύλογον confirme à quel point cette démarche aura été

féconde."

14. ———. 2020. "Les limites de l’écriture philosophique chez

Cicéron (Lucullus) et chez Augustin (Contra Academicos)."

Ítaca. Quaderns Catalans de Cultura Clàssica no. 35-36:71-84

Abstract: "The aim of this article is to show both Augustine’s

dependence on Cicero and his independence from his model. In

the Lucullus, Cicero divides his discourse into two parts, one

dialectical, the other much more literary, because he believes

that philosophical reflection should not do without the

resources of persuasive and eloquent speech. In his Contra

Academicos III, Augustine goes from the refutation of skeptical

theses to a sort of explanatory myth, which he recognizes as

subjective but it seems to him necessary to mark the limits of

reason. The purpose of Cicero is literary and aesthetic, that of

Augustine has a much clearer historical and ontological

ambition. Neither admits that dialectical reason can be the only

requisite of a discourse in search of the truth."

15. Nicolas, Christian. 2005. Sic enim appello... Essai sur

l'autonymie terminologique gréco-latine chez Cicéron.

Louvain: Peeters

"Le corpus de cette étude est constitué des vingt « grands

traités » philosophiques, rhétoriques et politiques de Cicéron,

dans lesquels l’influence grecque est prépondérante et où les

énoncés autonymiques ont quelque chance d’abonder, à savoir

(dans l’ordre alphabétique de leur notation abrégée) : Priora et

Posteriora Academica (Ac.), Laelius de amicitia (Am.), Brutus

(Br.), De oratore (De or.), De divinatione (Div.), De fato (Fat.),

De finibus bonorum et malorum (Fin.), De inventione (Inv.),

De legibus (Leg.), De natura deorum (Nat.), De officiis (Off.),

De optimo genere oratorum (Opt.), Orator (Or.), Paradoxa

Stoicorum (Parad.), Partitiones oratoriae (Part.), De re

publica (Rep.), Cato Maior de Senectute (Sen.), Timaeus

(Tim.), Topica (Top.) et Tusculanae disputationes (Tusc.).

Quant au théme de cette étude, celui de l'autonymie bilingue, il

pourra paraitre dans un premier temps sinon futile, à tout le

moins bien mince. Mais j'espére montrer ce qu'une analyse

structurelle des nombreux énoncés offerts par le corpus peut

révéler sur la langue latine elle-méme et, peut-étre, sur la

pensée de Cicéron.

Le choix de cet auteur n'est évidemment pas aléatoire : il est le

meilleur spécialiste qui soit de la langue et toute option

terminologique est chez lui significative. Lorsqu'il écrit que le

meilleur équivalent latin du terme grec εἴδωλα, dans son

emploi technique et avec son sens de « images des objets,

simulacres », est imagines (Fin. 1, 21), non seulement il y a lieu

de le croire et d'en tenir compte, mais surtout — et c'est ce qui

intéresse un spécialiste de la langue -- il y a possibilité de

considérer un tel segment comme un lieu privilégié d'étude de

la création verbale en latin. Un tel énoncé, où le modèle grec et

l'aboutissement latin se trouvent mis en paralléle de maniére

univoque, concertée, parfois hésitante (et ces flottements

commentés « en direct » par Cicéron sont au moins aussi riches

d'enseignements que ses assertions définitives), avec tout leur

caractére empirique, constituent un inestimable laboratoire de

la néologie." (pp. XI-XII, notes omises)

16. Poncelet, Roland. 1957. Cicéron traducteur de Platon.

L'expression de la pensée complexe en latin classique. Paris: de

Boccard.

17. Ravaute, Jeanne. 2022. "Les traductions d'οὐσία dans le Timée

Cicéronien." Philosophie antique no. 22:65-91

Résumé : "Dans sa traduction partielle du Timée de Platon,

Cicéron traduit le terme grec οὐσία par aeternitas et materia.

Ces choix de traduction sont particulièrement intéressants à

étudier puisqu'il n'existe pas de traduction fixe d’οὐσία en latin

à l'époque de Cicéron – il n'est, en effet, pas à l'origine du

néologisme essentia. Pourquoi Cicéron choisit-il deux termes

latins pour traduire un même mot grec ? Pourquoi deux mots si

différents à la fois l'un de l'autre et du terme οὐσία ? Quelle

compréhension du concept d’οὐσία, mais aussi du Timée, cette

traduction induit-elle ? Nous étudions dans cet article chacune

des deux traductions latines et tentons de montrer que Cicéron

est influencé par le contexte dans ses choix de traduction. Dans

le « prélude » du discours de Timée, il traduit οὐσία par

aeternitas lorsqu'il considère que le terme grec, opposé à

γένεσις, correspond au participe substantivé το ὂν ἀεί, γένεσιν

δε οὐκ ἔχον. En traduisant οὐσία par aeternitas en 29c3, il fait

du sème de lìéternité une caractéristique discriminante

d’οὐσία, qui correspond également au modèle intelligible du

monde. Dans le cas de materia, le mot latin traduit l’οὐσία dans

le cadre du mélange de l'âme du monde par le démiurge dans

un cratère. Cicéron choisit le terme materia qui sert

généralement, en contexte philosophique, à désigner une

matière disponible pour prendre la forme qu'on veut lui

donner, selon différentes doctrines. Nous tentons de montrer

que le contexte de la métaphore du mélange pousse Cicéron à

considérer le terme οὐσία comme une « substance » qui entre

dans la composition dun mélange. Ces deux traductions

d’οὐσία montrent que l'Arpinate choisit chacun des termes

latins selon le sens précis qu'il donne à οὐσία, en fonction du

contexte philosophique mais aussi en fonction du registre du

discours."

18. Rochette, Bruno. 1995. "Du grec au latin et du latin au grec. Les

problèmes de la traduction dans l'antiquité gréco-latine."

Latomus no. 54:245-261

"Comme on le voit, que les Romains utilisent uertere ou

interpretari, la traduction constitue chez eux un phénomène

littéraire qui depasse largement la restitution fidèle, dans une

autre langue, d'une oeuvre dont l'original ne pourrait être

compris par un public romain. Aux yeux des Latins, traduire

c'est aussi adapter, c'est-à-dire reprendre les idées d'une oeuvre

grecque en en renouvelant la forme. Nous mettons ainsi le doigt

sur le phenomène bien connu de la μίμησις ( imitatio ), qui est

monnaie courante dans les conceptions littéraires des Grecs et

des Latins, qui n'accordent pour ainsi dire aucune valeur a la

notion de proprieté littéraire (85). Selon les theories des

anciens (86), l'imitation pouvait revetir trois formes différentes

: l'interpretatio, qui consiste a traduire une oeuvre fidèlement,

selon le contenu et la forme ; l'imitatio, qui renouvelle la forme

en conservant les grandes lignes du contenu de l'original ;

1'aemulatio, qui est une refonte compleèe du contenu et de la

forme. Consideré comme phénomène littéraire, la traduction,

qu'elle soit version fidèle ou adaptation libre, constitue done, a

Rome, un des degrés de dependance d'une littérature par

rapport a une autre, en l'occurrence celle de la Grèce." (p. 259)

(85) E. Stemplinger, Das Plagiat in der griechischen Literatur,

Leipzig-Berlin, 1912, p. 110-116.

(86) Elles sont etudiees par A. Reiff, Interpretatio, imitatio,

aemulatio. Begriff und Vorstellung literarischer Abhangigkeit

bei den Romern, Cologne, 1959.

19. ———. 2012. "Problèmes du bilinguisme dans l’Antiquité gréco-

romaine." In Langue et histoire - Problèmes du bilinguisme

dans l’Antiquité gréco-romaine, edited by Bertrand, Jean-

Marie, Boilley, Pierre and Genet, Jean-Philippe 103-122. Paris:

Éditions de la Sorbonne

"Les limites de cette communication imposent que je

sélectionne quelques aspects qui touchent directement le

rapport entre langue et société et entre langue et culture. J’en ai

privilégié trois : l’hellénisation de Rome et la politique

linguistique romaine à l’époque républicaine ; le code-switching

dans la correspondance de Cicéron ; bilinguisme, diglossie et

identité dans l’Imperium Romanum : le choix de la langue." (p.

104)

20. Trégo, Kristelle. 2012. "Substance, sujet, acte. La première

réception latine d'Aristote : Marius Victorinus et Boèce." Les

Études philosophiques no. 101:233-256

"Quoique son enjeu concerne l’histoire de la métaphysique, le

présent article ne s’intéressera donc pas au moment où la

métaphysique prend son essor dans l’Occident latin, suite à la

réception de l’ouvrage ainsi intitulé (conjointement au traité al-

Ilāhiyyāt du Kitāb al-Šifā’ d’Avicenne) ; il examinera plutôt le

moment de naissance du vocabulaire latin de l’être, à savoir le

moment où les Latins ont cherché à traduire non pas la

Métaphysique, mais une partie de l’oeuvre logique d’Aristote.

Quoi qu’il en soit toutefois du travail effectué par Marius

Victorinus et Boèce dans leur oeuvre logique, c’est tout autant,

et sans doute d’une manière tout particulièrement

remarquable, dans leur oeuvre théologique qu’un certain

nombre de décisions conceptuelles sont prises, qui contribuent

à la mise en place d’une compréhension originale de l’être." (p.

234, notes omises)

21. Volpi, Franco. 2001. "Heidegger et la romanité philosophique."

Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale no. 31:287-300

Résumé : "Face à la conviction heideggérienne que la

philosophie serait une affaire originairement et foncièrement

grecque, une question inévitable se pose : qu’en est-il de la «

romanité philosophique » ? L’auteur analyse dans une

perspective critique l’unilatérale recontruction heideggérienne

du rapport entre la romanitas et le monde grec, notamment

l’idée que la romanité exprimerait une forme d’existence

dérivée et décadente, qui ne serait plus à la hauteur de

l’expérience grecque de l’être, occultée par la traduction latine

des termes grecs fondamentaux. Il se propose donc de montrer

que les Romains ont introduit d’autres concepts, inconnus des

Grecs et devenus fondamentaux pour la culture européenne,

tels que religio ou pietas, dont il présente un premier petit

catalogue."

22. ———. 2001. "La Romanité philosophique et son vocabulaire."

In Philosopher en français. Langue de la philosophie et langue

nationale, edited by Mattéi, Jean-François, 487-499. Paris:

Presses Universitaires de France

"... je voudrais simplement prendre en considération la

première transformation linguistique à laquelle la philosophie

fut soumise, avant la genèse des partitions linguistiques

modernes et avant l'essor des traditions philosophiques

nationales correspondantes : la tradition latine des Romains,

qui s'approprie mais en meme temps délaisse la tradition

grecque précédente, et qui est la mère de toutes les partitions

linguistiques ultérieures. De l'analyse de cette nouvelle

tradition - et de la possibilité d'une romanité ou d'une latinité

philosophiques - nous pouvons dériver d'importantes

conclusions à propos des autres traditions philosophiques

romanes (française, espagnole, italienne, etc.). Je voudrais

donc prendre en vue la traduction du patrimoine de la

philosophie grecque dans le vocabulaire latin des Romains pour

poser les questions suivantes : Quelles ont été les conséquences

de cette traduction pour les contenus philosophiques transmis

Quel rôle philosophique a joué le latin? A-t-il été secondaire et

dérivé, ou bien a-t-il produit également des ouvertures

philosophiques nouvelles et originales ? En somme, la

philosophie a-t-elle parlé aussi en latin ? Et dans ce cas, y a-t-il

une spécificité de la philosophie latine?" (p. 488)

Studi in Italiano

1. Aronadio, Francesco. 2008. "L’orientamento filosofico di

Cicerone e la sua traduzione del Timeo." Méthexis no. 21:111-

129

"II Timaeus costituisce il più ampio esempio di traduzione

ciceroniana da testi greci che ci sia pervenuta. Sappiamo che il

giovane Cicerone tradusse l'Economico di Senofonte, e che si

dedicò, in un'epoca difficile da precisare, alla versione in latino

del Protagora.(1) Di tali opere non restano però che pochi

frammenti, laddove il Timaeus comprende la traduzione

pressoché completa di una consistente parte del dialogo

platonico (da 27d a 47b ).(2)" (p. 111)

(...)

"Come sempre accade per le migliori traduzioni, anche nel caso

di Cicerone il suo rapporto con il testo da riportare nella

propria lingua è segnato da un mobile equilibrio fra intelligenza

della fonte e libertà del rendere. Proprio in ragione di ciò,

piuttosto che inseguire nelle linee del Timaeus le

corrispondenze e le distanze nel confronto con il testo

platonico, vorrei considerare alcuni luoghi della traduzione che

si presentano come problematici, nel senso che - come già

emerge dai brevi esempi appena riportati - portano

all'espressione il personale orientamento di pensiero di

Cicerone. L'intento che perseguirò è indagare se essi non

possano fornire un qualche indizio sul senso dell'operazione

culturale e filosofica che Cicerone intendeva intraprendere

apprestandosi alla versione in latino del dialogo di Platone. In

sostanza, vorrei formulare qualche considerazione, sì, sul modo

di tradurre di Cicerone, ma inserendola nel quadro di una

riflessione sul taglio concettuale con il quale egli si è accostato

al Timeo." (p. 113)

(1) Per i frammenti superstiti di tali opere cfr. M Tuili Ciceronis

Fragmenta, ex libris philosophicis, ex aliis libris deperditiis, ex

scriptis incertis, Ioanna Garbarino recognovit, Milano 1984

(per l'Economico, p. 65-83; per il Protagora, p. 83-85). Cfr.

anche R. Philippson, s.v. Cicero (Philosophische Schriften), in

RE VII A 1 (1939) coll. 1104-1192 (sul Protagora col. 1150).

(2) Il Timaeus ciceroniano si presenta come un lungo

monologo, poiché non riporta dalla parte corrispondente del

testo platonico l'interlocuzione del personaggio Socrate (in

29d). A parte ciò, il testo latino procede in sostanziale

parallelismo con quello greco. Vi sono due lacune: non

disponiamo, in primo luogo, della traduzione della pagina

platonica 37c3-38c8 (una lacuna che è solo parzialmente

integrabile grazie alla testimonianza nel De compendiosa

doctrina, 198, 30 M., di Nonio); manca, in secondo luogo, il

testo corrispondente al passo 43b5-46a2.

2. Biasutti, Franco. 2004. "Il ruolo di Cicerone nella

interpretazione hegeliana della Romanitas." In Hegel,

Heidegger e la questione della romanitas: atti del Convegno,

Verona, 16-17 maggio 2003, edited by Illetterati, Luca and

Moretto, Antonio, 3-15. Roma: Edizioni di Storia e Letteratura

"Nel corso di Lezioni sulla filosofia della storia risalente al

semestre invernale del 1822 -23 , descrivendo i caratteri che

connotano la religione dei Romani, Hegel fa questa

osservazione: «Cicerone deriva religio da

religare, legare, e si rallegra al riguardo della verità dei

maiores. Presso i Romani si tratta in effetti di un essere-

vincolati, mentre presso i Greci la religione è libera fantasia,

libertà della bellezza e per i cristiani è la libertà dello

spirito»(39). L'infortunio di Hegel a questo riguardo è evidente,

in quanto attribuisce a Cicerone una etimologia che, come è

noto, è di Lattanzio e di Agostino(40). Cicerone, nel De natura

deorum, deriva viceversa religio da relegere(41). Questo errore

di attribuzione non è tuttavia isolato, in quanto si trova ripetuto

anche nelle Lezioni sulla filosofia della religione, dove può

essere forse fatto risalire al corso del 1831(42)." (p. 13)

(...)

"!Il significato delle analogie che sono state messe qui in rilievo

può probabilmente essere reso comprensibile da una

osservazione di Rosenkranz: «Compenetrato dalla nobiltà e

dalla bellezza dello spirito greco,

Hegel non riuscì mai a riconoscere il cristianesimo autentico in

una forma che escludesse da sé la solenne serenità degli

antichi»(52). Vista in questa luce, pur nella sua determinazione

errata, l'etimologia di religio ha, alla fine, la funzione di segnare

una differenza nella esperienza dell'antichità, una differenza

che separa il mondo greco dalla Romanitas in modo essenziale.

La grecità risulta un punto importante per Hegel anche per la

comprensione del Cristianesimo in quanto religione della

modernità.

Implicitamente, infatti, un rapporto ideale, privilegiato viene a

stabilirsi tra la libertà della fantasia (religione greca) e la libertà

dello spirito (Cristianesimo). L' errore hegeliano appare in

sostanza funzionale a

stabilire proprio questo rapporto ideale: in tal modo Hegel

mirava ad avvicinare l'esperienza greca del divino al mondo

cristiano, o forse, più verosimilmente, a rimodellare anche in

funzione dell'esperienza greca

del divino il contenuto, l'esperienza della religione cristiana."

(p. 15)

(39)Vorlesungen iiber die Geschichte der Philosophie 1822-23,

p. 402 (423) .

(40) Lactan. Div. inst. , I V, 28, 2 e Aug. Retract. , l, 1 3 , 8-9.

(41) Cic. De nat. deor. , Il, 28. Per gli aspetti strettamente

filologici della questione si rinvia a Ae. Forcellini, Lexicon

totius latinitatis, a L Furlanetto, F. Corradini et L Perin

emendatum et auctum, Patavii 1940, sub voce e ad A. Emout et

A. Meillet, Dictionnaire étymologique de la langue latine, Paris

19594, sub voce; più ampiamente sul problema cfr. A. Wlosok,

Romischer Religions- und Gottesbegriff in heidnischer und

christlicher Zeit, «Antike Abendland>>, 16 ( 1970), pp. 39-53 e

H. Bouillard, La formation du concept de religion en Occident,

in AA.VV., Humanisme et foi chrétienne. Mélanges

scientifiques du centenaire de l'Institut Catholique de Paris,

publiés par C. Kanneugiasser et Y. Marchasson, Paris 1976, pp.

451-461.

(42) Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Religion , II, p. 588.

(52) 52 Ros., p. 12 (34)-

3. Brignoli, Fernando. 1957. "Le parole greche nelle opere di

Cicerone." In Studi ciceroniani, 101-162. Napoli: Armanni.

4. Brumana, Selene I. S. 2022. "Platonismo e aristotelismo nel

Timaeus di Cicerone." Elenchos no. 43:249-278

Abstract: "Cicero’s Timaeus legitimately stands as the first

Latin exegesis of the Platonic dialogue. I shall deal with the

interpretation of §§19–21, a passage that departs significantly

from the Greek text in several respects. The aim of this paper is

to explore the role Aristotelianism might have played in

Cicero’s Timaeus. Among the points that support such an

analysis is the mention of the Peripatetic Cratippus in the

prologue. The interpretative scenario I suggest considers both

Cratippus’ role and Antiochus’s philosophical system with its

agreement between Platonism and Aristotelianism."

5. Chiereghin, Franco. 1993. "L'inizio greco dell'Europa e la

questione della Romanitas. Il cammino di Heidegger verso un

altro inizio." Verifiche no. 22:95-122.

6. De Gennaro, Ivo, and Zaccaria, Gino. 2014. "Heidegger e Roma.

La romanità allo specchio della Seinsfrage." Eudia no. 8:1-19

"Ora, riprendendo il filo del discorso, il più importante di quei

luoghi — come s’è detto, particolarmente significativi — è un

corso su Parmenide, che il filosofo tenne nell’inverno 1941/42 a

Friburgo.(2) Nel contesto del tentativo di discernere l’indole di

Ἀλήθεια — la Dea, appunto, del cosiddetto “poema di

Parmenide” —, Heidegger dedica una puntuale analisi al senso

e alle conseguenze della traduzione, o, più esattamente, della

traslazione della verità greca — la ἀλήθεια — nella sfera della

verità romana (la veritas) intesa come rectitudo, nozione a sua

volta interpretata alla luce dei tratti dell’imperium e dello

iustum. (L’analisi è insomma dedicata alla puntualizzazione dei

tratti con cui la greca ἀλήθεια assume l’abito derivato della

romana veritas.) In particolare, si mostra come, in forza di tale

traslazione, il vero risponda ormai soltanto al carattere

“imperiale” del comando — di quel comando che, nel momento

genituralmente “opportuno”, informerà poi la metafisica della

soggettività e della volontà (da Cartesio a Nietzsche), il cui esito

è il malverso nichilismo che conferisce il geniturale tono di

fondo alla nostra epoca."

(2) Martin Heidegger, Parmenides, Frankfurt a. M.:

Klostermann, 21992

7. Illeterati, Luca, and Moretto, Antonio, eds. 2004. Hegel,

Heidegger e la questione della romanitas. Atti del Convegno.

Verona, 16-17 maggio 2003. Roma: Edizioni di Storia e

Letteratura

Indice: Premessa VII; Franco Chiereghin: Introduzione: La

condanna di Roma in Hegel e in Heidegger IX-XIX;

Saggi

Franco Biasutti: Il ruolo di Cicerone nella interpretazione

hegeliana della Romanitas 3; Giovanni Bonacina: Due prestiti

da Gibbon per la descrizione hegeliana dell'impero romano

d'Oriente nelle Lezioni sulla filosofia della storia 47;

FRancesco Camera: La critica heideggeriana al concetto di

religio e il problema del Cristianesimo 43; Umberto Regina:

Hegel e Heidegger. Prima e dopo la romanità 65: Mario

Ruggenini: Heidegger: la Grecia, Roma e il Cristianesimo 77;

Contributi

Stefano Fusau: Diritto e giustizia tra intelletto e ragione. Hegel

e il metodo della giurisprudenza romana 105; Francesca

Menegoni: Convergenze e divergenze nella definizione

senecana e hegeliana di libertà 127; Antonio Moretto: Sul ruolo

delle categorie logiche della limitazione nell'interpretazione

hegeliana della Romanitas 139; Luca lletterati: L'origine e la

sua dissoluzione: la Romanitas come problema in Hegel e

Heidegger 155; Leonardo Samonà: La Romanitas fra Heidegger

e Hegel 167;

Indice dei nomi 167-185.

8. Lambardi, Noemi. 1982. Il 'Timaeus' ciceroniano. Arte e

tecnica del 'vertere'. Firenze: Le Monnier

"Credo che il sottotitolo del presente lavoro (Il ‘Timaeus’

ciceroniano·, arte e tecnica del ‘vertere’') già ne delimiti i

confini in maniera netta. Però mi sembra opportuno fin d’ora

sottolineare che le pagine che seguono hanno come costante

punto di riferimento (non di rado polemico) gli studi di Roland

Poncelet[*] sull’espressione del pensiero astratto nella lingua

latina classica. Essi a mio avviso hanno dato un contributo

originale alla letteratura sul Timaeus." (p. 8)

(...)

"A conclusione della ricerca lessicale compiuta, sembra si possa

confermare quanto già si delineava nei capitoli precedenti.

Nonostante il tecnicismo che caratterizza ampi tratti del

modello (si pensi per esempio alla descrizione platonica in 3 le -

34c del demiurgo-architetto del mondo, che ordina secondo

rapporti proporzionali le parti costitutive del corpo

dell’universo), la lingua della traduzione non rinuncia ad

atteggiarsi secondo i moduli della prosa d’arte.

(...)

"Più in generale, dai confronti testuali dell’ultimo e dei

precedenti capitoli tra originale e traduzione sembra si possa

dedurre (contro l’interpretazione ponceletiana che vede

essenzialmente nel Timaeus il tentativo fallito di raggiungere la

precisione espressiva) che Cicerone ha rispetto al modello un

atteggiamento complesso che per comodità, ossia per

rappresentare sinteticamente i risultati conclusivi della ricerca

fin qui svolta, potremmo riassumere nella formula di un

concorso del tradurre ‘artistico’ e del tradurre ‘scientifico’. La

lingua del Timaeus, poiché non è solo prosastica e tecnica, non

si può intendere unicamente attraverso la analisi del valore

semantico della singola parola, ma richiede che si indugi tanto

sul colorito e sulla tonalità lessicale della parola isolata quanto

sugli effetti ritmici ed espressivi determinati dalle associazioni

tra più parole o tra più serie di parole. Cicerone si ispira, come è

nella logica della traduzione antica, a criteri letterari e artistici

di fronte ai quali può talora perfino passare in secondo piano lo

scrupolo della resa documentaria. Ma è anche vero, come si è

spesso segnalato, che la resa latina presuppone di norma una

attenzione meticolosa ai diversi valori del testo platonico, che

non lascia dubbi sulla profondità e consapevolezza di

quell’indagine, anche se essa evidentemente è di altra natura

rispetto ai criteri moderni di traduzione scientifica." (pp. 143-

144)

[*] Cicéron traducteur de Platon. L'expression de la pensée

complexe en latin classique, 1957.

9. Marchetta, Antonio. 1992. "Apuleio traduttore." In La langue

latine, langue de la philosophie. Actes du colloque organisé

par l’École française de Rome avec le concours’de l’Université

de Rome « La Sapienza », Rome, 17–19 mai 1990, 203-218.

Rome: École Française de Rome

Riassunto: "Nel testo del de mundo, versione latina di un

trattato (pseudo) aristotelico περί κόσμου giuntaci sotto il

nome di Apuleio, gli studiosi hanno ravvisato così gravi

travisamenti ed errori di traduzione, da ritenere inaccettabile

l'attribuzione al famoso retore e filosofo madaurese. Sennonché

mediante una più accurata verifica di questi presunti errori,

attenta alle varianti presentate dalla tradizione del testo greco,

capace di riconoscere particolari tecniche adottate

dall'interpres latino (traduzioni a distanza, traduzioni '

etimologiche ', doppia traduzione di un medesimo termine),

consapevole delle specifiche istanze medioplatoniche dello

scrittore latino, si può arrivare senz'altro a scagionare il

traduttore da ogni accusa e ad individuare in lui i tratti

dell'autentica personalità apuleiana. Di questo tipo di

approfondimento qui vengono forniti due esempi, miranti a

ricondurre due ' clamorosi ' scarti del testo latino nei confronti

del modello greco a un disegno precostituito e ben calcolato."

10. Marciniak, Katarzyna. 2020. "Cum tacei, vertit: Cicerone

traduttore dal greco al latino (in cinque puntate poetiche)."

Eikasmos. Quaderni Bolognesi di Filologia Classica no. 3

Abstract: "Il ruolo delle traduzioni è di importanza cruciale per

lo sviluppo delle culture sin dall 'antichità. La sensibilità

estetica, le forme esterne delle opere e persino i valori morali ivi

presenti vengono trasferiti e cominciano a fiorire in un

ambiente nuovo. Tuttavia, occorre osservare che l'adattamento

dei modelli culturali primari attraverso il processo traslatorio

porta paradossalmente alla creazione dei concetti ben diversi

da quello originale. Siccome i cambiamenti sono spesso quasi

impercettibili oppure si spiegano facilmente con le necessità di

adattare appunto l'originale all'altra cultura, le traduzioni- se

'applicate' da un visionario abile - possono diventare uno

strumento efficacissimo della formazione mentale (per non dire

'ideologica') della società in questa cultura. Marco Tullio

Cicerone è senza dubbio tale visionario, anzi, uno dei padri

fondatori della civiltà occidentale. Spesso privato della voce

sulla scena politica, ricorreva alla forza dell 'espressione

artistica, la pratica traslatoria inclusa, per promuovere le sue

idee e garantirgli una longue durée nei suoi scritti. Nel corso

dell' analisi sarà quindi dimostrato come l'Arpinate, per mezzo

delle traduzioni, ci abbia trasmesso la propria visione della

'Repubblica perfetta' - la visione che alimenta le menti delle

generazioni successive fino a quella nostra."

11. Setaioli, Aldo. 1988. Seneca e i Greci: Citazioni e traduzioni

nelle opere filosofiche. Padova: Patron

"Attraverso l'esame di tutte le citazioni da autori greci che

compaiono nell'opera filosofica senecana si indaga da un lato

sull'atteggiamento del filosofo romano nei confronti della

cultura ellenica, dall'altro sulle soluzioni da lui adottate di

fronte ai concreti problemi sollevati dalla resa in latino del

pensiero e della forma degli originali greci. Il tipo prevalente

della citazione senecana, che tende a configurarsi quasi sempre

in forma di sentenza, pone costantemente il problema del

carattere delle fonti greche utilizzate da Seneca. Il libro si

articola in capitoli dedicati ai vari autori greci citati dal

Romano, con il massimo spazio riservato a quelli

maggiormente utilizzati da lui: i filosofi stoici ed Epicurio.

Precede un capitolo sulla posizione teorica senecana sulle due

lingue e sulle due culture, fortemente influenzata da un lato

dall'atmosfera culturale della sua epoca, dall'altro dalle dottrine

filosofiche dello stoicismo relative al linguaggio, e strettamente

collegata col concreto problema della traduzione. Alle

dossografie dei vari libri delle Naturales questiones viene

dedicata una trattazione speciale, mentre alcune appendici

hanno lo scopo di completare il quadro tracciato nell'opera,"

Deutsche Studien

1. Büchner, Karl. 1974. "Zum Platonismus Ciceros. Bemerkungen

zum vierten Buch von Ciceros Werk De re publica." In Studia

Platonica. Festschrift fiir Hermann Gundert zu seinem 65.

Geburtstag am 30. 4. 1974, edited by Döring, Klaus and

Kullmann, Wolfgang, 165-184. Amsterdam: B. R. Grüner.

2. Fögen, Thorsten. 2000. Patrii sermonis egestas. Einstellungen

lateinischer Autoren zu ihrer Muttersprache. München: K. G.

Saur

Ein Beitrag zum Sprachbewußtsein in der römischen Antike.

Inhaltsverzeichnis: Vorwort 7; 1. Einleitung 11; 2.

Muttersprache und Fremdsprachen in der römischen Antike

27; 3. Lukrez 61; 4. Cicero 77; 5. Quintilian 142; 5.1

Vorbemerkungen 142; 6. Aulus Gellius 180; 7. Kurzer Ausblick

auf Zeugnisse der Spätantike 221; 8. Zusammenfassung:

Rückblick und Ausblick 229; 9. Bibliographie 237; 10.

Stellenregister 267.

3. Kosmas, Raspitsos. 2013. Die Latinisierung des Griechischen.

Übersetzung, Verstehen und Sprache im Ausgang von Martin

Heidegger und Hans-Georg Gadamer. Würzburg:

Königshausen & Neumann

"Die Analyse_ setzt mit zwei zentralen Beispielen der

Latinisierung ein, nämlich mit Heideggers Ausführungen zur

Übersetzung der griechischen philosophischen Begriffen

ενέργεια und φύσις in die lateinischen actualitas und natura.

Heideggers Auffassung des Übersetzens und ihre

philosophische Relevanz wird im Anschluss als Bedingung

dieser zwei Beispiele diskutiert.

Daraus wird ersichtlich, dass Heideggers Begriff des

Übersetzens gewisse Voraussetzungen hat. Er geht nämlich

nicht von einer übersetzungskritischen Analyse der lateinischen

Übersetzungen der griechischen Philosophie aus.

Die Motivation ist eher eine hermeneutische, genauer gesagt

die Abhängigkeit des Verstehens und mithin auch des

Übersetzens von dem jeweiligen Horizont und insbesondere

vom jeweiligen Sprachhorizont. Dieses Grundmotiv seines

Denkens, das auch seine Meinung zum Übersetzen bestimmt,

wird im Rest des ersten Kapitels dargelegt.

Heideggers Auffassung des Übersetzens wurzelt im Herzen

seiner ganzen Philosophie, in seinem Ansatz der

Seinsgeschichte. Das ist die allgemeinste Prämisse der

Latinisierung. Diese wird im zweiten Kapitel unter dem Titel

Die abendländische Metaphysik näher verdeutlicht. Dort wird

der Versuch unternommen, Heideggers Analyse der

Metaphysik des Abendlandes, von der Wandlung der ἀλήθεια

zur adaequatio und der platonischen ἰδέα bis zur neuzeitlichen

Wissenschaft und Technik und seine Kritik am Theoretischen

zu schildern." (pp. 12-13)

4. Mueller-Goldingen, Christian. 1992. "Ciceros als Übersetzer

Platons." In Zum Umgang mit fremden Sprachen in der

griechisch-römischen Antike edited by Müller, Carl Werner,

Sier, Kurt and Werner, Jürgen, 173-187. Stuttgart: F. Steiner.

5. Puelma, Mario. 1980. "Cicero als Platon-Übersetzer." Museum

Helveticum no. 37:137-178.

6. Ratkowitsch, Christine. 1996. "Die Timaios-Übersetzung des

Chalcidius - ein Plato christianus." Philologus no. 140:139-162.

7. Strasburger, Hermann, and Strasburger, Gisela. 1990. Ciceros

philosophisches Spätwerk als Aufruf gegen die Herrschaft

Caesars. Hildesheim: Georg Olms.

8. Switalski, Bronislaus Wladislaus. 1902. Des Chalcidius

Kommentar zu Plato’s Timaeus. Eine historisch-kritische

Untersuchung. Münster: Aschendorff.

9. Waszink, Jan Hendrik. 1964. Studien zum Timaioskommentar

des Calcidius. Leiden: Brill.

10. Wimmel, Walter. 1974. "Cicero auf platonischem Feld (zu § 9

des Orator)." In Studia Platonica. Festschrift fiir Hermann

Gundert zu seinem 65. Geburtstag am 30. 4. 1974, edited by

Döring, Klaus and Kullmann, Wolfgang, 185-194. Amsterdam:

B. R. Griiner.

11. Zoll, Galuus. 1962. Cicero Platonis aemulus. Untersuchungen

über die Form von Ciceros Dialogen, besonders von De

oratore. Zürich: Juris.

Bibliographia. Annotated bibliographies

Raul Corazzon || rc@ontology.co || Info

Synoptic Problem: Bibliography of

the main studies in English from

1964 (Tuc - Z)

Studies on the Synoptic Problem

1. Tuckett, Christopher M. 1979. "The Griesbach Hypothesis in

the 19th Century." Journal for the Study of the New Testament

no. 3:29-60.

Reprinted in S. E. Porter, C. A. Evans (eds.), New Testament

Interpretation and Methods: a Sheffield Reader, Sheffield:

Sheffield Academic Press, 1997, pp. 15-43.

Abstract: "Recent study of the history of the Synoptic Problem

has suggested that, in the 19th century, the theory of Marcan

priority was adopted, and the Griesbach hypothesis rejected, as

part of an attempt to counter the historical scepticism of D.F.

Strauss and others in the ’Tübingen school’, and to restore the

historical reliability of the gospel account.

This article examines this question, and suggests that, in fact,

the Griesbach hypothesis was considered, and rejected, quite

independently of any associations with the Tübingen school. A

brief survey of some of the arguments which were brought

against the Griesbach hypothesis suggests that what is lacking

is a set of convincing reasons for Mark’s having proceeded in

the way which the Griesbach hypothesis alleges

he did."

2. ———. 1980. "The Argument from Order and the Synoptic

Problem." Theologische Zeitschrift no. 36:336-354.

3. ———. 1983. The Revival of the Griesbach Hypothesis: An

Analysis and Appraisal. Cambridge: Cambridge University

Press.

4. ———. 1983. "The Beatitudes A Source-Critical Study. With a

Reply by M. D. Goulder." Novum Testamentum no. 25:193-216.

Reprinted in: David E. Orton (ed.), The Synoptic Problem and

Q: Selected Studies from Novum Testamentum, Leiden: Brill,

1999, pp. 180-203.

5. ———, ed. 1984. Synoptic Studies: The Ampleforth Conferences

of 1982 and 1983. Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press.

Reprint New York: Bloomsbury 2014.

Contents: C. M. Tuckett: Preface VII; P.S. Alexander: Midrash

and the Gospels 1; P. S. Alexander: Rabbinic Biography and the

Biography of Jesus: A Survey of the Evidence 19; F. G.

Downing: Contemporary Analogies to the Gospel and Acts:

'Genres', or 'Motifs'? 51; D. L. Dungan: A Griesbachian

Perspective on the Argument from Order 67; W. R. Farmer:

Certain Results Reached by Sir John C. Hawkins and C.F.

Burney which make more sense if Luke knew Matthew, and

Mark knew Matthew and Luke 75; M. D. Goulder: Some

Observations on Professor Farmer's 'Certain Results . . . ' 99;

W. R. Farmer: Reply to Michael Goulder 105; M.D. Goulder:

The Order of a Crank 111 157; H. B. Green: The Credibility of

Luke's Transformation of Matthew 131; H. B. Green: Matthew

12.22-50 and Parallels: An Alternative to Matthean Conflation

157; G. D. Kilpatrick: Matthew on Matthew 177; A. Meredith:

The Evidence of Papias for the Priority of Matthew 187; C. M.

Tuckett: Arguments from Order: Definition and Evaluation 197;

Index of Biblical References 221; Index of Authors Cited 228.

6. ———. 1984. "On the Relationship between Matthew and Luke."

New Testament Studies no. 30:130-142.

7. ———. 1984. "Arguments from Order: Definition and

Evaluation." In Synoptic Studies: The Ampleforth Conferences

of 1982 and 1983, edited by Tuckett, Christopher M., 197-219.

Sheffield: JSOT Press.

Reprinted in: C. M. Tuckett, From the Sayings to the Gospels,

Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2014, pp. 3-22.

8. ———. 1986. Nag Hammadi and the Gospel Tradition.

Synoptic Tradition in the Nag Hammadi Library. Edinburgh:

T & T Clark.

9. ———. 1987. "The Two Gospel Hypothesis Under Scrutiny: A

Response." Perkins School of Theology Journal no. 40:25-31.

10. ———. 1988. "Thomas and the Synoptics." Novum

Testamentum no. 30:132-157.

11. ———. 1990. "Response to the Two-Gospel Hypothesis [I]." In

The Interrelations of the Gospels. A Symposium led by M.-E.

Boismard - W.R. Farmer - F. Neirynck, Jerusalem 1984, edited

by Dungan, David L., 47-62. Leuven: Leuven University Press /

Peeters.

12. ———. 1990. "Response to the Two-Gospel Hypothesis II: The

Eschatological Discourse." In The Interrelations of the Gospels.

A Symposium led by M.-E. Boismard - W.R. Farmer - F.

Neirynck, Jerusalem 1984, edited by Dungan, David L., 63-76.

Leuven: Leuven University Press / Peeters.

13. ———. 1992. "Synoptic Problem." In The Anchor Bible

Dictionary: Vol. 6, edited by Freedman, Martin, 263-270. New

York: Doubleday.

14. ———. 1992. "Q (Gospel Source)." In The Anchor Bible

Dictionary: Vol. 5, edited by Freedman, David Noel, 567-572.

New York: Doubleday.

15. ———. 1993. "The Minor Agreements and Textual Criticism." In

Minor Agreements: Symposium Göttingen 1991, edited by

Strecker, Georg, 110-142. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht.

16. ———. 1993. "Mark and Q." In The Synoptic Gospels: Source

Criticism and the New Literary Criticism, edited by Focant,

Camille, 149-175. Louvain: Louvain University Press.

17. ———. 1995. "The Existence of Q." In The Gospel behind the

Gospels: Current Studies on Q, edited by Piper, Ronald Allen,

19-47. Leiden: Brill.

Reprinted in : C. M. Tuckett (ed.), From the Sayings to the

Gospels, Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2014, pp. 3-22.

18. ———. 1996. Q and the History of Early Christianity: Studies

on Q. Peabody (MA): Hendrickson Publishers.

19. ———. 1996. "Synoptic Tradition in the Didache." In The

Didache in Modern Research, edited by Draper, Jonathan A.,

92-128. Leiden: Brill.

"This paper has analyzed some of the parallels between

material in different parts of the Didache and material in the

synoptic gospels.

The result has been that these parallels can be best ex;plained if

the Didache presupposes the finished gospels of Matthew and

Luke.

Further, this result seems to apply to all parts of the Didache

examined here. Precisely how the gospels were available to the

author of the Didache is impossible to say: they may have been

available as separate texts; they may have been already

combined to form a single harmonized text. However, the

evidence of the Didache seems to show that the text is primarily

a witness to the post-redactional history of the synoptic

tradition. It is not a witness to any pre-redactional

developments." (p. 128)

20. ———. 2011. "The Current State of the Synoptic Problem." In

New Studies in the Synoptic Problem: Oxford Conference,

April 2008. Essays in Honour of Christopher M. Tuckett,

edited by Foster, Paul, Gregory, Andrew, Kloppenborg, John S.

and Verheyden, Joseph, 9-50. Leuven: Peeters.

21. ———. 2014. From the Sayings to the Gospels. Tübingen: Mohr

Siebeck.

22. ———. 2016. "Matthew's Conflation of His Sources." In An

Early Reader of Mark and Q, edited by Verheyden, Jozef and

van Belle, Gilbert, 67-107. Leuven: Peeters.

23. ———. 2020. "The Reception of Q Studies in the UK: No Room

at the Inn?" In The Q Hypothesis Unveiled: Theological,

Sociological, and Hermeneutical Issues Behind the Sayings

Source, edited by Tiwald, Markus, 62-85. Stuttgart:

Kohlhammer.

24. ———. 2020. "Theological Issues at Stake in Early-Twentieth-

Century: Research on the Synoptic Problem." In Theological

and Theoretical Issues in the Synoptic Problem, edited by

Kloppenborg, John S. and Verheyden, Joseph, 77-116. New

York: Bloomsbury.

"As we come to the end of the second decade of the twenty-first

century, the 2GH has waned somewhat in significance. Farmer

and Dungan, perhaps the most vocal and energetic of the

defenders of the 2GH in the recent past, have both died. Today,

lip service is regularly and explicitly paid to the 2GH as a

theoretical alternative to the 2DH, but I know of no great new

discussions or analyses of the theory in recent years.

Meanwhile, Goulder has also now died, but his mantle has been

taken over by others, so that the FH has gained considerable

momentum through the work of scholars such as Goodacre,

Poitier, Watson, and others, and now would appear to

command a significant level of support.

For some at least, it has inherited the place of the 2GH as the

main alternative theory to the 2DH. In any scholarly context,

the debates that take place are as often as not generated by, and

reflect, the interests and positions of the participants involved.

Hence today, in many contexts ( colloquia, volumes of essays,

etc.), space is regularly given to advocates of the FH to argue

their case, and the hypothesis is also often noted and discussed

in detail by advocates of the 2DH. By contrast, the 2GH today is

effectively rather sidelined." (p. 4, note omitted)

(...)

"We cannot and should not expect scholars of the past to have

anticipated the problems (and postulated solutions) that arose

subsequently to the time they wrote, especially in relation to the

Synoptic Problem where so many theoretical possibilities exist,

and it is simply not possible to consider them all in detail

within a finite time. In looking to the past, we have to seek to

engage in "fair play" in considering how

others at the time argued and debated and not impose our own

agendas, and presuppositions, on them.

In considering then "theological issues at stake" in past

discussions of the Synoptic Problem, I look first at the possible

issues that those engaged in the discussions at the time may

have thought were at stake. In a final section I offer some brief

critical reflections on those issues from a contemporary

standpoint from where, with hindsight, it is all too easy to be

critical! However, perhaps initially one owes it to those being

considered to try to understand what they thought were the key

issues concerned." (p. 6)

25. Turner, Nigel. 1959. "The Minor Verbal Agreements of Mt. and

Lk. against Mk." In Studia Evangelica. Papers presented to the

International Congress on "The Four Gospels in 1957, held ar

Christ Church, Oxford, 1957", edited by Aland, Kurt et al., 223-

234. Berlin: Akademie Verlag.

26. Tyson, Joseph B. 1976. "Sequential Parallelism in the synoptic

Gospels." New Testament Studies no. 22:276-308.

27. ———. 1983. "Conflict as a Literary Theme in the Gospel of

Luke." In New Synoptic Studies: The Cambridge Gospel

Conference and Beyond, edited by Farmer, William R., 303-

327. Macon: Mercer University Press.

28. ———. 1985. "The Two-Source Hypothesis: A Critical

Appraisal." In The Two-Source Hypothesis: A Critical

Appraisal, edited by Bellinzoni Jr., Arthur J., 437-452. Macon:

Mercer University Press.

29. Uchido, Kazuhiko. 1981. The Study of the Synoptic Problem in

the Twentieth Century: a Critical Assessment, Aberdeen

University.

Unpublished dissertation, Aberdeen University, accessible from

EThOS e-theses online service.

30. Vaage, Leif E. 2016. "How I Stopped being a Q-Scholar." In

Scribal Practices and Social Structures among Jesus

Adherents: Essays in Honour of John S. Kloppenborg, edited

by Arnal, William E., Ascough, Richard S., Derrenbacker, Jr.,

Robert A. and Harland, Philip A., 213-231. Leuven: Peeters.

31. Vaganay, Léon. 1954. Le problème synoptique : un hypothèse

de travail. Tournai: Desclée.

32. Valantsis, Richard. 2005. The New Q: A Translation with

Commentary. New York: T & T Clark.

33. Van Dore, James R. 2019. "Evidence for a Relationship

Between Mark and Q." In Greco-Roman and Jewish

Tributaries to the New Testament: Festschrift in Honor of

Gregory J. Riley, edited by Crawford, Chritpher S., 45-68.

Claremont, CA: Claremont Press.

34. Van Oyen, Geert. 1997. "The Doublets in 19th-Century Gospel

Studies." Ephemerides Theologicae Lovanienses no. 73:277-

306.

"In contemporary gospel study, the word ‘doublet' is used for

doubly attested sayings or narratives in one and the same

gospel. Its use was originally limited to saying doublets (logia),

especially in Mt and Lk. The great number of doublets in these

gospels became a classic argument for the two-source

hypothesis6: besides their knowledge and use of Mk, Matthew

and Luke used a second common source (a sayings collection,

Logienquelle, which was later called Q). At the times this

explanation of the doublets was something new in the study of

the synoptic gospels.

Before the rise of historical criticism it had been common to say

that the evangelist, who wrote twice the same saying of Jesus,

was convinced that Jesus had spoken these words on two

different occasions." (p. 278, notes omitted)

(...)

"At the end of the 19th century, with the priority of Mark

established, the search for Mark's literary sources will be

elaborated in the many theories of a primitive Markan gospel

and of a double miracle cycle. It will create a debate in Markan

exegesis of the twentieth century." (p. 306)

35. van Zyl, H. C. 1997. "Objective Display or Textual Engineering?

Hermeneutical aspects in Making and Using a Synopsis of the

Synoptic Gospels." Neotestamentica no. 31:361-368.

36. Vassiliadis, Petros. 1973. "Behind Mark: Towards a Written

Source." New Testament Studies no. 20:155-160.

37. ———. 1978. "The Nature and Extent of the Q-Document."

Novum Testamentum no. 20:49-73.

Reprinted in: David E. Orton (ed.), The Synoptic Problem and

Q: Selected Studies from Novum Testamentum, Leiden: Brill,

1999, pp. 138-162.

38. ———. 1982. "The Original Order of Q: Some Residual Cases."

In Logia. Les paroles de Jesus = The Sayings of Jesus:

Memorial Joseph Coppens, edited by Delobel, Joël, 379-387.

Leuven: Leuven University Press.

39. ———. 1999. LOGOI IÄSOU. Studies in Q. Atlanta: Scholars

Press.

Reconstruction of Q: The Q Text, pp. 85-116.

40. ———. 1999. "Prolegomena to a Discussion on the Relationship

Between Mark and the Q Document." In LOGOI IÄSOU:

Studies in Q, 71-84. Atlanta: Scholars Press.

41. Verheyden, Joseph. 1996. "Mark and Q." Ephemerides

Theologicae Lovanienses no. 72:408-417.

42. ———. 2011. "Proto-Luke, and What Can Possibly Be Made of

It." In New Studies in the Synoptic Problem: Oxford

Conference, April 2008: Essays in Honour of Christopher M.

Tuckett edited by Foster, P., Gregory, A., Kloppenborg, John S.

and Verheyden, Joseph, 617-654. Leuven: Peeters.

43. ———. 2020. "Introducing "Q" in French Catholic Scholarship

at the Turn of the 19th and 20th Century: Alfred Loisy’s

Évangiles synoptiques." In The Q Hypothesis Unveiled:

Theological, Sociological, and Hermeneutical Issues Behind

the Sayings Source, edited by Tiwald, Markus, 146-174.

Stuttgart: Kohlhammer.

44. Vinson, Richard. 2004. "How Minor? Assessing the

Significance of the Minor Agreements as an Argument against

the Two-Source Hypothesis." In Questioning Q: A

Multidimensional Critique, edited by Goodacre, Mark S. and

Perrin, Nicholas, 151-164. Downers Grove: InterVarsity Press.

45. Vinzent, Markus. 2014. Marcion and the Dating of the

Synoptic Gospels. Leuven: Peeters.

46. Viviano, Benedict Thomas. 2013. "Who Wrote Q? The Sayings

Document (Q) as the Apostle Matthew's Private Notebook as a

Bilingual Village Scribe (Mark 2:13-17; Matt 9:9-13)." In Mark

and Matthew II. Comparative Readings: Reception History,

Cultural Hermeneutics, and Theology, edited by Becker, Eve-

Marie and Runesson, Anders, 75-91. Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck.

47. ———. 2013. What Are They Saying About Q? New York:

Paulist Press.

48. ———. 2020. "French Catholic Scholarship on the Synoptic

Problem in the Late Nineteenth and Early Twentieth

Centuries." In Theological and Theoretical Issues in the

Synoptic Problem, edited by Kloppenborg, John S. and

Verheyden, Joseph, 151-164. New York: Bloomsbury.

"This is not a mysterious issue. The main figures are Loisy,

Lagrange, their reception of Harnack, the Biblical Commission

Decree of June 26, 1912, Leon Vaganay (1882-1969), and the

happy ending in the heroic figure of Bruno de Solages, whose

story should be better known." (p. 151)

(...)

"This report on French Catholic scholarship on the Synoptic

Problem in the late nineteenth and the twentieth centuries does

not come to a happy ending. From 1911 to 1956, French

Catholic scholars who expected an imprimatur for their studies

of the gospels felt that they were obliged to accept the decrees

of the Biblical Commission on this matter. The Commission

gave a particular reading of the words of Papias, as

preserved in Eusebius, Hist. eccl. 3.39. Papias briefly mentions

that Matthew wrote the oracles in the Hebrew language. The

Commission took this to mean the whole gospel of canonical

Matthew, but in Hebrew or Aramaic. This brief notice in

Papias/Eusebius was continuously repeated by those ancient

authors who discussed gospel origins, and they added the

chronological nuance that Matthew wrote before Mark,

although Papias does not say this. This ghost of an Aramaic

Matthew nearly identical with our canonical Greek Matthew

dominates Vaganay and still hovers over Boismard's

intermediate Matthew.

Boismard's three-volume work remains the most important

work in our purview. It culminates in a rich and remarkable

commentary on all of John, and in a valuable monograph on

Johannine Christology.

Recent commentaries on Mark by Simone Legasse(26) and

Camille Focant breathe a fresh spirit. Because of the war and

press of other business, de Solages never wrote a full

commentary on a Synoptic gospel.

The two-source hypothesis still has many enemies in France.

The battle is not over." (p. 164)

(26) Simon Legasse, L'Evangile de Marc (2 vols.; Lectio divina.

Commentaires 5; Paris: Les Editions du Cerf, 1997); Camille

Focant, L'Evangile selon Marc (Paris: Les Editions du Cerf,

2004), E.T. The Gospel According to Mark: A Commentary

(trans. L. R. Keylock; Eugene, OR: Wipf & Stock, 2012).

49. Walker, Norman. 1966. "Patristic Evidence and the Priority of

Matthew." In Studia Patristica. Vol. VII, 571-575. Berlin:

Akademie Verlag.

50. Walker, William O. Jr. 1977. "A Method for Identifying

Redactional Passages in Matthew on Functional and Linguistic

Grounds." Catholic Biblical Quarterly no. 39:76-93.

51. ———. 1983. "The Son of Man Question and the Synoptic

Problem." In New Synoptic Studies: The Cambridge Gospel

Conference and Beyond, edited by Farmer, William R., 261-

301. Macon: Mercer University Press.

52. ———. 1987. "The State of the Synoptic Question: Some

Reflections on the Work of Tuckett and McNicoI." Perkins

School of Theology Journal no. 40:14-21.

53. Walters, Patricia. 2010. "The Synoptic Problem." In The

Blackwell Companion to the New Testament, edited by Aune,

David E., 236-253.

54. Wansbrough, Henry, ed. 1991. Jesus and the Oral Gospel

Tradition. Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press.

Contents: Henry Wansborugh: Introduction 9; Ørvind

Andersen: Oral Tradition 17; David E. Aune: Prolegomena to

the Study of Oral Tradition in the Hellenistic World 59; Hans

Peter Rüger: Oral Tradition in the Old Testament 107;

Shemaryahu Talmon: Oral Tradition and Written

Transmission, or the Heard and the Seen Word in Judaism of

the Second Temple Period 121; Philip S. Alexander: Orality in

Pharisaic-rabbinic Judaism al the Turn of the Eras 159; Rainer

Riesner: Jesus as Preacher and Teacher 185; David E. Aune:

Oral Tradition and the Aphorisms of Jesus 211; Birger

Gerhardsson: llluminating the Kingdom: Narrative Meshalim

in the Synoptic Gospels 266; E. Earle Ellis: The Making of

Narratives in the Synoptic Gospels 310; Marion L. Soards: Oral

Tradition Before, In, and Outside the Canonical Passion

Narratives 334; James D. G. Dunn: John and the Oral Gospel

Tradition 351; Traugott Holtz: Paul and the Oral Gospel

Tradition 380; Willy Rordorf: Does the Didache Contain Jesus

Tradition Independently of the Synoptic Gospels? 394; Ben F.

Meyer: Some Consequences of Birger Gerhardsson's Account of

the Origins of the Gospel Tradition 424; Index of Biblical and

other References 441; Index of Authors 463.

55. Watson, Francis. 2009. "Q as Hypothesis: A Study in

Methodology." New Testament Studies no. 55:397-415.

56. ———. 2013. Gospel Writing: A Canonical Perspective. Grand

Rapids, MI: Eerdmans.

57. ———. 2014. "A Response to Richard Bauckham and Heike

Omerzu." Journal for the Study of the New Testament no.

37:210-218.

Response to Bauckham (2014) and Omerzu (2014).

58. ———. 2016. "Luke Rewriting and Rewritten." In Luke's

Literary Creativity, edited by Nielsen, Jesper Tang and Müller,

Mogens, 79-95. New York: Bloomsbury.

59. ———. 2020. "The Archaeology of the Q Hypothesis: The Case

of H. J. Holtzmann." In Theological and Theoretical Issues in

the Synoptic Problem, edited by Kloppenborg, John S. and

Verheyden, Joseph, 37-52. New York: Bloomsbury.

"The question this raises is whether the Q consensus that

established itself in the later nineteenth centu1y was the all-

but-inevitable conclusion of a centu1y of intensive synoptic

research, or the product of contingencies-decisions that might

have gone the other way given a different set of scholarly

priorities. In addressing this question, the case of H.J.

Holtzmann (1832-1910) will prove to be exempla1y. Spanning

the last four decades of the nineteenth century, the period of

transition between the diversity of early synoptic research and

the triumph of the two-source hypothesis, Holtzmann's work

both contributes to that triumph and discloses the uncertainties

on which it is founded." (p. 39)

60. Wenham, John William. 1972. "The Synoptic Problem

Revisited: Some New Suggestions about the Composition of

Mark 4:1-34." Tyndale Bulletin no. 23:3-38.

61. ———. 1981. "Synoptic Independence and the Origin of Luke's

Travel Narrative." New Testament Studies no. 27:507-515.

62. ———. 1992. Redating Matthew, Mark & Luke: A Fresh Assault

on the Synoptic Problem. Downers Grove (IL): InterVarsity

Press.

63. West Jr., Philip H. 1967. "A Primitive Version of Luke in the

Composition of Matthew." New Testament Studies no. 14:75-

95.

64. Westcott, Brooke Foss. 1902. Introduction to the Study of the

Gospels with Historical and Explanatory Notes. New York:

Macmillan.

65. Williams, C.S.. 1945. "Did Matthew and Luke se a 'Western'

Text of Mark." The Expository Times:41-45.

66. Williams, Matthew C. 2000. "The Owen Hypothesis: an Essay

Showing that it Was Henry Owen Who First Formulated the

So-Called "Griesbach Hypothesis"." The Journal of Higher

Criticism:109-125.

67. ———. 2006. Two Gospels from One: A Comprehensive Text-

critical Analysis of the Synoptic Gospels. Grand Rapids (MI):

Kregel.

68. Williams, N. P. 1911. "A Recent Theory of the Origin of St.

Mark's Gospel." In Studies in the Synoptic Problem By

Members of The University of Oxford edited by Sanday,

William, 388-421. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

69. Wilson, B. E. 1997. "The Two Notebook Hypothesis: An

Explanation of Seven Synoptic Patterns." The Expository Times

no. 108:265-268.

70. Wilson, Robert McL. 1959. "Farrer and Streeter on the Minor

Agreements of Matthew and Luke against Mark." In Studia

Evangelica. Papers presented to the International Congress on

"The Four Gospels in 1957, held ar Christ Church, Oxford,

1957", edited by Aland, Kurt et al., 254-257. Berlin: Akademie

Verlag.

71. Winter, Paul. 1956. "The Proto-Source of Luke I." Novum

Testamentum no. 1:184-199.

72. ———. 1970. "The Proto-Source of Luke I. Addenda." Novum

Testamentum no. 12:349.

73. Wittkowsky, Vadim. 2016. "Luke Uses/Rewrites Matthew: A

Survey of the 19th Century Research." In Luke's Literary

Creativity, edited by Nielsen, Jesper Tang and Müller, Mogens,

3-25. New York: Bloomsbury.

"For more than one hundred years, research on the Synoptic

Problem has tended to deny any direct interdependence

between the Gospels of Matthew and Luke. There are several

well-known (but partly fallacious)

arguments against the assumption that one author used the

text of the other, but as a rule, dismissal of the dependence idea

no longer seem to require explanation." (p. 3)

"The present study deals with that period in New Testament

studies when it was considered quite natural that Luke should

have been a sort of critic and one who deconstructed the Gospel

of Matthew. This starting

point even dominated scholarship in the nineteenth century.

The contemporary authors of the time, mostly German, would

have been surprised to hear that precisely the "scattering"

should be seen as a huge problem with regard to Luke's

dependence on Matthew. These scholars, who have been

unmeritedly forgotten, can in part be considered as the

predecessors of Austin Farrer, Michael Goulder, Mark

Goodacre and especially - as we will see below - Eric Franklin,

and their works therefore need to be reexamined and

integrated into the ongoing discussion." (p. 4)

74. Wood, Herbert G. 1985. "The Priority of Mark." In The Two-

Source Hypothesis: A Critical Appraisal, edited by Bellinzoni

Jr., Arthur J., 77-84. Macon: Mercer University Press.

Reprint of "The Priority of Mark", The Expository Times, 65

(1953-19654), pp-17-19.

75. Woods, F. H. 1890. "The Origin and Mutual Relation of the

Synoptic Gospels." In Studia Biblica et Ecclesiastica: Essays

Chiefly in Biblical and Patristical Criticism. Volume 2, edited

by Driver, S. R., Cheyne, T. K. and Sanday, William, 59-104.

Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Reprint: Piscataway, NJ: Gorgias Press 2006.

"It will be seen that the essential feature in the line of argument

adopted is the importance attached to parallelism of sequence

between the three Synoptics, as distinguished from mere

resemblance in subject-matter and even language." (p. 1)

(...)

"I will now give the reasons which seem to me to prove

conclusively that the original basis of the Synoptical Gospels

coincided in its range and order with our St. Mark(A).

(1) The earliest and the latest parallels in all three Gospels

coincide with the beginning and end of St. Mark. The first is the

ministry of St. John the Baptist, the last the visit of the women

to our Saviour's tomb,

(2) With but few exceptions we find parallels to the whole of St.

Mark in either St. Matthew or St. Luke, and to by far the larger

part in both.

(3) The order of the whole of St. Mark, excepting of course what

is peculiar to that Gospel, is confirmed either by St. Matthew or

St. Luke, and the greater part of it by both.

(4) A passage parallel in all three Synoptists is never

immediately followed in both St. Matthew and St. Luke by a

separate incident or discourse common to these two evangelists

alone.

(5) Similarly in the parts common to St. Matthew and St. Luke

alone, no considerable fragments, with some doubtful

exceptions(B), occur in the same relative order, so that it is

unlikely that they formed part of the original source.

(6) To this we may add the fact that in the same parts the

differences between St. Matthew and St. Luke are generally

greater than in those which are common to all three.

Not one of these arguments is of itself necessary to prove our

point. That the Synoptists should have preserved so much of

the original source and of its order, is for the Gospel student a

happy accident which enables him to determine its limits with a

certain degree of exactness. It may be added that arguments of

a like kind could not be adduced to prove the priority of a

Gospel resembling St. Matthew or St. Luke." (pp. 61-62)

(A) By our St. Mark here and throughout is meant our present

Gospel according to the best critical texts, and excluding

therefore xvi. 9-20, against the genuineness of which this

inquiry alone will be found to add strong evidence.

No Marcan section of anything like the same importance is

absent from St. Matthew and St. Luke.

(B) 1 Cf. Matt. xii. 22-30 with Luke xi. 14-23 ; xii. 38-42 with xi.

29-32 ; xii.43-45 with xi. 24-26. See pp. 77, 78. Perhaps we

should add Matt xii.33-35 compared with Luke vi. 43-45.

76. Worden, Ronald D. 1975. "Redaction Critism of Q: A Survey."

Journal of Biblical Literature no. 94:532-546.

77. Wright, Arthur. 1890. The Composition of the Four Gospels: A

critical inquiry. London: Macmillan and Co.

78. Youngquist, Linden. 2013. "Matthew, Mark and Q. A Literary

Exploration." In Mark and Matthew I. Comparative Readings:

Understanding the Earliest Gospels in Their First-Century

Settings, edited by Becker, Eve-Marie and Runesson, Anders,

233-261. Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck.

79. Youngquist, Linden E., Klampfl, Thomas, Carruth, Shawn, and

Reed, Jonathan L., eds. 2011. Documenta Q: Reconstructions

of Q Through Two Centuries of Gospel Research. Excerpted,

sorted, and evaluated: Q 6:37-42. Not Judging – The Blind

Leading the Blind – The Disciple and the Teacher – The Speck

and the Beam. Leuven: Peeters.

Bibliographia. Annotated bibliographies

Raul Corazzon || rc@ontology.co || Info

Synoptic Problem: Bibliography of

the main studies in English from

1964 (Buc - Day)

Studies on the Synoptic Problem

1. Buchanan, George Wesley. 1974. "Has the Griesbach

Hypothesis Been Falsified?" Journal of Biblical Literature no.

93:550-572.

"In recent article, Professors Talbert and McKnight have

attempted to falsify, or at least cast doubt upon the Griesbach

hypothesis.(1) This is a legitimate and timely undertaking,

because the synoptic problem is currently receiving more

attention than it has commanded since Sanday's seminar at

Oxford and Streeter's publication of The Four Gospels.(2) Like

all other hypotheses, the Griesbach hypothesis should be re-

analyzed periodically to evaluate its strengths and weaknesses."

(p. 550)

(...)

"Conclusion. McKnight's work is certainly a contribution to the

discussion which attempts to describe the literary relationships

which exist between Matthew and Luke. His method of

selecting parallel passages and comparing poetry with poetry or

prose with poetry is one of the ways this might be done. The

results of the study, however, did not falsify the Griesbach

hypothesis. For the first example, there is a reasonable,

alternative explanation for the literary phenomena described.

Matthew and Luke appear to contain different Greek

translations of the same Semitic poetry, but that does not prove

that either gospel used the other or was written without access

to the other during its own composition. The second example

included chreias upon which both gospel writers had

elaborated. It appears, however, that the absence of the phrase

"scribes and Pharisees" may be explained as the sort of

omission one would expect in a gospel approved by Marcion.

This suggestion is at least as likely as the proposal that the

addition was made by a Palestinian author. The argument is

not very convincing either way, and it seems wise to

acknowledge ignorance of the precise way in which these gospel

writers put together these particular sources. The third example

shows that in this case Luke did not use Matthew as his source

but it does not show that Luke is earlier than Matthew or was

the source Matthew used. It seems reasonable to suggest that

Matthew and Luke are not directly related here but have

instead used a common source.

None of Talbert's and McKnight's efforts to falsify the

Griesbach hypothesis turn out, upon analysis, to be conclusive.

Indeed, some of the passages point the critic toward the

Griesbach hypothesis rather than away from it. The purpose of

this response, however, has not been to prove the validity

hypothesis, but to analyze an attempt made to falsify it. A

careful case against the Griesbach hypothesis suggests the

verdict: "Not proved." (pp.571-572)

(1) C. H. Talbert and E. V. McKnight, "Can the Griesbach

Hypothesis JBL 91 (1972) 338-68.

(2) B. H. Streeter, The Four Gospels (New York: Macmillan

1930).

2. ———. 1983. "Matthean Beatitudes and Traditional Promises."

In New Synoptic Studies: The Cambridge Gospel Conference

and Beyond, edited by Farmer, William R., 161-184. Macon:

Mercer University Press.

"The Old Testament and Previous Scholarship

For many years scholars have understood that the Matthaean

Beatitudes were closely related to the Old Testament, especially

Isaiah 57, 61, 66, and Psalms 24, 37, and 73. This Old

Testament information, however, has not led scholars to realize

fully the unity of the message and structure of these Beatitudes.

This may be true, because New Testament scholars have not

approached the Beatitudes from a midrashic point of view,

realizing the influence that an Old Testament text can have

upon the meaning of the midrash. They may not have

understood some of the thought forms that were basic to the

Old Testament texts which the author of the Beatitudes took for

granted. Therefore, this essay will begin with an Introduction to

some of these presuppositions: first, concerning the influence

of the whole text to the message of a midrash." (p. 161)

3. Bultmann, Rudolf. 1926. "The New Approach to the Synoptic

Problem." The Journal of Religion no. 6:337-362.

Abstract: "The two-document theory as to the relations of the

Synoptic Gospels so generally held twenty years ago has proved

to be insufficient to explain the facts. In this article recent

developments of synoptic criticism are indicated. The method

of investigation, called Formgeschichte, undertakes to discover

the various elements in the Gospels by means of typical forms

of literary style. On the basis of this study it becomes possible

to discover the nature of editorial redaction in the Gospels and

to distinguish those portions of the tradition which are original

from the secondary elements supplied by the Gospel writers. By

comparing the literary styles in the Gospels with parallel

literary expressions of Hellenistic and rabbinical literature,

light is thrown on the question as to whether a given utterance

originated on Palestinian or on Hellenistic soil. It is the

conviction of the advocates of formgeschichtliche investigation

that this method marks a genuine advance in the task of

ascertaining what the historical facts are concerning the

preaching of Jesus and the rise of the early Christian

community."

4. ———. 1963. The History of the Synoptic Tradition. New York:

Harper & Row.

Revised edition 1968.

Translation by John Marsh of Die Geschichte der synoptischen

Tradition, Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1921 (second

revised edition 1931; fourth edition 1958 with a Supplement by

Gerd Theissen).

"The following investigation therefore sets out to give an

account of the history of the individual units of the tradition,

and how the tradition passed from a fluid state to the fixed

form in which it meets us in the Synoptics and in some

instances even outside them. I am entirely in agreement with

M. Dibelius when he maintains that form-criticism is not

simply an exercise in aesthetics nor yet simply a process of

description and classification; that is to say, it does not consist

in identifying the individual units of the tradition according to

their aesthetic or other characteristics and placing them in their

various categories. It ii much rather 'to rediscover the origin

and history of the tradition before it took literary form'. The

proper understanding of form-criticism rests upon the

judgement that the literature in which the life of a given

community, even the primitive Christian community, has taken

shape, springs out of quite definite style and quite specific form

and categories. Thus every literary category has its 'life

situation' (Sitz im Leben: Gunkel), whether it be worship in its

different forms, or work, or hunting, or war. The Sitz im Leben

is not, however, an individual historical event, but a typical

situation or occupation in the life of a community. In the same

way, the literary 'category', or 'form', through which a particular

item is classified is a sociological concept and not an aesthetic

one, however much it may be possible by its subsequent

development to use such form as aesthetic media in some

particular literary product. But in the literature of primitive

Christianity, which is essentially 'popular' (Dibelius) in kind,

this development had not yet taken place, and it is possible to

understand its forms and categories in connection with their

'life situation', i.e. the influences at work in the life of the

community." (p. 6, notes omitted)

5. Burkett, Delbert. 2004. Rethinking the Gospel Sources, Volume

1: From Proto-Mark to Mark. London: T & T Clark.

"The two-document hypothesis "affirms that Matthew and Luke

drew material from both Mark and a source or sources, now

lost, designated "Q" In an expanded form of the theory,

Matthew also used other material designated "M" while Luke

used other material designated "L"." (p. 1)

"In this study l am concerned primarily with the material in

Mark with its parallels in Matthew and/or Luke. Hence the

subtitle of my study designates its limits: "from Proto-Mark to

Mark." With respect to the "double tradition" found in Matthew

and Luke, I do not challenge the validity of the Q hypothesis.

My own theory includes something that could be called Q,

though I will not develop this aspect of the theory in the present

work. While my theory includes the hypothesis of Q, as well as

M and L, it goes beyond the scope of the present study to

delineate the contents of these sources or to discuss how they

have been incorporated into Matthew and Luke.

Chapters 2 through 6 present new data that leads to five major

conclusions. 1) The Gospel of Mark did not serve as a source for

either Matthew or Luke. 2) The Gospel of Matthew did not

serve as a source for either

Mark or Luke. 3) Matthew did not use Mark, nor did Mark use

Matthew, but both used the same three sources. 4) Luke did not

use Mark, nor did Mark use Luke, but both used the same

sources. 5) Mark often conflated two or more sources that were

also used by Matthew and Luke respectively. Chapter 7 uses

these five major conclusions as criteria to evaluate current

theories of Synoptic relations. Since no current theory meets all

five criteria, I present a new multi-source theory that does. This

theory proposes that a primitive gospel (Proto-Mark)

underwent two revisions (Proto-Mark A and Proto-Mark B).

Matthew knew Proto-Mark A, Luke knew Proto-Mark B, while

Mark knew and conflated both. In addition, several smaller

sources also contributed material. Chapters 8 to 11 discuss all

these sources in greater detail.

Finally, Chapter 12 gives examples of how this theory would

account for the composition of Mark." (pp. 5-6)

6. ———. 2009. "The Return of Proto-Mark. A Response to David

Neville." Ephemerides Theologicae Lovanienses no. 85:117-

134.

Abstract: "In my book Rethinking the Gospel Sources: From

Proto-Mark to Mark, I presented evidence for a new theory of

Synoptic relations, in which all three Synoptics depended on

earlier sources, including some form of a 'Proto-Mark'. My

arguments for this theory have been criticized in two articles by

David Neville.[*] Neville’s criticisms fall into three categories:

general criticisms, criticisms of my evidence against direct

dependence of one Synoptic on another (Chapters 2 and 3 of

my book), and criticisms of the constructive portion of my

book. An examination of his critique suggests that it does not

damage my case as much as Neville supposed. Ultimately,

Neville’s disagreements with my work are less significant than

his agreements. We both recognize that theories of Markan or

Matthean priority have had their day and that future progress

in solving the Synoptic Problem will require a hypothesis of

some form of Proto-Mark."

[*] Neville, 2006 and 2008.

7. ———. 2009. Rethinking the Gospel Sources, Volume 2: The

Unity and Plurality of Q. Atlanta: Society of Biblical Literature.

"This book constitutes the second of a series on the Synoptic

Problem. The first volume, Rethinking the Gospel Sources:

From Proto-Mark to Mark (T&T Clark, 2004), offered a new

theory about the sources of the material that Mark shares with

Matthew and/or Luke. The present book continues the former

by examining “Q,” the presumed source of the non-Markan

material common to Matthew and Luke. I address two disputed

issues in the study of Q: Is it necessary to hypothesize such a

source, and, if so, did the Q material come from a single source

or more than one? In chapter 1, I address the first issue and

conclude that some form of the Q hypothesis is necessary. In

chapters 2–11, I address the second issue. I conclude that Q

existed as a single written source unified by recurring features

of style and theme. I then identify the reasons why Matthew

and Luke often disagree in the wording of Q. Chapter 12

summarizes my conclusions. Several appendices then set out

significant results of this study." (from the Preface)

8. ———. 2018. The Case for Proto-Mark: A Study in the Synoptic

Problem. Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck.

"The present monograph makes a contribution to the study of

the Synoptic Problem, the question of what literary sources

were used by the Synoptic Gospels (Matthew, Mark, and Luke).

It does not consider every aspect of the Synoptic Problem but

addresses a single question: If the Q hypothesis is adopted to

explain the double tradition, then what theory best explains the

Markan material? I examine three theories

that are compatible with the Q hypothesis: the standard theory

of Markan priority, the Deutero-Mark hypothesis, and the

Proto-Mark hypothesis. The first two of these are theories of

Markan priority, while the Proto-Mark hypothesis is not. I

conclude that the Proto-Mark hypothesis best accounts for the

Markan material.

Any theory of Synoptic relations must account for two types of

material: the material that Matthew and Luke share with Mark

(the Markan material) and the non-Markan material common

to Matthew and Luke (the double tradition). Since the

beginning of the twentieth century, the most common

explanation for the double tradition has been the Q hypothesis,

the theory that Matthew and Luke took the double tradition

from a hypothetical source, now lost, called Q. This theory has

been challenged, especially by proponents of the Griesbach

hypothesis and proponents of the Farrer hypothesis. However,

it remains the most widely held theory to explain the double

tradition. In the present study, I do not enter into the debate

over the Q hypothesis but simply adopt it as a reasonable

working hypothesis. The question then becomes, if we adopt

the Q hypothesis to account for the double tradition, what

theory best accounts for the Markan material? This question is

the focus of the present study." (Introduction, p. 1)

9. ———. 2019. An Introduction to the New Testament and the

Origins of Christianity. Cambridge: Cambridge University

Press.

Second revised edition (First edition 2002); Chapter 10: The

Synoptic Problem, pp. 144-155.

"The first three gospels in the New Testament (Matthew, Mark,

and Luke) share many of the same sayings and stories about

Jesus. For instance, nearly every story and saying in Mark’s

gospel also occurs in one or both of the other gospels. In the

material that they share, they also tend to say the same things

about Jesus. They relate the same stories and sayings in the

same order with much the same wording. Because of these

similarities, scholars began to place all three texts on the same

page in parallel columns in order to more easily compare them.

Such a comparative view is called a synopsis, literally a

“viewing together.” Because these three gospels could be viewed

together in this way, they acquired the designation Synoptic

Gospels.

The similarities among the Synoptic Gospels give rise to the

Synoptic Problem. That is, why are these gospels so much

alike? What is the relationship between them? Most scholars

believe that the Synoptic Gospels

have similarities because they shared some of the same written

sources. The attempt to determine the sources of the gospels is

called “source criticism”." (p. 144)

10. Burrows, Edward B. 1976. "The Use of Textual Theories to

Explain Agreements of Matthew and Luke Against Mark." In

Studies in New Testament Language and Text: Essays in

Honour of George D. Kilpatrick on the Occasion of his Sixty-

Fifth Birthday, edited by Elliott, James Keith, 87-99. Leiden:

Brill.

"It is becoming increasingly popular to reject the hypothesis of

Q and to accept a direct literary connection between Matthew

and Luke, usually the use of Matthew by Luke. One main

argument in favour of a direct connection is provided by the

agreements of Matthew and Luke against Mark in passages

common to all three gospels, which, it is alleged, have not been

adequately accounted for by those who believe that Matthew

and Luke were written independently. Apart from the possible

overlapping of Mark and Q the two explanations usually given

(as for example by Streeter) are independent revision and

textual corruption. To many critics of this view textual

corruption looks suspiciously like an easy way out: surely we

cannot alter the text of the gospels to fit in with a literary

theory? Are there valid textual criteria that support the

proposed revisions of the text?

We may distinguish two main ways in which textual study has

been used to explain some of the agreements." (p. 87)

11. Butler, Basil Christopher. 1951. The Originality of St. Matthew:

A Critique of the Two-Document Hypothesis. Cambridge:

Cambridge University Press.

Contents: I. The Q Hypothesis Tested 1; II. II Arguments for Q

23; Ill. The Great Sermon 37; IV. Further Evidence 49; V. The

Lachmann Fallacy 62; VI. Matthew's Great Discourses 72; VII.

Streeter and Burney on Mark's Use of Q 107: VIII.

Miscellaneous Passages 123; IX. Doublets in Matthew 138; X.

Inclusio, Formulae and Aramaisms 147; XI. St Mark's Gospel

157; Epilogue 170; Index of New Testament Passages 173-178.

"At the end of the first quarter of the present century the Two-

Document hypothesis, the theory, that is to say, that our First

and Third Gospels depend on the Second Gospel and on a

conjectural source of which Q has become the usual

designation, was regarded in many scholarly circles as no

longer requiring proof, criticism or defence. It was on the way

to becoming, if it had not already become, less a hypothesis

than a dogma.

But criticism does not stand still. Wellhausen’s work on the

editorial aspect of St Mark’s Gospel was the prelude to the rise

of the school of Form Criticism, which contemptuously rejected

the supposition that that Gospel is virtually a mere transcript of

the oral teaching of an eyewitness. On the other side of the

Atlantic the eminent Professor J. H. Ropes admitted that the

grounds on which Q’s existence is inferred by modern scholars

are ‘far less secure than is commonly represented or supposed’,

and that the theory that St Luke’s Gospel draws its Q passages

from St Matthew’s ‘has never been shown to be impossible’.

The investigation recorded in the following pages was not, in

the main, carried out with direct reference to the Form Critics.

Yet it is hoped that what it has in fact achieved is to make

possible a synthesis of all that is objectively sound in the work

of that modern school with the elements of truth discovered by

the documentary critics of the generations preceding them. If

the outcome of the investigation may be said to contradict the

conclusions of the older critics, it will I hope be agreed that this

has been the result of a faithful application of their methods.

In the following pages ‘ Matthew’, ‘ Mark’, etc., mean

respectively the several Gospels, and their authors are referred

to as ‘ St Matthew’, etc. ‘Triple tradition’ means those sections

in which all three Synoptic Gospels are parallel, excepting only

those where Mark is not the connecting-link between Matthew

and Luke. ‘Marcan passage’ means a passage in Matthew or

Luke directly (as is usually maintained) connected with a

parallel passage in Mark; these passages constitute the ‘Marcan

tradition’, a more inclusive term than * Triple tradition*. By ‘Q

passages’ I mean such parts of Matthew and Luke as are

parallel with one another but are not parts of the Marcan

tradition. These terms are all used for convenience and without

prejudice." (From the Preface)

12. ———. 1985. "The Synoptic Problem." In The Two-Source

Hypothesis: A Critical Appraisal, edited by Bellinzoni Jr.,

Arthur J., 97-118. Macon: Mercer University Press.

Reprint of "The Synoptic Problem", A New Catholic

Commentary on Holy Scripture, ed. R.C. Fuller L. Johnson, C.

Kearns, London: Nelson, 1969, pp. 815-821.

From the Abstract: "Butler singles out for mention several

solutions to the synoptic problem: (1) The Two-Document

Hypothesis: original form (Weisse and Holtzmann: i.e., a first

edition of Mark [or Proto-Mark] and a conjectural Discourse

Source [later named Q]); (2) The Two-Document Hypothesis:

modern form (McLoughlin: i.e., Mark and Q); (3) The Four

Document Hypothesis (Streeter: i.e., Mark, Q, M. [the source of

Matthew’s peculiar material], and L [the source of Luke’s

peculiar material]); (4) Lagrange’s Modified Two-Document

Hypothesis (that is, an effort by Roman Catholic scholars to

reconcile the priority of Matthew with the Two-Document

Hypothesis); (5) The Priority of Matthew (Chapman); (6)

Pierson Parker (Matthew and Mark depend on a common

source, named by Parker K, a sort of Proto-Matthew); (7) A

Post-Lagrange Hypothesis (Vaganay); (8) Mark a conflation

(Farmer).

Butler proceeds to a detailed examination of certain aspects of

the Two-Document Hypothesis: (1) a seven-part critique of the

so-called Q passages, and (2) a three-part critique of the

priority of Mark as opposed to the priority of Matthew. He

concludes that the evidence requires that Mark depends on

Matthew, and that Luke depends on both Matthew (for his so-

called Q material) and on Mark. If conjectural sources are not

excluded from consideration, then Butler believes that it is

possible that Matthew and Mark on the one hand, and Matthew

and Luke on the other hand, are connected by the common use

of a lost Gospel, which can best be described as a Proto-

Matthew, a document of which our canonical Matthew is a

fairly faithful “second edition".” (pp. 97-98)

13. ———. 1985. "The Lachmann Fallacy." In The Two-Source

Hypothesis: A Critical Appraisal, edited by Bellinzoni Jr.,

Arthur J., 133-142. Macon: Mercer University Press.

Reprint from B. C. Butler, The Originality of St. Matthew: A

Critique of the Two-Document Hypothesis, Cambridge:

Cambridge University Press, 195 1 , pp. 962-971.

Abstract: "According to Butler, the priority of Mark rests, in

part, on an inference that is obviously false. Lachmann himself

drew a correct inference on the assumption that the Synoptic

Gospels are only indirectly connected by dependence of them

all on a lost document or oral tradition; namely, that the

phenomena of order show that the lost document is most

faithfully preserved in Mark. This conclusion was the basis of

the theory of Ur-Markus as a sort of first edition of Mark and as

a source for Matthew and Luke. In the course of time it was

seen that Ur-Markus must have been so similar to Mark as to

have been practically identical with it, and the proper step was

taken of abandoning this conjectural document. But it was not

noticed that by identifying Ur-Markus with Mark the terms of

Lachmann’s problem were essentially altered and his inference

no longer held good. In the theory of Markan priority Ur-

Markus’s ghost presides over his own sepulchre.

Butler quotes Streeter, interposing his own comments: “We

note, then, that in regard to (a) items of subject matter, (b)

actual words used, (c) relative order of incidents, Mark is in

general supported by both Matthew and Luke, and in most

cases where they do not both support him they do so alternately

[that is, one or the other supports him], and they practically

never agree together against Mark. This is only explicable [here

is the vicious inference] if they followed an authority which in

content, in wording, and in arrangement was all but identical

with Mark.”

This mistake, although not actually made by Lachmann, was

apparently fathered upon him and has been repeated in modem

times by Stanton, Abbott, Wellhausen, Burkitt, Hawkins,

Streeter, Rawlinson, Narborough, Redlich, and others. In fact,

Butler maintains, once the theory of Ur-Markus is rejected, all

that can be argued is that Mark is necessarily the connecting-

link between Matthew and Luke in the Triple Tradition, but not

necessarily the source of more than one of them. The data

simply do not support a more precise determination of the

relationship among the synoptic gospels.

Butler does concede that Mark’s use of phrases likely to cause

offense and his roughness of style and grammar and use of

Aramaic words is an argument for Markan priority deserving

serious attention."

14. Carey, Greg. 2013. "Moving Things Ahead: A Lukan

Redactional Technique and Its Implications for Gospel

Origins." BIblical Interpretation no. 21:302-319.

Abstract: "Recent and influential proposals (Richard

Bauckham; James Durin) have emphasized the role of memory

in the composition of the Gospels. Despite the diversity and

sophistication of these proposals, they have led to a devaluation

of source and redaction analysis among some interpreters. On

the contrary, attention to Lukan redaction of Mark, particularly

with respect to the sequence of pericopae, reveals both the

value of source and redaction analysis and the limitations of

memory-oriented accounts of Gospel origins. Lukan

transposition manifests itself most clearly in four pericopae:

Jesus in Nazareth (Luke 4:16-30), the woman who anoints

Jesus (7:36-50), the question of eternal life (10:25-37), and the

tradition of the fig tree (13:6-9). Looking at these pericopae one

by one, many interpreters debate whether Luke relies on

independent traditions; taken as a group, they reveal Luke's

redactional and literary activity. In each instance (a) Luke

neatly excises the pericope from its location in Mark's

sequence, (b) Luke changes fundamental dynamics of the

pericope, and (c) Luke's redactional activity favors widely

accepted Lukan emphases. Memory-oriented interpretations

will undervalue Luke's emphases in these instances."

15. Carlson, Stephen C. 2001. "Clement of Alexandria on the

‘Order’ of the Gospels." New Testament Studies no. 47:118-125.

"Proponents of the Griesbach hypothesis have often appealed to

a tradition handed down by Clement of Alexandria in support

of their position that Mark used Matthew and Luke. Written

early in his career in the now lost Hypotyposeis, Clement’s

information has been preserved for us by Eusebius of

Caesarea..." [follow the citation of Eusebius of Caesarea,

Historia Ecclesiastica 6.14.5-7] (p. 118)

(...)

"Although leading source critics have disputed the value of this

information, Clement’s statement, (...) is widely understood to

mean that Matthew and Luke, which include genealogies, were

written first, i.e. before Mark and John. Under this

interpretation, Clement’s statement raises perplexing questions

that have not been satisfactorily resolved.

For example, Clement’s order stands isolated in apparent

contradiction with the chronological order Matthew–Mark–

Luke–John given by virtually every other patristic witness. In

fact, Clement’s order was unsupported until the ninth century."

(p. 119)

(...)

"Clement’s statement [*] has puzzled commentators over the

years because it has been uniformly interpreted in

chronological terms, but its difficulties evaporate when

προγεγράφθαι is understood as a reference to the open

publication of Matthew and Luke. In terms of its textual and

historical contexts, therefore, the best interpretation of

Clement’s statement is that the gospels with the genealogies

were written before the public, as gospels for all Christians.

This interpretation makes better sense of the aetiology of Mark

that immediately follows and explains the patristic unanimity

of the chronological order for the gospels outside of Clement.

For the cause of synoptic source criticism, however, Clement’s

testimony can no longer be relied upon as evidence for the

relative order of the gospels." (p. 125, notes omitted)

[*] He said that those of the gospels comprising the genealogies

[Matthew and Luke] were ‘written before’ (προγεγράφθαι) that

Mark had this ‘disposition’.

16. ———. 2015. "Problems with the Non-Aversion Principle for

Reconstructing Q." In Marcan Priority Without Q:

Explorations in the Farrer Hypothesis, edited by Poirier, John

C. and Peterson, Jeffrey, 44-61. London: T & T Clark.

"The Critical Edition of Q was an ambitious undertaking by the

International Q Project. As a reconstruction of Q's text, it

seems reasonable that they should look for analogies by textual

critics in how they reconstructed the texts of the gospels based

on the manuscript evidence. Some of the techniques they

adopted from the textual critics seem appropriate to their task,

for example, their analysis of the text in

terms of variation units. (49) In fact, some of what the IQP did

can be seen as an improvement upon the praxis of textual

criticism, especially the compilation and publication of a

database of scholarly opinion on each variation unit. But other

aspects they adopted were less successful, and the {A} grade of

'virtual certainty' is one of them. Q is a hypothetical text whose

wording is contingent on other hypotheses, including the

hypothesis that the textual criticism can restore a sufficiently

accurate exemplar for Matthew and Luke. Because of this

contingency, it is impossible to be more confident in Q's text

than that of the attested

gospels and prima facie unlikely that even Q's doubly attested

text can be as confident as that of its witnesses." (p. 60, a note

omitted)

(49) Though this can be faulted since many of the variation

units do not appear to be independent.

17. Carlston, Charles E., and Norlin, Dennis. 1971. "Once More --

Statistics and Q." The Harvard Theological Review no. 64:59-

78.

"Exegetes are probably no less prone than anybody else to long

for something mathematical, something clearly right or wrong,

in their discipline. It is thus hardly surprising that in recent

years at least two attempts have been made to examine, on a

purely objective statistical basis, the disputed question of

synoptic relationships.(1) It is our intention in this paper to

comment briefly on these two studies and to add new figures to

the discussion." (p. 59)

(1) Theodore R. Rosché, The Words of Jesus and the Future of

the "Q" Hypothesis, Journal of Biblical Literature 79 (1960),

210-20; A. M. Honoré, A Statistical Study of the Synoptic

Problem, Novum Testamentum 10 (1968), 95-147. All pages

cited below refer to these two articles.

18. ———. 1999. "Statistics and Q--Some Further Observation."

Novum Testamentum no. 41:108-123.

"The Problem. In an article published in the Harvard

Theological Review in 1971(1) the authors suggested a method

of word-counting ("agreements" among various parallel

accounts) that might test certain literary relationships among

the first three gospels. Two responses to it make further

discussion necessary.(2)

Some preliminary observations: For the purposes of this

original article and the present response to its critics, we have

assumed that the so-called "Two-Source Theory" best explains

the synoptic problem.

But the Two-Source theory presumed here is not the only

option.

Other perfectly competent scholars hold to a wide variety of

viewpoints, which could be designated by tags such as

Griesbach, proto-Mark, two editions of Matthew, Lukan

priority, Luke's use of Matthew

or vice versa, multiple source theories, and even a benign

(resigned?) agnosticism toward the whole issue. Still, it should

be noted that the Two-Source theory is far more commonly

held than any other single

view. Consequently, our method should not be considered a

priori absurd, while those who hold different views have

neither established those views nor seriously challenged the

Two-Source theory by simply objecting to minor aspects of our

study. The larger problem is enormously complex and not

really under discussion here." (pp. 108-109)

(1) Charles E. Carlston and Dennis Norlin, "Once More-

Statistics and Q," HTR 64 (1971) 59-78. Allusions to the

"original article" in this study are intended as references to this

1971 study.

(2) John J. O'Rourke, "Some Observations on the Synoptic

Problem and the Use of Statistical Procedures,"Novum

Testamentum 16 (1974) 272-277; and Sharon L. Mattila, "A

Problem Still Clouded: Yet Again-Statistics and 'Q'," Novum

Testamentum 36 (1994) 314-329.

19. Carmignac, Jean. 1986. The Birth of the Synoptics Gospels.

Chicago: Franciscan Herald Press.

Translation of La naissance des Evangiles Synoptiques, Paris:

O.E.I.L. 1984.

20. Carruth, Shawn, and Garsky, Albrecht, eds. 1996. Documenta

Q: Reconstructions of Q Through Two Centuries of Gospel

Research. Excerpted, sorted, and evaluated: Q 11:2b-4. The

Lord’s Prayer. Leuven: Peeters.

21. Carruth, Shawn, and Robinson, James M., eds. 1996.

Documenta Q: Reconstructions of Q Through Two Centuries of

Gospel Research. Excerpted, sorted, and evaluated: Q 4:1-13,6.

The Temptations of Jesus – Nazara. Leuven: Peeters.

22. Carson, Donald A. 1994. "Matthew 11:19b/Luke 7:35: A Test

Case for the Bearing of Q Christology on the Synoptic Problem."

In Jesus of Nazareth: Lord and Christ. Essays on the

Historical Jesus and New Testament Christology, edited by

Green, Joel B. and Turner, Max, 128-146. Grand Rapids, MI:

Eerdmans.

23. Carson, D. A., and Moo, Douglas J. 2005. An Introduction to

the New Testament. Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan.

Second edition (First edition 1992); Chapter 2: The Synoptic

Gospels, pp. 77-133.

"Over the last two centuries, scholars have scrutinized the

Synoptic Gospels from many angles and with many different

results. This is inevitable, given the vital importance of these

books for Christian belief and life. In these books is narrated

the life of the One in whom God has chosen especially to make

himself known to human beings. They depict the events on

which the significance of history and the destiny of every single

individual depend: the death and resurrection of Jesus the

Messiah. Issues pertaining to these books individually will be

treated in the chapters devoted to each; here we address

significant issues that embrace all three accounts. Specifically,

we examine three questions: How did the Synoptic Gospels

come into being? How should we understand the gospels as

works of literature? And what do the gospels tell us about

Jesus?" (p. 78)

24. Casey, Maurice. 2002. An Aramaic Approach to Q: Sources for

the Gospels of Matthew and Luke. Cambridge: Cambridge

University Press.

"In surveying the history of previous scholarship in chapter 1, I

showed that the Aramaic dimension of Q has never been

properly treated, and is conventionally omitted. This is a

remarkable fact. Most people have noticed that language is a

significant part of culture, but the study of Q, like the study of

Jesus in general, has proceeded as if this were not the case. I

also showed in chapter 1 that the whole notion that Q was a

single document written in Greek has never been satisfactorily

demonstrated.

The omission of the Aramaic dimension is one significant

aspect of this, since it has prevented a proper critical

assessment of those passages in which the material was

transmitted in Aramaic, of which Matthew and Luke used or

made different translations. It is not, however, the only

significant defect in scholarship. The predication of a Q

community, and attempts to portray Jesus as a Cynic

philosopher are among other major problems. All these

problems are related at a profound level. The omission of

Aramaic is one aspect of a general failure to see the Q material

within the culture in which it was produced. This general

failure is behind most of the other serious problems. This

failure is due to the presence of scholarly investigators in their

own part of the modern world, and their strong tendency to

repeat each other reflects the fact that a scholar’s membership

of our vast academic bureaucracies is in some ways as

important as ideological orientation." (p. 185)

25. Catchpole, David. 1993. The Quest for Q. Edinburgh: T & T

Clark.

Reprint New York: Bloomsbury 2015.

"This volume incorporates a series of previously published

articles, which have been extensively supplemented and in

some cases very drastically revised." (p. XI)

(...)

"The study of Q, the hypothetical second source used by

Matthew and Luke alongside Mark, has rarely flourished as

exuberantly as it does now. Monographs abound, articles jostle

with one another in the scholarly journals, ever more

sophisticated and nuanced proposals concerning its

development arise.

And yet at the same time Q is experiencing a mid-life crisis,

with wounding attacks being made on its identity, indeed its

existence, the intention being to kill the hypothesis stone dead.

Something therefore needs to be said in its defence." (p. 1)

(...)

"We shall consider in a series of test cases how well the

hypothesis that Luke used Matthew works, how well the theory

that all the material was created by Matthew works, and how

well the Q hypothesis might explain the data. The approach will

be essentially a combination of the form-critical and the

redaction-critical for the purpose of clarifying the source-

crit1cal situation. The suggestion will be that all traditions in

the sample provide evidence that Luke gives us access to an

earlier version than that in Matthew, and that in different ways

they undermine the theory of Matthaean creativity.

Some in addition provide very important evidence of the space

between the theology of Q and the theology of Matthew." (p. 6)

26. Chang, Kai-Hsuan. 2019. "Questioning the Feasibility of the

Major Synoptic Hypotheses: Scribal Memory as the Key to the

Oral–Written Interface." Journal for the Study of the New

Testament no. 41:407-432.

Abstract: "Instead of blurring the oral and the literary media in

antiquity (R. Bultmann and B. Gerhardsson) or dividing them

with unsatisfying principles (J.D.G. Dunn), this article follows

recent scholarship on orality to explore the mechanical

operation of ancient scribal memory as the oral-written

interface. In so doing, I argue that the agreement of order

between the Synoptic Gospels is characteristic of memory-

based utilizations of written texts and does not necessarily

indicate the scribes’ visual contact with those texts. It is, rather,

the very high degree of verbal agreement that indicates

Matthew’s frequent visual contact with Q 10–11 and 12–13

throughout the gospel, even when following Mark’s narrative

sequence by memory. This approach explains the infrequent

micro-conflations on the Two Document Hypothesis (2DH)

with a more mechanically probable procedure, and so

strengthens the argument that the 2DH is more feasible than

the Two Gospel Hypothesis and the Farrer-Goulder

Hypothesis."

27. Chapman, D. J. 1937. Matthew, Mark, and Luke: A Study in

the Order and Interrelation of the Synoptic Gospels. London:

Longmans, Green.

Edited by John M. T. Barton.

28. Cirafesi, Wally V. 2013. Verbal Aspect in Synoptic Parallels:

On the Method and Meaning of Divergent Tense-Form Usage

in the Synoptic Passion Narratives. Leiden: Brill.

"In this volume I argue that an approach to the Greek verbal

system that is based on verbal aspect theory has more

explanatory power than the traditional temporal and

Aktionsart approaches for answering the question, why do the

Synoptic Gospels at times employ different tense-forms in

recounting the same narrative event? In the light of previous

research, I suggest that understanding the Greek verb as

operating within a systemic network of semantic relationships,

from which an author/speaker can make a subjective formal

choice (whether conscious nor not) that can result in a range of

discourse highlighting functions, helps to explain Synoptic

tense-form differences on the basis of normal Greek usage,

rather than in terms of anomaly or unexplainable irregularity,

mid thus provides interpreters of the New Testament with a

significant exegetical resource.

In view of the stated argument, I have three main goals: (1) to

give insight into the individual tendencies of discourse

structure within selected portions of the Synoptic Passion

Narratives (PNs) via a comparison of verbal aspect choice, (2)

to provide objective criteria for evaluating discourse

prominence in Synoptic parallels, and (3) to demonstrate the

overarching exegetical value of a rigorous understanding of the

textual function of Greek verbal aspecL" (p. 1)

29. Collins, Raymond F. 1983. Introduction to the New Testament.

Garden City, NY: Doubleday.

Chapter Two: Historical-Critical Methodology, pp. 115-155.

"In short, the most significant area for source analysis in the

study of the Synoptic Gospels is the overarching network of

issues relating to the Synoptic Problem. The associated issues

with respect to a proto-Matthew, an Urmarkus, and a proto-

Luke also require the use of the source-critical methodology.

Yet with the practical rejection of these earlier-edition theories

and the popular acceptance of the Two-Source theory, source

analysis of Matthew, Mark, and Luke has not been completely

exhausted."

30. Collison, J. G. F. 1983. "Linguistic Usages in the Gospel of

Luke." In New Synoptic Studies: The Cambridge Gospel

Conference and Beyond, edited by Farmer, William R., 245-

260. Macon: Mercer University Press.

"This volume has as its stated objective the furthering of

redactional work on the basis of the Griesbachian hypothesis.

Not only does the Brauchbarkeit [usefulness] argument used

by the advocates of the two-document hypothesis, though not a

logical argument, need to be countered, but there is also need

to provide standard material which can be used by the growing

company of those who operate on the basis of the Griesbach

paradigm, for use in the situations in which most of them earn

their daily bread, namely, teaching. This need exists

particularly with regard to the Gospel of Luke.

A thorough study of the redactional theology of Luke is

dependent, in part, upon one’s ability to distinguish between

source and redaction, particularly in those parts of his gospel

which are not dependent on the Gospel of Matthew. For this, a

definitive list of linguistic usages of the author of the gospel, as

well as a list of linguistic usages which will help delineate

whether, in addition to Matthew, Luke has used another

written source or sources, is needed. While linguistic controls

are not the only controls needed, the relentless pursuit of

theological motifs without adequate linguistic controls can lead

to subjective evaluations of the redactional theology of Luke. It

also can lead to the ignoring of the influences of Nebenquelle

[secondary sources]. By linguistic usages is meant the

vocabular, grammatical, and syntactical aspects of the language

of the author or of a document. For various reasons, the phrase

“literary characteristics” is an inappropriate word for these

kinds of phenomena." (pp. 245-246)

31. ———. 1983. "Eschatology in the Gospel of Luke." In New

Synoptic Studies: The Cambridge Gospel Conference and

Beyond, edited by Farmer, William R., 363-371. Macon: Mercer

University Press.

"This is an attempt at describing some aspects of Lukan

eschatology on the hypothesis that Luke* knew and used the

canonical gospel of Matthew. But, it is also an attempt to

delineate Lukan theology. So if the perception is right it must

provide some illumination, whatever one’s own hypothesis of

synoptic interrelationships.(2)

1. Since Conzelmann’s influential work,(3) it has become

commonplace to suggest that Luke has replaced primitive

Christian eschatology with salvation history and that his

hortatory category is “suddenness” rather than imminence.

There is in the gospel an emphasis on suddenness and

unexpectedness. But this is seen clearly only in some parables

and in Lk 17:20-37." (p. 363)

* “Luke* is used to indicate the author of the Gospel, the text

being indicated by the abbreviation “Lk”; and so for the Gospel

of Matthew.

(2) The reader will note in due course that there are in fact a

number of instances where the perceptions of Luke derived on

the basis of the Griesbach hypothesis coincide with those of the

small but increasing number of scholars who do not subscribe

to the Conzelmann synthesis on Luke-Acts. Among such works

the writer has profited most from the following three articles: F.

D. Francis, “Eschatology and History in Luke-Acts,” Journal of

the American Academy of Religion 37 (1969): 49-63; C. H.

Talbert, “The Redaction Critical Quest for Luke the

Theologian,” in Jesus and Man's Hope, vol. 1 (Pittsburgh:

Pittsburgh Theological Seminary, 1970) 171-222; and, R. H.

Hiers, “The Problem of the Delay of the Parousia in Luke-Acts”,

New Testament Studies 20 (1974): 145-55.

(3) H. Conzelmann, The Theology of St. Luke (London: Faber

and Faber, 1960).

32. Connolly-Weinert, Frank. 1989. "Assessing Omissions as

Redaction: Luke's Handling of the Charge against Jesus as

Detractor of the Temple." In To Touch the Text: Biblical and

Related Studies in Honor of Joseph A. Fitzmyer, edited by

Horgan, Maurya P. and Kobelski, Paul J., 358-368. Mew York:

Crossroad.

33. Cope, Lamar. 1973. "Matthew 12:40 and the Synoptic Source

Question." Journal of Biblical Literature no. 92:115.

34. ———. 1983. "The Argument Revolves: The Pivotal Evidence for

Markan Priority Is Reversing Itself." In New Synoptic Studies:

The Cambridge Gospel Conference and Beyond, edited by

Farmer, William R., 143-159. Macon: Mercer University Press.

"There are two major reasons for this continued use of a

hypothesis even when several of its major assertions have long

since been proven faulty. The first, the subject of this essay, is

the firm belief that in a number of places it can be shown that

Matthew blatantly or clumsily altered Mark, either correcting

or corrupting the sense of his source. Those cases present

powerful, and as yet unshaken evidence that Mark is the

earliest gospel. The second reason, more subtle and less often

articulate, is the belief that one can make the best sense of the

development of earliest Christianity and early Christian

literature by use of the Mark-Q literary hypothesis.(2) Since,

however, this “usefulness” argument would be blatantly circular

and dogmatic if it stood alone, most critics would probably

agree that the crux of current belief that Mark is the earliest

gospel is the evidence that Matthew has altered Mark in several

instances in unmistakable ways.

As most readers know, the actual cases of clear Matthean

alteration of Mark vary from scholar to scholar. Many of the

claims rest firmly on the prior and unquestioned assumption

that Mark is the earliest. In these cases the writers are unaware

that the evidence is completely circular and so uncompelling.

There are four passages, however, that are widely used as

evidence for Matthew’s transparent alteration of his Marcan

source. They are: the “purpose of parables” pericope in Mark 4

|| Matthew 13, the story of “the death of John the Baptist” in

Mark 6 || Matthew 14, the famous “Why do you call me good?”

passage in Mark 10 || Matthew 19, and the saying on “clean-

unclean” in Mark 7:15 || Matthew 15:11. The evidence from

these four passages, taken together, constitutes the strongest

argument available for the use of Mark by Matthew.

Thus today any challenge to the theory of Markan priority must

be directed to this crucial material. In order to dispute the

priority of Mark, evidence must be presented to show that

Matthew did not alter Mark because of misunderstanding or for

a deliberate theological motive. Moreover, one would need to

show that the opposite is true, that is, that there are places

where Mark can be shown to have altered Matthew (or Luke)

through misunderstanding or out of deliberate theological bias.

To my surprise, work with the passages usually cited in favor of

Markan priority done in the process of redactional study of

Matthew appears to show that the evidence in these reverses in

just this way."

(2) N. Perrin, Rediscovering the Teaching of Jesus (New York:

Harper Λ Row, 1967), 35.

35. Corley, Kathleen E. 2011. "White Male Dominance of Synoptic

Gospel Research and the Creative Process " In New Studies in

the Synoptic Problem: Oxford Conference, April 2008: Essays

in Honour of Christopher M. Tuckett edited by Foster, Paul,

Gregory, Andrew F., Kloppenborg, John S. and Verheyden,

Joseph, 831-844. Leuven: Peeters.

36. Cotter, Wendy. 2004. "Christopher Tuckett and the Question of

Q." Bulletin of the John Rylands Library no. 86:141-173.

37. Crawford, Matthew A. 2015. "Ammonius of Alexandria,

Eusebius of Caesarea and the Origins of Gospels Scholarship."

New Testament Studies no. 61:1-29.

Abstract: "In the early third and fourth centuries respectively,

Ammonius of Alexandria and Eusebius of Caesarea engaged in

cutting-edge research on the relationships among the four

canonical gospels. Indeed, these two figures stand at the head

of the entire tradition of comparative literary analysis of the

gospels. This article provides a more precise account of their

contributions, as well as the relationship between the two

figures. It argues that Ammonius, who was likely the teacher of

Origen, composed the first gospel synopsis by placing similar

passages in parallel columns. He gave this work the title

Diatessaron-Gospel, referring thereby to the four columns in

which his text was laid out. This pioneering piece of scholarship

drew upon a long tradition of Alexandrian textual scholarship

and likely served as the inspiration for Origen’s more famous

Hexapla. A little over a century later, Eusebius of Caesarea

picked up where Ammonius left off and attempted to

accomplish the same goal, albeit using a different and improved

method. Using the textual parallels presented in the

Diatessaron-Gospel as his ‘raw data’, Eusebius converted these

textual units into numbers which he then collated in ten tables,

or ‘canons’, standing at the beginning of a gospel book. The

resulting cross-reference system, consisting of the Canon

Tables as well as sectional enumeration throughout each

gospel, allowed the user to find parallels between the gospels,

but in such a way that the literary integrity of each of the four

was preserved. Moreover, Eusebius also exploited the potential

of his invention by including theologically suggestive cross-

references, thereby subtly guiding the reader of the fourfold

gospel to what might be called a canonical reading of the four."

38. Creed, John M. 1935. "’L’ and the Structure of the Lucan

Gospel: A Study of the Proto-Luke Hypothesis." The Expository

Times no. 46:101-107.

39. Crook, Zeba Antonin. 2000. "The Synoptic Parables of the

Mustard Seed and the Leaven: a Test-Case for the Two-

Document, Two-Gospel, and Farrer-Goulder Hypotheses."

Journal for the Study of the New Testament:23-48.

Abstract: "It is not uncommon to read studies that either state

explicitly or work under the assumption that the synoptic

problem has been solved. Using the parables of the Mustard

Seed and the Leaven as a test-case, it becomes clear that the

problem is far from a solution. Each of the three major source

hypotheses has its strengths (and weaknesses) when it attempts

to account for the data generated by these two pericopae.

Although this paper concludes that the Two-Document

Hypothesis (2DH) deals with the data with the fewest

problems, the strengths of the other hypotheses coupled with

the weaknesses of the 2DH should help keep the 2DH honest."

(...)

"The order of the sections is not meant to presuppose a favored

hypothesis.

The 2DH is presented first because for better or worse it is the

most widely accepted hypothesis. Though the Griesbach

hypothesis was popular before the 2DH, in its modem

manifestation (2GH) it is a reaction against the 2DH, and hence

follows. The Farrer-Goulder hypothesis can also be said to be a

reaction against the 2DH (and possibly the 2GH as well), and

so it is third." (p. 24 note 3)

40. Damm, Alex. 2003. "Ornatus: An Application of Rhetoric to the

Synoptic Problem." Novum Testamentum no. 45:338-364.

Abstract: "In this essay I shall consider ancient rhetoric as a

means to suggest synoptic relationships. Focusing on the

stylistic virtue of ornatus ("adornment"), I shall examine three

triple tradition sentences in which the gospel of Mark employs

a word used nowhere by the gospels of Luke or Matthew.

Focusing on the relationship between Mark and the other

gospels, I shall ask whether it is more likely that Mark adds the

word to Matthew and/or Luke on the Two-Gospel Hypothesis,

or whether Matthew and/or Luke delete it from Mark on the

Two-Document Hypothesis. My study leads me to two

conclusions. On grounds of omatus, editing on either source

hypothesis is plausible. But such editing on the Two-Document

Hypothesis is more plausible, since Mark's addition of each

word would entail the unlikely discovery of near-perfect or

coincidentally co-ordinated literary patterns in Matthew and/or

Luke."

41. ———. 2011. "Ancient Rhetoric and the Synoptic Problem." In

New Studies in the Synoptic Problem: Oxford Conference,

April 2008: Essays in Honour of Christopher M. Tuckett

edited by Foster, Paul, Gregory, Andrew F., Kloppenborg, John

S. and Verheyden, Joseph, 483-508. Leuven: Peeters.

42. ———. 2013. Ancient Rhetoric and the Synoptic Problem:

Clarifying Markan Priority. Leuven: Peeters.

43. Davis III, Charles T. 1983. "Mark: The Petrine Gospel." In New

Synoptic Studies: The Cambridge Gospel Conference and

Beyond, edited by Farmer, William R., 441-466. Macon: Mercer

University Press.

"Thomas Longstaff argues persuasively, drawing on studies

assuming both the Griesbach and the Two Source Hypotheses,

that Mark should

be understood as a spokesman for orthodoxy, the author of a

Gospel written primarily to present to the reader the correct

understanding of Jesus’ messiahship and the correct

understanding of what following him entails.(1)

The present study seeks to advance this argument by defining

more precisely the Markan understanding of messiahship on

the grounds of an intrinsic literary analysis of the gospel as a

whole.(2) It will be suggested that Mark’s understanding of

messiahship is compatible with a Roman provenance in that it

advances the claims of Peter to be the fountainhead of the true

“secret” gospel. By implication the gospel challenges the

Gnostic claim of a “secret” tradition deriving from Thomas or

others. Finally it will be argued that this literary understanding

of Mark gives one a basis for explaining adequately why Mark

could have abbreviated the available tradition that we see

reflected in Matthew and Luke by omitting birth narratives,

genealogy, Sermon on the Mount/Plain traditions,

postresurrection appearances and much teaching material."

(pp. 441-442, two notes omitted)

(1) "Crisis and Christology: The Theology of the Gospel of

Mark,” Perkins Journal 33:4 (Summer 1980):28. (See p. 392,

above).

(2) For a complete exposition of method see Charles Thomas

Davis III, Speaking of Jesus (Lakemont GA: CSA Press, 1978)

61-81; or, by the same author, “A Multidimensional Criticism of

the Gospels,” Orientation By Disorientation: Studies in

Literary Criticism and Biblical Literary Criticism (Pittsburgh:

Pickwick Press, 1980) 87-98.

44. Day, Matthew. 2005. "Reading the Fossils of Faith: Thomas

Henry Huxley and the Evolutionary Subtext of the Synoptic

Problem." Church History no. 74:534-556.

"In what follows, I want to examine a thicket of historical

relationships and issues that the warfare model has obscured

from view by unraveling the connection between evolutionary

thought and biblical criticism in the nineteenth century.

Specifically, my aim is to unearth the link that unites the

Synoptic Problem, the workhorse of modern New Testament

studies, and Thomas Henry Huxley (1825-95)?a man who is

often viewed as the paradigmatic scientific warrior against

religion." (p. 536)

(...)

"As I see it, the pressing historical question is not "Why did

Huxley write about the Synoptic Problem?" but is instead "Why

did Huxley believe all three Synoptic Gospels were dependent

upon a single Ur-Marcus?".

I will argue that Huxley arrived at this conclusion by viewing

biblical criticism as one plank within a larger campaign for

cultural and social reform - a campaign that, among other

things, would make science the conceptual foundation for

humanistic studies. More precisely, by extending the discourse

of natural history to address religion, Huxley could regard

"scientific" biblical criticism and the anthropology of religion as

forms of biological inquiry. Thus, both the form and content of

the Ur-Marcus solution to the Synoptic Problem became an

opportunity for Huxley to demonstrate the methodological

superiority of scientific thought and the explanatory breadth of

the Darwinian hypothesis."

45. Dayton, Wilber T. 1963. "A New Look at the Marcan Hypothesis

and Gospel Research." The Asbury Seminarian no. 17:53-64.

"For more than half a century there had been a "consensus"

among the scholars not only as to the nature of the Synoptic

Problem but as to its solution. As early as the nineties, students

at Cambridge had been told that there was no longer a synoptic

problem to solve.(1)" (p. 53)

(...)

But in 1961 William R. Farmer, of Perkins School of Theology,

said, "During the past ten years the situation has changed. "(8)

He cites the work of Butler in England (1951), Parker in

America (1953), Vaganay in France (1954), and Ludlum in

America (1958), all of whom opposed the view that our Mark

could have been used as a source by our Matthew. Upon

investigation. Farmer rejects the hypothesis that these writers

were but serving some ecclesiastical or traditional cause. And

the major thrust of his paper is to present the question

whether, in

the light of serious research, the priority of Mark can still be

assumed as an assured result of nineteenth century criticism.

Since this question haunts every serious student of the Gospels,

he has entitled his treatise, "A 'Skeleton in the Closet' of Gospel

Research. " (pp. 54-55)

(1) Foakes Jackson, Constructive Quarterly (June 1920), p.

326.

(8) William R. Farmer, "A 'Skeleton in the Closet' of Gospel

Research," Biblical Research, VI, (Papers of the Chicago Society

of Biblical Research, published at 800 West Beldon, Chicago

14, Illinois), pp. 18-42..

Bibliographia. Annotated bibliographies

Raul Corazzon || rc@ontology.co || Info

Synoptic Problem: Bibliography of

the main studies in English from

1964 (De - Fee)

Studies on the Synoptic Problem

1. De Jonge, Henk Jan. 1992. " Augustine on the Interrelations of

the Gospels." In The Four Gospels 1992. Festschrift Frans

Neirynck. Volume III, edited by van Seegreboeck, Frans,

Tuckett, Christopher M., Van Belle, Gilbert and Verheyden,

Joseph, 2409-2417. Leuven: Leuven University Press.

"In a contribution to the recent Jerusalem Symposium on The

Interrelations of the Gospels, Frans Neirynck makes mention

of the "Augustinian hypothesis" concerning the literary

relationships between the Gospels. According to Neirynck,

Augustine's view of these relationships was that Mark had

access to Matthew, and Luke to Mark."

(...)

"In a paper read at the Colloquium Biblicum Lovaniense of

1990, however, I have already argued that if Augustine had a

"Benutzungshypothese" [usage hypothesis] at all, it can only

have had the following form(3):

Mt -> Mk -> Lk -> Jn

The reason why Augustine should not be thought to have

regarded each evangelist äs dependent on all his predecessors

is that he, Augustine, wrote in De consensu evangelistarum

I,ii,4: "each evangelist proves to have chosen to write not in

ignorance of the other writer, his predecessor [in the singular!]"

(4)" (pp. 2409-2410)

(...)

Augustine had no "Benutzungshypothese" at all. The so-called

"Augustinian hypothesis" does not reflect Augustine's views on

the origin and interrelations of the Gospels. It is a recent

invention, possibly not older than the sixteenth Century(22)"

(p. 2417).

(3) H.J. DE JONGE, The Loss of Faith in the Historicity of the

Gospels, in A. DENAUX (ed.), John and the Synoptics (BETL,

101), Leuven, University Press - Peeters, 1992, 409-421.

(4) AUGUSTINUS, De consensu evangelistarum, ed F.

WEIHRICH (CSEL, 43), Vienna/Leipzig, Tempsky and Freytag,

1904, p 4, I,ii,4 "non tamen unusquisque eorum velut altenus

praecedentis [singular!] ignarus voluisse scnbere reppentur".

22. So far äs I know the first author to ascribe the "Augustinian

hypothesis" concerning the relationships between the Gospels

to Augustine was M. CHEMNITZ,Harmonia evangelica, 1593;

Frankfurt-Hamburg, 1652, "Prolegomena", cap. l, p. 3: "Et

manifestius hoc inde colligitur, cum, juxta Epiphanii et

Augustini sententiam, inter evangelistas illi, qui post alios

scripserunt, priorum scripta et viderint et legerint". For other

sixteenth-century authors who held the so-called "Augustinian

hypothesis" without ascribing it explicitly to Augustine, see H.J.

DE JONGE, The Loss of Faith (n. 3 above), especially footnotes

23-27.

2. de Lang, Marijke H. 1993. "The Prehistory of the Griesbach

Hypothesis." Ephemerides theologicae Lovanienses no. 69:134-

139.

"The theory that the Gospel of Mark is an abridgment of

Matthew and Luke has become known mainly through the work

of the eighteenth-century biblical scholar Johann Jakob

Griesbach. The question we want to deal with here is whether

Griesbach came to this hypothesis under the influence of the

investigations of other scholars or independently." (p. 134)

(...)

"However, Griesbach was not the first to argue that Mark had

used both Matthew and Luke. At least three authors had

defended the same view before him: Henry Owen, Anton

Friedrich Büsching and Friedrich Andreas Stroth.

Henry Owen's Observations on the Four Gospels appeared in

1764. Owen assumed Matthew had been the first to write his

Gospel, Luke being the second; and that Mark had made an

epitome of both Matthew and Luke." (p. 135, note omitted)

(...)

"The second work in which we find the thesis brought forward

that Mark is a compendium of Matthew and Luke, is the

harmony of the Gospels composed by Anton Friedrich Büsching

and published by him in 1766 under the title Die vier

Evangelien mit ihren eigenen Worten zusammengesetzt.

Büsching's view, however, differed from that of Owen and

Griesbach on one important point: he held that Luke, not

Matthew, was the earliest Gospel." (p. 136)

(...)

"The third scholar to defend the view that Mark is a

compendium of Matthew and Luke, was the anonymous author

of an article which appeared in 1781 in the periodical

Repertorium edited by J.G. Eichhorn. The author is generally

thought to be Friedrich Andreas Stroth. His essay is entitled

Von Interpolationen im Evangelium Matthäi. In it Stroth

argues that a number of passages in the Gospel of Matthew do

not belong to the original text of the evangelist, but are later

additions." (p. 137)

3. Deardorff, James W. 1992. The Problems of New Testament

Gospel Origins: A Glasnost Approach. San Francisco: Mellen

Research University Press.

4. Dearing, Vinton A. 1979. "The Synoptic Problem: Prolegomena

to a New Solution." In The Critical Study of Sacred Texts,

edited by O'Flaherty, Wendy Doniger, 121-137. Berkeley:

Graduate Theological Union.

5. Denaux, Adelbert. 1992. "The Q-Logion Mt 11,27/Lk 10,22 and

the Gospel of John." In John and the Synoptics, edited by

Denaux, Adelbert. Leuven: Leuven University Press / Peeters

Leuven.

6. ———. 1995. "Criteria for Identifying Q-Passages. A Critical

Review of a Recent Work by T. Bergemann." Novum

Testamentum no. 37:105-129.

Reprinted in: David E. Orton (ed.), The Synoptic Problem and

Q: Selected Studies from Novum Testamentum, Leiden: Brill,

1999, pp. 243-268.

"The hypothetical source Q receives much attention in N.T.

research today. A quick examination of the current

bibliography of D.M. Scholer clearly demonstrates this fact.(1)

The first task of Q research is to make a reliable reconstruction

of Q. It is such a reconstruction, reliable done, which acts as a

basis for what one can assert about other aspects of Q, such as

its literary unity and macro-structure, its literary genre and

theology, its (poetic) formal features, the tradition- and

composition history of Q and its place in the history of Early

Christianity. One cannot, of course, detach this primordial task

of reconstruction from the other tasks: there is a certain

reciprocity between all these aspects.

Elements of the task of reconstruction may be seen in the work

of A.D. Jacobson. He distinguishes two different but

complementary aspects: "Two reconstructive procedures are

necessary: (a) reconstruction of the original wording of each

saying or group of sayings, and (b) reconstruction of the

original sequence of the material.

It is not possible to do either in isolation from the other, but, as

in many large tasks, some division of labor is inevitable".(2)"

(1) One can find the basic bibliography in F. Neirynck & F. Van

Segbroeck, "Q Bibliography", in J. Delobel (ed.), Logia. Les

paroles de Jésus--The Sayings of Jesus (BETL, 59), Leuven,

1982, pp. 561-586; it was continued in "Q-Bibliography:

Additional List 1981-85", ETL 62 (1986) 157-65. From 1982 on,

see the current bibliography of D.M. Scholer, "Q Bibliography:

1981-1989", SBL 1989 Seminar Papers, pp. 23-37; "Supplement

I: 1990", SBL 1990 Seminar Papers, pp. 11-13; "Supplement II:

1991", SBL 1991 Seminar Papers, pp. 1-7; "Supplement III:

1992", SBL 1992 Seminar Papers, pp. 1-4; "Supplement IV:

1993", SBL 1993 Seminar Papers, pp. 1-5.

(2) A.D. Jacobson, The First Gospel. An Introduction to Q,

Sonoma, CA: Polebridge Press, 1992, p. 2

7. Derico, Travis Michael. 2016. Oral Tradition and Synoptic

Verbal Agreement: Evaluating the empirical evidence for

literary dependence. Eugene (OR): Pickwick Publications.

"This book is an attempt to address part of a difficult problem

in New Testament studies that, owing to certain advances in

our understanding of the relevant issues, has recently got much

worse. The problem can be adequately stated in three

sentences:

1. Some first-century Christians remembered and transmitted

oral traditions about Jesus.

2. The Synoptic Evangelists made some use of some of these

traditions in the composition of their Gospels.

3. We don't know very much about these traditions or how the

Synoptic Evangelists used them.

New Testament scholars have long been aware of this problem

and of the crucial importance of its solution. The Synoptic

Gospels contain the earliest and most detailed accounts of the

life and ministry of Jesus of Nazareth now extant. To be able to

accurately assess the data contained in these texts concerning

Jesus, the primitive church, the Synoptic Evangelists, and the

Synoptics themselves, we need to know something about the

sources consulted in process of their composition. And since

the Synoptic Evangelists were undoubtedly familiar with orally

transmitted Jesus traditions, we need to know the extent to

which their Gospels were derived from or influenced by those

traditions. Unfortunately, we have very little unambiguous

evidence to indicate the precise character of any part of the

first-century oral Jesus tradition, or to illuminate the editorial

policies of the Synoptic Evangelists with respect to it." (pp. 1-2)

8. Derrenbacker Jr., Robert A. 2002. "Greco-Roman Writing

Practices and Luke's Gospel: Revisiting "The Order of a

Crank"." In The Gospels Accordng to Michael Goulder: A

North American Response, edited by Rollston, Christopher A.,

61-83. Harrisburg: Trinity Press International.

9. ———. 2005. Ancient Compositional Practices and the

Synoptic Problem. Leuven: Leuven University Press / Peeters.

10. ———. 2009. "The "Abridgement" of Matthew and Luke: Mark

as Epitome?" In Resourcing New Testament Studies: Literary,

Historical, and Theological Essays in Honor of David L.

Dungan, edited by McNicol, Allan J., Peabody, David B. and

Subramanian, J. Samuel 36-45. New York: T & T Clark.

11. ———. 2011. "The "External and Psychological Conditions

under which the Synoptic Gospels Were Written": Ancient

Compositional Practices and the Synoptic Problem." In New

Studies in the Synoptic Problem: Oxford Conference, April

2008: Essays in Honour of Christopher M. Tuckett edited by

Foster, Paul, Gregory, Andrew F., Kloppenborg, John S. and

Verheyden, Joseph, 435-457. Leuven: Peeters.

12. ———. 2013. "Texts, Tables and Tablets A Response to John C.

Poirier." Journal for the Study of the New Testament no.

35:380-387.

13. ———. 2016. "Ancient Literacy, Ancient Literary Dependence,

Ancient Media, and the Triple Tradition." In Scribal Practices

and Social Structures among Jesus Adherents: Essays in

Honour of John S. Kloppenborg, edited by Arnal, William E.,

Ascough, Richard S., Derrenbacker, Jr., Robert A. and Harland,

Philip A., 81-95. Leuven: Peeters.

14. ———. 2017. "Matthew as Scribal Tradent: An Assessment of

Alan Kirk’s Q in Matthew." Journal for the Study of the

Historical Jesus no. 15:213-223.

15. Derrenbacker Jr., Robert A., and Kloppenborg, John S. 2001.

"Self-Contradiction in the IQP? A Reply to Michael Goulder."

Journal of Biblical Literature:57-76.

IQP = International Q Project.

16. Derrett, J. Duncan M-. 1987. "Marcan Priority and Marcan

Skill." Bibbia e oriente no. 29:135-139.

Reprinted in: John Duncan Martin Derrett, Studies in the New

Testament: Volume Five: The Sea-Change of the Old

Testament in the New, Leiden: Brill 1989, pp. 114-118.

17. deSilva, David A. 2018. An Introduction to the New Testament:

Contexts, Methods & Ministry Formation. Downers Grove, IL:

InterVarsity Press.

Second edition (First edition 2004).

Chapter 4: The Four Gospels and the On Jesus: Critical Issues

in the Study of the Gospels, pp. 117-173.

18. Dibelius, Martin. 1927. "The Structure and Literary Character

of the Gospels." The Harvard Theological Review no. 20:151-

170.

19. Dickerson, Patrick L. 1997. "The New Character Narrative in

Luke-Acts and the Synoptic Problem." Journal of Biblical

Literature no. 116:291-312.

20. Downing, F. Gerald. 1985. "Towards the Rehabilitation of Q."

In The Two-Source Hypothesis: A Critical Appraisal, edited by

Bellinzoni Jr., Arthur J., 269-285. Macon: Mercer University

Press.

Reprint from New Testament Studies, 11, 1964-65, pp. 169-181.

21. ———. 1988. "Compositional Conventions and the Synoptic

Problem." Journal of Biblical Literature no. 107:69-85.

22. ———. 1988. "Quite Like Q A Genre for 'Q': The 'Lives' of Cynic

Philosophers." Biblica no. 69:196-225.

23. ———. 1992. "A Paradigm Perplex: Luke, Matthew and Mark."

New Testament Studies no. 38:15-36.

24. ———. 1994. "A Genre for Q and a Socio-Cultural Context for Q:

Comparing Sets of Similarities with Sets of Differences."

Journal for the Study of the New Testament no. 55:3-26.

25. ———. 1996. "Word-Processing in the Ancient World The Social

Production and Performance of Q." Journal for the Study of the

New Testament no. 19:29-48.

26. ———. 2001. "Dissolving the Synoptic Problem Through Film?"

Journal for the Study of the New Testament no. 84:117-119.

27. ———. 2004. "Disagreements of Each Evangelist with the

Minor Close Agreements of the Other Two." Ephemerides

Theologicae Lovanienses no. 80:445-469.

Abstract: "Whilst the “Q” hypothesis is largely accepted in

continental European research, it continues to be disputed in

English language debate. Perhaps Mk conflated Mt and Lk

(Griesbach – Farmer); or Lk conflated Mk and Mt (Farrer –

Goulder). Largely unattended to in these debates, however, are

the very frequent though not entirely consistent refusals of the

imagined third author to copy his sources when they agree

verbatim or very closely, while happy to copy precisely one or

the other in the same immediate context. Some sixty instances

are discussed. Where other ancient authors explain their

preference for agreement in their sources, these writers have to

be imagined refusing just that, and going to considerable pains

to avoid it. Mk and Q as the sources for Mt and Lk remains by

far the more plausible hypothesis."

28. ———. 2011. "Writers’ Use or Abuse of Written Sources." In

New Studies in the Synoptic Problem: Oxford Conference,

April 2008: Essays in Honour of Christopher M. Tuckett

edited by Foster, Paul, Gregory, Andrew F., Kloppenborg, John

S. and Verheyden, Joseph, 523-550. Leuven: Peeters.

29. ———. 2013. "Waxing Careless: Poirier, Derrenbacker and

Downing." Journal for the Study of the New Testament no.

35:388-393.

30. ———. 2017. "Plausibility, Probability, and Synoptic

Hypotheses." Ephemerides Theologicae Lovanienses no.

93:313-337.

Abstract: "Scholars assert their reconstructions are possible,

probable, plausible. Even Matthew and Luke quite

independently agreeing against Mark in Markan contexts is

agreed by sceptics to be possible, if not really plausible. Can

'possibility' or 'plausibility' be quantified? Perhaps our

judgement between hypotheses is inescapably subjective.

However, if some proposed reconstruction can be shown to be

impossible, then any that are merely possible surely hold the

field, alone or 'complausible' with others. One evangelist

writing third (whether Mark, Luke, or recently, from Alan

Garrow, Matthew) turns out willing to paraphrase or often copy

verbatim – or all but – single matter from the other two, while

assiduously avoiding forty or so extensive sequences of the

verbatim agreed witness of the other two. Only the hypothesis

of Matthew and Luke independently using Mark and 'Q' (2DH)

avoids such an arguably impossible reconstruction."

31. Dunderberg, Ismo. 1995. "Q and the Beginning of Mark." New

Testament Studies no. 41:501-511.

32. Dungan, David Laird. 1970. "Mark - The Abridgment of

Matthew and Luke." In Jesus and Man's Hope. Volume 1,

edited by Buttrick, D. G., 51-97. Pittsburgh: Pittsburgh

Theological Seminary.

33. ———. 1974. "Reactionary Trends in the Gospel Producing

Activity of the Early Church: Marcion, Tatian, Mark." In

L'Évangile selon Marc : tradition et rédaction, edited by

Sabbe, M., 179-202. Louvain: Louvain University Press.

34. ———. 1983. "The Purpose and Provenance of the Gospel of

Mark according to the “Two-Gospel” (Owen-Griesbach)

Hypothesis." In New Synoptic Studies: The Cambridge Gospel

Conference and Beyond, edited by Farmer, William R., 411-

440. Macon: Mercer University Press.

35. ———. 1984. "A Griesbachian Perspective on the Argument

from Order." In Synoptic Studies: The Ampleforth Conferences

of 1982 and 1983, edited by Tuckett, Christopher M., 67-74.

Sheffield: JSOT Press.

36. ———. 1985. "Critique of the Main Arguments for Mark’s

Priority as Formulated by B. H. Streeter." In The Two-Source

Hypothesis: A Critical Appraisal, edited by Bellinzoni Jr.,

Arthur J., 143-161. Macon: Mercer University Press.

Reprint of "Mark - The Abridgement of Matthew and Luke", in

Jesus and the Man's Hope, Pittsburgh; Pittsburgh Theological

Seminary, 1970, Volume 1, pp. 54-74.

37. ———. 1985. "Critique of the Q Hypothesis." In The Two-

Source Hypothesis: A Critical Appraisal, edited by Bellinzoni

Jr., Arthur J., 427-433. Macon: Mercer University Press.

Reprint of "Critique of the Q Hypothesis", from "Mark - The

Abridgement of Matthew and Luke", in Jesus and the Man's

Hope, Pittsburgh; Pittsburgh Theological Seminary, 1970,

Volume 1, pp. 74-80.

38. ———, ed. 1990. The Interrelations of the Gospels: A

Symposium Led by M.-É. Boismard, W. R. Farmer, F.

Neirynck, Jerusalem 1984. Leuven: Leuven University Press /

Peeters.

Proceedings of the 1984 Jerusalem Symposium on the

Interrelations of the Gospels, April 8-22.

Contents: F. Neirynck: Introduction: The two-source

hypothesis; F. Neirynck: Matthew 4:23-5:2 and the Matthean

composition of 4:23-11:1; C.M. Tuckett: Response to the two-

gospel hypothesis; F. Neirynck: Response to the multiple-stage

hypothesis; W.R. Farmer: The Two Gospel Hypothesis: The

Statement of the Hypothesis; A.J. McNicol: The composition of

the synoptic eschatological discourse; D.L. Dungan: Response

to the two source hypothesis; D.B. Peabody: Response to the

multi-stage hypothesis; M.E. Boismard: Théorie des niveaux

multiples; B. Reicke: The history of the synoptic discussion;

D.L. Dungan: Synopses of the future; J.K. Elliott: The relevance

of textual criticism to the synoptic problem; S.O. Abogunrin:

The synoptic gospel debate. A re-examination from an African

point of view; P. Borgen: John and the Synoptics; F. Neirynck:

John and the synoptics: Response to P. Borgen; P.L. Shuler:

The Genre(s) of the gospel; P. Stuhlmacher: The genre(s) of the

gospels: response to the P.L. Shuler; B. Gerhardsson: The

gospel tradition; B.F. Meyer: Objectivity and subjectivity in

historical criticism of the gospels; R.H. Fuller: Response to B.F.

Meyer; H. Merkel: Die Überlieferungen der alten Kirche über

das Verhältnis der Evangelien; Bernard Orchard: Response to

H. Merkel.

39. ———. 1990. "Response to the Two-Source Hypothesis." In The

Interrelations of the Gospels. A Symposium led by M.-E.

Boismard - W.R. Farmer - F. Neirynck, Jerusalem 1984, edited

by Dungan, David L., 201-216. Leuven: Leuven University Press

/ Peeters.

40. ———. 1992. "Two-Gospel Hypothesis." In The Anchor Bible

Dictionary: Vol. 6, edited by Freedman, Martin, 671-679. New

York: Doubleday.

"The Two-Gospel Hypothesis, formerly known as the Griesbach

Hypothesis, proposes a comprehensive solution to the

SYNOPTIC PROBLEM. It was first given this new title by

Bernard Orchard (1982: vii; 1983: xii) to emphasize the central

argument that the gospel of Mark was originally composed by

joining together elements of the two earlier gospels, Matthew

and Luke. The name is intended to distinguish this approach

from the Two-Source (or Document) Hypothesis (hereafter

2SH), in that it does not postulate a hypothetical "lost

document" such as "Q" plus Mark (or a second hypothetical

"lost document" such as UrMark or DeuteroMark) as a source

of Matthew and Luke. See TWO-SOURCE HYPOTHESIS. The

Two-Gospel Hypothesis (hereafter 2GH) contends that the

gospel of Matthew was written first in the service of the

Palestinian Jewish Christian proclamation of the messiahship

of the recently crucified Jesus of Nazareth. It proposes that the

gospel of Luke + Acts was written second for use in the Pauline

mission to the gentiles, using Matthew as the main source. It

proposes that the gospel of Mark was written third as a

selective combination of Matthew and Luke, as an attempt to

reconcile the Jewish and gentile branches in the early Church.

It proposes that the gospel of John was written fourth,

revealing an extensive awareness of the other Gospels but

consisting mostly of a separate stream of the Jesus tradition."

(p. 671)

41. ———. 1995. ""Eppur si muove': Circumnavigating the Mythical

Recensions of Q." Soundings: An Interdisciplinary Journal no.

78:541-570.

42. ———. 1999. A History of the Synoptic Problem: The Canon,

the Text, the Composition and the Interpretation of the

Gospels. New York: Doubleday.

"Why Another History of the Synoptic Problem?

Given the hundreds of handbooks introducing the New

Testament and Bible study guides being used around the world,

as well as the scores of commentaries on the Gospels and the

dozen or so histories of New Testament scholarship, why

should I feel impelled to add another lengthy study of this

subject, especially since there is such unanimity regarding the

solution to the Synoptic Problem, namely, the almost universal

acceptance of the Two Source Hypothesis? What more could be

said that hasn't been already, more than once? My account will

differ from all others in four important ways:

• Most accounts do not tell the whole story; they begin around

1800 instead of at the beginning. As a result, they privilege the

most recent form of the Synoptic Problem, treating it as if it

were somehow self-evident. Thus, they do not notice that there

are earlier forms of the Synoptic Problem, and, by comparison

with them, they do not notice how destructive to traditional

Christianity the modern form is. This skewed situation is

instead regarded as morally and politically neutral and

objective, when precisely the opposite is the case.

• No history of source criticism correlates the four basic

components of the full Synoptic Problem to each other or

explains their intrinsic interrelationships. This history will

show how the Synoptic Problem has always involved much

more than just the question of how the Gospels were composed

and what sources were used. The complete Synoptic Problem

has always also involved the question of which Gospels to

consider (the question of canon), which text of the normative

Gospels to use (text criticism), and how to interpret the Bible as

a whole and the Gospels in particular (hermeneutics). The full

Synoptic Problem, strictly speaking, always includes these four

components.

• This history is unique in that it discusses the history of each of

these four components as they arise within each of the major

Forms of the Synoptic Problem.

• No history of the Synoptic Problem has tried to indicate the

cultural, political, economic, and technological presuppositions

undergirding and shaping the debate in every historical period.

Instead, most biblical scholars naively believe that their

discipline is free of such mundane concerns, as if their biblical

research had no economic agenda and did not serve

fundamental political objectives. It will be the task of this

history to make these political and economic aspects clear for

each of the major Forms of the Synoptic Problem." (pp. 2-3)

43. ———. 2011. "Dispensing with the Priority of Mark." In

Handbook for the Study of the Historical Jesus. Vol. 2. The

Study of Jesus, edited by Holmén, Tom and Porter, Stanley E.,

1313-1342. Leiden: Brill.

44. Dunn, James D. G. 1992. "Matthew's Awareness of Markan

Redaction." In The Four Gospels 1992: Festschrift Frans

Neirynck. Volume II, edited by van Segbroeck, Frans, Tuckett,

Christopher M., van Belle, Gilbert and Verheyden, Joseph,

1349-1359. Leuven: Leuven University Press / Peeters.

Reprinted in James D. G. Dunn, The Oral Gospel Tradition,

Grand rapids, MI: Eerdmans, pp. 109-119.

45. ———. 2003. "Altering the Default Setting: Re-envisaging the

Early Transmission of the Jesus Tradition." New Testament

Studies no. 49:139-175.

Abstract: "The literary mindset (‘default setting’) of modern

Western culture prevents those trained in that culture from

recognizing that oral cultures operate differently. The classic

solution to the Synoptic problem, and the chief alternatives,

have envisaged

the relationships between the Gospel traditions in almost

exclusively literary terms. But the earliest phase of

transmission of the Jesus tradition was without doubt

predominantly by word of mouth. And recent studies of oral

cultures provide several characteristic features of oral tradition.

Much of the Synoptic tradition, even in its present form,

reflects in particular the combination of stability and flexibility

so characteristic of the performances of oral tradition.

Re-envisaging the early transmission of the Jesus tradition

therefore requires us to recognize that the literary paradigm

(including a clearly delineated Q document) is too restrictive in

the range of possible explanations it offers for the

diverse/divergent character of Synoptic parallels. Variation in

detail may simply attest the character of oral performance

rather than constituting evidence of literary redaction."

46. ———. 2005. "Q1 as Oral Tradition." In The Writtten Gospel,

edited by Bockmuehl, Markus and Hagner, Donald A., 45-69.

Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Reprinted in James D. G. Dunn, The Oral Gospel Tradition,

Grand rapids, MI: Eerdmans, pp. 80-108.

47. Dyer, Charles H. 1981. "Do the Synoptics Depend on Each

Other?" Bibliotheca sacra no. 138:230-245.

"What is the literary relationship between the Synoptic

Gospels? How does one explain the many similarities of content

and wording within the Gospel accounts while at the same time

accounting for the numerous differences between the

individual records? This article examines the theories which

have been proposed in an attempt to arrive at an acceptable

solution to the question of literary dependence in the Synoptic

Gospels." (p. 230)

48. Edwards, James R. 2009. The Hebrew Gospel and the

Development of the Synoptic Tradition. Grand Rapids (MI):

Eerdmans.

49. Edwards, Richard Alan. 1975. A Concordance to Q. Missoula:

Scholars Press.

50. ———. 1976. A Theology of Q: Eschatology, Prophecy, and

Wisdom. Philadelphia: Fortress Press.

51. ———. 1982. "Matthew's use of Q in Chapter 11." In Logia : les

paroles de Jésus. mémorial Joseph Coppens, edited by Delobel,

Joël, 257-275. Leuven: Peeters.

52. Elliott, James Keith. 1971. "The Synoptic Problem and the Laws

of Tradition: A Cautionary Note." The Expository Times no.

82:148-152.

"It is a commonplace of Form-critical studies that as the Gospel

tradition developed, proper names were added to the material.

The ’ proofs ’ for this usually include such examples as the

identification of the high priest’s servant as Malchus only in the

developed tradition of the Fourth Gospel. The criterion that the

earliest tradition was largely without names is usually used by

writers on the synoptic problem often to support Markan

priority, it being stressed that Matthew makes many aspects of

Mark’s material more precise and detailed.(1)" (p. 148)

(...)

"In this paper I have dealt only with the appearance or absence

of proper names. In assessing the order of the gospels one

needs obviously to consider many other features, for example,

Hawkins’ conclusions about language(2) must be tested against

Butler’s(3) and both tested against the developments in Koine

on the one hand and against the evangelists’ own style and

idiosyncrasies of grammar on the other. Similarly, the author’s

own theological position will need to be tested against the

developments of theological thought elsewhere in the New

Testament. Stringent use of a redaction-critical approach to the

gospels not only enables the reader to assess the relative

priority of the synoptic gospels as complete units, but can also

be harnessed to test the relative

antiquity of individual pericopes in the gospels; but the main

contribution it can make to New Testament studies is less in

assessing antiquity of tradition than explaining the theological

position of the Gospel writers. And it is this which seems the

more worthwhile pursuit." (p. 152)

(1) e.g., The Gospel According to St Matthew by W. C. Allen

(I.C.C.) (1907), xxiv f.

(2) J. C. Hawkins, Horae Synopticae, 2nd ed. (1909).

(3) B. C. Butler, The Originality of St Matthew (1951).

53. ———. 2015. "The Relevance of Textual Criticism to the

Synoptic Problem." In Essays and Studies in New Testament

Textual Criticism, edited by Elliott, J. K., 147-158. New York:

Bloomsbury.

54. Engelbrecht, John. 1996. "Challenging theTwo-Source

Hypothesis: How Successful are the Commentaries?"

Neotestamentica no. 30:89-101.

55. Enslin, Morton S. 1985. "Luke and Matthew: Compilers or

Authors?" In Aufstieg und Niedergang der römischen Welt:

Principat 25.3. Religion (Vorkonstantinisches Christentum:

Leben und Umwelt Jesu; Neues Testament [Kanonische

Schriften und Apokryphen], Forts.), edited by Temporini,

Hildegard and Haase, Wolfgang, 2357-2388. Berlin: Walter de

Gruyter.

56. Evans, Craig A. 2004. "Sorting out the Synoptic Problem: Why

an Old Approach Is Still Best." In Reading the Gospels Today,

1-26. Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans.

57. ———. 2016. "The Two-Source Hypothesis." In The Synoptic

Problem: Four Views, edited by Porter, Stanley E. and Dyer,

Bryan R., 27-46. Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic.

58. ———. 2016. "Two-Source Hypothesis Response." In The

Synoptic Problem: Four Views, edited by Porter, Stanley E. and

Dyer, Bryan R., 113-126. Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic.

59. Evans, Owen E. 1961. "Synoptic Criticism since Streeter." The

Expository Times no. 72:295-299.

60. Eve, Eric. 2004. "Reconstructing Mark: A Thought

Experiment." In Questioning Q: A Multidimensional Critique,

edited by Goodacre, Mark S. and Perrin, Nicholas, 89-114.

Downers Grove: InterVarsity Press.

61. ———. 2011. "The Synoptic Problem without Q?" In New

Studies in the Synoptic Problem: Oxford Conference, April

2008: Essays in Honour of Christopher M. Tuckett edited by

Foster, P., Gregory, A., Kloppenborg, John S. and Verheyden,

Joseph, 551-570. Leuven: Peeters.

62. ———. 2015. "Memory, Orality and the Synoptic Problem."

Early Christianity no. 6:311-333.

63. ———. 2015. "The Devil in the Detail: Exsorcising Q from the

Belzebul Controversy." In Marcan Priority Without Q:

Explorations in the Farrer Hypothesis, edited by Poirier, John

C. and Peterson, Jeffrey, 16-43. London: T & T Clark.

"In all three synoptic gospels, the Beelzebul Controversy (Mt.

12.22-37 // Mk 3.20-30 // Lk. 11.14-23) takes the form of a

sorcery accusation. It also provides a textbook example of

where, exceptionally, it is Matthew

rather than Mark that constitutes the 'middle term' among the

three synoptics. On the Two-Document hypothesis (henceforth

2DH) this is explained as a Mark-Q overlap, meaning that

versions of this pericope

appeared in both Mark and Q, and that Matthew combined the

two (while Luke, in this case, broadly followed Q alone). On the

Griesbach hypothesis (henceforth GH) the data are explained

on the basis that Luke

and Mark each adapted Matthew (there would be little need to

argue for Mark's conflation of Matthew and Luke in this case).

Supporters of the Farrer hypothesis (henceforth FH) would

instead argue that here

Matthew adapted Mark and Luke adapted Matthew." (p. 16,

notes omitted)

(...)

"The present essay has had the following limited aim: to

determine whether the Synoptic parallel Mt. 12.22-37

//Mk3.20-30//Lk. 11.14-23 is more plausibly explained on the

Two-Document hypothesis (2DH) or

on the Farrer Hypothesis (FH) - that is, whether, assuming

Marcan priority, the major agreements of Matthew and Luke

against Mark in the Beelzebul Controversy are more plausibly

explained as a Mark-Q overlap

or an instance where Matthew has reworked Mark and Luke

has reworked Matthew. To achieve this, the Matthaean and

Lucan versions of the Beelzebul Controversy have been

examined in some detail." (p.42)

64. ———. 2016. Writing the Gospels: Composition and Memory.

London: SPCK.

65. ———. 2021. Relating the Gospels: Memory, Imitation and the

Farrer Hypothesis. New York: Bloomsbury.

66. Farkasfalvy, Denis. 1992. "The Presbyters' Witness on the

Order of the Gospels as Reported by Clement of Alexandria."

The Catholic Biblical Quarterly no. 54:260-270.

"In his Ecclesiastical History, Eusebius reports that Clement of

Alexandria in his work Hypotyposes had transmitted a

tradition preserved by "the ancient presbyters" about the order

of the Gospels.[*]

(...)

Current scholarship routinely uses this text for claiming that

Clement of Alexandria not only accepted the fourfold Gospel

canon but also held that Matthew and Luke were composed

before Mark and John. The purpose of this article is to propose

a new interpretation of this text by carefully distinguishing

among the three levels on which this passage must be analyzed:

the understanding of Eusebius, that of Clement, and that of the

"ancient presbyters."

While the actual order of the composition of the four Gospels is

undoubtedly an important issue, here I do not want to enter

into that question as such, nor do I think that this article should

be considered as support for any of the theories espoused in the

current debate. In fact, I attempt to show that the presbyters

quoted by Clement of Alexandria did not provide information

about the chronological order of the four canonical Gospels and

thus the passage neither favors nor contradicts any of the

modern theories concerning that question." (pp. 261-262, note

omitted)

[*] Book 6.14.5

67. ———. 1998. "The Papias Fragments on Mark and Matthew and

Their Relationship to Luke's Prologue: An Essay on the Pre-

History of the Synoptic Problem." In The Early Church in its

Context: Essays in Honor of Everett Ferguson, edited by

Malherbe, Abraham J., Norris, Frederick W. and Thompson,

James W., 92-106. Leiden: Brill.

"Papias is our earliest known author who tells us explicitly of

two gospels coexisting in the Church, Matthew and Mark. The

fragments of Papias which have survived do not speak of the

parallel or combined use of these two gospels but reveal the

problem caused by the plurality of the gospels as it was

perceived at the beginning of the second century. The thesis of

this article is threefold. First, it intends to show that Papias

transmits information coming from a significantJy earlier

source.

Second, it demonstrates that this source, when speaking of

Mark, is reflecting views closely similar to those contained in

the prologue of Luke. Third, it demonstrates that, in the

fragments of Papias, Mark is judged by the same criteria which

Luke held and that these reflect a gospel model developed in

the early church under the influence of Matthew's gospel. The

importance of this investigation consists in unveiling the

thought pattern which brought together the Synoptic Gospels

into one single gospel canon." (p. 92)

68. Farmer, William R. 1962. "Notes on a Literary and Form-

Critical Analysis of Some of the Synoptic Material Peculiar to

Luke." New Testament Studies no. 8:301-316.

Extract: "We may begin our analysis of the synoptic tradition

peculiar to Luke with a study of one of its most important

component parts, namely that preserved in the fifteenth

chapter. The whole of this chapter constitutes a single literary

unit, whose beginning and end are well defined and whose

internal structure, while not uniform, is perfectly self-

consistent. The Introduction to this literary unit points to the

‘grumbling’ of the Pharisees and Scribes in response to Jesus'

behaviour of receiving and eating with those tax collectors and

sinners who had come to hear him. This response of the

Pharisees and Scribes occasions a threefold response from

Jesus, namely a threefold insistence upon the single point that

it is right to accept the repentance of sinners and to rejoice with

them, since their repentance is accepted by God who himself in

heaven rejoices over their return."

69. ———. 1964. The Synoptic Problem: A Critical Analysis. New

York: Macmillan.

A critical review of the literary relationship between Matthew,

Mark, and Luke.

Contents: I. The Essential Developments in the Pre-Holtzmann

Period 1; II. The Holtzmannian Synthesis 36; III. The English

Endorsement and Modification of the Two-Document

Hypothesis 48; IV. An Analysis of Streeter’s Contribution to the

Two-Document Hypothesis 118; V. Other Factor· Contributing

to the Twentieth-Century Consensus 178; VI. A New

Introduction to the Problem 199; VII. Notes for a History of the

Redaction of Synoptic Tradition in Mark 233; Appendix A 284;

Appendix B 287; Index 294-308.

"A history of the Synoptic Problem is a history of the basic ideas

which have influenced men’s thinking about this problem.

These ideas are limited in number and can be presented in such

a way as to provide the reader with a firm grasp of the

essentials of the problem and its history. He who would

attempt to go beyond this, and attempt to review all the work

that has ever been done on this problem, faces an almost

limitless task." (p. 3)

(...)

"Prior to the publication of Lessing' views in 1784 [*], other

developments had taken place, the importance of which it is

essential to grasp. We have already mentioned the emergence

of a new type of Gospel harmony, specifically the famous

“Synopsis” of Griesbach. While Griesbach printed some

passages of John, he included the entire texts of only Matthew,

Mark, and Luke. Therefore, these three Gospels, which were

featured in his “Synopsis,” came to be known as the “Synoptic”

Gospels.

In the beginning of this work, which in its successive editions

was to become a handbook for subsequent scientific

investigators, Griesbach confessed to “the heresy” of doubting

the possibility of harmonizing even the closely related but

conflicting chronologies of Matthew, Mark, and Luke. In other

words, Griesbach’s harmony, if a harmony at all, was a

harmony to end harmonization. Henceforth, those who

followed in his footsteps would no longer seek to reconcile the

conflicting chronologies of the Gospels, but rather would seek

to understand the relationships between the Gospels in terms

of their direct literary dependence, or in terms of their indirect

literary dependence through the mutual use of earlier

hypothetical sources.

It is important to recognize the fact that all previous authors of

Gospel harmonies had been wrestling with the problem created

by chronological differences between Gospels believed to have

been written by authoritative witnesses who would not

deliberately have differed from one another without good

cause. The frank and shocking admission of Griesbach that he

confessed to the “heresy” of doubting that this problem could

be solved paved the way for widespread theological interest in

Lessing’s solution. For with Lessing’s hypothesis, scholars were

provided with an explanation of the reasons why the canonical

Evangelists, who frequently agreed verbatim, sometimes

differed from one another. Because on this hypothesis each

Evangelist could be thought of as following faithfully an

apostolic model preserved in the particular modified form of

the original Nazarene Gospel available to him." (pp. 5-6)

[*] Gotthold Ephraim Lessing, “Neue Hypothese über die

Evangelisten als bloss menschliche Geschichtschreiber

betrachtet,” Theologischer Nachlass, Berlin, 1784, pp. 45-72.

English translation: “New hypothesis on the evangelists as

merely human historians”, in H. B. Nisbett (ed.), Lessing.

Philosophical and Theological Writings, Cambridge:

Cambridge University Press 2005, pp. 148-171.

70. ———. 1968. "‘The Lachmann Fallacy’." New Testament Studies

no. 14:441-443.

71. ———. 1973. "A Response to Robert Morgenthaler's

"Statistische Synopse"." Biblica no. 54:417-433.

72. ———. 1977. "Modern Developments of Griesbach's

Hypothesis." New Testament Studies no. 23:275-295.

73. ———. 1980. "A Note on the Ideological Background of the

Marcan Hypothesis." In Occasional Notes on Some Points of

Interest in New Testament Studies, edited by Farmer, William

R., 1-6. Dallas: Southern Methodist University.

"In his recent book on the synoptic problem, after having

presented the results of his extensive and detailed philological

analysis of the seven most important arguments that have been

used to support Marcan priority. Hans-Herbert Stoldt turned to

the larger and very speculative historical and sociological

question of the idiological background of the Marcan

hypothesis.1 Because of the importance of the issues involved,

and because of their complexity, it is necessary to clarify the

larger significance of Stoldt's over-all argument, and explore

the perimeters within which Stoldt's original contribution to

our understanding of the idiological background of the Marcan

hypothesis can best be evaluated The purpose of this note is not

to settle any of the issues involved, but rather to orient readers

to the current discussion of Stoldt’s book in such a way that his

discoveries about the importance of the reaction to David

Friedrich Strauss' Leben Jesu for understanding the history of

the synoptic problem are neither over-emphasized nor unfairly

discounted." (p. 1)

74. ———. 1980. "Notes For a Compositional Analysis on the

Griesbach Hypothesis of the Empty Tomb Stories in the

Synoptic Gospels." In Occasional Notes on Some Points of

Interest in New Testament Studies, edited by Farmer, William

R., 7-14. Dallas: Southern Methodist University.

"A hypothesis that works may not be true. But any hypothesis

that merits widespread consideration ought to work. How well

the Griesbach hypothesis does or does not work may be seen

from a compositional analysis of the empty tomb narratives in

the Synoptic Gospels. On the Marcan hypothesis one begins an

analysis of this tradition by considering the text preserved in

Mark 16:1-8. But on the Griesbach hypothesis the Gospels were

written in the order of Matthew, Luke and Mark. On this

hypothesis, therefore, the synoptic texts can best be understood

when considered in that order.

The strict parallel in Matthew to Mark 16:1 -8 is Matthew 28:1

-10. It is especially important to study Matthew 28:1 -10 within

the context of the continuous narrative of which it is a part. The

thread of this narrative can be conveniently picked up at 27:50

where "Jesus ... gave up his spirit." For with these words the

account of the events leading up to the death of Jesus are

brought to an end, and what follows narrates the events that

occurred after Jesus' death." (p. 7)

75. ———, ed. 1983. New Synoptic Studies: The Cambridge Gospel

Conference and Beyond. Macon: Mercer University Press.

Table of Contents:

Introduction

William R. Farmer: Introductio 1;

PART ONE

The Patristic Evidence

1. William R. Farmer: The Patristic Evidence Reexamined: A

Response to George Kennedy 3; 2. Giuseppe Giov. Gamba: A

Further Reexamination of Evidence from the Early Tradition

17; 3. David Peabody: Augustine and the Augustinian

Hypothesis: A Reexamination of Augustine’s Thought in De

consensu evangelistarum 37;

PART TWO

Further evidence for the Posteriority of Mark and for the Early

Character of Matthean Tradition in Relation to Luke and Mark

1. Pierson Parker: The Posteriority of Mark 67; 2. Lamar Cope:

The Argument Revolves: The Pivotal Evidence for Markan

Priority Is Reversing Itself 143; 3. George Wesley Buchanan:

Matthean Beatitudes and Traditional Promises 161; 4. Phillip

Sigal: Aspects of Mark Pointing to Matthean Priority 185; 5. Bo

Reicke: A Test of Synoptic Relationships: Matthew 10:17-23

and 24:9-14 with Parallels 209;

PART THREE

New Methodological Approaches

1. Albert C. Outler: Canon Criticism and the Gospel of Mark

233; 2. J. G. F. Collison: Linguistic Usages in the Gospel of

Luke 245; 3. William O. Walker, Jr.: The Son of Man Question

and the Synoptic Problem 261; 4. Joseph B. Tyson: Conflict as a

Literary Theme in the Gospel of Luke 303;

PART FOUR

Papers Assuming the “Two-Gospel” (Owen-Griesbach)

Hypothesis

1. Jack Dean Kingsbury: The Theology of St. Matthew’s Gospel

according to the Griesbach Hypothesis 331; 2. J. G. F. Collison:

Eschatology in the Gospel of Luke 363; 3. Thomas R. W.

Longstaff: Crisis and Christology: The Theology of Mark 373; 4.

J. B. Orchard: The “Common Step” Phenomenon in the

Synoptic Pericopes 393;

PART FIVE

Papers Exploring a Paradigm Shift in Gospel Studies

1. David L. Dungan: The Purpose and Provenance of the Gospel

of Mark according to the “Two-Gospel” (Owen-Griesbach)

Hypothesis 411; 2. Charles T. Davis III: Mark: The Petrine

Gospel 441; 3. Philip Shuler: Genre Criticism and the Synoptic

Problem 467; 4. Peter W. Agnew: The “Two-Gospel”

Hypothesis and a Biographical Genre for the Gospels 481;

Appendix

William R. Farmer: A Response to Joseph Fitzmyer’s Defense

of the “Two-Document” Hypothesis 501-523.

Index: Modern autors: 525; "Fathers" of the Church 532-533.

76. ———. 1983. "The Patristic Evidence Reexamined: A Response

to George Kennedy." In New Synoptic Studies: The Cambridge

Gospel Conference and Beyond, edited by Farmer, William R.,

3-15. Macon: Mercer University Press.

77. ———. 1983. "Appendix: A Response to Joseph Fitzmyer’s

Defense of the “Two-Document” Hypothesis." In New Synoptic

Studies: The Cambridge Gospel Conference and Beyond,

edited by Farmer, William R., 501-523. Macon: Mercer

University Press.

78. ———. 1984. "Certain Results Reached by Sir John C. Hawkins

and C.F. Burney which make more sense if Luke knew

Matthew, and Mark knew Matthew and Luke." In Synoptic

Studies: The Ampleforth Conferences of 1982 and 1983, edited

by Tuckett, Christopher M., 75-94. Sheffield: JSOT Press.

79. ———. 1984. "Reply to Michael Goulder." In Synoptic Studies:

The Ampleforth Conferences of 1982 and 1983, edited by

Tuckett, Christopher M., 105-110. Sheffield: JSOT Press.

80. ———. 1984. "Is Streeter's Fundamental Solution to the

Synoptic Problem Still Valid?" In The New Testament Age,

Volume1: Essays in Honor of Bo Reicke, edited by Weinrich,

William C., 147-164. Macon, GA: Merce University Press.

81. ———. 1984. "The Import of the Two-Gospel Hypothesis."

Concordia Theological Quarterly no. 48:55-59.

82. ———. 1985. "A New Introduction to the Problem." In The Two-

Source Hypothesis: A Critical Appraisal, edited by Bellinzoni

Jr., Arthur J., 163-197. Macon: Mercer University Press.

Reprint from The Synoptic Problem: A Critical Appraisal,

second edition, Macon, Ga: Mercer University Press 1976, pp.

199-232.

83. ———. 1985. "A Fresh Approach to Q." In The Two-Source

Hypothesis: A Critical Appraisal, edited by Bellinzoni Jr.,

Arthur J., 397-408. Macon: Mercer University Press.

Reprint from Jacob Neusner (ed.), Christianity, Judaism, and

Other Greco-Roman Cults: Studies for Morton Smith at Sixty,

Part One: New Testament, Leiden: Brill, 1975, pp. 39-50.

84. ———. 1990. "The Passion Prediction Passages and the

Synoptic Problem: a Test Case." New Testament Studies no.

36:558-570.

85. ———. 1990. "The Two Gospel Hypotesis: The Statement of the

Hypothesis." In The Interrelations of the Gospels. A

Symposium led by M.-E. Boismard - W.R. Farmer - F.

Neirynck, Jerusalem 1984, edited by Dungan, David L., 125-

156. Leuven: Leuven University Press / Peeters.

86. ———. 1993. "The Minor Agreements of Matthew and Luke

Against Mark and the Two Gospel Hypothesis. A Study of These

Agreements in Their Compositional Contexts." In Minor

Agreements: Symposium Göttingen 1991, edited by Strecker,

Georg, 773-815. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht.

87. ———. 1994. The Gospel of Jesus: The Pastoral Relevance of

the Synoptic Problem. Louisville: Westminster/John Knox

Press.

88. ———. 1995. "State Interesse and Markan Primacy: 1870-1914."

In Biblical Studies and the Shifting of Paradigms, 1850-1914,

edited by Reventlow, Henning Graf and Farmer, William, 15-

49. Sheffield: Sheffeild Academic Press.

"In 1987 the late Professor Bo Reicke of Basel University

published his study of 'Synoptic Theories Advanced during the

Consolidation of Germany, 1830-1870', in which he traced the

history of the idea of

Markan primacy from Strauss to Holtzmann. In passing, Reicke

noted that the appointment in 1874 of Holtzmann to the

prestigious chair of New Testament at the reconstituted

University of Strasbourg gave this

young scholar's career (and thus the Markan Hypothesis) an

important boost.(2) Stoldt had analyzed Holtzmann's

influential work published in 1863 in his 1977 work, and had

demonstrated its critical untenability.

This had been done independently as early as 1866 by Hajo

Meijboom, eight full years before Holtzmann's appointment to

the chair at Strasbourg.(3) Thus it is an unsolved question in

the social history of

biblical studies how and why this important appointment was

made.(4)

This leads me to focus on the decade in which this happened—

1870-1880, the era of the Kulturkampf—in order to see

whether it is possible to discover how and why what was still

only a very popular 'scientific'

hypothesis in 1870 was eventually transformed into what Bo

Reicke designates as a theologumenon. It should be said in

advance that this bit of social history cannot settle the vexing

question of whether Mark was

or was not the earliest Gospel. That question can only be settled

on the basis of historical and literary evidence. This bit of social

history can, however, help explain what might be called the

sociology of Markan

primacy. (pp. 16-17)

(2) 'From Strauss to Holtzmann and Meijboom: Synoptic

Theories Advanced during the Consolidation of Germany,

1830-1870', Novum Testamentum 19.1 (1987), pp. 1-21, p. 18.

(3) Hajo Uden Meijboom, Geschiedenis en critiek der

Marcushypothese (Amsterdam: Gebroeders Kragg, 1866).

[English translation: A History and Critique of the Origin of

the Marcan Hypothesis, 1835-1866. A Contemporary Report

Rediscovered, 1993]

(4) The correspondence between Bismarck and Ledderhose,

who represented the University in the appointment process,

focuses on Holtzmann's church politics.

89. ———. 1998. "The Present State of the Synoptic Problem." In

Literary Studies in Luke-Acts: Essays in Honor of Joseph B.

Tyson, edited by Thompson, Richard P. and Phillips, Thomas

E., 11-36. Macon (GA): Mercer University Press.

90. ———. 2001. "The Case for the Two-Gospel Hypothesis." In

Rethinking the Synoptic Problem, edited by Black, David Alan

and Beck, David R., 97-135. Grand Rapids (MI): Baker

Academic.

91. Farnell, F. David. 2002. "Independence Response." In Three

Views on the Origins of the Synoptic Gospels, edited by

Thomas, Robert L., 111-125. Grand Rapids (MI): Kregel

92. Farnell, P. David. 1999. "The Synoptic Gospels in the Ancient

Church: the Testimony to the Priority of Matthew's Gospel."

The Master's Seminary Journal no. 10:53-86.

Abstract: "Modern historical criticism has systematically

ignored the writings of the early church fathers regarding their

viewpoints on the Gospels. This article examines pertinent

writings of several significant early fathers (Papias, Tertullian,

Irenaeus, Clement of Alexandria, Origen, Eusebius, and

Augustine) regarding any information that they can impart

regarding the chronological order of the Gospels. Their writings

reveal that the unanimous and unquestioned consensus of the

early church was that Matthew was the first gospel written.

They also reveal that, while they considered John as written

last, Luke was predominately considered second and Mark

third (although admittedly Mark, at times, appears in second

place). Since the church fathers lived much closer to the time of

the composition of the gospels and were scholars in their own

right, their testimony must be given serious consideration in

any hypothesis regarding chronological order. Such early

testimony stands in direct contradiction to the predominant

contention of source criticism that concludes for the Two- or

Four-Document Hypothesis (i.e. priority of Mark and Q),

especially since the latter is not a product of objective historical

analysis but a late-blooming conjecture spawned by

Enlightenment ideologies."

93. ———. 2002. "How Views of Inspiration Have Impacted

Synoptic Problem Discussions." The Master's Seminary

Journal no. 13:33-64.

Abstract: "Second Corinthians 10:5 and Colossians 2:8 warn

believers to examine their thought life carefully to guard

against being taken prisoner by philosophical presuppositions

that are hostile to the Bible. One can either take thoughts

captive or have their thought life taken captive to the detriment

of their spiritual lives. One place in particular where

conservative evangelicals have been taken captive is in the

historical-critical discipline of source criticism. The

predominant view of the early church was that the Gospels

were four independent witnesses to the life of Christ.

Starting around the A. D. 1600-1700s, there occurred a

philosophical and ideological shift in thinking about the origin

of the Gospels, particularly in relationship to Synoptic Gospels.

Due to the rise of Rationalism, Deism, Skepticism, the

Enlightenment, and Romanticism (to name a few), the

Independence approach was rejected and two qualitatively

different approaches in explaining the Gospels resulted: the

Two-Gospel hypothesis and Two-Source hypothesis. A careful

investigation reveals that both approaches stemmed from the

same errancy roots as modern unorthodox views of inspiration.

Because of the history and philosophy behind source criticism,

when evangelicals adopt either approach in their interpretation

of the Gospels, they automatically tap into these errancy roots

that inevitably lead to deprecating the historicity of the

Gospels."

94. Farrer, Austin M. 1954. Saint Matthew and Saint Mark.

Westminster: Dacre Press.

95. ———. 1985. "On Dispensing with Q." In The Two-Source

Hypothesis: A Critical Appraisal, edited by Bellinzoni Jr.,

Arthur J., 321-356. Macon: Mercer University Press.

Reprint from D. E. Nineham (ed.), Studies in the Gospels:

Essays in Memory of R. H. Lightfoot, Oxford: Blackwell 1955,

pp. 55-88.

96. Fee, Gordon D. 1978. "Modern Text Criticism and the Synoptic

Problem." In J. J. Griesbach: Synoptic and Text-Critical

Studies, 1776-1976, edited by Orchard, Bernard and Longstaff,

Thomas R. W., 154-169. Cambridge: Cambridge University

Press.

"That there is an interrelationship between textual criticism

and the Synoptic Problem is the presupposition of most

Synoptic studies. Nonetheless the specific nature of that

relationship, especially as it affects the

finding of solutions, is seldom spelled out, and, it would seem,

is frequently neglected. This present paper is an attempt,

partially at least, to fill up that lacuna.

As far as I know, the last comprehensive study which took both

disciplines (textual and Synoptic criticism) seriously as being

interrelated in arriving at solutions was B. H. Streeter's

monumental The Four Gospels

(1924). The first two large sections of his book were entitled

'The Manuscript Tradition' and 'The Synoptic Problem'. I may

be pardoned for borrowing this Gattung for my paper. In part I,

some suggestions are

offered as to what 'modern textual criticism' means, by

overviewing some recent work on method. Since I am part of

the debate in this area, I can scarcely be expected to achieve

objectivity! But I do hope I have been fair to all, and have

touched on the essential issues. In part II, I offer some general

observations on the chief area of interrelationship, the problem

of harmonization/dis-harmonization. The illustrations in this

section are basically concerned with the resolution of textual

questions." (p. 154)

97. ———. 1980. "A Text-Critical Look at the Synoptic Problem."

Novum Testamentum no. 22:12-28.

Reprinted in: David E. Orton (ed.), The Synoptic Problem and

Q: Selected Studies from Novum Testamentum, Leiden: Brill,

1999, pp. 163-179.

98. ———. 1993. "Modern Textual Criticism and the Synoptic

Problem: On the Problem of Harmonization in the Gospels." In

Studies in the Theory and Method of New Testament Textual

Criticism, edited by Epp, Eldon Jay and Fee, Gordon D., 174-

182. Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans.

Bibliographia. Annotated bibliographies

Raul Corazzon || rc@ontology.co || Info

Synoptic Problem: Bibliography of

the main studies in English from

1964 (Fit - Gou)

Studies on the Synoptic Problem

1. Fitzmyer, Joseph A. 1970. "The Priority of Mark and the 'Q'

Source in Luke." In Jesus and Man's Hope. Volume 1, edited by

Buttrick, D. G., 131-170. Pittsburgh: Pittsburgh Theological

Seminary.

2. ———. 1985. "The Priority of Mark." In The Two-Source

Hypothesis: A Critical Appraisal, edited by Bellinzoni Jr.,

Arthur J., 63-75. Macon: Mercer University Press.

Reprint of Donald G. Miller (ed.), Jesus and Man's Hope,

Pittsburgh: Pittsburgh Theological Seminary, 1970, Volume 1,

pp. 134-147 and 164-166.

3. ———. 1985. "Luke Use of Q." In The Two-Source Hypothesis:

A Critical Appraisal, edited by Bellinzoni Jr., Arthur J. Macon:

Mercer University Press.

Reprint of Donald G. Miller (ed.), Jesus and Man's Hope,

Pittsburgh: Pittsburgh Theological Seminary, 1970, Volume 1,

pp. 147-156.

4. Fleddermann, Harry T. 1995. Mark and Q: A Study of the

Overlap Texts. Leuven: Leuven University Press / Peeters.

With an assessment by Frans Neirynck, pp. 261-307.

5. ———. 2003. "Mid-Level Techniques in Luke's Redaction of Q."

Ephemerides Theologicae Lovanienses no. 79:53-71.

6. ———. 2005. Q: A Reconstruction and Commentary. Leuven:

Peeters.

7. ———. 2008. "The Doublets in Luke." Ephemerides

Theologicae Lovanienses no. 84:409-444.

8. ———. 2012. "The Plot of Q." Ephemerides Theologicae

Lovanienses no. 88:43-69.

Abstrac t: "This essay addresses two questions: (1) Is Q a

narrative?, and (2) Is Q a narrative gospel? Both questions

receive an affirmative answer as Q has all the essential

characteristics of a narrative, including an identifiable plot, and

all the essential elements of a gospel. The author of Q develops

the plot of Q in a series of dialogues and speeches. The five

dialogues in Q provide a symbolic presentation of the

transformation Jesus undergoes in the crucifixion and

resurrection and arange of reactions to this tranformation. The

speeches of Q unfold the four dimensions of the revelation

contained in the transformation: (1) The disclosure of Jesus as

the end-time savior and judge, (2) The revelation of a new way

of living through absolute faith in God to the exclusion of any

concern for the Self, (3) The revelation of a new radical ethic of

love, and (4) The disclosure of a new understanding of

community as a radical religious and economic democracy."

9. ———. 2016. "Matthew's Sources." In An Early Reader of Mark

and Q, edited by Van Belle, Gilbert and Verheyden, Joseph, 1-

43. Leuven: Peeters.

10. Focant, Camille. 1993. The Synoptic Gospels: Source Criticism

and the New Literary Criticism. Leuven: Leuven University

Press / Peeters.

11. Foster, Lewis A. 1964. "The "Q" Myth in Synoptic Studies."

Bulletin of the Evangelical Theological Society no. 7:111-119.

12. Foster, Paul. 2003. "Is it possible to dispense with Q?" Novum

Testamentum no. 45:313-337.

13. ———. 2011. "The M-Source. Its History and Demise in Biblical

Scholarship." In New Studies in the Synoptic Problem: Oxford

Conference, April 2008: Essays in Honour of Christopher M.

Tuckett edited by Foster, Paul, Gregory, Andrew F.,

Kloppenborg, John S. and Verheyden, Joseph, 591-616.

Leuven: Peeters.

14. ———. 2013. "Is Q a "Jewish Christian" Document?" Biblica no.

94:368-394.

15. ———. 2020. "The Rise and Development of the Farrer

Hypothesis." In The Q Hypothesis Unveiled: Theological,

Sociological, and Hermeneutical Issues Behind the Sayings

Source, edited by Tiwald, Markus, 86-128. Stuttgart:

Kohlhammer.

"During the period from the 1960s until the 1990s it is fair to

say that the major rival alternative to the widely accepted two-

source theory was the Griesbach hypothesis, or perhaps more

correctly the neo-Griesbach hypothesis. In no small part, due to

the indefatigable stream of publications and presentations from

W.R. Farmer and his energetic band of supporters,(1) the neo-

Griesbach hypothesis gained a prominence which was probably

disproportionate to its numerical support. The basic tenet of

this theory was that the Gospel of Mark was the last of the three

synoptic gospels to be composed, and that it was the result of

the conflation of the Matthean and I.ukan accounts. In the

contemporary period support for this theory appears to have

quite literally ‘died out’. With the deaths of the major

proponents of this theory of synoptic relationships, and the

failure of this hypothesis to have attracted new defenders, there

appears to be few if any advocates for this solution. Moreover,

no significant publications in support of the neo-Griesbach

hypothesis have appeared during the last couple of decades.

This demise of the neo-Griesbach hypothesis has not, however,

resulted in an upsurge of support for the two-source theory.

The decrease in support for Farmer’s ideas has coincided with a

notable increase in support for the Farrer hypothesis (FH), or,

as some prefer, the Mark without Q theory (MwQ). The primary

figure associated with this synoptic solution, Austin Farrer,

presented his major statement in defence of the basic claims of

the theory prior to Farmer’s work on the neo-Griesbach

hypothesis.(2) Its two basic tenets are the defence of Markan

priority, and in place of the Q hypothesis the claim that Luke

made direct use of the Gospel of Matthew as a source for the

material that is shared uniquely by Matthew and Luke (the so-

called double tradition material). Farrer’s work attracted some

limited support in the period from the 1950s to the 1980s.

However, growth in support became more widespread from the

1990s onwards, to the extent that it might now be correctly

seen as the current major rival proposal to the two-source

theory, which still remains the most widely accepted and

preferred solution to the synoptic problem.

In this discussion, the development and emergence of the

Farrer hypothesis will be traced from its antecedents to the

current form of this synoptic solution theory. An attempt will

also be made to account for this rise in popularity of the variant

forms of this hypothesis, and an assessment will be made of its

impact on synoptic gospels scholarship and possible future

trajectories in the discussion surrounding the Farrer

hypothesis." (pp. 86-87)

(1) Perhaps Farmer’s most influential publication on the topic

was Farmer, Synoptic Problem.

(2) See Farrer, On Dispensing with Q, 55-88.

16. Foster, Paul, Gregory, Andrew F., Kloppenborg, John S., and

Verheyden, Joseph, eds. 2011. New Studies in the Synoptic

Problem: Oxford Conference, April 2008: Essays in Honour of

Christopher M. Tuckett Leuven: Peeters.

Table of Contents: Preface VII; David R. Catchpole:

Christopher M. Tuckett: An Appreciation XIII; Publications

XiX; John S. Kloppenborg: Introduction 1;

PART I

Christopher M. Tuckett: The Current State of the Synoptic

Problem 9; John S. Kloppenborg: Synopses and the Synoptic

Problem 51; Andrew Gregory: What Is Literary Dependence?

87; Peter M. Head: Textual Criticism and the Synoptic Problem

115;

PART II

D.B. Peabody: Reading Mark from the Perspectives of Different

Synoptic Source Hypotheses: Historical, Redactional and

Theological Implications 159; D.C. Sim: Matthew and the

Synoptic Problem 187; John C. Poirier: The Composition of

Luke in Source-Critical Perspective 209; M. Eugene Boring:

The “Minor Agreements” and Their Bearing on the Synoptic

Problem 227; Robert H. Stein: Duality in Mark 253; Mark

Goodacre:

The Evangelists’ Use of the Old Testament and the Synoptic

Problem 281; Duncan Reid: Miracle Stories and the Synoptic

Problem 299; Charles W. Hedrick: The Parables and the

Synoptic Problem 321; William R.G. Loader: Attitudes to

Judaism and the Law and Synoptic Relations 347; William E.

Arnal: The Synoptic Problem and the Historical Jesus 371;

PART III

Robert A. Derrenbacker, Jr.: The “External and Psychological

Conditions under Which the Synoptic Gospels Were Written”:

Ancient Compositional Practices and the Synoptic Problem

435; Alan Kirk: Memory, Scribal Media, and the Synoptic

Problem 459; Alex Damm: Ancient Rhetoric and the Synoptic

Problem 483; Dennis R. MacDonald: The Synoptic Problem

and Literary Mimesis: The Case of the Frothing Demoniac 509;

F. Gerald Downing: Writers’ Use or Abuse of Written Sources

523;

PART IV

Eric C.S. Eve: The Synoptic Problem without Q? 551; Ulrich

Luz: Looking at Q through the Eyes of Matthew 571; Paul

Foster: The M-Source: Its History and Demise in Biblical

Scholarship 591; J. Verheyden: Proto-Luke, and What Can

Possibly Be Made of It 617;

PART V

Richard Bauckham: The Gospel of John and the Synoptic

Problem 657; Andreas Lindemann: The Apostolic Fathers and

the Synoptic Problem 689; Dieter Lührmann: Übrige

„apokryph gewordene“ Evangelien und das synoptische

Problem 721; Judith Lieu: Marcion and the Synoptic Problem

731; Scott G. Brown: The Longer Gospel of Mark and the

Synoptic Problem 753; Stephen J. Patterson: The Gospel of

(Judas) Thomas and the Synoptic Problem 783; Udo Schnelle:

Die synoptische Frage in der Geschichte der neueren

protestantischen Theologie 809; Kathleen E. Corley: White

Male Dominance of Synoptic Gospel Research and the Creative

Process 831; Christopher Rowland: Another Perspective on the

“Synoptic” Problem 845;

Abbreviations 857; Bibliography 859;

INDEXES

Index of Names 915; Index of Biblical References 930; Index of

Other References 959.

17. Franklin, Eric. 1994. Luke: Interpreter of Paul, Critic of

Matthew. Sheffield: JSOT Press.

18. Friedrichsen, Timothy A. 1989. "The Minor Agreements of

Matthew and Luke against Mark. Critical Observations on R. B.

Vinson's Statistical Analysis." Ephemerides Theologicae

Lovanienses no. 65:397-408.

19. ———. 1989. "The Matthew-Luke Agreements against Mark: A

Survey of Recent Studies: 1974 - 1989." In L'Évangile de Luc =

The Gospel of Luke : Revised and enlarged edition of

L'Évangile de Luc : problèmes Littéraires et théologiques,

edited by Neirynck, Frans, 335-391. Leuven: Leuven University

Press / Peeters.

20. ———. 1992. "'Minor' and 'Major' Matthew-Luke Agreements

Against Mk 4,30-32." In The Four Gospels 1992: Festschrift

Frans Neirynck. Volume I, edited by van Segbroeck, Frans,

Tuckett, Christopher M., van Belle, Gilbert and Verheyden,

Joseph, 649-676. Leuven: Leuven University Press / Peeters

Leuven.

21. ———. 1993. "Alternative Synoptic Theories on Mk 4,30-32." In

The Synoptic Gospels: Source Criticism and the New Literary

Criticism, edited by Focant, Camille and Neirynck, Frans, 427-

450. Leuven: Leuve University Press.

22. ———. 1996. "Luke 9:22: A Matthean Foreign Body?"

Ephemerides Theologicae Lovanienses no. 72:398-407.

Abstract: "In a lengthy article on “Matthean Foreign Bodies”

(1992) Robert H. Gundry pulls together strands of the

argument in his commentary on Matthew that some minor

agreements of Matthew and Luke against Mark represent

subsidiary influence of Matthew on Luke's use of his primary

sources, Mark and Q. F. Neirynck has already engaged in a

lively exchange with Gundry concerning the minor agreements

in the Great Commandment pericope (Lk 10,25-28). The

purpose of this note is to respond to Gundry's continued

defense of Matthean influence on Lk 9,22, with special

attention to his rejoinders to the brief article on which Neirynck

and I collaborated."

23. ———. 2001. "The Parable of the Mustard Seed: Mark 4,30-32

and Q 13,18-19. A Surrejoinder for Independence."

Ephemerides Theologicae Lovanienses no. 77:297-317.

24. ———. 2003. "A Note on the Lamp Saying, Mk 4,21 and Q

11,33." Ephemerides Theologicae Lovanienses no. 79:423-430.

Abstract: "Mk 4,21, the saying on the lamp, has a direct Lucan

parallel in Lk 8,16; a variant form appears in Lk 11,33 parallel

Mt 5,15, which is considered a Q-version of the saying. Among

other Mark–Q overlaps, H.T. Fleddermann proposes that here

Mark uses and redacts Q for his text1. In this note, we will

present Fleddermann’s argument and show why he has not

demonstrated his position, concluding that it is more probable

that the lamp saying in Mk 4,21 is independent from Q 11,33."

25. ———. 2004. "What Is Hidden Will Be Revealed. A Note on the

Independence of Mk 4,22 and Q 12,2." Ephemeriudes

Theologicae Lovanienses no. 80:439-444.

Abstract: "This note first provides an overview of the

presentation of H.T. Fleddermann's proposal (Mark and Q,

BETL 122, Leuven, 1995, esp. pp. 81-84) that the saying in Mk

4,22, concerning "what is hidden will be revealed", is Mark's

redaction of Q 12,2. The note then critiques his methodology as

insufficient for establishing Mark's dependence on Q 12,2 (this

note follows the author's similar treatment of the Lamp Saying,

Mk 4,21 and Q 11,33, in ETL 79 [2003] 423-430). First,

Fleddermann's proposal requires that Mark take the saying of

Q 12,2 out of its own logical context and attach it somewhat

uncomfortably to the saying on the lamp in Mk 4,21. More

specifically, the proposed Marcan redaction of Q 12,2 results in

three hapax legomena in one verse, which is highly improbable.

The article thus demonstrates that the independence of Mk

4,22 and Q 12,2 is a better understanding of these respective

forms of the saying."

26. ———. 2005. "The Measure: Mk 4,24cd and Q 6,38c; 12,31b. A

Note on Its Independence from Q." Ephemerides Theologicae

Lovanienses no. 81:186-196.

27. ———. 2006. "“To One Who Has…": Mk 4,25 (Mt 25,29; Lk

19,26). A Note on the Independence of Mk 4,25 from Q 19,26

and on the Sayings Cluster of Mk 4,21-25." Ephemerides

Theologicae Lovanienses no. 82:165-173.

28. Frye, Roland Mushat. 1978. "The Synoptic Problems and

Analogies in Other Literatures." In The Relationships Among

the Gospels. An Interdisciplinary Dialogue, edited by Walker,

William O., 261-302. San Antonio: Trinity University Press.

29. Fuller, Reginald H. 1978. "Baur Versus Hilgenfeld: A Forgotten

Chapter in the Debate on the Synoptic Problem." New

Testament Studies no. 24:355-370.

"William R. Farmer's history of the debate on the Synoptic

Problem contains the following footnote:

Baur answered Hilgenfeld in his Das Markusevangelium,

Tübingen, 1851, and the two carried on the debate for years in

the Theologische Jahrbücher. This debate is worthy of

thorough analysis and evaluation.(1)

When I was invited to read a paper at this year's meeting at

Tübingen with the understanding that the paper should deal if

possible with some aspect of the work of the Tübingen school of

the mid-nineteenth century, this seemed to be an appropriate

occasion to take up Professor Farmer's challenge." (p. 355)

(...)

"What can we learn of value for the discussion of the relations

between the gospels today? First, it confirms the point made by

E. P. Sanders(5) that most of the arguments for the priority of

one gospel over another are reversible.

To that I would add, that the direction in which you take them

depends largely if not entirely on your Blick - the view you have

already adopted on the relations between the gospels. There is

however one non-reversible criterion which emerges from this

debate. It appeared in Hilgenfeld's argument that the

dependence of one gospel upon another is demonstrated when

Tendenz material from the earlier gospel survives in the later. If

Luke's Tendenz shows up in Mark and if Mark does not share

that Tendenz, it would be a clear sign of Mark's dependence on

Luke. Today we would substitute the concept of' redaction' for

Tendenz. But even this criterion has to be applied with caution,

otherwise the argument becomes circular. A gospel's redaction

must be determined without recourse to a synoptic theory

already presupposed.(1a) That calls into question much of the

redactional study that has been done in recent years on

Matthew and on Luke. It is indeed ironic that the

Tendenzkritik, for which the Tübingen school has been so

notorious, at least in the English-speaking world, should have

led them to contribute a criterion of permanent value to the

discussion of the relation between the gospels today." (pp. 369-

370)

(1) W. R. Farmer, The Synoptic Problem (Dillsboro: WNC,

21976), p. 30, n. 50.

(5) E. P. Sanders, The Tendencies of the Synoptic Tradition

(SNTS Monograph 9; Cambridge, 1969

(1a) This is not meant to exclude a comparison of the parallels

in the other gospels, a procedure necessary to expose what is

unique to and characteristic of the gospel which is being

studied.

30. Funk, Robert W. 1985. New Gospel Parallels. Volume 2: John

and the Other Gospels. Philadelphia: Fortress.

31. ———. 1985. New Gospel Parallels: Volume 1: Mark. Sonoma:

Polebridge.

32. Gamba, Giuseppe Giovanni. 1983. "A Further Reexamination of

Evidence from the Early tradition." In New Synoptic Studies:

The Cambridge Gospel Conference and Beyond, edited by

Farmer, William R., 17-35. Macon: Mercer University Press.

33. Garrow, Alan J. P. 2004. The Gospel of Matthew's Dependence

on the Didache. New York: T & T Clark International.

34. ———. 2016. "Streeter’s ‘Other’ Synoptic Solution: The Matthew

Conflator Hypothesis." New Testament Studies no. 62:207-

226.

35. ———. 2016. "An Extant Instance of ‘Q’." New Testament

Studies no. 62:398-417.

36. ———. 2020. "Plausibility, Probability, and Synoptic

Hypotheses: A Response to F. Gerald Downing." Ephemerides

Theologicae Lovanienses no. 96:131-137.

37. Garsky, Albrecht, Heil, Christoph, Hieke, Thomas, and Amon,

Josef E., eds. 1997. Documenta Q: Reconstructions of Q

Through Two Centuries of Gospel Research. Excerpted, sorted,

and evaluated: The critical edition of Q. Q 12,49-59. Children

against Parents – Judging the Time – Settling out of Court.

Leuven: Peeters.

38. Gathercole, Simon. 2012. The Composition of the Gospel of

Thomas: Original Language and Influences. Cambridge:

Cambridge University Press.

39. ———. 2018. "The Alleged Anonymity of the Canonical

Gospels." The Journal of Theological Studies no. 69:447-476.

40. Gerhardsson, Birger. 1998. Memory and Manuscript: Oral

Tradition and Written Transmission in Rabbinic Judaism and

Early Christianity. With Tradition and Transmission in Early

Christianity. Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans.

Foreword by Jacob Neusner.

41. Goguel, Maurice. 1933. "Luke and Mark: With a Discussion of

Streeter's Theory." The Harvard Theological Review no. 26:1-

55.

42. Goodacre, Mark S. 1996. Goulder and the Gospels: An

Examination of a New Paradigm. Sheffield: Sheffield

Academic Press.

An Examination of a New Paradigm.

43. ———. 1998. "Fatigue in the Synoptics." New Testament

Studies no. 44:45-48.

Abstract: "Matthew and Luke sometimes write versions of

Marcan pericopae in which they make initial changes, only to

lapse into the thought or wording of the original. Clear

examples are Matt 14.1-12 II Mark 6.14-29 (Death of John);

Matt 8.1-411 Mark 1.40-5 (Leper); Matt 12.46-5011 Mark 3.31-5

(Mother and Brothers); Luke 8.4-1511 Mark 4.1-20 (Sower);

Luke 5.17-2611 Mark 2.1-12 (Paralytic) and Luke 9.10-1711

Mark 6.30-44 (Five Thousand), all of which make good sense

on the theory of Marcan Priority. 'Fatigue' may also suggest a

solution to the problem of double tradition material: Luke 9.1-6

(cf. Matt 10.5-15, Mission Charge) and Luke 19.11-2711 Matt

25.14-30 (Talents) both make good sense on the theory of

Luke's use of Matthew."

44. ———. 1999. "Beyond the Q Impasse or Down a Blind Alley?"

Journal for the Study of the New Testament no. 76:33-52.

45. ———. 2000. "The Synoptic Jesus and the Celluloid Christ:

Solving the Synoptic Problem though Film." Journal for the

Study of the New Testament no. 80:31-43.

46. ———. 2000. "A Monopoly on Marcan Priority? Fallacies at the

Heart of Q." Society of Biblical Literature Seminar Papers

2000:583-622.

47. ———. 2001. The Synoptic Problem: A Way Through the Maze.

London: T & T Clark.

48. ———. 2002. The Case against Q: Studies in Markan Priority

and the Synoptic Problem. Harrisburg: Trinity Press

International.

49. ———. 2003. "On Choosing and Using Appropriate Analogies:

A Response to F. Gerald Downing." Journal for the Study of the

New Testament no. 26:237-240.

50. ———. 2004. "A World without Q." In Questioning Q: A

Multidimensional Critique, edited by Goodacre, Mark S. and

Perrin, Nicholas, 174-179. Downers Grove: InterVarsity Press.

51. ———. 2004. "When Is a Text Not a Text? The Quasi Text-

Critical Approach of the International Q Project." In

Questioning Q: A Multidimensional Critique, edited by

Goodacre, Mark S. and Perrin, Nicholas, 115-126. Downers

Grove: InterVarsity Press.

52. ———. 2011. "The Synoptic Problem: John the Baptist and

Jesus." In Method and Meaning: Essays on New Testament

Interpretation in Honor of Harold W. Attridge, edited by

McGowan, Andrew B. and Richards, Kent Harold, 177-192.

Atlanta: Society of Biblical Literature.

53. ———. 2011. "The Evangelists' Use of the Old Testament and

the Synoptic Problem." In New Studies in the Synoptic

Problem: Oxford Conference, April 2008: Essays in Honour of

Christopher M. Tuckett edited by Foster, Paul, Gregory,

Andrew F., Kloppenborg, John S. and Verheyden, Joseph, 281-

298. Leuven: Peeters.

54. ———. 2012. Thomas and the Gospels: The Case for Thomas's

Familiarity with the Synoptics. Grand Rapids (MI): Eerdmans.

55. ———. 2012. "Criticizing the Criterion of Multiple Attestation:

The Historical Jesus and the Question of Sources." In Jesus,

Criteria, and the Demise of Authenticity, edited by Keith, Chris

and Le Donne, Anthony, 152-169. London: T & T Clark.

56. ———. 2014. "A Flaw in McIver and Carroll’s Experimentsto

Determine Written Sources in the Gospels." Journal of Biblical

Literature no. 133:793-800.

57. ———. 2014. "Did Thomas Know the Synoptic Gospels? A

Response to Denzey Lewis, Kloppenborg and Patterson."

Journal for the Study of the New Testament no. 36:282-293.

58. ———. 2015. "Too Good to Be Q: High Verbatim Agreement in

the Double Tradition." In Marcan Priority Without Q:

Explorations in the Farrer Hypothesis, edited by Poirier, John

C. and Peterson, Jeffrey, 82-100. London: T & T Clark.

"It is a fact seldom acknowledged that the double tradition

material in Matthew and Luke shows a remarkably high degree

of verbatim agreement.

It is a fact still more rarely acknowledged that the high

verbatim agreement makes best sense if Luke is copying from

Matthew. The issue is surprisingly straightforward, and yet it is

almost always missed in

discussions of the Synoptic Problem. Where two documents

show very close agreement in wording in parallel passages, the

best explanation is that one is copying directly from the other,

not that both are copying

from a hypothetical third document. Where two documents are

copying from a third, we should not expect to see the kind of

high verbatim agreement that we often see in the double

tradition. The evidence

suggests that Luke had direct contact with Matthew, and this

entails dispensing with Q." (p. 82)

59. ———. 2016. "Re-Walking the "Way of the Lord": Luke's Use of

Mark and His Reaction to Matthew." In Luke's Literary

Creativity, edited by Nielsen, Jesper Tang and Müller, Mogens,

26-43. New York: Bloomsbury.

60. ———. 2016. "Farrer Hypothesis Response." In The Synoptic

Problem: Four Views, edited by Porter, Stanley E. and Dyer,

Bryan R., 127-138. Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic.

61. ———. 2016. "The Farrer Hypothesis." In The Synoptic

Problem: Four Views, edited by Porter, Stanley E. and Dyer,

Bryan R., 47-66. Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic.

62. ———. 2017. "Q, Memory and Matthew: A Response to Alan

Kirk." Journal for the Study of the Historical Jesus no. 15:224-

233.

63. ———. 2018. "Taking Our Leave of Mark-Q Overlaps: Major

Agreemnts and the Farrer Theory." In Gospel Interpretation

and the Q-Hypothesis, edited by Müller, Mogens and Omerzu,

Keike, 201-222. New York: Bloomsbury.

64. Goodacre, Mark S., and Perrin, Nicholas, eds. 2004.

Questioning Q: A Multidimensional Critique. Downers Grove:

InterVarsity Press.

Contents: List of tables VIII; N. T. Wright: Foreword IX;

Abbreviations XIII; Nicholas Perrin: Introduction: Reasons for

Questioning Q 1; John C. Poirier: The Q Hypothesis and the

Role of Pre-Synoptic Sources in Nineteenth-Century

Scholarship 13; Jeffrey Peterson: Order in the Double Tradition

and the Existence of Q 28; Mark A. Matson: Luke s Rewriting of

the Sermon on the Mount 43; Nicholas Perrin: The Limits of a

Reconstructed Q 71; Eric Eve: Reconstructing Mark: A Thought

Experiment 89; Mark Goodacre: When Is a Text Not a Text?

The Quasi Text-Critical Approach of the International Q Project

115; Ken Olson: Unpicking on the Farrer Theory 127; Richard

Vinson: How Minor? Assessing the Significance of the Minor

Agreements as an Argument against the Two-Source

Hypothesis 151; Nicholas Perrin: Some Implications of

Dispensing with Q 165; Mark Goodacre: A World without Q

174; Bibliography 181; Index of Ancient and Biblical Texts 191;

Index of Modern Authors 198-201.

65. Gorman, Heather M. 2015. "Crank or Creative Genius? How

Ancient Rhetoric Makes Sense of Luke's Order." In Marcan

Priority Without Q: Explorations in the Farrer Hypothesis,

edited by Poirier, John C. and Peterson, Jeffrey, 62-81. London:

T & T Clark.

"Conclusion

In sum, with the help of the ancient rhetorical tradition, I have

demonstrated that Luke's narrative is indeed orderly, just as he

claims. This proves true on a macro scale insomuch as Luke

arranges his material sequentially according to the topics listed

in the progymnasmata. On a micro scale, I have also shown

that if Luke did indeed use Matthew as a source for his SOP

[Sermon of the Plain], such redaction would have made sense

on ancient rhetorical grounds. His rearrangements and

omissions of Matthaean material would be justified in light of

his larger concerns for clarity, brevity, and plausibility.

What implications does this study have for source criticism of

the gospels? Perhaps one of the strongest criticisms launched

against the FH has been aimed at Luke's order.

(...)

"The above clarification of the rhetorical principles on which

Luke ordered his narrative suggests that there is less need to

invoke Q to account for Luke's sequence. This study, of course,

does not prove that Luke used Matthew, but it does make the

FH that much more probable. While there are still problems to

be solved regarding the sources of the Synoptics and their

relationship to one another, this study has done at least two

things: (1) it has removed a significant obstacle for proponents

of the FH by showing Luke's order is justifiable on rhetorical

grounds, and (2) it suggests that rhetorical analysis may be a

profitable way forward in source-critical studies of the gospels."

(pp. 80-81, a note omitted)

66. Goulder, Michael D. 1974. Midrash and Lection in Matthew.

London: London.

The Speaker's Lectures in Biblical Studies 1969-71.

Reprint: Eugene, OR: Wipf & Stock, 2004.

67. ———. 1978. "On putting Q to the Test." New Testament

Studies no. 24:218-234.

68. ———. 1978. The Evangelists' Calendar: A Lectionary

Explanation of the Development of Scripture. London: SPCK.

69. ———. 1980. "Farrer on Q." Theology no. 83:190-195.

70. ———. 1984. "Some observations on Professor Farmer's

'Certain Results...'." In Synoptic Studies: The Ampleforth

Conferences of 1982 and 1983, edited by Tuckett, Christopher

M., 99-104. Sheffield: JSOT Press.

71. ———. 1984. "The Order of a Crank." In Synoptic Studies: The

Ampleforth Conferences of 1982 and 1983, edited by Tuckett,

Christopher M., 111-130. Sheffield: JSOT Press.

72. ———. 1985. "A House Built on Sand." In Alternative

Approaches to New Testament Study, edited by Harvey,

Anthony Ernest, 1-24. London: SPCK.

73. ———. 1989. Luke: A New Paradigm. Sheffield: Sheffield

Academic Press.

74. ———. 1993. "Luke's Knowledge of Matthew." In Minor

Agreements: Symposium Göttingen 1991, edited by Strecker,

Georg, 143-162. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht.

75. ———. 1993. "Luke's Compositional Options." New Testament

Studies no. 29:150-152.

76. ———. 1994. "The Pre-Marcan Gospel." Scottish Journal of

Theology no. 47:453-472.

77. ———. 1996. "Is Q a Juggernaut?" Journal of Biblical

Literature no. 115:667-681.

78. ———. 1999. "Self-Contradiction in the IQP." Journal of

Biblical Literature no. 118:506-517.

79. ———. 2002. "The Derrenbacker-Kloppenborg Defense."

Journal of Biblical Literature no. 121:331-336.

80. ———. 2003. "Two Significant Minor Agreements (Mat. 4:13

Par.; Mat. 26:67-68 Par.)." Novum Testamentum no. 45:365-

373.

81. ———. 2009. Five Stones and a Sling: Memoirs of a Biblical

Scholar. Sheffield: Sheffield Phoenix Press.

Chapter 13: The Synoptic Problem, pp. 69-76.

Bibliographia. Annotated bibliographies

Raul Corazzon || rc@ontology.co || Info

Synoptic Problem: Bibliography of

the main studies in English from

1964 (Gre - Klo)

Studies on the Synoptic Problem

1. Green, H. Benedict. 1984. "The Credibility of Luke's

Transformation of Matthew." In Synoptic Studies: The

Ampleforth Conferences of 1982 and 1983, edited by Tuckett,

Christopher M., 131-156. Sheffield: JSOT Press.

2. ———. 1984. "Matthew 12.22-50 and Parallels: An Alternative

to Matthean Conflation." In Synoptic Studies: The Ampleforth

Conferences of 1982 and 1983, edited by Tuckett, Christopher

M., 157-176. Sheffield: JSOT Press.

3. ———. 1989. "Matthew, Clement and Luke: their Sequence and

Relationship." The Journal of Theological Studies no. 40:1-25.

4. Greenberg, Gary. 2020. The Case for a Proto-Gospel:

Recovering the Common Written Source Behind Mark and

John. New York: Peter Lang.

5. Gregory, Andrew. 2011. "What Is Literary Dependence?" In

New Studies in the Synoptic Problem: Oxford Conference,

April 2008: Essays in Honour of Christopher M. Tuckett

edited by Foster, Paul, Gregory, Andrew F., Kloppenborg, John

S. and Verheyden, Joseph, 87-114. Leuven: Peeters.

6. Griesbach, Johann Jakob. 1978. "A demonstration that Mark

was written after Matthew and Luke." In J. J. Griesbach:

Synoptic and Text-Critical Studies, 1776-1976, edited by

Orchard, Bernard and Longstaff, Thomas R. W., 103-135.

Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

A translation of J. J. Griesbach's Commentatio qua Marci

Evangelium totum e Matthaei et Lucae commentariis

decerptum esse monstratur (1789, revised 1794) by Bernard

Orchard.

7. Gundry, Robert H. 1992. "Matthean Foreign Bodies in

Agreements of Luke with Matthew against Mark Evidence that

Luke Used Matthew." In The Four Gospels 1992: Festschrift

Frans Neirynck. Volume II, edited by van Segbroeck, Frans,

Tuckett, Christopher M., van Belle, Gilbert and Verheyden,

Joseph, 1467-1495. Leuven: Leuven University Press / Peeters.

8. ———. 1995. " A Rejoinder On Matthean Foreign Bodies in

Luke 10,25-28." Ephemerides Theologicae Lovanienses no.

71:139-150.

9. ———. 1999. "The Refusal of Matthean Foreign Bodies to Be

Exorcised from Luke 9,22; 10, 25-28." Ephemerides

Theologicae Lovanienses no. 75:104-22.

10. Günther, Heinz O. 1991. "The Sayings Gospel Q and the Quest

for Aramaic Sources: Rethinking Christian Origins." Semeia no.

55:41-76.

Abstract: "The assumption that a productive and vital Aramaic

tradition gave rise to early Christianity has haunted critical

New Testament scholarship since its inception some 200 years

ago. The traditional image of Christianity's birth in the

Aramaic-speaking milieu of Palestine, together with the idea of

the church's gradual expansion into the Hellenistic world, has

made scholarship search unabatingly for Q's Aramaic

ancestors. Fanciful translation hypotheses, prompted by Q's

Semitisms and its LXXal style, are coupled in the literature

with speculations about the transformation of Q's early

apocalyptic outlook on history into a manual of sapiential

instructions intended to shape Mediterranean life and culture.

A closer comparison of the arguments advanced in support of

or in opposition to this assumption reveals its problematic

nature. Studies of the evolution of Q from a compilation of

sayings into a Sayings Gospel have opened new vistas from

within the document itself. Q's portrait of Jesus as Sophia's

most trusted envoy, along with the literary devices employed by

the Q redactors to flesh out their vision of Jesus, suggests

strongly that at each stage of its evolution the document was at

home, in language and in thought, in the Hellenistic milieu of

Galilee and Syria."

11. Gupta, Nijay K. 2020. A Beginner's Guide to New Testament

Studies: Understanding Key Debates. Grand Rapids, MI: Baker

Academic.

Chapter 1. The Synoptic Problem, pp. 1-14.

12. Gustaffson, Daniel. 2016. "Luke's Rewriting of the Markan

Mélange of Christological Titles (Mark 8.27-33 par.; 12.35-37

par.; 14.55-64 par.)." In Luke's Literary Creativity, edited by

Nielsen, Jesper Tang and Müller, Mogens, 185-207. New York:

Bloomsbury.

13. Guthrie, Donald. 1990. New Testament Introduction. Downers

Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press.

Fourth revised edition (First edition 1961).

Chapter Five: The Synoptic Problem, pp. 136-208.

14. Guy, Harold H. 1972. "Did Luke Use Matthew?" The Expository

Times no. 83:245-247.

15. Hägerland, Tobias. 2019. "Editorial Fatigue and the Existence

of Q." New Testament Studies:190-206.

Abstract: "This article challenges Mark Goodacre's contention

that the distribution of editorial fatigue in Matthew and Luke

points not only to Markan priority but also to Luke's

dependence on Matthew. Goodacre's argument is criticised

through questioning the assumptions that Matthew's handling

of Q would have been analogous to his handling of Mark and to

Luke's handling of Q, as well as the claim that no instances of

editorial fatigue can be detected in Matthew's handling of the

double tradition. The conclusion is that the argument from

editorial fatigue cannot be used to establish that the existence

of Q is improbable."

16. Hagner, Donald A. 2012. The New Testament: A Historical and

Theological Introduction. Grand rapids, MI: Baker Academic.

Chapter 9: The Synoptic Problem, pp. 131-153; Chapter 10: Q as

an Entity, pp. 154-162.

17. Hamann, H. P. 1970. "Sic et Non: Are We So Sure of Matthean

Dependence on Mark?" Concordia Theological Monthly no.

41:462-469.

18. Hamilton, Catherine Sider, and Willits, Joel, eds. 2019. Writing

the Gospels: A Dialogue with Francis Watson. London: T & T

Clark.

Contents: List of Contributors IX; Preface X; Permissions XII;

Abbreviations XIII;

Catherine Sider Hamilton: Introduction: Francis Watson's

Gospel Writing and The Fourfold Gospel: engaging a "New

Paradigm" 1

Part I. Critical assessments of Gospel Writing and The Fourfold

Gospel

Chapter 1. Richard Bauckham: Gospels before normativization:

a critique of Francis Watson's Gospel Writing 17; Chapter 2.

Markus Bockmuehl: Fourfold Gospel writing 40;

Part II. Gospel writing and Gospel sources

Chapter 3. Richard A. Burridge: Ancient biography and the

development of the canonical collection 63; Chapter 4. Mark

Goodacre: What does Thomas have to do with Q? The afterlife

of a sayings Gospel 81;

Chapter 5. Jens Schroter: Gospels in the First and Second

century and the origin of the "Fourfold Gospel": a critical

appraisal of Francis Watson's Gospel Writing 90;

Part III. Gospel Writing and The Fourfold Gospel

Chapter 6. Jonathan T. Pennington: Revelatory epistemology in

the Gospel according to Matthew in dialogue w8ith Francis

Watson's "Canonical Perspective" 103; Chapter 7. Joshua W.

Jipp: Messiah language and Gospel writing 126; Chapter 8.

Catherine Sider Hamilton: Quartet for the End of Time: the

Fourfold Gospel, hitotry and Matthew's birth narrative 145;

Chapter 9. Frederik S. Mulder: Gospel contradictions,

harmonizations, and historical truth: Francis Watson and

Origen's comprehensive paradigm shift 166;

Chapter 10. Margaret M. Mitchell: Gospel optics 184; Chapter

11. Ephraim Radner: Singing the Gospels: beyond the bookish

text 206;

Part IV. Francis Watson's Response

Chapter 12. Francis Watson: A reply to my critics 227;

Bibliography 249; Index of Subjects 264; Index of Scripture

and Other Ancient Sources 268-275.

19. Harrington, Jay M. 2000. The Lukan Passion Narrative: the

Markan Material in Luke 22,54 - 23,25: a Historical Survey:

1891-1997. Leiden: Brill.

"The passion narrative has been and continues to be one of the

most studied sections of the Gospel of Luke. The problem is

that many differences exist between the Lukan account and the

passion in Mk, encompassing at times the absence of some

material and the addition of other material as well as the

difference in the order of various accounts. Our purpose is to

reexamine the use of the Markan material in Lk. In recent years

the discussion has once more focused on the question of Luke’s

sources as part of ongoing source-critical and redaction-critical

research. The issue of Luke’s use of a special source (or sources)

for his passion narrative has again generated much scholarly

debate. Consequently, some believe that the discussion has

arrived at an impasse4. Led by proponents of the new literary

criticism, a number of exegetes now prescind from source-

critical investigation, and even from any supposition

concerning sources.

Although the Lukan passion narrative has been the focus of

much analysis, no adequate history has sketched the contours

of the debate. Our goal is not only to present a recent history,

but to trace the discussion to its beginnings. We have generally

followed a combination of a chronological and systematic order

alternating between proponents and opponents of the theory of

a special source or sources. It has also been our intention to

report dependence of scholars upon one another.

The survey, covering roughly the period from the 1880’s to

1997, is divided into two major sections. The first details the

development from P. Feine through the 1960’s. The second

period begins with the work of G. Schneider and continues up

through 1997. In the treatment of each scholar’s position,

insofar as it is possible, we review their underlying Synoptic

theory, their source theory as applied to the passion in general,

then the trial of Pilate, and finally any contributions regarding

the trial before Herod. Three appendices are provided: 1)

Special LQ vocabulary and constructions according to J. Weiss,

2) Lukan priority theories, and 3) the Gospel of Peter and its

relation to the Herod pericope." (pp. XI-XII, note omitted)

20. Havener, Ivan. 1987. Q, the Sayings of Jesus: With a

reconstruction of Q by Athanasius Polag. Wimington (DE):

Glazier.

21. Hawkins, John C. 1911. "Three Limitations to St. Luke's Use of

St. Mark's Gospel." In Studies in the Synoptic Problem By

Members of The University of Oxford edited by Sanday,

William, 29-94. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

1. The Disuse of the Marcan Source in St. Luke ix. 51-xviii. 14

2. The Great Omission by St. Luke of the Matter contained in

St. Mark vi. 45-viii. 16

3. St. Luke's Passion-Narrative considere with reference to the

Synoptic Piobiem.

22. ———. 1911. "Probabilities as to the So-Called Double Tradition

of St. Matthew and St. Luke." In Studies in the Synoptic

Problem By Members of The University of Oxford edited by

Sanday, William, 95-138. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

23. Hays, Christopher. 2008. "Marcion vs. Luke: A Response to the

Plädoyer of Matthias Klinghardt." Zeitschrift für die

Neutestamentliche Wissenschaft und Kunde der Älteren Kirche

no. 99:213-232.

"Considerable mystery enfolds Marcion of Sinope, the

notorious second century heresiarch, since none of the

documents he bequeathed to history survive directly." (p. 213)

(...)

"One topic generated particularly heated debate, that of the

relation between the Gospel of Luke and the Gospel of Marcion.

Sparked by Johann Salomo Semler in 1783, the controversy

raged until 1921, when Adolf von Harnack’s magisterial

monograph reaffirmed the traditional position that Marcion

excised portions from Luke.(2) Though the alternative thesis

cropped up only sporadically during the 20th century, a small

contingent of scholars have recently reopened the question,

including the recent learned essay of Matthias Klinghardt

“Markion vs. Lukas: Plädoyer für die Wiederaufnahme eines

alten Falles.”(5)" (pp. 213-214, a note omitted)

(...)

"Though Klinghardt considers the historically broad assent to

Harnack’s later, critically grounded reaffirmation of the

position to have been prematurely dismissive (485), he has not

yet overturned Harnack’s case. The cumulative weight of

internal evidence and considerations of dating corroborate the

external testimony to Lukan priority over Marcion’s Gospel,

though whether the document which Marcion edited is

identical with the canonical Third Gospel remains a viable

question." (p. 232)

(2) A. von Harnack, Marcion: Das Evangelium vom fremden

Gott: Eine Monographie zur Geschichte der Grundlegung der

katholischen Kirche (TU 15), Leipzig 1921.

(5) M. Klinghardt, Markion vs. Lukas: Plädoyer für die

Wiederaufnahme eines alten Falles, NTS 52 (2006) 484–513.

24. Head, Peter M. 1997. Christology and the Synoptic Problem:

An Argument for Markan Priority. Cambridge: Cambridge

University Press.

25. ———. 2011. "Textual Criticism and the Synoptic Problem." In

New Studies in the Synoptic Problem. Oxford Conference,

April 2008: Essays in Honour of Christopher M. Tuckett

edited by Foster, P., Gregory, A., Kloppenborg, John S. and

Verheyden, Joseph, 115-156. Leuven: Peeters.

26. Heard, Richard. 1954. "The Aφomnhmoneymata in Papias,

Justin, and Irenaeus." New Testament Studies no. 1:122-129.

27. ———. 1954. "Papias' Quotations from the New Testament."

New Testament Studies no. 1:130-134.

28. Hedrick, Charles W. 2011. "The Parables and the Synoptic

Problem." In New Studies in the Synoptic Problem, Oxford

Conference, April 2008. Essays in Honour of Christopher M.

Tuckett, edited by Foster, Paul, Gregory, Andrew F.,

Kloppenborg, John S. and Verheyden, Joseph, 321-345.

Leuven: Peeters.

29. Henaut, Barry W. 1988. "Is Q but the Invention of Luke and

Mark? Method and Argument in the Griesbach Hypothesis."

Religious Studies and Theology no. 8:15-32.

30. Hengel, Martin. 2000. The Four Gospels and the One Gospel of

Jesus Christ: An Investigation of the Collection and Origin of

the Canonical Gospels. Harrisburg, PA: Trinity Press

International.

31. Hieke, Thomas, ed. 2001. Documenta Q: Reconstructions of Q

Through Two Centuries of Gospel Research. Excerpted, sorted,

and evaluated: Q 6:20-21. The Beatitudes for the Poor,

Hungry, Mourning. Leuven: Peeters.

32. Higgins, A. J. B. 1984. "Luke 1-2 in Tatian's Diatessaron."

Journal of Biblical Literature no. 103:193-222.

33. Hincks, Edward Y. 1891. "The Probable Use of the First Gospel

by Luke." Journal of Biblical Literature no. 10:92-106.

34. Hoard, George. 1978. "Stylistic Inversion and the Synoptic

Tradition." Journal of Biblical Literature no. 97:375-389.

35. Hobbs, Edward C. 1980. "A Quarter-Century Without "Q"."

Perkins School of Theology Journal no. 33:10-19.

36. Hobson, A. A. 1904. The Diatessaron of Tatian and the

Synoptic Problem. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Being an investigation of the Diatessron for the light which it

throws upon the solution of the problem of the origin of the

synoptic gospels.

37. Hodgson, Robert. 1985. "On the Gattung of Q: A Dialogue with

James M. Robinson." Biblica no. 66:73-95.

38. Hoffmann, Paul, Amon, Josef E., Brauner, Ulrike, Hieke,

Thomas, BBoring, M- Eugene, and Asgeirsson, Jon Ma., eds.

1997. Documenta Q: Reconstructions of Q Through Two

Centuries of Gospel Research. Excerpted, sorted, and

evaluated: Q 12:8-12. Confessing or Denying – Speaking

against the Holy Spirit – Hearings before the Synagogues.

Leuven: Peeters.

39. Hoffmann, Paul, Brandenburger, Stefan H., Brauner, Ulrike,

and Hieke, Thomas, eds. 1998. Documenta Q: Reconstructions

of Q Through Two Centuries of Gospel Research. Excerpted,

sorted, and evaluated: Q 22:28, 30: You will judge the twelve

tribes of Israel. Leuven: Peeters.

40. Holladay, Carl R. 2005. A Critical Introduction to the New

Testament: Interpreting the Message and Meaning of Jesus

Christ. Nashville: Abingdon Press.

Chapter 3: Relating the Gospels to Each Other, pp. 41-81.

41. Honoré, A. M. 1968. "A Statistical Study of the Synoptic

Problem." Novum Testamentum no. 10:95-147.

Reprinted in: David E. Orton (ed.), The Synoptic Problem and

Q: Selected Studies from Novum Testamentum, Leiden: Brill,

1999, pp. 70-122.

42. Hooker, Morna D. 1992. "The Son of Man and the Synoptic

Problem." In The Four Gospels 1992: Festschrift Frans

Neirynck. Volume I, edited by van Segbroeck, Frans, Tuckett,

Christopher M., van Belle, Gilbert and Verheyden, Joseph, 189-

201. Leuven: Leuven University Press / Peeters.

43. Horman, John. 2011. A Common Written Greek Source for

Mark & Thomas. Waterloo (On): Canadian Corporation for

Studies in Religion.

"This book uncovers an early collection of sayings, called N,

that are ascribed to Jesus and are similar to those found in the

Gospel of Thomas and in Q, a document believed to be a

common source, with Mark, for Matthew and Luke. In the

process, the book sheds light on the literary methods of Mark

and Thomas. A literary comparison of the texts of the sayings of

Jesus that appear in both Mark and Thomas shows that each

adapted an earlier collection for his own purpose. Neither Mark

nor Thomas consistently gives the original or earliest form of

the shared sayings; hence, Horman states, each used and

adapted an earlier source. Close verbal parallels between the

versions in Mark and Thomas show that the source was written

in Greek. Horman's conclusion is that this common source is N.

This proposal is new, and has implications for life of Jesus

research. Previous research on sayings attributed to Jesus has

treated Thomas in one of two ways: either as an independent

stream of Jesus sayings written without knowledge of the New

Testament Gospels or as a later piece of pseudo-Scripture that

uses the New Testament as source. This book rejects both

views."

44. Horsley, Richard A. 1999. "The Historical Context of Q." In

Whoever Hears You Hears Me: Prophets, Performance, and

Tradition in Q, edited by Horsley, Richard A. and Draper,

Jonathan A., 46-60. Harrisburg: Trinity Press International.

45. ———. 1999. "The Contours of Q." In Whoever Hears You

Hears Me: Prophets, Performance, and Tradition in Q, edited

by Horsley, Richard A. and Draper, Jonathan A., 61-93.

Harrisburg: Trinity Press International.

46. ———. 1999. "The Oral Communication Evironment of Q." In

Whoever Hears You Hears Me: Prophets, Performance, and

Tradition in Q, edited by Horsley, Richard A. and Draper,

Jonathan A., 123-149. Harrisburg: Trinity Press International.

47. ———. 1999. "Recent studies of oral-derived literature and Q."

In Whoever Hears You Hears Me: Prophets, Performance, and

Tradition in Q, edited by Horsley, Richard A. and Draper,

Jonathan A., 150-174. Harrisburg: Trinity Press International.

48. ———, ed. 2006. Oral Performance, Popular Tradition, and

Hidden Transcript in Q. Leiden: Brill.

Contents: Abbreviations VII; Richard A. Horsley: Introduction

Part One. Oral Performance and Popular Tradition in Q

Essays

Werner H. Kelber: The Verbal Art in Q and Thomas: A

Question of Epistemology 25; Richard A. Horsley: Performance

and Tradition: The Covenant Speech in Q 43; Jonathan A.

Draper: Jesus’ “Covenantal Discourse” on the Plain (Luke 6:12–

7:17) as Oral Performance: Pointers to “Q” as Multiple Oral

Performance 71;

Responses

Joanna Dewey: Response to Kelber, Horsley, and Draper 101;

Vernon K. Robbins: Oral Performance in Q: Epistemology,

Political Conflict, and Contextual Register 109; John Miles

Foley: The Riddle of Q: Oral Ancestor, Textual Precedent, or

Ideological Creation? 123;

Part Two

Moral Economy and Hidden Transcript: Applying the Work of

James C. Scott to Q

Essays

Richard A. Horsley: Moral Economy and Renewal Movement in

Q 143; Milton Moreland: The Jesus Movement in the Villages of

Roman Galilee: Archaeology, Q, and Modern Anthropological

Theory 159; Alan Kirk: Going Public with the Hidden

Transcript in Q 11: Beelzebul Accusation and the Woes 181;

Melanie Johnson-DeBaufre: Communities Resisting

Fragmentation: Q and the Work of James C. Scott 193;

Response

William R. Herzog II: The Work of James C. Scott and Q: A

Response 211;

Bibliography 217-226.

49. Horsley, Richard A., and Draper, Jonathan A. 1999. Whoever

Hears You Hears Me: Prophets, Performance and Tradition in

Q. Harrisburg: Trinity Press International.

50. Howard, George. 1978. "Stylistic Inversion and the Synoptic

Tradition." Journal of Biblical Literature:375-389.

51. Howes, L. 2015. "'Divided Against Himself'? Individuals

Maxims and the Redaction of Q." Acta Theologica no. 35:96-

114.

52. Huggins, Ronald V. 1992. "Matthean Posteriority: A

Preliminary Proposal." Novum Testamentum no. 34:1-22.

53. Hultgren, Stephen. 2002. Narrative Elements in the Double

Tradition: A Study of Their Place within the Framework of the

Gospel Narrative. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter.

54. ———. 2008. "The Apostolic Church’s Influence on the Order of

Sayings in the Double Tradition. Part I: From John the Baptist

to the Mission Discourse; and the Rest of Matthew." Zeitschrift

für die Neutestamentliche Wissenschaft und Kunde der Älteren

Kirche no. 99:185-212.

55. ———. 2009. "The Apostolic Church’s Influence on the Order of

Sayings in the Double Tradition. Part II: Luke’s Travel

Narrative." Zeitschrift für die Neutestamentliche Wissenschaft

und Kunde der Älteren Kirche no. 100:199-222.

56. Humphrey, Hugh M. 2006. From Q to "Secret" Mark: A

Composition History of the Earliest Narrative Theology. New

York: T & T Clark.

57. Jackson, Henry Latimer. 1909. "The Present State of the

Synoptic Problem." In Essays on Some Biblical Questions of

the Day, edited by Swete, Henry Barclay, 421-460. London:

Macmillan.

58. Jacobson, Arland Dean. 1982. "The Literary Unity of Q."

Journal of Biblical Literature no. 101:365-389.

Reprinted in John S. Kloppenborg (ed.), The Shape of Q:

Signal Essays on the Sayings Gospel, Minneapolis, MN:

Augsburg Fortress, 1994.

59. ———. 2005. The First Gospel: An Introduction to Q. Eugene

(OR): Wipf & Stock.

60. Jameson, H. G. 1922. The Origin of the Synoptic Gospels: A

Revision of the Synoptic Problem. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.

61. Jenkins, Geoffrey. 1994. "A Written Jerusalem Gospel Ύ":

Reflections on the Socio-Politics of the Synoptic Problem."

Pacifica no. 7:309-323.

62. Johnson, Sherman E. 1991. The Griesbach Hypothesis and

Redaction Criticism. Atlanta: Scholars Press.

63. Johnson, Steven R., ed. 2001. Documenta Q: Reconstructions

of Q Through Two Centuries of Gospel Research. Excerpted,

sorted, and evaluated: Q 7:1-10. The Centurion’s Faith in

Jesus’ Word. Leuven: Peeters.

64. ———, ed. 2007. Documenta Q: Reconstructions of Q Through

Two Centuries of Gospel Research. Excerpted, sorted, and

evaluated: Q 12:33-34. Storing Up Treasures in Heaven.

Leuven: Peeters.

65. Johnson, Steven R., Steinhauser, Michael G., and Jolliffe,

Ronald L., eds. 2014. Documenta Q: Reconstructions of Q

Through Two Centuries of Gospel Research. Excerpted, sorted,

and evaluated: Q 13:34-35. Judgment over Jerusalem.

Leuven: Peeters.

66. Jolliffe, Ronald L., Harb, Gertraud, Heil, Christoph, Felber,

Anneliese, and Magnes, Angelika, eds. 2012. Documenta Q:

Reconstructions of Q Through Two Centuries of Gospel

Research. Excerpted, sorted, and evaluated: Q 11:39a, 42, 39b,

41, 43-44. Woes against the Pharisees. Leuven: Peeters.

67. ———, eds. 2012. Documenta Q: Reconstructions of Q Through

Two Centuries of Gospel Research. Excerpted, sorted, and

evaluated: Q 11:46b, 52, 47-51. Woes against the exegetes of

the Law. Wisdoms judgment on this generation. Leuven:

Peeters.

68. Jones, Brice C. 2011. Matthean and Lukan Special Material: A

Brief Introduction with Texts in Greek and English. Eugene,

OR: Wipf & Stock.

69. Joseph, Simon J. 2012. Jesus, Q, and the Dead Sea Scrolls: A

Judaic Approach to Q. Tübingen: Moh Siebeck.

70. Kahl, Werner. 2016. "Towards a Neutral Comparison of the

Synoptic Gospels, or Minor Agreements as Misleading

Category." In Luke's Literary Creativity, edited by Nielsen,

Jesper Tang and Müller, Mogens, 79-95. New York:

Bloomsbury.

71. Kelber, Werner H. 1983. The Oral and the Written Gospel: The

Hermeneutics of Speaking and Writing in the Synoptic

Tradition, Mark, Paul, and Q. Philadelphia: Fortress Press.

Reprint: Bloomington: Indiana University Press 1997.

72. Keown, Mark. 2018. Discovering the New Testament: An

Introduction to Its Background, Theology, and Themes. Vol. 1:

The Gospels & Acts. Bellingham, WA: Lexham.

Chapter 5: The synoptic Gospels.

73. Kilpatrick, G. D. 1946. The Origins of the Gospel accoring to St.

Matthew. Oxford Oxford University Press.

74. ———. 1984. "Matthew on Matthew." In Synoptic Studies: The

Ampleforth Conferences of 1982 and 1983, edited by Tuckett,

Christopher M., 177-186. Sheffield: JSOT Press.

75. Kingsbury, Jack Dean. 1983. "The Theology of St. Matthew’s

Gospel according to the Griesbach Hypothesis." In New

Synoptic Studies: The Cambridge Gospel Conference and

Beyond, edited by Farmer, William R., 331-361. Macon: Mercer

University Press.

76. Kirk, Alan. 1998. The Composition of the Sayings Source:

Genre, Synchrony and Wisdom Redaction in Q. Leiden: Brill.

77. ———. 2011. "Memory, Scribal Media, and the Synoptic

Problem." In New Studies in the Synoptic Problem. Oxford

Conference, April 2008: Essays in Honour of Christopher M.

Tuckett edited by Foster, P., Gregory, A., Kloppenborg, John S.

and Verheyden, Joseph, 459-482. Leuven: Peeters.

78. ———. 2012. "Orality, Writing, and Phantom Sources: Appeals

to Ancient Media in Some Recent Challenges to the Two

Document Hypothesis." New Testament Studies no. 58:1-22.

79. ———. 2016. Q in Matthew: Ancient Media, Memory, and

Early Scribal Transmission of the Jesus Tradition. New York:

Bloomsbury.

80. ———. 2017. "The Synoptic Problem, Ancient Media, and the

Historical Jesus. A Response." Journal for the Study of the

Historical Jesus no. 15:234-259.

Abstract: The editors of JHJS have pulled together an ideal set

of respondents to Q in Matthew: Robert Derrenbacker and

Sarah Rollens, fellow alums of the University of Toronto

program and representatives of the so-called ‘Toronto School’

of Q scholarship, Rafael Rodríguez, Synoptic source-critical

agnostic and fellowtraveler in the world of ancient media, and

Mark Goodacre, genial champion of the Farrar-Goulder

hypothesis (fgh). I am grateful for the investment of time

evident in their responses. While their expressions of

appreciation for the work are welcome, naturally what is of

most interest are the points they raise in critique. That this is a

journal dedicated to historical Jesus research also raises the

question of why the editors have seen fit to devote an issue to

the Synoptic Problem debate. We will therefore conclude with

reflections on the significance of the memory factor in the

transmission of the Jesus tradition, as this becomes visible in

Synoptic source relations, for historical Jesus enquiry."

81. ———. 2020. "Memory, Tradition, and Synoptic Sources: The

Quest ofHoltzmann and

Wemle for a Pre-Dogma Jesus." In Theological and Theoretical

Issues in the Synoptic Problem, edited by Kloppenborg, John S.

and Verheyden, Joseph, 53-70. New York: Bloomsbury.

"A grasp of nineteenth- and early-twentieth-century

scholarship on the Synoptic Problem is indispensable for

putting our own debates in perspective. Though good surveys of

this fascinating and pioneering period are available, (1) as yet

untried angle is a media analysis - what role particular

concepts of memory, oral tradition, and the written medium

played in nineteenth-century synoptic scholarship, and just as

importantly, what was at stake when critics invoked media

factors in their histories of the synoptic tradition and gospel

writing. In this exploratory probe we will focus on Heinrich

Julius Holtzmann and Paul Wernle, two of the most

consequential critics of that era. In particular, we will look at

how they deployed memory, oral tradition, and written sources

in their quest for a pre-dogma Jesus." (p. 53)

(1) The best is John S. Kloppenborg, Excavating Q: The

History and Setting of the Sayings Gospel (Minneapolis, MN:

Fortress, 2000), chapters 6 and 7.

82. Klinghardt, Matthias. 2008. "The Marcionite Gospel and the

Synoptic Problem: A New Suggestion." Novum Testamentum

no. 50:1-27.

Abstract: "The most recent debate of the Synoptic Problem

resulted in a dead-lock: The best-established solutions, the

Two-Source-Hypothesis and the Farrer-Goodacre-Theory, are

burdened with a number of apparent weaknesses. On the other

hand, the arguments raised against these theories are cogent.

An alternative possibility, that avoids the problems created by

either of them, is the inclusion of the gospel used by Marcion.

This gospel is not a redaction of Luke, but rather precedes

Matthew and Luke and, therefore, belongs into the maze of the

synoptic interrelations. The resulting model avoids the

weaknesses of the previous theories and provides compelling

and obvious solutions to the notoriously difficult problems."

83. ———. 2017. "Marcion's Gospel and the New Testament:

Catalyst or Consequence?" New Testament Studies no. 63:318-

323.

"In order to assess the importance of the Marcionite Gospel for

the New Testament we must determine the editorial relation

between this gospel and Luke: this is the basic problem for

everybody dealing with the Marcionite Gospel, no matter

whether for literary, historical or theological reasons. As I have

argued in some detail elsewhere, I strongly believe that the

direction of the editorial process linking the two texts runs from

the Marcionite Gospel to Luke.(1) Only under this basic

assumption does the full impact of the Marcionite Gospel

become visible: with regard to the emergence of the gospel

tradition, the understanding of the New Testament and its

textual history, and many other – hitherto unanswered –

questions.(2)" (p. 318)

(1) M. Klinghardt, Das älteste Evangelium und die Entstehung

der kanonischen Evangelien (2 vols.; TANZ 60/1-2; Tübingen:

Francke, 2015). An English translation is in preparation. [The

Oldest Gospel and the Formation of the Canonical Gospels:

Inquiry. Reconstruction - Translation - Variants, Leuven,

Peeters 2020]

(2) These problems precede and outweigh even a critical

reconstruction of the text of the Marcionite Gospel: significant

parts of the heresiologists’ testimony, particularly the

numerous contradictory attestations, will be evaluated

according to the direction of the editorial process.

84. Kloppenborg, John S. 1986. "The Formation of Q and Antique

Instructional Genres." Journal of Biblical Literature no.

105:443-462.

85. ———. 1987. "Symbolic Eschatology and the Apocalypticism of

Q." The Harvard Theological Review no. 80:287-306.

86. ———. 1990. "Nomos and Ethos in Q." In Gospel Origins &

Christian Beginnings: In Honor of James M. Robinson, edited

by Goehring, James E. , Sanders, Jack T. and Hedrick, Charles

W., 35-48. Sonoma: Polebridge Press.

87. ———. 1990. "City and Wasteland: Narrative World and the

Beginning of the Sayings Gospel (Q)." Semeia no. 52:145-160.

88. ———. 1991. "Literary Convention, Self-Evidence, and the

Social History of the Q People." Semeia no. 55:77-102.

89. ———. 1992. "The Theological Stakes in the Synoptic Problem."

In The Four Gospels 1992: Festschrift Frans Neirynck. Volume

II, edited by van Segbroeck, Frans, Tuckett, Christopher M.,

van Belle, Gilbert and Verheyden, Joseph, 93-120. Leuven:

Leuven University Press / Peeters.

Reprinted in: S. Kloppenborg, Synoptic Problems: Collected

Essays, Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2014, pp. 11-37.

90. ———, ed. 1994. The Shape of Q: Signal Essays on the Sayings

Gospel Minneapolis: Fortress Press.

Contents: Acknowledgments V; Preface VII; John S.

Kloppenborg: Introduction 1; 1. Rudolf Bultmann: : What the

Saying Source Reveals about the Early Church 23; 2. Helmut

Koester: The Synoptic Sayings Source and the Gospel of

Thomas 35; 3. James M. Robinson: Jewish Wisdom Literature

and the Gattung, LOGOI SOPHON 51; 4. Dieter Luhrmann: Q

in the History of Early Christianity 59; 5. Heinz Schurmann:

Observations on the Son of Man Title in the Speech Source: Its

Occurrence in Closing and Introductory Expressions 74; 6.

Arland D. Jacobson: The Literary Unity of Q 98; 8. Dieter

Zeller: Redactional Processes and Changing Settings in the Q-

Material 116; 9. Ronald A. Piper: Matthew 7:7-11 par. Luke 11:9-

13: Evidence of Design and Argument in the Collection of Jesus’

Sayings 131; 10. John S. Kloppenborg: The Formation of Q and

Antique Instructional Genres 138; 10. Migaku Sato: The Shape

of the Q-Source156-179; Abbreviations 180; Bibliography 183;

Index of Names 209; Index of Ancient Sources 212-224.

91. ———, ed. 1995. Conflict and Invention: Literary, Rhetorical,

and Social Studies on the Sayings Gospel Q. Valley Forge, PA:

Trinity Press.

Contents: 1. John S. Kloppenborg: Conflict and Invention:

Recent Studies on Q; 2. Johnathan L. Reed: The Social Map of

Q; 3. Richard Horsley: Social Conflict in the Synoptic Sayings

Source of Q; 4. Ronald A. Piper: The Language of Violence and

the Aphoristic Sayings in Q: A Study of Q 6:27-36; 5. Leif E.

Vaage: Composite Texts and Oral Mythology: The Case of the

"Sermon" in Q (6:20-49); 6. Shawn Carruth: Strategies of

Authority: A Rhetorical Study of the Character of the Speaker in

Q 6:20-49; 7. R. Conrad Douglas: "Love Your Enemies":

Rhetoric, Tradents, and Ethos; 8. Wendy Cotter: "Yes, I Tell

You, and More Than a Prophet": The Function of John in Q; 9.

Patrick J. Hartin: "Yet Wisdom is Justified by Hew Children"

(Q 7:35): A Rhetorical and Compositional Analysis of Divine

Sophia in Q; 10. William Arnal: Redactional Fabrication and

Group Legitimation: The Baptist's Preaching in Q 3:7-9, 16-17;

11. Leif E. Vaage: More than a Prophet, and Demon-Possessed:

Q and the "Historical" John.

92. ———. 1995. "Jesus and the Parables of Jesus in Q." In The

Gospel behind the Gospels: Current Studies on Q, edited by

Piper, Ronald A., 275-319. Leiden: Brill.

93. ———. 1996. "The Sayings Gospel Q: Literary and Stratigraphic

Problems." In Symbols and Strata: Essays on the Sayings

Gospel Q, edited by Uro, Risto, 1-66. Helsinki: Finnish

Exegetical Society.

Reprinted in: S. Kloppenborg, Synoptic Problems: Collected

Essays, Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, pp. 266-321.

94. ———. 1999. The Formation of Q: Trajectories in Ancient

Wisdom Collections. Harrisburg, PA: Trinity Press

International.

Second edition with a new preface (First edition Philadelphia:

Fortress Press 1987).

95. ———. 1999. "Q (Sayings Gospel)." In Dictionary of Biblical

Interpretation: Volume 2, edited by Hayes, John H., 343-346.

Nashville: Abingdon.

96. ———. 2001. "Discursive Practices in the Sayings Gospel Q and

the Quest of the Historical Jesus." In The Sayings Source Q

and the Historical Jesus, edited by Lindemann, Andreas, 149-

190. Leuven: Peeters.

97. ———. 2003. "On Dispensing with Q?: Goodacre on the

Relation of Luke to Matthew." New Testament Studies no.

49:210-236.

Reprinted in: S. Kloppenborg, Synoptic Problems: Collected

Essays, Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, pp. 62-90.

98. ———. 2006. "Holtzmann's Life of Jesus according to the 'A'

Source: Part 1." Journal for the Study of the Historical Jesus

no. 4:75-108.

Abstract: "H.J. Holtztnann's Die synoptischen Evangelien

(1863) is not only regarded as having established Markan

priority and the basic contours of the Two Source hypothesis; it

also offered a sketch of the life of Jesus based on a Mark-like

source that represents a starting point for the so-called 'Liberal

Lives of Jesus' which prevailed from 1863 until the early 1900s.

Holtzmann's 'Life' portrayed Jesus as an exemplary personality,

and posited psychological development in seven stages in the

career of Jesus. This essay discusses the intellectual context

leading to Holtzmann's book and then offers an annotated

English translation of Holtzmann's 'Life of Jesus'. This is Part 1

of a two-part essay."

99. ———. 2006. "Holtzmann's Life of Jesus according to the 'A'

Source: Part 2." Journal for the Study of the Historical Jesus

no. 4:203-223.

100. ———. 2007. "Variation in the Reproduction of the Double

Tradition and an Oral Q?" Ephemeriudes Theologicae

Lovanienses no. 83:53-80.

Reprinted in: S. Kloppenborg, Synoptic Problems: Collected

Essays, Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, pp. 91-119.

101. ———. 2008. Q, the Earliest Gospel: An Introduction to the

Original Stories and Sayings of Jesus. Louisville: Westminster

John Knox Press.

102. ———. 2008. "Q." In Encyclopedia of the Historical Jesus,

edited by Evans, Craig A., 469-472. New York: Routledge.

103. ———. 2011. "Gospels." In The Oxford Encyclopedia of the

Books of the Bible: Vol. 1, edited by Coogan, Michael D., 334-

349. New York: Oxford University Press.

The Synoptic Problem, pp. 345-347.

104. ———. 2014. Synoptic Problems: Collected Essays. Tübingen:

Mohr Siebeck.

Contents: Preface VII; Abbreviations XIII; Introduction 1;

Part I: SYNOPTIC PROBLEMS 9

1. The Theological Stakes in the Synoptic Problem 11; 2. Is there

a New Paradigm? 39; 3. On Dispensing with Q? Goodacre on

the Relation of Luke to Matthew 62; 4. Variation in the

Reproduction of the Double Tradition and an Oral Q? 91; 5.

Synopses and the Synoptic Problem 120;

Part II:THE SAYINGS GOSPEL Q 155

6. Symbolic Eschatology and the Apocalypticism of Q 157; 7.

“Easter Faith” and the Sayings Gospel Q 179; 8. Nomos and

Ethos in Q 204; 9. City and Wasteland: Narrative World and

the Beginning of the Sayings Gospel (Q) 222; 10. Literary

Evidence, Self-Evidence, and the Social History of the Q People

237; 11. The Sayings Gospel Q: Literary and Stratigraphic

Problems 266; 12. A Dog Among the Pigeons: The ‘Cynic

Hypothesis’ as a Theological Problem 322; 13. Discursive

Practices in the Sayings Gospel Q and the Quest for the

Historical Jesus 366;

Part III: MARK 407

14. Egyptian Viticultural Practices and the Citation of Isa 5:1–7

in Mark 12:1–9 409; 15. Self-Help or Deus ex Machina in Mark

12:9? 434; 16. Evocatio deorum and the Date of Mark 458; 17.

Agrarian Discourse in the Sayings of Jesus 490;

Part IV: PARABLES 513

18. Jesus and the Parables of Jesus in Q 515; 19. The Parable of

the Prodigal Son and Deeds of Gift 556; 20. Pastoralism, Papyri

and the Parable of the Shepherd 577; 21. The Representation of

Violence in the Synoptic Parables 600;

Bibliography 631; Index of Modern Authors 697.

105. ———. 2014. "A New Synoptic Problem: Mark Goodacre and

Simon Gathercole on Thomas." Journal for the Study of the

New Testament no. 36:199-239.

Abstract: "Recent analyses of the Gospel of Thomas by Mark

Goodacre and Simon Gathercole make only a partial and, in

several instances, unconvincing case for Thomas’s knowledge of

the Synoptic Gospels. Other neglected data suggests that some

portions of Thomas are substantially autonomous. This calls for

a more complex understanding of the composition of Thomas,

one that recognizes its construction as a ‘school text’ or

‘anthology’, drawing on multiple and parallel streams of the

Jesus tradition."

References

Gathercole, Simon 2012. The Composition of the Gospel of

Thomas: Original Language and Influences (SNTSMS, 151;

Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).

Goodacre, Mark S. 2012. Thomas and the Gospels: The Case

for Thomas’s Familiarity with the Synoptics (Grand Rapids,

MI: Wm. B. Eerdmans).

106. ———. 2015. "The Farrer/Mark Without Q Hypothesis: A

Response." In Marcan Priority Without Q: Explorations in the

Farrer Hypothesis, edited by Poirier, John C. and Peterson,

Jeffrey, 226-244. London: T & T Clark.

"It is an honour to be able to respond to the nine essays in this

collection, some offering arguments that advance the case for

the Farrer or Mark without-Q hypothesis, and others that raise

issues with the positing of Q as a component of the Two

Document hypothesis. In this response I will treat the essays

that advance the FH first (Eve, Gorman, Abakuks, Peterson,

Landry, Poirier), and then the remaining three essays (Carlson,

Olson, Goodacre). Although Poirier's essay is entitled to suggest

that it deals primarily with Q, it is in fact an analysis of Delbert

Burkett's critique of the FH, and a defence of some of the key

features of the FH, rather than simply a treatment of Burkett' s

view of Q." (p. 226)

107. ———. 2016. "Composing Matthew by Recomposing Q: The

Composition of Matt 23–25." In An Early Reader of Mark and

Q, edited by van Belle, Gilbert and Verheyden, Josef, 187-215.

Leuven: Peeters.

108. ———. 2017. "Conceptual Stakes in the Synoptic Problem." In

Gospel Interpretation and the Q-Hypothesis, edited by Müller,

Mogens, 13-42. New York: Bloomsbury.

109. ———. 2018. "Oral and Literate Contexts for the Sayings Gospel

Q." In Built on Rock or Sand? Q Studies: Retrospects,

Introspects and Prospects, edited by Heil, Christoph, Harb,

Gertraud and Smith, Daniel A., 49-72. Leuven: Peeters.

110. ———. 2019. "Macro-Conflation, Micro-Conflation,

Harmonization and the Compositional Practices of the Synoptic

Writers." Ephemerides Theologicae Lovanienses no. 95:629-

643.

111. ———. 2020. "Camouflaging Q: The Catholic 2DH from

Lagrange to Sickenberger and Beyond." In Theological and

Theoretical Issues in the Synoptic Problem, edited by

Kloppenborg, John S. and Verheyden, Joseph, 165-188.

London: T & T. Clark.

"The question posed in this chapter is not how Catholic

scholars at the turn of the last century came to embrace the

two-document hypothesis (2DH) - that is, the specific

arguments that were made, although that too is important but

what seems to have been at stake in them doing so. The matter

is complicated by the fact that, as in the case of many

treatments of the Synoptic Problem, the decision is often

framed as simply a matter of historical or literary probability or

even as "objective" scholarship; there is often very little

reflection on what might be at stake, both conceptually and

theologically, in a particular synoptic hypothesis.

I hasten to add that this chapter does not take the view that

synoptic hypotheses are embraced (or rejected) merely because

they have or lack some perceived theological utility; that would

be to misread the history of scholarship and this possibility was

expressly rejected by scholars such as Marie-Joseph Lagrange

and Friedrich Maier. Nevertheless, irrespective of the particular

historical and literary grounds upon which a particular

hypothesis is founded, there are theoretical "costs" and

"advantages" entailed in that hypothesis. My interest is not in

personal motivations, data for which is in almost all cases

lacking, but rather in the larger theoretical or conceptual

interests that may have been served by one or other synoptic

hypothesis.(1)" (p. 165)

(1) See Christopher M. Tuckett, "The Griesbach Hypothesis in

the 19th Century," JSNT 3 (1979), 29-60 for an analogous

exploration.

112. Kloppenborg, John S., and Verheyden, Joseph, eds. 2020.

Theological and Theoretical Issues in the Synoptic Problem.

New York: Bloomsbury.

Contents: Preface VI; Notes on Contributors VII; 1. Christopher

Tuckett: Theological Issues at Stake in Early-Twentieth-

Century Research on the Synoptic Problem 1; 2. Marijke H. de

Lang: The Decline of the Gospel Harmony: Loss or Gain? 19: 3.

Francis Watson: The Archaeology of the Q Hypothesis: The

Case of H. J. Holtzmann; 4. Alan Kirk: Memory, Tradition, and

Synoptic Sources: The Quest of Holtzmann and Wernle for a

Pre-Dogma Jesus; 5. Markus Tiwald: Die Suche nach dem ,,

Urevangelium" als Frage nach der Authentizitat der

Jesustiberlieferung 71; 6. Paul Foster: The Rise of the Markan

Priority Hypothesis and Early Responses and Challenges to It

89; 7. Daniel A. Smith: "No Weapon but That of Analysis":

Issues at Stake in the Rise and Reception of the Two-Document

Hypothesis 113; 8. Jens Schroter: The Synoptic Problem, the "

Apocryphal Gospels," and the Quest of the Historical Jesus:

Toward a Reformulation of the Synoptic Problem 135; 9.

Benedict Thomas Viviano O.P.: French Catholic Scholarship on

the Synoptic Problem in the Late Nineteenth and Early

Twentieth Centuries 151; 10. John S. Kloppenborg:

Camouflaging Q: The Catholic 2DH from Lagrange to

Sickenberger and Beyond 165; Bibliography 189; Inde.x of

Names 211; Inde.x of References 217-220.

113. Kloppenborg Verbin, John S. 2000. "Is There a New

Paradigm?" In Christology, Controversy and Community. New

Testament Essays in Honour of David R. Catchpole, edited by

Horrell, David G. and Tuckett, Christopher M., 23-47. Leiden:

Brill.

Reprinted in: S. Kloppenborg, Synoptic Problems: Collected

Essays, Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, pp. 39-61.

114. ———. 2000. Excavating Q: The History and Setting of the

Sayings Gospel. Minneapolis: Fortress Press.

"This book explores two sets of issues crucial to the study of

early Christianity: first, the basic methodological issues bearing

on the identification and reconstruction of one of the earliest

documents of the Jesus movement, and second, how so

seemingly abstract and hypothetical a project has belonged and

continues to belong to the history of discourse on early

Christianity and what importance it has in that discourse. In

short, it is a book on how one talks about Q, and why it matters.

The motivations for this book are several. First, I have been

thinking and writing about Q for two decades and have watched

it transformed from a documentary source of rather limited

interest into a major point of debate in matters of the

delineation of the early Jesus movement and in the quest of the

historical Jesus. With much work already accomplished, this

seems a mod juncture at which to review and evaluate what has

been done. Second, for the last several years I have also

conducted a doctoral seminar on the Synoptic Problem, inviting

students to examine seriously, sympathetically, and critically a

variety of solutions to the Synoptic Problem—not only the two

Document hypothesis (2DH), but the Two Gospel (Griesbach)

hypothesis (2GH), the complex hypotheses of Vaganay,

Boismard, and Rolland, The solution of the so-called Jerusalem

school, and the Farrer-Goulder hypothesis. Part of my concern

has been to ensure that graduate students appreciate both the

strengths and weaknesses of various Synoptic solutions, and

that they understand the difference between well and poorly

constructed hypotheses." (From the Preface, IX)

115. ———. 2002. "Goulder and the New Paradigm: A Critical

Appreciation of Michael Goulder on the Synoptic Problem." In

The Gospels Accordng to Michael Goulder: A North American

Response, edited by Rollston, Christopher A., 29-60.

Harrisburg: Trinity Press International.

Bibliographia. Annotated bibliographies

Raul Corazzon || rc@ontology.co || Info

Synoptic Problem: Bibliography of

the main studies in English from

1964 (Kni - Mey)

Studies on the Synoptic Problem

1. Knight, Christopher. 2017. "The Synoptic Problem: Some

Methodological Considerations and a New Hypothesis."

Heythrop Journal no. 58:247-261.

Abstract: "Michael Goulder’s analysis of the predominant

understanding of the relationship between the synoptic gospels

is assessed in terms of the philosophy of science, and more

nuanced criteria for assessing the rationality of synoptic study

are developed, especially in relation to historical plausibility.

A new hypothesis is proposed, which has claims to greater

historical plausibility than the two-source hypothesis. While

Luke is still seen as being based on Mark and Q, it is argued

that these two documents were not a source for Matthew, but

were derived from an early version of its text and used initially

for didactic purposes. The advantages of this hypothesis are

urged, especially in relation to Mark’s ‘missing ending’."

2. Knoppers, Gary N. 2009. "The Synoptic Problem? An Old

Testament Perspective." Bulletin for Biblical Research no.

19:11-34.

3. Knox, John. 1987. "Marcion's Gospel and the Synoptic

Problem." In Jesus, the Gospels, and the Church: Essays in

Honor of William R Farmer, edited by Sanders, Ed Parish, 25-

31. Macon GA: Mercer University Press.

4. Knox, Wilfred L. 1953. The Sources of the Synoptic Gospels:

Volume One: St Mark. Cambridge: Cambridge University

Press.

Posthumously edited by Henry Chadwick.

5. ———. 1953. The Sources of the Synoptic Gospels: Volume

Two: St Luke and St Matthew. Cambridge: Cambridge

University Press.

Posthumously edited by Henry Chadwick.

6. Koester, Helmut. 1983. "History and Development of Mark's

Gospel (From Mark to Secret Mark and "Canonical" Mark)." In

Colloquy on New Testament Studies: A Time for Reappraisal

and Fresh Approaches, edited by Corley, Bruce, 35-85. Macon

GA: Mercer University Press.

7. ———. 1990. Ancient Christian Gospels: Their History and

Development. Philadelphia: Trinity Press International.

8. Köstenberger, Andreas J., Kellum, L. Scott , and Quarles,

Charles L. 2016. The Cradle, the Cross, and the Crown: An

Introduction to the New Testament. Nashville: B&H Publishing

Group.

Second edition (First edition 2009).

Chapter 3: Jesus and the relationship between the Gospels:

The Transmission of Gospel Traditions.

9. Kowalczyk, Andzej. 2013. The Synoptic Problem. Pelplin:

Bernardinum.

10. Kudasiewicz, Józef. 1996. The Synoptic Gospels Today. New

York: Alba House.

11. Kümmel, Werner Georg. 1975. Introduction to the New

Testament. Nashville: Abingdon.

Translated by Howard C. Kee.

Part One: The Formation of the New Testament Writings; A.

The Narrative Books; I. The Synoptic Gospels and the Acts; § 5.

The Synoptic Problem, pp. 38-79.

12. ———. 1985. "In Support of Markan Priority." In The Two-

Source Hypothesis: A Critical Appraisal, edited by Bellinzoni

Jr., Arthur J., 53-62. Macon: Mercer University Press.

Reprint of "Attempt at a Solution of the Synoptic Problem",

Introducton to the New Testament, Nashville: Abingdon Press

1973, pp. 56-63.

13. ———. 1985. "In Support of Q." In The Two-Source Hypothesis:

A Critical Appraisal, edited by Bellinzoni Jr., Arthur J., 227-

243. Macon: Mercer University Press.

Reprint of "Attempt at a Solution to the Synoptic Problem", in

Introduction to the New Testament, Nashville: Abingdon Press

1973, pp. 63-67.

14. Labahn, Michael. 2008. "Historical Crticism (or Gospels as

Sources)." In Encyclopedia of the Historical Jesus, edited by

Craig, Evans A., 280-296. New York: Routledge.

15. Labahn, Michael, and Schmidt, Andreas, eds. 2001. Jesus,

Mark, and Q. The Teaching of Jesus and Its Earliest Records.

Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press.

Contents: Preface 7; Abbreviations 8; List of Contributors 12;

Andreas Schmidt:

Introduction 14

Part I. Mark and Q

Harry T. Fleddermann: Mark's Use of Q: The Beelzebul

Controversy and the Cross Saying 17; Jens Schröter: The Son of

Man as the Representative of God's Kingdom: On the

Interpretation of Jesus in Mark and Q 34;

Part II. The Historical Jesus in New Research

Michael Labahn: Introduction 70;

A. Recent Trends in the Historical and Sociological Portrait of

Jesus

David S. Du Tort: Redefining Jesus: Current Trends in Jesus

Research 82; Markus Ohler: Jesus as Prophet: Remarks on

Terminology 125; Tom Holmen: The Jewishness of Jesus in the

Third Quest' 143; Craig E. Evans: The New Quest for Jesus and

the New Research on the Dead Sea Scrolls 163; F. Gerlad

Downing: The Jewish Cynic Jesus 184;

B. Theological and Hermeneutical Investigations into the

Proclamation of Jesus

Marius Reiser: Eschatology in the Proclamation of Jesus 216;

Peter Balla: What Did Jesus Think about his Approaching

Death? 239; Elizabeth Schüssler Fiorenza: The Rhetorics and

Politics of Jesus Research: A Critical Feminist Perspective 259;

Index of References 283; Index of Authors 292-296.

16. Lambrecht, Jan. 1995. "The Great Commandment Pericope and

Q." In The Gospel behind the Gospels. Current Studies on Q,

edited by Piper, Roland Allen, 73-96. Leiden: Brill.

17. ———. 2003. "The Great Commandment Pericope (Mark 12,28-

34 and Q 10,25-28)." In Understanding What One Reads: New

Testament Essays, edited by Koperski, Veronica, 80-101.

Leuven: Peeters.

18. Landry, David. 2015. "Reconsidering the Date of Luke in Light

of the Farrer Hypothesis." In Marcan Priority Without Q:

Explorations in the Farrer Hypothesis, edited by Poirier, John

C. and Peterson, Jeffrey, 160-190. London: T & T Clark.

"Conclusion

The final dating technique that is applicable to the gospel of

Luke is consideration of the constellation of ideas found in the

text and their consonance or dissonance with a particular

historical context. Many of

the scholars who argue for a late date for Luke do so on the

basis of this criterion, claiming that (a) Luke's ideas clearly

reflect a later stage in the development of Christianity than

Mark and Matthew, and (b) that the texts whose ideas are most

similar to Luke's were all written in the second century. What is

more interesting is the fact that even those scholars who argue

for an early date often admit that Luke's thought fits

better in a second-century context than a first-century one."

(...)

"The fact is that the gospel of Luke (and Acts) display(s) almost

unmistakable signs of having been written after 115 CE. Luke

reflects know ledge of all the texts one would expect him to be

familiar with if he wrote the gospel this late: Mark, Matthew,

John, Josephus, and Paul. The terminus a quo for Luke cannot

be earlier than about 100 CE. But no other author quotes from

Luke until Marcion or Justin. Hence the terminus ad quem for

Luke lies somewhere between 125 and 160 CE." (pp. 189-190)

19. Lang, Marijke Hélene de. 2020. "The Decline of the Gospel

Harmony: Loss or Gain?" In Theological and Theoretical

Issues in the Synoptic Problem, edited by Kloppenborg, John S.

and Verheyden, Joseph, 19-36. New Yo9rk: Bloomsbury.

"The year 1774 is usually marked as an important year for New

Testament scholarship. It was the year Johann Jakob Griesbach

published his gospel synopsis, a presentation of the texts of the

first three gospels in columns side by side. The work was meant

as the first portion of an edition of the New Testament. The

synopsis was reissued in his edition of the whole New

Testament, which appeared in 1776. The

impo1tance of Griesbach's synopsis was not that it was a

synopsis. In the early modern period, apart from a host of

gospel harmonies, quite a number of gospel synopses had been

published. Well-known examples are the synopses published by

Calvin in 1555 and Jean Le Clerc in 1699. But Griesbach's

publication of 1774 had one striking new feature: no attempt

was made to reconstruct the life of Jesus.

(...)

Understandably, several experts on the history of the Synoptic

Question have supposed that Griesbach's synopsis was also the

point of departure from which he developed his solution of the

synoptic problem, in his case the Two Gospel Hypothesis. It is

true that no other synopsis before his time had ever been meant

for such a purpose.

(...)

In this chapter, I would like to address two questions. The first

is: Was the decline of the gospel harmony after the publication

of Griesbach's synopsis a loss or a gain? This entails the issue of

how the genre of the old-fashioned harmony related historically

to the new genre of the "unharmonized" synopsis.

My second question is: How clear-cut exactly was the

"paradigm shift" in synoptic studies that was brought about by

Griesbach's synopsis? Or, to rephrase this question more

strongly: Can we speak at all of a turning point or paradigm

shift with regard to Griesbach's synopsis?" (pp. 19-20, note

omitted)

20. Lieu, Judith. 2011. "Marcion and the Synoptic Problem." In

New Studies in the Synoptic Problem, Oxford Conference,

April 2008. Essays in Honour of Christopher M. Tuckett,

edited by Foster, Paul, Gregory, Andrew F., Kloppenborg, John

S. and Verheyden, Joseph, 731-751. Leuven: Peeters.

21. Lindemann, Andreas. 2011. "The Apostolic Fathers and the

Synoptic Problem." In New Studies in the Synoptic Problem,

Oxford Conference, April 2008. Essays in Honour of

Christopher M. Tuckett, edited by Foster, Paul, Gregory,

Andrew F., Kloppenborg, John S. and Verheyden, Joseph, 689-

719. Leuven: Peeters.

22. Lindsey, Robert L. 1963. "A Modified Two-Document Theory of

the Synoptic Dependence and Interdependence." Novum

Testamentum no. 6:239-263.

Reprinted in: David E. Orton (ed.), The Synoptic Problem and

Q: Selected Studies from Novum Testamentum, Leiden: Brill,

1999, pp. 7-31.

23. Lindsey, Robert Lisle. 1969. A Hebrew Translation of the

Gospel of Mark. Greek-Hebrew Diglot. Jerusalem: Dugith.

English Introduction bt R. L. Lindsey; foreword by David

Flusser.

24. ———. 1984. A New Approach to the Synoptic Gospels.

Jerusalem: Dugith Publishers.

25. Linnemann, Eta. 1992. Is There a Synoptic Problem?

Rethinking the Literary Dependence of the First Three

Gospels. Grand Rapids: Baker.

Translated from German by R. W. Yarbrough.

26. ———. 1996. "The Lost Gospel of Q—Fact Or Fantasy?" Trinity

Journal no. 17:3-18.

27. Linton, O. 1972. "The Q Problem Reconsidered." In Studies In

New Testament And Early Christian Literature: Essays In

Honor Of Allen P. Wikgren, edited by Aune, David E., 43-59.

Leiden: Brill.

28. Loader, William R. G. 2011. "Attitudes to Judaism and the Law

and Synoptic Relations." In New Studies in the Synoptic

Problem: Oxford Conference, April 2008: Essays in Honour of

Christopher M. Tuckett edited by Foster, Paul, Gregory,

Andrew F., Kloppenborg, John S. and Verheyden, Joseph, 347-

370. Leuven: Peeters.

29. Longstaff, Thomas R. W. 1975. "The Minor Agreements: An

Examination of the Basic Argument." The Catholic Biblical

Quarterly no. 37:184-192.

30. ———. 1977. Evidence of Conflation in Mark?: A Study in the

Synoptic Problem. Missoula: Scholars Press.

31. ———. 1983. "Crisis and Christology: The Theology of Mark." In

New Synoptic Studies: The Cambridge Gospel Conference and

Beyond, edited by Farmer, William R., 373-392. Macon: Mercer

University Press.

32. Lowe, Malcolm. 1982. "The Demise of Arguments from Order

for Markan Priority." Novum Testamentum no. 24:27-36.

33. ———. 1982. "From the Parable of the Vineyard to a pre-

synoptic source." New Testament Studies no. 28:257-263.

34. Lowe, Malcolm, and Flusser, David. 1983. "Evidence

Corroborating a Modified Proto-Matthean Synoptic Theory."

New Testament Studies no. 29:25-47.

35. Ludlum, John H. 1958. "New Light on the Synoptic Problem

(Part I)." Christianity Today no. 3:6-9.

"What is called the “modern” and the “critical” study of the

gospels began in earnest about 170 years ago. Through a series

of fortunate circumstances the writer has sometimes been led—

sometimes impelled—to examine in detail for himself nearly

the entire course of development of “critical” or “scientific”

gospel study. A thirteen years’ investigation of this little known

field yields a very different impression of it than the books and

the popularizers give us. Real acquaintance with such work

leads also to a markedly different evaluation of it than the

current one.

The results of such study would normally find embodiment in

monographs, and be put on a library shelf to collect dust. But in

the present case the results have an unusual practical value for

the Church and for its ministers. We will say no more of this,

but will allow the reader to judge of this matter for himself."

36. ———. 1958. "New Light on the Synoptic Problem (Part II)."

Christianity Today no. 3:10-14.

37. ———. 1959. "Are We Sure of Mark's Priority? (Part I)."

Christianity Today no. 3:11-14.

Abstract: "Is Matthew, our first canonical Gospel, a genuine

and authentic production of an apostle? The answer to this

question is at stake in the debate on the validity of the Mark-

hypothesis. The question of Matthew’s authenticity is tied to

the question whether it was known and used by Mark, or Mark

was used by its writer. It is therefore of importance to decide

whether Mark came first, as the Mark-hypothesis holds, or

whether Matthew was written first.

The writer of “More Light on the Synoptics” (Christianity

Today, March 2 issue) tries to prove the Mark-hypothesis. He

claims that Mark was written first and was used and adapted by

the writer of our Matthew. His attempted proof of the priority

of Mark is the most important part of his article. Therefore we

will consider it first. We meet here a kind of argument often

given for the Mark-theory. We are firmly convinced that it is

not, and indeed in the nature of the case can never become, a

valid proof. After pulling the attempted proof to the ground

four distinct times by four separate handles, we will explain

why, in our opinion, no one should accept the same article’s

special pleading for Matthew’s genuineness and authenticity.

And lastly, we have a point to clarify. Some readers of

CHRISTIANITY TODAY concluded that the present writer

argued (“New Light on the Synoptic Gospels”) for totally

independent origination of our first three Gospels. But this was

not so."

38. ———. 1959. "Are We Sure of Mark's Priority? (Part II)."

Christianity Today no. 3:9-10.

39. Lührmann, Dieter. 1989. "The Gospel of Mark and the Sayings

Collection Q." Journal of Biblical Literature no. 108:51-71.

40. Luomanen, Petri. 2013. "From Mark and Q to Matthew. An

Experiment in Evolutionary Analysis." In Mark and Matthew

II. Comparative Readings: Reception History, Cultural

Hermeneutics, and Theology, edited by Becker, Eve-Marie and

Runesson, Anders, 37-73. Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck.

41. Luz, Ulrich. 2011. "Looking at Q through the Eyes of Matthew."

In New Studies in the Synoptic Problem: Oxford Conference,

April 2008: Essays in Honour of Christopher M. Tuckett

edited by Foster, P., Gregory, A., Kloppenborg, John S. and

Verheyden, Joseph, 571-589. Leuven: Peeters.

42. MacDonald, Dennis Ronald. 2011. "The Synoptic Problem and

Literary Mimesis: The Case of the Frothing Demoniac." In New

Studies in the Synoptic Problem: Oxford Conference, April

2008: Essays in Honour of Christopher M. Tuckett edited by

Foster, Paul, Gregory, Andrew F., Kloppenborg, John S. and

Verheyden, Joseph, 509-522. Leuven: Peeters.

43. ———. 2012. Two Shipwrecked Gospels: The Logois of Jesus

and Papias's Exposition of Logia about the Lord. Atlanta:

Society of Biblical Literature.

44. MacDonald, Dennis Ronald, and Van Dore, James R. . 2019.

From the Earliest Gospel (Q+) to the Gospel of Mark: Solving

the Synoptic Problem with Mimesis Criticism. Lanham:

Lexington Books/Fortress Academic.

45. MacEwen, Robert K. 2015. Matthean Posteriority: An

Exploration of Matthew's Use of Mark and Luke As a Solution

to the Synoptic Problem. London: T & T Clark.

46. Mack, Burton L. 1992. "Q and the Gospel of Mark: Revising

Christian Origins." Semeia no. 55:15-39.

Abstract: "The importance of Q for reimagining Christian

origins can hardly be overstated. Recent studies in Q have

identified layers of literary tradition from which stages of the

social history of its tradents can be reconstructed. The

movement that comes into view is markedly different from the

kerygmatic congregation that scholars have customarily

imagined as the first social formation of Christianity. Since the

traditional picture of "the earliest Christian community" is

largely dependent upon a conflation of Pauline texts and the

Gospel of Mark, scholars are now forced to consider the

relation of Q to Mark and Paul. This essay takes up one of these

challenges by focusing upon the relation of Q to Mark. It argues

for the priority of Jesus movements like that reflected in Q and

explains the Markan divergences from Q in terms of Mark's

own plan for his gospel. Finally, the implications for a

reconstruction of Christian origins are sketched and some

consequences for New Testament studies in general are drawn."

47. ———. 1993. The Lost Gopel: The Book of Q and Christian

Origins. New York: HarperSanFrancisco.

48. MacLean, Gilmour. 1948. "A Critical Re-Examination of Proto-

Luke." Journal of Biblical Literature no. 67:143-152.

49. Maio, Eugene. 1959. "The Synoptic Problem and the Vaganay

Hypothesis." Irish Theological Q!uarterly no. 26:167-181.

50. Malan, Gert J. 2014. "Is rewritten Bible/Scripture the solution

to the Synoptic Problem?" HTS Teologiese Studies/Theological

Studies no. 70:1-10.

51. Manson, Thomas Walter. 1949. The Sayings of Jesus as

Recorded in the Gospels according to St. Matthew and St. Luke

arranged with Introduction and Commentary. London: SCM

Press.

52. Marshall, Ian Howard. 1984. "How to solve the Synoptic

Problem: Luke 11:43 and Parallels." In The New Testament

Age: Essays in Honor of Bo Reicke. Vol. 1, edited by Weinrich,

William C, 313-325. Macon: Mercer University Press.

53. Martin, R. A. 1987. Syntax Criticism of the Synoptic Gospels.

Lewiston: Edwin Mellen Press.

54. Matson, Mark A. 2004. "Luke's Rewriting of the Sermon on the

Mount." In Questioning Q: A Multidimensional Critique,

edited by Goodacre, Mark S. and Perrin, Nicholas, 43-70.

Downers Grove: InterVarsity Press.

55. Mattila, Sharon Lea. 1994. "A Problem Still Clouded: Yet Again

-- Statistics and "Q"." Novum Testamentum no. 36:313-329.

Reprinted in: David E. Orton. (ed.), The Synoptic Problem and

Q: Selected Studies from Novum Testamentum, Leiden: Brill,

1999, pp. 226-242.

56. ———. 1995. "A Question Too Often Neglected." New

Testament Studies no. 41:199-217.

57. ———. 2004. "Negotiating the Clouds Around Statistics and

"Q": A Rejoinder and Independent Analysis." Novum

Testamentum no. 46:105-131.

58. McCool, Francis J. 1956. "Revival of Synoptic Source-

Criticism." Theological Studies no. 17:459-493.

59. McIver, Robert. 1997. "Implications of New Data Pertaining to

the Problem of Synoptic Relationships." Australian Biblical

Review no. 45:20-39.

60. ———. 2011. Memory, Jesus, and the Synoptic Gospels.

Atlanta: Society of Biblical Literature.

61. McIver, Robert, and Carroll, Marie. 2002. "Experiments to

Develop Criteria for Determining the Existence of Written

Sources, and Their Potential Implications for the Synoptic

Problem." Journal of Biblical Literature no. 121:667-687.

62. McKnight, Scot. 1988. Interpreting the Synoptic Gospels.

Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic.

63. ———. 2001. "A Generation who Knew not Streeter: the Case

for Markan Priority." In Rethinking the Synoptic Problem,

edited by Black, David Alan and Beck, David R., 65-95. Grand

Rapids (MI): Baker Academic.

64. McLoughlin, Michael. 2009. "Synoptic Pericope Order."

Ephemerides Theologicae Lovanienses no. 85:71-97.

65. ———. 2011. "Listing the Minor Agreements." Ephemerides

Theologicae Lovanienses no. 87:201-228.

66. ———. 2018. "Using the Minor Agreements." Ephemerides

theologicae Lovanienses no. 84:93-114.

Abstract: "According to the Two Source theory (2ST) Matthew

and Luke derived their triple tradition material by copying

Mark. But occasionally the others agree against Mark. These

agreements are slight, but they could suggest that Mark was not

the only source. Authors who contest the 2ST frequently cite

these minor agreements as evidence against that theory. An

attempt is made here to identify the most weighty cases. Forty

were found. These are explained as independent reactions by

Matthew and Luke to the Markan text, so that the 2ST is safe

from objection. In addition, rival source theories are positively

discouraged."

67. McNicol, Allan J. 1987. "The Two Gospel Hypothesis Under

Scrutiny: A Response to C. M. Tuckett's. Analysis of Recent

Neo-Griesbachian Gospel Criticism." Perkins School of

Theology Journal no. 40:5-13.

68. McNicol, Allan James. 1990. "The Composition of the Synoptic

Eschatological Discourse." In The Interrelations of the Gospels.

A Symposium led by M.-E. Boismard - W.R. Farmer - F.

Neirynck, Jerusalem 1984, edited by Dungan, David L., 157-

200. Leuven: Leuven University Press / Peeters.

69. ———. 2009. "Has Goulder Sunk Q?: On Linguistic

Characteristics and the Synoptic Problem." In Resourcing New

Testament Studies: Literary, Historical, and Theological

Essays in Honor of David L. Dungan, edited by McNicol, Allan

J., Peabody, David B. and Subramanian, J. Samuel 46-65. New

York: T & T Clark.

70. McNicol, Allan James, Dungan, David L., and Peabody, David

Barrett. 1996. Beyond the Q Impasse: Luke's Use of Matthew:

A Demonstration by the Research Team of the International

Institute for Gospel Studies. Valley Forge: Trinity Press.

71. Mealand, David L. 2011. "Is There Stylometric Evidence for Q?"

New Testament Studies no. 57:483-507.

72. ———. 2017. "The Synoptic Problem and Statistics: A Review."

Journal for the Study of the New Testament no. 40:236-241.

73. Meijboom, Hajo Uden. 1993. A History and Critique of the

Origin of the Marcan Hypothesis, 1835-1866. A Contemporary

Report Rediscovered. Louvain: Peeters.

A translation with Introduction and notes of Geschiednis en

critiek der Marcushypothese (History and Critique of the

Marcan Hypothesis), translated and edited by John J. Kiwiet.

"The synoptic problem has vehemently disturbed the minds of

biblical scholars ever since the controversial publication of Das

Leben Jesu, kritisch bearheitet by David Friedrich Strauss in

1835-1836 (ET The Life of Jesus Critically Examined, 1846).

The author compared the reaction to his book to “a wailing of

terrified women after hearing the sound of a gunshot in their

vicinity.”' Even deep into the American frontier, revival

preachers for more than a century afterward would blast the

supposed demonic attack of higher criticism. Strauss not only

questioned the historical data of the New Testament, but its

theological content as well. The Gospel, he contended, did not

give the message of Jesus in the first place, but rather the

historical interpretations of the authors.

Crucial to this confrontation was the “two-document

hypothesis,” also called the “Marcan hypothesis.” The

opponents of the Tübingen School, which followed Strauss, saw

in this hypothesis a valid argument for the historicity of the

data presented by the synoptic gospels. They interpreted a

statement by Papias(2) as a reference to two historic

documents, namely an earlier form of Mark and a Logia

(“Sayings”) document, with which the later hypothetical Quelle

(“Source”) or Q-document is sometimes identified. Thus the

Marcan hypothesis claimed to defend the historical reliability of

the New Testament. This interpretation of history clashed with

that of the Tübingen school, whose adherents attempted to

discover the historical tendencies of the gospel writers, a view

later described as “Tendency Criticism".

Over against a documentary history came a doctrinal history,

which reflected the situation during the decades following the

cross and the resurrection. The Hegelian dialectic provided a

convenient pattern for this history, as Professor Bo Reicke has

described? The Jewish original Gospel of Matthew was

counteracted by the Hellenistic Gospel of Luke, which Mark—as

the new catholic gospel— then synthesized.

Conservative scholars welcomed Marcan priority, while liberal

theologians, valuing the ethical norms of the Sermon on the

Mount, claimed traditional Matthean priority. The debate was

fanned by the sociopolitical tensions of early mid-nineteenth-

century Germany. Conservative forces wanted to maintain and

extend the Prussian establishment, while liberal forces hoped

to achieve a more democratic pattern of government and

society. Originally the center of the debate was the newly

established University of Berlin, founded by the Prussian King

Friedrich Wilhelm III in order to revamp the German spirit by

establishing a bulwark against the rising revolutionary tide of

the French Revolution. Two of the leading protagonists were

Georg F. W. Hegel and Friedrich E. D. Schleiermacher." (pp.

XIII-XIV)

(1) See below, Hajo U. Meijboom, "History and Critique of the

Marcan Hypothesis,” 11.

(2) See below, Meijboom, "History and Critique,” 17, cf. 67ff.

74. Meredith, Anthony. 1984. "The Evidence of Papias for the

Priority of Matthew." In Synoptic Studies: The Ampleforth

Conferences of 1982 and 1983, edited by Tuckett, Christopher

M., 187-196. Sheffield: JSOT Press.

"The central purpose of this essay is to examine the external

evidence for the priority of Matthew; and as the main evidence

of this type is arguably, though not I suspect demonstrably, to

be found in the fragments of Papias largely preserved in

Eusebius, something must be said about the reliability as

distinct from the exact import of the evidence he provides. It

bas become the fashion to decry Papias himself and

consequently the evidence which comes from him by means of

an argument that can be reduced to syllogistic form somewhat

as follows.

(i) AJl the available external evidence for the independence and

priority of Matthew is derived from Papias.

(ii) But Papias was a 'pinhead, as well as a 'bottle neck'. (For

this minor Eusebius's words at Historia Ecclesiastica 3.39.13

are taken as conclusive evidence.)

(iii) Therefore we can afford to disregard all the external

evidence in favour of Matthaean priority." (p. 187)

(...)

"I have implied or more than implied in the above argument

that not all that Eusebius has to say on the subject of Papias

need be taken at its face value. Valuable though he is as an

historian, he is also a propagandist. In his efforts to portray the

empire as God’s work on earth and as reaching its culmination

he could not afford to treat favourably those writers or writings

which told a different story. Hence the silence on the Montanist

writings of Tertullian and the apocalyptic strain in Hippolytus.

Hence the fondness for the spiritualizing versions of the gospel

to be had in Origen and Dionysius. Hence too the hostility to

Papias. My conclusion is that to accept the superior dismissal

by Eusebius of Papias as σψόδρα σμικρός ών τον νούν is to

adopt a less than serious attitude to the historiographical

problems that H.E. 3.39.12-17 raise." (p. 195)

75. Metzger, Bruce M. 1950. "Tatian's Diatessaron and a Persian

Harmony of the Gospels." Journal of Biblical Literature no.

69:261-250.

76. Meynell, Hugo. 1967. "The Synoptic Problem: Some

Unorthodox Solutions." Theology no. 70:386-397.

Bibliographia. Annotated bibliographies

Raul Corazzon || rc@ontology.co || Info

Synoptic Problem: Bibliography of

the main studies in English from

1964 (Mic - Pat)

Studies on the Synoptic Problem

1. Michaud, Jean-Paul. 2005. "Effervescence in Q Studies."

Studien zum Neuen Testament und seiner Umwelt no. 30:61-

103.

2. Millard, A. R. 1995. "Writing and the Gospels." Qumran

Chronicle no. 5:55-62.

3. Monaghan, Christopher J. 1970. Reflections on the Synoptic

Gospels and Their Special Design. Staten Island, N.Y: Alba

House.

4. ———. 2010. A Source Critical Edition of the Gospels of

Matthew and Luke in Greek and English. Roma: Gregorian &

Biblical Press.

Two volumes.

5. ———. 2017. "The Synoptic Problem: Where to from Here?"

Pacifica no. 30:72-87.

Abstract: "The study of the Synoptic Problem continues with a

wide range of hypotheses proposed to explain the relationship

of Mark, Matthew and Luke to the early Jesus tradition, and to

each other. This article reviews recent developments in

synoptic studies highlighting the recognition of the ongoing

role of the oral tradition, the ways in which scribal

compositional practices in the first century have been used to

test the major hypotheses, and the methodological constraints

that accompany research in this area."

6. Montefiore, Claude Goldsmid. 1927. The Synoptic Gospels.

London: Macmillan.

Second revised edition in two volumes; first edition 1909.

7. Montgomery, Robert M. 1970. The Two-source Theory and the

Synoptic Gospels. Nashville: Abingdon Press.

8. Mosbo, Thomas J. 2017. Luke the Composer: Exploring the

Evangelist's Use of Matthew. Minneapolis: Fortress Press.

9. Mosse, Martin. 2007. The Three Gospels: New Testament

History Introduced by the Synoptic Problem. Miulton Keynes

(GB): Paternoster Press.

10. Mournet, Terence. 1969. Oral Tradition and Literary

Dependency. Variability and Stability in the Synoptic

Tradition and Q. Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck.

11. Müller, Mogens, and Omerzu, Keike. 2018. Gospel

Interpretation and the Q-Hypothesis. New York: Bloomsbury.

Contents: Preface VII; List of Contributors IX; Chapter 1. Heike

Omerzu: Introduction: what is at stake by advocating or

disputing to Two-Source Theory? 1;

Part I History and Theory

Chapter 2. John S. Kloppenborg: Conceptual stakes in the

synoptic problem 13; Chapter 3. Stefan Alkier: Sad sources:

observations from the history of theology on the origins and

contours of the synoptic problem 43; Chapter 4. Mogens

Müller: Were the gospel authors really 'simply Christians

without literary gift' (Albert Schweitzer) ?: Arguments for the

quest for sources behind to gospels 79; Chapter 5. Francis

Watson: Q and the Logia: on the discovery and marginalizing of

P.Oxy.1 97; Chapter 6. Christopher M. Tuckett: Watson, Q and

'L/M' 115; Chapter 7. Francis Watson: Seven these on te

synoptic problem, in disagreement with Christopher Tuckett

139;

Part II Textual Studies

Chapter 8. Eve-Marie Becker: Mark with and against Q: the

earliest gospel narrative as a counter-model 151; Chapter 9.

Clare K. Rothschild: Refusing to acknowledge the immerser (Q

7.31-35) 165; Chapter 10. Hildegard Scherer: Coherence and

distinctness: exploring the social matrix of the double tradition

185; Chapter 11. Mark Goodacre: Taking our leave of mark-Q

overlaps: Major Agreements and the Farrer Theory 201;

Chapter 12. Werner Kahl: The gospel of Luke as narratological

improvement of synoptic pre-texts the narrative Introduction

to the Jesus story (Mark 1.1-8 parr.) 223; Chapter 13. Shelly

Matthews: Does dating Luke-Acts to the Second Century affect

the Q Hypothesis? 245; Chapter 14. Dieter T. Roth: Marcion's

gospel and the synoptic problem in recent scholarship 267;

Author Index 283; Subject Index 288; Index of References 292-

302.

12. Myllykoski, Matti. 1991. "The Material Common to Luke and

John: A Sketch." In Luke-Acts. Scandinavian Perspectives,

Publications of the Finnish Exegetical Society, edited by

Luomanen, Petri. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht.

13. Neirynck, Frans. 1972. Duality in Mark: Contributions to the

Study of the Markan Redaction. Leuven: Leuven University

Press / Peeters.

Revised edition, with supplementary notes 1988.

14. ———. 1973. The Argument from Order and St. Luke's

Transpositions. Gembloux: J. Duculot.

Reprinted in: F. Neirynck, Evangelica: Gospel studies = Études

d'Évangile : Collected Essays, pp. 737-768.

15. ———. 1973. "Minor Agreements: Matthew Luke in the

Transfiguration Story." In Orientierung an Jesus: Zur

Theologie der Synoptiker: Für Josef Schmid, edited by

Hoffmann, Paul, 253-266. Freiburg im Bresgau: Herder.

Reprinted in: F. Neirynck, Evangelica: Gospel studies = Études

d'Évangile : Collected Essays, pp. 797-810.

16. ———. 1974. The Minor Agreements of Matthew and Luke

against Mark, with a Cumulative List. Leuven: Leuven

University Press / Peeters.

In collaboration with Theo Hansen and Frans van Segbroeck.

17. ———. 1978. "The Symbol Q (= Quelle)." Ephemerides

Theologicae Lovanienses no. 54:119-125.

Reprinted in: F. Neirynck, Evangelica: Gospel studies = Études

d'Évangile : Collected Essays, pp. 683-689.

18. ———. 1979. "Once More: the Symbol Q." Ephemerides

Theologicae Lovanienses no. 55:382-383.

19. ———. 1982. "Recent Developments in the Study of Q." In

Logia. Les paroles de Jésus = The Sayings of Jesus: Mémorial

Joseph Coppens, edited by Delobel, Joël, 29-75. Leuven:

Leuven University Press / Peeters.

Reprinted in F. Neirynck, Evangelica: Gospel studies = Études

d'Évangile : Collected Essays. II. 1982-1991, pp. 409-464.

20. ———. 1982. "The Griesbach Hypothesis: the Phenomenon of

Order." Ephemerides Theologicae Lovanienses no. 58:111-122.

Reprinted in F. Neirynck, Evangelica: Gospel studies = Études

d'Évangile : Collected Essays. II. 1982-1991, pp. 281-292.

21. ———. 1982. Evangelica: Gospel studies = Études d'Évangile :

Collected Essays. Leucen: Leuven University Press / Peeters.

Contents: Collected Essays 1966-1981

I. The Four Gospels

1. La rédaction Matthéenne et la structure du premier évanglle

[1967]

2. La matière marcienne dans l'évangile de Luc [1973]

3. Duplicate Expressions in the Gospel of Mark [1971]

4. L'epanalepsis et la critique littéraire. Á propos de l'évangile

de Jean [1980]

II. The Empty Tomb Stories

5. ANATEIΛANTOΣ TOY HAIOY. Mc 16,2 (1978]

6. La fuite du jeune homme en Mc 14.51-52 [1979]

7. Marc 16,1-8: Tradition et rédaction. Tombeau vide et

angélophanie [1980]

8. Les femmes au tombeau. Étude de la rédaction mattéenne.

Matt. xxviii.1-10 [1969]

9. Le recit du tombeau vide dans l'évangile de Luc (Lc 24.1-12)

[1976]

10. Lc xxiv.12. Les témoins du texte occidental [1978]

11. The Uncorrected Historic Present in Lk xxiv.12 [1972]

12. The 'Other disciple' in Jn 18,15-16 [1975]

13. John and ihe Synoptics [1977]

14. ΠAPAKYΨAΣ BAEΠEI. Lc 24,12 et Jn 20,5 [1977]

15. AΠHΛΘEN ΠΡOΣ EAYTON. Lc 24.12 et Jn 20.10 (1978]

16. ElΣ TA IΔIA: Jn 19,27b (et 16.32) [1979]

17. La traduction d'un verset johannique: Jn 19,27b [1981]

III. The Gospel of Mark

18. L'évangile de Marc (I). Á propos de R. PESCH, Das

Markusevangelium, 1. Teil [1977]

19. L'évangile de Marc (II). Á propos de R. PESCH, Das

Markusevangelium, 2. Teil [1979]

20. Note sur la nouvelle édition du Commentaire [1980]

21. Marc 13. Examen critique de l'interprétation de R. Pesch

[1980]

22. Le discours anti-apocalyptique de Mc 13 [1969]

23. Deux nouveaux commentaires sur Marc [1981]

24. The Redactional Text of Mark [1981]

25. Jesus and the Sabbath. Some Observations on Mark II,27

[1975]

IV. Matthew and Luke

26. The Symbol Q (= Quelle) [1978]. Once More: The Symbol Q

[1979]

27. The Gospel of Matthew and Literary Criticism. A Critical

Analysis of A. Gaboury's Hypothesis [1971]

28. Les évangiles synoptiques: X. Léon-Dufour [1979]

29. The Sermon on the Mount in the Gospel Synopsis [1976]

30. The Argument from Order and SL Luke's Transpositions

[1973]

31. Deuteromarcus et les accords Mathieu-Luc [1980)

32. Les ac:cords mineurs et la rédaction des évangiles.

L'épisode du paralytique [1974]

33. Minor Agreements Matthew-Luke in the Transfiguration

Story [1973]

34. Mc 9,33-50 en de overlevering van de Jezuswoorden (E.T.

Concilium) [1966]

35. De Jezuswoorden over echtscheiding [1972]

36. The Miracle Stories in the Acts of the Apostles. An

Introduction [1979]

V. The Text of the Gospels

37. The Synopric Gospels According to the New Textus

Receptus [1976]

38. The New Nestle-Aland: The Text of Mark in N26 [1979]

39. L 'édition du texte de Q. A propos de A. POLAG, Fragmenta

Q [1979]

40. L'edition des Elzevier et le Textus Receptus du Nouveau

Testament [1980]

41. Note on the Codex Bezae in the Textual Apparatus of the

Synopsis [1976]

42. La Concordance de Franciscus Lucas Brugensis (1617)

[1979]

43. La nouvelle Concordance du Nouveau Testament [1976-

1981]

22. ———. 1984. "The Matthew-Luke Agreements in Mt 14,13-

14/Lk 9,10-11 (par. Mk 6,30-34). A Response to M.-E.

Boismard." Ephemerides Theologicae Lovanienses:25-43.

Reprinted in F. Neirynck, Evangelica: Gospel studies = Études

d'Évangile : Collected Essays. II. 1982-1991, pp. 75-94.

23. ———. 1985. "The Synoptic Problem." In The Two-Source

Hypothesis: A Critical Appraisal, edited by Bellinzoni Jr.,

Arthur J., 85-93. Macon: Mercer University Press.

Reprinted from The Interpreter's Dictionay of the Bible,

Nashville: Abindon 1976, Supp. pp. 845-848.

24. ———. 1987. "Τίς ἐστιν ὁ παίσας σε: Mt 26,68/Lk 22,64 (diff.

Mk 14,65)." Ephemerides Theologicae Lovanienses no. 63:5-

47.

Reprinted in F. Neirynck, Evangelica: Gospel studies = Études

d'Évangile : Collected Essays. II. 1982-1991, pp. 95-138.

25. ———. 1989. "The Apocryphal Gospels and the Gospel of Mark."

In The New Testament and Early Christianity = La reception

des écrits neotestamentaires dans le christianisme primitif,

edited by Sevrin, Jean-Marie, 123-175. Leuven: Leuven

University Press / Peeters.

Reprinted in F. Neirynck, Evangelica: Gospel studies = Études

d'Évangile : Collected Essays. II. 1982-1991, pp. 715-772.

26. ———. 1989. "Note on Luke 9:22: a Response to M. D.

Goulder." Ephemerides Theologicae Lovanienses no. 65:390-

394.

Abstract: "In M.D. Goulder's opinion, the minor agreements of

Mt 16,21 and Lk 9,22 against Mk 8,31 indicate Matthean

influence on Luke. He does not question Matthew's redaction of

Mark's text, so here, too, the focus shall be on Luke's changes."

27. ———. 1990. "Introduction: The Two-Source Hypothesis." In

The Interrelations of the Gospels. A Symposium led by M.-E.

Boismard - W.R. Farmer - F. Neirynck, Jerusalem 1984, edited

by Dungan, David L., 3-22. Leuven: Leuven University Press /

Peeters.

Reprinted in F. Neirynck, Evangelica: Gospel studies = Études

d'Évangile : Collected Essays. III. 1992-2000, pp. 343-362.

28. ———. 1990. "Matthew 4:23-5:2 and the Matthean Composition

of 4:23-11:1." In The Interrelations of the Gospels. A

Symposium led by M.-E. Boismard - W.R. Farmer - F.

Neirynck, Jerusalem 1984, edited by Dungan, David L., 23-46.

Leuven: Leuven University Press / Peeters.

29. ———. 1990. "Response to the Multiple-Stage Hypothesis I: The

Introduction to the feeding story." In The Interrelations of the

Gospels. A Symposium led by M.-E. Boismard - W.R. Farmer -

F. Neirynck, Jerusalem 1984, edited by Dungan, David L., 81-

93. Leuven: Leuven University Press / Peeters.

30. ———. 1990. "Q Mt and Q Lk and the Reconstruction of Q."

Ephemerides Theologicae Lovanienses no. 66:385-390.

Reprinted in F. Neirynck, Evangelica: Gospel studies = Études

d'Évangile : Collected Essays. II. 1982-1991, pp. 475-480.

31. ———. 1990. "Synoptic Problem." In The New Jerome Biblical

Commentary, edited by Brown, Raymond E., Fitzmyer, Joseph

A. and Murphy, Roland E., 587-595. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice

Hall.

32. ———. 1990. "Response to the Multiple-Stage Hypothesis II:

The healing of the leper." In The Interrelations of the Gospels.

A Symposium led by M.-E. Boismard - W.R. Farmer - F.

Neirynck, Jerusalem 1984, edited by Dungan, David L., 94-107.

Leuven: Leuven University Press / Peeters.

33. ———. 1990. "Response to the Multiple-Stage Hypothesis III:

The eschatological discourse." In The Interrelations of the

Gospels. A Symposium led by M.-E. Boismard - W.R. Farmer -

F. Neirynck, Jerusalem 1984, edited by Dungan, David L., 108-

124. Leuven: Leuven University Press / Peeters.

34. ———. 1991. "The Minor Agreements and Proto-Mark. A

Response to H. Koester." Ephemerides Theologicae

Lovanienses no. 67:82-94.

Reprinted in: F. Neirynck, Evangelica II: Collected Essays,

1982-1991, Leuven: Peeters, 2000, pp. 59-73.

35. ———. 1991. "A Symposium on the Minor Agreements."

Ephemerides Theologicae Lovanienses no. 67:361-372.

Reprinted in: F. Neirynck, Evangelica III: Collected Essays,

1992-2000, Leuven: Peeters, 2000, pp. 333-339.

36. ———. 1991. "The Minor Agreements: Note on a Test Case. A

Response to W. R. Farmer." Ephemerides Theologicae

Lovanienses no. 67:73-81.

37. ———. 1991. Evangelica: Gospel studies = Études d'Évangile :

Collected Essays. II. 1982-1991. Leuven: Leuven University

Press / Peeters.

Contents: I. The Minor Agreements

1. The Minor Agreements and the Two-Source Theory [1991]

2. Note on Lk 9,22:: A Response to M.D. Goulder [1989]

3. Note on a Tesl Case: A Response to W.R. Farmer [1991]

4. The Minor Agreements and Proto-Mark: A Response to H.

Koester [1991]

S. The Matthew-Luke Agreements in Mt 14,13-14 / Lk 9,10-11

(par. Mk 6.30-34): A Reponse to M.-Ė Boismard ([984]

6. TIΣ EΣTIN HO ΠAIΣAΣ ΣE: Mt 26,68 / Lk 22,64 (diff. Mk

14.65) [1987]

II. Matthew and Luke

7. AΠO TOTE HPΞATO and 1be Structure of Matthew [1988]

8. Luke 14,1-6: Lukan Composition and Q Saying [1991]

9. Luc 24,36-43: Un réclt lucanien [1985]

10. Actes 10,36-43 et l'Évanglle [1984]

11. Actes 10,36a TON AOΓON ON [1984]

12. Le texte des Actes des Apôtres et les caracteristiques

stylistiques lucaniennes [1985]

lll. Mark and the Synoptic Problem

13. The Griesbach Hypothesis: The Phenomenon of Order

[1982]

14. Les expressions doubles chez Marc et le problèmc

synoptique [1983]

15. L'arrière-fond sémitique des évangiles synoptiques :

Réponse à P. Rolland [1984]

16. Marc 6,14-16 et par. [1989]

17. KAI EΛEΓON en Mc 6114 [1989]

18. Words Characteristic of Mark: A New List {M. Friedrich)

(1987]

19. Mark and His Commentators: Mk 1,1-8,26 [1989]

20. The Order of the Gospels and the Making of a Synopsis

[1985]

21. Once More: The Making of a Synopsis [1986]

22. Greeven's Text of the Synoptic Gospels [1982]

23. Le texte des évangiles dans la Synopse de Boismado-

Lamouille [1987]

IV. The Saylngs of Jesus

24. Recent Developments in the Study of Q [1982]

25. A Synopsis of Q [1988]

26. QMt and QLk and the Reconstruction of Q [1990]

27. Mt 12,25a / Lc 11,17a et la rédaction des évangiles [1986]

28. The Eschatological Discourse [1990]

29. Paul and the Sayings of Jesus [1986]

V. The Fourth Gospel

30. John and the Synoptics: The Empty Tomb Stories [1984]

31. John 21 [1990]

32. The Anonymous Disciple in John 1 [1990]

33. The Signs Source in the Founh Gospel: A Critique of the

Hypothesis [1983]

34. John 4,46-54: Signs Source and/or Synoptic Gospels [1984]

35. Note sur Jn 21,14 [1988]

36. Parentheses in the Fourth Gospel [1989]

37. John 5,1-18 and the Gospel of Mark: A Response to P.

Borgen [1990]

VL The Apocryphal Gospels

38. The Apocryphal Gospels and the Gospel of Mark [1989]

39. Papyrus Egenon 2 and the Healing of the Leper [985]

40. Le lexique de Bauer-Aland [1988]

38. ———. 1993. "The Minor Agreements and the Two-Source

Theory." In Minor Agreements: Symposium Göttingen 1991,

edited by Strecker, Georg, 25-63. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck &

Ruprecht.

Reprinted in F. Neirynck, Evangelica: Gospel studies = Études

d'Évangile : Collected Essays. II. 1982-1991, pp. 3-42.

39. ———. 1993. "The Minor Agreements in a Horizontal-Line

Synopsis: Appendices I, II, III 221." In Minor Agreements:

Symposium Göttingen 1991, edited by Strecker, Georg, 221-

230. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht.

40. ———. 1994. "Luke 10:25-28: a Foreign Body in Luke?" In

Crossing the Boundaries: Essays in Biblical Interpretation in

Honour of Michael D. Goulder, edited by Porter, Stanley E.,

Joyce, Paul M. and Orton, David E., 149-165. Leiden: Brill.

41. ———. 1995. "The Minor Agreements and Lk 10,25-28."

Ephemerides Theologicae Lovanienses no. 71:151-160.

Reprinted in: F. Neirynck, Evangelica III: Collected Essays,

1992-2000, Leuven: Peeters, 2000, pp. 283-294.

Abstract: "In a recently published essay I studied the minor

agreements used by some scholars for expanding Q to triple-

tradition passages. I examined Q 3,2-4; 3,21- 22; 6,12-16;

10,25-28; 12,1b; 17,2; 17,31 as possible candidates for inclusion

in Q and had to conclude that “in none of them the Matthew-

Luke agreements against Mark seem to provide conclusive

evidence”. One of these passages, the pericope of the Great

Commandment, was studied again, and more extensively, with

regard to the alternative theory of Luke’s use of Matthew. It is

to this last essay that R.H. Gundry now responds with a

Rejoinder."

42. ———. 1995. "Q: From Source to Gospel." Ephemerides

Theologicae Lovanienses no. 71:421-430.

43. ———. 1995. "The Minor Agreements and Q." In The Gospel

Behind the Gospels: Current Studies on Q, edited by Piper,

Roland Allen, 49-72. Leiden: Brill.

44. ———. 1996. "The Sayings Source Q and the Gospel of Mark."

In Geschichte-Tradition-Reflexion: Festschrift für M. Hengel

zum 70. Geburtstag. III. Frühes Christentum, edited by Cancik,

H., Lichtenberger, H. and Schäfer, P., 125-145. Tübingen: Mohr

Siebeck.

45. ———. 1996. "Documenta Q: Q 11,2b-4." Ephemerides

Theologicae Lovanienses no. 72:418-424.

46. ———. 1996. "The First Synoptic Pericope: the Appearance of

John the Baptist in Q?" Ephemerides Theologicae Lovanienses

no. 72:41-74.

47. ———. 1996. "The International Q Project." Ephemerides

Theologicae Lovanienses no. 69:221-225.

48. ———. 1997. "Note on the Argument(s) from Order."

Ephemerides Theologicae Lovanienses no. 73:386-392.

49. ———. 1997. "Note on Q 4, 1-2." Ephemerides Theologicae

Lovanienses no. 73:94-102.

50. ———. 1998. "The Sources of Matthew. Annotations to U. Luz's

Commentary." Ephemerides Theologicae Lovanienses no.

74:109-126.

Reprinted in F. Neirynck, Evangelica: Gospel studies = Études

d'Évangile : Collected Essays. II. 1982-1991, pp. 371-398.

51. ———. 2000. "NAZAPA in Q: Pro and Con." In From Quest to

Q: Festschrift James M. Robinson, edited by Asgeirsson, Jon

Ma., de Toyer, Kristin and Meyer, Mavin W., 159-169. Leuven:

Leuven University Press / Peeters.

Reprinted in: F. Neirynck, Evangelica III: Collected Essays,

1992-2000, Leuven: Peeters, 2000, pp. 451-461.

52. ———. 2001. "Luke 9,22 and 10,25-28: the Case for

Independent Redaction." In Evangelica: Gospel studies =

Études d'Évangile : Collected Essays. II. 1982-1991, edited by

van Segbroeck, Frans, 295-306. Leuven: Leuven University

Press / Peeters.

53. ———. 2001. "Goulder and the Minor Agreements." In

Evangelica: Gospel studies = Études d'Évangile : Collected

Essays. II. 1982-1991, edited by van Segbroeck, Frans, 307-318.

Leuven: Leuven University Press / Peeters.

54. ———. 2001. "The Argument(s) from Order." In Evangelica:

Gospel studies = Études d'Évangile : Collected Essays. II.

1982-1991, edited by van Segbroeck, Frans, 363-370. Leuven:

Leuven University Press / Peeters.

55. ———. 2001. Q Parallels: Q Synopsis and IQP/CritEd

Parallels. Leuven: Leuven University Press / Peeters.

IQP = International Q Project.

56. ———. 2001. Evangelica: Gospel studies = Études d'Évangile :

Collected Essays. III. 1992-2000. Leuven: Leuven University

Press / Peeters.

Contents: I. Colloquium Biblicum Lovaniense: 1. John and the

Synoptics: 1975-1990; 2. Literary Criticism, Old and New. 3.

The Sayings of Jesus in 1 Corinthians. 4. Q 6,20b-21; 7,22 and

Isaiah 61. 5. Luke 4,16-30 and the Unity of Luke-Acts. II. The

Minor Agreements; 6. The First Synoptic Pericope; 7. The

Minor Agreements and Q: 8. Luke 10:25-28: A Foreign Body in

Luke?; 9. The Minor Agreements and Lk 10,25-28; 10. Luke

9,22 and 10,25-28: R.H. Gundry; 11. Goulder and the Minor

Agreements; 12. Gospel Issues in the Passion Narratives: R.E.

Brown; 13. A Symposium on the Minor Agreements. III. The

Synoptic Problem; 14. The Two-Source Hypothesis:

Introduction; 15. The Argument(s) from Order: D.J. Neville; 16.

The Sources of Matthew: U. Luz; 17. Urmarcus révisé: M.-É.

Boismard. IV. The Sayings Source Q:;18. Q: From Source to

Gospel; 19. Documenta Q: Q 11,2b-4; 20. Note on Q 4,1-2; 21.

Nazara in Q: Pro and Con; 22. The Divorce Saying in Q 16,18;

23. Saving/Losing One's Life: Luke 17,33 (Q?) and Mark 8,35;

24. Mark and Q: Assessment: H. Fleddermann. V. John and the

Synoptics Revisited; 25. Once More Luke 24,12: A. Dauer; 26. A

Supplementary Note on Lk 24,12; 27. Note on Mt 28,9-10; 28.

Short Note on John 19,26-27; 29. Jean 4,46-54: Une leçon de

méthode: S. Landis; 30. John and the Synoptics in Recent

Commentaries: U. Wilckens, U. Schnelle; 31. The Question of

John and the Synoptics: D.M. Smith; 32. The Gospels and

Jesus: J.D. Crossan.

57. Neville, David J. 1994. Arguments from Order in Synoptic

Source Criticism: A History and Critique. Macon: Mercer

University Press.

"The purpose of this historical-critical study is to evaluate the

various ways that critics have appealed to the phenomenon of

order in attempting to resolve the synoptic problem. But what

is “the phenomenon of order”? It refers neither to the historical

order of events in the life of Jesus of Nazareth nor to the

chronological order in which the gospels were written, but to a

literary feature related to the narrative structures of the

gospels. Within the context of gospel source criticism, “the

phenomenon of order” denotes the pattern of agreement and

disagreement between the first three gospels with respect to

narrative sequence or to the order in which pericopes are

arranged.(11) As such, this particular phenomenon must be

distinguished from similar patterns of convergence and

divergence in the order of words, phrases, clauses, or even

subsections within pericopes.(12)

This study is restricted to the phenomenon of order in relation

to material shared between all three gospels (“the triple

tradition”), together with material shared between Matthew

and Mark and between Mark and Luke. Sometimes designated

“the Marcan tradition,” this appellation stems from the view

that the Gospel of Mark, or a document similar to Mark’s

Gospel, was a principal source for Matthew’s and Luke’s

Gospels. No prejudice should be read into my decision to

exclude an analysis of the significance of similarity and

dissimilarity in the sequential arrangement of material

common only to Matthew’s and Luke’s Gospels." (pp. 3-4)

(...)

"The following historical and analytical survey is divided into

three sections. Section I explores the fons et origo of arguments

from order for each of these two views: Mark’s dependence on

Matthew’s and Luke’s Gospels or Matthew’s and Luke’s

dependence on Mark’s Gospel. The first to argue for a

particular source theory on the basis of the phenomenon of

order was Johann Jakob Griesbach (1745-1812), who also set

source criticism of the gospels on a scientific foundation by

constructing a tool designed to facilitate critical comparison of

the first three gospels. He called his tool a “synopsis” because it

presented the texts of Matthew, Mark, and Luke in parallel

columns so they could be viewed simultaneously.

Consequently, the first three gospels have since been referred to

collectively as “the synoptic gospels".” (p. 7)

(...)

"Section II traces the development of two distinct arguments

from order for Marcan priority in English-speaking synoptic

criticism between the publication of F. H. Woods’s influential

study, “The Origin and Mutual Relation of the Synoptic

Gospels,” and the release of B. H. Streeter’s epochal book on

The Four Gospels." (p. 7, two notes omitted)

(...)

"Section III examines major turning points in synoptic criticism

since the publication in 1951 of B. C. Butler’s The Originality of

St Matthew, which forced a number of critics to reassess B. H.

Streeter’s “fundamental solution.” The developmental thread in

this section is, first, Butler’s demonstration that Streeter’s

argument from order for Marcan priority was not so much an

argument as a fallacious inference; second, Farmer’s

resuscitation of Griesbach’s hypothesis as the theory that

allegedly provides the most tenable explanation of the various

literary phenomena in the synoptic gospels, particularly the

phenomenon of order; and third, Tuckett’s defense of a

particular type of argument from order in the wake of Butler’s

and Farmer’s criticisms of the use of an inconclusive argument

for Marcan priority."(p. 9)

(11) In the first instance, “the phenomenon of order” simply

refers to the sequential arrangement of pericopes in any one

gospel, but it is the pattern of agreement and disagreement

between the different arrangements of pericopes in all three

gospels that is significant for determining their

interrelationships.

(12) Cf. Thomas R. W. Longstaff, Evidence of Conflation in

Mark? A Study in the Synoptic Problem (Missoula MT:

Scholars Press, 1977). An entire issue of Second Century (6/2

[Summer 1987-1988]) is devoted to Longstaff s study under the

heading “Order in the Synoptic Gospels: Patterns of Agreement

within Pericopes.”

58. ———. 2002. Mark’s Gospel - Prior or Posterior? A

Reappraisal of the Phenomenon of Order. London: Sheffield

Academic Press.

59. ———. 2006. "The Demise of the Two-Document Hypothesis?

Dunn and Burkett on Gospel Sources." Pacifica: Australasian

Theological Studies no. 19:78-92.

60. ———. 2008. "The Phantom Returns: Delbert Burkett's

Rehabilitation of Proto-Mark." Ephemerides Theologicae

Lovanienses no. 84:135-173.

61. New, David S. 1993. Old Testament Quotations in the Synoptic

Gospels. Atlanta: Scholars Press.

62. Newman, Robert C. 1980. "The Synoptic Problem! A Proposal

for Handling both Internal & External Evidence." Westminster

Theological Journal no. 43:132-151.

63. Nickle, Keith F. 2001. The Synoptic Gospels: An Introduction.

Louisville: Westminster John Knox.

Second revised and expanded edition (First edtion 1989).

64. Nielsen, Jesper Tang, and Müller, Mogens, eds. 2016. Luke's

Literary Creativity. New York: Bloomsbury.

Contents: Preface VII; Abbreviations IX; Contributors XI;

Jesper Tang Nielsen: Introduction XIII-XXVII;

Part I. Luke Rewriting

Vladimir Wittkowsky: Luke Uses/Rewrites Matthew: A Survey

of the Nineteenth-Century Research 3; Mark Goodacre: Re-

Walking to "Way of the Lord": Luke's Use of Mark and His

Reaction to Matthew 26; Werner Kahl: Inclusive and Exclusive

Agreements - Towards a Neutral Comparison of the Synoptic

Gospels, or Minor Agreements as a Misleading Category 44;

Francis Watson: Luke Rewriting and Rewritten 79; Magnus

Müller: Acts as Biblical Rewriting of the Gospels and Paul's

Letters 96;

Part II. Rewriting of Testament Themes and Passages

Lukas Borman: Rewritten Prophecy in Luke-Acts 121; Lotta

Valve: The Lord Elijah in the Temple as in Malachi 3.1:

"Overkilling" Elijah Traditions in Luke 2 144; Joseph M. Lear

Jr: Luke's Use of the Old Testament in the Sending of the

Seventy(-Two): A Compositional Study 160;

Part III. Rewriting Gospel Themes and Passages

Daniel Gustafsson: Luke's rewriting o0f the Markan Mélange of

Christological Titles (Mark 8.27-33 par.; 12.25-37 par.; 14.55-

64 par.) 185; Marianne Bjelland Kartzow: Rewritten

Stereotypes: Scripture and Cultural Echo in Luke's Parable of

the Widows and the Judge 208; Niels Willert: Luke's Portrait of

Jesus and the Political Authorities in His Passion Narrative: A

Rewriting of the Passion Narratives of the Other Gospels 225;

Part IV. Luke Rewriting Roman Authorities

Martin Friis: Paul in the Presence of Power: Depictions of

Social Interactions in Acts and in the Hellenistic Historians

251; Stefan Nordgaard: Luke's Readers and Josephus: Paul and

Agrippa II as a Test Case 266;

Index of References 280; Index of Authors 295-299.

65. Niemeld, John H. 2002. "Two-Gospel Response." In Three

Views on the Origins of the Synoptic Gospels, edited by

Thomas, Robert L., 97-110. Grand Rapids (MI): Kregel

66. ———. 2002. " The Case for the Two-Gospel View of Gospel

Origins." In Three Views on the Origins of the Synoptic

Gospels, edited by Thomas, Robert L., 126-197. Grand Rapids

(MI): Kregel

67. O'Connell, L. J. 1978. "Boismard's Synoptic Theory: Exposition

and Response." Theology Digest no. 26:325-342.

68. O'Leary, Anne M. 2006. Matthew's Judaization of Mark.

Examined in the Context of the Use of Sources in Graeco-

Roman Antiquity. London / New York: T & T Clark.

69. O'Neill, J. C. 1975. "The Synoptic Problem." New Testament

Studies no. 21:273-285.

70. O'Rourke, John J. 1974. "Some Observations on the Synoptic

Problem and the Use of Statistical Procedures." Novum

Testamentum no. 16:272-277.

Reprinted in: David E. Orton (ed.), The Synoptic Problem and

Q: Selected Studies from Novum Testamentum, Leiden: Brill,

1999, pp. 132-137.

71. Olson, Ken. 2004. "Unpicking on the Farrer Theory." In

Questioning Q: A Multidimensional Critique, edited by

Goodacre, Mark and Perrin, Nicholas, 127-150. London: SPCK.

72. ———. 2015. "Luke 11.2-4: The Lord's Prayer (Abridged

Edition)." In Marcan Priority Without Q: Explorations in the

Farrer Hypothesis, edited by Poirier, John C. and Peterson,

Jeffrey, 101-118. London: T & T Clark.

"In the literature on the Lord's Prayer one frequently finds the

claim that there are no credible reasons for Luke to have

rejected the material he must have omitted if he knew the

longer version of the prayer. I do

not doubt that many of those accustomed to thinking of Luke's

prayer as earlier and more original will not find the reasons for

omission proposed here to be fully convincing. Deductions

about what an author might or might not have done are never

absolutely conclusive but always involve a contest of

plausibility among various options. The question, though, is

whether more convincing reasons can be given for the other

side. There seems to be a working assumption among many

scholars that we should assume as a default position that Luke

copied out everything in his source for the Lord's Prayer unless

it can be demonstrated that Luke necessarily would have

omitted it. We would have a great deal of difficulty explaining

Luke's omissions from Mark in the Sower, or Gethsemane, or

Jairus' Daughter, if this standard were applied consistently. It

ought to be incumbent on those asserting that Luke would have

retained the unparalleled material from the Lord's Prayer had

he known it to produce reasons that are equally or more

convincing than the ones given here for their omission. I do not

think this has been done." (p. 118)

73. Omerzu, Heike. 2014. "Beyond the Fourfold Gospel: A Critical

Reading of Francis Watson’s Gospel Writing: A

Canonical Perspective." Journal for the Study of the New

Testament no. 37:201-209.

74. Orchard, Bernard. 1976. "J.A.T. Robinson and the Synoptic

Problem." New Testament Studies no. 22:346-352.

75. ———. 1977. Matthew, Luke, & Mark: the Griesbach Solution

to the Synoptic Question. Manchester: Koinonia Press.

76. ———. 1979. "Why THREE Synoptic Gospels? A Statement of

the Two-Gospel Hypothesis." Irish Theological Quarterly no.

46:240-255.

77. ———. 1980. "The Two-Gospel Hypothesis or, Some Thoughts

on the Revival of the Griesbach Hypothesis." The Downside

Review no. 98:267-279.

78. ———. 1983. "The “Common Step” Phenomenon in the

Synoptic Pericopes." In New Synoptic Studies: The Cambridge

Gospel Conference and Beyond, edited by Farmer, William R.,

393-407. Macon: Mercer University Press.

79. ———. 1987. "Some reflections on the relationship of Luke to

Matthew." In Jesus, the Gospels, and the Church, edited by

Sanders, Ed Parish, 33-46. Macon GA: Mercer University Press.

80. ———. 1988. "The Formation of the Synoptic Gospels." The

Downside Review no. 106:1-16.

81. ———. 1990. "Response to H. Merkel." In The Interrelations of

the Gospels. A Symposium led by M.-E. Boismard - W.R.

Farmer - F. Neirynck, Jerusalem 1984, edited by Dungan,

David L., 591-604. Leuven: Leuven University Press / Peeters.

82. ———. 1992. "Mark and the Fusion of Traditions." In The Four

Gospels 1992: Festschrift Frans Neirynck. Volume II, edited by

van Segbroeck, Frans, Tuckett, Christopher M., van Belle,

Gilbert and Verheyden, Joseph, 779-800. Leuven: Peeters.

83. ———. 1993. "The Publication of Mark's Gospel." In The

Synoptic Gospels: Source Criticism and the New Literary

Criticism, edited by Focant, Camille, 518-520. Louvain:

Louvain University Press.

84. Orchard, Bernard, and Longstaff, Thomas R. W., eds. 1978. J. J.

Griesbach: Synoptic and Text-Critical Studies, 1776-1976.

Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Contents: Portrait of J. J. Griesbach page vi; Copy of

Colloquium announcement vii; List of participants and selected

observers ix; Preface xi; Abbreviations xvi;

1 William R. Farmer: The genesis of the Colloquium 1; 2

Gerhard Delling: Johann Jakob Griesbach: his life, work and

times 5; 3 Heinrich Greeven: The Gospel synopsis from 1776 to

the present day 22; 4 Bo Reicke: Griesbach's answer to the

Synoptic Question 50; 5 J. J. Griesbach: Commentatio qua

Marci Evangelium totum e Matthaei et Lucae commentariis

decerptum esse monstratur (Introduction by Bo Reicke) 68; 6.

Bernard Orchard: A demonstration that Mark was written after

Matthew and Luke (A translation of J. J. Griesbach's

Commentatio) 103; 7 G. D. Kilpatrick: Griesbach and the

development of text criticism 136; 8 Gordon D. Fee: Modern

text criticism and the Synoptic Problem 154; 9 Thomas R. W.

Longstaff: At the Colloquium's conclusion 170; Frans Neirynck

and F. Van Segbroeck: 10 The Griesbach Hypothesis: a

bibliography 176;

Notes 182; Appendix: Additional entries to the Bibliography

219; Index 220-224.

85. Orchard, Bernard, and Riley, Harold. 1987. The Order of the

Synoptics : Why Three Synoptic Gospels? Macon, GE: Mercer

University Press.

Contents: Foreword X; Abbreviations XIII; Part One: Harold

Riley: The Internal Evidence 3; Part Two: Bernard Orchard:

The Historical Tradition 111; Part Three: Bernard Orchard:

How the Synoptic Gospels Came into Existence (A tentative

reconstruction of the history of their composition by means of a

synthesis of the evidence drawn from parts one and two) 229;

REcapitualtion and Conclusion 275; Epilogue 278;

Bibliography 281; Indexes 289-294.

"This study is the first attempt to coordinate, within the

compass of a single volume, the three separate lines of

argument necessary to solve the Synoptic Problem, namely the

historical and patristic evidence, the internal critical evidence

for mutual literary dependence, and the ‘‘scenario” necessary to

show how the tensions between the first and the second lines of

argument can be satisfactorily resolved. It is the work of two

scholar priests. Harold Riley, an Anglican, and Bernard

Orchard, a Benedictine monk, and forms a further link in a

series of studies of the Synoptic Problem, initialed by John

Chapman. Christopher Butler, and later developed by William

R. Farmer. David L. Dungan Η. H. Stoldt. T. R. W. Longstaff,

and many others who have over the past fifty years helped to

expose the weaknesses of the various Markan-Priority

hypotheses, and have now built up a strong case for the

contrary hypothesis known as the Two-Gospel Hypothesis, a

recent development of the old Griesbach Hypothesis.

(...)

Part one does not attempt to deal with the usual flaws in the

argument for Markan Priority, for these have been adequately

dealt with by other writers. Instead, Riley works out an original

argument in which he shows how the thematic order of

Matthew cannot be derived from Mark, nor can that of Luke;

and he is then able to show that Mark is in fact derived mostly

from our Matthew and our Luke. His section concludes with a

refutation of G. M. Styler’s "key-passages” in favor of Markan

Priority.

In part two the historical testimonies are approached

scientifically, that is to say, in chronological order according to

the dates of the documents in which the evidence has come

down to us. Thus the vital Papias testimony is dealt with only

when the discussion reaches the fourth century witnesses. In

the course of this part the following points become clear: (I)

that the evidence for the apostolic origin of the Gospels is in

reality both consistent and cogent, despite the two or three

minor discrepancies, for which adequate explanations are

available; (2) that the late appearance (in mid-second century)

of the first direct written attestation of the authorship of the

Gospels is in itself no argument for disregarding its value; and

(3) that the "John the Presbyter" legend is a fabrication of

Eusebius on the basis of a single comment of Dionysius of

Alexandria. Thus the conclusions of part two support those of

part one.

Part three, however, will probably be the principal object of

critical concern. and understandably, in view of the

revolutionary yet conservative nature of the thesis proposed.

For here there is a great problem, since scholarly integrity

requires that a serious effort be made to see if the data of the

patristic tradition, now shown to be compatible with the critical

evidence, actually slot into the historical development of the

Primitive Church as portrayed in the Acts of the Apostles. In

fact they do. and part three shows that it makes excellent sense,

historically speaking, for our Greek Matthew to be the first

gospel and for our Luke to be the second, with Mark

chronologically in the third place. In fact, if Acts was written

and completed before Paul’s release from his Roman

confinement, it makes good sense to see Matthew as composed

for the primitive Jewish Christian Church described in Acts 1-

12. and Luke to have been written for Paul’s converts of Acts 13-

28. In other words, each Gospel reflects a well-defined stage in

the development of the Church, seen against the background of

the struggle between the Circumcision and the Non-

Circumcision parties. Peter and Paul being the two key figures."

(Foreword, X)

86. Orton, David E., ed. 1999. The Synoptic Problem and Q:

Selected Studies from Novum Testamentum. Leiden: Brill.

Preface VII; Places or Original Publication IX;

Stewart Petrie: "Q" Is Only What You Make It 1; R. L. Lindsey:

A Modified Two-Document Theory or the Synoptic Dependence

and Independence 7; Stefan Porúbcan: Form Criticism and the

Synoptic Problem 32; A.M. Honoré: A Statistical Study of the

Synoptic Problem 70; Alfred Jepsen: Ammerkungen eines

Aussenseiters zum Synoptkerproblem 123; John J. O'Rourke:

Some Observations on the Synoptic Problem and the Use of

Statistical Procedure 132; Petros Vassiliadis: The Nature and

Extent of the Q-Document 138; Gordon D. Fee: A Text-Critical

Look at the Synoptic Problem 163; C. M. Tuckett: The

Beatitudes: A Source-Critical Study. With a Reply by M. D.

Goulder 180; Ronald V. Huggins: Matthean Posteriority: A

Preliminary Proposal 204; Sharon L. Mattila: A Problem Still

Clouded: Yet Again - Statistics and "Q" 226; Adelbert Denaux:

Criteria for Identifying Q-Passages 243; Index of Authors 269;

Index of Biblical References 273.

87. Osborne, Grant R., and Williams, Matthew C. 2002. "The Case

for the Markan Priority View of Gospel Origins: The

Two-/Four-Source View." In Three Views on the Origins of the

Synoptic Gospels, edited by Thomas, Robert L., 19-96. Grand

Rapids (MI): Kregel

88. ———. 2002. "Markan Priority Response." In Three Views on

the Origins of the Synoptic Gospels, edited by Thomas, Robert

L., 198-209. Grand Rapids (MI): Kregel

89. Outler, Albert C. 1983. "Canon Criticism and the Gospel of

Mark." In New Synoptic Studies: The Cambridge Gospel

Conference and Beyond, edited by Farmer, William R., 233-

243. Macon: Mercer University Press.

90. Paffenroth, Kim. 1997. The Story of Jesus According to L.

Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press.

91. Palmer, N. H. 1985. "Lachmann’s Argument." In The Two-

Source Hypothesis: A Critical Appraisal, edited by Bellinzoni

Jr., Arthur J., 119-131. Macon: Mercer University Press.

Reprint of "Lachmann’s Argument", New Testament Studies,

13, 1966-67,pp. 368-378.

92. Pardee, Cambry. 2019. Scribal Harmonization in the Synoptic

Gospels. Leiden: Brill.

93. Parker, Pierson. 1953. The Gospel Before Mark. Chicago:

Chicago University Press.

94. ———. 1981. "A Second Look at The Gospel Before Mark."

Journal of Biblical Literature no. 100:389-413.

"The late, great Burton Scott Easton was once heard to say that

his idea of heaven was a group of competent scholars, sitting

about a table through eternity, discussing the synoptic problem.

I hope we may infer, not that it will take eternity to solve the

problem, rather, that something very like heaven are occasions

such as the one that brought forth the present essay. At its 1979

meeting, the SBL [Society of Biblical Literature] Group on the

Relationships of the Gospels held a panel discussion. The topics

were (a) my old book, The Gospel Before Mark, and (b) a

statement from me that had appeared in Seminar Papers Vol. 1.

The assignment for the latter was to indicate where my own

thinking about the synoptic problem had changed in the past

quarter-century and, every whit as important, where it had not.

The present article has been revised in the light of comments

from the panelists3 and from the JBL editorial board." (p. 389,

notes omitted)

95. ———. 1983. "The Posteriority of Mark." In New Synoptic

Studies: The Cambridge Gospel Conference and Beyond,

edited by Farmer, William R., 67-142. Macon: Mercer

University Press.

96. ———. 1985. "The Second Gospel Is Secondary." In The Two-

Source Hypothesis: A Critical Appraisal, edited by Bellinzoni

Jr., Arthur J., 205-217. Macon: Mercer University Press.

Reprint from "A Second Look to the Gospel Before Mark",

Journal of Biblical Literature, 100, 1981, pp. 395-405.

97. Patterson, Stephen J. 1993. "Wisdom in Q and Thomas." In In

Search of Wisdom: Essays in Honor of John G. Gammie,

edited by Perdue, Leo G., 187-221. Louisville:

Westminster/John Knox Press.

Reprinted in: S. Patterson, The Gospel of Thomas and

Christian Origins: Essays on the Fifth Gospel, Leiden: Brill

2013, pp. 141-174.

98. ———. 2011. "The Gospel of (Judas) Thomas and the Synoptic

Problem." In New Studies in the Synoptic Problem. Oxford

Conference, April 2008: Essays in Honour of Christopher M.

Tuckett edited by Foster, Paul, Gregory, Andrew F.,

Kloppenborg, John S. and Verheyden, Joseph, 783-808.

Leuven: Leuven University Press / Peeters.

Reprinted in: S. Patterson, The Gospel of Thomas and

Christian Origins: Essays on the Fifth Gospel, Leiden: Brill

2013, pp. 93-118.

99. ———. 2014. "Twice More—Thomas and the Synoptics: A Reply

to Simon Gathercole, The Composition of the Gospel of

Thomas, and Mark Goodacre, Thomas and the Gospels."

Journal for the Study of the New Testament no. 36:251-261.

Abstract: "Whereas the recent studies by Mark Goodacre and

Simon Gathercole focus on sayings in the Gospel of Thomas

which have close Synoptic parallels, this review article

highlights the historical and theological questions raised by a

late rather than early Thomas.

Furthermore, the review argues that too much credit is given to

scanty or ambiguous evidence for Synoptic dependence

(Gathercole), and that several cases of verbatim agreement

between Thomas and the Synoptic Gospels (Goodacre) are

brief, formulaic

sayings which might in fact indicate familiarity with Q. Drawing

on the modern analogy of how jokes circulate, ‘diagnostic

shards’ (Goodacre) of shared words and phrases do not

necessarily brand the author of Thomas as a plagiarist, but

point in all likelihood to the author’s reliance on common oral

tradition. Thomas also draws on numerous other, Synoptic-like

traditions that are clearly independent of the canonical

Gospels."

Bibliographia. Annotated bibliographies

Raul Corazzon || rc@ontology.co || Info

Synoptic Problem: Bibliography of

the main studies in English from

1964 (Pea - Row)

Studies on the Synoptic Problem

1. Peabody, David Barrett. 1978. "A Pre-Markan Prophetic

Sayings Tradition and the Synoptic Problem." Journal of

Biblical Literature no. 97:391-408.

2. ———. 1983. "The Late Secondary Redaction of Mark's Gospel

and the Griesbach Hypothesis: a Response to Helmut Koester."

In Colloquy on New Testament Studies: A Time for

Reappraisal and Fresh Approaches, edited by Corley, Bruce,

87-132. Macon GA: Mercer University Press.

3. Peabody, David Barett. 1983. "Augustine and the Augustinian

Hypothesis: A Reexamination of Augustine’s Thought in De

consensu evangelistarum." In New Synoptic Studies: The

Cambridge Gospel Conference and Beyond, edited by Farmer,

William R., 37-64. Macon: Mercer University Press.

4. Peabody, David Barrett. 1987. Mark as Composer. Macon, GA:

Mercer University Press.

5. ———. 1987. "Chapters in the History of the Linguistic

Argument for Solving the Synoptic Problem: The Nineteenth

Century in Context." In Jesus, the Gospels, and the Church.

Essays in Honor of William R. Farmer, edited by Sanders, Ed

Parish, 47-68. Macon GA: Mercer University Press.

6. ———. 1990. "Response to the Multi-Stage Hypothesis." In The

Interrelations of the Gospels. A Symposium led by M.-E.

Boismard - W.R. Farmer - F. Neirynck, Jerusalem 1984, edited

by Dungan, David L., 217-230. Leuven: Leuven University Press

/ Peeters.

7. ———. 1995. "H. J. Holtzmann and his European Colleagues:

Aspects of the Nineteenth-Century European Discussion of

Gospel Origins." In Biblical Studies and the Shifting of

Paradigms, 1850-1914, edited by Reventlow, Henning Graf and

Farmer, William, 50-131. Sheffield: Sheffeild Academic Press.

"I first became aware that studies by members of the so-called

Strasbourg school might have importance for understanding

the history of a paradigm shift that took place in Europe in the

middle of the nineteenth

century when I read an early version of an English translation

of a Dutch doctoral dissertation. The paradigm shift to which I

refer was the shift from the Griesbach explanation of gospel

origins to the theory

of Markan Priority. The dissertation was that by Hajo Uden

Meijboom entitled History and Criticism of the Markan

Hypothesis which was defended at Groningen, in the

Netherlands, on Thursday, 27 September

1866, at noon. The English translation was being prepared

already in the early 1980s by John J. Kiwiet of the

Southwestern Baptist Theological Seminary in Forth Worth,

Texas, It was published by Mercer University Press in 1993,

after more than ten years of work.

I have chosen to begin this paper with an overview of

Meijboom's dissertation and then to move to a closer

examination of one chapter within it, namely, Meijboom's

analysis of the development of the

Markan Hypothesis in France. The central section of my paper

consists of a series of biographical sketches of Timothee Colani

(1824-1888), Eduard Reuss (1804-1891), Edmond Scherer

(1815-1889), Albert

Reville (1826-1906) and Michel Nicolas (1810-1886), all

members of the Strasbourg school." (pp. 5051, notes omitted)

8. ———. 1998. "Luke's Sequential Use of the Sayings of Jesus

from Matthew's Great Discourses: A Chapter in the Source-

Critical Analysis of Luke on the Two-Gospel (Neo-Griesbach)

Hypothesis." In Literary studies in Luke-Acts: essays in honor

of Joseph B. Tyson, edited by Phillips, Thomas E., 37-58.

Macon, GA: Mercer University Press.

9. ———. 2011. "Reading Mark from the Perspectives of Different

Synoptic Source Hypotheses. Historical, Redactional and

Theological Implications." In New Studies in the Synoptic

Problem. Oxford Conference, April 2008: Essays in Honour of

Christopher M. Tuckett edited by Foster, P., Gregory, A.,

Kloppenborg, John S. and Verheyden, Joseph, 159-185.

Leuven: Peeters.

10. ———. 2016. "The Two Gospel Hypothesis." In The Synoptic

Problem: Four Views, edited by Porter, Stanley E. and Dyer,

Bryan R., 67-111. Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic.

11. ———. 2016. "Two Gospel Hypothesis Response." In The

Synoptic Problem: Four Views, edited by Porter, Stanley E. and

Dyer, Bryan R., 139-150. Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic.

12. Peabody, David Barrett, Cope, Lamar, and McNicol, Allan J.,

eds. 2002. One Gospel From Two: Mark's Use of Matthew and

Luke. Harrisburg: Trinity Press International.

"Also by the early 1980s, many of us had rejected the name

“Griesbach” as a label for our hypothesis and had come to call

our source theory “the Two Gospel hypothesis” for several

reasons. First, it brought the name of our theory into an

intended contrast and tension with the dominant view among

experts at that time, the Two Document or Two Source

hypothesis (the priority of the two documents/sources, Mark

and “Q,” followed by the mutual, but independent, use of these

sources by Matthew and Luke)." (Preface, XII)

"In the conclusion to our volume, Beyond the Q Impasse:

Luke’s Use of Matthew, we stated that we had provided a

plausible account of the composition of Luke on the

assumption that canonical Matthew was his main source. As far

as we knew, it was an entirely new contribution to the field of

Lukan Studies. Such an analysis of Luke was never attempted

by Griesbach or any of his followers in the nineteenth century.

In the conclusion, we stated that our next step would be to

provide a pericope-by-pericope compositional analysis of the

Gospel of Mark showing that a plausible account could be given

of it, assuming that it was written after and on the basis of

Matthew and Luke. After some forty years of painstaking

research, going back beyond William R. Farmer’s ground-

breaking book, The Synoptic Problem: A Critical Analysis, and

after several preliminary attempts. we now present One Gospel

from Two: Mark's Use of Matthew and Luke, the necessary

complement to Beyond the Q Impasse, to our peers and

colleagues for their consideration and critical response.

In the following detailed compositional analysis, we do not

posit the existence of lost versions of Mark (such as UrMarkus.

Secret Mark or Deutero Markus), or lost recensions either of

Luke (e.g., ProtoLuke) or of Matthew (Aramaic Matthew) to

help make sense out of the text of Mark. The number of such

hypothetical sources continues to grow in the scholarly

literature on the Synoptic Problem for one fundamental reason:

to defend the idea that Mark was written first. That task,

however, in our view, is unnecessary. As we seek to

demonstrate in this volume, Mark’s secondary character vis-à-

vis Matthew and Luke can be demonstrated at many different

levels and in many different ways." (Introduction, XV)

13. Perkins, Pheme. 2007. Introduction to the Synoptic Gospels.

Grand Rapids (MI) Eerdmans.

Chapter 3. The Quest for Sources. From a Synopsys:

Comparting the Synoptic Gospels; From Q and the Gopsel of

Thomas to Sayings Gospels; Q: Is It a Gospel?; Strata in Q; The

Community Responsible for Q.

14. Perrin, Nicholas. 2004. "Introduction: Reasons for Questioning

Q." In Questioning Q: A Multidimensional Critique, edited by

Goodacre, Mark S. and Perrin, Nicholas, 1-12. Downers Grove:

InterVarsity Press.

15. ———. 2004. "The Limits of a Reconstructed Q." In

Questioning Q: A Multidimensional Critique, edited by

Goodacre, Mark S. and Perrin, Nicholas, 71-88. Downers

Grove: InterVarsity Press.

16. ———. 2004. "Some Implications of Dispensing with Q." In

Questioning Q: A Multidimensional Critique, edited by

Goodacre, Mark S. and Perrin, Nicholas, 165-173. Downers

Grove: InterVarsity Press.

17. Peterson, Jeffrey. 2004. "Order in the Double Tradition and the

Existence of Q." In Questioning Q: A Multidimensional

Critique, edited by Goodacre, Mark S. and Perrin, Nicholas, 28-

42. Downers Grove: InterVarsity Press.

18. Petrie, C. Stewart. 1943. "The Proto-Luke Hypothesis." The

Expository Times no. 54:175-177.

19. ———. 1943. "The Proto-Luke Hypothesis: A Rejoinder." The

Expository Times no. 54:219-222.

20. ———. 1959. ""Q" Is Only What You Make It." Novum

Testamentum no. 3:28-33.

Reprinted in: David E. Orton (ed.), The Synoptic Problem and

Q: Selected Studies from Novum Testamentum, Leiden: Brill,

1999, pp. 1-6.

21. Petterson, Jeffrey. 2015. "Matthew's Ending and the Genesis of

Luke-Acts: The Farrer Hypothesis and the Birth of Christian

History." In Marcan Priority Without Q: Explorations in the

Farrer Hypothesis, edited by Poirier, John C. and Peterson,

Jeffrey, 140-159. London: T & T Clark.

"The present study is offered primarily to illustrate the

exegetical results made available by holding to Marcan priority

along with Luke's knowledge of both Mark and Matthew. I shall

suggest that adopting this as one's working model for exegesis

affords a more plausible account of Luke's decision to compose,

as a companion piece to his protos logos surveying Jesus' life

and ministry, a deuteros logos covering the ministry and travels

of the disciples through the succeeding generation, tracing the

progress of the word of God from Jesus' first Jewish followers

in Judea through Samaria to Gentile lands and peoples, toward

the ends of the earth (Acts 1.1-2, 8).(3)" (p. 141)

(3) 'Luke' is used here for the author of the third gospel and

Acts, but nothing crucial to the argument depends on his

traditional identification as the missionary associate of Paul,

nor on a first-century date of composition for Luke or Acts.

22. Piper, Roland Allen. 1982. "Matthew 7,7-11 par. Lk 11,9-13:

Evidence of Design and Argument in the Collection of Jesus’

Sayings." In Logia. Les paroles de Jésus. The Sayings of Jesus:

Mémorial Joseph Coppens, edited by Delobel, Joël, 411-418.

Leuven: Peeters.

Reprinted in: John S. Kloppenborg (ed.), The Shape of Q:

Signal Essays on the Sayings Gospel, Edited by Minneapolis,

MN: Augsburg Fortress, 1994, pp. 131-137.

23. ———, ed. 1995. The Gospel Behind the Gospels: Current

Studies on Q. Leiden: Brill.

Contents: Ronald A. Piper: Preface IX; Abbreviations: XI;

Ronald A. Piper: In Quest of Q: The Direction of Q Studies; 1;

Christopher M. Tuckett: The Existence of Q 19; Frans Neirynck:

The Minor Agreements and Q 49; S.J. Jan Lambrecht: The

Great Commandment Pericope and Q 73; Dieter Lührmann: Q:

Sayings of Jesus or Logia? 97; C.S.J. Wendy Cotter: Prestige,

Protection and Promise: A Proposal for the Apologetics of Q

117; Migaku Sato: Wisdom Statements in the Sphere of

Prophecy 139; Paul Hoffmann: The Redaction of Q and the Son

of Man: A Preliminary Sketch 159; Leif E. Vaage: Q and

Cynicism: On Comparison and Social Identity 199; Risto Uro:

John the Baptist and the Jesus Movement: What Does Q Tell

Us? 231; James M. Robinson: The Jesus of Q as Liberation

Theologian 259; John S. Kloppenborg: Jesus and the Parables

of Jesus in Q 275; Bradley H. McLean: On the Gospel of

Thomas and Q 321; Luise Schottroff: Itinerant Prophetesses: A

Feminist Analysis of the Sayings Source Q 347; Arland D.

Jacobson: Divided Families and Christian Origins 361; Index to

Modern Authors: 381; Index to Ancient Sources: Pages: 389-

412.

24. Poirier, John C. 2004. "Memory, Written Sources, and the

Synoptic Problem: A Response to Robert K. McIver and Marie

Carroll." Journal of Biblical Literature no. 123:315-322.

25. ———. 2004. "The Q Hypothesis and the Role of Pre-Synoptic

Sources in Nineteenth-Century Scholarship." In Questioning Q:

A Multidimensional Critique, edited by Goodacre, Mark S. and

Perrin, Nicholas, 13-27. Downers Grove: InterVarsity Press.

26. ———. 2008. "Statistical Studies of the Verbal Agreements and

their Impact on the Synoptic Problem." Currents in Biblical

Research no. 71:68-123.

27. ———. 2009. "The Synoptic Problem and the Field of New

Testament Introduction." Journal for the Study of the New

Testament no. 32:179-190.

Abstract: "The synoptic problem is an important and visible

subfield within NT studies, yet, for some reason, almost every

NT Introduction written in the past forty or so years has passed

on a defective understanding of that subfield. Two problems in

particular

plague these NT Introductions: (1) their discussions of the

synoptic problem tend to rely on a logical argument disproven

almost sixty years ago, and (2) they tend to misrepresent the

current state of the question by marginalizing the Farrer

hypothesis, which today is the Two-Source Theory’s leading

competitor."

28. ———. 2011. "The Composition of Luke in Source-Critical

Perspective." In New Studies in the Synoptic Problem. Oxford

Conference, April 2008: Essays in Honour of Christopher M.

Tuckett edited by Foster, Paul, Gregory, Andrew F.,

Kloppenborg, John S. and Verheyden, Joseph, 209-226.

Leuven: Leuven University Press / Peeters.

29. ———. 2012. "The Roll, the Codex, the Wax Tablet and the

Synoptic Problem." Journal for the Study of the New

Testament no. 35:3-30.

30. ———. 2015. "Delbert Burkett's Defense of Q." In Marcan

Priority Without Q: Explorations in the Farrer Hypothesis,

edited by Poirier, John C. and Peterson, Jeffrey, 191-225.

London: T & T Clark.

"Delbert Burkett's second volume of Rethinking the Gospel

Sources (2009) opens with one of the most robust defenses of

Q yet to address the Farrer hypothesis ( = FH). Burkett

understands that the existence of Q

depends in some measure on the unlikelihood that Luke used

Matthew.

He notes that not only does the FH hold to Luke's use of

Matthew, but so also do the Three-Document hypothesis (of

Gundry et al.), the Augustinian hypothesis, and the Griesbach

hypothesis. He seems to think

that, as far as Q goes, a critique of any one of these theories

might suffice, and he settles on the FH, perhaps due to its

recent successes. His critique of the FH is hard-hitting on some

points, and his understanding

of the main source-critical issues is on all points exceptional."

(p. 191)

(...)

"Thus the reader is made to think that, when Farrerians are

said to begin from a deficit, it is as though they failed to qualify

for the front row of the racing formation - that is, that they have

to begin the race several rows back - while the 2DH and the

'Burkett' hypothesis somehow get to begin at the front of the

pack. This in fact misrepresents the macro perspective with

which one must judge the main advantages of one source

theory over another. F arrerians accept the challenge of

explaining how Luke worked with Matthew, because they find it

easier and more believable than explaining how, on the 2DH,

the minor agreements

arose. Proponents of the 2DH, on the other hand, are convinced

that the opposite is the case. Progress is best made, of course,

by those who appreciate the straitening aspects of their own

source theories as

fully as they recognize them in an opposing view." (pp. 224-

225)

31. ———. 2015. "Introduction: Why the Farrer Hypothesis? Why

Now?" In Marcan Priority Without Q: Explorations in the

Farrer Hypothesis, edited by Poirier, John C. and Peterson,

Jeffrey, 1-15. London: T & T Clark.

"The reigning source theory in synoptic studies is the Two-

Document hypothesis (= 2DH), which consists of two main

tenets: (1) Matthew and Luke both used Mark as a source, and

(2) they did so independently,

which necessitates the postulation of an otherwise unattested

source, which scholars call 'Q'. The present book features

original essays written from the perspective of a competing

source theory - the Farrer

hypothesis (= FH) -which agrees with tenet (1) of the 2DH, but

which holds, in place of (2), that Luke knew Matthew's gospel

(obviating the need for Q). " (p. 1, note omitted)

(...)

"The PH has an easier time in 2015 than it did in (say) 1975.

Why is this the case? It would be difficult to name a point at

which the PH became (as it now is) the 2DH's leading

challenger, and it would be even

more difficult to account for all the reasons for this

development.

(...)

There are at least four such developments: (1) increased

awareness of the evangelists as writers and reshapers of

tradition rather than as strict (scissors-and-paste) compilers,

(2) wider acceptance of the view that

Luke wrote in response to other gospel writers, (3) increased

awareness of Luke's literary ability, and (4) wider acceptance of

a late date for Luke. These points, of course, do not tell the

whole story, particularly as

the PH's newfound respect is also owed in large part to the

efforts of some of its more able defenders. Nevertheless, it

appears that scholarship in general has become much more

accepting of the PH's major

facilitating adjuncts - viz. the ideas that help it make sense

within the reality of the NT world - and that this is at least

partly responsible for the PH's recent fortunes." (p. 2, two notes

omitted)

32. Poirier, John C., and Peterson, Jeffrey, eds. 2015. Marcan

Priority Without Q: Explorations in the Farrer Hypothesis.

London: T & T Clark.

Contents: List of Contributors IX; Acknowledgments XI;

Abbreviations XIII; Introduction: John C. Poirier: Why the

Farrer Hypothesis? Why Now? 1; Chapter 1. Eric Eve: The Devil

in the Detail: Exorcising Q from the Beelzebul controversy 16;

Chapter 2. Stephen C. Carlson: Problems with the Non-

Aversion Principle for Reconstructing Q 44; Chapter 3. Heather

M. Gorman: Crank or Creative genius? How Ancient Rhetoric

Makes Sense of Luke's Order 62; Chapter 4. Mark Goodacre:

Too Good To Be Q: High Verbatim Agreement i the Double

Tradition 82; Chapter 5. Ken Olson: Luke 11.2-4: The Lord's

Prayer (Abridged Edition) 101; Chapter 6. Andris Abakuks: A

Statistical Time Series Approach to the Use of Mark by

Matthew and Luke 119; Chapter 7. Jeffrey Peterson: Matthew's

Ending and the Genesis of Luke-Acts: The Farrer Hypotheses

and the Birth of Christian History 140; Chapter 8. David

Landry: Reconsidering the Date of Luke in Light of the Farrer

Hypothesis 160; Chapter 9. John C. Poirier: Delbert Burkett's

Defense of Q 191; Chapter 10. John S. Kloppenborg: The

Farrer/Mark Without Q Hypothesis: A Response 226;

Bibliography 245; Index of References 260; Index of Authors

269.

33. Porter, Stanley E. 2016. "The Synoptic Problem: The state of

the question." Journal of Greco-Roman Christianity and

Judaism no. 12:73-98.

34. ———. 2016. "The Legacy of B. F. Westcott and Oral Gospel

Tradition." In Earliest Christianity within the Boundaries of

Judaism: Essays in Honor of Bruce Chilton, edited by Avery-

Peck, Alan ., Evans, Craig A. and Neusner, Jacob, 326-345.

Leiden: Brill.

"Brooke Foss Westcott (1825–1901), one of the so-called

Cambridge triumvirate along with J.B. Lightfoot (1828–1889)

and F.J.A. Hort (1828–1892), was a truly outstanding New

Testament scholar of the nineteenth century, certainly in

Britain." (p. 326)

(...)

"One of the least well known of Westcott’s works began as an

essay that he wrote when he was twenty-five years old, entitled

“On the Alleged Historical Contradictions of the Gospels.”(5)

This prize-winning essay (one of several prizes Westcott won on

the basis of his academic prowess) was expanded into his first

book, The Elements of the Gospel Harmony,(6) and then

further expanded and subsequently titled An Introduction to

the Study of the Gospels, which went through eight editions.(7)

This is the volume with which I am concerned here. I wish to

return to Westcott’s theory of the origins of the Gospels,

examine the

response to his work in recent scholarship, and then propose

some explanations for this response." (p. 327)

(5) This essay won the Norris prize for 1850 in the University of

Cambridge. See C.D., “The Harmony of the Gospels,” in The

Journal of Sacred Literature 3 (1853), pp. 60–86, here 65.

(6) B.F. Westcott, The Elements of the Gospel Harmony

(Cambridge: Macmillan, 1851).

(7) B.F. Westcott, An Introduction to the Study of the Gospels

(London: Macmillan, 1860; 8th ed., 1896).

35. Porter, Stanley E., and Dyer, Bryan R., eds. 2016. The Synoptic

Problem: Four Views. Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic.

Contents: Preface VII; Abbreviations IX; Stanley E. Porter and

Bryan R. Dyer: 1. The Synoptic Problem: An Introduction to Its

Key Terms, Concepts, Figures, and Hypotheses 1; Craig A.

Evans: 2. The Two Source Hypothesis 27; Mark Goodacre: 3.

The Farrer Hypothesis 47; David Barrett Peabody: 4. The Two

Gospel Hypothesis 67; 5. Rainer Riesner: The Orality and

Memory Hypothesis 89; Craig A. Evans: 6. Two Source

Hypothesis Response 113; Mark Goodacre: 7. Farrer Hypothesis

Response 127; David Barrett Peabody: 8. Two Gospel

Hypothesis Response 139; Rainer Riesner: 9. Orality and

Memory Hypothesis Response 151; Stanley E. Porter and Bryan

R. Dyer: 10. What Have We Learned regarding the Synoptic

Problem, and What Do We Still Need to Learn? 165; Glossary

179; List of Contributors 181; Index of Authors and Subjects

183; Index of Scripture and Other Ancient Sources 187-194.

36. ———. 2016. "The Synoptic Problem: An Introduction to Its Key

Terms, Concepts, Figures, and Hypotheses." In The Synoptic

Problem: Four Views, edited by Porter, Stanley E. and Dyer,

Bryan R., 1-26. Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic.

37. ———. 2016. "What Have We Learned regardint the Synoptic

Problem, and What Do We Still Need to Learn?" In The

Synoptic Problem: Four Views, edited by Porter, Stanley E. and

Dyer, Bryan R., 165-178. Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic.

38. Porúbcan, Stefan. 1964. "Form Criticism and the Synoptic

Problem." Novum Testamentum no. 7:81-118.

Reprinted in: David E. Orton (ed.), The Synoptic Problem and

Q: Selected Studies from Novum Testamentum, Leiden: Brill,

1999, pp. 32-69.

39. Powell, Evan. 2006. The Myth of the Lost Gospel. La Vegas:

Symposium Press.

40. Powers, B. Ward. 2010. The Progressive Publication of

Matthew: An Explanation of the Writing of the Synoptic

Gospels. Nashville: B & H Academic.

41. Price, Ron. 2001. "A Three Source Theory for the Synoptic

Problem." Journal of Biblical Studies no. 1:1-9.

Abstract: "This paper posits that Luke used three written

sources: Mark's gospel, an early sayings source and

subsidiarily, Matthew's gospel. Evidence is provided for Luke's

knowledge of Matthew's gospel, and for the incongruity of Q as

normally delineated. Some of the pericopae usually assigned to

Q are shown to have typical Matthean features and so to be

unlikely to have originated in the sayings source. Instead it is

suggested that Luke derived these pericopae directly from

Matthew's gospel. This Three Source Theory is shown to

combine the best features of the Farrer-Goulder Theory and the

prevailing Two Source Theory."

42. Ra, Yoseop. 2016. Q, the First Writing about Jesus. Eugene,

OR: Wipf and Stock.

43. Reicke, Bo. 1978. "Griesbach's Answer to the Synoptic

Question." In J. J. Griesbach: Synoptic and Text-Critical

Studies, 1776-1976, edited by Orchard, Bernard and Longstaff,

Thomas R. W., 50-67. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

"Johann Jakob Griesbach (1745-1812) was active in Halle when

he published his epoch-making Synopsis of 1774 which

appeared separately in 1776. This instrument enabled him to

apply himself to an exhaustive study of the literary

relationships among the Gospels of Matthew, Mark and Luke.

He later moved to Jena, and in 1783 gave scholars of Germany

a hint of his Synoptic Theory.(1) In 1789-90 this was fully

elaborated and published under the title of Commentatio(2) in

1794 the study was republished with supplements.(3) Similar

theories had been put forward in Great Britain by Henry Owen

in 1764 and in Germany by Anton Friedrich Büsching in 1766;

but Griesbach mentioned neither of these.(4)" (p. 50)

(1) J. J. Griesbach, Fontes unde evangelistae suas de

resurectione Domini narrationes hauserint: Paschatos

solemnia... (Jena, 1783); reprinted in J. J. Griesbach, Opuscula

academica, ed. J. Ph. Gabler, vol. II (Jena, 1825),

pp. 241-56 (quotations below are from this edition).

(2) Idem, Commentatio qua Marci evangelium totum e

Matthaei et Lucae commentariis decerptum esse monstratur

(Jena, 1789-90).

(3) Idem, Commentatio (n. 2 ) . . . locupletata: J. C. Velthusen

et al (eds.), Commentationes Theologicae, vol. I (Leipzig, 1794),

pp. 360-434; reprinted in Griesbach, Opuscula (n. 1), pp. 358-

425 (quotations below

are from this edition).

(4) H. Owen, Observations on the Four Gospels (London,

1764), p. 32: Matthew-Luke-Mark; A. F. Büsching, Die vier

Evangelisten mit ihren eigenen Worten zusammengesetzt und

mit Erklärungen versehen (Hamburg,

1766), pp. 99,108,118ff.: Luke-Matthew-Mark.

44. ———. 1983. "A Test of Synoptic Relationships: Matthew 10:17-

23 and 24:9-14 with Parallels." In New Synoptic Studies: The

Cambridge Gospel Conference and Beyond, edited by Farmer,

William R., 209-229. Macon: Mercer University Press.

45. ———. 1986. The Roots of the Synoptic Gospels. Philadelphia:

Fortress Press.

46. ———. 1987. "From Strauss to Holtzmann and Meijboom:

Synoptic Theories Advanced during the Consolidation of

Germany, 1830-70." Novum Testamentum no. 29:1-21.

Abstract: "The discussion of the synoptic problem, which had

been promoted by Griesbach's publication of a Greek synopsis

in A.D. 1774, was largely intensified among German Protestants

during the years 1830-70. It was a period of academic

liberalism, historical positivism, national enthusiasm, and

political consolidation. During these years German theologians

produced critical and challenging studies of the synoptic

question with an enormous assiduity. Their contributions

gained wide importance for later generations occupied with the

synoptic Gospels, and the circumstances under which the

German discussion took place is therefore of interest."

47. ———. 1990. "The History of the Synoptic Discussion." In The

Interrelations of the Gospels. A Symposium led by M.-E.

Boismard - W.R. Farmer - F. Neirynck, Jerusalem 1984, edited

by Dungan, David L., 291-316. Leuven: Leuven University

Press.

48. Reicke, Bo, and Peabody, David B. . 1999. "Synoptic Problem."

In Dictionary of Biblical Interpretation: Volume 2, edited by

Hayes, John H., 517-524. Nashville: Abingdon.

49. Reid, Duncan Graham. 2011. "Miracle Stories and the Synoptic

Problem." In New Studies in the Synoptic Problem. Oxford

Conference, April 2008: Essays in Honour of Christopher M.

Tuckett edited by Foster, Paul, Gregory, Andrew F.,

Kloppenborg, John S. and Verheyden, Joseph, 299-319.

Leuven: Leuven University Press / Peeters.

50. ———. 2016. Miracle Tradition, Rhetoric, and the Synoptic

Problem. Leuven: Peeters.

51. ———. 2016. "Gospel Openings and the Synoptic Problem." In

Scribal Practices and Social Structures among Jesus

Adherents: Essays in Honour of John S. Kloppenborg, edited

by Arnal, William E., Ascough, Richard S., Derrenbacker, Jr.,

Robert A. and Harland, Philip A., 281-307. Leuven: Peeters.

52. Riesner, Rainer. 2012. "Martin Hengel's Quest for Jesus and

the Synoptic Question." In Earliest Christian History, History,

Literature, and Theology. Essays from the Tyndale Fellowship

in Honor of Martin Hengel, edited by Bird, Michael F. and

Maston, Jason, 171-190. Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck.

53. ———. 2016. "The Orality and Memory Hypothesis." In The

Synoptic Problem: Four Views, edited by Porter, Stanley E. and

Dyer, Bryan R., 89-112. Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic.

54. ———. 2016. " Orality and Memory Hypothesis Response." In

The Synoptic Problem: Four Views, edited by Porter, Stanley E.

and Dyer, Bryan R., 151-164. Grand Rapids, MI: Baker

Academic.

55. Riley, Harold. 1989. The Making of Mark: An Exploration.

Macon, GA: Mercer University Press.

56. ———. 1992. The First Gospel. Macon GA: Merce University

Press.

57. Rist, John M. 1978. On the Independence of Matthew and

Mark. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

58. Robbins, C. Michael. 2007. The Testing of Jesus in Q. Frankfurt

am Main: Peter Lang.

59. Robinson, John Arthur Thomas. 1975. "The Parable of the

Wicked Husbandmen: A Test of Synoptic Relationships." New

Testament Studies no. 21:443-461.

60. Robinson, James M. 1971. "LOGOI SOPHON: On the Gattung

of Q." In Trajectories through Early Christianity, edited by

Robinson, James M. and Koester, Helmut, 71-113. Philadelphia:

Fortress Press.

61. ———. 1999. "A Written Greek Sayings Cluster Older than Q: A

Vestige." The Harvard Theological Review no. 92:61-77.

"By way of conclusion, let me draw two inferences from this

little study that point the way for biblical scholarship of the

next century: First, the flood of new source material from early

Christianity that has emerged over the last half century not only

provides its own new information about early Christianity, but

also provides material for understanding better the traditional

source material, the New Testament itself. A scribal error in

Matthew and Luke, because it was already in Q, has corrupted

the text of one of the oldest small sayings collections in the New

Testament, containing material that has usually rightly been

ascribed to Jesus himself. Now a noncanonical gospel fragment

of the early third century and an erased text of Matt 6:28 from

the fourth century produce the text as it was prior to the scribal

error, and containing other traits of primitiveness. The canon

has always been seen as the official norm for the noncanonical

material, but in this case it is the noncanonical material that

corrects the very wording of the canon itself and may well be

nearer to what Jesus actually said.

Second, already as early as Q, a spiritualizing trend away from

the basic necessities of life was creeping into the Jesus tradition

in such a way that food and clothing were held to be less

important to God than the soul and body they nourish. What

Jesus himself had probably wanted to say was to trust God

precisely for the physical necessities of life, such as food and

clothing. That may not have sounded religious enough for the

early church or for much spirituality even today. Yet since God

acts through people, what Jesus would seem to have said

amounts in our time to a call for social responsibility that,

though uncomfortable for much of the established church, may

point the direction for the survival of a relevant Christianity in

the century to come." (p. 74)

62. ———. 2005. The Sayings Gospel Q: Collected Essays. Leuven:

Leuven University Press / Peeters.

Edited by Christoph Heil and Joseph Verheyden.

63. ———. 2016. "The Matthean Trajectory from Q to Mark." In

Ancient and Modern Perspectives on the Bible and Culture:

Essays in Honor of Hans Dieter Betz, edited by Collins, Adela

Yarbro, 122-154. Atlanta: Scholars Press.

64. Robinson, James M., Hoffman, Paul, and Kloppenborg, John S.

2002. The Sayings Gospel Q in Greek and English: with

Parallels from the Gospels of Mark and Thomas. Minneapolis:

Fortress Press.

65. Robinson, James M., Hoffmann, Paul, and Kloppenborg, John

S., eds. 2000. The Critical Edition of Q. Leuven: Peeters.

Synopsis including the Gospels of Matthew and Luke, Mark and

Thomas with English, German, and French Translations of Q

and Thomas.

Contents: Q Texts in Matthean Order IX; Frank Moore Cross

and Helmut Koester: Foreword Xlll; James M. Robinson, Paul

Hoffmann, and John S. Kloppenborg : Preface XV;

Acknowledgements XVIl; James M. Robinson: History of Q

Research XIX; James M. Robinson: Technical Data LXXII--

CVII; The Critical Text of Q 2-561; John Kloppenborg:

Concordance of Q 563-581.

66. ———, eds. 2001. The Sayings Gospel Q in Greek and English

with parallels from the Gospels of Mark and Thomas Leuven:

Peeters.

Contents: Preface: 3; Acknowledgements: 4; Q Texts in

Matthean Order 5; Divergences for the Lukan Sequence 9;

James M. Robinson: Introduction 11; Sigla 73; The text of Q in

Greek and English 75; John S. Kloppenborg: Concordance:

Introduction 153; Concordance 156; Recommended Reading

175.

67. Rodriguez, Rafael. 2017. "Matthew as Performer, Tradent,

Scribe: A Review of Alan Kirk’s Q in Matthew." Journal for the

Study of the Historical Jesus no. 15:192-212.

68. Rollens, Sarah E. 2010. ""Why Do You Not Judge for

Yourselves What is Right?". A Consideration of the Synoptic

Relationship between Mt 5,25-26 and Lk 12,57-59."

Ephemerides Theologicae Lovanienses:449-469.

69. ———. 2011. "Does “Q” Have Any Representative Potential?"

Method and Theory in the Study of Religion no. 23:64-78.

Abstract: "This article examines mutually exclusive

reconstructions of the community “behind” Q. It argues this

state of affairs is a product of the implicit assumptions about

religion that each reconstruction takes for granted. Rather than

dismissing theoretical reflection on the category of religion as

irrelevant for their work, it is time for Q scholars to recognize

that presuppositions about “religion” fundamentally shapes

their understanding of the text’s representative potential."

70. ———. 2017. "Q in Matthew: A Review Essay." Journal for the

Study of the Historical Jesus no. 15:169-191.

"In Q in Matthew: Ancient Media, Memory, and Early Scribal

Transmissions of the Jesus Tradition, Alan Kirk presents the

culmination of a long-held interest in the Synoptic Problem

with a nearly as long-held interest in the role of memory in the

transmission of the Jesus tradition and the production of the

earliest texts. This book is a welcome intervention into synoptic

studies, for it brings fresh attention to ancient media practices,

the production and conditions of writing, and the influence of

memory. Understanding ancient media practices (and the

mountain of scholarship that informs the topic) is no easy task,

and to be honest, biblical scholars have been known to ignore

methodologies other than philology and history. Therefore, the

careful attention to these neglected topics in Q in Matthew is an

invaluable contribution to the field." (p. 169)

71. Rollston, Christopher A., ed. 2002. The Gospels According to

Michael Goulder: A North American Response. Harrisburg:

Trinity Press International.

Contents: Preface VII; Contributors IX; Abbreviations X; 1.

Michael D. Goulder Matthew's Gospel Round the Year 1; 2.

Bruce Chilton: Festivals and Lectionaries: Correspondence and

Distinctions 12; 3. John S. Kloppenborg Verbin: Goulder and

the New Paradigm: A Critical Appreciation of Michael Goulder

on the Synoptic Problem 29; 4. Robert A. Derrenbacker Jr.:

Greco-Roman Writing Practices and Luke's Gospel: Revisiting

"The Order of a Crank" 61; 5. Gary Gilbert: From Eschatology to

Imperialism: Mapping the Territory of Acts 2 84; 6. Alan

F.Segal: Transformation and Afterlife 111; 7. Krister Stendahl:

Personal Reflections on the Goulder Symposium: An Afterword

131; Appendix: Michael Goulder Responds 137; Index of

Ancient Texts 153; Index of Authors and Subjects 162-165.

72. Ropes, James Hardy. 1934. The Synoptic Gospels. Cambridge,

MA: Harvard University Press.

73. Rosché, Theodore R. 1985. "The Words of Jesus and the Future

of the “Q” Hypothesis." In The Two-Source Hypothesis: A

Critical Appraisal, edited by Bellinzoni Jr., Arthur J., 357-369.

Macon: Mercer University Press.

Reprint from Journal of Biblical Literature, 79, 1960, pp. 210-

220.

74. Rowland, Christopher. 2011. "Another Perspective on the

"Synoptic" Problem." In New Studies in the Synoptic Problem:

Oxford Conference, April 2008: Essays in Honour of

Christopher M. Tuckett edited by Foster, Paul, Gregory,

Andrew F., Kloppenborg, John S. and Verheyden, Joseph, 845-

853. Leuven: Peeters.

Bibliographia. Annotated bibliographies

Raul Corazzon || rc@ontology.co || Info

Synoptic Problem: Bibliography of

the main studies in English from

1964 (San - Tri)

Studies on the Synoptic Problem

1. Sanday, William. 1876. The Gospels in the Second Century.

London: Macmillan.

2. ———, ed. 1911. Studies in the Synoptic Problem By Members

of The University of Oxford Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Contents: Introductory VII;

I. William Sanday:

The Conditions under which the Gospels were written, in their

bearing upon some difficulties of the Synoptic Problem 3;

II. John C. Hawkins:

Three Limitations to St. Luke's Use of St. Mark's Gospel: 29

1. The Disuse of the Marcan Source in St. Luke ix. 51-xviii. 14

2. The Great Omission by St. Luke of the Matter contained in

St. Mark vi. 45-viii. 16

3. St. Luke's Passion-Narrative considere with reference to the

Synoptic Probiem;

III. Probabilities as to the so-called Double Tradition of St.

Matthew and St. Luke 95;

B. H. Streeter:

IV. On the Original Order of Q 140

V. St. Mark's Knowledge and Use of Q 165

VI. The Original Extext of Q 185

VIL The Literary Evolution of the Gospels 209

VIIL On the Trial of Our Lord before Herod: A Suggestion 228

[See also Appendix, p. 425]

W. C. Allen:

IX.The Book of Sayings used by the Editor of the First Gospel

235

X. The Aramaic Background of the Gospels 287

J. Vernon Bartlet:

XI. The Sources of Luke's Gospel 314

W. E. Addis:

XII. The Criticism of the Hexateuch compared with that of the

Synoptic Gospels 367

N. P. Williams:

XIII. A Recent Theory of the Origin of St. Mark's Gospel 388

Appendix (B. H. Streeter)

Synoptic Criticism and the Eschatological Problem 425

Index 437-456.

3. ———. 1911. "The Conditions under which the Gospels were

Written, in Their Bearing upon Some Difficulties of the

Synoptic Problem." In Studies in the Synoptic Problem By

Members of The University of Oxford edited by Sanday,

William, 3-26. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Reprinted in: Craig A. Evans, Stanley E. Porter (eds.), Essays in

Biblical Criticism and Exegesis, Sheffield: Sheffield Academic

Press 2001, p. 40-58.

4. Sanders, Ed Parish. 1969. The Tendencies of the Synoptic

Tradition. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

5. ———. 1973. "The Overlaps of Mark and Q and the Synoptic

Problem." New Testament Studies no. 19:453-465.

6. ———. 1985. "Suggested Exceptions to the Priority of Mark." In

The Two-Source Hypothesis: A Critical Appraisal, edited by

Bellinzoni Jr., Arthur J., 199-203. Macon: Mercer University

Press.

Reprint of "Appendix II: Suggested Exceptions to the Priority of

Mark", in The Tendencies of the Synoptic Tradition,

Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1969, pp. 290-293.

7. ———. 1985. "The Argument from Order and the Relationship

Between Matthew and Luke." In The Two-Source Hypothesis:

A Critical Appraisal, edited by Bellinzoni Jr., Arthur J., 409-

425. Macon: Mercer University Press.

Reprint from New Testament Studies, 15, 1968-69, pp. 249-

261.

8. Sanders, Ed Parish, and Davies, Margaret. 1989. Studying the

Synoptic Gospels. London: SCM Press.

9. Scherer, Hildegard. 2020. "Learning Lessons on Q: The 2DH

and Q in Academic Teaching." In The Q Hypothesis Unveiled:

Theological, Sociological, and Hermeneutical Issues Behind

the Sayings Source, edited by Tiwald, Markus, 254-273.

Stuttgart: Kohlhammer.

10. Schmitt, John J. 1981. "In Search of the Origin of the Siglum

Q." Journal of Biblical Literature no. 100:609-611.

"In a recent critical note in this journal, Lou Silberman

suggested that Johannes Weiss in his use of the siglum Q in NT

studies was influenced by the use which Wellhausen had made

of the same sign in OT study, viz., for "[der] Kern der

Grundschrift."' This note offers further considerations on the

use of this sign in both OT and NT areas of biblical

scholarship." (p. 609)

(...)

"Quelle was abbreviated in print by Weiss in 1890, and it stuck,

no doubt, because it replaced the current Greek abbreviation Λ

for λόγια(13) The young theologians at Gottingen now used

with enthusiasm "Q" as a German abbreviation in NT study,

after OT study in the person of Wellhausen had tried, albeit

temporarily, to use it as a Latin abbreviation." (pp. 610-611, a

note omitted)

11. Schnelle, Udo. 1998. The History and Theology of the New

Testament Writings. Minneapolis: Fortress Press.

Chapter 3. The Synoptic Gospels: 3.1 The Gospel genre 151; 3.2

The Synoptic Problem 161; 3.3 The Sayings Source Q 179-197.

12. Schröter, Jens. 2020. "Key Issues Concerning the Q

Hypothesis: Synoptic Problem, Verbal Reconstruction, and the

Message of Jesus." In The Q Hypothesis Unveiled: Theological,

Sociological, and Hermeneutical Issues Behind the Sayings

Source, edited by Tiwald, Markus, 18-40. Stuttgart:

Kohlhammer.

13. ———. 2020. "The Synoptic Problem, the "Apocryphal

Gospels", and the Quest of the Historical Jesus: Toward a

Reformulation of the Synoptic Problem." In Theological and

Theoretical Issues in the Synoptic Problem, edited by

Kloppenborg, John S. and Verheyden, Joseph, 135-150. New

York: Bloomsbury.

"To sum up, in the late seventeenth century, the question of the

foundations of Christian faith is reformulated in the context of

the theology of Enlightenment. It now appears as the

hermeneutical problem whether or to what extent historical

testimonies from the early period of Christianity can serve as a

reliable basis also for later times. In this context, the Synoptic

Problem appears for the first time. As especially Lessing's thesis

of an original version of the Gospel of Matthew in Hebrew

language shows, an important aspect of that problem was the

question of the oldest sources for the activity and fate of the

earthly Jesus. Griesbach's rejection of a Gospel harmony and

his remark about the possible historical unreliability of all of

accounts of all the Gospels points to the literary dimension of

the Synoptic Problem, which

eventually leads to the interpretation of the Gospels as

individual writings.

The Synoptic Problem is therefore discussed from the

beginning in a framework determined by literary and historical

dimensions. Consequently, in one respect the debate is aimed

at a solution of the literary relationship between the Synoptic

gospels.

In this regard, the Synoptic Problem touches upon questions

such as the existence of Q or Luke's use of Mark and Matthew

as an alternative to the two-source hypothesis. The historical

dimension of the Synoptic Problem is concerned with the oldest

and most reliable sources for the activity and fate of Jesus. In

this respect, it is part of the wider discussion about sources for

a historical reconstruction of the activity and fate of Jesus.

From a current perspective, however, the Synoptic Problem has

to take into account the wider horizon of the early Jesus

tradition in its literary and historical dimensions. I will return

to this aspect below." (p. 141)

14. Sewell, Peter. 2001. "The Synoptic Problem: A Stylometric

Contribution Regarding Q." Colloquium no. 33:59-74.

15. Shellard, Barbara. 2002. New Light on Luke: Its Purpose,

Sources and Literary Context. Sheffield: Sheffield Academic

Press.

Chapter 3: Luke and Matthew: the Synoptic Problem, pp. 59-

84.

16. Shin, Hyeon Woo. 2004. Textual Criticism and the Synoptic

Problem in Historical Jesus Research: The search for valid

criteria. Leuven: Peeters.

17. Shuler, Philip L. 1980. "Griesbach Hypothesis and Gospel

Genre." Perkins School of Theology Journal no. 33:41-49.

18. ———. 1983. "Genre Criticism and the Synoptic Problem." In

New Synoptic Studies: The Cambridge Gospel Conference and

Beyond, edited by Farmer, William R., 467-480. Macon:

Mercer University Press.

19. ———. 1987. "The Genre of the Gospels and the Two Gospel

Hypothesis." In Jesus, the Gospels, and the Church, edited by

Sanders, Ed Parish, 69-88. Macon GA: Mercer University

Press.

20. ———. 1990. "The Genre(s) of the Gospels." In The

Interrelations of the Gospels. A Symposium led by M.-E.

Boismard - W.R. Farmer - F. Neirynck, Jerusalem 1984, edited

by Dungan, David L., 459-463. Leuven: Leuven University

Press / Peeters.

21. Sigal, Phillip. 1983. "Aspects of Mark Pointing to Matthean

Priority." In New Synoptic Studies: The Cambridge Gospel

Conference and Beyond, edited by Farmer, William R., 185-

208. Macon: Mercer University Press.

22. Silberman, Lou H. 1979. "Whence Siglum Q? A Conjecture."

Journal of Biblical Literature no. 98:287-288.

23. Sim, David C. 2011. "Matthew and the Synoptic Problem." In

New Studies in the Synoptic Problem: Oxford Conference,

April 2008: Essays in Honour of Christopher M. Tuckett

edited by Foster, Paul, Gregory, Andrew F., Kloppenborg, John

S. and Verheyden, Joseph, 187-208. Leuven: Peeters.

24. ———. 2011. "Matthew's Use of Mark: Did Matthew Intend to

Supplement or to Replace His Primary Source?" New

Testament Studies no. 57:176-192.

Abstract: "Most scholars acknowledge Matthew’s debt to Mark

in the composition of his own Gospel, and they are fully aware

of his extensive redaction and expansion of this major source.

Yet few scholars pose what is an obvious question that arises

from these points: What was Matthew’s intention for Mark

once he had composed and circulated his own revised and

enlarged account of Jesus’ mission? Did he intend to

supplement Mark, in which case he wished his readers to

continue to consult Mark as well as his own narrative, or was it

his intention to replace the earlier Gospel? It is argued in this

study that the evidence suggests that Matthew viewed Mark as

seriously flawed, and that he wrote his own Gospel to replace

the inadequate Marcan account."

25. Simpson, R. T. 1985. "The Major Agreements of Matthew and

Luke Against Mark." In The Two-Source Hypothesis: A Critical

Appraisal, edited by Bellinzoni Jr., Arthur J., 381-395. Macon:

Mercer University Press.

Reprint from New Testament Studies, 12, 1985-86, pp. 273-

284.

26. Sloan, David B. 2016. "The τίς ἐξ ὑμῶν Similitudes and the

Extent of Q." Journal for the Study of the New Testament no.

38:339-355.

Abstract: "Most recent studies of Q are built on the assumption

that Q is not much more extensive than the double tradition, a

questionable assumption given that Mark is much more

extensive than the components of Mark that are found in both

Matthew and Luke and that Matthew’s selective rather than

consecutive approach to Q may have caused him to leave out

many verses of Q. This article considers three similitudes

unique to Luke that begin with the phrase τίς ἐξ ὑμῶν (Lk. 11.5-

8; 14.28-33; 17.7-10) as well as one that is paralleled in

Matthew but has been omitted from the Critical Edition (Lk.

14.5 par. Mt. 12.11-12) and argues that all four of these passages

are from Q. The criteria of Vassiliadis and Kloppenborg for

finding Q passages in Lukan Sondergut are used, with

particular emphasis on Kloppenborg’s ‘stylistic coherence’."

27. Smit, Peter-Ben A. 2014. "Synoptic, Redactional, Stylistic and

Narratological Observations on the Retelling of Mark 7:30 in

Matthew 15:28." New Testament Studies no. 70:1-6.

28. ———. 2017. "Restoring Mark - Reducing Q? A Note on the

Reconstruction of the Original Text of Mark 9:28-29." Biblische

Notizen / Biblical Notes no. 172:53-64.

29. Smith, Daniel A. 2009. "Matthew and Q. The Matthean

Deployment of Q and Mark in the Apocalyptic Discourse."

Ephemerides Theologicae Lovanienses no. 85:99-116.

Abstract: "In their studies of Matthew and the Sayings Gospel

Q, Ulrich Luz and James M. Robinson agree in proposing that

the Matthean community was, sociohistorically as well as

theologically, the direct descendent of the Q community,

although they differ considerably as to the compositional

procedures of the author (hereafter simply “Matthew”) in his

use of Q (2). This paper will present brief synopses of the

approaches of Luz and Robinson to Matthew’s use of Q and

evaluate them in light of Matthew’s use of the latter parts of Q

in the composition of the Apocalyptic Discourse (Matthew 24–

25). The paper will also explore insights from Matthew’s

redeployment of Q’s eschatological materials and use them,

where possible, to assess the arguments of Luz and Robinson in

favour of a possible sociohistorical connection between the

communities behind the texts of Q and Matthew."

(2) 2. Ulrich Luz, Matthew 1–7: A Commentary (Hermeneia),

Minneapolis, MN, Fortress, 2007, p. 49; ID., Matthäus und Q,

in Rudolf Hoppe – Ulrich Busse (eds.), Von Jesus zum

Christus: Christologische Studien. Festgabe für Paul

Hoffmann zum 65. Geburtstag

(BZNW, 93), Berlin, de Gruyter, 1998, 201-215, translated as

Matthew and Q, in ID., Studies in Matthew, Grand Rapids, MI,

Eerdmans, 2005, 39-53; James M. Robinson, The Matthean

Trajectory from Q to Mark, in Adela Yarbro Collins (ed.),

Ancient and Modern Perspectives on the Bible and Culture:

Essays in Honor of Hans Dieter Betz (SPHS, 22), Atlanta, GA,

Scholars, 1998, 122-154, reprinted in Christoph Heil – Josef

Verheyden (eds.), The Sayings Gospel Q: Collected Essays

(BETL, 189), Leuven, University Press – Peeters, 2005, 599-

627; ID., From Safe House to House Church: From Q to

Matthew, in Michael Becker – Wolfgang Fenske (eds.), Das

Ende der Tage und die Gegenwart des Heils: Begegnungen

mit dem Neuen Testament und seiner Umwelt. Festschrift für

Heinz-Wolfgang Kuhn zum 65. Geburtstag (AGJU, 44),

Leiden, Brill, 1999, 183-199, reprinted in Heil – Verheyden

(eds.), The Sayings Gospel Q, 629-644.

30. ———. 2018. "The Sayings Gospel Q in Marcion’s Edition of

Luke." Ephemerides Theologicae Lovanienses no. 94:481-503.

Abstract: "Recent studies proposing that Marcion’s Gospel

represents, or provides access to, an edition of Luke earlier

than its canonical form have obvious implications for Synoptic

Problem scholarship. This article examines the place of the

Double Tradition material (i.e., Q material) in the work of

Joseph Tyson, Jason BeDuhn, and Matthias Klinghardt, with

detailed analyses of the so-called Minor Agreements and the

problematic attestation of Double Tradition material in

Marcion’s Gospel. Finally, a moderate suggestion concerning

the place of Marcion’s Gospel in the web of Synoptic

relationships will be tentatively proposed."

Works cited

Jason David BeDuhn, The First New Testament: Marcion’s

Scriptural Canon, Salem, OR, Polebridge, 2013.

Jospeh B. Tyson, Marcion and Luke-Acts: A Defining Struggle,

Columbia: University of South Carolina Press 2006.

Matthias Klinghardt, The Oldest Gospel and the Formation of

the Canonical Gospels: Inquiry. Reconstruction - Translation -

Variants, Leuven: Peeters 2020 (original German edition

2015).

31. ———. 2019. "Marcion’s Gospel and the Synoptics: Proposals

and Problems." In Gospels and Gospel Traditions in the Second

Century: Experiments in Reception, edited by Schröter, Jens ,

Nicklas, Tobias, Verheyden, Joseph and Simunovic, Katharina,

129-158. Berlin: de Gruyter.

"To be sure, any proposal to include Marcion’s Gospel as a

factor in the Synoptic Problem will be beset with problems,

although this could never be an option for anyone who believes,

as Irenaeus, Tertullian, and many others since them have

claimed, that Marcion’s Gospel (hereafter, MLk) is the direct

descendent of Canonical Luke (hereafter, CLk), an abridged

Luke, the product of Marcion’s own editorial (“mutilating”)

hand.(1)"

(...)

"The essay has four parts. The first part assesses briefly the

three recent reconstructions of MLk by Jason BeDuhn,

Matthias Klinghardt, and Dieter Roth.(8) The second section

revisits the question whether CLk or MLk is the earlier form of

Luke, with observations concerning five different arguments in

favor of MLk being prior to (though not necessarily the direct

source of) CLk. The third section addresses the proposal of

Matthias Klinghardt and Markus Vinzent that MLk is “the

oldest gospel,” the Urquelle, with special attention to the

question of the relative priority of Mark and MLk.(9) A close

reading of Mark 16:1–8 and Luke 24:1– 12 will test Klinghardt’s

Arbeitshypothese (“working hypothesis”) of Markan

dependence on MLk(10). The fourth and final section deals

briefly with the question of the limits of Q in a scenario in

which, as BeDuhn and others propose, MLk is seen as a kind of

relic of an early edition of Luke, in which Mark and Q were

already combined." (p. 131)

(1) Irenaeus, Adv. Haer. 1.27.2; Tertullian, Adv. Marc. 4.2.4;

Epiphanius, Pan. 42.9.1–2. In this essay, “MLk” is meant to

refer to the recension of Luke associated with Marcion (but not

to a particular contemporary reconstruction), and “CLk” either

to the recension of Luke known to the heresiologists, and/or

established by textual criticism today (=Nestle-Aland28).

(8) Jason D. BeDuhn, The First New Testament: Marcion’s

Scriptural Canon (Salem, OR: Polebridge, 2013); Matthias

Klinghardt, Das älteste Evangelium und die Entstehung der

kanonischen Evangelien (TANZ 60/1–2; Tübingen: Francke,

2015); T. Roth, “Marcion’s Gospel and Luke: The History of

Research in Current Debate,” Journal of Biblical iterature 177

(2008): 513–27.

(9) See Markus Vinzent, Marcion and the Dating of the

Synoptic Gospels (Studia Patristica Supplements 2; Leuven:

Peeters, 2014); Klinghardt, Das älteste Evangelium (n. 8).

(10) Klinghardt, Das älteste Evangelium (n. 8), 1:195: “Als

Arbeitshypothese ist daher davon auszugehen, dass Mk die

erste Bearbeitung dieses mutmaßlich ältesten Evangeliums

darstellt” (emphasis original).

32. ———. 2020. "“No Weapon but That of Analysis”: Issues at

Stake in the Rise and Reception of the Two-Document

Hypothesis." In Theological and Theoretical Issues in the

Synoptic Problem, edited by Kloppenborg, John S. and

Verheyden, Joseph, 113-135. New York: Bloomsbury.

"The focus of this chapter, then, is the matter of stakes,

theological and otherwise, in the rise and reception of the 2DH

in nineteenth-century scholarship. Rather than attempting to

sketch these issues out in broad outline, this chapter will focus

on four figures of note, namely: Christian Hermann Weisse,

Heinrich Julius Holtzmann, Arthur Wright, and William

Sanday.(6) While the others scarcely need an Introduction,

Wright

probably does. Admittedly, he was not a major influence in

Synoptic scholarship in Britain, but his caution, moderation,

and piety in proposing what is essentially an oral catechesis

variant of the 2DH are worth considering. The discussion treats

Wright before Sanday because a definitive statement from the

latter on the Synoptic Problem was quite a long time in coming-

a matter worth considering in its own right.(7)" (p. 114)

(6) In treating the two German innovators of the 2DH with two

figures from English scholarship, one from Cambridge and one

from Oxford, I follow the rough schema of Farmer, who sees

the history of the Synoptic Problem unfolding in two

corresponding phases (Farmer, Synoptic Problem [n. 4], 47).

(7) Sanday hinted in already 1872 that he "accept[ed]

temporarily" the conclusions of those arguing for the 2DH, but

"hope[d] to be able to approach the subject [himself] with

sufficient independence": William Sanday, The Authorship and

Historical Character of the Fourth GospeL Considered in

Reference to the Contents of the Gospel Itself: A Critical Essay

(London: Macmillan, 1872), IX.

33. Smith, David Oliver. 2011. Matthew, Mark, Luke, and Paul:

The Influence of the Epistles on the Synoptic Gospels. Eugene,

OR: Wipf and Stock.

34. Smith, Shawn C. 2013. "A Defense of Using Patristic Sources in

Synoptic Problem Research." Stone-Campbell Journal no.

16:63-83.

35. Soards, Marion L. 1987. The Passion According to Luke: The

Special Material of Luke 22. Sheffield: Sheffield Academic

Press.

Reprint: New York: Bloomsbury 2015.

36. Stanton, Graham N. 1985. "The Origin and Purpose of

Matthew' s Gospel: Matthean Scholarship from 1945 to 1980."

In Aufstieg und Niedergang der römischen Welt. Teil II:

Principat. Band 36: Philosophie, Wissenschaften, Technik. 5.

Teilband: Philosophie (Einzelne Autoren, Doxographica),

edited by Haase, Wolfgang, 1889-1951. Berlin: Walter de

Gruyter.

"Q was assumed without discussion. In 1951 B. C. BUTLER

launched the first modern full-scale attack on Marcan priority,

but his attempt to revive Augustine's solution of the synoptic

problem did not attract many followers and it was not

influential on Matthean scholarship. In 1964 W. R. FARMER

revived the GRIESBACH hypothesis and he has continued to

champion it vigorously. On this view, Matthew's gospel was the

first to be written, Luke used Matthew, and Mark used both

Matthew and Luke. If the GRIESBACH hypothesis (or a

modern modification of it) were to be accepted, many of the

conclusions accepted by most Matthean

specialists would be falsified, for they rest on the

presupposition that Matthew used two sources, Mark and Q, as

weIl as oral tradition not found elsewhere in the gospels. Hence

it is not surprising to find that the origin and relationship of the

three synoptic gospels has been debated fiercely in recent

years." (p. 1899)

(...)

"Three British scholars, A. M. FARRER (1954), H. B. GREEN

(1975) and M. D. GOULDER (1974) have acknowledged that

there are sound reasons for concluding that Matthew's main

source is Mark, but have challenged the existence of Q.

FARRER argued that the Q hypothesis wholly depends on the

incredibility of Luke's having read Matthew's book. "It needs no

refutation except the demonstration that its alternative is

possible." (p. 62) Once rid of Q, FARRER believed, we are rid of

a progeny of nameless chimaeras, and free to let St. Matthew

write as he is moved. Most scholars have conceded that while

FARRER'S account of

Luke's use and redaction of Matthew is ingenious, it is

implausible."

(,,,)

"GOULDER has taken up and adapted FARRER'S emphasis on

Matthew's creative freedom. He claims that Matthew has

expanded Mark (his only source, apart from a small handful of

oral traditions) by means of midrash. Matthew's gospel is, quite

simply, a very free midrashic exposition and expansion of

Mark.

Why did Matthew want to write in this way? GOULDER' s

answer is novel, to say the least: Matthew's gospel was

developed liturgically and was intended to be used liturgically;

its order is liturgically significant, for the author has taken the

Jewish Festal Year and its pattern of lections as his base. With a

wave of the lectionary wand, Q is consigned to oblivion." (pp.

1901-1902)

37. Stanton, Graham N., and Perrin, Nicholas. 2013. "Q." In

Dictionary of Jesus and the Gospels. Second edition, edited by

Green, Joel B., Brown, Jeannine K. and Perrin, Nicholas, 711-

718. Downersa Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press.

38. Stegner, William Richard. 1982. "The Priority of Luke: An

Exposition of Robert Lindsey’s Solution to the Synoptic

Problem." Journal of the Chicago Society of Biblical Research

no. 27:26-38.

39. Stein, Robert H. 1971. "The Proper Methodology for

Ascertaining a Markan Redaction History." Novum

Testamentum no. 13:181-198.

40. ———. 1983. "Luke 1:1-4 and Traditiongeschichte." Journal of

the Evangelical Theological Society no. 26:421-430.

41. ———. 1983. "The ”Redaktionsgeschichtlich“ Investigation of a

Markan Seam (Mc 1 21f.)." Zeitschrift für die

Neutestamentliche Wissenschaft und Kunde der Älteren Kirche

no. 26:421-430.

42. ———. 1987. The Synoptic Problem: An Introduction. Grand

Rapids: Baker.

43. ———. 1992. "The Matthew–Luke Agreements Against Mark:

Insight from John." The Catholic Biblical Quarterly no.

54:482-502.

44. ———. 2001. Studying the Synoptic Gospels: Origin and

Interpretation. Grand Rapids (MI): Baker Academic.

Second revised edition of The Synoptic Problem (1987).

45. ———. 2011. "Duality in Mark." In New Studies in the Synoptic

Problem: Oxford Conference, April 2008: Essays in Honour of

Christopher M. Tuckett edited by Foster, Paul, Gregory,

Andrew F., Kloppenborg, John S. and Verheyden, Joseph, 253-

280. Leuven: Peeters.

46. Stephenson, T. 1918. "The Classification of Doublets in the

Synoptic Gospels." The Journal of Theological Studies no. 20:1-

47. ———. 1918. "The Overlapping of Sources in Matthew and

Luke." The Journal of Theological Studies no. 21:127-145.

48. Stoldt, Hans-Herbert. 1980. History and Criticism of the

Marcan Hypothesis. Macon (GA): Mercer University Press.

Translated from the German Geschichte und Kritik der

Markus-hypothese, Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1977,

and edited by Donald L. Niewyk; Introduction by William R.

Farmer.

"The present work does not approach a critical analysis of the

whole problem of the Gospels, but for the time being examines

only its most highly controversial and therefore most essential

feature, the synoptic problem." (p. 2)

(...)

"Until now it has been generally accepted that there were, in all,

six different possibilities of utilization, calculated according to

the law of permutation theory. But that hardly exhausts all of

the potential combinations of the three Gospels: of these, there

are not six, but over thirty (see below, p.!44ff). It can be said

that almost all of the theoretical relationships have been

represented experimentally, or have at least put in an

appearance, during the course of research. However, only two

of them have received the concentrated attention of scholarly

discussion, and thus taken on true historical importance; the

Griesbach hypothesis, and the Marcan hypothesis.

Both of these theories proceed from the assumption that the

key to the solution of the synoptic problem must lie in the

Gospel of Mark. Without a doubt, the Gospel of Mark occupies

a central position, and its relationship to the first and third

Gospels is different from the relationship between those two.

One may also reverse the situation and say: each of these two

Gospels has for its very own a special relationship to Mark

which cannot be compared with the one that relates it to the

other. Both hypotheses, therefore, start from the same

alternative: Either Matthew and Luke are dependent on Mark,

or Mark is dependent on them. In a chronological sense this

would mean that the Gospel of Mark is either the first or the

last of the synoptic Gospels. Griesbach’s hypothesis asserts the

latter, and the Marcan hypothesis the former." (pp. 4-5)

(...)

"One looks in vain among the founders of the Marcan

hypothesis for such a preparatory balancing of the pros and

cons of their theory of sources. Rather, one has the impression

that they rush too quickly into the thick of the fray, and that

their gaze is overwhelmingly turned toward questions of detail

in the synoptic gospels in order to consider these questions

from the perspective of the Marcan hypothesis and to bring

them into harmony with it whenever necessary. But only if

these parts were fitted together to form an unbroken chain of

evidence without excluding any unsolved questions could it be

said that the Marcan hypothesis had been proved, at all events

from this point of view.

Therefore, in the following chapters we shall submit this

source-theory to a severe ordeal by fire. In doing so it is of

decisive importance to examine this fundamental question

from its very beginning, that \s,from the laying of its

foundation by its originators. But for what reason? Is it not

possible to object and say that all of this is “old hat”—old

research results that have gathered dust for more than a

hundred years? Have not these results again and again been

scrutinized and confirmed by competent researchers? It does

not seem to be necessary to repeat the whole process; for some

time these conclusions have belonged to the “assured results of

scholarship,” and they have stood forth like a rock of Gibraltar.

But let us assume that this “assured result of scholarship” was

false. Then it must have been, or at least could have been, false

from the very beginning. Then it would be of decisive

importance to examine it as it comes to birth and to discover its

peccatum originale. This is what we shall undertake in the

following chapters." (pp. 22-23)

49. Stonehouse, Ned B. 1964. Origins of the Synoptic Gospels:

Some basic questions. Grand Rapids, Mi: Eerdmans.

50. Strecker, Georg, ed. 1993. Minor Agreements: Symposium

Göttingen 1991. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht.

Inhalt: Georg Strecker: Vorwort/Foreword 7; Georg Strecker:

Begrüßung/Words of Welcome 17; Frans Neirynck: The Minor

Agreements and the Two-Source Theory 25; Albert Fuchs: Die

"Seesturmperikope" Mk 4,35-41 parr im Wandel der

urkirchlichen Verkündigung 65; Wolfgang Schenk: Zur Frage

einer vierten Version der Seesturm-Erzählung in einer Mt/Lk-

Agreement-Redaktions-Schicht ("Dt-Mk") 93; Christopher Μ.

Tuckett: The Minor Agreements and Textual Criticism 119;

Michael D. Goulder: Luke’s Knowledge of Matthew 143;

William R. Farmer: The Minor Agreements of Matthew and

Luke Against Mark and the Two

Gospel Hypothesis 163; Ulrich Luz: Korreferat zu W.R. Farmer,

The Minor Agreements of Matthew and Luke against Mark and

the Two-Gospel Hypothesis 209; The Minor Agreements in a

Horizontal-Line Synopsis (F. Neirynck): Appendices I, II, III

221; Literatur 231; Abkürzungen 241; Register 243;

Teilnehmerliste 245.

51. Streeter, Burnett Hillman. 1911. "On the Trial of Our Lord

before Herod: A Suggestion." In Studies in the Synoptic

Problem By Members of The University of Oxford edited by

Sanday, William, 228-231. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

52. ———. 1911. "The Literary Evolution of the Gospels." In Studies

in the Synoptic Problem By Members of The University of

Oxford edited by Sanday, William, 209-227. Oxford: Clarendon

Press.

53. ———. 1911. "On the Original Order of Q." In Studies in the

Synoptic Problem By Members of The University of Oxford

edited by Sanday, William, 140-164. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

54. ———. 1911. "Synoptic Criticism and the Eschatological

Problem." In Studies in the Synoptic Problem By Members of

The University of Oxford edited by Sanday, William, 425-436.

Oxford: Clarendon Press.

55. ———. 1911. "The Original Extext of Q." In Studies in the

Synoptic Problem By Members of The University of Oxford

edited by Sanday, William, 185-208. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

56. ———. 1911. "St. Mark's Knowledge and Use of Q." In Studies in

the Synoptic Problem By Members of The University of Oxford

edited by Sanday, William, 165-184. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

57. ———. 1921. "Fresh Light on the Synoptic Problem." The

Hibbert Journal no. 20:103-112.

58. ———. 1924. The Four Gospels: A Study of Origins, Treating of

the Manuscript Tradition, Sources, Authorship, and Dates.

London: Macmillan.

Selections (pp. 157-169 and 195-197) reprinted with the title

The Priority of Mark in: Arthur J. Belinzoni, Jr. (ed.), The

Two-Source Hypothesis A Critical Appraisal, Macon: Mercer

University Press 1985, pp. 23-36.

59. ———. 1985. "The Priority of Mark." In The Two-Source

Hypothesis: A Critical Appraisal, edited by Bellinzoni Jr.,

Arthur J., 23-36. Macon: Mercer University Press.

Reprint of B. H. Streeter, The Four Gospels; A Study of

Origins, London: Macmillan 1924, pp. 157-169 and 195-197.

60. ———. 1985. "The Document Q." In The Two-Source

Hypothesis: A Critical Appraisal, edited by Bellinzoni Jr.,

Arthur J., 221-225. Macon: Mercer University Press.

Reprint from The Four Gospels: A Study of Origins, London:

Macmillan 1924, pp. 182-186.

61. Strickland, Michael. 2014. The Evangelicals and the Synoptic

Problem. Bern: Peter Lang.

"The purpose of this work is to discover how, throughout their

history, evangelical Christians have approached the Synoptic

Problem (SP)-the classic puzzle in NT criticism-and engage

with recent scholarly discussion among evangelicals about

solutions to the SP. This study addresses five crucial questions.

First, for how long have those with evangelical convictions

sought to explain the similarities and differences between the

synoptic gospels by appealing to the evangelists' sources?

Second, as they considered these sources and the evangelists'

use of them, how were views of inspiration held by those

evangelicals affected and explained? Third, how have

evangelical solutions to the SP evolved as biblical criticism has

developed over the centuries? Fourth, how have evangelicals

advocated their preferred solutions to the SP and characterized

those solutions different from their own? Fifth, how has

ecclesiology factored into evangelical discussions of the SP?" (p.

XII()

62. ———. 2016. "The Synoptic Problem in Sixteenth-Century

Protestantism." Journal of Ecclesiastical History no. 67:82-93.

Abstract: "This article examines early Protestant discussion of

the historic puzzle in New Testament study known as the

Synoptic Problem, which deals with the potential literary

relationship between the

Gospels of Matthew, Mark and Luke. The subject was

addressed by John Calvin, pioneer Reformer, and by the early

Lutheran Martin Chemnitz. Calvin made a puissant

contribution by constructing the first three-column Gospel

harmony. Chemnitz contributed nascent redaction-critical

assessments of Matthew’s use of Mark. Thus, far from simply

being a concern to post-Enlightenment critics (as is often

assumed), interest in the Gospel sources was present from the

earliest days of the Reformation."

63. Stuhlmacher, Peter. 1990. "The Genre(s) of the Gospels.

Response to P. L. Shuler." In The Interrelations of the Gospels.

A Symposium led by M.-E. Boismard - W.R. Farmer - F.

Neirynck, Jerusalem 1984, edited by Dungan, David L., 464-

494. Leuven: Leuven University Press / Peeters.

64. Styler, G. M. 1985. "The Priority of Mark." In The Two-Source

Hypothesis: A Critical Appraisal, edited by Bellinzoni Jr.,

Arthur J., 63-75. Macon: Mercer University Press.

Reprint from C. F. D. Moule, The Birth of the New Testament,

New York: Harper & Row 1962, pp. 223-232.

"The priority of Mk and the hypothesis of Q have been widely

accepted in the present century, and are conveniently denoted

by the name ‘The Two-document Hypothesis’, although it

should be noted that the documents may well have been many

more than two.

The classical statement and defence was made by B. H.

Streeter,(1) who attempted to reconstruct Q as a unitary

document, but restricted it more narrowly than previous

scholars. He gave the labels ‘M’ and

‘L ’ to the material peculiar to Matt. and Lk., or (to be more

precise) to the sources from which he took most of their

peculiar material to be derived. Here again it may be noted that

some scholars have been

cautious in accepting the unity of the M or L material, and that

since this material appears in only one gospel any

reconstruction of its alleged source is even more speculative

than the reconstruction of a Q.

It was not necessary to maintain that Mk’s version must at

every point be older than Matt.’s parallel version, since it was

possible to say that anything in Matt. which in fact seemed

more original than Mk could have been derived from Q.

Further, there had been lingering doubts about the existence of

Q. But it came as a shock when in 1951 Dom B. C. Butler

published his book The Originality of St Matthew, attacking

the Q-hypothesis and the priority of Mk at the same time. In a

minutely detailed study he subjected both hypotheses to a

severe criticism, and argued strongly for the priority of Matt.

Mk, he argued, was dependent on Matt.; Lk. was dependent on

_Mk for the material which the two had in c6mmon, and on

Matt. for the Q-material. Once the Q-hypothesis is abandoned,

the priority of Matt., he claimed, quickly follows‘ from the

existence of those passages in which Matt.’s text seems clearly

more original than Mk’s, or in some other way superior to it.

In spite of much close and careful reasoning, and the existence

of at any rate some passages which tell in favour of Butler’s

conclusion, scholars have not abandoned the usual belief in the

priority of Mk.

In this Excursus it will not be possible to examine all Butler’s

arguments and instances one by one.(2) But an attempt will be

made to show that the belief in the priority of Mk is in fact

securely grounded, and to make clear the principal arguments

on either side, on which the decision must turn." (pp. 223-224)

(1) The Four Gospels (1924.).

(2) Nor to consider the various articles that have appeared

subsequently.

65. Talbert, Charles H. 1970. "The Priority of Mark and the 'Q'

Source in Luke." In Jesus and Man's Hope. Volume 1, edited by

Buttrick, D. G., 131-170. Pittsburgh: Pittsburgh Theological

Seminary.

66. ———. 1978. "Oral and Independent or Literary and

Interdependent?: A Response to Albert B. Lord." In The

Relationships Among the Gospels. An Interdisciplinary

Dialogue, edited by Walker, William O., 92-102. San Antonio:

Trinity University Press.

67. Talbert, Charles H., and McKnight, Edgar V. 1972. "Can the

Griesbach Hypothesis Be Falsified?" Journal of Biblical

Literature no. 91:336-368.

68. Taylor, Vincent. 1926. Behind the Third Gospel: A Study of the

Proto-Luke Hypothesis. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

69. ———. 1927. " Is the Proto-Luke Hypothesis Sound." The

Journal of Theological Studies:147-155.

70. ———. 1933. The Formation of the Gospel Tradition: Eight

Lectures. London: Macmillan.

71. ———. 1985. "The Original Order of Q." In The Two-Source

Hypothesis: A Critical Appraisal, edited by Bellinzoni Jr.,

Arthur J., 295-317. Macon: Mercer University Press.

Reprint from A. J. B. Higgins (ed.), New Testament Essay:

Studies in Memory of T. W. Manson, 1893-1958, Manchester:

Manchester University Press 1959, pp. 246 ff.; reprinted in V.

Taylor, New Testament Essays, London: Epworth Press 1970,

pp. 95-118.

72. Thomas, Robert L. 1976. "An Investigation of the Agreements

between Matthew and Luke against Mark." Journal of the

Evangelical Theological Society no. 19:103-112.

73. ———, ed. 2002. Three Views on the Origins of the Synoptic

Gospels. Grand Rapids (MI): Kregel

Contents: Contributors 7; Robert L. Thomas: Introduction 8;

Chapter 1: Grant R. Osborne and Matthew C. Williams: The

Case for the Markan Priority View of Gospel Origins: The

Two-/Four-Source View 19; John H. Niemeld:Two-Gospel

Response 97; F. David Farnell: Independence Response 111;

Chapter 2: John H. Niemeld: The Case for the Two-Gospel View

of Gospel Origins 126; Grant R. Osborne and Matthew C.

Williams: Markan Priority Response 198; F. David Farnell:

Independence Response 210;

Chapter 3: F. David Farnell: The Case for the Independence

View of Gospel Origins 226; Grant R. Osborne and Matthew C.

Williams: Markan Priority Response 310; John H. Niemeld:

Two-Gospel Response 323;

Robert L. Thomas: Conclusion: The Evidence Summarized 337;

Author Index 389; Scripture Index 393; Subject Index 398-

406.

74. ———. 2002. "Two-Gospel Response." In Conclusion: The

Evidence Summarized, edited by Thomas, Robert L., 327-387.

Grand Rapids (MI): Kregel

75. Throckmorton Jr., Burton H. 1948. "Did Mark Know Q?"

Journal of Biblical Literature no. 67:319-329.

76. Tischendorf, Costantin. 1867. Origins of the Four Gospels.

Boston: America Tract Society.

77. Tiwald, Markus. 2015. Q in Context I: The Separation between

the Just and the Unjust in Early Judaism and in the Sayings

Source. Göttingen: V & R unipress.

78. ———. 2015. Q in Context II: Q in Context II: Social Setting

and Archaeological Background of the Sayings Source.

Göttingen: V & R unipress.

79. ———, ed. 2020. The Q Hypothesis Unveiled: Theological,

Sociological, and Hermeneutical Issues Behind the Sayings

Source. Stuttgart: Kohlhammer.

Contents: Markus Tiwald: Looking behind the Curtain: An

Introduction to the Volume 9; Jens Schröter: Key Issues

Concerning the Q Hypothesis: Synoptic Problem, Verbal

Reconstruction and the Message of Jesus 18; Lukas Bormann:

Das lnteresse an Markuspriorität, Logienquelle und

Zweiquellentheorie im deutschen Protestantismus des

19.Jahrhunderts 41; Christopher Tuckett: The Reception of Q

Studies in the UK: No room at the inn? 62; Paul Foster: The

Rise and Development of the Farrer Hypothesis 86; Markus

Tiwald: The Investment of Roman Catholics in the 2DH and Q

129; Joseph Verheyden: Introducing "Q" in French Catholic

Scholarship at the Turn of the 19th and 20th Century: Alfred

Loisy's Évangiles synoptiques 146; Gerd Theissen: Itinerant

Radicalism: The Origin of an Exegetical Theory 175; Marco

Frenschkowski: Itinerant Charismatics and Travelling Artisans

- Was Jesus Travellng Lifestyle Induced by His Artisan

Background? 191; Sarah E. Rollens: Where Are All the Women

in Q Studies?: Gender Demographics and the Study of Q 223;

Hildegard Scherer: Learning Lessons on Q: The 2DH and Q in

Academic Teaching 254; Ralf Miggelbrink: The Quest for the

Historical Jesus and Q in the View of Systematic Theology 274;

Contributors 283.

80. ———. 2020. The Sayings Source: A Commentary on Q.

Stuttgart: Kohlhammer.

81. ———. 2020. "The Investment of Roman Catholics in the 2DH

and Q." In The Q Hypothesis Unveiled: Theological,

Sociological, and Hermeneutical Issues Behind the Sayings

Source, edited by Tiwald, Markus, 129-145. Stuttgart:

Kohlhammer.

82. Toda, Satoshi. 2012. "The reasons why the synoptic problem

should be reconsidered once again." Hitotsubashi Journal of

Arts and Sciences no. 53:47-78.

83. Trevett, Christine. 1984. "Approaching Matthew from the

Second Century: the Under-Used Ignatian Correspondence."

Journal for the Study of the New Testament no. 20:59-67.

"We are often told that in writing the seven letters of the so-

called Middle Recension Ignatius of Antioch, bishop and

martyr, showed knowledge of Matthew’s Gospel.(1) His

epistles, it has been claimed, provide therefore a terminus ante

quem for that Gospel’s creation and/or supportive evidence in

favour of its Syrian provenance.(2)

Although such statements are made, the question of literary

relationship has been relatively little studied, and this paper

will draw attention to the findings of a small number of

scholars which has considered seriously Ignatius’s alleged

dependence on Matthew’s Gospel. To facilitate comparison for

readers, it will include a table of the parallels between the

Gospel and the letters most frequently adduced as well as

comments concerning some of those factors which render the

approach to a Gospel from the second century difficult and

worth undertaking. For although no consensus of scholarly

opinion has emerged regarding Ignatius’s usage, the few

studies cited in this paper provide tempting glimpses of

insights yet to be gained.

They suggest that our knowledge of the Synoptic Problem, of

the form, date and provenance of individual Synoptic sources

and of the use of Gospel traditions in Christian communities

may be furthered by means of an approach to the Gospels from

the second century." (p. 59)

(1) Written to Ephesus, Magnesia, Tralles, Rome, Philadelphia,

Smyrna and to Polycarp.

(2) E.g. B.H. Streeter, The Primitive Church (London, 1929), p.

281; G.D. Kilpatrick, The Origins of the Gospel according to St.

Matthew (Oxford, 1946), p. 6; G. Strecker, Der Weg der

Gerechtigkeit (Gottingen, 1962), pp. 35f.; J.C. Fenton, The

Gospel of St. Matthew (Harmondsworth, 1963), p. 11; D. Hill,

The Gospel of Matthew (London, 1972), pp. 48f., 51.

84. Tripp, Jeffrey M. 2013. "Measuring Arguments from Order for

Q: Regression Analysis and a New Metric for Assessing

Dependence." Neotestamentica no. 47:123-148.

Bibliographia. Annotated bibliographies

Raul Corazzon || rc@ontology.co || Info

Synoptic Problem: Bibliography of

the main studies in English from

1964 (A - Bro)

Bibliographies on the Synoptic problem

1. Longstaff, Thomas Richmond Willis, and Thomas, Page Allison,

eds. 1989. The Synoptic Problem. A Bibliography, 1716-1988.

Macon: Mercer University Press.

"This bibliography includes the major works (books and

reviews; articles in journals and collected essays; dissertations;

unpublished material) not only with reference to the synoptic

problem, but with reference to the wider question of the

sources of and interrelationships among the synoptic gospels. A

number of works are included which, while not dealing with the

issues directly, are relevant and have been cited in the

literature. Many of the books in the bibliography themselves

contain excellent bibliographies. The most important of these

have the notation “Includes bibl. ”

This bibliography is divided into three sections: (1) Author/title

index; (2) date of publication/writing index (author and entry

number listed); and (3) keyword index with entry numbers." (p.

XV)

2. McKnight, Scot, and Williams, Matthew C. 2000. The Synoptic

Gospels: An Annotated Bibliography. Grand Rapids, MI: Baker

Books.

Studies on the Synoptic Gospels, pp. 37-46.

"The number of studies devoted to the Synoptic Problem is

immense and no longer controllable. The following works are

among the most important. For those who wish to delve further

into the Synoptic Problem, the bibliography of Longstaff (see

#142) is exhaustive through 1988. Besides the industry of

individual scholars poring painstakingly over the data of the

texts themselves, scholars of the Synoptic Problem have

frequently sponsored international conferences where heated

debate and constructive progress held the day. Fortunately,

many of the conferences have had their papers published. A

virtual history of the debate can be traced by studying such

volumes. Let it be observed that one's solution to the Synoptic

Problem has a decided impact on one's perception of early

Christian history and the nature of the theology of each

Evangelist (see Farmer, #120)." (p. 37)

References

#142 = Longstaff, Thomas, The Synoptic Problem. A

Bibliography, 1716-1988.

#120 = Farmer, The Synoptic Problem: A Critical Analysis.

Studies on the Synoptic Problem

1. Abakuks, Andris. 2006. "A Statistical Study of the Triple-Link

Model in the Synoptic Problem." Journal of the Royal

Statistical Society no. 169:49-60.

Summary: "In New Testament studies, the synoptic problem is

concerned with the relationships between the gospels of

Matthew, Mark and Luke. A careful specification in

probabilistic terms is set up of what is known as the triple-link

model, and, as a special case, the double-link model.

Counts of the numbers of verbal agreements between the

gospels are examined to investigate which of the possible triple-

link models appears to give the best fit to the data."

"Honoré (1968) in a pioneering paper carried out a statistical

analysis of the synoptic problem, a well-known branch of New

Testament studies, in which hypotheses about the relationships

between the gospels of Matthew, Mark and Luke are

investigated. A good Introduction to the various theories that

have been proposed for the relationships between the synoptic

gospels is given by Goodacre (2001). Honoré (1968) is

particularly useful in that it provides a comprehensive listing of

the data that were used in the analysis and a detailed account of

the mathematical and statistical reasoning. However, from the

point of view of a statistician, one of the challenges of Honoré

(1968) is that his terminology tends not to conform to what is

accepted usage in statistical theory." (p. 49)

2. ———. 2007. "A Modification of Honoré’s Triple-link Model in

the Synoptic Problem." Journal of the Royal Statistical Society

no. 170:841-850.

Summary: "In an earlier paper a careful specification in

probabilistic terms was set up of Honoré’s triple-link model. In

the present paper, a modification of Honoré’s model is

proposed. As previously, counts of the numbers of verbal

agreements between the gospels are examined to investigate

which of the possible triple-link models appears to give the best

fit to the data, but now using the modified version of the model

and additional sets of data."

3. ———. 2012. "The Synoptic Problem: on Matthew’s and Luke’s

Use of Mark." Journal of the Royal Statistical Society no.

175:959-975.

Summary: "Assuming Markan priority, we investigate the

relationship between the words in Mark that are retained

unchanged by Matthew and those that are retained unchanged

by Luke. This is done by mapping the sequence of words in

Mark into binary time series that represent the retention or

non-retention of the individual words, and then carrying out a

variety of logistic regression analyses.

4. ———. 2015. The Synoptic Problem and Statistics . Boca Raton

(FL): CRC Press.

"Outline of this book"

"In Chapter 2, we build upon the triple-link model introduced

by Honoré (1968), broadly following the development in

Abakuks (2006a, b, 2007), but with some changes. In Chapter

3, the bivariate binary time series obtained from the

highlighted text of Mark in Farmer's Synopticon is introduced,

and much of the rest of the book is concerned with the analysis

of such binary time series. In Chapter 3 itself, following the

treatment in Abakuks (2012), under the assumption of Markan

priority, i.e., that Mark was the first of the synoptic gospels to

be written, the time series is analyzed using logistic regression

methods in order to investigate Matthew's and Luke's use of

Mark and, in particular, to test whether Matthew and Luke

were statistically independent in their verbal agreements with

Mark. From Chapter 4 onwards, hidden Markov models are

used to analyze the series. Chapter 4 is a theoretical interlude in

which the theory of hidden Markov models for binary data is

presented, with some associated R code in Appendix A at the

end of the book. In Chapter 5, hidden Markov models are used

to investigate Matthew's and Luke's use of Mark.(24) In

Chapter 6, a different bivariate binary time series, which uses

Matthew as the base text instead of Mark, is analysed in order

to investigate the verbal agreements of Mark and Luke with

Matthew.

After the statistical analysis in earlier chapters of the binary

data extracted from the gospel texts, in Chapter 7 we turn to

some examples of the incomparably richer material of the texts

themselves in Greek, to be able to exhibit the verbal agreements

word by word, and in English translation, to make the texts

accessible to a wider readership. Parallel passages from the

synoptic gospels, which emerge from the results of the

statistical analysis as particularly significant for the synoptic

problem, are presented for detailed examination.

We focus especially on passages that, from the statistical

analysis, appear likely to provide the strongest evidence that,

under the assumption of Markan priority, Matthew and Luke

were not independent in their use of Mark. This leads to the

discussion of specific issues concerning the relationships

between parallel sections of text and the responses of New

Testament scholars who defend different synoptic hypotheses.

Finally, in Chapter 8 we summarize the conclusions that may

be drawn from our analysis and suggest directions for further

research.

To put things in the broader context of New Testament studies,

much of the material in this book could be regarded as falling

within the scope of what is known as source criticism, which

seeks to identify the sources used by the gospel authors. Some

of the discussion in Chapter 7 touches on aspects of redaction

criticism, which deals with the way in which the gospel authors

edited and adapted their sources to fit in with their own

theological standpoint.

These and other aspects of biblical criticism are surveyed in

Tuckett (1987)."

(24) An introductory sketch of this approach is given in

Abakuks (2015).

5. ———. 2015. "A Statistical Time Series Approach to the Use of

Mark by Matthew and Luke." In Marcan Priority Without Q:

Explorations in the Farrer Hypothesis , edited by Poirier, John

C. and Peterson, Jeffrey, 119-139. London: T & T Clark.

"1. Introduction

The statistical approach to the synoptic problem to be

described in this study follows a tradition of statistical analysis

of verbal agreements comprehensively reviewed in a recent

article by John Poirier.(1) In particular, it builds on aspects of a

seminal paper by A. M. Honoré.(2) Earlier analysis by the

present author(3) put some of Honoré's work on the so-called

triple-link model on a more rigorous mathematical footing.

Using the symbols A, B, and C to refer to any permutation of

the synoptic gospels, it is supposed in the triple-link model

that, (...) Gospels B and C both use Gospel A and that Gospel C

also uses Gospel B as a source. To summarise very briefly the

results of this earlier work, it was found that the triple-link

model appeared to give a good fit to the data, with the best fit

provided by the two cases of the model where Luke was the last

of the gospels to be written: A = Mark, B = Matthew, C = Luke,

and A = Matthew, B = Mark, C = Luke, respectively." (p. 119)

1. John C. Poirier ' Statistical Studies of the Verbal Agreements

and their Impact on the Synoptic Problem', Currents in Biblical

Research 7 (2008), pp. 68- 123.

2. A. M. Honoré,' A Statistical Study of the Synoptic Problem',

NovT 10 (1968), pp. 95- 147.

3. Andris Abakuks, 'A Statistical Study of the Triple-link Model

in the Synoptic Problem', Journal of the Royal Statistical

Society, Series A, 169 (2006), pp. 49- 60; idem, 'A Modification

of Honoré's Triple-link Model in the Synoptic Problem',

Journal of the Royal Statistical Society, Series A, 170 (2007),

pp. 841- 50.

6. Abbott, Edwin. 1901. The Corrections of Mark Adopted by

Matthew and Luke . London: Adam and Charles Black.

Book II: The principal corrections of Mark , pp. 61-300; § 80.

Minor agreements of Matthew and Luke , pp- 300-304.

Appendix I: A complete table of the corrections in Greek , pp.

307-324; Appendix II: Oral tradition , pp. 325-330.

"The object of this book is to demonstrate that Mark contains a

tradition from which Matthew and Luke borrowed, and to

discuss the corrections of Mark jointly adopted by Matthew and

Luke." (Preface, VII).

(....)

"A comparison of the Synoptists will show that Matthew and

Luke, where Mark is altogether wanting, often agree very

closely indeed, as, for example, in this passage of the Sermon

on the Mount: " No one (Lk. servant) can be bond-servant to

two lords ; for either he will hate the one and love the other or

hold fast to one and despise the other. Ye cannot serve God and

Mammon." ^ In the whole of the Triple Tradition there is

perhaps no instance of such close agreement as in this and in

other passages common to Matthew and Luke and wanting in

Mark. But these passages are best considered by themselves.

Almost all of them contain sayings, not doings, of Christ, and

they have (many of them) peculiarities of style and subject-

matter which render it desirable to consider them separately, as

constituting a distinct document from the Triple Tradition.

Theoretically, it may be urged that this has no more right to be

treated as a distinct document than any other doubly-attested

tradition, e.g. the similarities common to Mark and Matthew

alone, or to Mark and Luke alone. But in practice this collection

of Matthew -Luke passages is so much more important than

any other " double traditions " in the Synoptists that we shall

find it convenient, for brevity, to call it the Double Tradition,

and to discuss it in a separate volume, without, of course,

allowing this convenient title to commit us to any conclusions

about the authorship of this or that passage in the collection."

(p. 48)

(1) Mt. vi. 24, Lk. xvi. 13.

7. Abogunrin, Samuel Oyinloye. 1990. "The Synoptic Gospel

Debate: A Re-Examination from an African Point of View." In

The Interrelations of the Gospels. A Symposium led by M.-E.

Boismard - W.R. Farmer - F. Neirynck, Jerusalem 1984 ,

edited by Dungan, David L., 381-407. Leuven: Leuven

University Press / Peeters.

8. Adamczewski, Bartosz. 2010. Q or not Q? The So-called Triple,

Double, and Single traditions in the Synoptic Gospels .

Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang.

"If the 'Q source' ever existed, it must have been one of the

pillars of theology of early Christianity. In such a case, why was

this pillar so underdeveloped theologically, especially in

comparison to the Pauline ideas? Why did 'Q' completely

disappear as a literary entity soon after the composition of the

gospels of Matthew and Luke? Shall we believe that Christianity

is based on sand of an unknown, lost, theologically problematic

document?

It is therefore evident that the solution to the synoptic problem

has fundamental importance for interpretation of the Synoptic

Gospels and of the early Christian tradition as a whole. Every

solution to the synoptic problem offers not only a more or less

satisfactory explanation of the literary similarities and

differences among the gospels of Matthew, Mark, and Luke. It

either gives or presupposes also an answer to a more general

question, whether the Synoptic Gospels and other New

Testament writings were based on one internally coherent

gospel tradition or on numerous disparate, partially

overlapping traditions and literary

sources.

Consequently, every solution to the synoptic problem not only

explains the origin of the so-called triple, double, and single

traditions in the Synoptic Gospels but also gives an explicit or

implicit answer to the more fundamental literary-hermeneutic

question, in what sense we may call them 'traditions' at all.

Were they channels of more or less faithful oral transmission of

some preliterary material or rather ways of literary-rhetorical

formulation and reformulation of some particular theological

ideas? Accordingly, shall we understand the synoptic

'traditions' as having (similarly to other scriptural traditions)

mainly a historical-informative or rather an intertextual-

performative nature?

The quest for the correct solution to the synoptic problem is

therefore by no means a purely technical issue. Every solution

to the synoptic problem to a considerable degree conditions

understanding not only of the history of early Christianity but

also of the literary character of the New Testament writings and

consequently of adequate ways of their overall interpretation."

(pp. 17-18)

9. Addis, William Edward. 1911. "The Criticism of the Hexateuch

compared with that of the Synoptic Gospels." In Studies in the

Synoptic Problem By Members of The University of Oxford

edited by Sanday, William, 367-386. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Syllabus: "The principles of criticism whether applied to the

Old or New Testament are identical.

But the subject-matter in each case is very different.

The date of Moses most uncertain, but he must have lived at

least several centuries before any record of his life, which has

reached us, came into being. Contrast with this the proximity of

St. Mark's Gospel and of Q to the events which they attest.

The present position of criticism of the Hexateuch. The

uncritical conservatism of MoUer and Orr. New views on the

early date of Monolatry. Eerdmans' rejection of critical

principles accepted ever since Astruc published his book on the

composition of Genesis in 1751.

Sir W. M. Ramsay's protest against the claim of Hexateuch

critics to determine in the minutest details the extent of the

several documents. The misleading nature of the parallel which

he draws.

The minute severance of documents in the Hexateuch justified

by an examination of the story of the Flood as given in Genesis.

General sketch of the documents in the Hexateuch and their

characteristics.

Both Hexateuch and Gospels of composite origin. Similar

composite origin can be proved in case of Chronicles, I Esdras,

and may be illustrated from the Saxon Chronicle.

Doublets the best clue to diversity of documents. Doublets in

Synoptic Gospels, Psalms, and Proverbs.

The compiler of the Hexateuch had no documents near to the

time of Moses, and he makes his latest document the

framework in which he sets and to which he adapts all his

earlier material. The Synoptic Evangelists, on the contrary, base

their narratives on Mark, their earliest document for the life of

Christ. Matthew and Luke also build on Q, which may belong to

the Apostolic age. But a peculiar difficulty arises in the Gospels

from the fact that there must have been an Aramaic

background."

10. Agnew, Peter W. 1983. "The “Two-Gospel” Hypothesis and a

Biographical Genre for the Gospels." In New Synoptic Studies:

The Cambridge Gospel Conference and Beyond , edited by

Farmer, William R., 481-499. Macon: Mercer University Press.

"The gospels differ considerably from each other. The question

this raises is pressing for genre criticism: what gives the gospels

themselves any generic affinity with each other, let alone

generic identity with Hellenistic biography? Can we really

speak of the gospels as belonging to one genre? Under the sui

generis solution this problem is nonexistent, for the gospels,

being Kleinliteratur, are in a category by themselves, separate

from any extant examples of Hellenistic Hochliteratur , and

generically united with each other in their own genre gospel on

the basis of their kerygmatic content. But if the gospels are not

simply gospels alone, being instead, generically speaking,

literary works, perhaps biographies, which incidentally have

gospel subject matter, then their differences do create the

problem of what comprises their generic unity. Current

discussion on this question must discern some factor that gives

the gospels their common genre other than the gospels’ subject

matter, if the gospels can successfully be regarded as

Hellenistic biographies.

The purpose of this paper is to suggest that such a factor is

discernible, in the case of the synoptic gospels, in the historical

source-copier relationship that exists among Matthew, Mark,

and Luke-Acts. This proposal explores the ramifications of one

of Shuler’s [*] observations about genre, that it must be a

dynamic concept, allowing for the influence of one work on

those that follow, so that the works in question can be different

because they stand in relation to one another, each author

reacting to the preceding authors’ work, while at the same time

the works belong to a single genre. Perhaps the synoptic

gospels’ historical interrelationships can make intelligible the

differences among these works without infringing on their

generic unity, thus opening the way for a new biographical

consensus view on the question of the genre of the synoptic

gospels based on contemporary scholarship. We shall see how

such a consensus might look after first considering in detail the

historical relationships existing among Matthew, Mark, and

Luke-Acts." (pp. 485-486, notes omitted)

[*] Philip L. Shuler, A Genre for the Gospels: The Biographical

Character of Matthew , Philadelphia: Fortress Press 1982.

11. Allen, Willoughby C. 1911. "The Aramaic Background of the

Gospels." In Studies in the Synoptic Problem By Members of

The University of Oxford edited by Sanday, William, 287-312.

Oxford: Clarendon Press.

"The first three Gospels are written in Greek.

Was that their original language, and are they based on Greek

sources? Apart from the question of the language of the first

Gospel writings, did Christ speak in Aramaic or in Greek ?

The case of St. Luke is the easiest and may be taken first. It is

written in Greek, and is largely based on Greek sources. That is

to say, the compiler had before him a Greek Gospel practically

identical with our St. Mark.

He has also a good many sayings which are also found in St.

Matthew. Whatever St. Matthew may have done, St. Luke no

doubt drew them from a Greek source or sources. The rest of

the Gospel of St. Luke was probably also based on Greek

sources. The first two chapters, which are strongly marked by

Hebraisms (not Aramaisms), have often been thought to be

translation work of a Hebrew original. But it is equally possible

that they were purposely written in the style of the Greek

version of the Old Testament. St. Luke's language, generally

speaking, in the Gospel is tinged with Hebraisms, but these

need not anywhere be signs of translation work. Conscious

imitation of the Septuagint will quite adequately account for

them.

The case of the Second Gospel is rather different. This too is

extant in Greek, and in the judgement of most modem writers

that was the original language. The Greek of the Gospel is

coloured by Aramaisms (not Hebraisms).

So long ago as 1902 I ventured to suggest that the only

adequate explanation of this foreign element is that the Gospel

is a translation of an Aramaic original.(1) Recently this opinion

has received the weighty corroboration of the judgement of

Wellhausen. It is not sufficient to say that the writer may have

been an Aramaic-speaking Jew who was not very adequately

equipped with a knowledge of Greek, and that he was writing in

Greek matter which had come to him orally in Aramaic. The

evidence rather suggests, as Wellhausen points out, a translator

of an Aramaic document who sometimes misinterprets by

translating

too literally.

On the original language of the First Gospel much has been

written, but the investigations of the last century of criticism

seem to have proved beyond reasonable doubt that the Gospel

was written in Greek, and is based at least in part upon Greek

sources. Like St. Luke, the author had before him a Gospel

practically identical with our St. Mark. And he also has a good

many sayings which in substance are also found in the Third

Gospel." (pp. 292-293)

(1) Expository Times, xiii. 328 fl.

12. ———. 1911. "The Book of Sayings used by the Editor of the

First Gospel." In Studies in the Synoptic Problem By Members

of The University of Oxford edited by Sanday, William, 235-

286. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

"The criticism of the Synoptic Gospels seems to have reached

this point. It is very generally agreed that Matthew and Luke

have edited and enlarged the Second Gospel. The points still

debated in this connexion are details. The main fact is, as it

would seem, undeniable.

There is further a very widely held belief that Matthew and

Luke had also before them a second source, consisting mainly

of discourses ; and for some years attempts have been made to

reconstruct this.

It was at one time usual to call this alleged discourse source the

Logia, but as that term seemed to beg disputable questions

connected with a statement of Papias about the Logia written

by Matthew, recent writers have preferred to adopt for it a

colourless symbol Q ( = Quelle).

Harnack (2) has recently set himself to the reconstruction of Q,

and as his results are likely to be widely accepted, it is the

purpose of this chapter to offer some criticism of both his

methods and his results by way of introducing a reconstruction

of a discourse source which was used by the editor of the First

Gospel." (p. 235)

(2) The Sayings of Jesus (Crown Theological Library, 1908).

13. Anderson, Paul N. 2014. From Crisis to Christ: A Contextual

Introduction to the New Testament . Nashville: Abingdon.

"Therefore, most scholars embrace a two-source or a four-

source approach, and such is warranted by the evidence. A

glaring weakness, though, with all approaches to the Synoptic

problem is that none of them does anything with the Gospel of

John. If John represents an independent Jesus tradition with

different perspectives from the beginning, though theologically

developed, might it require consideration alongside the other

Gospels? This would call for a new theory; we might call it a Bi-

Optic Hypothesis.

A Bi-Optic Hypothesis—Bringing John into the Mix

The Gospel of John alone argues that the primary source for its

material was an eyewitness, the beloved disciple, who leaned

against the breast of Jesus at the Last Supper and whose

“testimony is true” (John 21:23-24). The question is whether

such is a knowing opinion or simply a rhetorical claim with no

basis in knowledge—therefore a false assertion. Of course, John

is so different from the Synoptics that it makes it easier for

interpreters to ascribe John’s story of Jesus to theological

factors rather than historical ones, thereby expunging it from

canons of historical memory about Jesus and his ministry. And

yet, this is a simplistic and facile way out of the problem, as

John’s final compiler claims the opposite, and John also

includes apparent historical tradition that is not in the

Synoptics.

The de-historicization of John appeals to some historical-

critical scholars, as it is much easier to deal with the Synoptics’

literary and historical issues without John in the mix. But is

this a robust approach or a timid one? Ascribing John’s origin

to theology rather than history has also come to be preferred by

some traditionalist scholars because if John were judged

historically correct where it differed from the other Gospels,

this would create new problems for interpreting the canonical

Gospels. Therefore, critical and traditional scholars have settled

for a more manageable compromise, differing from the early

church, claiming that John is not historical but is theological

only; three against one, John is the lone Gospel out. However, if

Matthew and Luke built upon settled for a more manageable

compromise, differing from the early church, claiming that

John is not historical but is theological only; three against one,

John is the lone Gospel out. However, if Matthew and Luke

built upon Mark, it is not a three-to-one majority; it is a factor

of John and Mark—two Gospels having individuated

perspectives, perhaps from day one—deserving to be analyzed

critically as the Bi-Optic Gospels." (Part I: The Gospels and

Jesus; Excursus I: A Bi-Optic Hypothesis - A Theory of Gospel

Relations , pp. 102-126)

14. Andrejevs, Olegs. 2019. Apocalypticism in the Synoptic

Sayings Source: A Reassessment of Q's Stratigraphy .

Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck.

"While we presuppose the validity of the 2DH and Q’s written

character, in what follows we shall engage the feasibility of Q’s

reconstruction and the attainability of the document’s wording.

The former has recently been dismissed by a number of

scholars who have pointed out the inferiority of the

reconstructed Mark(4) to the canonical version of the gospel,

while Q’s wording has come under renewed scrutiny. This will

be followed by arguments in support of the autonomy of

Didaché 1:3b–2:1 and portions of the Gospel of Thomas , both

contested subjects in recent academic discussion. Some of the

observations included in the treatment of these matters will

cover familiar terrain. However, their configuration is designed

to highlight the problematic nature of a number of current

claims and to lay the methodological foundation for the present

investigation as well as for a fresh treatment of the Sayings

Source and related documents." (p. 2, note 5 omitted)

(4) Viz., Mark’s gospel as reconstructed from its reception by

Matthew and Luke.

15. ———. 2020. "The “Reconstructed Mark” and the

Reconstruction of Q: A Valid Analogy?" Biblical Theology

Bulletin: Journal of Bible and Culture no. 50:83-91.

Abstract: "Described as a “thought experiment” by a number of

scholars, Mark’s Gospel as reconstructed exclusively from its

reception by Matthew and Luke has been repeatedly advanced

as a challenge to the reconstruction of Q in recent decades. This

essay analyzes the “Reconstructed Mark” argument, finding it

to form a poorly calibrated analogy for the Q document. It will

be shown that Matthew and Luke treat Q, which is a sayings

collection, differently from the sayings of Jesus in Mark’s

Gospel, which are already valued by them more highly than

Mark’s narrative. Further arguments in support of the

feasibility of Q’s reconstruction and the attainability of its text

will also be provided."

16. ———. 2020. "A Source-critical Analysis of the Lord's Prayer:

Multiple Autonomous Recensions or Q?" Ephemerides

Theologicae Lovanienses no. 96:661-679.

Abstract: "Although in the New Testament the Lord’s Prayer is

extant only in Matthew and Luke, scholars who work with the

Two-Document hypothesis frequently maintain the Prayer’s

proliferation apart from the Q source, in a liturgical tradition

potentially also responsible for the Didache ’s recension and for

the Prayer’s echoes in Mark’s gospel. This essay analyzes the

data supporting the above hypothesis, reopening the question

of the Prayer’s exclusive transmission through Q. Some

observations are included concerning the alternative solution

offered by the Farrer-Goulder hypothesis."

17. ———. 2021. "The Double Tradition in Luke (Q) 3–7 as a

Macro-Chiasm and its Significance for the Synoptic Problem."

New Testament Studies :388-406.

Abstract: "The level of scepticism met by the concept of macro-

chiasm in ancient literature is noticeably lower today than two

decades ago, with sizable agreement coalescing around certain

examples. One such example is found in the synoptic double-

tradition material as it is preserved in Luke's Gospel, which

provides the methodological foundation for the reconstruction

of the hypothetical synoptic source document Q. This article

explores the study of the macro-chiasm identified in Luke (Q)

3.7–7.35 and its implications for the synoptic problem. It also

addresses the methodological considerations advanced by S. E.

Porter and J. T. Reed in their NTS article two decades ago,

meeting a certain stipulation placed by them upon subsequent

scholarship."

18. Argyle, Aubrey William. 1985. "Evidence for the View that St.

Luke Used St. Matthew’s Gospel." In The Two-Source

Hypothesis: A Critical Appraisal , edited by Bellinzoni Jr.,

Arthur J., 371-379. Macon: Mercer University Press.

Reprint from Journal of Biblical Literature , 83, 1964, pp. 390-

396.

Abstract: "Argyle notes that there are a number of editorial

agreements between Matthew and Luke that are best explained

not by their use of a common source (Mark), but by the fact

that one of them was acquainted with the work of the other.

The evidence at the beginning of Matthew 5 suggests

unmistakably that Luke followed Matthew.

Argyle examines a number of passages to show how Luke has

dealt with material from Matthew and argues that the

differences between Matthew and Luke are no obstacle to the

belief that Luke uses Matthew’s gospel, a belief for which the

very many agreements of Matthew and Luke against Mark

afford sufficient warrant.

After examining in detail several passages in the Triple

Tradition, Argyle concludes on the basis of the evidence that

the view that Luke knew and used Matthew’s gospel is not only

a possible one, but is very probable."

19. Arnal, William E. 2007. "The Q Document." In Jewish

Christianity Reconsidered, Rethinking Ancient Groups and

Texts , edited by Jackson-McCabe, Matt, 119-154. Minneapolis:

Fortress Press.

20. ———. 2011. "The Synoptic Problem and the Historical Jesus."

In New Studies in the Synoptic Problem: Oxford Conference,

April 2008: Essays in Honour of Christopher M. Tuckett

edited by Foster, Paul, Gregory, Andrew F., Kloppenborg, John

S. and Verheyden, Joseph, 371-432. Leuven: Peeters.

"Arguably, the synoptic problem has been intimately related to

the quest for the historical Jesus from its inception. The

recognition that the gospels are not perfect renditions of “what

actually happened” is what

raises the question of their sources of information and the

reasons for their agreements or disagreements; and at the same

time, what makes pressing the issue of how much of what they

relate is reliable" (p. 371)

(...)

"To conclude inconclusively, then, one’s solution to the

synoptic problem does have important consequences for how

one approaches individual texts, and even for what one may

reasonably infer about the

overall development of the traditions about Jesus –

consequences that are not always admitted by advocates of that

solution. There may also be affinities between one’s solution

and one’s reconstruction of the historical Jesus, something we

see when a 2DH advocate produces a Q-like Jesus, or a FH

advocates produces a Mark-like Jesus, or a 2GH advocate

produces a Matthew-like Jesus. At the same time, however,

both in theory and in practice, no necessary relationship

emerges between one’s synoptic source theory and one’s

portrait of Jesus: similar portraits of Jesus are held by

adherents of different synoptic source theories, while very

different reconstructions of Jesus may be offered by adherents

of the same solutions to the synoptic problem. The critical

questions that must be answered before one can address the

vexed matter of the historical Jesus are less those of the literary

relationship among the extant gospels than historical questions

about the nature and transmission of the tradition." (pp. 429-

430)

21. ———. 2013. "The Trouble with Q." Forum. Foundations and

Facts no. 2:7-76.

"The bulk of this article, therefore, is devoted to attempting a

rather less idealized characterization of Q’s literary

development and social history than has been customary. It is

not of especially great concern to me that the people

responsible for Q be identified specifically and precisely with

the exact office of village scribe (κωμογραμματεύς, sometimes

translated as “village clerk”), or whether they “should perhaps

be estimated a few notches higher.”(30) Caviling about just how

high or low on the spectrum of literate administrators these

people should be does not much affect the basic reading of Q’s

rhetoric or situation

(though it might have some impact on the details), and in any

case misses the point, which is to situate Q and its literary

development in a genuinely historical context, that is, one that

is specific, concrete, material, and also has the potential to be

truly explanatory.(31) So long as Q and its traditions are

recognized as the literary product of a bureaucratic-scribal

milieu rather than an incidentally transcribed residue of

indigenizing village prophets or the self-promotion of destitute

peasant itinerants, this will suffice." (pp. 15-16, some notes

omitted)

(30) So Kirk, The Composition of the Sayings Source , 399.

(31) In what follows I am taking it for granted that Q is the

product of a Galilean environment and that it dates to before

the war of 66–70 CE.

22. Asgeirsson, Jon Ma, De Troyer, Kristin, and Meyer, Marvin W.,

eds. 2000. From Quest to Q: Festschrift James M. Robinson .

Leuven: Leuven University Press / Peeters.

Contents: Preface VII;

H. Koester: An Intellectual Biography of James M. Robinson

XIII;

James M. Robinson: Curriculum Vitae XXIII; James M.

Robinson: Bibliography XXV;

Founder and Fashion

M. Frenschkowski: Welche biographischen Kentnisse von Jesus

setzt die Logienguelle voraus? Beobachtungen z:ur Gattung von

Q im Kontext antiker Spruchsammlungen 3; Th. Hieke:

Schriftgelehrsamkeit in der Logienguelle: Die altestamentlichen

Zitate in der Versuchungsgeschichte Q 4,1-3 43; J.S.

Kloppenborg Verbin: A Dog among the Pigeons: The "Cynic

Hypothesis" as a Theological Problem 73; M. Ebner:

Feindesliebe - ein Ratschlag zum Überlegungen? Sozial- und

religionsgeschichtliche Überlegungen zu Mt 5,38-47/Lk 6,27-

35 119; M.W. Meyer: Did Jesus Drink from a Cup? The

Equipment of Jesus and His Followers in Q and al-Ghazzali

143;

Topos and Topics

F. Neirynck: NAZAPA in Q:: Pro and Con 159; C.M. Tuckett: Q

12,8: Once again "Son of Man" or "I''? 171; A.O. Jacobson: Jesus

against the Family: The Dissolution of Family Ties in the

Gospel Tradition 189; R.A. Piper: Wealth, Poverty and

Subsistence in Q 219; P.J. Hartin: The Woes against the

Pharisees (Matthew 23,1-39): The Reception and Development

of Q 11,39-52 within the Matthean Community 265; F. Bovon:

Tracing the Trajectory of Luke 13,22-30 Back to Q: A Study in

Lukan Redaction 285; H.W. Attridge: "Seeking" and "Asking"

in Q. Thomas, and John 295; R. Uro: Washing the Outside of

the Cup: Gos. Thom. 89 and the Synoptic Parallels 303;

Indexes; Abbreviations 325; Index of Biblical References 329;

Index of Other Ancient Writings 341.

23. Barker, James W. 2016. "Ancient Compositional Practices and

the Gospels: A Reassessment." Journal of Biblical Literature

no. 135:109-121.

Abstract: "Recent studies of ancient compositional practices

and the Synoptic Problem have validated the Two-Source

hypothesis and challenged the “Augustinian,” Farrer–Goulder,

and Griesbach hypotheses. These studies conclude that,

according to the Two-Source hypothesis, subsequent

evangelists would have adhered to the Greco-Roman

conventions of working with one source at a time and not

working backward through a text. The present essay adduces

counterexamples such as the Greek Minor Prophets Scroll from

Naḥal Ḥever, which predates the Gospels, and Tatian’s

Diatessaron, which postdates the Gospels. Upon further

examination, simultaneously accessing multiple sources and

reordering those sources were established compositional

practices in the first century. Moreover, every solution to the

Synoptic Problem necessitates such scribal conventions.

Therefore, the lesser extent of these ancient compositional

practices does not privilege the Two-Source hypothesis over its

rivals."

24. Barrett, Charles Kingsley. 1985. "Q: A Reexamination." In The

Two-Source Hypothesis: A Critical Appraisal , edited by

Bellinzoni Jr., Arthur J., 259-268. Macon: Mercer University

Press.

Reprint from The Expository Times, 54, 1942-43, pp. 320-323.

Abstract: "Barrett questions the theory that the material we

have called Q was all derived from one written document;

rather it was derived from a number of non-Markan sources

that were used by Matthew and Luke. Barrett’s investigation is

directed toward two issues.

(1) The degree of agreement not only in words but also in

traditional background ( Sitz im Leben ) between Matthew and

Luke when they are reporting sayings of the same purport.

Barrett finds, in this regard, that in some of the Q passages the

agreement is so close that there is no reason to doubt they were

drawn from a common source or sources, but in other passages

the agreement is much less close. He concludes that the part of

the material where agreement is closest may be satisfactorily

explained as derived from a single common Greek source, but

that the remainder cannot be explained without recourse to

some parallel version. Barrett maintains that it is simpler to

suppose that Matthew and Luke in collecting their material

used traditions that were similar but not identical than that

they each had identical copies of one source, which in the case

of one of them was contaminated with a parallel version.

(2) If Matthew and Luke are both using the same continuous

source, we should expect them to show in their use of it the

same agreements in order that, in general, they show when

both are following Mark. Barrett finds, in this regard, that the

argument that the order of the Q sections in Matthew and Luke

indicates that they were drawn from a common document,

breaks down. The common order of much of the Q material in

Matthew and Luke is afforded rather by the outline of Mark.

In conclusion, Barrett argues that behind Q we should probably

see a wider editorial research and a greater number of sources

than have commonly been allowed for."

25. Bartlet, J. Vernon. 1911. "The Sources of Luke's Gospel." In

Studies in the Synoptic Problem By Members of The University

of Oxford edited by Sanday, William, 314-363. Oxford:

Clarendon Press.

Syllabus: "The current Two-Document theory is open to

question. The differences in the Logian element of Matthew

and Luke demand fuller scope for the Oral factor.

I. Yet Luke used a second written source besides Mark, and our

problem is to define its character.

(i) The test of style points to the Jewish-Christian or Hellenistic

nature of Luke's special source (S).

(ii) Characteristic ideas confirm this, e.g. the notion of '

fulfilment ', Messiah, etc.

Analysis of certain sections in this light:—The Epileptic Boy (ix.

37-43*); Peter's Confession; the non-use of Mk vi. 45-viii. 26 ;

the Feeding of the 5,000 (ix. 10b-17) ; and especially the

Mission of the Twelve.

Hence the basal Apostolic tradition (Q), implied even by Mark,

was used by Luke in an independent form (QL) already

embedded in his ' special source ' (S) ; while Q itself included

the ' Logia '. This seen in the Great Sermon, the Message of the

Baptist and Jesus' response, and the Parable of the Sower.

The question whether one ' special source ' will explain all

Luke's non-Marcan matter, to be answered in the affirmative:

e.g. for the Sermon at Nazareth, the incident at Nain, etc.

These results apply also to the Passion story, on the view that

this also stood in Q as far back as we can trace it: detailed proof.

Further, it is there even clearer than elsewhere that the

continuous twofold special material in Luke (S + QL), apart

from Mark, lay before the Evangelist already unified in an order

fixed by the witness of a single authoritative informant.

Traces of independent historical witness peculiar to Luke's

narrative, both before the Passion (xviii. 15-xxi. 38) and after

(ch. xxiv).

Luke's 'Great Insertion' (ix. 51-xviii. 14) best explained on the

above theory: The ' Peraean ' Ministry ; the Mission of the

Seventy (special relation of Luke's informant to their circle);

the Lucan Parables, their setting and special features.

Exact form of Luke's special source: its probable place of origin

among Palestinian Hellenists; its Johannine elements; Luke's

editorial handling of it.

II. Objections met.

Professor Stanton's kindred view.

Merits of the theory. Diagram.

26. Batovici, Dan. 2009. "The Oxford Conference on the Synoptic

Problem." Currents in Biblical Research no. 7:245-271.

Abstract: "The past two centuries have witnessed a wide

spectrum of solutions for the Synoptic Problem. Even though

quite far from a consensus, the problem tends to incorporate

new domains from ongoing connected research: the relevance

of the Gospel of Thomas, the Synoptic authors’ use of the Old

Testament or recent studies on communication media in

antiquity. This article surveys a number of issues presented in

the papers of the Oxford Conference on the Synoptic Problem,

held in May 2008, ranging from challenging past and present

solutions of the Synoptic Problem from different perspectives

to new directions of research on this topic."

27. Bauckham, Richard. 2011. "The Gospel of John and the

Synoptic Problem." In New Studies in the Synoptic Problem:

Oxford Conference, April 2008: Essays in Honour of

Christopher M. Tuckett edited by Foster, Paul, Gregory,

Andrew F., Kloppenborg, John S. and Verheyden, Joseph, 657-

688. Leuven: Peeters.

28. ———. 2014. "Gospels before Normativization: A Critique of

Francis Watson’s Gospel Writing ." Journal for the Study of the

New Testament no. 37:185-200.

Abstract: "This extended review of Francis Watson, Gospel

Writing , engages critically with some of the major arguments

of the book, including Watson's case against Q and for Luke’s

use of Matthew, his claim that the Gospel of Thomas preserves

a very early genre of gospel writing, his argument that the

Gospel of John is dependent on the Egerton Gospel, and his

account of the process (‘normativization’) that produced the

canon of the four gospels.

His work is criticized generally for neglecting the wider literary

context of the gospels in ancient Jewish and Graeco-Roman

literature."

29. Bauer, David R. 2019. "Streeter Versus Farmer: The Present

State of the Synoptic Problem as Argument for a Synchronic

Emphasis in Gospel Interpretation." The Journal of Inductive

Biblical Studies no. 6:7-28.

Abstract: "The dominant method for Gospel interpretation over

the past several decades has been redaction criticism, which

depends upon the adoption of a certain understanding of

synoptic relationships in order to identify sources that lie

behind our Gospels. Yet an examination of the major proposals

regarding the Synoptic problem reveals that none of these

offers the level of reliability necessary for the reconstruction of

sources that is the presupposition for redaction criticism. This

consideration leads to the conclusion that approaches to Gospel

interpretation that require no reliance upon specific source

theories are called for."

30. Baum, Armin D. 2008. "Matthew's Sources - Written or Oral? A

Rabbinic Analogy and Empirical Insights." In Built Upon the

Rock: Studies in the Gospel of Matthew , edited by Gurtner,

Daniel M. and Nolland, John, 1-23. Grand Rapids, MI:

Eerdmans.

"How did the textual similarities and differences between

Matthew and Mark and Matthew and Luke develop? The

answer to this question has to be well founded.

A mere description of the New Testament evidence is not

enough. The synoptic data raise a number of preliminary

questions, but in themselves they do not provide a reliable

answer. In order to solve the Synoptic Problem on the basis of a

broader foundation it is necessary to compare the New

Testament synoptic data (part 1) to the relationship that exists

between other parallel texts from antiquity, especially from

rabbinic tradition (part II ), and to relevant results from

experimental psychology and oral poetry research (part III).

Most Gospels scholars have not paid much attention to these

analogies to the Synoptic Problem. But of those scholars who

took these analogies into account only a minority argued for a

simple literary dependence between the New Testament

Gospels. Most of them integrated, to varying degrees, an oral

factor into their solution to the Synoptic Problem. l would like

to develop their approach a step further.

One of my results is that neither the selection of material nor its

order is adequate criterion for distinguishing between literary

and orally related parallel texts. The verbal agreements and

disagreen1ents are much more relevant.

But it has turned out to be essential to look not only at the

number of verbal agreements (1) but also at their dispersion

(2), and at the higher figures in the poetic sections (3), in the

words of Jesus (4) and in the Old Testament quotations (5) as

well as at the Minor Agreements (6)." (pp. 1-2)

31. ———. 2013. "Synoptic Problem." In Dictionary of Jesus and

the Gospels. Second edition , edited by Green, Joel B., Brown,

Jeannine K. and Perrin, Nicholas, 911-919. Downers Grove, IL:

InterVarsity Press.

"The Synoptic Problem deals with the interrelationship of the

Synoptic Gospels (Matthew, Mark, Luke) and addresses a

foundational question: What is the best explanation for the

textual similarities and

differences between Matthew, Mark, and Luke? Based on the

Synoptic evidence, this question can be split into a number of

subquestions, which can be formulated on the basis of the most

commonly accepted

solution, the two-source hypothesis (...).

1. The Synoptic Evidence

2. The Proposed Explanations

3. Insights from Cognitive Psychology

4. Conclusion" (p. 911)

(...)

"2.8. Conclusion. Irrespective of the many different opinions

about chronological order and the mutual relationships among

the Synoptic Gospels, there exists a broad variety of views

about the relative amount of literary dependence and oral

tradition involved in the composition of the Gospels. The

explanation of the Synoptic evidence in terms of a more or less

exclusively literary dependence is widespread (cf. Wilke;

Farmer; Goulder; Burkett) but contested. A second approach

combines literary dependence with the influence of oral

tradition and/or human memory and appears in two variants.

Some parts of the Synoptic parallels are explained by literary

dependence, while other parallel sections are explained as the

result of oral tradition (Dunn; Mournet). Alternatively, one

ascribes the Synoptic parallels to a concurrence of literary

dependence and human memory activity (Goodacre). Third, a

clear alternative to the theory of literary dependence is the oral-

tradition hypothesis originally put forward by Westcott

(Reicke; Baum)." (p. 918)

32. Beare, Francis W. 1964. The Earliest Records of Jesus: A

Companion to the Synopsis of the First Three Gospels by

Albert Huck . Oxford: Blackwell.

"This book is intended in the first instance for the use of

students in theological colleges and kindred institutions who

have in their hands the well-knowm edition of the Synoptic

Gospels arranged in parallel columns, first prepared by Albert

Huck. This Synopsis of the First Three Gospels is now available

in an English edition prepared by Professor F. L. Cross, which

is based upon the ninth German edition of Huck, revised by

Hans Lietzmann, with the same Greek text, but with

prolegomena, section-headings and sub-titles given in English.

Students also have at their disposal the same text in the English

of the American Revised Standad Version, edited by Burton H.

Throckmortorn, Jr. (and edition, 1957).

(...)

These notes are intended to serve as a companion to the Huck

Synopsis .

They are not meant to offer anything like a commentary on the

first three Gospels. Their purpose is rather to lead the student

into an understanding of thye nature of the materials with

which he has to deal, and of the motives and methods of the

Evangelists. Exegesis and exposition are therefore

suborfdinated to the discussion of the problems raised by

criticism." (from the Foreword)

33. Becker, Eve-Marie. 2013. "Dating Mark and Matthew as

Ancient Literature." In Mark and Matthew I. Comparative

Readings: Understanding the Earliest Gospels in Their First-

Century Settings , edited by Becker, Eve-Marie and Runesson,

Anders, 123-143. Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck.

" Conclusion s. Even if it seems to be the case that, in terms of a

relative chronology, Matthew follows Mark rather than vice

versa, in terms of an absolute dating, Matthew provides no

unique or even more precise indications for a terminus post

quem in comparison to Mark. This observation can be

interpreted twofold: First, in regard to the post quem -dating,

Mark and Matthew need to be treated equally.

And because we could not find a further(112) or later date than

70 C. E. in the history of the first century C. E. that could

function as a terminus post quem for dating Mark and

Matthew, we need to conclude that both Gospels were written

either before or after 70 C. E. Secondly, what can be said for the

literary intention of the Markan Gospel is also relevant for

Matthew: Both Gospels obviously refuse a precise dating. This

does not mean, however, that we are discharged from dating

Mark and Matthew. To the contrary, a precise dating of Mark

and Matthew could shed light on central issues of Markan and

Matthean exegesis: for instance, we could precisely formulate

the extent of the authors’ agreement in creating the ‘level of

narration,’ how much they reveal of the ‘level of reference,’ and

the extent to which each narrator affects the Gospel narrative

and makes himself visible. In terms of a relative chronology,

Matthew might be the later Gospel. The manner in which

Matthew succeeds Mark also indicates how

Matthew values his writing in relation to the Markan ‘Vorlage,’

namely, as a competitive completion of Mark rather than as a

totally new-conceptualization." (p. 143, a note omitted)

(112) The only exception might be 44 C. E. (cf. Mark 10:35

ff.par. Matt 20:20 ff.).

34. Becker, Eve-Marie, and Runesson, Anders, eds. 2011. Mark and

Matthew I. Comparative Readings: Understanding the

Earliest Gospels in their First-Century Settings . Tübingen:

Mohr Siebeck.

Table of Contents: Preface V; Eve-Marie Becker and Anders

Runesson: Introduction: Studying Mark and Matthew in

Comparative Perspective 1;

1. History of Research

Cilliers Breytenbach: Current Research on the Gospel according

to Mark: A Report on Monographs Published from 2000–2009

13; David C. Sim: Matthew: The Current State of Research 33;

2. Reconstructing the Artifacts: Text-Critical and Linguistic

Aspects of the Study of Mark and Matthew;

Barbara Aland: Was heißt Abschreiben? Neue Entwicklungen

in der Textkritik und ihre Konsequenzen für die

Überlieferungsgeschichte der frühesten christlichen

Verkündigung 55; Tommy Wasserman: The Implications of

Textual Criticism for Understanding the 'Original Text' 77;

Stanley E. Porter: Matthew and Mark: The Contribution of

Recent Linguistic Thought 97;

3. Date and Genre

Eve-Marie Becker: Dating Mark and Matthew as Ancient

Literature 123; David E. Aune: Genre Theory and the Genre-

Function of Mark and Matthew 145;

4. Socio-Religious Location

Sean Freyne: Matthew and Mark: The Jewish Contexts 145;

Morten Hørning Jensen: Conflicting Calls? Family and

Discipleship in Mark & Matthew in the Light of First-Century

Galilean Village Life 205; Linden Youngquist: Matthew, Mark

and Q 233; Wayne Baxter: Matthew, Mark, and the Shepherd

Metaphor: Similarities, Differences, and Implication 263s;

5. Conflict and Violence

Warren Carter: Matthew: Empire, Synagogues, and Horizontal

Violence 285; Lorenzo Scornaienchi: The Controversy

Dialogues and the Polemic in Mark and Matthew 309; John S.

Kloppenborg: The Representation of Violence in Synoptic

Parables 323;

6. Building Community Using Text

Oda Wischmeyer: Forming Identity Through Literature: The

Impact of Mark for the Building of Christ-Believing

Communities in the Second Half of the First Century C. E. 355;

Anders Runesson: Building Matthean Communities: The

Politics of Textualization 379;

7. Notes from the Conference: Further Discussion

Adela Yarbro Collins: Reflections on the Conference at the

University of Aarhus, July 25–27, 2008 411;

Bibliography 415; List of Contributors 457; Index of References

459; Index of Subjects 483-491.

35. ———. 2013. "Introduction: Studying Mark and Matthew in

Comparative Perspective." In Mark and Matthew I.

Comparative Readings: Understanding the Earliest Gospels in

Their First-Century Settings , edited by Becker, Eve-Marie and

Runesson, Anders, 1-10. Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck.

"The study of Mark and Matthew in comparative perspective

has a long history, but mainly insofar as we attempt to solve the

Synoptic Problem, and, to a certain degree, to untangle the

relationship of these Gospels through redaction-historical

analyses. However, ever since the theory of Markan priority

became firmly established in the first half of the 19th century,

such redaction-historical work has focused on understanding

Matthew rather than Mark when they are compared.

To be sure, many studies, especially commentaries of either

Mark or Matthew, make observations related to the other

Gospel as they interpret specific passages or reconstruct certain

events; nevertheless, most often the result of studying Mark

and Matthew is that one Gospel stands in the shadow of the

other." (p. 1)

(...)

"In this volume, the purpose of comparing Mark and Matthew

is to shed light on the earliest history of gospel literature, i. e.,

the earliest history of Jesus-traditions that were transformed

into a more or less coherent Jesus-story that was not only

repeated and imitated, but also modified and redefined. Within

this comparative approach, the most challenging and

deceivingly simple question arises: What is it that makes

Mark’s Gospel a Markan Gospel, and Matthew’s Gospel a

Matthean Gospel?

For the Aarhus conference, and thus for this volume, we

decided to focus on investigating the first Gospels in their first-

century C. E. settings." (pp. 2-3)

36. Becker, Eve-Marie, and Vinzent, Markus. 2018. "Marcion and

the Dating of Mark and the Synoptic Gospels." In Studia

Patristica. Vol. XCIX: Marcion of Sinope as Religious

Entrepreneur , edited by Vinzent, Markus. Leuven: Peeters.

In conversation with Markus Vinzent.

"In this contribution, however, I [E.-M- Becker] have to limit

my thoughts about the Marcionite Gospel, and I will restrict

myself to examining some of the critical reflections and ideas

concerning Marcion and the Dating of the Synoptic Gospels

raised in your 2014 monograph.[*] The following remarks

should therefore be seen as critical responses to the discourse

opened up – or, better, renewed – by you and your suggestion

that we view Marcion as the creator of ‘the new literary genre of

the “Gospel”’.(26) As indicated already, my remarks are

motivated by – what I would call – a New Testament scholar’s

view on Marcion’s general place in 2nd century CE Christianity

and – more particularly – Marcion’s interaction with the gospel

traditions and writings.

Firstly, I will outline my general approach to Marcion and 2nd

century literary history – an approach derived from my

perspective on New Testament exegesis and its specific interest

in literature that succeeds – what might best be called – the

‘New Testament’ period of formative literature. This will help to

illuminate more in detail my disciplinary perspective and

heuristic presuppositions when investigating and interpreting

who Marcion was and which role he really played in Christian

literary history in the 2nd century CE.

Secondly, I will comment on some of your arguments that

present Marcion as the founder of the gospel genre. Finally, I

will suggest how to approach the question of dating the

Synoptic Gospels, and, more specifically, the Markan Gospel,

which I consider to be the earliest gospel narrative with a

prototype like status in the history of early Christian literature."

(pp. 12-13)

[*] Markus Vinzent, Marcion and the Dating of the Synoptic

Gospels , Studia Patristica Supplement 2 (Leuven, 2014).

(26) M. Vinzent, Marcion (2014), 277. As Dieter Roth claims,

this discourse can only be renewed to the extent that it was

initiated by scholars such as Baur and Ritschl in the 1840s and

1850s. See D.T. Roth, ‘Marcion’s Gospel and Luke: The History

of Research in Current Debate’, Journal of Biblical Literature

127 (2008), 513-27.

37. Bellinzoni Jr., Arthur J., ed. 1985. The Two-Source Hypothesis:

A Critical Appraisal . Macon: Mercer University Press.

Edited with an Introduction by Arthur J. Bellinzoni, Jr. with

the assistance of Joseph B. Tyson and William O. Waker, Jr.

Contents: Arthur J. Bellinzoni, Jr.: Preface IX; Arthur J.

Bellinzoni, Jr.: Introduction 1;

THE CASE FOR THE PRIORITY OF MARK 21

B. H. Streeter: The Priority of Mark 23; J. A. Fitzmyer: The

Priority of Mark 37; W. G. Kümmel: In Support of Markan

Priority 53; G. Μ. Styler: The Priority of Mark 63; H. G. Wood:

The Priority of Mark 77; F. Neirynck: The Synoptic Problem 85;

THE CASE AGAINST THE PRIORITY OF MARK 95

B. C. Butler: The Synoptic Problem 97; N. H. Palmer:

Lachmann’s Argument 119; B. C. Butler: The Lachmann Fallacy

133; D. L. Dungan: Critique of the Main Arguments for Mark’s

Priority as Formulated by B. H. Streeter 143; W. R. Farmer: A

New Introduction to the Problem 163; E. P. Sanders: Suggested

Exceptions to the Priority of Mark 199; P. Parker: The Second

Gospel Is Secondary 205;

THE CASE FOR THE Q HYPOTHESIS 219

B. H. Streeter: The Document Q 221; W. G. Kümmel: In

Support of Q 227; J. A. Fitzmyer: Luke’s Use of Q 245; C. K.

Barrett: Q: A Reexamination 259; F. G. Downing: Towards the

Rehabilitation of Q 269; E. L. Bradby:

In Defense of Q 287; V. Taylor: The Original Order of Q 295;

THE CASE AGAINST THE Q HYPOTHESIS 319

A. Μ. Farrer: On Dispensing with Q 321; R. Rosche: The Words

of Jesus and the Future of the “Q” Hypothesis 357; A. W.

Argyle: Evidence for the View that St. Luke Used St. Matthew’s

Gospel 371; R. T. Simpson: The Major Agreements of Matthew

and Luke Against Mark 381; A. M. Farmer: A Fresh Approach

to Q 397; E. P. Sanders: The Argument from Order and the

Relationship Between Matthew and Luke 409; D. L. Dungan:

Critique of the Q Hypothesis 427;

CONCLUSION 435

Joseph B. Tyson: The Two-Source Hypothesis: A Critical

Appraisal 437;

Bibliography 453; Indexes: Biblical Citations 471; Names 483-

486.

38. ———. 1985. "Introduction." In The Two-Source Hypothesis: A

Critical Appraisal , edited by Bellinzoni Jr., Arthur J., 1-19.

Macon: Mercer University Press.

"Basically, the purpose of this collection of essays is to afford to

the reader easy access to the literature that is most critical to an

understanding of the question of synoptic relationship, or more

particularly to an understanding of the two-source hypothesis.

Specifically, the volume is divided into two main sections: the

first dealing with the question of the priority of the Gospel of

Mark, and the second dealing with the question of the

hypothetical source “Q. ” In each principal section we have tried

to assemble those essays which argue most strongly, most

forcefully, most convincingly the case for and the case against

Markan Priority and Q. Some of the arguments are repeated in

more than one essay, but each essay makes a special

contribution to the question of synoptic relationships.

Effectively, the volume should be read as a whole, although it

may serve some readers simply as a convenient source for the

individual essays being consulted. Each main section is viewed

as a unit; together the several essays within the section argue

the case for or the case against Markan priority or the use of Q.

The effect of the case made by each section must weighed as the

reader tries to judge whether the two-source hypothesis

deserves to continue to serve as the basic model for

contemporary gospel research." (pp. 12-13)

(...)

"This volume does not represent a single point of view. It has

no particular model that it seeks to promote. It has no axe to

grind other than to offer the strongest arguments possible on

both sides of the issues, to give a hearing to alternative

solutions to the synoptic problem, and to encourage further

research in the area. This volume has no pretense of being

exhaustive, but these essays and their bibliographical

references are important resources for any scholar interested in

synoptic studies." (p. 14)

39. Betz, Hans-Dieter. 1992. "The Sermon on the Mount and Q.

Some Aspects of the Problem." In Synoptische Studien.

Gesammelte Aufsätze II . Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr (P. Siebeck).

"The relationship between the Sermon on the Mount, Matt. 5:

3-7: 27 (henceforth abbreviated: SM), and Q is far more

intricate than a superficial view of a synopsis of the New

Testament gospels would suggest.

James Robinson pointed to the problem years ago in a

footnote, when he said: •The cohesion of the collection suggests

that the Sermon on the Mount (or Plain) is derived from an oral

or written collection of its own, and did not first come into

being in the context of Q ... The end seems to be the conclusion

of a collection, and this is not simply because of the occurrence

there of the term logoi .(1) This way of stating the matter,

however, leaves room for several options. Since two texts are

involved, the SM and the Sermon on the Plain, Luke 6: 20b-49

(henceforth: SP), the question is whether we are dealing with

one sermon or two. Which of them is derived from a previous

collection? Since that previous collection is said to be oral and

thus different from the written Q, how many collections are we

to assume? What relationship exists between the presumed oral

source and the written Q?" (p. 249)

(1) James M. Robinson and Helmut Koester, Trajectories

Through Early Christianit y

(Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1971) 94 n. 4 7.

40. Bird, Michael F. 2014. The Gospel of the Lord: How the Early

Church Wrote the Story of Jesus . Grand Rapids, MI:

Eerdmans.

Chapter 4: The Literary Genetics of the Gospels: The Synoptic

Problem and Johannine Question 221; Excursus: Patristic

Quotations on the Order of the Gospels 281-298.

"Conclusion: In sum, I believe in a literary relationship between

the Gospels, because oral tradition does not account for the

strong verbal and structural correspondences that we find in

the Gospels and because proto-Gospel theories are speculative

and lack solid evidence. I believe in Marcan priority, because it

explains why Mark is the middle term between Luke and

Matthew and why Mark’s roughness in language is smoothed

over by the other two Evangelists. I believe in Q because,

despite its potential misgivings, it allows us to hold together a

literary connection between Matthew and Luke that is indirect

enough to explain their varied order and divergent utilization of

the double tradition. I believe that Luke used Matthew because

it accounts for the minor agreements and erases the anomaly of

the so-called Q-Mark overlaps." (p. 187)

41. Black, David Alan. 1988. "Some Dissenting Notes on R. Stein's

The Synoptic Problem and Markan "Errors"." Filología

neotestamentaria no. 1:95-101.

42. Black, David Alan, and Beck, David R., eds. 2001. Rethinking

the Synoptic Problem . Grand Rapids (MI): Baker Academic.

Contents: Abbreviations; David Alan Black and David R. Beck:

Introduction; 1. Craig L. Blomberg: The Synoptic Problem:

Where We Stand at the Start of a New Century; 2. Darrell L.

Bock: Questions about Q; 3. Scot McKnight: A Generation Who

Knew Not Streeter: The Case for Markan Priority; 4. William

Farmer: The Case for the Two-Gospel Hypothesis; 5. Grant R.

Osborne: Response; Notes; Subject Index; Scripture Index.

43. Black, Steve D. 2010. "One Really Striking Minor Agreement:

ΤΙΣ ΕΣΤΙΝ Ο ΠΑΙΣΑΣ ΣΕ in Matthew 26:68 and Luke 22:64."

Novum Testamentum no. 52:313-333.

Abstract: "It is asserted that Matt 26:68|Luke 22:64(|Mark

14:65) is the most difficult of the minor agreements. Some

advocates of the two-source theory have addressed this minor

agreement by trying to make sense of the narrative as we have

it, and others by making sense of the text as we have it (arguing

for textual corruption or lost recensions). While some of these

arguments are reasonable, in the final analysis they are not

satisfying. Although we might remain persuaded that the two-

source theory best integrates the data relating to the synoptic

problem, this minor agreement reminds us that the synoptic

problem is still a problem."

44. Blair, Geroge Alfred. 2003. The Synoptic Gospels Compared .

Lewiston: Edwin Mellen Press.

45. Bloomberg, Craig. 2001. "The Synoptic Problem: Where We

Stand at the Beginning of a New Century." In Rethinking the

Synoptic Problem , edited by Black, David Alan and Beck,

David R., 17-40. Grand Rapids, MI: Baker.

"... I limit this survey to what has traditionally come under the

rubric of the “Synoptic problem”—the question of the written

sources of Matthew, Mark, and Luke, and the literary

interrelationship of these three Gospels. The most recent

history of the Synoptic problem, by David Dungan, casts its net

far more widely, covering issues of textual criticism,

canonization, and hermeneutics as well, demonstrating the

interrelatedness of each of these three issues with source-

critical questions.(5) It is a fascinating study that I highly

commend, but I cannot hope in this short time to do anything

as wide-ranging.

With this Introduction, let us turn to the major solutions to the

Synoptic problem. I discuss them in what I perceive to be a

decreasing order of probability, which also roughly corresponds

to a decreasing order of how commonly each is held. Obviously,

not all of us agree that these two sequences match each other.

Also I focus on the most recent and important work in each

area, because the literature is voluminous and others have well

documented earlier developments.(6)" (p. 18)

(5) David L. Dungan, A History of the Synoptic Problem: The

Canon, the Text, the Composition and the Interpretation of the

Gospels , ABRL (New York and London: Doubleday, 1999).

(6) In addition to Dungan, History , and the previous historical

surveys cited therein, see esp. the thorough bibliography by T.

R. W. Longstaff and P. A. Thomas, The Synoptic Problem: A

Bibliography, 1716–1988 , NGS 4 (Macon, Ga.: Mercer

University Press, 1988).

46. Bock, Darrell L. 2001. "Questions about Q." In Rethinking the

Synoptic Problem , edited by Black, David Alan and Beck,

David R., 41-64. Grand Rapids (MI): Baker Academic.

"In this opening section I treat how arguments against Q are

made by those who do not believe the source ever existed as

well as explain the rationale for arguing for the source’s

existence. In sum, those who hold to Matthean priority reject

Q’s existence largely on the basis of the external evidence of

church tradition, which argued that Matthew was the first

Gospel composed. In their view, there is no need to posit the

existence of this hypothetical source. It is necessary to evaluate

this church tradition surrounding Matthew’s origin. Only then

does it become clear that one should also consider issues tied to

internal evidence, such as the order of units and their wording,

as well as evidence for or against Luke’s use of Matthew.(1) If

Matthew is not the first Gospel written or there is evidence that

Luke did not use Matthew, then the rationale for the existence

of a source like Q becomes plausible." (p. 41)

(1) For reasons of space, I cannot go over the full debate that

argues internally for Matthean priority, including the important

argument made from agreements between Matthew and Luke

against Mark. I will only try to make the positive case for the

possibility of Q. A complete treatment would require that one

deal with this argument in some detail. In fact, this essay in

general focuses only on “macro” arguments of larger structures

between the Gospels. The issues raised by “micro” arguments of

details within are also important, but are so varied as to be

difficult to pursue in a summarizing essay. For a full argument

to be present, however, both macro and micro arguments need

consideration.

47. Boismard, Marie-Émile. 1979. "The Two-Source Theory at an

Impasse." New Testament Studies no. 26:1-17.

"To summarize the conclusions resulting from the analyses in

this article:

1. Mark blends two parallel accounts, taken from two distinct

sources, which we could call Document A and Document B.

2. One must distinguish between two successive states of

Matthew; we call them Matt. I and Matt. II. Matt. I does not

depend on Mark, but on one of Mark's sources, Document A.

Matt. II complements the Matt. I

account by copying ad litteram a section from Mark.(32)

3. Luke, here, depends fundamentally on Matt. I and not on

Mark. He complements the former by using Mark: this shows

up most if one thinks of the account which immediately

precedes the pericope we have analysed.

4. In this article we have not studied John's text. It would be

possible to show that John 6. 1-2 depends either on Matt. I or,

more probably, on Matt. I's source, Document A, as we have

acknowledged in our Commentary on John's Gospel.(33)

A synoptic theory that wishes to account for all the literary facts

contained in the Gospels should include, at the minimum, the

synoptic relations which we have just mentioned. The Two-

Source theory is much too simple to answer such a

requirement; the same can be said about Griesbach's theory,

though it has the advantage of recognizing an influence of

Matthew on Luke.

The reader might refer to the rather complex synoptic theory

we presented, which takes into account the literary facts

analysed here.(34"

(32) All the conclusions in this second paragraph can be found

in Michel Hubaut's study, La Parabole des vignerons

homicides (Cahiers de la Revue Biblique, 16; Paris, 1976); see

the outline on page 128.

33) M.-E. Boismard and A. Lamouille, L'Évangile de Jean

(Synopse des quatre évangiles en français, tome III; Paris,

1977), 179.

(34 P. Benoit and M.-E. Boismard, Synopse des quatre

évangiles en français , tome II, Commentaire, par M.-E.

Boismard avec la collaboration de A. Lamouille et P. Sandevoir

(Paris, 1972).

48. ———. 1992. "Two-Source Hypothesis." In The Anchor Bible

Dictionary: Vol. 6 , edited by Freedman, Martin, 679-682. New

York: Doubleday.

Translated from French by Terrence Prendergast.

"To account for the complexity of the Synoptic Problem, the

Two-Source Hypothesis in its purest form can best be

summarized in the following three propositions: (a) in the

sections common to the three Synoptics (the Triple Tradition),

Matthew and Luke depend on Mark; (b) in the sections

common only to Matthew and Luke (the Double Tradition),

these two gospels depend on a second source, designated by the

letter "Q" (for the German Quelle = "source", which was made

up almost exclusively of logia ("sayings"); c) Matthew and Luke

are independent of one another. Scholars also concur that

Matthew and Luke had available to them their own particular

sources for those sections which are unique to themselves. This

hypothesis—widely held today, though with important

qualifications—was only worked out in successive stages." (p.

679)

49. Borgen, Peder. 1990. "John and the Synoptics." In The

Interrelations of the Gospels. A Symposium led by M.-E.

Boismard - W.R. Farmer - F. Neirynck, Jerusalem 1984 ,

edited by Dungan, David L., 406-437. Leuven: Leuven

University Press / Peeters.

50. Boring, M. Eugene. 1992. "The Synoptic Problem, "Minor"

Agreements, and the Beelzebul Pericope." In The Four Gospels

1992: Festschrift Frans Neirynck. Volume I , edited by van

Segbroeck, Frans, Tuckett, Christopher M., van Belle, Gilbert

and Verheyden, Joseph, 587-619. Leuven: Peeters.

51. ———. 2011. "The "Minor Agreements" and Their Bearing on

the Synoptic Problem." In New Studies in the Synoptic

Problem, Oxford Conference, April 2008. Essays in Honour of

Christopher M. Tuckett , edited by Foster, Paul, Gregory,

Andrew F., Kloppenborg, John S. and Verheyden, Joseph, 227-

251. Leuven: Peeters.

52. Bradby, E. L. 1985. "In Defense of Q." In The Two-Source

Hypothesis: A Critical Appraisal , edited by Bellinzoni Jr.,

Arthur J., 287-293. Macon: Mercer University Press.

Reprint from The Expository Times , 68, 1956-57, pp. 315-318.

Abstract: "Biadby’s purpose is to suggest a rough-and-ready

method of judging Austin Farrer’s hypothesis in “On

Dispensing with Q” that Luke had available and used as the

basis of his gospel both Mark and Matthew. Bradby maintains

that Farrer’s thesis can fairly be judged by reference to a small

number of key-passages from the Triple Tradition in which

Matthew’s text is fuller than Mark’s. In these instances, if

Farrer is right, we should surely find some instances in which

Luke has reproduced material from Matthew which neither

Matthew nor Luke could have gotten from Mark, because it is

not paralleled in Mark.

Bradby considers four sets of passages from the Triple

Tradition:

1. the walk through the cornfields and its sequel

2. the parable of the sower

3. the charge to the apostles

4. Peter’s confession at Caesarea Philippi.

Bradby concludes that Farrer’s thesis cannot be “proved” or

“disproved.” But in the four instances examined, if Farrer’s

thesis is correct, then Luke has consistently spurned the latter

and fuller version in Matthew in favor of the earlier and shorter

version in Mark. Bradby prefers to fall back on the theory of the

priority of Mark and the use of Mark and Q by both Matthew

and Luke."

53. Breckenridge, James. 1983. "Evangelical Implications of

Matthean Priority." Journal of the Evangelical Theological

Society no. 26:117-121.

"The fact is that no evangelical solution to the synoptic problem

is going to be found through Marcan priority. Scholars like

Farmer and Griesbach have presented the elements of an

answer. It is up to modern evangelicals to take that answer-

Matthean priority-and adapt it to a conservative view of

Scripture. Such an option requires three things: (1) a clear

theological commitment to inerrancy, (2) an elevation of

patristic tradition and resources, and (3) a reasonable and

constructive use of form criticism. Relative to the latter, we

seem to have two choices: either opt for Matthean priority and

a reasonable exercise of form criticism,

or accept Marcan priority and suffer the consequences of a

more severe redaction criticism." (p. 121)

54. Breytenbach, Cilliers. 2013. "Current Research on the Gospel

according to Mark. A Report on Monographs Published from

2000–2009." In Mark and Matthew I. Comparative

Readings: Understanding the Earliest Gospels in Their First-

Century Settings , edited by Becker, Eve-Marie and Runesson,

Anders, 13-32. Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck.

"Six years ago, in 2004, Andreas Lindemann published his

report on Markan research from 1992 till 2000.(1) His essay is

valuable for many reasons, not least because it helps us to

follow certain tendencies in Markan research2 Rather than

structuring the current report according to categories such as

volumes of essays, monographs, specific topics, expositions of

particular passages, and commentaries, as Lindemann did, I

shall focus this review on the literature that has been published

in monograph form since 2000. When necessary, the preceding

discussion will be briefly summarized. Sometimes the question

is not only what

was published, but rather what questions have not been

addressed. It is not possible to give due credit to new

commentaries, nor is it commendable to pay attention to the

volumes of collected essays on Mark or monographs confined

to specific episodes or single passages of the Gospel." (p. 13,

some notes omitted)

(1) A. Lindemann, “Literatur zu den Synoptischen Evangelien

1992–2000 (III): Das Markusevangelium,” Theologische

Rundschau 69 (2004): 369–423.

55. Broadhead, Edwin K. 1997. "On the (Mis)definition of Q."

Journal for the Study of the New Testament no. 68:3-12.

Abstract: "Important developments in the study of the Sayings

Tradition (Q) and growing awareness of this issue beyond

critical circles demand renewed attention to how the Sayings

Tradition is defined and to the terminology by which it is

described. Definitions based upon where this tradition is found

or how it was used are no longer adequate. Future descriptions

must be based upon the fundamental identity of this tradition

and upon its role in the development of early Christianity.

Furthermore, it is time to rethink the terminology by which we

refer to the collection of Jesus’ sayings. The relevance of the

designation ’Q’ is questionable, and the propriety of speaking of

a Sayings Gospel is debatable. In light of these problems, new

terminology is proposed, and a more descriptive definition of

the Sayings Tradition is offered."

56. Brodie, Thomas L. . 1995. "Re-Opening the Quest for Proto-

Luke: The Systematic Use of Judges 6-12 in Luke 16:1-18:8."

The Journal of Higher Criticism no. 2:68-101.

57. Brodie, Thomas L. 1999. "The Unity of Proto-Luke." In The

Unity of Luke-Acts , edited by Verheyden, Jozef, 627-638.

Leuven: Leuven University Press / Peeters.

"The theory of Proto-Luke is an hypothesis that Luke-Acts first

existed in a shorter edition, independently of Mark(1). As

proposed here - in a way which differs from the proposal of M.-

E. Boismard(2) - there are essentially three arguments for

Proto-Luke:

(1) Distinctive dependence on the LXX. Within Luke-Acts is a

stream of texts which has a distinctive dependence on the LXX.

This does not prove former separateness, merely

distinctiveness. The texts: Lk 1,1-4,22a(3) (except 3,7-9; 4,1-13);

7,1-8,3; 9,51- 10,20; 16,1-9.19-31; 17,11-18,8; 19,1-10; chaps. 22-

24 (except 22,31-65): Acts 1.1-15,35.

(2) Distinctive unity, especially unity of structure (eight

diptychs).

The above texts have a unique unity: unity of content and,

above all, of structure - a precise structure of eight diptychs.

Such unity argues not only for distinctiveness but also for

former separateness. (Separateness need not mean two

authors. Both editions probably come from one person - Luke

the evangelist).

(3) Subsequent verification: the hypothesis solves problems.

Once Proto-Luke is so identified (as in the above texts),

problems about gospel origins and relationships, including

aspects of Mark and Q. come closer to resolution." (p. 627)

(1) On the history or Proto-Lukan research. see esp. J.M.

Harrington, The Lukan Passion Narrative. The Markan

Material in Luke 22.ì,S4-23,2S. Diss. Leuven. 1998, pp. 4-557,

esp. 4-45, 98-200, 412-468.

(2) See esp. En quête du Proto-Luc (ĖB, 37). Paris, Gabalda,

1997.

(3) Not 4,30 or 427 as indicated in some of lhe present authors

earlier publications.

58. ———. 2001. "An Alternative Q/Logia Hypothesis:

Deuteronomy-Based, Qumranlike, Verifiable." In The Sayings

Source Q and the Historical Jesus , edited by Lindemann,

Andreas, 729-743. Leuven: Peeters.

"Within Matthew 5 and 11,25-30 lies a group of sayings that

constitutes a distinct synthesis of Deuteronomy, and, to a lesser

degree, of Sirach.

The sayings are three-part: Five Beatitudes (Matt 5,5-9); Five

Antitheses (plus prologue and sequel) (partly scattered, within

Matt 5,17-48); A Wisdom Cry/Song/Hymn (Matt 11 ,25-30).

The relationship of these Matthean sayings to the OT is

complex, but it is precise and verifiable.

The purpose of this paper is to indicate that this short

arrangement of sayings constituted the original logia which

underlie many NT writings.

This hypothesis. when combined with a specific form of the

theory of Proto-Luke(1) makes the prevailing notion of Q

unnecessary." (p. 729)

(1) On the general history of Proto-Luke research, see J.M.

Harrington, The Lukan Passion Narrative. The Markan

Material in Luke 22,54-3,25. A Historical Survey 1891-1991

(NTTS. 30) Leiden, Brill, 2000, esp. 4-45, 98-200, 412-468

(diss. Leuven, 1998; dir. F. Neirynck). For the specific theory of

Proto-Luke presupposed here there are three basic arguments:

(A) Distinctive dependence on the LXX . Within t.uke-Acts is a

stream of texts which as a distinctive dependence on the LXX.

This does not prove former separateness, merely

distinctiveness. The texts: Lk 1,1-4.22a (excerpt 3,7-9; 4,1-13);

7,1-8,3; 9,51-10,20; 16,1-9.19.31; 17,11-18,8; 19,1-10: chaps. 22-

24 (except 22,31-65); Acts 1,1-15,35. (B). Distinctive unity,

especially unity of structure (eight diptychs) .

The above texts have a unique unity: unity of content and,

above all, of structure - a precise structure of eight diptychs.

Such eight-fold unity argues not only for distinctiveness but

also for former separateness. (Separateness need not mean two

authors. Both editions probably come from one person - Luke

the Evangelist), On a literary precedent of this eight-fold

structure in the Elijah-Elisha narrative, see T.L. Broodie, The

Crucial Bridge. The Elijah-Elisha Narrative as an Interpretive

of Genesis-Kings and a Literary Model for the Gospels.

Collegeville. MN, Liturgical Press, 2000, pp. 6-27, 85. (C).

Subsequent verification: the hypothesis solves problem . Once

Proto-Luke is so identified (as in the above texts), problems

about gospel origins and relationships, including aspects of

Mark and Q, come close lo resolution. For further details, see T.

L. Brodie, The Unity of Proto-Luke, in J. Verheyden (ed.), The

Unity of Luke-Acts (BETL, 142), Leuven, University Press -

Peeters, 1999, pp. 627-638, esp. 627; Id. Intertextuality and Its

Use in Tracing Q and Proto-Luke, in C. M. Tuckett (ed.), The

Scripture in the Gospels, (BETL, 131), Leuven, University Press

- Peeters, 1997, pp. 469-477.

59. ———. 2004. The Birthing of the New Testament: The

Intertextual Development of the New Testament Writings .

Sheffield: Sheffield Phoenix Press.

"The purpose of this work is to outline the literary development

of several of the New Testament writings and, while doing so, to

unravel the Synoptic Problem-the well known puzzle about the

relationship between the first three gospels ('the Synoptics').

'Outline' is the key word. The New Testament is like a vast

complex tapestry, and one volume cannot try to unravel all the

levels of textual weaving. This work does indeed look closely at

some levels of some texts, but the volume has already become

bulky, and for several reasons it is appropriate, necessary even,

to keep a focus on leading threads and to provide just an

outline. This then is the goal: an outline that hopefully can be

tested and developed by others.

The work has four parts:

I. General Introduction: Ancient Writing and its Context

(Chapters 1-9)

II. The Overall Picture: Initial Evidence (Chapters 1 0--26)

III. Proto-Luke as Septuagint-Based (Argument 1): Supporting

Evidence (Chapters 27-54)

IV. Appendices: Further, Exploratory Aspects of New

Testament Intertextuality (Appendices I-8)" (Preface, p. XX)

60. ———. 2006. Proto-Luke: The Oldest Gospel Account: A

Christ-Centered Synthesis of Old Testament History, Modelled

Especially on the Elijah-Elisha Narrative. Introduction, Text,

and Old Testament Model . Sheffield: Phoenix.

61. Brooks, Stephenson. 1987. Matthew’s Community: The

Evidence of His Special Sayings Material . Sheffield: Sheffield

Academic Press.

Reprint New York: Bloomsbury 2015.

[Matthew 23,-1-3 and 16-22]

Verses 1-3 and 16–22 contain statements that imply various

and even contrary relationships to Jewish authorities

sanctioned by reference to sayings of Jesus. What relationship

did Matthew advocate for his readers? Not only are Matt 23.1-3,

16-22 unique in the Synoptics specifically and in the NT

generally, but a large portion of Matt 23 is unparalleled in the

Synoptics. Sayings similar to those found in Matt 23 also occur

in Matt 5.17–6.18 and Matt 10. These sayings, like those in Matt

23, are also unparalleled and suggest the possibility of various

relationships between Matthew’s community and Judaism.

Unparalleled sayings are also found in Matt 5.5, 7–10, 14–16;

7.6, 15 16a, 11.28-30; 12.34–37; 16.17–19, 18.16–19; 19.10-12."

(pp. 11-12)

(...)

"Chapters 2, 3, and 4 will isolate the M sayings in Matt 5.17–

6.18; 10, 23, respectively. Each chapter will be organized

according to thought units made apparent by literary shifts in

the text. Within each section of the text, first a translation will

be given, followed by an identification of four types of material,

always in the same order: (a) verses with parallels in Mark; (b)

verses with parallels in Luke; (c) verses likely to come from

Matthew; (d) verses with a strong possibility of containing an M

saying. Chapter 5 will accumulate the results from these

chapters, describe the material, and establish probable life

settings for the sayings or groups of sayings. Use of the

preliminary results from Chapter 5 will be an aid in Chapter 6

in recovering other M sayings that may occur throughout the

Gospel.” Whereas the unparalleled material in Matt 5.17–6.18;

10; 23 occurs in contexts where the use of parallels, style,

vocabulary, and content can be employed with relative ease,

there are other unparalleled sayings in Matthew in contexts

where those criteria are more difficult to utilize. These

additional M sayings will also be described and assigned life

settings. Chapter 7 will relate the results of the analysis to a

hypothesis that suggests a reconstruction of the history of the

community and accounts for the tradition(s) recovered." (p. 22)

62. Brown, John Pairman. 1959. "An Early Revision of the Gospel

of Mark." Journal of Biblical Literature no. 78:215-227.

"fundamental datum of the Synoptic problem is that Luke in its

"Markan materials" (primarily Luke 4 31-44, 5 12-6 19, 8 4-9

50, 18 15-43, 19 28-22 23, 22 31-24 11) has only minor

agreements with Matthew against Mark, either in matter or

order.' Mark then must be some kind of connecting link

between Matthew and Luke; the usual solution, which I take to

be correct, is that both Matthew and Luke knew some form of

Mark. What form of Mark they knew I hope here to define more

precisely." (p. 215)

(...)

"We are thus led to the proposal that there existed in the first

century a revised version or versions of Mark, which accounts

for many textual variants in our MSS of Mark, for many

divergences from Mark in Matthew and Luke, and particularly

for the bulk of the agreements of Matthew and Luke against

Mark; and that to this recension the best witness is the

"Caesarean."

We have already considered the importance of this suggestion

for the Synoptic problem; I add just a word about what it would

mean for textual history, and then leave it to the mercy of more

competent hands.

If the suggestion is right, Mark's Greek was very rough, scribes

corrected it very early, and already in the first century we could

talk about a "vulgate text" of Greek Mark. Only Alexandria,

most particularly in codex B, preserved with any consistency

the forms of the original; although indeed a series of

Aramaisms, in Mark as elsewhere, have been preserved only in

D.(30). Both d the Old Syriac will then come from good local

texts with a moderate contamination of "vulgate" readings; the

Byzantine text will represent a different contamination of

vulgate readings into a local text, which, further revised,

happened to win the day.

The "Caesarean" witnesses, which it is becoming harder and

harder to localize geographically, will then simply be direct

descendants of the "first century vulgate" which to varying

degrees have escaped assimilation to the Byzantine text."

(1) I.e., Luke (unlike Matt) after 4 16 does not give "Q-

materials" in the context of their Markan parallels. The only

exception is Luke 9 3-5, where the agreements with Matt 10 7-

14 against Mark 6 6-11 are echoes or transfers from the (Q)

mission-discourse Luke 10 1-12.

(30) Matthew Black, An Aramaic Approach to the Gospels and

Acts (2nd ed.; Oxford, 1954).

63. ———. 1959. "Mark as Witness to an Edited Form of Q."

Journal of Biblical Literature no. 80:29-44.

"It is doubted, even by believers in the existence of the Q

document, that Mark can have known it. Streeter's earlier

view(1) was that "Mark wrote to supplement Q," which

explained why Mark, "while

apparently familiar with Q ... uses it so little and usually with

abbreviation."

Afterwards Streeter(2) rejected this view, and his second

thoughts have usually been taken as decisive; e. g., by Taylor,

on the grounds that "the existence of parallel versions of

sayings in the great Churches of primitive Christianity is highly

probable."(3) That is, the question, "Did Mark know Q?"(4)

tends to be answered a priori, on the basis of our general

opinion how the sayings of Jesus circulated. I here suggest, on

the contrary, that the relations between Mark and Q are

concrete evidence how those sayings circulated." (p. 29)

(1) W. Sanday (ed.), Studies in the Synoptic Problem , p. 219;

cf. pp. 166-83.

(2) B. H. Streeter, The Four Gospels, rev. ed., pp. 186-91.

(3) V. Taylor, The Gospel According to St. Mark , p. 87.

(4) Cf. T. E. F. Honey, "Did Mark Use Q?" Journal of Biblical

Literature , 62 (1943), pp. 319-31; B. H. Throckmorton, Jr.,

"Did Mark Know Q?" Journal of Biblical Literature , 67 (1948),

pp. 319-29.

64. ———. 1961. "The Form of ‘Q’ known to Matthew." New

Testament Studies no. 8:27-42.

"It is usually assumed that Matthew did not know Luke, nor

Luke Matthew.(1)

The non-Marcan ('Q,'-) materials common to Matthew and

Luke, then, ultimately go back to a common source or sources,

oral or written, much of which anyway had reached a fixed

Greek form. Attempts have been made to split up the source of

the Q-materials into two documents,(2) into one-sheet 'tracts',

(3) and into individual floating sayings.(4) I here assume that

the great bulk of the Q-materials have as their ultimate

common source a single Greek document 'Q,' (while holding

open the possibility that behind Matthew—but probably not

Luke—there lies also independent knowledge of Aramaic

originals for some sayings). The basic evidence is the

considerable series of Q-materials given in the same order by

Matthew and Luke." (p. 27)

(1) I have made a textual suggestion ('An Early Revision of the

Gospel of Mark', Journal of Biblical Literature, LXXVIII

(1959), 215-27) which would eliminate most of the 'minor

agreements' between Matthew and Luke. Mgr de Solages, A

Greek Synopsis of the Gospels (Leiden, 1959), pp. 1055-65, now

gives the fullest list of such agreements. For the text of Mark

known to Matthew and Luke, cf. A. F. J. Klijn, 'A Survey of the

Researches into the Western Text of the Gospels and Acts', 11,

Novum Testamentum , III (1959). 162 note 2.

(2) Wilhelm Bussmann, Synoptische Studien : II, Zur

Redenquelle (Halle, 1929), pp. 137-49.

(3) Wilfred L. Knox, The Sources of the Synoptic Gospels: II, St

Luke and St Matthew (Cambridge, 1957), ed. H. Chadwick.

(4) Joachim Jeremias, ' Zur Hypothese einer schriftlichen

Logienquelle Q,', Zeitschrift für die neutestamentliche

Wissenschaft xxix (1930), 147-9.

65. Brown, Raymond E. 1997. An Introduction to the New

Testament . New Haven: Yale University Press.

Chapter 6: Gospels in General; Synoptic Gospels in Particular,

pp.118-139.

The Synoptic Problem p. 127; The Existence of Q, p. 130-136.

"A further stage in Gospel development is required to explain

the interrelationship of the first three Gospels, called

“Synoptic” because they can be reviewed side by side (syn-

optically). These Gospels have so much in common that in the

third stage described above there must have been some

dependence of one or two on the other or on a common written

source. Although much scholarly attention and even passion

has been devoted to this problem, most readers of the NT find

the issue complex, irrelevant to their interests, and boring—a

fact that causes me to be succinct in my treatment. Ample

bibliography will be given; but beginners are warned that the

subject tends to generate complexity, and they may want to

settle for the most common conclusions that I have italicized

below (pp. 114, 115, 122).

Statistics and terminology: Mark has 661 verses (vv.); Matt has

1,068, and Luke has 1,149. Eighty percent of Mark’s vv. are

reproduced in Matt and 65 percent in Luke.(18) The Marcan

material found in both the other two is called the “Triple

Tradition.” The approximate 220–235 vv. (in whole or in part)

of nonMarcan material that Matt and Luke have in common is

called the “Double Tradition.” In both instances so much of the

order in which that common material is presented, and so

much of the wording in which it is phrased are the same that

dependence at the written rather than simply at the oral level

has to be posited. Let me simply list some proposals offered to

explain these statistics, including for each the main

argument(s) pro and con. Finally I shall draw out corollaries

from the most commonly accepted solution." (p. 127, a note

omitted)

(18) 18Numbers drawn from Neirynck, The New Jerome

Biblical Commentary , 40:5. Very few Marcan pericopes have

no parallel in either Matt or Luke.

66. Brown, Scott G. 2011. "The Longer Gospel of Mark and the

Synoptic Problem." In New Studies in the Synoptic Problem:

Oxford Conference, April 2008: Essays in Honour of

Christopher M. Tuckett edited by Foster, Paul, Gregory,

Andrew F., Kloppenborg, John S. and Verheyden, Joseph, 753-

782. Leuven: Peeters.

External links

Stephen C. Carlson, Synoptic Problem Website

Alan Bill, Gospel Origins

Bibliographia. Annotated bibliographies

Raul Corazzon || rc@ontology.co || Info

Studies on Synopsis,

Concordances, Harmonies of the

Gospels

Bibliography

1. Aland, Kurt, ed. 1978. Vollständige Konkordanz zum

griechischen Neuen Testament: unter Zugrundelegung aller

modernen kritischen Textausgaben und des Textus receptus.

Berlin: de Gruyter.

Band 1/I; Band 1/II; Band 2 (1978-1983).

2. ———, ed. 1996. Synopsis Quattuor Evengeliorum: Locis

parallelis evangeliorum apocryphorum et patrum adhibitis

edidit Kurt Aland. Stuttgart: Deutsche Bibelgesellschaft.

First edition 1963; 15th corrected edition 2005.

"The plan of the Synopsis in detail can be seen directly from

using it, and therefore only a few observations need to be made

here.

The headings in several languages will facilitate the use of the

Synopsis beyond the area where German is understood. The

Latin and English texts do not represent simply a wooden

translation from the German, but provide headings for the

respective sections in accord with usage current among those

who use Latin and English (at the same time account is taken of

the advantages of assimilation whenever possible). The chapter

and verse references for the leading texts (which, in their

succession, form the consecutive text of the Gospels) are

printed in medium bold-face type. References at the beginning

and at the end of these sections, so far as they are not given in

their original order, indicate clearly the connection between

them. In addition to these leading texts there will be found

primary and secondary parallels. The primary parallels are

printed in normal type and can be recognized by the fact that

their chapter and verse references are not printed in medium

bold-face type; the secondary parallels are immediately

recognizable by being in smaller print. In each case both kinds

of parallels are supplied with references by number and page to

the place where they are printed as leading texts. A critical

apparatus is provided not only for each principal passage but

for the principal parallels also, for an investigation of mutual

relationships requires the consultation of textual variants. The

subject apparatus for each section supplies references within

the text as weil as parallels from the Old and New Testament

which will serve to illustrate the text. In other words, here is a

concise commentary which will direct the user to further

material, and thus in academic instruction teacher and student

alike will no doubt be spared much trouble both in dictating

and in writing down information." (from the Preface to the

First Edition)

3. ———, ed. 1996. Synopsis of the Four Gospels. Greek-English

Edition of the Synopsis Quattuor Evangeliorum. Stuttgart:

German Bible Society.

First edition 1972; 15th edition 1987.

Numerous copies of the comprehensive edition of the Synopsis

Quattuor Evangeliorum are in international circulation, as is

shown by the publication of six editions in just over six years. It

is therefore unnecessary to say anything further about it here,

except to justify the publication of this Greek-English edition. A

short description of its structure will accomplish this: The

Greek part of this diglot edition agrees exactly with the

comprehensive edition in its structure, arrangement of parallel

texts, and critical apparatus. The last has even been enlarged by

the addition of newly discovered papyri and uncials. Omitted

are the appendices (the Gospel of Thomas and the witnesses of

the early Church Fathers concerning the origin of the Gospels)

and the additions to the individual pericopes from the

apocryphal Gospels and the Church Fathers. A number of less

important secondary parallels has been dispensed with. Their

texts, previously given in small print, have been replaced by

references. In this way, the Greek part has been made clearer

and more concise.

The decisive reasons for these modifications were that the user

of the Greek-English Synopsis is chiefly interested in the texts

of the Gospels and much less in the witnesses of the early

Church and in noncanonical supplementary material. He

frequently wants to use primarily the English part and is only

concerned to be able to compare the translation at certain

points with the original text. This is now possible for him to do

in a completely systematic manner. For this reason, the English

part consists of the text of the Revised Standard Version. In

addition the critical apparatus lists all variant readings

occurring in the Authorized Version, the American and English

Revised Versions, and the Catholic Edition of the Revised

Standard Version insofar as they are of any relevance (cf. the

Introduction to the English part, p. XI). The user therefore not

only has before him at all times several different possible

translations of the Greek text and can choose between them,

but he also has a concise survey of the development of official

and semi-official Bible translations in the English language.

The Revised Standard Version has been chosen as the basic text

since it enjoys such general approval. Not only is it the

translation most widely used at present but it is also a

comparatively literal translation of the Greek text." (From the

Preface to the First edition)

"The second edition of the Synopsis of the Four Gospels in 1975

was characterized by a change of texts: the Greek text was

adapted to the 26th edition of Nestle-Aland, Novum

Testamentum graece, and the 3rd edition of the United Bible

Societies’ Greek New Testament, and the English text was

conformed to the second edition of the Revised Standard

Version. In the present sixth edition the earlier apparatus,

which is now dated, has been replaced by the apparatus

familiar to the reader from the 26th edition of Nestle-Aland,

increasing the usefulness of the Synopsis. For this edition the

corrected apparatus of the 4th printing was reviewed once

again." (From the Preface to the Sixth edition)

4. Bachmann, Horst, Slaby, Wolfgang, Aland, Kurt, and Werner,

Helmut, eds. 2015. Concordance to the Novum Testamentum

Graece of Nestle-Aland, 26th edition, and to the Greek New

Testament, 3rd edition/ Konkordanz zum Novum

Testamentum Graece von Nestle-Aland, 26. Auflage, und zum

Greek New Testament, 3rd edition. Berlin: de Gruyter.

Contents / Inhalt: 1. Preface - Vorwort; 2. Directions for use -

Anweisung zum Gebrauch; 3. Concordance - Konkordanz; 4.

Appendix.

"The present concordance was produced because, in addition to

the users of the "Complete Concordance to the Greek New

Testament on the Basis of All Modern Critical Text Editions

and the Textus Receptus" (ed. Κ. Aland, 2 vols. Berlin/New

York, 1983) there are larger groups of students and parish

pastors who are interested in owning an overview of the words

in the New Testament which is as far as possible complete.

Thus the limited selection in Schmoller is insufficient for them.

On the other hand, they believe they do not necessarily need

the complete tradition of the text as offered by the "Complete

Concordance." In the latter the readings of all the critical

editions from Tischendorf to the present (and the Textus

Receptus) are given under each entry. The present

concordance, however, only employs the text of Nestle-Aland26

(in its contents identical with the Greek New Testament3) as its

basis. In the "Complete Concordance" the occurrences of all

words in the New Testament are offered with a full text.

(...)

Schmoller's concordance only offers a limited selection. Those

of Bruder and Moulton are 100 years old and are based on an

antiquated text. Thus we believe the present concordance fills a

real gap and - within the limits described - presents a welcome

tool for the exegesis of the New Testament." (From the Preface

by K. Aland, H. Werner)

5. Baird, J. Arthur, and Freedman, David N. 1971. A Critical

Concordance to the Synoptic Gospels. Wooster, Hoio: Biblical

Research Associates.

6. Barr, Allan. 1995. A Diagram of Synoptic Relationships: In

Four Colors. Edinburgh: T & T Clark.

Second Edition with a New Introduction by James Barr.

First edition 1938.

"The Preface and Introduction which my father wrote for the

original edition of his Diagram was concerned principally with

pragmatic questions. He introduced the organization and use of

the Diagram and furnished the practical explanations necessary

for the use of it by the reader; and along with this he provided a

minimal statement of the critical theories implied, such as the

existence of the document Q and the use of the symbols M and

L for the material peculiar to Matthew and Luke respectively."

(p. 1)

(...)

"The advantage of the Diagram as a mode of presentation is

that it displays very clearly and on one visual plane six things

that are highly essential: (a) the relative lengths of a passage as

between Gospels (e.g.

where Mark has a passage that is also in Matthew and/ or Luke,

the Marc an version is commonly longer); this is displayed

because the Diagram is to the scale of 32 verses to one inch; (b)

the extent of material which is found in Mark and also in one or

both of the other two Gospels; this is indicated by red; (c) the

existence of material which is peculiar to one of the three

Gospels; this is indicated by white in Matthew, by yellow in

Luke, and by green for the small amount of material peculiar to

Mark; (d) the existence of material which is common to

Matthew and Luke but absent from Mark; this is indicated by

blue; (e) differences in order as between Mark and the other

two Gospels, or between Matthew and Luke; these are indicated

by lines drawn between one column and another; (f) passages

in Mark which are absent from either Matthew or Luke are

indicated with a heavy black block at the appropriate side. All

this can be quickly seen by the student of the Bible without

having to look up references or turn over pages." (p. 4)

7. Benoit, Pierre, and Boismard, Marie-Émile. 1973. Synopse des

quatre Évangiles en français avec parallèles de apocryphes et

de Pères. Paris: Les éditions du Cerf.

Deuxième édition revue et corrigée par P. Sandevoi; trois

volumes. Première édition 1965-1967).

Tome I: Textes; Tome II: Commentaire par M. É. Boismard

avec la collaboration de Arnaud Lamouille et Pierre Sandevoir;

Tome III: L'Évangile de Jean, commentaire par M. É.

Boismard et A. Lamouille avec la collaboration de Gérard

Rochais.

"Le premier volume de cette Synopse mettait « sous les yeux

des lecteurs les textes confrontés des quatre évangiles » de

façon à « souligner leurs différences et leurs ressemblances »

(vol. I, p. VII). Ce deuxième volume en est un commentaire,

section par section, dont le but est d’aider le lecteur à scruter

les textes évangéliques afin de « mieux comprendre leurs

parentés littéraires, la genèse de leur rédaction, leurs emprunts

mutuels et leurs sources » (ibid.). C’est, en un mot, la «

préhistoire » de nos évangiles actuels qu’il s’agit de

reconstituer. Depuis longtemps, les commentateurs ont essayé

de trouver une théorie qui puisse rendre compte de toutes les

données littéraires de ce qu’on a l’habitude d’appeler le «

problème synoptique»; il faut bien avouer que pas une n’a

réussi à s’imposer. Même la théorie des « Deux Sources », qui

a pourtant connu un succès certain et, encore maintenant, est

tenue pour un « dogme » indiscutable par beaucoup de

commentateurs, surtout en Allemagne, se trouve soumise à de

virulentes attaques venant d’horizons divers. Le fait même que

le problème synoptique continue à susciter études et

polémiques est un indice qu’il se pose en termes complexes ; s’il

est possible de lui trouver une solution (ce qui n’est pas

certain), cette solution ne peut être que complexe. Dans cette

Introduction, nous voudrions exposer les grandes lignes d’une

théorie que nous avons élaborée en étudiant toutes les

péricopes évangéliques; nous donnerons ensuite une

justification de cette théorie en renvoyant de façon

systématique au commentaire de la Synopse." (Tome II, p 15)

"En présentant le tome II de la Synopse des Quatre Évangiles

en français, nous écrivions : «Ce volume a pour but de

proposer une explication de la genèse littéraire des quatre

évangiles ; il donne donc le primat aux analyses littéraires. La

valeur théologique des textes n'est cependant pas négligée,

dans la mesure où elle interfère arec leur évolution littéraire.

Malgré tout, on ne trouvera pas, dans les notes, un

commentaire détaillé et complet de chaque péricope

évangélique. Pour cette raison, nous avons renoncé à rédiger

des notes sur les sections johanniques qui n'ont pas de parallèle

dans les Synoptiques... Le problème littéraire posé par les

textes johanniques pourra faire l'objet d'un volume ultérieur »

{p. 7). Ce projet s'est réalisé. Ce tome III de la Synopse, qui

paraît sous le titre : L’évangile de Jean, se situe dans la même

perspective que le tome II. Il s'en distingue toutefois sur deux

points. D'une part, les analyses de vocabulaire et de style y sont

beaucoup plus poussées. D'autre part, les développements et les

synthèses théologiques ont souvent une ampleur plus

considérable que les analyses littéraires. Pour faciliter l'accès de

ce volume aux personnes qui sont peu familiarisées avec le

travail exégétique, nous avons, dans chaque note, groupé en

deux parties distinctes les analyses littéraires et les

développements théologiques ; ceux qui ne voudraient pas se

lancer dès l'abord dans le dédale d'analyses souvent subtiles

pourront commencer par lire la dernière partie de chaque note

où nous donnons le sens des récits ou des discours de Jésus à

leurs divers niveaux rédactionnels. Il reste qu'analyses

littéraires et développements théologiques sont étroitement

liés, à tel point que, souvent, les premières ne trouveront leur

achèvement qu'à la lecture des seconds. En général, les discours

sont d'un abord plus difficile que les récits. Pour se familiariser

avec la méthode que nous avons suivie, nous suggérons au

Lecteur de se laisser guider par la Samaritaine, personnage, au

reste, peu farouche {note § 81)." (Tome III, p. 7)

8. Boismard, Marie-Émile, and Lamouille, Arnaud. 1986.

Synopsis Graeca Quattuor Evangeliorum. Leuven: Peeters.

9. Bruder, Karl Hermann, ed. 1842. Ταμιε

ῖ

ον τ

ῶ

ν τ

ῆ

ς καιν

ῆ

διαθήκης λέξεων sive Concordantiae omnium vocum Novi

Testamenti graeci, primum ab Erasmo Schmidio editae.

Leipzig: Karl Tauchnitz.

10. Crook, Zeba A. 2011. Parallel Gospels: A Synopsis of Early

Christian Writing. New York: Oxford University Press.

11. de Lang, Marijke H. 1993. "Gospel Synopses from the 16th to

the 18th Centuries and the Rise of Literary Criticism of the

Gospels." In The Synoptic Gospels: Source Criticism and the

New Literary Criticism, edited by Focant, Camille, 599-607.

Louvain: Louvain University Press.

"From the 16th century until the time of Griesbach, no less than

24 synopses of the Gospels and works of a synopsis-like

structure appeared. The new genre of the synopsis rose up in

the 16th century beside the much older and more popular genre

of the harmony. In the harmonies of the Gospels, the texts of

the four Gospels were integrated into one continuous text so

that a single flowing overview of the works of Jesus was

achieved. At this point, the harmonies become irrelevant for

our study due to the fact that the Gospels as individual writings

are completely lost in the harmonies. Moreover, the harmony

prevents the

reader from confronting the problem of the discrepancies and

the similarities between the Gospels, a problem which

motivates and encourages the reader to further investigate the

formation of the Gospels.

Because of these factors, the harmonies have played no

significant role in the development of the historical and literary

criticism of the Gospels.

From the very beginning, two works have had a profound

influence upon the way synopses were arranged: 1) Augustine's

treatise De consensu evangelistarum, which appeared around

the year 400; and 2) the Harmonia evangelica published by

the German Lutheran Andreas Osiander in the year 1537." (pp.

600-601, notes omitted)

12. ———. 2020. "The Decline of the Gospel Harmony: Loss or

Gain?" In Theological and Theoretical Issues in the Synoptic

Problem, edited by Kloppenborg, John S. and Verheyden,

Joseph, 19-36. New York: Bloomsbury.

"The year 1774 is usually marked as an important year for New

Testament scholarship.

It was the year Johann Jakob Griesbach published his gospel

synopsis, a presentation of the texts of the first three gospels in

columns side by side." (p. 19)

(...)

Understandably, several experts on the history of the Synoptic

Question have supposed that Griesbach's synopsis was also the

point of departure from which he developed his solution of the

synoptic problem, in his case the Two Gospel Hypothesis. It is

true that no other synopsis before his time had ever been meant

for such a purpose.

(...)

"In my dissertation of 1993 on the history of the gospel

synopsis from Calvin to Griesbach, I also took Griesbach's

synopsis as a turning point in the history of synoptic studies.

However, I have come to wonder if this view does not need to

be qualified.

The influence of Griesbach's theory on the synoptic discussion

at the end of the eighteenth century turned out to be marginal:

the Two Gospel Hypothesis disappeared and surfaced only in

1825 when Heinrich Saunier adopted it.(7) In particular, the

question has to be reconsidered whether there was indeed a

direct link between Griesbach's synopsis and his solution of the

Synoptic Problem in the form of the Two Gospel Hypothesis.

In this chapter, I would like to address two questions. The first

is: Was the decline of the gospel harmony after the publication

of Griesbach's synopsis a loss or a gain? This entails the issue of

how the genre of the old-fashioned harmony related historically

to the new genre of the "unharmonized" synopsis.

My second question is: How clear-cut exactly was the

"paradigm shift" in synoptic studies that was brought about by

Griesbach's synopsis? Or, to rephrase this question more

strongly: Can we speak at all of a turning point or paradigm

shift with regard to Griesbach's synopsis?" (p. 20)

(7) See John S. Kloppenborg, Excavating Q: The History and

Setting of the Sayings Gospel (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress,

2000), 282.

13. Dungan, David Laird. 1980. "Theory of Synopsis Construction."

Biblica no. 61:305-329.

14. ———. 1985. "Synopses of the Future." Biblica no. 66:457-492.

Reprinted in: D. L. Dungan (ed.)., The Interrelations of the

Gospels. A Symposium led by M.-E. Boismard - W.R. Farmer -

F. Neirynck, Jerusalem 1984, Leuven: Leuven University Press,

1990. pp. 317-347.

15. Easley, Kendell H, and Cox, Steven L. 2007. HCSB Harmony of

the Gospels. Nashville: Holman Bible Publishers.

16. Elliott, James Keith. 1980. "Textual Criticism, Assimilation and

the Synoptic Gospels." New Testament Studies no. 26:231-242.

Reprinted in: J. K. Elliott, New Testament Textual Criticism:

The Application of Thoroughgoing Principles, Leiden: Brill

2010, pp. 417-430.

"The main object of textual criticism is to establish as

accurately as possible a text approximating to the original

words of the original authors.

As far as the text of the synoptic gospels is concerned, one of

the main problems in establishing the text is the amount of

cross-fertilization in the MSS whenever the gospels are in

parallel. Scribes were prone

to assimilate the gospel they were copying to a parallel text in

another gospel." (p. 231)

(...)

"The principles which were applied to some of the variants in

Mark seem therefore not to have been consistently

acknowledged in other variants. This observation ought to

make us cautious in using the UBS3

text or of our accepting uncritically the explanatory notes in

Metzger’s Commentary. Our concentrating here on the UBS3

text is significant, because the 9th edition of Aland’s Synopsis

(= Syn9) (3) has a text substantially the same as UBS3 (which

also agrees with Nestle–Aland in the forthcoming 26th edition

of that text) whereas the 8th edition of Aland’s Synopsis was

based on Nestle–Aland25 (= N–A25). The majority

of scholars who will work on the synoptic problem in the future

are likely to base their work on the text of Syn9 It is important

therefore to see how far that text is reliable and in particular to

what extent

assimilated readings have been allowed to appear as the text

rather than as part of the marginal apparatus." (p. 232)

(3) K. Aland, Synopsis Quattuor Evangeliorum, 9th edition

(Stuttgart: United Bible Societies [UBS], 1975).

17. ———. 1986. "An Examination of the Text and Apparatus of

Three Recent Greek Synopses." New Testament Studies no.

32:557-582.

Reprinted in: J. K. Elliott, New Testament Textual Criticism:

The Application of Thoroughgoing Principles, Leiden: Brill

2010, pp. 385-416.

"Serious study of the synoptic problem can be undertaken only

with the aid of a Greek synopsis. At the present time three such

synopses are readily available:(1) Aland’s Synopsis Quattuor

Evangeliorum, the 13th

edition of Huck extensively revised by H. Greeven and the

recently published text by B. Orchard. In this article these

synopses are referred to as follows: Aland as Syn when all

editions are intended, otherwise

as SynA=1–8 or SynB=9–12 to differentiate between the two major

editions of the text, the earlier of which has a text comparable

with the twenty-fifth edition of Nestle-Aland Novum

Testamentum Graece (= N-A25)

and the later a text comparable with N-A26; Greeven’s revision

as H-G; and Orchard’s text as Orchard.

Syn and H-G print the parallel columns of the synoptic gospels

in the sequence Matthew, Mark, Luke. Orchard, whose text was

produced in order to assist those scholars who feel such a

sequence prejudicial

against the neo-Griesbach theory, prints the parallels in the

sequence Matthew, Luke, Mark. It is my task in this article not

to discuss these three editions as aids to a particular attempted

solution to the synoptic problem but to examine the texts and

apparatuses with special reference to H-G and Orchard but

with comparisons with Syn also.(2) What is immediately

striking is that each of the three has a different text despite the

claim of one of them (SynB p. xi) to be the ‘Standard Text’ of the

future." (p. 557)

(1) R.J. Swanson ‘s Horizontal Line Synopsis of the Gospels the

Greek edition of which at present covers only Matthew and its

parallels has been discounted from this article, so too has W.R.

Farmer ’s Synopticon dismissed by H.F.D. Sparks in his review

in Journal of Theological Studies 1971 as of use only in

conjunction with a conventional synopsis. Farmer’s exercise

cannot be considered a new synopsis in its own right.

(2) A full discussion of the text found in SynB is to be found in

my reviews of UBS3 and N-A26 in Novum Testamentum 20

(1978) pp. 242–77 and JTS 32 (1981) pp. 19–49.

18. ———. 1986. "Printed Editions of Greek Synopses and their

Influence on the Synoptic Problem." In The Four Gospels 1992

(Festschrift for Frans Neirynck), edited by van Segbroeck, F.,

Tuckett, C. M., van Belle, G. and Verheyden, J., 337-357.

Leuven: Peeters.

Reprinted in: J. K. Elliott, New Testament Textual Criticism:

The Application of Thoroughgoing Principles, Leiden: Brill

2010, pp. 431-458.

"I have attempted on several occasions(2) to preach that

decisions about the Synoptic Problem ought not to be made on

the basis of the text in any one Synopsis but that one should

make use of the alternative

readings to be found in the critical apparatus and that one

should not imbue the editor of any one printed text with an

omniscience that enabled him to produce a definitive version of

the text. In reality I

recognise that such preaching generally falls on deaf ears. Most

writers on the Synoptic Problem still base their discussions on

one printed text and with scarcely an acknowledgement that

the apparatus is of

help. However, one notable exception among scholars of the

Synoptic Problem is Professor Neirynck, and that is why this

present study is offered in grateful tribute to an indefatigable

contributor to and critic

of the international synoptic debate. Neirynck is all too well

aware of the differences in printed synopses and the effect these

can have on aspects of the Synoptic Problem: he is also alert to

the textual variants." (p. 338)

(2) Most recently in D.L. Dungan, The Interrelations of the

Gospels (BETL, 95), (Leuven: University Press – Peeters, 1990)

pp. 348–359. My article [The relevance of textual criticism to

the synoptic problem] is reprinted in J.K. Elliott, Essays and

Studies in New Testament Textual Criticism chapter 12

(Cordova: El Almendro, 1992) (= Estudios de Filología

Neotestamentaria 3).

19. ———. 1993. "Resolving the Synoptic Problem using the Text of

Printed Greek Synopses." Filología Neotestamentaria no.

11:51-58.

Reprinted in: J. K. Elliott, New Testament Textual Criticism:

The Application of Thoroughgoing Principles, Leiden: Brill

2010, pp. 459-467.

"In the Neirynck Festschrift(1) I listed under several categories

differences between the Greek text printed in the synopses of

Aland(2) (= Syn) and Greeven(3) (= HG) and with cross-

references to the synopses of Orchard(4) and Boismard-

Lamouille(5) (= BL) in order to demonstrate the effect editorial

text-critical decisions could have on an investigation into, or on

statistics relevant to, the resolution of the Synoptic Problem. In

that article I tried to present mere lists without commentary. In

the present article I shall endeavour to make the dry

presentation of lists into a practical exposition of how these

texts (on which most exegetes will base their conclusion about

the Synoptic Problem) can lead the unsuspecting along

differing paths. For my examples below I shall use samples that

reveal different aspects of literary interrelationship. We are

concerned here only with those variants that are the cause of

differences in the printed editions." (p. 51)

(1) F. van Segbroeck et al. (ed.), The Four Gospels 1992

(Leuven: University Press and Peeters) pp. 338–57 “Printed

Editions of Greek Synopses and their Influence on the Synoptic

Problem”. Reprinted here as Chapter 26.

(2) K. Aland, Synopsis Quattuor Evangeliorum (Stuttgart:

Deutsche Bibelgesellschaft, 131985).

(3) A. Huck, Synopse der drei ersten Evangelien. Synopsis of

the First Three Gospels 13th edition revised by H. Greeven

(Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr [Paul Siebeck], 1981).

(4) J.B. Orchard, Synopsis of the Four Gospels in Greek

(Edinburgh: T. and T. Clark, 1983).

(5) M.-E. Boismard and A. Lamouille, Synopsis Graeca

Quattuor Evangeliorum (Leuven and Paris: Peeters, 1986).

20. Farmer, William R. 1979. Synopticon: The Verbal Agreement

between the Greek Texts of Matthew, Mark and Luke

Contextually Exhibited. Cambridge: Cambridge University

Press.

"This Synopticon is designed to supplement existing aids to

Gospel studies. It stands in a tradition which began with the

earliest systematic attempts to compare the work of one

evangelist with that of another. Ammonius of Alexandria

constructed an aid to Gospel studies which made it possible to

compare passages in Mark, Luke and John with their parallels

in Matthew. This was accomplished by copying the relevant

portions of the other Gospels alongside the full text of Matthew.

Eusebius noted that this procedure often destroyed the

sequence of the material in Mark, Luke and John. He also

complained that it presented only those parts of these Gospels

which had parallels in Matthew. In order to facilitate the study

of similar passages in all four of the Gospels, and to preserve

the sequential arrangement which each evangelist gave to his

material, Eusebius developed a cross reference system which

was widely accepted and remains useful today.

The basic format for most modern synopses was established by

J. J. Griesbach in 1776 with the publication of his Synopsis

Evangeliorum Matthaei Marci et Lucae una cum iis Johannis

pericopis. . . . Most subsequent synopses have varied only in

their use of John and in the degree to which relevant citations

and parallels from apocryphal and patristic literature are

included." (Introduction, p. VII)

21. Funk, Robert Walter. 1985. New Gospels Parallels. Volume 1:

The Synoptic Gospels. Phildalphia: Fortress Press.

22. Gaston, Lloyd. 1973. Horae Synopticae Electronicae: Word

Statistics of the Synoptic Gospels. Missoula: Society of Biblical

Literature.

23. Greven, Heinrich. 1978. "The Gospel Synopsis from 1776 to the

Present Day." In J. J. Griesbach: Synoptic and Text-Critical

Studies, 1776-1976, edited by Orchard, Bernard and Longstaff,

Thomas R. W., 22-49. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

"Griesbach's synopsis and its significance for Gospel research

can be properly judged only when it is seen in the total context

in which it belongs: namely that Christianity has never fully

satisfied itself or been quite at ease with the fact that what it

knows of its Master has been handed down to it in four books

which - unanimous as their witness is - do differ from one

another in numerous details. Whatever theological motives

may underlie this, the Church has never, or at least never for

long, wanted to accept the four Gospels simply as they are. The

replacement, connected with the beginnings of the Syrian

Church, of the four Gospels by Tatian's Diatessaron is no doubt

the most violent attempt up to now, and so one not repeated, to

cut the Gordian Knot. But also the Eusebian Canons cautiously

try to put some order into the Gospels' mixture of agreement,

divergence and contradiction. The problem, here only sketched

out, is discussed at length by Augustine. In his De consensu

evangelistarum he shows that the Gospels present a clear and

complete picture of the persons and things about which they

narrate, and that the occasional contradictions are either no

contradictions at all, are insignificant, or serve the purpose of

clarification. His harmonizing is sometimes forced and can

hardly prove acceptable to a critical reader, but he has no

intention of turning the four Gospels into a single work, behind

which the four Evangelists would have to retire. So the early

Church already took in hand a theme of Biblical scholarship

that was afterwards always with it, obviously not without being

variously illuminated by the historical currents of the human

spirit and of theology. The ways in which this theme is

expressed are diverse. The trend of the scribes, more or less

observable everywhere, to harmonize the text of the canonical

Gospels (mostly with Matthew) belongs to it, as does a broad

stream of harmonizing Gospel interpretation which is handed

down in the exegetical tradition." (pp. 22-23, a note omitted)

24. Hawkins, John C. 1909. Horae Synopticae: Contributions to

the study of the Synpotic Problem. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Second edition, revised and supplemented. (First edition 1898).

"The origin, mode of composition, and mutual relations of the

three Synoptic Gospels form so obscure and so complex a

subject of inquiry that it has come to be generally known as the

'Synoptic Problem'. Among the many modern attempts to deal

with it, this volume has a limited and merely preparatory

purpose, which I have tried to indicate upon its title-page. It is

called by the plural name 'Horae Synopticae', because, while it

is the outcome of a good many hours spent in examination of

the Synoptic Gospels and in tabulation of the results thus

obtained, those results are presented separately and almost

independently in the successive sections of the book, no

attempt being made to combine them as foundations or

supports of any system or theory. And the sub-title is '

Contributions to the study ' - rather than to the solution - ' of

the

Synoptic Problem', because I have only been trying to help in

that preliminary process of collecting and sifting materials

which must be carried much further than it has yet been before

we can be ready for the solution of the Problem - or, as I would

rather express it, of such parts of it as are not now insoluble."

(Preface to the First Edition, p. V)

25. Hoffman, Paul, Hieke, Thomas, and Bauer, Ulrich. 1999.

Synoptic Concordance: Vol. 1: Introduction / Einführung.

A[lpha] - D[elta] Berlin: De Gruyter.

A Greek Concordance to the First Three Gospels in Synoptic

Arrangement, statistically evaluated, including occurrences in

Acts.

"At the beginning of each entry a chart with the New Testament

word statistics gives information about the distribution of the

key word in the whole New Testament."

(...)

"The synoptic statistics give in three lines (Mt, Mk, Lk) a

classified statistical overview of the number of occurrences of

the key word in the Synoptic Gospels. A chart containing a

three-digit statistical code classifies the synoptic situation in

several columns.

The first digit stands for Matthew, the second for Mark, the

third for Luke."

(...)

"The term “triple tradition” refers to all verses of the Gospel of

Mark as well as to those verses of the Gospels of Matthew and

Luke that have a parallel in Mark.

If the Synoptic Concordance speaks of the “triple tradition”,

there is always a Markan verse at issue. In the statistical code

the second digit is either “1” or “2”. On the two-document

hypothesis one can speak

of the Markan tradition.

The term “double tradition” refers to all verses of the Gospel of

Matthew with a parallel in Luke, but not in Mark, and to all

verses of the Gospel of Luke with a parallel in Matthew, but not

in Mark.

If the Synoptic Concordance speaks of the “double tradition”, a

Markan verse is not at issue. In the statistical code the second

digit is “0”. On the two-document hypothesis one can speak of

the Q tradition.

The term “Sondergut” refers to all verses in the Gospels of

Matthew and Luke that have no parallels in the other two

Synoptic Gospels." (p. 8)

26. ———. 2000. Synoptic Concordance: Vol. 2: E[psilon] - I[ota].

Berlin: De Gruyter.

27. ———. 2000. Synoptic Concordance: Vol. 3: K[appa]-

O[mikron]. Berlin: De Gruyter.

28. ———. 2000. Synoptic Concordance: Vol. 4: P[i] - O[mega].

Berlin: De Gruyter.

29. Huck, A., and Greeven, H. 1981. Synopsis of the First Three

Gopsels, with the Addition of the Johannine Parallels.

Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr.

Thirteenth edition.

German title: Synopse der drei ersten Evangelien, mit Beigabe

der johannischen Parallelstellen.

30. Kloppenborg, John S. 1988. Q Parallels: Synopsis, Critical

Notes & Concordance. Santa Rosa (CA): Polebridge Press.

31. ———. 2011. "Synopses and the Synoptic Problem." In New

Studies in the Synoptic Problem, Oxford Conference, April

2008. Essays in Honour of Christopher M. Tuckett, edited by

Foster, Paul, Gregory, Andrew, Kloppenborg, John S. and

Verheyden, Joseph, 51-85. Leuven: Peeters.

Reprinted in: S. Kloppenborg, Synoptic Problems: Collected

Essays, Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, pp. 120-154.

"Since Griesbach’s time, it is safe to say that every study of the

synoptic problem has relied on the tool of the synopsis. The

modern three- or four-gospel synopsis in a complex tool,

displaying not only the texts of

the gospels for comparison, but often including an apparatus

criticus with text-critical data, and other apparatus with

indications of citations of or allusions to the Hebrew Bible

(rarely an actual display of the text

in Hebrew and Greek), parallel texts drawn from the Pauline

epistles, patristic writers, and extracanonical gospels (rarely,

however, displayed in parallel with the synoptic texts), section

titles, and a conspectus locorum.

Not all of these features of the synopsis are oriented to the

same task: some assist in the close verbal comparison of the

texts of the Synoptics; others facilitate seeing the role of

harmonization in the textual

tradition of the gospels; others allow the user to see the

variations in gospel texts as they are variously performed in the

Synoptics, patristic writers and extracanonical gospels; and still

other features are designed

to display the varying degrees of indebtedness that gospels

texts have to the Hebrew Bible.(8)

The modern synopsis, then, has multiple functions, with the

inevitable result that not all synopses are equally suited to every

task.(9) My interest in this paper is not to offer a general survey

of synopses and to comment on their advantages and

disadvantages for a variety of critical operations, but instead to

focus on the issue, raised by Bernard Orchard, David Dungan,

and others, as to whether synopses are in principle ‘neutral’ in

regard to synoptic source theories." (p. 53, a note omittted)

(8) See the survey of synopses by G. Lasserre, Les synopses:

élaboration et usage (Subsidia Biblica, 19), Rome, Pontifical

Biblical Institute Press, 1996.

(9) See the survey by J.K. Elliott (Which is the Best Synopsis?,

in Expository Times 102 [1991] 200-204) who agrees that the

choice of synopsis depends on one’s purpose, but nonetheless

suggests that, if pressed to recommend one synopsis, he would

recommend Huck-Greeven.

32. ———. 2014. "Gospel Parallels/Parallel Gospels." Biblical

Theology Bulletin no. 44:156-161.

Abstract: "Zeba Crook’s Parallel Gospels, mainly for use by

undergraduates and students who lack Greek, takes the genre

of the Gospel synopsis in innovative and helpful directions.

Crook’s addition of texts of the “Sayings Gospel Q” and the

Gospel of Thomas enhance the utility of his synopsis; Crook’s

innovative and controversial English translation is designed to

maximize the user’s ability to see small differences and critical

similarities; and his display and alignment of parallels lets the

user see what other many synopses obscure."

33. Miller, Robert J., ed. 2010. The Complete Gospels. The

Scholars Version. Salem, OR: Polebridge Press.

Fourth edition revised and expanded.

"IThe Complete Gospels offers its readers several distinctive

features.

First, it is the premier publication of the Scholars Version

translation of the gospels, and represents the efforts of a group

of independent scholars to capture die meaning of the original

documents in living American English and in a text that is

entirely free of ecclesiastical control.

The Complete Gospels is also the first publication to include

both the canonical gospels and their principal extracanonical

counterparts under one cover. Within this anthology can be

found:

• the lost Q Gospel, in a reconstructed text that is the fruit of

years of critical scholarly work. The Q Gospel is a crucial

literary source for the Gospels of Matthew and Luke.

• the first publication for the general reader of the Signs Gospel,

which many believe underlies the canonical Gospel of John,

and is thus older than the Fourth Gospel.

• the first publication for the general reader of the fragmentary

Gospel of the Savior, which was discovered in the 1990s, as well

as the Gospel of Judas, which came to light in 2006.

• the first publication of the miscellaneous collection we call

“Orphan Sayings and Stories”—anecdotes and sayings that

never found a firm place in the manuscript tradition of any

particular gospel, but which nevertheless survived as notes in

one or more manuscripts." (p. 3)

34. Morgenthaler, Robert. 1971. Statistische Synopse. Stuttgart:

Gotthelf-Verlag.

35. Moulton, William Fiddian, and Geden, Alfred Shenington.

2004. Concordance to the Greek New Testament. London: T &

T Clark.

Sixth edition fully revised, edited by I. Howard Marshall.

36. Neirynck, Frans. 1970. "Hawkins's Additional Notes To His

"Horae Synopticae"." Ephemerides theologicae Lovanienses

no. 46:78-111.

37. ———. 1986. "Once More: The Making of a Synopsis."

Ephemerides theologicae Lovanienses no. 62:141-154.

38. ———. 1987. "A Concordance of the Synoptic Parallels."

Ephemerides theologicae Lovanienses no. 63:375-383.

39. ———. 1988. Q-Synopsis: The Double Tradition Passages in

Greek. Leuven: Leuven University Press.

In the order of Luke.

40. ———. 1991. The Minor Agreements in a Horizontal-Line

Synopsis. Leuven: Leuven University Press / Peeters.

41. ———. 1999. "A New Synoptic Tool." Ephemerides theologicae

Lovanienses no. 75:407-418.

42. Neyrinck, Frans, and van Segbroeck, Frans. 1984. New

Testament Vocabulary: A Companion Volume to the

Concordance. Leuven: Leuven University Press.

With the collaboration of Henri Leclercq.

43. Orchard, Bernard. 1978. "Are all Gospel Synopses Biased?"

Theologische Zeitschrift no. 34:149-162.

44. ———, ed. 1983. A Synopsis of the Four Gospels, in Greek,

Arranged According to the Two-Gospel Hypothesis. Macon:

Mercer University Press.

45. Petersen, William L. 1997. "From Justin to Pepys: The History

of the Harmonized Gospel Tradition." In Studia Patristica. Vol.

XXX: Biblica et Apocrypha, Ascetica, Liturgica, edited by

Livingstone, Elizabeth A., 71-96. Leuven: Peeters.

Reprinted in: Jan Krans, Josepeh Verheyden (eds.), Patristic

and Text-Critical Studies, The Collected Essays of William L.

Petersen, Leiden: Brill 2012, p. 272-300.

"Treatments of the harmonized gospel tradition usually follow

one of two paths. Either they focus on only Tatian and his

Dialessaron, or they deal with only a single pericope or witness.

Both of these norms will be transgressed in this study, for it

seeks to offer an overview - a tour d'horizon, if you will - of a

literary genre: gospel harmonies.

Tatian will, of course, loom large in this scheme, but· our

survey will not be limited to him and his Diatessaron. Rather,

we will take bird's eye view of gospel harmonies, commencing

with their pre-Tatianic origins in the writings of Juslin Martyr

(who died sometime between 163 and 167 CE), and continuing

down through the late Middle Ages. We will conclude with lhe

Chemnitz-Leyser-Gerhard harmony, published in I 652.

Compiled by three generations of Germans, this harmony was

not, however, the only one circulating in the seventeenth

century, for at the same time the library of the English diarist

Samuel Pepys (1633-1703) contained a Middle English

manuscript (now in the library of Magdalene College,

Cambridge, catalogued as MS Pepys 2698, and known to

scholarship as the 'Pepysian Harmony') which is today

recognized as the sole surviving witness in English to Tatian's

Diatessaron(1)." (p. 71)

(1) 1he Pepysian Harmony. ed. M. Goates (EETS O.S. 157;

London, 1922).

46. Read-Heimerdinger, Jenny, and Rius-Camps, Josep, eds. 2014.

A Gospel Synopsis of the Greek Text of Matthew, Mark and

Luke: A Comparison of Codex Bezae and Codex Vaticanus.

Leiden: Brill.

"The purpose of this edition of the Synoptic Gospels is to

provide an objective tool for New Testament study and research

that has hitherto not been available." (p. IX)

(...)

"It is intended that this new Gospel Synopsis should give an

insight into the subtle and complex nature of the variation

between early New Testament manuscripts. It becomes readily

apparent that the type of variation found among the three

Synoptic Gospels, which is something of a minefield in itself (or

‘a maze’ to take up Goodacre’s term), also exists among the

manuscripts. This fact compounds, of course, the difficulty for

synoptic studies. But to adopt the easy solution of disregarding

the complexity is to work with an illusion and to risk producing

misleading results.

In the first instance, the Gospel Synopsis serves directly as a

means to compare Codex Bezae with Codex Vaticanus, and to

establish the nature of their relationship as well as their

distinctive features. This is potentially of great importance for

textual studies for, apart from the insight given into the two

manuscripts, it will allow more precise notions of editorial and

scribal activity, in particular with regard to harmonisation, to

be formulated.

The value for synoptic studies, on the other hand, is that it

offers a tool for examining with a higher degree of accuracy

than has been possible with the current Greek editions the

interrelatedness of the Gospel texts. By shining light on the

amount and the nature of textual variation that existed in the

early centuries, it disturbs the false sense of security often

present in synoptic studies and reveals how the issues of the

order of the Gospel writings, the relationships among them and

their connection with other traditions and sources are even

more intricate than is usually envisaged. In setting out the three

Gospels in turn, the aim has been to facilitate the study of the

different forms and the connections between them.

Of particular value for synoptists is that the entire text of the

manuscripts in continuous form is made available, so enabling

a complete reading of any given passage of each of the Gospels,

where the significance of variant readings is enhanced as they

are seen working together within their context." (p. XVII)

47. Schmoller, Alfred, ed. 1998. Pocket Concordance to the Greek

New Testament = Handkonkordanz zum griechischen Neuen

Testament. Stuttgart: German Bible Society.

Based on the Text of the Nestle-Aland Novum Testamentum

Graece (28th Edition)

and The Greek New Testament (5th Edition).

Revised by Beate von Tschischwitz at the Institute for New

Testament Textual Research Münster/Westphalia (Ninth

edition 2014).

"When Otto Schmoller produced his "Ταμιεῖον τῆς καινῆς

διαθήκης εγχειριδιον oder, Handconcordanz zum griechischen

Neuen Testament" in 1869, it filled a real need in the market.

The fact that his work has been reprinted up to the present

demonstrates that the need for a pocket concordance continues

unabated. But since 1938, when Alfred Schmoller adapted his

father's work in the seventh edition to the 15th/16th edition of

Erwin Nestle's Novum Testamentum Graece, "Schmoller" has

not been compared with modern editions. In view of the

progress made in New Testament textual criticism this

situation requires urgent attention.

The German Bible Society resolved therefore to adapt

"Schmoller" to the text of Nestle-Aland26 and GNT3. The Greek

vocabulary presented no problem, but the notes on the

vocabulary of the Septuagint and the Latin Vulgate which

Alfred Schmoller had added in the seventh edition of the

concordance raised a question. Would it be worth the expense

of correcting this supplemental information against modern

critical editions, especially when despite their acknowledged

significance they are no substitute for the use of Septuagint and

Vulgate concordances?

In view of the fact that today's reader is primarily if not

exclusively concerned with the Greek text, it was decided to

adapt only the Greek text and to let the notes on the Septuagint

and Vulgate texts remain unchanged. This would require a

resetting of only the lines requiring changes in the Greek text.

The data for the text of the Septuagint and the Vulgate,

therefore, do not reflect the state of modern critical editions,

although the notes on the text of the Vulgate in particular

continue to serve as a valuable resource for persons interested

in the history of the Latin text of the Bible." (From the

Introduction)

48. Solages, Bruno de. 1959. A Greek Synopsis of the Gospels: A

new way of solving the synoptic problem. Leiden: Brill.

49. Sparks, H. F. D. 1964. A Synopsis of the Gospels: The Synoptic

Gospels with the Johannine Parallels. Philadelphia: Fortress

Press.

50. Swanson, Reuben J. 1984. The Horizontal Line Synopsis of the

Gospels. Pasadena, CA: William Carey Library.

Revised edition (First edition Dillsboro: Western North

Carolina Press, 1975).

51. Throckmorton Jr., Burton H., ed. 1992. Gospel Parallels: A

Comparison of the Synoptic Gospels. Nashville: Thomas

Nelson Publishers.

Based on 9th ed. of the Huck-Lietzmann Greek Synopsis

(1936). 5th ed. Nashville: Nelson, 1992.

52. Tyson, Joseph B., and Longstaff, Thomas R. W. 1978. Synoptic

Abstracts. Wooster, Ohio: Biblical Research Association.

Bibliographia. Annotated bibliographies

Raul Corazzon || rc@ontology.co || Info

Bibliographies on Biblical Studies

Questions of Biblical Criticism

Hebrew Bible Textual Criticism

History of the Hebrew Bible Critical Research

New Testament Textual Criticism

History of New Testament Critical Research

Hebrew Bible

(Under construction)

New Testament

The Synoptic Gospels

The Synoptic Problem

The Gospel of Matthew

The Gospel of Mark

The Gospel of Luke

The Pauline Epistles

1 Thessalonians, 1 Corinthians, 2 Corinthians, Philippians, Philemon,

Galatians, Romans

Early Developments of Christianity

The Acts of the Apostles

Deutero-Pauline Epistles

2 Thessalonians, Colossians, Ephesians

Pastoral Epistles

1 Timothy, 2 Timothy, Titus

The Epistle to the Hebrews

The Catholic Epistles: James, 1 Peter, 2 Peter, Judas

The Johannine Literature

The Gospel of John

The Epistles: 1, 2, 3 John

The Christian Apocalyptic

The Book of Revelation

The Canon of the New Testament

The Formation of the Canon

The New Testament Apocrypha

on the Apocryphal Literature

General Studies on the Apocryphal Literature

New Testament Apocrypha

Apocryphal Gospels

Apocryphal Acts

Apocryphal Letters

Apocryphal Apocalypses

Bibliographia. Annotated bibliographies

Raul Corazzon || rc@ontology.co || Info

Bibliography on the Literature of

Early Christianity (I-II centuries)

Apostolic Fathers

Clement of Rome (fl. c. 95)

Ignatius of Antioch (fl. c. 100-115)

Polycarp of Smyrna (69- 155)

Didache (100-150)

The Epistle of Barnabas (130-131)

Papias of Hierapolis (c. 60-130)

Quadratus of Athens (d. 129)

Papias of Hierapolis (c. 60-130)

Epistle to Diognetus (130 ? - late 2nd century ?)

The Shepherd of Hermas (90-150)

Christian Writers of the Second Century

Justin Martyr (c. 100-165)

Aristide of Athens, Apology (c. 120-138)

Clement of Alexandria (c. 150-215)

Tertullian (155-c. 220)

Melito of Sardis (d. 180)

Irenaeus (early 2nd century – died c. 202)

Athenagoras of Athens (c. 133-c.190)

Theophilus of Antioch (d. 183-185)

Hippolitus of Rome (170-235)

The Bauer Thesis: The Origins of Orthodoxy and Heresy

Dissent in the First Century

Simon Magus

Ebionism

Nicolaism

Heresies of the Second Century

Christian Gnosticism

Sethianism

Marcionism

Montanism

Ebionites

Nazarenes

Elchasaites

Bibliographia. Annotated bibliographies

Raul Corazzon || rc@ontology.co || Info

Bibliography on the Religious

Literature of the Early Judaism

(Under construction)

Bibliographia. Annotated bibliographies
Raul Corazzon || rc@ontology.co || Info
Bibliography on the Philosophy
and Phenomenology of Religion
Fundamental Questions
The Definition of 'Religion'
The Sacred
Monotheism and Polytheism
History of the Ontological Argument for the
Existence of God
General Introduction
General Works on the History of the Ontological Argument
Anselm of Canterbury's argument in the Proslogion
The Medieval Period from Anselm of Canterbury to Duns Scotus
The Modern Period from Suárez to Frege
The Contemporary Period from Barth to the Present Time
A Selection of Primary Texts

Bibliographia. Annotated bibliographies

Raul Corazzon || rc@ontology.co || Info

History of the Ontological

Argument for the Existence of God

Introduction

"Philosophers who address the questions of what it is for an

individual to exist, or what it is for an individual to be actual, often

do so with reference to the fallacy they have uncovered in the

classical Ontological Argument for God's existence. Indeed, the

Ontological Argument is useful as a vehicle by which this and other

issues in ontology and the philosophy of logic may be introduced and

sharpened."

Nathan Salmon - Existence - in: Philosophical Perspectives, vol. 1 "

Metaphysics" edited by James E. Tomberlin, 1987, p. 49.

"Higher-type classical logic is intensional logic with the intensional

features removed, so this is a good place to start. Ontological

arguments, Gödel's in particular, are natural examples of intensional

logic at work, so this is a good place to finish." (page XI)

"There are many directions form which people have tried to prove

the existence of God. There have been arguments based on design: a

complex universe must have a designer. There have been attempts to

show that the existence of an ethical sense implies the existence of

God. There have been arguments based on causality: trace chain of

effect and cause backward and one must reach a fist cause.

Ontological arguments seek to establish the existence of God based

on pure logic: the principles of reasoning require that God be part of

ones ontology." (p. 133)

Melvin Fitting - Types, tableaus and Gödel's God - Dordrecht,

Kluwer, 2002.

"Of all the arguments for the existence of God, the one which Anselm

first formulated is the most refined and the least capable of a finally

satisfactory statement. It draws its strength from an ambiguity,

which appears to be an ambiguity in language, but is more deeply an

ambiguity in human experience. If God exists, there must be a level

of experience at which it is impossible to think of God as not existing.

But at what level can this impossibility be made to appear? Must the

demonstration await the experience of the Beatific Vision? Or can it,

at the very opposite extreme, be made out at the level of linguistic-

logical analysis? Whether valid or not, the first three chapters of the

Proslogion were the first piece of writing in which this problem was

raised and a solution proposed which will probably never be finally

buried. It may be agreed that Descartes put it better, because more

simply and with fewer philosophical presuppositions. He had the

advantage, which Anselm lacked, of inheriting, if only to reject, a

long philosophical tradition. The Augustinian and grammatical

background of Anselm's thought, which made it possible for him to

formulate the argument, also burdened it with limitations. But these

pages of Anselm must be placed among the most deeply interesting

pieces of reasoning ever written The early chapters of the Proslogion,

in which the argument was first expressed, will never be read without

excitement, nor thought about without appearing to be more cogent

than they are. For the most extraordinary thing about the argument

is that it loses nothing of its power, its freshness, or even in a curious

way its persuasiveness, by being refuted. The Proslogion may not set

forth a valid argument for belief in God, and even if it were valid it is

doubtful whether it would ever persuade an unbeliever; but in its

subtlety, and in a certain unsubstantial, ethereal quality which

antagonizes men of robust common sense, it perfectly reflects the

quality and mystery of Anselm's personality." (pp. 74-75).

Richard William Southern - Saint Anselm and His Biographer: A

Study of Monastic Life and Thought 1059-c. 1130, Cambridge:

Cambridge University Press, 1963.

"The ontological argument for the existence of Cod has fascinated

philosophers ever since it was formulated by St. Anselm of

Canterbury (1033-1109). It is doubtful, I think, that any person was

ever brought to a belief in God by this argument, and unlikely that it

has played the sort of role in strengthening and confirming religious

belief that, for example, the teleological argument has played. To the

unsophisticated, Anselm's argument is (at first sight at least)

remarkably unconvincing, if not downright irritating, it smacks too

much of word magic. And yet almost every major philosopher from

the time of Anselm to the present has had his say about it; the last

few years have seen a remarkable flurry of interest in it.

What accounts for this fascination? Not, I think, the religious

significance of the argument, although no doubt that can be

underrated. The cause is perhaps twofold. First, the ontological

argument offers an enormous return on a pretty slim investment - a

definition, and a perplexing but not altogether implausible premise

connecting existence and 'greatness,' yield the theistic conclusion.

Second, although the argument certainly looks at first sight as if it

ought to be unsound, it is profoundly difficult to say what exactly is

wrong with it. Indeed, it is doubtful that any philosopher has given a

really convincing and thorough refutation of the ontological

argument. Too often philosophers merely remark that Kant refuted

the argument by showing that existence is not a predicate and that

'one cannot build bridges from the conceptual realm to the real

world.' But it is very doubtful that Kant specified a sense of 'is a

predicate' such that, in that sense, it is clear both that existence is not

a predicate and that Anselm's argument requires that it be one. Nor

are the mere claims that no existential propositions are necessary or

the above comment about bridge building impressive as refutations

of Anselm - after all, he claims to have an argument for the necessity

of at least one existential proposition. So one must either show just

where his argument goes wrong, or else produce a solid argument for

the claim that no existential (in the appropriate sense) propositions

can be necessary-and this, I think, no one has succeeded in doing."

Alvin Plantinga - God and others minds. A study of the rational

justification of belief in God. - Cornell University Press (1967) pp.

26-27.

"PROSLOGION 2-4 consists of four pages. Barth's book about them

["Fides Quaerens Intellectum" (1931)] has 165 pages. All the books

and essays written about them in the last eight hundred years would

fill libraries. It is a legitimate question to ask, What is it, in these four

pages, that makes them so potent a challenge to the best minds of

humanity? What is the spell they cast over the reader so that

occupation with them becomes a passionate enterprise? These pages

do not seem to have the completeness and remoteness of a classic;

rather, they seem to call on the reader personally to do something

about them. They arouse in him an intellectual passion -- either for

or against them -- which makes him feel that the core of his own

thinking is being touched. On the one hand, they seem so concise

that nothing can be added, on the other, so loose that everything still

has to be done. But what? The reader feels puzzled, teased, imposed

upon. He feels called to take a personal part in a herculean

intellectual struggle.

The reason for this spell -- which was already felt in Anselm's life

time --cannot be solely Anselm's subject matter, for this has treated

by many before and after with less than intriguing effects. It must be,

to a large degree, his method. But what can there be so exciting about

a logical demonstration?"

Robert S. Hartman - Prolegomena to a meta-Anselmian axiomatic -

Review of Metaphysics, XIV, 4, June 1961 p. 637.

"No logician wishes to deny that in ordinary speech sentences such

as 'tame tigers exist' can be used with perfect propriety. Some of

them may be false, but it is not for the logician to determine which

are and which are not. If, however, we assume that grammatical form

is a sure guide to logical structure, we may be tempted to say that in

these sentences the word 'existence' stands for a predicate, where

'predicate' has a logical sense distinct from its grammatical sense.

That some philosophers have taken the word 'existence' to stand for

a predicate in the logical sense, i.e., for an attribute, may be seen

from their use of the ontological argument to prove the existence of

God.

Descartes' exposition of the argument is clearer than most others. He

starts from the position, supposed to be already established, that we

can know some propositions, e.g., simple theorems of mathematics,

to be necessarily true. It does not matter for our purposes whether he

thinks that his necessary propositions are analytic or synthetic,

although we may remark in passing that the language in which he

refers to them suggests that they are analytic. He wishes to say that

the proposition that God exists can be proved in the same way as that

in which a necessary proposition of mathematics is proved.(...) [His]

argument is based on the assumption that 'God exists' is a

proposition of the same sort as a theorem of geometry. Descartes

writes as though both propositions predicated something of a

subject, the one being about 'God,' the other about 'the triangle.' If he

did not assume this, he would not say that they can be proved in the

same fashion. Gassendi was the first, I think, to criticize the

argument on the ground that existence is not a property of God or of

anything else. (...) No doubt Descartes and those who agree with him

would say, if questioned, that they wished to make a distinction

between existence and qualities such as redness. But refinements of

the theory of existence as a predicate only introduce fresh difficulties.

The theory is unacceptable."

William Calvert Kneale - Is Existence a Predicate? - Aristotelian

Society, Supplementary volume 15, 1936 (reprinted in: Herbert Feigl

and Wilfrid Sellars (eds.) - Readings in Philosophical Analysis - New

York, Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc. (1949) pp. 29-30.

"It is much harder than one might first suspect to see what is wrong -

if anything - with the ontological argument, in some of its variants at

least. By way of criticism, it is often said that the argument fails

because 'existence is not a predicate'. However, there are senses -

and what is more, senses other than the purely grammatical one - in

which existence clearly is a predicate. It is sometimes said that

existence is not the kind of property that can be included in the

essence of anything; but the reasons for saying so are far from clear,

and the notion of essence is a notorious mess in the best of

circumstances. One might suspect that something goes wrong with

the logic of definite descriptions in the modal contexts involved in

the argument; but I shall try to reconstruct some of the most

important aspects of the ontological argument in terms having little

to do with ordinary modalities and nothing whatsoever with definite

descriptions. In fact, the independence of the essential features of the

ontological argument from the theory of definite descriptions ought

to be clear enough without much detailed argument. If what we are

trying to do is to establish that there exists a unique being 'than

which nothing greater can be conceived' - in short, a unique

supremely perfect Being - surely the great difficulty is to show that

there exists at least one such being, whereas we can face the problem

of uniqueness with relative calm.

Furthermore, it has been complained that the notion 'being greater

than anything else that can be conceived of' and the notion of

supreme perfection are unclear. More than that, it is sometimes

suggested that they are systematically ambiguous - that they make no

sense until it has been specified in what respect greatness or

perfection is to be measured. Certainly, greater evil or more perfect

vice cannot be what is meant - but even if there be no such things as

these, what precisely is meant? Yet a straightforward answer to this

question is forthcoming. What is at stake is surely greatness or

perfection with respect to existence. It does not take a neo-Platonist

to agree that the greatest or most supreme being intended in the

argument is certainly one whose powers of existing are maximal or

whose mode of being is, as existence qua existence goes, supremely

perfect."

Jaakko Hintikka - On the Logic of the Ontological Argument. Some

elementary remarks - in: Models for Modalities - Dordrecht, D.

Reidel Publishing Company (1969) pp. 45-46.

"Modal reasoning can be replaced by non-modal, ordinary reasoning

about possible things. Given an obscure modal argument, we can

translate it into a non-modal argument - or into several non-modal

arguments, if the given argument was ambiguous. Once we have a

nonmodal argument, we have clear standards of validity; and once

we have non-modal translations of the premises, we can understand

them well enough to judge whether they are credible. Foremost

among our modal headaches is Anselm's ontological argument. How

does if fare under the translation treatment I have prescribed? It

turns out to have two principal non-modal translations. One is valid;

the other has credible premises; the difference between the two is

subtle. No wonder the argument has never been decisively refuted;

no wonder it has never convinced the infidel. (pp. 10-11).

CONCLUSION. Of the alternative non-modal translations of our

ontological argument, the best are the arguments from 3A and 3B.

The premises of the argument from 3B enjoy some credibility, but

the argument is invalid. The argument from 3A is valid, but 3A

derives its credibility entirely from the illusion that because our

world alone is actual, therefore our world is radically different from

all other worlds - special in a way that makes it a fitting place of

greatest greatness. But once we recognize the indexical nature of

actuality, the illusion is broken and the credibility of 3A evaporates.

It is true of any world, at that world but not elsewhere, that that

world alone is actual. The world an ontological arguer calls actual is

special only in that the ontological arguer resides there - and it is no

great distinction for a world to harbor an ontological arguer. Think of

an ontological arguer in some dismally mediocre world - there are

such ontological arguers - arguing that his world alone is actual,

hence special, hence a fitting place of greatest greatness, hence a

world wherein something exists than which no greater can be

conceived to exist. He is wrong to argue thus. So are we." (p. 20)

David Lewis - Anselm and Actuality - Noûs, 4 (1970) pp. 175-188

(reprinted with a Postscript (pp. 21-25) in: Philosophical Papers -

vol. I Oxford, Oxford University Press 1983 p. 10-20.

"In the preface to his Proslogion Anselm audaciously claims

discovery of 'a single formula which needs no other to prove itself but

itself alone, and which by itself suffices to establish that God truly is,

and that he is the greatest good needing no other, and that which

everything needs if it is to be and be well, and whatever else we

believe about divine being' (93.6-10). Anselm published his

argument in 1077 or 1078. The dispute immediately kindled was

bright but brief; and after Anselm's death his argument lay fallow for

some hundred years. Then, in the thirteenth century, it was widely

debated, and widely accepted, (...) until it received the authoritative

disapproval of St Thomas Aquinas.

In the Seventeenth century Descartes discovered and vigorously

defended an argument for the existence of God which was plainly

similar to and allegedly identical with Anselm's argument.

Controversy over the Cartesian argument culminated with Kant; in a

section 'On the Impossibility of an Ontological Argument for the

Existence of God' in the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant performed for

Descartes the service Aquinas had rendered Anselm. Incidentally he

gave the argument a title, imposing, universally adopted, and wholly

opaque.

After Kant's assault the argument again languished - for the Hegelian

claim to have revived it is specious (...). In recent years, however,

philosophers and theologians have again looked with favour, or at

least attention, on the Ontological Argument. In this renaissance of

interest a new version of the argument has been brought to birth;

Norman Malcolm and Charles Hartshorne, its independent

obstetricians, both maintain that the new version, unlike the old,

does provide a proof of the existence of God."

Jonathan Barnes - The Ontological Argument - London, Macmillan

St. Martin's Press (1972) p. 1

"This argument has excited enormous controversy. Nearly every

great philosopher from Anselm's time to ours had his say about it:

Aquinas rejected it, John Duns Scotus 'coloured' (modified) it a bit

and accepted it. René Descartes and Nicolas Malebranche accepted

it; Leibniz accepted a version of it; Kant rejected it (and delivered

what many have thought the final quietus to it); Arthur

Schopenhauer thought it at best a charming joke; and many

contemporary philosophers seem to think it as a joke all right, but at

all a charming joke."

Alvin Plantinga - Ontological Arguments. I: Classical - in:

Handbook of Metaphysics and Ontology, eds., B. Smith and H.

Burkhardt, Philosophia Verlag, Munich, 1991pp. 622-623.

"Gödel showed his *1970 [Ontological Proof] to Dana Scott, and

discussed it with him, in February 1970. Gödel was very concerned

about his health at that time, feared that his death was near, and

evidently wished to insure that this proof would not perish with him.

Later in 1970, however, he apparently told Oskar Morgenstern that

though he was 'satisfied' with the proof, he hesitated to publish it, for

fear it would be thought "that he actually believes in God, whereas he

is only engaged in a logical investigation (that is, in showing that

such a proof with classical assumptions [completeness, etc.],

correspondingly axiomatized, is possible)." Scott made notes on the

proof and presented a version of the argument to his seminar on

logical entailment at Princeton University in the fall of 1970.

Through this presentation and the recollections and notes of those

who attended the seminar, Gödel's ontological proof has become

fairly widely known. Discussion of the proof, thus far, has been based

largely on Scott's version of it (Dana Scott 'Gödel's ontological proof'

in: Judith Jarvis Thomson (ed.) 'On being and saying: essays for

Richard Cartwright' - Cambridge, Mass. MIT Press 1987), which

differs somewhat in form from Gödel's own memorandum. The latter

is published here - though not for the first time; like Scott's version,

it was published as an appendix to John Howard Sobel 'Gödel's

ontological proof' in: J. J. Thomson cit. pages 256-7.

Gödel had devised his ontological proof some time before 1970.

Other, presumably earlier, versions of it have been found among his

papers. A sheet of paper headed "Ontological Proof' (in German),

and dated, in Gödel's own hand, 'ca. 1941', contains some but not all

of the ideas of the proof. Extensive preparatory material is contained

in the philosophical notebook 'Phil XIV'. The first page of this

notebook bears a notation indicating that it was written during the

period 'Ca. Ju1y 1946-May 1955". The last page of the notebook

contains the note 'Asbury Park 1954 p. 100 ff.', which presumably

applies to the pages (103-109) pertaining to the ontological proof.

Other documents, including letters, indicate that Gödel intended to

leave Princeton for the shore 9 August 1954, was vacationing in

Asbury Park on 25 August 1954, and was probably back in Princeton

by 3 October 1954. We may reasonably assume, then, that the

notebook pages on the ontological proof were written in the late

summer and early fall of 1954 and were completed at any rate by

May 1955. Relevant excerpts from the notebook, and two of the

(presumably earlier) loose sheets headed 'Ontological Proof',

including the one dated 'ca. 1941', are published in Appendix B to

this volume."

Robert Merrihew Adams - Introductory note to *1970 [Ontological

proof] in: Kurt Gödel - Collected Works - vol. III Unpublished essays

and lectures - Edited by Solomon Feferman and alii. - New York -

Oxford University Press 1995 p. 388-389 (notes omitted).

HISTORY OF THE ONTOLOGICAL

ARGUMENT

Graham Oppy wrote ( Ontological Arguments and Belief in God -

Cambridge University Press, 1995, pp. 202-203):

"1. SOME HISTORICAL CONSIDERATIONS.

As far as I know, there has been no exhaustive historical study of

ontological arguments, even for relatively narrow historical periods.

In particular, I found the pre-Cartesian discussion of ontological

arguments very hard to investigate. An accessible book of

translations, commentary, and analysis would be very useful.

1.1 HISTORICAL SYNOPSIS.

Gilson (1955) [History of Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages]

contains much information about the status of ontological arguments

- versions of the arguments of St. Anselm - in the Middle Ages.

Unfortunately, there is no subject index to this book, so the

information is not easily accessed. As we have seen, Thomists

rejected ontological arguments; but other philosophers of a more

rationalistic bent - for example, Scotists - accepted them.

Consequently, there were lively debates about ontological arguments

during the golden age of Scholasticism. However, the victory of

Occamist nominalism seems to have led to a widespread rejection of

those arguments by the end of the fourteenth century. Among those

who discussed St. Anselm's argument, there are the following:

William of Auxerre, Richard Fishacre, Alexander of Hales, Matthew

of Aquasparta, Johannes Peckham, Nicolaus of Cusa, [this is the

same error of Hartshorne (1965) p. 154: Daniels (1909) speaks of

Nicolaus Occam] Aegidius of Rome, William of Ware, Albertus

Magnus, Peter of Tarentaise, Henry of Ghent, Gregory of Rimini,

Robert Holcot, John of Beverley, John Wyclif, Richard Rufus of

Cornwall, Pierre Oriole, and Richard Middleton."

That no historical study of ontological arguments exists, is not exact

(see the bibliography at the bottom of this page).

HISTORICAL STUDIES

In English: The Part Two of Hartshorne (1965) titled "A critical

survey of responses to Anselm's proof" pp. 137-303, Harrelson

(2009) and Logan (2009) Chapter 6, 7, 8.

In German: Grunwald (1907), Daniels (1909), Dyroff (1928), Henrich

(1960), Rohls (1987), Röd (1992).

In French: Chatillon (1959).

In Italian: Scribano (1994), Tomatis (1997), Piazza (2000).

In Spanish: Ceñal (1970).

Daniels (1909) contains "an invaluable collection of medieval Latin

texts referring to the Argument, with a penetrating analysis of them

as indications that the author accepted or rejected Anselm's Proof,

and a careful discussion of the philosophical beliefs which

determined this acceptance or rejection" Hartshorne (1965) p. 306.

"The reception of the Argument in the Twelfth and thirteenth

centuries was almost as odd as what happened in its inventor's own

lifetime or in the modern period. (In this section I am heavily

indebted - and deeply grateful -to P. A. Daniels 1909). In the twelfth

century the Proof was simply ignored, so far as our records go. Three

conclusions have been drawn from this: all accepted the Proof, all

rejected it, they were unacquainted with it. Daniels shows that the

last is the most reasonable. In the next three centuries things were

dramatically different. Fifteen authors refer to the Proof, of whom

the following ten accept it: William of Auxerre, Richard Fishacre,

Alexander of Hales, Bonaventura, Matthew of Aquasparta, Johannes

Peck ham, Nicolaus of Cusa, [this is a lapsus: Daniels (1909) speaks

of Nicolaus Occam] Aegidius of Rome, William of Ware, and Duns

Scotus. Of these at least four, Alexander, Bonaventura, Nicolaus, and

Scotus seem to have some appreciation of Proslogion III and of the

true Anselmian Principle; the rest seem to be thinking largely or

exclusively of Proslogion II. Albertus Magnus, Peter of Tarentaise,

and Henry of Ghent take no position on the Proof; of these, only the

first seems to have read past Proslogion II. St. Thomas and his

disciple Richard of Middleton reject the Proof; Richard cites only

Proslogion II, while Thomas refers (in five different writings)

sometimes to this and sometimes to the following chapter; however,

where he is explicitly rejecting the Proof (in the two Summas) he

mentions only Proslogion II; and where he does mention the other

chapter he, in my opinion, misconceives the relationship of the two.

We have then fifteen medieval judges, of whom at most five show

that they have the Principle clearly and centrally in mind; one or two

others exhibit some conception of it, and the rest, little or none. Of

the five having the Principle (as Anselm did) clearly and centrally in

mind, four accept the Proof, and the fifth takes no stand. Of the other

ten, those who seem not to grasp the centrality of Proslogion III, six

accept, two reject, and two give no verdict. Thus even where the

Proof was taken at its weakest, still six found it convincing and but

two rejected it; and where it was taken at its strongest, four out of

five accepted and none rejected i t. This seems to show the power of

the Proof even when incompletely grasped, and its much greater

power when fully grasped. It also shows the blighting influence of

Gaunilo's inability to read beyond Chapter II.

Unfortunately, the example of Thomas has in the end outweighed in

prestige all the others put together. Bonaventura's cogent rebuttal of

Gaunilo's 'island' analogy has been passed over as though it had

never happened, while the objections of Thomas have been

treasured."

Charles Harstshorne - Anselm's Discovery: A re-examination of the

Ontological Proof for God's Existence - Lasalle - Open Court 1965

pp. 154-155.

A SELECTION OF PRIMARY AUTHORS,

WITH ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHIES

Legenda: P = Pro (accept the proof); C = Contra (rejected the proof);

I = indifferent (take no position on the proof); ca. = circa; fl =

flourished; d. died.

References are to the most important works where ontological

argument is discussed.

The Medieval Period from Anselm to Scotus

P Anselm of Canterbury [Anselmus Cantuariensis, Doctor Angelicus]

C Gaunilo of Marmoutiers [Gaunilo, monachus]

P William of Auxerre [Guillelmi Altissiodorensis]

P Alexander of Hales [Alexander Halensis, Doctor Irrefragabilis]

P Richard Fishacre [Richardus Flamesburensis]

C Richard Rufus of Cornwall [Richaruds Rufus Cornubiensis]

P Bonaventure of Bagnorea [Bonaventurae, Johannes Fidanza,

Doctor Seraphicus]

I Albert the Great [Albertus Magnus, Doctor Universalis ]

C Thomas Aquinas [Thomae Aquinatis, Doctor Angelicus]

I Peter of Tarentaise [Petrus a Tarentasia, Pope Innocent V]

P John Peckham [Johannis Packham, Doctor Ingeniosus]

I Henry of Ghent [Henrici de Gandavo, Doctor Solemnis]

P Nicolaus of Ockham [Nicolaus de Ockham]

P Matthew of Aquasparta [Matthaei ab Aquasparta]

P Giles of Rome [Aegidius Romanus, Egidio Colonna]

C Richard of Middletown [Richardus of Mediavilla]

P William of Ware [Gulielmi Guarae]

P John Duns Scotus [Johannes Duns Scotus, Doctor Subtilis]

The Modern Era from Suárez to Frege

P Francisco Suárez

P René Descartes

C Pierre Gassendi

P Henry More

P Ralph Cudworth

P Baruch Spinoza

P Nicolas Malebranche

P Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz

P François Fénelon

P Samuel Clarke

P Christian Wolff

C David Hume

P Alexander Baumgarten

C Immanuel Kant

P Moses Mendelssohn

P Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel

P Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling

C Ludwig Feuerbach

P Robert Flint

P Franz Brentano

C Gottlob Frege

The Contemporary Debate

P Heinrich Scholz

P Karl Barth

P Robin George Collingwood

P Charles Hartshorne

C John Niemeyer Findlay

P Kurt Gödel

P Norman Malcolm

P Jan Berg

C John Howard Sobel

P Alvin Plantinga

C David Kellogg Lewis

P Robert Maydole

C Graham Oppy

P Alexander Pruss

Pages about the History of the Ontological Proof:

History of the Ontological Argument. Introductory Remarks

Bibliography of General and Introductory Studies

The Medieval Period from Anselm of Canterbury to Duns Scotus

Bibliography on Medieval Authors

The Modern Period from Suárez to Frege

Bibliography on Modern Authors

The Contemporary Period from Barth to the Present Time

Bibliography on Contemporary Authors

A Selection of Text of Primary Authors

Bibliographia. Annotated bibliographies

Raul Corazzon || rc@ontology.co || Info

Selected Bibliography on the

History of the Ontological

Argument. General Works

General Histories of the Ontological

Argument

1. Bonansea, Bernardino. 1979. God and Atheism. A Philosophical

Approach to the Problem of God. Washington: The Catholic

University of America Press.

See Chapter III. The Ontological Argument pp. 107-170.

2. Harrelson, Kevin J. 2009. The Ontological Argument from

Descartes to Hegel. Amherst: Prometheus Books.

Contents: Preface 9; List of Abbreviations 11; Introduction: an

episode in the history of an argument 15; Chapter One: Proof

and perception: the contest of the Argumentum Cartesianum

41; Chapter Two: Refutations of atheism: ontological

arguments in English philosophy, 1652-1705 79; Chapter

Three: Being and intuition: Malebranche's appropriation of the

Argument 101; Chapter Four: An adequate conception: the

argument in Spinoza's philosophy 121; Chapter Five:

Ontological Arguments in Leibniz and the German

Enlightenment 141; Chapter Six: Kant's systematic critique of

the Ontological Argument 167; Chapter Seven: Hegel's

reconstruction of the Argument 197; Glossary of terms,

arguments, and positions 231; Bibliography 235; Index 249-

253.

"This book provides a philosophical analysis of the several

debates concerning the "ontological argument" from the middle

of the seventeenth to the beginning of nineteenth century. My

aim in writing it was twofold. First, I wished to provide a

detailed and comprehensive account of the history of these

debates, which I perceived to be lacking in the scholarly

literature. Second, I wanted also to pursue a more

philosophically interesting question concerning the apparent

unassailability of ontological arguments. In pursuit of this

latter problem, the driving question that my account addresses

is "why has this argument, or kind of argument, been such a

constant in otherwise diverse philosophical contexts and

periods?"

As familiar as the ontological argument is, there have been no

book- length studies in English about the historical

development of the arguments of Anselm, Descartes, etc. A vast

collection of articles and chapter-length treatments of the

history of these arguments does exist, however; and in

composing this work I have benefited from the labors of

numerous scholars. Particularly helpful was the work of

Bernardino Bonansea, Charles Hartshorne, Asnat Avshalom,

and Oded Balabon. Even more influential were the many

monograph-length studies that have long appeared in other

Western languages, especially in German and French. In

conducting the necessary research I accrued an enormous debt

to the authors of these texts. I thus owe my sincere gratitude to

Wolfgang Röd, Louis Girard, and Jan Rohls. My greatest debt

in this regard, however, is to Dieter Henrich. My work is little

more than an extended argument with him." (From the

Preface)

3. Matthews, Scott. 2001. Reason, Community and Religious

Tradition. Anselm's Argument and the Friars. Aldershot:

Ashgate.

Contents: Preface; Introduction: Arguments, texts and

contexts; Anselm and tradition; Encountering God within:

Anselm's argument among the early Franciscans in Paris; Other

ways to God: Anselm, the early Dominicans and the friars in

Oxford; Bonaventure and the Franciscan community; Thomas

Aquinas and the Dominican community; Contested traditions;

Conclusion; Bibliography; Index.

"This book examines key questions about the relationship of

rationality to its contexts by tracing the early history of the so-

called 'ontological' argument. The book follows Anselm's

Proslogion from its origins in the private, devotional context of

an eleventh-century monastery to its reception in the public

and adversarial contexts of the friars' schools in the thirteenth

century. Using unpublished manuscript evidence from the

Dominican and Franciscan schools at Oxford, Paris and

Bologna in the thirteenth century, Matthews argues that the

debate over Anselm's argument embodied the broader religious

differences between the Franciscan and Dominican

communities. By comparing the most famous figures of the

period with their lesser-known contemporaries, Matthews

argues that the Friars thought as communities and developed

as traditions as they developed their arguments."

4. Chatillon, Jean. 1959. "De Guillaume d'Auxerre à saint Thomas

d'Aquin: l'argument de Saint Anselme chez les premiers

Scolastiques du XIII siècle." In Spicilegium Beccense I.

Congrés International du IX centenaire de l'arrivée d'Anselme

au Bec, 209-231. Paris: Vrin.

5. Piazza, Giovanni. 2000. Il nome di Dio. Una storia della prova

ontologica. Bologna: Edizioni dello Studio Domenicano.

6. Scribano, Emanuela. 1994. L'esistenza di Dio. Storia della

prova ontologica da Descartes a Kant. Bari: Laterza.

Traduction française par Charles Barone: L'existence de Dieu.

Histoire de la preuve ontologique de Descartes a Kant, Paris:

Seuil 2002.

7. Staglianò, Antonio. 1996. La mente umana alla prova di Dio:

filosofia e teologia nel dibattito contemporaneo

sull'argomento di Anselmo d'Aosta. Bologna: Edizioni

Dehoniane.

8. Tomatis, Francesco. 1997. L'argomento ontologico: l'esistenza

di Dio da Anselmo a Schelling. Roma: Città Nuova.

9. Daniels, Augustinus. 1909. Quellenbeiträge und

Untersuchungen zur Geschichte der Gottesbeweise im

Dreizehnten Jahrundert, mit besonderer Beruchsichtigung des

Arguments im Proslogion des Hl. Anselm, Beiträge zur

Geschichte der Philosophie des Mittelalters. Münster: Druck

und verlag der Aschendorffschen Buchhandlung.

Inhaltsverzeichnis:

A. Texte.

I. Anselm von Canterbury 3; II. Richard Fishacre 21; III.

Wilhelm von Auxerre 25; IV. Alexander von Hales 28; V. Albert

der Grosse 36; VI. Bonaventura 38; VII. Johannes Peckham 41;

VIII. Matthaeus von Aquasparta 51; IX. Thomas von Aquino

64; X. Peter of Tarentaise 68; XI. Ägidius von Rom 72; XII.

Heinrich von Gent 79; XIII. Nicolaus Occam 82; XIV. Richard

von Middleton 84; XV. Wilhelm von Ware 89; XVI. Johannes

Duns Scotus 105;

B. Untersuchungen.

I. Vorfragen.

1. Die Bedeutung des Schweigens gewisser Scholastiker mit

Bezug auf Anselms Argument 111; 2. Der scholastische

Lehrbetrieb und das gegenwärtige Problem 115;

II. Das Ergebnis der Texte.

III. Die Voraussetzungen, welche für die Annahme von

Anselms Argument in Frage kommen 131.

1. Die angeborene Gottesidee bei S. Bonaventura und seiner

Schule 132; 2. Das primum cognitum bei den Anhängern des

Gottesbeweises des Proslogion 143; 3. Der Satz "non ens non

potest esse obiectum intellectus" in seiner Beziehung zum

Gottesbeweis des Proslogion 154;

Anhang.

1. Scholastiker des dreizehnten Jahrunderts, die den

Gottesbeweis des Proslogion nicht erwähnen 157; 2. Die

Abhängigkeit des Matthaeus von Aquasparta von Bonaventura

159; 3. Die Unechtheit der dom Scotus zugeschriehenen Schrift:

Expositio et Quaestiones in VIII Libros Physicorum Aristotelis

162; Namenregister 165-167.

10. Dyroff, Adolf. 1928. "Der ontologische Gottesbeweis des hl.

Anselmus in der Scholastik." In Probleme der

Gotteserkenntnis, 79-115. Münster: Verlag der

Aschendorffschen Verlagsbuchhandlung.

11. Grunwald, Georg. 1907. Geschichte der Gottesbeweise im

Mittelalter bis zum Ausgang der Hochscholastik nach den

Quellen Dargestellt. Münster: Aschendorff.

12. Henrich, Dieter. 1960. Der ontologische Gottesbeweis. Sein

Problem und seine Geschichte in der Neuzeit. Tübingen: Mohr.

Traduzione italiana di Sonia Carboncini: La prova ontologica

dell'esistenza di Dio. La sua problematica e la sua storia

nell'età moderna, Napoli, Prismi, 1983.

13. Rõd, Wolfgang. 2009. Der Gott der reinen Vernunft.

Ontologischer Gottesbeweis und rationalistische Philosophie.

München: Beck.

Nachdruck 2009: Der Gott der reinen Vernunft. Ontologischer

Gottesbeweis und rationalistische Philosophie.

14. Rohls, Jan. 1987. Theologie und Metaphysik. Der ontologische

Gottesbeweis und seine Kritiker. Gütersloher: Verlagshaus

Gerd Mohn.

15. Ceñal, Ramon. 1970. "El argumento ontologico de la existencia

de Dios en la escolastica de los siglos 17 y 18." In Homenaje a

Xavier Zubiri. Tomo I, 247-325. Madrid: Editorial Moneda y

Crédito.

Introductory Studies on the Ontological

Argument

1. Barnes, Jonathan. 1972. The Ontological Argument . London:

Macmillan.

Contents: General Editor's Preface VII; Author's Preface VIII; 1.

The Arguments 1; 2. Necessary Existence 29; 3. Existence and

Predication 39; 4. 'God' 67; Appendix A: Chronology of

Anselm's Life 87; Appendix B: Anselm's Reductio 88;

References 91-98.

"The Ontological Argument has been debated for eight

centuries, and never more energetically than in the last decade.

The present essay is less concerned to break new ground than

to harrow land already ploughed. Thus Chapter 1 expounds,

perhaps rather more particularly than is customary, some of

the chief versions of the Ontological Argument; while Chapters

2-3 attempt to appraise and then to outflank the two main

manoeuvres which opponents of the Argument have essayed.

Finally, Chapter 4 outlines and advocates a more elementary

plan of attack.

My goal has been to state, as plainly as I can, what the

Ontological Argument is, and what is and is not most wrong

with it. But I have tried to keep in mind a secondary objective,

and to provide some intimation of a few of the wider

philosophical issues which the Argument raises. For even those

philosophers who are sceptical of the merits of the Argument

itself must allow that it has inspired and stimulated some

considerable work in philosophical logic, and that it still offers

a pointed introduction to a number of peculiarly recalcitrant

problems.

The literature on the Ontological Argument is of daunting

magnitude, and it swells almost daily: I am acutely conscious of

broad lacunae in my reading, especially of the more

theologically inclined matter. Nevertheless, my debts to the

published thoughts of others are frequent and heavy; I have

tried to acknowledge the most important in the text." (P. VIII)

2. Bastit, Michel. 2016. Le principe du monde. Le Dieu du

philosophe . Paris: Les Press universitaires de l'IPC.

Table des matières : Introduction : À la recherche du principe 7;

Chapitre 1: Des traditions religieuses à la philosophie 13;

Chapitre 2: Persuasion et démonstration 29; Chapitre 3: De la

pensée à la pensée ou de la pensée à l’existence ? 47; Chapitre

4: Commencement et fin 63; Chapitre 5: Le concert des

sciences 85; Chapitre 6: Survie des substances dans l'espace-

temps 107; Chapitre 7: Les mouvements des corps mobiles 135;

Chapitre 8: Le temps des mouvements 147; Chapitre 9: Limites

et unicité du monde 157; Chapitre 10: Les causes 171; Chapitre

11: La Cause Première 199; Chapitre 12: Éléments principaux de

théologie naturelle 217; Conclusion 237; Bibliographie 243-258.

"Cet ouvrage est un livre de philosophie première, et

particulièrement de théologie naturelle. Il a pour objet

l’établissement de l’existence d’un principe premier de la réalité

qui pourra peut-être par la suite être identifié avec Dieu, puis

l’exploration de quelques-uns des attributs de ce principe. Sa

démarche ne relève pas de croyances religieuses, mais de la

pure rationalité philosophique. Il relève de la métaphysique en

sa partie ultime, mais d’une métaphysique appuyée sur une

physique. Il pourra arriver au cours de la réflexion de croiser

des problèmes et des thèmes qui relèvent aussi des croyances

religieuses. Ces points de contact, à l’exception de l’étude de la

portée philosophique des croyances religieuses qui forme une

partie importante du chapitre premier, seront signalés, mais ils

doivent être considérés comme accidentels par rapport à la

démarche et seront donc traités marginalement." (p. 7)

(...)

"La recherche scientifique d’un principe n’est pas exclusive de

l'adhésion de foi à ce principe. Inversement la foi peut susciter

le désir de démontrer ce que l’on croit ou une partie de ce que

l’on croit. C’est une attitude de ce genre qui est à l’origine de la

démonstration dite par la preuve ontologique due à Anselme de

Cantorbéry et à un grand nombre de ses successeurs, comme

aujourd’hui par exemple Plantinga. Le mérite de ces démarches

est sans aucun doute leur recherche de scientificité et rigueur

attestée d'ailleurs par un certain nombre de formalisations

possibles, toujours chez Plantinga qui fait appel au système

modal S5, ou chez Gödel qui a été préoccupé par une

élaboration rigoureuse de la preuve pendant une longue partie

de sa carrière.

Il est probable que l’idée de la preuve ontologique procède en

partie de la vanité et de l’impossibilité de concevoir une

démonstration à partir d’un principe situé au-delà du premier

principe. Il vient facilement à l’idée devant l’impossibilité

radicale de posséder un principe au-delà du premier principe

pour le démontrer, de recourir à une sorte de dédoublement du

premier principe dont une partie sert de principe à l’autre. La

preuve ontologique repose sur un mécanisme de ce genre : une

partie du principe, son essence, sert à démontrer son

existence." (p. 47)

Le Chapitre 3 contient une discussion détaillée des argument de

Anselme de Cantorbéry, Kurt Gödel et Alvin Plantinga (pp. 47-

62).

3. Bourgeois-Gironde, Sacha. 2002. "L'argument ontologique." In

Analyse et théologie. Croyances religieuses et rationalité ,

edited by Bourgeois-Gironde, Sacha, Gnassounou, Bruno and

Pouivet, Roger, 31-52. Paris: Vrin.

4. Breton, Stanislas. 1990. "L'argument ontologique aujourd'hui.

Problèmes et perspectives." In L'argomento ontologico / The

ontological Argument / L'argument ontologique / Der

Ontologische Gottesbeweis , edited by Olivetti, Marco M., 665-

678. Padova.

5. Bromand, Joachim, and Kreis, Guido, eds. 2011.

Gottesbeweise: von Anselm bis Gödel . Berlin: Suhrkamp.

6. de la Sienra, Adolfo García. 2000. "The Ontological argument."

In The Rationality of Theism , edited by de la Sienra, Adolfo

García, 127-142. Amsterdam: Rodopi.

7. Dore, Clement. 1984. Theism . Dordrecht: Reidel.

See Chapters: 5. A Modal Argument 49; 6. Is God's Existence

Logically Possible? 62; 7. Descartes's Meditation V Argument

82-103; Appendix: Two Argument of St. Anselm 141-147.

8. Durrant, Michael. 1973. The Logical Status of 'God' and the

Function of Theological Sentences . London: Macmillan.

9. Gale, Richard. 1991. On the Nature and Existence of God .

Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

See Chapter 6: Ontological arguments pp. 201-237.

10. Hick, John, and McGill, Arthur C., eds. 1967. The Many-faced

Argument. Recent Studies on the Ontological Argument for the

Existence of God . London: Macmillan.

Contents: Preface VII; Part I. The argument in Anselm; I.

Anselm: Proslogion (Chapter II-IV) 3; Gaunilo and Anselm:

Criticism and reply 9; III: Arthur C. McGill: Recent discussions

of Anselm's argument 33; IV. A. Beckaert: A Platonic

justification for the argument a priori (1959) 111; V. Karl Barth:

A presupposition of the proof: the Name of God (1931) 119; VI.

Karl Barth: Proslogion III : the special existence of God (1931)

135; VII. André Hayen: The role of the Fool in St. Anselm and

the necessarily Apostolic character of true Christian reflection

(1959) 162; VIII. Anselm Stolz: Anselm's theology in the

Proslogion (1933) 183; Part II. The argument in recent

philosophy; IX. John Hick: Introduction 209; A. Is existence a

predicate?; X. Bertrand Russell: General propositions and

existence (1918) 219; XI. Jerome Shaffer: Existence,

predication and the ontological argument (1962) 226; B. The

Hegelian use of the argument; XII. Gilbert Ryle: Mr.

Collingwood and the ontological argument (1935) 246; XIII. E.

E. Harris: Mr. Ryle and the ontological argument (1936) 261;

XIV. Gilbert Ryle: Back to the ontological argument (1937) 269;

XV. Aimé Forest: St. Anselm's argument in reflexive philosophy

(1959) 275; C. The second form of the argument; XVI. Norman

Malcolm: Anselm's ontological arguments (1960) 301; XVII.

Charles Hartshorne: What did Anselm discover? (1962) 321;

XVIII. Charles Hartshorne: The irreducibly modal structure of

the argument (1962) 334; XIX. John Hick: a critique of the

"Second argument" 341; Selected bibliography 357; Index of

topics 371; Index of names 373.

11. Inwagen, Peter van. 1998. "Arguments for God's Existence:

Ontological Arguments." In Philosophy of Religion , edited by

Davies, Brian, 54-58. Washington: Georgetown University

Press.

"This chapter gives a very compressed history of the ontological

argument from Anselm to Kant, and discusses briefly a modern,

modal version of the argument. It is argued that Anselm's and

Descartes's versions of the argument are flawed, and that one

cannot know the main premise of the modal argument -- 'It is

possible for there to be a perfect being (a being that has all

perfections essentially)' -- to be true otherwise than by

knowing, on some ground independent of the modal argument,

that a perfect being actually exists."

12. ———. 2002. "Necessary Being: the Ontological Argument." In

Metaphysics , 91-114. Boulder: Westview Press.

Second revised edition (first edition 1993).

Reprinted in: Eleonore Stump, Michael J. Murray (eds.),

Philosophy of Religion. The Big Questions, Malden: Blackwell,

1999, pp. 69-83.

13. Kutschera, Franz von. 1990. Vernunft und Glaube . Berlin:

Walter de Gruyter.

See: Anhang: 1) Zum ontologischen Gottesbeweis pp. 323-334.

14. Leftow, Brian. 2005. "The Ontological Argument." In The

Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Religion , edited by

Wainwright, William J., 80-116. New York: Oxford University

Press.

"I analyze and evaluate ontological arguments and objections to

them in Anselm, Gaunilo, Descartes, his immediate objectors,

Leibniz, Kant and Brouwer. Anselm comes off rather better

than he is often portrayed, Kant rather worse; Descartes (I

argue) is as bad as you've heard."

15. Logan, Ian. 2009. Reading Anselm's Proslogion. The History

of Anselm's Argument and its Significance Today . Farnham:

Ashgate.

Contents: Acknowledgements VII; List of Abbreviations IX; 1.

Introduction 1; 2. The pre-text: the dialectical origins of

Anselm's Argument 7; 3. The Text Proslogion 25; Pro

Insipiente 59; Responsio 67; 4. Commentary on the Proslogion

85; 5. Anselm's defence and the Unum Argumentum 115; 6.

The medieval reception 129; 7. The modern reception 151; 8.

Anselm's Argument today 175; Conclusion: the significance of

Anselm's Argument 197; Bibliography 203; Index 215.

"Presenting an account of Anselm's Proslogion argument, its

background and its subsequent history in later thought is more

than an exercise in intellectual archaeology. Work still needs to

be done to understand what Anselm was trying to achieve arid

how he was trying to achieve it, Anselm's argument presents an

important paradigm for the history or ideas, since it has been

treated directly or indirectly by so many different thinkers in

subsequent centuries, and it provides a direct challenge to the

way philosophy has been done over those centuries. That

Anselm has been consistently misunderstood and

misrepresented is a central thesis of this book. It is only by

returning to and reading Anselm's text that we can hope to

establish what he was trying to say and understand how he was

trying to say it. Anselm's argument has fascinated and

continues to fascinate philosophers and theologians, to such an

extent that it is no longer possible in a single work to review

exhaustively the history of its reception. Thus, the account of

the reception in this book is selective, particularly in Chapter 8

where I limit myself in the main to its reception amongst

modern English speaking philosophers. It is these philosophers

who have been particularly concerned with the logical form,

validity and soundness of. Anselm's argument, and to whom it

is necessary to respond, if one wishes to discover wether

Anselm still has something of philosophical interest to say to us

in the Proslogion.

There has been a natural tendency amongst modern thinkers to

adhere, wittingly or unwittingly, to a Whig view of history, to

see the history of ideas as the steady progress of enlightened

thought over benighted ignorance. The past is a bad or at best

confused place, in which people concerned themselves 'with a

lot of outdated foolishness', such as questions about the

existence of God, which we now correctly consider to be

irrelevant. (1) It is my hope that the study of Anselm's

argument and its subsequent reception will help to counter

such views, not because everything in the past was good, but

because some things were, and it may just be that some of those

good things are what 'we' now consider outdated and irrelevant.

Anselm's argument is frequently identified with later

ontological arguments. It is one of my tasks in this work to

show how that has happened, and that Anselm's argument has

to be addressed in its specificity, that 'that than which a greater

cannot be thought' is the irreplaceable middle term of Anselm's

argument, which for Anselm functions as the 'natural or proper

word' for God. This is not simple a question of scholarship, but

also of philosophy, for in my view the latter is aided by the

former.

In this book I seek to create and 'audit trail' which stretches

from (I) a prehistory of the text (Chapter 2) to (ii) the

manuscript tradition and a translation which seeks to remain

faithful to Anselm's Latin text (Chapter 3), presenting the Latin

and English texts in parallel to (iii) a commentary on the text

(Chapter 4) to (iv) an exposition of the debate that immediately

followed its 'publication' (Chapter 5) to (v) a review and

evaluation of the historical ongoing reception of the Proslogion

(Chapters 6, 7 and 8). It concludes with an assessment of the

significance of Anselm's argument." (pp. 1-2)

(1) See R. Rorty, 'The historiography of philosophy: four

genres', in R. Rorty et al. (eds.), R‘¨þé Philosophy in History.

Essays on the historiography of philosophy , Cambridge 1984,

pp. 49-75, p. 52.

16. Mackie, John Leslie. 1982. The Miracle of Theism. Arguments

for and Against the Existence of God . Oxford: Clarendon

Press.

Chapter 3. Ontological Arguments: (a) Descartes's Proof and

Kant's Criticism 41; (b)Anselm's Ontological Proof and

Gaunilo's Reply 49; (c) Plantinga's Ontological Proof 55-63.

17. Matthews, Gareth B. 2004. "The ontological argument." In The

Blackwell Guide to the Philosophy of Religion , edited by

Mann, William E. Malden: Blackwell.

18. Micheletti, Mario. 1972. Il problema teologico nella filosofia

analitica. Vol. II: Lo status logico della credenza religiosa .

Padova: Editirice La Garangola.

Capitolo IV: L'argomento ontologico nella filosofia analitica

282-377.

19. Miethe, Terry. 1977. "The Ontological Argument: A Research

Bibliography." Modern Schoolman no. 54:148-166.

"Within the past two decades or so there has been a gradual

renewal of interest in metaphysics in general and in the theistic

arguments in particular. This is the most comprehensive

bibliography ever done on this argument for God's existence,

with over 330 items listed. The article is divided into the

following categories:

I. General histories of the argument; II. The argument in

Anselm; III. The argument in the Middle Ages after Anselm; IV:

The argument from Descartes to Kant; V: The Hegelian and

Idealist use of the argument; VI. The argument in Continental

philosophy; VII: The argument in British and American

philosophy; VIII. The logic of "exists"; IX. The concept of

necessary being; X: Additions as a result of additional

research."

20. Olivetti, Marco M., ed. 1990. L'argomento ontologico / The

ontological Argument / L'argument ontologique / Der

Ontologische Gottesbeweis . Padova: Cedam.

21. Plantinga, Alvin, ed. 1965. The Ontological Argument from St.

Anselm to Contemporary Philosophers . London: Macmillan.

Contents: Richard Taylor: Introduction VII-XVIII; Part I. The

ontological argument in the history of philosophy; 1. St. Anselm

3; 2. St. Thomas Aquinas 28; 3. René Descartes 31; 4. Benedict

de Spinoza 40; 5. Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz 54; 6. Immanuel

Kant: The impossibility of an Ontological Proof of the existence

of God 57; 7. Arthur Schopenhauer 65; Part II. Contemporary

views of the ontological argument; 8. G. E. Moore: Is existence

a predicate? 9. William P. Alston: The ontological argument

revisited 86; 10. J. N. Findlay: Can God's existence be

disproved? 111; 11. Charles Hartshorne; The Necessarily

Existent 123; 12. Norman Malcolm: A. Malcolm's statement of

Anselm's ontological argument 136; B. A reply by Alvin

Plantinga: A valid ontological argument? 160; C. A reply by

Paul Henle: Uses of the ontological argument 171-180.

22. Sciacca, Michele Federico, ed. 2009. Con Dio e contro Dio.

Raccolta sistematica degli argomenti pro e contro l'esistenza

di Dio . Milano: Marzorati.

Vol. I: Dai Presocratici a Kant (1972); Vol. II: Dal pensiero

romantico a oggi (1972); Vol. III: Novecento teologico. Il Dio

dei teologi (1995); Vol. IV: Novecento teologico: Il Dio dei

filosofi e degli scienziati (1995).

23. Seifert, Josef. 2000. Gott als Gottesbeweis. Eine

phänomenologische Neubegründung des ontologischen

Arguments . Heidelberg: C. Winter.

Second improved and substantially (by a new statement of the

core of the ontological argument of 102 pages and a Preface for

the Arabic translation of 29 pages) enlarged edition. (First

edition 1996).

24. Szatkowski, Miroslaw, ed. 2012. Ontological Proofs Today .

Frankfurt: Ontos Verlag.

Contents: Acknowledgements 5; Authors of Contributed Papers

Part I. Introduction

1. Mirosław Szatkowski: Guided Tour of the Book: Ontological

Proofs Today 19

Part II. Interpretation of Old Ontological Proofs. God’s

Attributes

2. Reinhard Hiltscher: Ratio Anselmi 69; 3. L. Jason Megill:

Two Ontological Arguments for the Existence of an Omniscient

Being 77; 4. L. Jason Megill and Amy Reagor: A Modal Theistic

Argument 89; 5. Marcin Tkaczyk: A Debate on God: Anselm,

Aquinas and Scotus 113; 6. Peter Van Inwagen: Three Versions

of the Ontological Argument 143;

Part III. New Ontological Proofs

7. Richard M. Gale: More Modest Ontological Argument 165; 8.

E. J. Lowe: A New Modal Version of the Ontological Argument

179; 9.Uwe Meixner: A Cosmo-Ontological Argument for the

Existence of a First Cause - perhaps God 193; 10. Alexander R.

Pruss: A Gödelian Ontological Argument Improved Even More

203;

Part IV. Semantics for Ontological Proofs

11. Sergio Galvan: Logic of Existence, Ontological Frames,

Leibniz’s and Gödel’s Ontological Proofs 215; 12. Mirosław

Szatkowski: Fully Free Semantics for Anderson-like Ontological

Proofs 243;

Part V. Ontological Proofs and Kinds of Necessity

13.Anthony C. Anderson: Conceptual Modality and Ontological

Argument 295; 14. Stamatios Gerogiorgakis: Does the Kind of

Necessity which Is Represented by S5 Capture a Theologically

Defensible Notion of a Necessary Being? 309; 15. Srećko Kovač:

Modal Collapse in Gödel’s Ontological Proof 323; 16. Richard

Swinburne: What Kind of Necessary Being Could God Be? 345;

Part VI. Ontological Proofs and Formal Ontology

17. Robert E. Maydole: On Grim’s Cantorian Anti-Ontological

Argument 367; 18. Edward Niezńanski: Concepts of Proof and

Formalized Arguments ex gradibus perfectionis 379; 19. Jerzy

Perzanowski: Onto/Logical Melioration 391; 20. John Turri:

Doomed to Fail: The Sad Epistemological Fate of Ontological

Arguments 413; 21. Paul Weingartner: The Premises of

Anselm’s Argument 423;

Part VII. Debate Maydole-Oppy

22. Graham Oppy: Maydole on Ontological Arguments 445; 23.

Robert E. Maydole: Ontological Arguments Redux 469; 24.

Graham Oppy: Response to Maydole 487; 25. Robert E.

Maydole: Reply to Oppy’s Response to ”Ontological Redux”

501;

Author Index 511; Subject Index 515-520.

25. Tilliette, Xavier. 1990. "Quelques défenseurs de l'argument

ontologique." In L'argomento ontologico / The ontological

Argument / L'argument ontologique / Der Ontologische

Gottesbeweis , edited by Olivetti, Marco M., 403-420. Padova:

CEDAM.

Bibliographia. Annotated bibliographies

Raul Corazzon || rc@ontology.co || Info

Selected Bibliography on the

Ontological Argument of Anselm of

Canterbury

Anselm of Canterbury (1033-1109)

Texts and translations

The standard critical edition of Anselm's works is the Opera omnia

prepared by Fr. F. S. Schmitt: S. Anselmi Cantuariensis

archiepiscopi opera omnia, ad fidem codicum recensuit, 6 vols [the

first printed at Seckau, 1938, the second at Rome in 1940, all reset

for the Nelson edition], (Edinburgh: Nelson, 1946-1961).

Reprinted with new editorial material as: S. Anselmi Cantuariensis

archiepiscopi opera omnia, ad fidem codicum recensuit, 2 vols.

(Stuttgart-Bad-Cannstatt: Frommann, 1968-1984)

1. Anselm, of Canterbury. 1938. Proslogion. Edinburgh: Thomas

Nelson & Sons.

Written in 1077-1078.

Critical edition of Latin text in the first volume of: Sancti

Anselmi Cantuariensis Archiepiscopi Opera Omnia ad fides

codicum recensuit Franciscus Salesius Schmitt, OSB - 6 voll.

(1938-1961); reprinted in two volumes, Stuttgart (Bad

Cannstatt) Friedrich Frommann Verlag 1968 with an

introducition by Schmitt drawing together his articles on

Anselm.

Proslogion vol. I pp. 93-122.

2. ———. 1938. Responsio Anselmi (Quid ad haec respondeat

editor ipsius libelli). Edinburgh: Thomas Nelson & Sons.

Reply to Gaunilo written in 1078.

Critical edition of Latin text in the first volume of: Sancti

Anselmi Cantuariensis Archiepiscopi Opera Omnia, vol. I pp.

130-139.

3. ———. 1986. A new, interpretive translation of St. Anselm's

Monologion and Proslogion. Minneapolis: Arthur J. Banning

Press.

Translated by Jasper Hopkins

4. ———. 2000. Complete philosophical and theological treatises

of Anselm of Canterbury. Minneapolis: Arthur J. Banning

Press.

Translated by Jasper Hopkins and Herbert Richardson.

Proslogion pp. 88-112.

5. ———. 2001. Proslogion, with the Replies of Gaunilo and

Anselm. Indianapolis: Hackett.

Translated, with introduction, by Thomas Williams.

Studies

1. Adams, Robert Merrihew. 1971. "The Logical Structure of

Anselm's Argument." Philosophical Review no. 80:28-54.

Reprinted in: R. M. Adams, The Virtue of Faith and Other

Essays in Philosophical Theology, New York: Oxford University

Press, 1987, pp. 221-242.

"In this essay I offer a formal analysis of Anselm's arguments

for the existence of God in the Proslogion and in his reply to

Gaunilo. I do not attempt to show here that the arguments are

compelling, or that they are not. What I try to do is discover in

each argument, so far as possible, a valid logical form, to

exhibit the relations of the arguments to each other, and to

show how they depend on certain doctrines in logic or the

philosophy of logic. Anselm's arguments are far from dead, and

in this paper I hope to provide a logical map, so to speak, of

some ground that is still very much fought over.

The first two sections of the paper are concerned with the most

famous of Anselm's arguments, the argument of Chapter 2 of

the Proslogion. In Section I, I formulate a version of the

argument in modern logical symbolism, and state the

assumptions about existence and predication on which the

argument seems to me to depend. Gaunilo's criticism of Anselm

was directed very largely against the ontological

presuppositions of the Proslogion 2 argument; and in Section II

I try to show how Gaunilo's famous "lost island"

counterexample proves that the assumptions stated in Section I

must be modified, if not rejected. In his reply to Gaunilo

Anselm introduced two new arguments for the existence of

God, which do not depend on assumptions about predication.

I discuss one of these arguments in Section III; it seems to me

to be at least a better argument than the argument of

Proslogion 2. Analysis of this argument from the reply to

Gaunilo leads to the conclusion that the crucial question about

logically necessary divine existence is whether it is possible.

Section IV is devoted to an analysis of Anselm's argument in

the third chapter of the Proslogion and its relation to the other

arguments."

2. Anscombe, Gertrude Elizabeth. 1985. "Why Anselm's proof in

the Proslogion is not an ontological argument." Thoreau

Quarterly no. 17:32-40.

3. Armour, Leslie. 1999. "Anselm's proof and some problems of

meaning and reference." In God and argument, edited by

Sweet, William, 97-113. Ottawa: Ottawa University Press.

"In Proslogion IV, Anselm addresses the peculiar referring

power of the expression "God". In the light of the idea of

determinates and determinables (used by W.E. Johnson and

others) one can read what Anselm says here, supplemented

perhaps by De Grammatico, as making a case for the belief that

"God" refers not to a thing in the world but to the highest

member of the system of determinates and determinables, and

that this hierarchy is essential to meaning. The highest order

determinable can plausibly be identified with God. Denying

that God exists, therefore, is denying the possibility of

meaningfulness."

4. Bäck, Allan. 1981. "Existential Import in Anselm's Ontological

Argument." Franciscan Studies no. 41:97-109.

"The ontological argument of Saint Anselm has attracted a

great deal of attention. There has been considerable discussion

of whether the argument begs the question, by assuming the

existence of God in the premises of the argument. But, although

the theological, Augustinian context of Anselm's argument has

been dealt with, and although the argument has been

extensively treated in modern logical terms, little attention has

been paid to how the argument fares in terms of traditional

logic. In this article I shall analyze the argument of Proslogion

2 in traditional terms. I shall then argue that to a great extent

the debate between Anselm and Gaunilon can be viewed as

depending on attitudes toward the Aristotelian syllogistic.1 In

short, the standard for the validity and soundness of arguments

in medieval philosophy was the syllogistic. It was apparently

assumed that all terms used in the syllogistic have existential

import. So Anselm's argument is suspect in that it employs a

term, 'that than which nothing greater can be conceived,' which

cannot be assumed to have existential import. I then shall offer

a solution of this difficulty. I shall argue that the success of the

argument of Proslogion 2 depends on the modal character of

'that than which nothing greater can be conceived.' That modal

character suggests that the argument of Proslogion 2 is modal

as well. I shall show that there are grounds in theology and in

the Aristotelian modal syllogistic for rejecting the existential

import assumption, and shall suggest that Anselm does not

make such an assumption, at least in the ontological argument.

Rather, despite its assertoric appearance, the argument in

Proslogion 2 is modal." (pp. 97-98)

5. ———. 1983. "Anselm on Perfect Islands." Franciscan Studies

no. 43:188-204.

6. Bencivenga, Ermanno. 1993. Logic and Other Nonsense. The

Case of Anselm and his God. Princeton: Princeton University

Press.

7. Boutin, Maurice. 1990. "L'argument d'Anselme et la règle de foi

selon Rudolf Bultmann." Archivio di Filosofia:471-481.

8. Brecher, Robert. 1974. "Greatness in Anselm's ontological

argument." Philosophical Quarterly no. 24:97-105.

"Examination of Anselm's Proslogion shows that he carefully

distinguishes 'greater' from 'better' or 'more perfect'. He says

that God 'most truly exists', that he exists 'in the highest

degree'; the Neo-platonist metaphysical framework suggested

by this is confirmed by examining Anselm's Augustinian

background, and the Monologion. 'Greatness' is an ontological

concept. This both makes good sense of Anselm's argument,

and justifies his refutation of the 'Lost Island' objection: it is

nonsense to say of any island, or dollar, that it is ontologically

superior to another, or to anything else."

9. ———. 1983. "Gremlins and parodies." Philosophical Studies

(Ireland) no. 29:48-54.

"The paper aims to show that parody-based critiques of

Anselm's ontological argument fail to do damage because there

is a crucial disanalogy between 'God' and for example,

Gaunilean 'Islands'. the basis of the disanalogy is God's alleged

uniqueness in terms of necessary existence. It is this rather

than the structure of Anselm's argument which constitutes the

real problem in attempting to assert that there is a God."

10. ———. 1985. Anselm's argument. The logic of divine existence.

Aldershot: Gower.

11. Brunner, Fernad. 1976. "Questions sur l'interprétation du

"Proslogion" par Jules Vuillemin." In Saint Anselme ses

précurseurs et ses contemporains, edited by Kohlenberger,

Helmut, 65-83. Frankfurt: Minerva.

12. Campbell, Richard James. 1976. From Belief to Understanding.

A Study of Anselm's Proslogion Argument on the Existence of

God. Canberra: Australian National University.

Contents: Acknowledgments VII; 1. Introduction 1; 2. The Text

6; 3. The Structure of the Argument 10; 4. The First Stage 30; 5.

The Second Stage 92; 6. The Third Stage 126; 7. A

Formalisation of the Argument 151; 8. The Force of the

Argument 172; 9. The Relevance of the Argument 208; Index

228-229.

13. Cappuyns, Maieul D. 1934. "L'argument de saint Anselme."

Recherches de Théologie ancienne et médiévale no. 6:313-330.

14. Cattin, Yves. 1986. La preuve de Dieu. Introduction à la lecture

du Proslogion d'Anselme de Canterbury. Paris: Vrin.

15. Chambers, Timothy. 2000. "On behalf of the Devil: a parody of

Anselm revisited." Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society no.

100:93-113.

"This paper treats a question which first arose in these

Proceedings: Can Anselm's ontological argument be inverted

so as to yield parallel proofs for the existence (or nonexistence)

of a least (or worst conceivable being? Such "devil parodies"

strike some commentators as innocuous curiosities, or

redundant challenges which are no more troubling than other

parodies found in the literature (e.g., Gaunilo's Island). I take

issue with both of these allegations; devil parodies, I argue,

have the potential to pose substantive, and novel, challenges to

Anselm's ontological argument."

16. Chandler, Hugh S. 1993. "Some ontological arguments." Faith

and Philosophy no. 10:18-32.

"The principal arguments considered are in some ways similar

to those offered in Anselm's Proslogium, Chapters II and III. In

addition, two quick' versions of the ontological argument are

examined. Finally, I worry a bit about the ineffable One. The

general line of attack is similar to a procedure employed by

David Lewis in discussing Proslogium II. My approach to

Proslogium III is based upon the idea that the appropriate

modal logic for these matters is much weaker than the standard

S5. The hope is that this alternative perspective reveals features

worthy of notice."

17. Corbin, Michel. 1983. "Cela dont plus grand ne puisse être

pensé." Anselm Studies.An Occasional Journal no. 1:59-83.

18. ———. 1988. ""Nul n'a plus grand amour que de donner sa vie

pour ses amis (Jn 15,13)". La signification de l'unum

argumentum du Proslogion." Anselm Studies.An Occasional

Journal no. 2:201-228.

19. D'Onofrio, Giulo. 1990. "Chi è l' "insipiens"? L'argomento di

Anselmo e la dialettica dell'alto Medioevo." In L'argomento

ontologico / The ontological Argument / L'argument

ontologique / Der Ontologische Gottesbeweis, edited by

Olivetti, Marco M., 95-109. Padova: CEDAM.

20. Davies, Brian. 2004. "Anselm and the ontological argument."

In The Cambridge Companion to Anselm, edited by Davies,

Brian and Leftow, Brian, 157-178. Cambridge: Cambridge

University Press.

21. De Boni, Luis Alberto. 2011. "Saint Anselm and Duns Scotus."

In Anselm of Canterbury (1033-1109). Philosophical Theology

and Ethics, edited by Pich, Roberto Hofmeister, 169-195. Porto:

Fédération Internationale des Institutd d'Études Mèdiévales.

22. Delgado, Antolin Salvador. 1988. El argumento anselmiano.

Sevilla: Publicaciones de la Universidad.

23. Devine, Philip. 1977. "'Exists' and Saint Anselm's argument."

Grazer Philosophische Studien no. 3:59-70.

"This paper examines interpretations of the doctrine that

"exists" is not a predicate (existence is not a property). None, it

is concluded, is both true and a refutation of st Anselm's

"ontological" argument for the existence of God."

24. Dicker, Georges. 1988. "A refutation of Rowe's critique of

Anselm's ontological argument." Faith and Philosophy no.

5:193-202.

25. Evans, Gillian Rosemary. 1978. Anselm and talking about God.

Oxford: Clarendon Press.

26. Evdokimov, Paul. 1959. "L'aspect apophatique de l'argument de

Saint Anselme." In Spicilegium Beccense (vol. I), 233-258.

Paris.

27. Forest, Aimé. 1972. "Remarques sur l'argument du Proslogion."

In Scritti in onore di Carlo Giacon, 147-172. Padova.

28. Galvan, Sergio. 1989. "Una variante deontica dell'argomento

modale di S. Anselmo." Epistemologia no. 12:135-144.

29. ———. 1993. "Aspetti problematici dell'argomento modale di

Anselmo." Rivista di Storia della Filosofia:587-609.

30. Ghisalberti, Alessandro. 1990. "Per una rilettura

dell'argomento ontologico di Anselmo d'Aosta." Vita e Pensiero

(7-8):543-549.

31. Gilbert, Paul. 1990. "Unum argumentum et Unum

necessarium." In L'argomento ontologico / The ontological

Argument / L'argument ontologique / Der Ontologische

Gottesbeweis, edited by Olivetti, Marco M., 81-94. Padova:

Cedam.

32. ———. 1990. Le Proslogion de S. Anselme. Silence de Dieu et

joie de l'homme. Roma: Editrice Pontificia Università

Gregoriana.

Bibliographie Anselmienne: pp. 249-279: sur l'argument

ontologique: livres pp. 253-255, articles pp. 267-273.

33. Gilson, Etienne. 1934. "Sens et nature de l'argument de saint

Anselme." Archives d'Histoire Doctrinale et Littéraire du

Moyen Age no. 9:5-51.

34. Gogacz, Mieczyslaw. 1970. "La "ratio Anselmi" en face du

problème des relations entre métaphysique et mystique."

Analecta Anselmiana no. 2:169-185.

35. Gombocz, Wolfgang. 1974. Uber E! Zur Semantik der

Existenzprädikates und des ontologischen Arguments für

Gottes Existenz von Anselm von Canterbury. Wien: Verband

der Wissenschaflliche Gesellschaft.

Unpublished Dissertation (University of Graz).

36. ———. 1976. "Zur Zwei-Argument-Hypotese bezüglich Anselms

Proslogion." In Saint Anselme ses précurseurs et ses

contemporains, edited by Kohlenberger, Helmut, 85-98.

Frankfurt: Minerva.

37. Grappone, Arturo Graziano. 1999. "Anselm's Ontological Proof:

Consequences in System Theory." Metalogicon no. 12:33-40.

38. Hartman, Robert S. 1961. "Prolegomena to a Meta-Anselmian

Axiomatic." Review of Metaphysics no. 14:637-675.

39. Hartshorne, Charles. 1983. "Anselm and Aristotle's First Law of

Modality." Anselm Studies.An Occasional Journal no. 1:51-58.

40. Hendley, Brian. 1981. "Anselm's "Proslogion" argument." In

Sprache und Erkenntnis in Mittelalter (vol. II), 838-846.

Berlin, New York.

41. Henry, Desmond Paul. 1969. "Proslogion Chapter III." In

Analecta Anselmiana (vol. I), 101-105.

42. ———. 1993. "Aliquid quo nihil maius cogitari possit:

counterpart of homo mortuus." Rivista di Storia della

Filosofia:513-525.

43. Herrera, Robert A. 1979. Anselm's Proslogion: an introduction.

Washington: University Press of America.

44. ———. 1984. "The "Proslogion Argument" viewed from the

perspective of "De casu diaboli"." In Spicilegium Beccense (vol

II), 623-629.

45. Hochberg, Herbert. 1959. "Anselm's ontological argument and

Russell's theory of descriptions." New Scholasticism:319-330.

46. Holopainen, Toivo. 2007. "Anselm's argumentum and the early

medieval theory of argument." Vivarium no. 47:1-29.

"The article aims at elucidating the argumentation in Anselm's

Proslogion by relating some aspects of it to the early medieval

theory of argument. The focus of the analysis is on the "single

argument" (unum argumentum), the discovery of which

Anselm announces in the Preface to the Proslogion. Part 1 of

the article offers a preliminary description of the single

argument by describing the reductio ad absurdum technique

based on the notion "that than which a greater cannot be

thought". Part 2 discusses the ideas about arguments and

argumentation that Boethius presents in Book One of his In

Ciceronis Topica. Part 3 draws attention to some early

medieval sources (Abelard, Lanfranc, Anselm) that are witness

to the importance of the Boethian ideas in Anselm's time.

Finally, Part 4 argues that Anselm looked at his single

argument in the Boethian framework and that the term "that

than which a greater cannot be thought" should be identified as

his single argument."

47. Hopkins, Jasper. 1972. A Companion to the Study of St.

Anselm. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

Chapter III. Ontological Argument 67-89.

48. ———. 1978. "On Understanding and Preunderstanding St.

Anselm." New Scholasticism no. 52:243-284.

Review of R. Campbell, From Belief to Understanding. A Study

of Anselm's Proslogion Argument on the Existence of God

(1976).

49. Huber, Carlo. 1990. "Considerazioni semantiche e logiche sul

cosiddetto argomento ontologico di Anselmo d'Aosta nel

Proslogium." In l'attualità filosofica di Anselmo d'Aosta, edited

by Hoegen, Maternus, 11-23. Roma.

50. Jacquette, Dale. 1997. "Conceivability, intensionality, and the

logic of Anselm's modal argument for the existence of God."

International Journal for Philosophy of Religion no. 42:163-

173.

51. Jarmuzek, Tomasz, Nowicki, Maciej, and Pietruszczak, Andrzej.

2006. "An outline of the Anselmian theory of God." In Essays

in logic and ontology, edited by Malinowski, Jacek and

Pietruszczak, Andrzej, 317-330. Amsterdam: Rodopi.

"The article presents a formalization of Anselm's so-called

'ontological arguments' from Proslogion. The main idea of our

research is to stay to the original text as close as is possible. We

show, against some common opinions, that (i) the logic

necessary for the formalization must be neither a purely

sentential modal calculus, nor just non-modal first-order logic,

but a modal first-order theory; (ii) such logic cannot contain

logical axiom A right arrow implies that A is possible; (iii)

none of Anselm's reasoning requires the assumptions that God

is a consistent object or that existence of God is possible; (iv) no

such thing as the so-called Anselm's principle is involved in any

of the proofs; (v) Anselm's claims (that God exists in reality and

that God necessarily exists in reality) can be obtained

independently, hence, there is no need for presenting them in

an opposite order than Anselm did."

52. Kelly, Charles J. 1994. "Circularity and Amphiboly in Some

Anselmian Ontological Proofs: A Syllogistic Inquiry." Noûs no.

28:482-504.

53. Kenny, Anthony Patrick. 1990. "Anselm on the conceivability of

God." In L'argomento ontologico, edited by Olivetti, Marco M.,

71-79. Padova.

54. Kienzler, Klaus. 1993. "Das Proslogion-Argument. Anselm's

und die Confessiones des Augustinus." In The European

dimension of St. Anselm's thinking, 137-161.

55. ———. 1999. International bibliography - Anselm of

Canterbury. Lewiston: The Edwin Mellen Press.

In cooperation with Eduardo Brinacesco, Walter Fröhlich,

Helmut Kohleberger, Frederick Van Flaten, Coloman Viola.

Contains 3.784 references up to 1996.

Contents: I. Text and editions 12 (items 1-441); II. Alpahbetical

Table 33 (items 442-3784); III. Systematic Table 158-201.

Introduction: "With this International Bibliography of Anselm

of Canterbury we intend to lay out a comprehensive list of

works and sources of Anselm of Canterbury as well as the

relevant research literature. The systematic presentation takes

into consideration the time period from the first manuscripts

until 1996. The bibliography includes all together three

thousand, seven hundred, and eighty four individual citations.

Part I: For a manual of this kind, not only a presentation of

secondary literature, but also a presentation of texts,

manuscripts, omnia opera, editions, and translations, ordered

according to the most important languages, should be useful.

This latter collection is presented in the first part of the

bibliography, entitled 'Texts and Editions'. We have undertaken

no new studies of sources and manuscripts, but have taken the

references of F. S. Schmitt's Omnia Opera and F. S. Schmitt's

and R. Southern's Memorial, and have reprinted the most

important bibliographical information.

Part Il: The 'Alphabetical Table' presents alphabetically all the

relevant secondary literature in detail. This second section is

the heart of the bibliography. It serves as the foundation for

Part III. The systematic presentation of the literature extends to

the year 1996. The final references were to the contributions in

the collection of D. E. Luscombe and G. R. Evans, Aosta, Bec,

and Canterbury. Papers in Commemoration of the Nine-

hundreth Anniversary of Anselm's Enthronement as

Archbishop, 25 September 1093 (1996). After that, particular

titles appear only sporadically.

Part III: The 'Systematic Table' is conceived as an aid for

research into the works of Anselm of Canterbury. In a

systematic reference word table, developed especially for this

purpose, relevant research contributions are presented in short

form. It should be possible quickly to find citations in the

'Alphabetical Table' through the presentation of references of

Author (Year) in the 'Systematic Table'."

56. King, Peter. 1984. "Anselm's intentional argument." History of

Philosophy Quarterly no. 1:147-166.

"Anselm's Ontological Argument is an ad hominem argument

against the Foole, part of which is a reductio ad absurdum,

designed to prove the existence of God. The actual argument

offered by St. Anselm has seventeen premisses; the heart of the

argument is a careful distinction among intentional objects-and

the Ontological Argument cannot be formalized by modal logic.

It is not a modal argument at all, but rather relies on certain

intuitive principles of intentional logic, which Anselm applies

throughout the Proslogion. The Ontological Argument is valid,

if one accepts these principles; insofar as an ad hominem

argument may be sound, it is sound as well. It is not a

demonstration, for the key premiss granted by the Foole is

highly implausible. Those who agree with the Foole, however,

may justifiably assert God's existence.

These claims only apply to Anselm's actual argument, not to

other Ontological Arguments, no matter how distinguished the

pedigree, no matter how careful the formalization. Other

Ontological Arguments only interest me insofar as they shed

light on, or claim to accurately represent, Anselm's Ontological

Argument. Other Ontological Arguments must be judged on

their own merits. Anselm's actual argument, unlike most

versions, is an exercise in intentional logic, a fact that has

eluded commentators from the time of Gaunilon. That

Ontological Argument is the subject of this article, and

henceforth I shall call it the Ontological Argument."

57. Klima, Gyula. 2000. "Saint Anselm's Proof: a problem of

reference, intentional identity and mutual understanding." In

Medieval philosophy and modern times, edited by Holmström-

Hintikka, Ghita, 69-87. Dordrecht: Kluwer.

58. ———. 2003. "Conceptual closure in Anselm's Proof: reply to

Professor Roark." History and Philosophy of Logic no. 24:131-

134.

"This paper provides replies to the objections Tony Roark

presented (Roark, T. 2003. 'Conceptual closure in Anselm's

proof', History and Philosophy of Logic 24) to my

reconstruction of Anselm's famous argument in the Proslogion

(Klima, G. 2000. 'Saint Anselm's Proof: A Problem of

Reference, Intentional Identity and Mutual Understanding', in

G. Holmström-Hintikka, Medieval Philosophy and Modern

Times, Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 69-87). The

replies argue that Roark's objections actually strengthen the

general conclusion of my original paper concerning the

different attitudes one can take toward Anselm's argument,

depending on whether one refers to that than which nothing

greater can be thought 'constitutively' or 'parasitically'. In

agreement with Roark, however, at the end of the paper I also

indicate some of the broader implications of this distinction

worthy of further exploration."

59. Kopper, Joachim. 1962. Reflexion und Raisonnement im

ontologischen Gottesbeweis. Köln: Universitätsverlag.

60. Koyré, Alexandre. 1923. L'idée de Dieu dans la philosophie de

St. Anselme. Paris.

61. La Croix, Richard R. 1972. Proslogion II and III. A third

interpretation of Anselm's argument. Leiden: E. J. Brill.

62. Losoncy, Thomas. 1982. "Anselm's Response to Gaunilo's

Dilemma -- An Insight into the Notion of 'Being' Operative in

the Proslogion." New Scholasticism no. 56:207-216.

63. ———. 1994. "Chapter 1 of St. Anselm's Proslogion: its

preliminaries to proving God's existence as paradigmatic for

subsequent proofs of God's existence." In Greek and Medieval

Studies in Honor of Leo Sweeney, S.J., edited by Carroll,

William J. and Furlong, John J., 171-180. New York: Peter

Lang.

64. ———. 2008. "Language and Saint Anselm's Proslogion

argument." In Acta Conventus Neo-Latini Bononiensis, edited

by Schoeck, Richard J. Binghantom: State University of New

York Press.

Proceedings of the Fourth International Congress of Neo-Latin

Studies: Bologna, 26 August to 1 September 1979.

"In the over nine hundred years since Saint Anselm wrote the

Proslogion steadfast disagreement over what he meant, and

sometimes over what he said, functions as an unbroken

principle of interpretation among its readers and

commentators alike. How to explain this phenomenon has

proven equally controversial. However, two explanations of the

long embattled history of the Proslogion are feasible.

One is that access to the complete Proslogion was impossible

for many of Anselm's successors, including such renowned

reviewers of the work as Aquinas, Scotus, and the noted

modern critic of the ontological argument, Immanuel Kant. A

second, applying more to recent times, appears to be a failure

to exercise due regard for the language of the work. (1) This is

further evidenced by a tendency to concentrate only on part of

the Proslogion, principally chapters two-four."

(1) Two recent discussions of the Proslogion deserve notice in

this regard. Professor G. R. Evans, Anselm and Talking about

God (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1978), devotes more time to

talking about the interpretation a large tradition has placed

upon the Proslogion argument than to an analysis of the

argument's language as such. See, especially, chapters two and

three, pp. 39-75. On the other hand, Professor Gregory

Schufreider's study, "The Identity of Anselm's Argument," The

Modern Schoolman, LIV (1977), pp. 345-61, breaks genuinely

new ground in its search for the argument in Anselm's

Proslogion instead of a new search for confirmation of an old

rendition. In arguing that Saint Anselm has a single argument

in the Proslogion Schufreider provides a careful analysis of

Anselm's use of "vere esse" in chapter eleven's heading and

chapter three's text (pp. 349-52); of "absolute" in chapters

twenty-two and twenty-eight of the Monologion (pp. 353-58)

and the modal quality of the Proslogion's "vere esse" (p. 360).

The conclusion Schufreider reaches reinforces the argument of

this paper from a different perspective.

65. Makin, Stephen. 1988. "The ontological argument." Philosophy

no. 63:83-91.

"I offer a defence of the ontological argument. I argue for the

principle that if Fis a necessarily exemplified concept and G is

not, then Fs are a greater kind of thing than Gs. This principle

is defended on the basis of two other principles concerning

such attitudes as total reliance, which it is appropriate to take

to Fs if f is a necessarily exemplified concept."

66. ———. 1992. "The ontological argument defended." Philosophy

no. 67:247-255.

67. Mann, William E. 1972. "The ontological presuppositions of the

ontological argument." Review of Metaphysics:260-277.

"I present a semi-formal analysis of St. Anselm's version of the

ontological argument from Proslogion II, with two purposes in

mind. First, I show that some contemporary analyses of the

argument, in terms of the apparatus of modal logic, neglect the

conceptual framework within which Anselm worked. I then

display three ingredients of that framework: the distinction

between beings 'in intellectu' and beings 'in re', the distinction

between one's conceiving of a thing and one's conceiving it to

exist, and the doctrine that existence is a property of things.

Second, I argue that even if Anselm is granted all three of these

presuppositions, he still cannot produce a convincing argument

for the existence of God."

68. Marenbon, John. 2006. "Anselm Rewrites his Argument

Proslogion 2 and the Response to Gaunilo." In Écriture et

réecriture des textes philosophiques mèdiévaux. Volume

d'hommage offert à Colette Sirat, edited by Hamesse,

Jacqueline and Weijers, Olga, 347-365. Turnhout: Brepols.

69. Martinich, Aloysius P. 1977. "Scotus and Anselm on the

Existence of God." Franciscan Studies no. 37:139-152.

70. Matthews, Scott. 1999. "Arguments, Texts, and Contexts:

Anselm's Argument and the Friars." Medieval Philosophy and

Theology no. 8:83-104.

"The contrast between the reception of Anselm's Proslogion in

the work of Bonaventure and in the work of Thomas Aquinas is

often held up as a classic example of their competing

intellectual assumptions. Some have located the intellectual

prerequisites for the acceptance or rejection of Anselm's

argument in the prior acceptance of univocal or analogical

accounts of being. (1) P. A. Daniels argued that the

prerequisites for Bonaventure's acceptance of the argument

were not his "ontological" mode of thought, or a doctrine of the

innate idea of God within the soul, but in his acceptance of

examplar causality.(2) Half a century later, Jean Chattillon,

following Étienne Gilson, affirmed the more common view of

the issue, that the acceptance or rejection of Anselm's argument

among the first scholastics of the thirteenth century depended

upon their allegiance to Augustinian or Aristotelian traditions.

(3) Anton Pegis did the same when he insisted that recovery of

the Anselmian argument in its original form involved stripping

away the Aristotelian framework in terms of which the

Proslogion has been read since Thomas. (4)"

(1) In general terms, the interpretation of Bonaventure as

leader of an Augustinian tradition, and of Thomas as

representative of Aristotelianism, can be found in the work of

E. Gilson, A History of Christian Philosophy in the Middle

Ages (London, 1978). On Bonaventure's refinement of Anselm

in the context of the Augustinian tradition, see H. R. Klocker,

S.J. "Bonaventure's Refinement of the Ontological Argument,"

Mediaevilla 4 (1978): 209-23. On analogical and univocal

accounts of being as factors determining attitudes to Anselm's

argument, see H. J. Johnson, "Contra Anselm But Contra

Gentiles: Aquinas's Rejection of the Ontological Argument,"

Schede Medievali 13 (1986): 18-27.

(2) P. A. Daniels, Quellenbeiträge und Untersuchungen zur

Geschichte der Gottesbeweise im Dreizehnten Jahrhundert

(Münster, 1909), pp. 131, 156.

(3) Jean Chattillon, "De Guillaume d'Auxerre à Saint Thomas

d'Aquin: L'Argument de Saint Anselme Chez Les Premiers

Scolastiques du XIIIe Siècle," Spicilegium Beccense 1 (1959):

209-31.

(4) Anton C. Pegis, "St. Anselm and the Argument of the

"Proslogion"," Mediaeval Studies 28 (1966): 228-67.

71. McEvoy, James. 1994. "La preuve anselmienne de l'existence de

Dieu est-elle un argument "ontologique"? A propos de trois

interprétations récentes." Revue Philosophique de Louvain no.

92:167-183.

72. McGrath, P.J. 1988. "The ontological argument revisited."

Philosophy no. 63:529-533.

73. ———. 1990. "The refutation of the ontological argument."

Philosophical Quarterly no. 40:195-212.

74. ———. 1994. "Does the ontological argument beg the question?"

Religious Studies no. 30:305-310.

"In his paper Has the Ontological Argument Been Refuted?'

(Religious Studies, 29 (1993), 97-110) William F. Vallicella

argues that my attempt to show that the Ontological Argument

begs the question is unsuccessful. I believe he is wrong about

this, but before endeavouring to vindicate my position I must

first make clear what precisely is the point at issue between us.

The Ontological Argument is not a single argument, but a

family of arguments. Newly devised formulations of the

argument are frequently put forward by philosophers in an

effort to avoid difficulties that have been pointed out in

previous versions. As a consequence there is no possibility of a

conclusive proof that every form of the argument embodies the

same fallacy. Nevertheless, one can, I believe, prove that all the

standard versions of the argument embody a certain fallacy and

that, given the nature of the argument, it is therefore unlikely

that the argument can be formulated in such a way as to avoid

this difficulty. What I tried to show in my paper is that the six

best-known versions of the argument (the non-model versions

of Anselm, Descartes and Leibniz and the modal versions of

Malcolm, Hartshorne and Plantinga) all beg the question and

that they do so at the same point in the argument, namely when

it is asserted that it is possible,that an absolutely perfect being

exists. It is difficult to see how an ontological argument could

be formulated without, including this claim as one of its

premises, since the distinguishing badge of the argument is the

inference from the possibility of an absolutely perfect being to

its actuality. It must be unlikely then, if my criticism of these six

versions is correct, that there is any way of formulating the

argument that avoids this fallacy."

75. Millican, Peter. 2004. "The one fatal flaw in Anselm's

argument." Mind (113):437-476.

"Anselm's Ontological Argument fails, but not for any of the

various reasons commonly adduced. In particular, its failure

has nothing to do with violating deep Kantian principles by

treating 'exists' as a predicate or making reference to

'Meinongian' entities. Its one fatal flaw, so far from being

metaphysically deep, is in fact logically shallow, deriving from a

subtle scope ambiguity in Anselm's key phrase. If we avoid this

ambiguity, and the indeterminacy of reference to which it gives

rise, then his argument is blocked even if his supposed

Meinongian extravagances are permitted. Moreover it is

blocked in a way which is straightforward and compelling (by

contrast with the Kantian objections), and which generalizes

easily to other versions of the Ontological Argument. A

significant moral follows. Fear of Anselm's argument has been

hugely influential in motivating ontological fastidiousness and

widespread reluctance to countenance talk of potentially non-

existing entities. But if this paper is correct, then the

Ontological Argument cannot properly provide any such

motivation. Some of the most influential contributions to

ontology, from Kant to Russell and beyond, rest on a mistake."

76. Moreau, Joseph. 1967. Pour ou contre l'insensé? Essai sur la

preuve anselmienne. Paris.

77. ———. 1981. "Logique et dialectique dans l'argument du

"Proslogion"." In Sprache und Erkenntnis im Mittelalter. Axten

des VI. Internationalen Kongresses für Mittelaterliche

Philosophie der Société internationale pour l'étude de la

philosophie médiévale 29. August - 3, September 1977 in Bonn.

II Halbband, edited by Beckmann, Jan P., Honnefelder,

Ludger, Jüssen, Gabriel, Münxelhaus, Barbara, Schrimpf,

Gangolf, Wieland, Georg and Kluxen, Wolfgang, 718-721.

Berlin, New York: Walter de Gruyter.

78. ———. 1983. "Inintelligible et impensable (Anselm, Liber

Apologeticus, IV)." Anselm Studies.An Occasional Journal no.

1:85-93.

79. Morscher, Edgar. 1997. "Anselm's Argument -- Once Again."

Logique et Analyse no. 158:175-188.

"The kernel of Anselm's famous argument in chapter II of his

Proslogion consists of a few lines. Thousands of pages have

been written about them, but nevertheless they have resisted

final clarification, though the literature about them still grows.

Most of what has allegedly been written about Anselm's

argument is concerned more with phantasies than with

Anselm's original text. In fact most authors take Anselm's

argument as an excuse for doing quite different things and

developing their own ideas.

Anselm's brilliant text does not deserve such a treatment.

Accordingly I will focus on Anselm's own words and will display

the ingenuity of his argument as well as where it fails."

80. Müller, Jörn. 2011. "Ontologischer Gottesbeweis? Zur

Bedeutung und Funktion des unum argumentum in Anselm

von Canterburys Proslogion." In Anselm of Canterbury (1033-

1109). Philosophical Theology and Ethics, edited by Pich,

Roberto Hofmeister, 37-71. Porto: Fédération Internationale

des Institutd d'Études Mèdiévales.

81. Nef, Frédéric. 2002. "Perfection divine et propriétés positives.

L'argumentum unicum d'Anselme et la preuve ontologique de

Leibniz à la lumière de la preuve gödelienne de l'existence de

Dieu." In Analyse et théologie. Croyances religieuses et

rationalité, edited by Bourgeois-Gironde, Sacha, Gnassounou,

Bruno and Pouivet, Roger, 95-124. Paris: Vrin.

82. Park, Desirée. 1983. "Berkeley's Rejection of Anselm's

Argument." Anselm Studies.An Occasional Journal no. 1:105-

109.

83. Pearl, Leon. 1990. "A puzzle about Necessary Being."

Philosophy no. 65:229-231.

"I argue contrary to Stephen Makin's "The Ontological

Argument" (Philosophy 63, No. 243) that one can't show that

necessary being is a meaningful concept by the use of modal

notions involving the exemplification of concepts. For

conceptual coherence provides, at best, a necessary condition

for necessary exemplification, not a sufficient one. What then

could there possibly be about a concept beyond its coherence

that would necessitate its exemplification. I suspect there is

none."

84. Pegis, Anton Charles. 1966. "St. Anselm and the Argument of

the "Proslogion"." Mediaeval Studies no. 28:228-267.

"This study is a reexamination of the Proslogion, aiming, in the

light of the interpretations of K. Barth, E. Gilson and especially

H. Bouillard, to determine the nature of its argument for God

as a rational construction. St. Anselm believes that the

believing reason is both believing in itself and rationally visible

to an unbeliever. The argument in chapters 2-4 is not from

thought to existence, but from God as designated by and in

things to God as posited in his transcendence. There is no

reason for thinking that the so-called ontological argument

originates in the Proslogion."

85. Pich, Roberto Hofmeister. 2011. "Amselm's "Idea" and

Anselm's Argument." In Anselm of Canterbury (1033-1109).

Philosophical Theology and Ethics, edited by Pich, Roberto

Hofmeister, 73-110. Porto: Fédération Internationale des

Institutd d'Études Mèdiévales.

86. Priest, Stephen. 2000. "Reality and existence in Anselm."

Heythrop Journal.A Bimonthly Review of Philosophy and

Theology no. 41:461-462.

"Although 'exists' has the superficial appearance of a predicate

in the Proslogion, Anselm does not rely on the premise that

'exists' is a logical predicate (or that existing is a property) in

the ontological proof. Anselm argues that God exists not only as

a mental object (in intellectu) but also exists in extramental

reality (in re). Whether 'exists' is a predicate is irrelevant to this

inference. It follows that many putative refutations of the

argument fail."

87. Read, Stephen. 1981. "Reflections on Anselm and Gaunilo."

International Philosophical Quarterly no. 21:437-438.

"In Anselm's ontological argument, the phrase 'to exist (only) in

the understanding' needs explanation; so also does the claim

that something which exists only in the understanding, and so

does not exist, is less great than something that does exist.

What this means is that, if it were to exist, it would be less great

than the other. But it could not then be less great than itself. So

Anselm's argument collapses."

88. Roark, Tony. 2003. "Tarski and Klima: conceptual closure in

Anselm's Proof." History and Philosophy of Logic no. 24:1-14.

"Gyula Klima maintains that Anselm's ontological argument is

best understood in terms of a theory of reference that was made

fully explicit only by later medievals. I accept the interpretative

claim but offer here two objections to the argument so

interpreted. The first points up a certain ambiguity in Klima's

formulation of the argument, the correction of which requires a

substantive revision of the argument's conclusion. The second

exploits the notion of semantic closure introduced by Tarski.

Klima offers the atheist an 'out' by drawing a distinction

between constitutive and parasitic reference. I argue that using

Klima's preferred description ('the thought object than which

no thought object can be thought to be greater') to refer

constitutively to God results in conceptual closure, a condition

analogous to semantic closure that renders the instant

conceptual scheme inconsistent and subject to paradox.

Although the proof ultimately fails, Klima's development of the

notions of constitutive and parasitic reference has important

and far-reaching implications."

89. Sagal, Paul. 1973. "Anselm's Refutation of Anselm's Ontological

Argument." Franciscan Studies no. 33:285-291.

90. Scapin, Pietro. 1983. "Argomento Ontologico e Ateismo

Semantico." Anselm Studies.An Occasional Journal no. 1:95-

101.

91. Schmitt, Franciscus Salesius. 1933. "Der ontologische

Gottesbeweis Anselms." Theologische Revue no. 32:217-223.

92. Schnepf, Robert. 1998. "Sein als Ereignis: Zu einigen

Voraussetzungen des Gottesbeweises bei Anselm von

Canterbury." Patristica et Mediaevalia no. 19:3-22.

"In recent discussions on Anselm's ontological argument, the

assumption is made, that Anselm holds "existence" to be a first

order predicate.

However, there is no explicit statement in Anselm's texts that

confirms this interpretation. In Thomas Aquinas and his

predecessors, the logic of subject and predicate is applied on

Anselm's argument.

Anselm himself has no logic of "existence". The exact meaning

and function of the expression "existence" is, therefore, to be

investigated by an interpretation of its actual use in the

argument itself. I propose, that Anselm views existence to be an

event, and that the term "maius" can best be interpreted as a

relation between different kinds of events."

93. Schufreider, Gregory. 1977. "The identity of Anselm's

argument." Modern Schoolman no. 54:345-361.

94. ———. 1978. An introduction to Anselm's argument.

Philadelphia: Temple University Press.

95. ———. 1992. "A classical misunderstanding of Anselm's

argument." American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly no. 66

(4):489-499.

96. Smith, A. D. 2014. Anselm's Other Argument. Cambridge:

Harvard University Press.

97. Tichy, Pavel. 1979. "Existence and God." Journal of Philosophy

no. 76:403-420.

"The article presents an analysis of Anselm's ontological

argument for the existence of God, based on Transparent

Intensional Logic. Section I consists of general considerations

on denotation and existence. In section II, two fallacies flawing

Descartes's proof are exposed. Anselm's argument is

reconstructed and assessed in section III, it is found logically

sound, but doubt is cast on one of its premises."

98. Vallicella, William. 1993. "Has the ontological argument been

refuted?" Religious Studies no. 29:97-110.

"Suppose we say that a deductive argument is probative just in

case it is (i) valid in point of logical form, (ii) possesses true

premises, and (iii) is free of informal fallacy. We can then say

that an argument is normatively persuasive for a person if and

only if it is both probative and has premises that can be

accepted, without any breach of epistemic propriety, by the

person in question. If the premises of a probative argument

would be accepted by any reasonable person, I will call such an

argument demonstrative.

Now it seems that a reasonable position to take with respect to

the Ontological Argument for the existence of God (hereafter,

OA) is that none of its versions is demonstrative, though some

of the versions are normatively persuasive. If so, the OA in at

least one version is a 'good' argument although not a successful

piece of natural theology'. To show that the OA is 'bad' in all

versions one would have to show, for each version, either that it

is not probative, by showing that it is either invalid, or

possessed of one or more false premises, or guilty of informal

fallacy, or such that its premises are more rationally rejected

than accepted by the person who considers the argument. To

show a version 'bad', then, it does not suffice to show that it

fails to establish its conclusion in some incontrovertible

manner. Precious few philosophical arguments get the length of

that." (Notes omitted).

99. Varisco, Novella. 1998. "La 'Ratio Anselmi' nell'interpretazione

di alcuni pensatori medievali." Rivista di Filosofia Neo-

Scolastica no. 90:5-27.

100. Viola, Coloman E. 1992. "Origine et portée du principe

dialectique du 'Proslogion' de Saint Anselme. De l' 'argument

ontologique' à l' 'argument mégalogique'." Rivista di Filosofia

Neo-Scolastica no. 83:339-384.

101. ———. 1996. "Saint Anselme est-il le 'père de l'argument

ontologique'? Le Proslogion confronté à Kant." In Saint Anselm

- Thinker for Yesterday and Today. Anselm's Thought Viewed

by our Contemporaries, edited by Viola, Coloman E. and Van

Fleteren, Frederick. Evanston: Edwin Mellen Press.

102. Vuillemin, Jules. 1971. Le Dieu d'Anselme et les apparences de

la raison. Paris: Aubier.

Bibliographia. Annotated bibliographies

Raul Corazzon || rc@ontology.co || Info

Selected Bibliography on the

History of the Ontological

Argument from Anselm of

Canterbury to Duns Scotus

A Selection of Primary Authors

Legenda: P = Pro (accept the proof); C = Contra (rejected the proof);

I = indifferent (take no position on the proof); ca. = circa; fl =

flourished; d. died.

References are to the most important works where ontological

argument is discussed.

P Anselm of Canterbury [Anselmus Cantuariensis, Doctor

Angelicus]

C Gaunilo of Marmoutiers [Gaunilo, monachus]

P William of Auxerre [Guillelmi Altissiodorensis]

P Alexander of Hales [Alexander Halensis, Doctor

Irrefragabilis]

P Richard Fishacre [Richardus Flamesburensis]

C Richard Rufus of Cornwall [Richaruds Rufus Cornubiensis]

P Bonaventure of Bagnorea [Bonaventurae, Johannes Fidanza,

Doctor Seraphicus]

I Albert the Great [Albertus Magnus, Doctor Universalis]

C Thomas Aquinas [Thomae Aquinatis, Doctor Angelicus]

I Peter of Tarentaise [Petrus a Tarentasia, Pope Innocent V]

P John Peckham [Johannis Packham, Doctor Ingeniosus]

I Henry of Ghent [Henrici de Gandavo, Doctor Solemnis]

P Nicolaus of Ockham [Nicolaus de Ockham]

P Matthew of Aquasparta [Matthaei ab Aquasparta]

P Giles of Rome [Aegidius Romanus, Egidio Colonna]

C Richard of Middletown [Richardus of Mediavilla]

P William of Ware [Gulielmi Guarae]

P John Duns Scotus [Johannes Duns Scotus, Doctor Subtilis]

Gaunilo of Marmoutiers (fl. XI century)

Texts and translations

1. Gaunilo, of Marmoutiers. 1938. Liber Pro insipiente (Quid ad

haec respondeat quidam pro insipiente). Edinburgh: Thomas

Nelson & Sons.

Written in 1078.

Printed in the Opera Omnia by Anselm of Canterbury, edited

by Franciscus Salesius Schmitt - Vol. I pp. 123-129.

For the translations, see the editions of Anselm's Proslogion.

Studies

1. Bencivenga, Ermanno. 2007. "A note on Gaunilo's lost Island."

Dialogue.Canadian Philosophical Review no. 46:583-587.

"Gaunilo's "Lost Island" argument is his most famous objection

to Anselm's ontological proof, and Anselm is known to provide

quite an unsatisfactory response to it. So someone sympathetic

to Anselm might ask: is there something that Anselm is not

saying, some point he has perhaps made elsewhere and he

might be implicitly appealing to which would give substance to

his disappointing statement? I believe there is, and this paper

provides my answer."

2. Burgess-Jackson, Keith. 1994. "Anselm, Gaunilo, and Lost

Island." Philosophy and Theology no. 8:243-249.

"The received view is that Gaunilo's attempted refutation of

Anselm's ontological argument fails. But those who believe this

do not agree as to why it fails. The aim of this essay is to show

that "whether" the attempted refutation succeeds depends

crucially on how one formulates the so-called greatmaking

principle on which Anselm's argument rests. This principle has

largely been ignored by contemporary philosophers, who have

chosen to focus on other aspects of the argument. I sketch two

analyses of metaphysical greatness and suggest that on one of

them, which Anselm may have held, his argument avoids

Gaunilo's criticism."

3. Davis, Stephen T. 1975. "Anselm and Gaunilo on the Lost

Island." Southern Journal of Philosophy no. 13:435-448.

4. Hopkins, Jasper. 1976. "Anselm's debate with Gaunilo." In

Saint Anselme ses précurseurs et ses contemporains, edited by

Kohlenberger, Helmut, 25-33. Frankfurt: Minerva.

"Gaunilo, monk of Marmoutier, is known almost exclusively for

his attempted refutation of Anselm's ontological argument

around 1079. Indeed, both his counterexample about the

alleged island which is more excellent than all others and

Anselm's rebuttal thereof have nowadays become standard

items for courses in medieval philosophy. Over the past decade

or so, which has witnessed a revival of interest in the

ontological argument, Gaunilo has been either lauded for his

brilliancy or disparaged for his mediocrity. Thus, R. W.

Southern judges that, "in words which are as trenchant as, and

in some details strikingly similar to, those of Kant", Gaunilo

pointed out the main difficulty in accepting Anselm's argument.

(1) By contrast, the most Charles Hartshorne can say on

Gaunilo's behalf is that he is "a clever, but essentially

commonplace mind". (2) Those who praise Gaunilo tend to do

so because he "wisely" discerned the illegitimacy of inferring a

factual statement from an a priori description. Those who

speak derogatorily of his achievement tend to side with

Anselm's two criticisms: (I) that he misunderstood the phrase

aliquid quo nihil maius cogitari potest - replacing it by maius

omnibus - and (II) that his definition of "understanding" is

inconsistent with his having maintained that what is unreal can

be understood. (3) Now, if Gaunilo did commit himself to two

blatantly inconsistent statements within a few lines of each

other, as the second criticism maintains, then to call him a

clever mind would itself be an overstatement.

In this paper I want to cleat up several misinterpretations both

within and about the debate between Anselm and Gaunilo. At

the same time, I want to articulate the reformulations of the

ontological argument as they occur in Reply to Gaunilo 1. I

shall not take up the issue of whether or not any of these

reformulations presents a sound argument for the existence of

God, though in my judgment none does. Nor shall I worry

about the respective degrees of brilliancy attributable to our

two opponents, though on the present interpretation Gaunilo

will fare better than Hartshorne supposes but not as well as

Southern fancies." (pp.25-26)

(1) The Life of St Anselm by Eadmer, ed., introd., and trans. by

R. W. Southern (New York: Thomas Nelson and Sons, 1962), 31

(2) Charles Hartshorne, Anselm's Discovery: A Re-

examination of the Ontological Proof for God's Existence (La

Salle, Ill.: Open Court, 1965), 20. See also p. 151.

(3) Hartshorne complains that Gaunilo, and others like him,

neglected the principle of Proslogion 3 that to exist without

conceivable alternative of not existing is better than to exist

with such alternative. Anselm's Discovery, 88 (verbatim).

5. Imbrisevic, Miroslav. 2007. "Gaunilo's Cogito argument." Saint

Anselm Journal no. 5:50-56.

"Gaunilo presents Anselm with a dilemma in section 7 of his

Responsio: I know most certainly that I exist. But If I cannot

think my non-existence at the same time, then Anselm's claim

in Proslogion 3 (that my inability to think God's non-existence,

while knowing most certainly that He exists, is a unique

property of God) would be false. If I can do so, however, then I

should also be able to know most certainly that God exists and,

at the same time, think his non-existence. I will show that

Anselm's response to Gaunilo's attack is not adequate because

it does not address the issue of certainty, which is at the heart

of Gaunilo's objection."

6. Losoncy, Thomas. 1996. "The Anselm-Gaunilo dispute about

Man's knowledge of God's existence: an examination." In

Twenty-five years (1969-1994) of Anselm studies, edited by

Fleteren, Frederick van and Schnaubelt, Joseph C., 161-181.

Lewiston: Edwin Mellen Press.

"The existence of major disagreement between Saint Anselm

and Gaunilo concerning reason's ability (unaided by faith) to

attain any knowledge of God's hence is easily recognized by

reading their famous exchanges. What has received minimal

notice is the extent of this disagreement and its significance for

interpreting Anselm's argument in the Proslogion. This study

will seek to establish to what extent knowledge of God's

existence is / is not attainable and what said knowledge

includes according to these two thinkers. The method for

conducting this endeavor will be to examine the kinds, range,

and origins of human knowledge of existence as variously held

and disputed by Anselm and Gaunilo. Such a survey should

help to place this aspect of the two protagonists' thought in

sharper relief. Moreover, expanding the parameters of our

consideration of Anselm's argument in this fashion will free us

from the, for many, enslaving fascination of Anselm's logic in

Proslogion II-IV and allow a clearer insight into the

metaphysics at work in these three chapters and the work as a

whole. Additionally, such freedom of inquiry will permit a due

recognition of chapter one's role in posing the problematic

according to Anselm.

Finally, the metaphysical notions stated obliquely in Proslogion

II-IV, and especially in III, will be better heard by examining

their elaboration in later chapters of Proslogion and the

subsequent exchanges between Anselm and Gaunilo.

It is necessary, then, to turn to the originals to see if, indeed,

such insights are forthcoming."

William of Auxerre (ca. 1140-1231)

Texts

1. William, of Auxerre. 1980. Summa Aurea. Paris: Éditions du

Centre national de la recherche scientifique.

Written ca. 1215-1229.

Magistri Guillelmi Altissiodorensis Summa aurea - Cura et

studio Jean Ribaillier - Grottaferrata, Romae: Editiones Collegii

S. Bonaventurae ad Claras Aquas, 1980-1987 (4 v. in 6) + 1

volume titled: Introduction générale.

Prologue 15-23;

Daniels (1909) pp. 25-27: Liber I. Quid sit fides et propter quid

ad probationem fidei adducantur rationes naturales.

2. Solère, Jean-Luc. 2008. "Présentation, traduction et annotation

de Guillaume d'Auxerre, Summa aurea, I, traité XI (extraits)."

In La Puissance et son ombre. De Pierre Lombard à Luther,

edited by Boulnois, Oliver, 99-127. Paris: Aubier.

Studies

1. Ottaviano, Carmelo. 1929. Guglielmo D'Auxerre (+1231). La

vita, le opere, il pensiero. Roma: L'universale Tipografia

Poliglotta.

2. Principe, Walter Henry. 1963. William of Auxerre's theology of

the hypostatic union. Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval

Studies.

Alexander of Hales (1185-1245)

Texts

1. Alexander, of Hales. 1924. Summa Theologica seu sic ab

origine dicta 'Summa fratris Alexandri. Quaracchi: Editiones

Collegii s. Bonaventurae ad Claras Aquas.

Written after 1245.

Studio et cura PP. Collegii s. Bonaventurae ad fidem codicum

edita (reprinted 1979)

The Summa Alexandri, attributed to Alexander, is a

compilation put together by his students after his death.

Daniels (1909) pp. 28-35): Pars I Quaestio III. De

essentialitate divinae Substantie Membrum. I, II et III.

Studies

1. Gál, Gideon. 1998. "Alexander of Hales." In The Routledge

Encyclopedia of Philosophy, edited by Craig, Edward, 176-178.

New York: Routledge.

Vol. I.

2. Schumacher, Lydia. 2020. "The Proof for a Necessary Existent

in the Summa Halensis." In The Summa Halensis. Doctrines

and Debates, edited by Schumacher, Lydia. Berlin: de Gruyter.

Abstract: "Since the late medieval period, Anselm of

Canterbury has been heralded in the West as the first

proponent of the so-called ontological argument for God’s

existence.

This kind of argument purports to provide proof for the reality

of God, which is derived from the very definition of God as the

supreme being. Although Anselm’s work has garnered

considerable attention in the late medieval and modern

periods, it was largely neglected in the century between his

death and the first years of the University of Paris in the early

13th century. A few other precedents notwithstanding,

Alexander of Hales and the authors of the Summa Halensis

were the first extensively to appropriate and popularise the

work of Anselm, not least, the famous argument which can be

found in chapters 2–3 of his Proslogion. As I will demonstrate

in this chapter, however, the Summa’s version of Anselm’s

argument represents a significant development beyond

Anselm’s own iteration. Through an assessment of Anselm’s

argument on its own terms and a study of the Summa’s

presentation of the argument in relation to its sources—above

all, Richard of St Victor and Avicenna— I will argue that early

Franciscans rather than Anselm are responsible for developing

the version of the ontological argument that has been

associated in some form with Anselm’s legacy to this day."

Richard Fishacre (ca. 1205-1248)

Texts

1. Richard, Fishacre. 1240. Commentarias super I-IV Sententiam.

Written ca. 1240, this work, the first Commentary on the

Sentences of Peter Lombard written at Oxford, is unpublished;

a critical edition is in preparation.

Daniels (1909) pp. 21-24: Liber I, Distinctio III.

2. ———. 2003. In tertium Librum Sententiarum. München:

Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften.

Vol. II Dist. 23-40.

Studies

1. Long, Raymond James. 1987. "Richard Fishacre's way to God."

In A straight path. Studies in medieval philosophy and culture.

Essays in honor of Arthur Hyman, edited by Link-Salinger,

Ruth, Hackett, Jeremiah, Manekin, C.H., Long, Raymond

James and Hyman, M.S., 174-182. Washington: Catholic

University of America Press.

2. ———. 1999. The life and works of Richard Fishacre OP.

Prolegomena to the edition of his Commentary on the

Sentences. München: Bayerischen Akademie der

Wissenschaften.

3. ———. 2002. "The significance of Richard Fishacre's Sentences-

Commentary." Bochumer Philosophisches Jahrbuch fur Antike

und Mittelalter no. 6:214-216.

Richard Rufus of Cornwall (fl. 1231-1256)

Texts

1. Richard, Rufus of Cornwall. 1250. Sententia Oxoniensis I-III.

Ca. 1250, available in only one manuscript: Oxford, Balliol

College (B62 cols. 57-59), partially edited by Gedeon Gal in

Viae ad existentiam Dei probandum in doctrina Richardi Rufi

OFM, Franziskanische Studien 1956, 38 pp. 187-202.

Studies

1. Gál, Gideon. 1956. "Viae ad exsistentiam Dei probandum in

doctrina Richardi Rufi OFM." Franziskanische Studien no.

38:177-202.

"Publishes substantial excerpts from Rufus' Oxford theology

lectures and brief excerpts from Assisi 138. Shows that Rufus

anticipated both Thomas' criticism of Anselm's Proslogion

proof for God's existence and Scotus' modal proof for the

existence of God." Rega Wood - The Richard Rufus of Cornwall

Project.

2. Long, Raymond James, and DeWitt, Richard. 2007. "Richard

Rufus's reformulations of Anselm's Proslogion argument."

International Philosophical Quarterly no. 47:329-340.

3. Raedts, Peter. 1987. Richard Rufus of Cornwall and the

tradition of Oxford theology. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

4. Wood, Rega. 2003. "Richard Rufus of Cornwall." In A

Companion to philosophy in the Middle Ages, edited by Gracia,

Jorge J.E. and Noone, Timothy B., 579-587. Malden: Blackwell.

5. ———. 2006. "Richard Rufus' response to Saint Anselm." In

Anselm and Abelard. Investigations and juxtapositions, edited

by Gasper, Giles and Kohlenberger, Helmut, 87-102. Toronto:

Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies.

"In previous articles, Fr. Gedeon Gàl and I have shown that

after rejecting Anselm's argument in its original form, Rufus,

like John Duns Scotus, and like the modern American

analytical philosopher, Norman Malcolm, proposed another

ontological argument in its place. To oversimplify: either as a

gloss on Anselm or as a substitute for his argument, they

claimed that God's existence, or rather the existence of a per se

being, could be inferred by modus tollens: a per se being is

necessary if possible, a variety of arguments show that a per se

being is possible, therefore a per se being is necessary. (3) Here,

I want to look at Rufus' criticism and very briefly at another

proposed substitute argument for God's existence." (p. 88)

(3) G. Gàl, 'Viae ad exsistentiam Dei probandum in doctrina

Richardi' Franziskanische Studien, 38 (1956), 183-186, 194-

196. R. Wood, 'Scotus's Argument for the Existence of God,'

Franciscan Studies, 47 (1987), 270-274 and an unpublished

paper, Scotus' Ontological Argument'.

In Appendix (pp. 99-102) is given the Latin text of Rufus

(Sententia Oxoniensis 1.2, B62.20ra-va).

Bonaventure of Bagnorea (1221-1274)

Texts and translations

1. Bonaventure, of Bagnorea. 1882. Commentarium in Quatuor

Libros Sententiarum. Claras Aquas (Quaracchi): Typographia

Collegii S.Bonaventurae.

Written in 1251-1253.

Edita studio et cura PP. Collegii a S. Bonaventura.

See also the Editio Minor Quaracchi, Firenze, Ex typographia

Collegii S. Bonaventurae (1934).

Daniels (1909) pp. 38-39: Liber I, Distinctio VIII, Pars I. De

veritate et immutabilitate Dei. Articulus I. De veritate Dei.

2. ———. 1953. The minds road to God. New York: Macmillan.

Translated with an introduction by George Boas.

3. ———. 1979. Disputed Questions on the Mystery of Trinity. St.

Bonaventure: Franciscan Institute.

Works of Saint Bonaventure Vol. III.

Introduction and translation by Zachary Hayes (reprinted

2000).

4. ———. 1993. Quaestionum Disputatarum. De mysterio

Trinitatis. Roma: Città Nuova.

Written in 1254-1255.

Sancti Bonaventurae Opuscola theologica (Opera V/1) - Latin

text and Italian translation.

Daniels (1909) pp. 39-40: Quaestio I, Articulo I. Utrum Deum

esse sit verum.

5. ———. 2003. Itinerarium mentis in Deum. Saint Bonaventure

NY: Francsican Institute.

Written in 1259.

Latin text and English translation by Zachary Hayes;

introduction and commentary by Philotheus Boehner.

Studies

1. Bougerol, Jacques. 1972. "Saint Bonaventure and Saint

Anselme." Antonianum no. 47:333-361.

2. Doyle, John Patrick. 1974. "Saint Bonaventure and the

Ontological Argument." Modern Schoolman no. 52:27-48.

"For St Bonaventure the self-evident truth of God's existence

can be shown forth by 'intellectual exercises' like that of st

Anselm. Such exercises are not simple-minded transits from

the ideal to the real order. Rather they are based upon a

sophisticated metaphysics. They involve the experience of

common intelligibility. With Plato, they accept the 'really real'

character of that intelligibility. implicitly, they also accept a

plurality and a one-way hierarchy of intelligibles leading up to a

'First'. Turning then precisely upon the unprincipiated nature

of this 'First', they spread before us its absolute necessity both

in reality and for thought."

3. Mathias, Thomas. 1976. "Bonaventurian ways to God through

reason (First part)." Franciscan Studies no. 36:192-232.

4. ———. 1977. "Bonaventurian ways to God through reason

(Second part)." Franciscan Studies no. 37:153-206.

5. Oeing-Hanhoff, Ludger. 1973. "Note sur l'argument

ontologique chez Descartes et Bonaventure." Archives de

Philosophie no. 36:643-655.

6. ———. 1975. "Der sogennante ontologische Gottesbeweis bei

Descartes und Bonaventura." In Analecta anselmiana.

Frankfurt.

Vol. 4/1.

7. Pegis, Anton Charles. 1967. "The Bonaventurean way to God."

Mediaeval Studies no. 29:206-242.

8. Platzek, E.W. 1975. "Die Verwendung der 'via Anselmiana' bei

Bonaventura." In Analecta anselmiana. Frankfurt.

Vol. 4/1.

9. Rivera de Ventosa, Enrique. 1974. "Supuestos filosofico-

religiosos de la pruebas de la existencia de Dios en San

Bonaventura." In S. Bonaventura 1274-1974, edited by

Bougerol, Jacques, 201-258. Grottaferrata: Collegio S.

Bonaventura.

10. Seifert, Josef. 1992. "Si Deus est, Deus est. Reflections on St.

Bonaventure's interpretation of St. Anselm's ontological

argument." Franciscan Studies no. 52:215-231.

"The formula (if God is God, God exists) is the shortest

summary of the ontological argument. The article tries to

demonstrate that this argument, as interpreted by

Bonaventure, in no way is guilty of the logical mistakes with

which one reproaches it. It proceeds not from a subjective idea

or concept but from an intrinsically necessary and supremely

intelligible divine nature and therefore applies to no other

being but to the divine being. Bonaventure's basic thesis is that

the inner truth (necessity) of the divine nature imposes itself on

the mind and contains objectively the real existence of God.

Only someone who does not understand this inner necessary

truth can deny God's existence."

Albert the Great (ca. 1200-1280)

Texts and translations

1. Albert, the Great. 1978. Summa Theologiae, sive De mirabili

scientia Dei. Monasterii Westfalorum: Aschendorff.

Written ca. 1270-1280

Edidit Dionysius Siedler, collaborantibus Wilhelmo Kübel et

Henrico Georgio Vogels.

Daniels (1909) pp. 36-37: Pars I. Tractatus III, Quaestio XVII;

Tractatus IV, Quaestio XIX, Membrum II.

Studies

1. Noone, Timothy B. 1992. "Albert the Great on the Subject of

Metaphysics and Demonstrating the Existence of God."

Medieval Philosophy and Theology no. 2:31-52.

Thomas Aquinas (1225/6-1274)

Texts and translations

1. Thomas, Aquinas. 1961. Summa contra Gentiles. Torino:

Marietti.

Written ca. 1257-1273.

S. Thomae Aquinatis doctoris angelici Liber de veritate

catholicae fidei contra errores infidelium, qui dicitur Summa

contra Gentiles, cura et studio Petri Marc, coadiuvantur Ceslao

Pera, et Petro Caramello (3 vols. I: Introductio; II-III: Textus

Leoninus diligenter recognitus, 1961-1967).

Texts selected by Daniels (1909) pp. 64-67:

1) In librum Boethii de Trinitate Expositio: Quaestio I Articulus

III: Utrum Deus sit primum quad a mente cognoscitur.

2) Sententiarum Liber I Distinctio III Quaestio I Articulus II

Utrum Deum esse sit per se notum.

3) Summa Contra Gentiles Liber I Capitulo X et Capitulo XI.

4) De Veritate Queastio X Articulus XII. Utrum Deum esse sit

per se notum menti humnae sicut prima principia

demonstrationis quae non possunt cogitari non esse.

5) Summa Theologica Pars I. Quaestio II Articulus I. Utrum

Deum esse sit per se notum.

2. ———. 1962. Summa theologiae. Torino: Marietti.

Written ca. 1266-1273.

S. Thomae Aquinatis doctoris angelici Summa theologiae, cura

et studio Petri Caramello, cum textu ex recensione leonina.

(3 vols. I: Pars prima et Prima secundae; II: Pars Secunda

secundae; III: Tertia pars et Supplementum, 1962-1963).

Studies

1. Bassler, Wolfgang. 1970. Die Kritik des Thomas von Aquin am

ontologischen Gottesbeweis . Köln: Walter Kleikamp.

2. Cosgrove, Matthew R. 1974. "Thomas Aquinas on Anselm's

Argument." Review of Metaphysics no. 27:513-530.

3. Matthews, Gareth B. 1963. "Aquinas on saying that God doesn't

exist." Monist.An International Quarterly Journal of General

Philosophical Inquiry :472-477.

"The article discusses inadequacies in Aquinas' criticism of

Anselm's ontological argument. Aquinas is commonly credited

with criticizing Anselm by distinguishing two kinds of self-

evidence, a distinction which for the purpose of criticizing

Anselm, is not very helpful, and instead of an effective rebuttal

of Anselm, Aquinas provides mostly a mere denial that his

argument is cogent. The article attempts to show how Anselm's

ontological argument can be defeated."

4. Rikhof, Herwi. 1990. "Aquinas and the "ratio Anselmi". A theo-

logical analysis of Aquinas' criticism." In L'argomento

Ontologico , edited by Olivetti, Marco M., 137-202. Padova:

CEDAM.

5. Wippel, John. 1992. "Thomas Aquinas on what philosophers

can know about God." American Catholic Philosophical

Quarterly no. 66 (3):279-297.

Peter of Tarentaise (1225-1276)

Texts

1. Peter, of Tarentaise. 1259. Innocentii Quinti in IV libros

Sententiarum Commentaria.

Written ca 1259.

The last printed edition is that of Toulouse: Vol. I. (1652); Vol.

II (1649); Vol. III. (1652); Vol. IV. (1651).

Daniels (1909): Sententiarum I Distinctio III. Quaestio I. De

cognitine Dei. Articulus I. An Deus a creatura sit cognoscibilis.

Articulus Ii. Qualiter possit cognosci et probari Deum esse (pp.

68-71).

Studies

John Peckham (ca. 1230-1292)

Texts

1. John, Peckham. 1260. Commentariius in IV libros

Sententiarum.

Unpublished; a manuscript of Book I (written ca. 1260-1270):

Biblioteca Nazionale di Firenze Conv. G. 854.

Daniels (1909) pp. 41-50: Liber I Distinctio II, Quaestio I.

Quaesitum primum. Circa primum quaeritur an Deus sit, et

ostenditur.

Studies

Henry of Ghent (ca. 1217-1293)

Texts and translations

1. Henry, of Ghent. 2005. Henry of Ghent's Summa. The

Questions on God's Existence and Essence (Articles 21-24).

Leuven: Peeters.

Written 1280-1293.

Latin text, introduction, and notes by Roland J. Teske;

translation by Jos Decorte and Roland J. Teske.

N.B. Daniels (1909) edition of: Summae Quaestionum

Ordianrium Tous I. Articulus XXI. De Deo an sit in se

absolute. Quaestio I. Utrum Deus habest esse. Articulus XXII.

De Deo an sit in comparatione ad nostram notitiam. Questio

II. Utrum Deum esse sit homini notum naturaliter per se (pp.

79-81) is now supersed by the new edtion by R. J. Teske.

2. ———. 2006. Henry of Ghent's Summa. The Questions on

God's Unity and Simplicity (Articles 25-30). Leuven: Peeters.

Written 1280-1293.

Latin text, introduction, translation and notes by Roland J.

Teske.

Studies

1. Paulus, Jean. 1936. "Henri de Gand et l'argument ontologique."

Archives d'Histoire Doctrinale et Littéraire du Moyen Age no.

10-11:265-323.

2. Pegis, Anton Charles. 1968. "Toward a new way to God: Henry

of Ghent." Mediaeval Studies no. 30:226-247.

3. ———. 1969. "A new way to God: Henry of Ghent (II)."

Mediaeval Studies no. 31:93-116.

4. ———. 1970. "Four medieval ways to God." Monist.An

International Quarterly Journal of General Philosophical

Inquiry no. 54:317-358.

"St. Anselm, St. Bonaventure, St. Thomas Aquinas and Henry

of Ghent represent three medieval philosophical traditions in

proving the existence of God, namely, the Platonic, the

Aristotelian and the Avicennian. Platonic hierarchy and

participation, leading to a supreme term, govern the proof of

God in St. Bonaventure and St. Anselm. St. Thomas, beginning

with data in nature (e.g. motion), reaches God as the cause of

these data before reaching him as he is in his own absoluteness.

St. Thomas' argumentation and method are Aristotelian. The

proofs of God in St. Anselm (specifically, in the Proslogion ), in

St. Bonaventure and in St. Thomas are all empirical and "a

posteriori". but the proof of God in Henry of Ghent, Avicennian

in origin, is "a priori" and seeks to reach God in his unity as the

necessary being. Henry's proof is the model and perhaps the

origin of the ontological argument."

5. ———. 1971. "A new way to God: Henry of Ghent (III)."

Mediaeval Studies no. 33:158-179.

6. Teske, Roland J. 2005. "Henry of Ghent's metaphysical

argument for the existence of God." Modern Schoolman no.

83:19-38.

Nicolaus of Ockham (fl. XII century)

Texts

1. Nicolaus, of Ockham. 1260. Commentaria in Sententiarum.

Unpublished manuscript (ca. 1260-1270) - Biblioteca Nazionale

di Firenze Conv. G5, 858.

Daniels (1909) pp. 82-83: Sententiarum Libro I Distinctio III.

Quaestio II. Quaeritur secundo an Deum esse sit per se notum.

Studies

Matthew of Aquasparta (ca. 1240-1302)

Texts

1. Matthew, of Acquasparta. 1280. Commentarius in Primum,

Secondum et Quartum Librum Sententiarum.

Written ca. 1271-1280; unpublished.

See the introduction by Victorin Doucet to Fr. Matthaei ab

Aquasparta, O.F.M. ... Quaestiones disputatae de gratia ...

cum introductione critica de magisterio et scriptis eiusdem

doctoris, Quaracchi, Florence, 1935, pp. LVIII-CLV (on the

Commentatius see pp.LXXI-CVI. Daniels (1909) pp. 51-63:

Liber I Distinctio II Articulus Primus. De Unitate divina.

Quaestio I: Utrum Deum esse sit verum; Quaestio III: Utrum

Deum esse sit verum indubitabile.

Studies

Giles of Rome (ca. 1243-1316)

Texts

1. Giles, of Rome. 1492. Super Librum I Sententiarum

(Reportatio).

Written ca. 1280-1290; last printed edition: Venezia (1492).

Daniels (1909) pp. 72-78: Sententiarum Liber I Distinctio III.

Quaestio I. De cognitione Dei in se. Articulus I. Utrum Deum

possium cognoscere in vita ist (*); Articulus II. Utrum Deum

esse sit per se notum. Articulus III. Utrum Deum esse possit

demonstrari.

2. Luna, Concetta. 1990. "Fragments d'une reportation du

commentaire de Gilles de Rome sur le premier livre des

Sentences. Les extraits des mss. Clm. 8005 et Paris, B. N. Lat.

15819 (First Part)." Revue des Sciences Philosophiques et

Théologiques no. 74:205-254.

3. ———. 1990. "Fragments d'une reportation du commentaire de

Gilles de Rome sur le premier livre des Sentences. Les extraits

des mss. Clm. 8005 et Paris, B. N. Lat. 15819 (Second Part)."

Revue des Sciences Philosophiques et Théologiques no. 74:437-

456.

Richard of Middletown (1249-1308)

Texts

1. Richard, of Middleton. 1591. Super quatuor libros sententiarum

Petri Lombardi quaestiones subtilissimae.

Written ca. 1290-1300; last printed edition Bussels, 1591.

Daniels (1909) pp. 84-88: Sententiarum I. Distinctio III.

Articulus I. De cognitione Dei a creatura. Quaestio II. Utrum

Deum esse sit nobis per se notum. Quaestio III: Utrum Deum

esse possit demonstrari.

Studies

William of Ware (fl. 1290-1305)

Texts

1. William, of Ware. 1424. Quaestiones super libros Sententiarum.

Written ca. 1290-1300; available only in manuscript.

Daniels (1909) pp. 89-104: Quaestio XIV. Quaeritur utrum

Deus sit. Questio XXI. Quaeritur utrum Deum esse per se sit

notum.

Studies

John Duns Scotus (1265/6-1308)

Texts and translations

1. John, Duns Scotus. 1960. Lectura in librum primum

Sententiarum. Civitas Vaticana: Typis Poliglottis Vaticanis.

Written 1298-1299.

Opera Omnia. ("The Vatican edition"), vol. XVI: Librum I

Distinctio II, Quaestio I, nn. 38-135.

2. ———. 1982. A treatise on God as first principle. Chicago:

Franciscan Herald Press.

Written in 1308.

A Latin text and English translation of the De Primo Principio.

Second edition, revised, with a commentary by Allan B. Wolter.

Firs edition 1966.

3. ———. 2003. Opus Oxoniense.

Written 1300-1306.

Opera Omnia. ("The Vatican edition") Civitas Vaticana: Typis

Polyglottis Vaticanis, 1950-.

Vol. I Librum I, Distinctio II, Quaestio I, nn. 39-190.

Studies

1. Bonansea, Bernardino. 1967. "Duns Scotus and St. Anselm's

ontological argument." Studies in Philosophy and the History

of Philosophy no. 4:128-141.

2. Doyle, John Patrick. 1979. "Some Thoughts on Duns Scotus and

the Ontological Argument." New Scholasticism no. 53:234-241.

"Called since Kant “ the Ontological Argument,” the famous

reasoning originally offered by St. Anselm of Canterbury passes

from a concept of God as “ that than which a greater cannot be

thought ” (id quo maius cogitari nequit ) to the very fact of

God’s existence. (1) Our present first concern is with Duns

Scotus’ reduction of Anselm’s “ that than which a greater

cannot be thought ” to another notion, namely, that of “ the

Highest Thinkable ” (Summum cogitabile ). (2)

Between the Anselmian and the Scotistic concepts there is an

evident disparity. While “ the Highest Thinkable ” is something

which, as high as it might be, is still “ thinkable,” “ that than

which a greater cannot be thought ” need not be itself a

thinkable. All that Anselm’s expression on its face requires is

that nothing be thinkable beyond it. Anselm himself seems to

recognize this when, in reply to Gaunilo, he all but admits the

unthinkability of “ that thing (res illa ) than which a greater

cannot be thought.” (3)

Steeped as he was in medieval respect for “ authorities ”, Scotus

most certainly knew Anselm's position. Yet he ignored it.

Indeed, even as he accepts the basic validity of Anselm's

argument, in apparent opposition to Anselm, Scotus

understands it as turning on the notion of “ the Highest

Thinkable ”. The question is, why?

For answer, we must look to where Scotus has employed

Anselm's reasoning, but only after adding some ” coloration “

(coloratio ) to it. (4)" (pp. 234-235)

(...)

"Being compossible with something else is manifestly different

from having a cause adequate to one’s production or to being

possible in the full sense of having both internal and external

possibility together. Being incompossible with something else,

e. g. the Highest Thinkable with one yet higher—which is

actually all Scotus has aimed at showing—is even more

removed from having real adequate possibility. For

incompossibility with a higher already falls short of

compossibility with any or all others, whether the

incompossibility and the compossibility in question be real or

merely logical. Much more then does such incompossibility fall

short of real adequate (ordinarily including external as well as

internal) possibility.

In conclusion accordingly, Scotus must (as he in fact does)

advance his argument principally from his first “without

contradiction That is to say, God is a Highest Thinkable

inasmuch as such a notion is without contradiction. But the

Subtle Doctor still must bridge the gap which he himself

acknowledges between thinkability and real possibility. And

notwithstanding success in this, he has yet reached only a real

internal possibility and any further passage to actual existence

is very much subject to Descartes’ criticism." (p. 241)

(1) Cf. St. Anselm, Proslogion , cc. 2-4, in Obras completas de

San Anselmo (Madrid, 1952), I, pp. 366-370.

(2) Cf. Ordinatio I, d. 2, p. 1, q. 2 (ed. Vat. II, pp. 208-209, nn.

137-138); De primo principio , c. 4 (ed. Muller and Roche

[Madrid, 1950], p. 687.

(3) Quid ad haee respondeat editor ipsius libelli (more

commonly called: Liber apologeticus ) c. 9 (ed. Madrid, 1952),

p. 434.

(4) Cf. note 2, above.

3. Grabs, Harmut. 1997. "Johannes Duns Scotus' Rezeption des

Anselmianischen Arguments." Bochumer Philosophisches

Jahrbuch fur Antike und Mittelalter no. 2:105-125.

"In his "Ordinatio", Scotus disregards the constitutive function

of thinking inherent to Anselm's "ratio". Scotus's

representation of the argument in "Ordinatio" I d. 2 p. 1 q. 2,

which lays no claim to "coloratio", eliminates this constitutive

function, proving instead by means of a syllogism containing

the terms "being", "non-being" and "the highest" the existence

of the highest. In the "coloratio" ("Ord." I d. 2 p. 1 q. 1), then,

Scotus replaces Anselm's expression "that than which nothing

greater can be thought" with the concept "the highest

thinkable", by which he means an infinite being. The

introduction of an infinite being taken as the highest thinkable,

however, destroys the structure of Anselm's argument with its

innate coherence. In fact, Scotus proves the existence of the

highest thinkable not by means of this argumentative structure,

but instead on the basis of his own analysis of certain

ontological structures. This proof has no real connection in

content to Anselm's argument and does not foster its

comprehension; instead, Scotus merely couches his argument

in Anselm's terms, so that it is more appropriate to talk about a

"coloration rationum Scoti". "

4. Kielkopf, Charles. 1978. "Duns Scotus's rejection of 'Necessarily

Exists' as a predicate." Journal of the History of Philosophy no.

16:13-21.

"The paper begins with a reconstruction of Scotus's argument

in chapter three (3.23) of his Treatise about the first principle

that there can be at most one necessary being. This argument is

shown to presuppose that 'necessarily exists' is not a predicate.

Scotus' argument is modified to show that he also has to accept

that 'exists' is not a predicate. The remaining problem is, then,

to explain how Scotus can still accept a "colored" ontological

argument. This problem is met by suggesting that the nature of

an existing being has more perfections than any nature of a

non-existing being but that, still, existence is not one of the

features -l et alone anything which can be called a perfection --

making up the nature."

5. Wolter, Allan, and Adams, McCord Marilyn. 1982. "Duns

Scotus Parisian proof for the existence of God." Franciscan

Studies no. 42:248-321.

6. Wood, Rega. 1987. "Scotus argument for the existence of God."

Franciscan Studies no. 47:259-277.

Bibliography on the Ancient Period (before

Anselm of Canterbury)

1. Audet, Thomas-André. 1949. Une source augustinienne de

l'argument de S. Anselme. In Rencontres

Étienne Gilson, philosophe de la Chrétienté.

2. Baldassarri, Mariano. 1971. "Lo stoicismo antico e l'argomento

ontologico." Rivista di Filosofia Neo-Scolastica no. 63:391-418.

3. Beckaert, A. 1959. "Une justification platonicienne de

l'argument a priori." In Spicilegium Beccense I. Congrés

International du IX centenaire de l'arrivée d'Anselme au Bec,

185-190. Paris: Vrin.

Translated in English as: A Platonic justification for the

argument a priori in: J. Hick and A. C. McGill (eds.), The

many-faced argument. Recent studies on the ontological

argument for the existence of God, London: Macmillan 1967,

pp. 111-118.

4. Brunschwig, Jacques. 1994. "Did Diogenes of Babylon invent

the ontological argument?" In Papers in Hellenistic philosophy,

170-189. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Translated by Janet Lloyd.

5. Burrell, David. 1986. Knowing the Unknowable God: Ibn-Sina,

Maimonides, Aquinas. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame

Press.

6. Davidson, Herbert Alan. 1979. "Avicenna's proof of the

existence of God as a necessarily existent Being." In Islamic

philosophical theology, edited by Morewedge, Parviz, 165-187.

Albany: State University of New York Press.

"The first philosopher known to use the concept of necessary

existence in order to construct a proof of the existence of God

was Avicenna. Avicenna's proof, it will appear, neither is, nor

inevitably reduces itself to, an ontological proof. It is rather a

certain kind of cosmological proof.

The concept of necessary existence is used by Avicenna to prove

the existence of God in two works, at length in the Najat, briefly

and somewhat obscurely in the Isharat. The concept is also

discussed fully in two other works, the Shifa and Danesh

Namesh, but there Avicenna employs it only to define the

nature of God, not, as far as I can see, to establish His

existence."

7. ———. 1987. Proofs for eternity, creation and the existence of

God in Medieval Islamic and Jewish philosophy. New York:

Oxford University Press.

8. Dumont, Jean-Paul. 1982. "Diogène de Babylone et la preuve

ontologique." Revue Philosophique de la France et de

l'Étranger:391-395.

9. Faggiotto, Pietro. 1954. "La fonte platonica dell'argomento

ontologico di Anselmo d'Aosta." Rivista di Filosofia Neo-

Scolastica no. 46:495-497.

10. Fakhry, Majid. 1968. "The ontological argument in the Arabic

tradition: the case of Alfarabi." Studia Islamica no. 64:5-17.

11. Gelinas, Luke. 2006. "The Stoic argument Ex gradibus

entium." Phronesis no. 51:49-73.

"In this paper I offer an interpretation of the Stoic argumentum

ex gradibus entium as it appears in Book II of Cicero's De

Natura Deorum. In addition to displaying certain similarities

to later formulations of the so-called "ontological argument,"

particularly Anselm's, I argue that the argument ex gradibus

entium was a versatile feature of Stoic philosophical theology,

capable of employment in relation to two distinct topics: the

existence of god and the identification of god's essential nature

with the world. I claim that the instance of the argument ex

gradibus entium at ND II 18-21 is a token of this latter type,

and show that there are no textual reasons precluding this

interpretation. In light of the fact that the argument can be

analyzed more effectively in this role, I suggest that this

particular instance of the argument is best thought of as an

attempt on the part of the Stoics to identify the world with god

rather than as a strict proof for god's bare existence. I end with

some reflections on the general type of the Stoic argument qua

precursor to two of Anselm's ontological proofs. Although I

think it is a mistake to call the Stoic argument "ontological" in a

strict sense, it may, I suggest, have shared a similar conceptual

underpinning with at least one of Anselm's famous

formulations."

12. Gerogiorgakis, Stamatios. 2005. "Wenn die Möglichkeit in

Notwendigkeit umschlägt. Ein Beitrag zur Vorgeschichte

modaler ontologischer Beweise." Bochumer Philosophisches

Jahrbuch für Antike und Mittelalter no. 10:21-36.

"Aristotle produced several arguments to vindicate the futura

contingentia and to refute the conception of modalities which

do not allow incidental facts. This conception was coined

mainly by Diodorus Cronus and implied the view that whatever

may happen, is to happen necessarily. Although Aristotle

condemned this view and refuted the theology which it implies,

Diodorean modalities were employed by the Scholastics (at

least since Abelard, as Leibniz pointed out) to support their

theology. Abelard's Diodorean formula reads: God wishes no

more and no less than what He is able to do -- i.e., God's ability

to do something implies necessity. In the Summa theologiae,

Thomas Aquinas employed Diodorean modalities along with

this result of Abelard's. Leibniz himself confessed his debt to

Diodorean modalities as well as to the work of Abelard in

formulating his own ontological proof. For the Greek-speaking

scholars of the Middle Ages, however, Aristotelian influences

were stronger than Diodorean as regards theory building on

modalities. The absence of Leibniz-like modal ontological

proofs in the Greek tradition seems more plausible under these

circumstances."

13. Halfwassen, Jens. 2002. "Sein als uneingeschränkte Fülle. Zur

Vorgeschichte des ontologischen Gottesbeweises im antiken

Platonismus." Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung no. 56.

14. Held, Klaus. 1983. "Zur Vorgeschichte des ontologischen

Gottesbeweis. Anselm und Parmenides." Perspektiven der

Philosophie no. 9:217-234.

15. Johnson, J.Prescott. 1953. "The ontological argument in Plato."

Personalist no. 44:24-34.

16. Mayer, Tony. 2001. "Ibn Sina's 'Burhan Al-Siddiqin'." Journal

of Islamic Studies no. 12:18-39.

"Ibn Sina (d.429/1037) gave a distinctive argument for the

existence of God in his works. Scholars disagree on the exact

structure and character of his argument (admittedly, Ibn Sina

gives it in more than one form). This paper tries to determine

the argument's precise shape and classify it in relation to other

such proofs. It attempts this through a detailed analysis of one

of the best known presentations of the proof, in Ibn Sina's

Isharat, which is cross-checked with other versions and the

commentaries. The argument is found to build on the

proposition that existence occurs in the mind dichotomically, as

either necessary or contingent. Ibn Sina claims that an

extramental Necessary Existent follows from both modes. In

the first case, it is contradictory to posit 'necessary existence' in

the mind and deny it outside the mind. In the second case

'contingent existence' is such that it could not be self-

explanatory. Most space in Ibn Sina's argument is taken up

with showing that contingent existence, even if temporally

infinite, ultimately implies necessary existence. On these

grounds, it is concluded that Ibn Sina's proof must be classified

as both ontological and cosmological, without paradox. It is

ontological insofar as 'necessary existence' in intellect is the

first basis for arguing for a Necessary Existent in re. It is,

however, also cosmological insofar as most of it is taken up

with arguing that contingent existents cannot stand alone and

must end up in a Necessary Existent."

17. Moreau, Joseph. 1947. "L'argument ontologique dans le

Phédon." Revue Philosophique de la France et de l'Étranger

no. 137:320-343.

18. Morewedge, Parviz. 1979. "A third version of the ontological

argument in the Ibn Sinian metaphysics." In Islamic

philosophical theology, edited by Morewedge, Parviz, 182-222.

New York: State University of New York Press.

Reprinted in: P. Morewedge, The mystical philosophy of

Avicenna, Binghamton: Global Publications, 2001 pp. 117-163.

19. Papazian, Micharl. 2007. "The Ontological Argument of

Diogenes of Babylon." Phronesis no. 52:188-209.

"An argument for the existence of gods given by the Stoic

Diogenes of Babylon and reported by Sextus Empiricus appears

to be an ancient version of the ontological argument. In this

paper I present a new reconstruction of Diogenes' argument

that differs in certain important respects from the

reconstruction presented by Jacques Brunschwig. I argue that

my reconstruction makes better sense of how Diogenes'

argument emerged as a response to an attack on an earlier Stoic

argument presented by Zeno of Citium. Diogenes' argument as

reconstructed here is an example of a modal ontological

argument that makes use of the concept of being of such a

nature as to exist. I argue that this concept is a modal concept

that is based on the Philonian definition of possibility, and thus

that Diogenes' argument is a source of important evidence

about the use of non-Stoic modalities in the post-Chrysippean

Stoa. I conclude by arguing that the objections made against

considering Diogenes' argument as ontological are unfounded

and that Diogenes' argument clearly resembles modern

versions of modal ontological arguments."

20. Vergnes, Jules. 1924. "Les sources de l'argument de Saint

Anselme." Revue des Sciences Religeuses no. 4:576-579.

Bibliography on the Medieval Period

1. Bettoni, Efrem. 1950. Il problema della conoscibilità di Dio

nella scuola francescana. Padova: Cedam.

2. Bonansea, Bernardino. 1973. "The Ontological Argument:

Proponents and Opponents." Studies in Philosophy and the

History of Philosophy no. 6:135-192.

"This study is a follow-up to my previous article, Duns Scotus

and St Anselm's ontological argument, and traces the history

of the controversy about the Anselmian proof from the time

when it was first proposed up to the present day. The argument

found its strongest opponents in Gaunilo, Aquinas, and Kant,

who objected to it on more or less the same ground but from a

different perspective, while Bonaventure, Descartes, Leibniz,

and Barth came to its support. Between these two opposite

positions there is the view of Malcolm and Hartshorne, who see

in the "ratio Anselmi" two distinct pieces of reasoning and

claim that only one is valid. Koyré and Gilson view the

argument within the context of the whole Proslogion and other

Anselmian works. Each position is carefully analyzed and

evaluated."

3. ———. 1979. "The Ontological Argument." In God and Atheism.

A Philosophical Approach to the Problem of God, 107-170.

Washington: Catholic University of America Press.

This chapter is a combination, with some minor changes, of two

essays which appeared in Studies in Philosophy and the

History of Philosophy, ed. John K. Ryan (Washington, D.C.:

The Catholic University of America Press), i.e., "Duns Scotus

and St. Anselm's Ontological Argument," vol. IV (1969), pp.

128-41, and "The Ontological Argument: Proponents and

Opponents," vol. VI (1973), pp. 135-92.

"St. Anselm's ontological argument is one of the most

provocative and fascinating topics in the field of philosophy.

Although the subject of endless discussion, the argument

continues to draw the attention of philosophers of different

persuasions. New interpretations have superseded those of the

past and new insights into the controversy have been revealed

which point out, among other things, the difficulty and

complexity of the issue.

It has been customary to dismiss the Anselmian argument for

the existence of God on the ground that it involves a transition

from the ideal to the real order, from a concept in our mind to

the existence of the being so conceived. This transition, it is

asserted, is never permissible, not even in the case of the

greatest conceivable being, as the argument seems to imply.

The fact that many great thinkers, such as Aquinas and Kant,

have felt a need to refute the argument is a further proof, so it is

claimed, that the ratio Anselmi has little more than a historical

value. St. Anselm would have fallen victim to an illusion, and

no dialectical effort could ever rescue his argument from the

attacks of its critics, even though no serious scholar would

subscribe today to Schopenhauer's view that the ratio Anselmi

is merely a charming joke.

Yet, despite the many attacks and "refutations", the argument

has a peculiar power of survival. There is a growing realization,

even among those whose philosophical background is very

different from St. Anselm's way of thinking, that the argument

is not as simple as it first appears to be and that much of the

criticism directed against it is due to a superficial knowledge of

its context and the general framework of Anselm's thought. As a

contemporary author points out, "If Anselm is to be refuted, it

should be for what he said, taken in something like the context

which he provided, and not for something someone else said he

said, or a fragment of what he said, torn wholly out of context.''

(1) The Anselmian argument, which has been called "one of the

boldest creations of man's reason and a credit not only to its

inventor, but to human reason itself," (2) is not to be treated

lightly, nor are some of its later formulations.

An objective study of the Anselmian argument in its actual

context and historical development may reveal that, while

undue credit has been given to certain modern and

contemporary thinkers for their role in the controversy about it,

the actual contribution of philosophers who long preceded

them in the academic arena has often been neglected or even

completely ignored. Yet it is perhaps in the writings of these

forgotten masters, who both historically and intellectually are

closer to the "father of scholasticism" than their later

contenders, that one may find a clue to a better appreciation of

the celebrated argument.

To avoid misunderstanding, a distinction must be made at the

very outset between two different issues: first, the nature and

scope of the argument in the mind of its author, and second,

the validity of the argument as an attempt to prove the

existence of God. The first issue must be solved in terms of the

argument's original text as contained in the Proslogion and set

in relation to Anselm's other writings where his philosophical,

and especially his epistemological, doctrines are more clearly

stated. The solution of the second issue rests to a great extent

on the critic's conviction as regards the possibility, ways, and

means of attaining to any knowledge of a Supreme Being by

unaided reason. The failure to make such a distinction has

contributed to much of the confusion in appraisals of the

Anselmian proof.

The purpose of this chapter is to present the essential features

of the ontological argument as stated in the Proslogion and

follow the history of the controversy it has generated from

Anselm's first debate with his fellow-monk Gaunilo down to the

present day. The presentation will be followed by a critical

evaluation of the argument itself and of the argument's

interpretations by succeeding philosophers and

commentators." pp. 107-108

(1) Charles Hartshorne, Introduction to the Second Edition of

Saint Anselm: Basic Writings, trans. by S. W. Deane (La Salle,

Ill.: The Open Court Publishing Company, 1962), p. 2.

(2) Richard Taylor, Introduction to The Ontological Argument

from St. Anselm to Contemporary Philosophers, ed. by Alvin

Plantinga (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday "Anchor Books, 1965),

p. XVIII.

4. Gómez Caffarena, José. 1963. "Review of: Die ontologische

Gottesbeweis by Dieter Henrich." International Philosophical

Quarterly no. 3:617-624.

5. Javelet, Robert. 1984. "L'argument dit ontologique et la

speculatio." In Spicilegium Beccense (vol. II), 501-510. Paris.

6. Johnson, H.J. 1981. "The Ontological Argument and the

Languages of "Being"." In Sprache und Erkenntnis im

Mittelalter (vol. II), 724-737. Berlin, New York.

7. Pegis, Anton. 1970. "Four Medieval Ways to God." Monist no.

54:317-358.

About St. Anselm, St. Bonaventure, St. Thomas Aquinas amd

Henry of Ghent.

8. Streveler, Paul. 1976. "Two "New" Critiques of the Ontological

Argument." In Saint Anselme ses précurseurs et ses

contemporains, edited by Kohlenberger, Helmut, 55-64.

Frankfurt: Minerva.

"We need only look back upon the history of medieval

philosophy to become immediately aware that it was not only

Gaunilon who saw reason to criticise Anselm's famous

argument. I would like to examine here, in a rather sketchy

manner, two medieval critiques of Anselm's argument which, to

my mind, are quite unique and which, in many ways, far

surpass in cogency and relevancy the common criticisms found

in textbooks. The first I gather from certain remarks of William

of Occam which, are not directed precisely at Anselm's

argument, but which are naturally applicable to it. The second

is the critique of Gregory of Rimini.

Occam's critique, it will be seen, rests upon a very subtle logical

point, which is somewhat unique in medieval philosophy and

which anticipates views in modern symbolic logic. Occam was

recognized even in his own day as somewhat of an innovator,

although we have since learned that there were others of his

contemporaries of even more radical stature.

The second critique I gather from Gregory of Rimini, a younger

contemporary of Occam, whose thought evinces certain

affinities to that of the latter. Rimini's fame among logicians of

modern symbolic logic who attempt to see anticipations of later

more sophisticated developments in medieval philosophy, rests

upon his doctrine of the cornplexe significabile which seems to

be a subtle anticipation of our modern notion of a proposition,

or at least of the Fregean notion of the "object" of thought.

It should be remarked also, by way of introduction, that a great

deal of the ideas and interpretations as well as of the scholarly

references utilized in this paper came to me through

discussions with my former teacher and friend of happy

memory, the late, Julius R. Weinberg." (pp. 55-56)<

Bibliographia. Annotated bibliographies

Raul Corazzon || rc@ontology.co || Info

Selected Bibliography on History of

the Ontological Argument from

Suárez to Frege

A Selection of Primary Authors

Legenda: P = Pro (accept the proof); C = Contra (rejected the proof);

I = indifferent (take no position on the proof).

References are to the most important works where ontological

argument is discussed.

P Francisco Suárez

P René Descartes

C Pierre Gassendi

P Henry More

P Ralph Cudworth

P Baruch Spinoza

P Nicolas Malebranche

P Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz

P François Fénelon

P Samuel Clarke

P Christian Wolff

C David Hume

P Alexander Baumgarten

C Immanuel Kant

P Moses Mendelssohn

P Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel

P Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling

C Ludwig Feuerbach

P Robert Flint

PFranz Brentano

C Gottlob Frege

Francisco Suárez (1548-1617)

Texts and translations

1. Suárez, Francisco. 1965. Disputationes Metaphysicae.

Hildesheim: Georg Olms.

The first edition was published in Salamanca (Spain) in 1597

(two wolumes) and reprinted in the Luis Vivés edition: R. P.

Francisci Suárez e societate Jesu, Opera omnia - in 26 volumes

(1856-1861) with two additional volumes of indexes (27-28);

the Disputationes Metaphysicae are in voll. 25-26.

The only complete translation is: Disputaciones metafisicas,

edición y traducción de Sergio Rabade Romeo, Salvador

Caballero Sanchez, Antonio Puigcerver Zanón, Madrid Editorial

Gredos, 1960-1966 (7 voll.).

2. ———. 2004. The Metaphysical Demonstration of the

Existence of God. Metaphysical Disputations 28-29. South

Bend: St. Augustine Press.

XXVIII: De divisione entis in infinitum et finitum; XXIX: De

Primo et increato Ente, an sit.

Translated and edited with an introduction (pp. X-XXIV) by

John P. Doyle.

Studies

1. Fastiggi, Robert. 1999. "The proof for the existence of God in

Suarez." In Francisco Suárez (1548-1617). Tradiçao e

Modernidade , edited by Cardoso, Adelino, Martins, Antonio

Manuel and Dos Santos, Leonel Ribeiro, 81-92. Lisboa: Ediçoes

Colibri.

René Descartes (1596-1650)

Texts and translations

1. Descartes, René. 1978. Méditations métaphysiques. Paris: Vrin.

French translation by Charles d'Albert, duc du Luyne (1647).

Œuvres complètes edited by Charles Adam and Paul Tannery,

originally published 1897-1913 in 12 volumes.Vol. IX, 1.

2. ———. 1983. Meditationes de prima philosophia. Paris: Vrin.

Written in 1641; See the III and V Meditations.

Œuvres complètes edited by Charles Adam and Paul Tannery,

originally published 1897-1913 in 12 volumes.Vol. VII.

Studies

1. Abbruzzese, John Edward. 2007. "The structure of Descartes's

ontological proof." British Journal for the History of

Philosophy no. 15:253-282.

2. Armogathe, Jean-Robert. 1995. "Caterus' objections to God." In

Descartes and His Contemporaries. Meditations, Objections

and Replies, edited by Ariew, Roger and Grene, Marjorie, 34-

43. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

3. Cress, Donald. 1973. "Does Descartes' 'ontological argument'

really stand on its own?" Studi Internazionali di Filosofia no.

5:127-136.

A discussion of the Gouhier-Gueroult controversy on the

purpose of placing the ontological argument in Descartes' Fifth

Meditation.

4. ———. 1975. "Does Descartes have two "ontological

arguments?"." International Studies in Philosophy no. 7:155-

166.

"The ontological arguments of (1) the Fifth Meditation and (2)

the Principles and the Response to the Second set of Objections

differ in that they have two distinct major premises. By means

of a set of interlocking distinctions, I show how one might deal

with the vicious circle as well as resolve the dispute between

Gueroult and Gouhier on the standing of the ontological

argument in the Fifth Meditation."

5. Crocker, Sylvia Fleming. 1976. "Descartes' ontological

argument." Modern Schoolman no. 53:347-377.

6. Curley, Edwin. 2005. "Back to the ontological argument." In

Early modern philosophy. Mind, matter, and metaphysics,

edited by Mercer, Christa and O'Neill, Ellen, 46-64. New York:

Oxford University Press.

7. Dicker, Georges. 1993. Descartes. An Analytical and Historical

Introduction. New York: Oxford University Press.

Chapter 4. Meditation V: The Ontological Argument for the

Existence of God pp. 147-176.

8. Doney, Willis. 1991. "Did Caterus misunderstand Descartes's

ontological proof?" In René Descartes. Critical assessments.

Vol. II, edited by Moyal, Georges J.D., 344-353. London:

Routledge.

9. ———. 1993. "On Descartes' Reply to Caterus." American

Catholic Philosophical Quarterly no. 67:413-430.

"In Descartes' presentation of his a priori proof in the Fifth

Meditation, there are three sorts of problems often passed over

by commentators which will occupy me here. In each case, I

will first present the problem as clearly as I can and then

consider some important information found in the First Set of

Objections and Replies concerning a solution of the problem."

(p. 413)

10. ———. 2003. "Objections and Replies within the Fifth

Meditation." British Journal for the History of Philosophy no.

11:219-234.

11. Dougherty, Michael V. 2002. "The importance of Cartesian

triangles: a new look at Descartes's ontological argument."

International Journal of Philosophical Studies no. 10:35-62.

"In this paper, I argue that commentators have missed a

significant clue given by Descartes in coming to understand his

'ontological' proof for the existence of God. In both the analytic

and synthetic presentations of the proof throughout his

writings, Descartes notes that the proof works 'in the same way'

as a particular geometrical proof. I explore the significance of

such a parallel, and conclude that Descartes could not have

intended readers to think that the argument consists of some

kind of intuition. I argue that for Descartes the attribute of

existence is a 'second-order' attribute that is demonstrated to

belong to the idea of God on the basis of 'first-order' attributes.

The proof, properly understood, is in fact a demonstration.

Having brought to light the geometrical parallels between the

ontological and geometrical proofs, we have new evidence to

resolve the 'intuition versus demonstration' controversy that

has characterized much of the discussion of Descartes's

ontological argument."

12. Dutton, Blake. 1993. "The Ontological Argument: Aquinas's

Objection and Descartes' Reply." American Catholic

Philosophical Quarterly no. 67:431-450.

"One might wonder what Aquinas's response would have been

to Descartes' unique form of the ontological argument. He

certainly would not, as Descartes seems to think, find it

compatible with his own natural theology. But how exactly

would he have read it? Although one can only guess, I believe

he would have read it as a failed attempt to gain a supernatural

knowledge of God by the natural light of reason alone. More

specifically, he would have seen it as an attempt to attain a

knowledge of God that is accessible only to the elect in heaven

who enjoy the beatific vision.

We have seen that Aquinas rejects the possibility of all natural

knowledge which does not originate in the senses and is

independent of any sense-based image. This, of course, holds

true for natural knowledge of God as well. However, these

conditions do not pertain to the state of beatitude. In that state,

Aquinas tells us, the saints in heaven are granted an intellectual

vision of the essence of God to which no created similitude is

adequate. They are said to see the divine essence by an

uncreated similitude which, by virtue of being uncreated,

cannot be produced by the abstractive activity of the intellect

upon the image. Here the intellect has a direct apprehension of

its object which is not grounded in sense perception. Two

features of this account should strike us as familiar; the beatific

vision is an intellectual vision of the essence of God, and it is

not attained by the abstraction from an image. These features

are familiar because they are the very features we have found to

characterize Descartes' account of clear and distinct knowledge

of God. Such knowledge, Descartes claims, is of the nature of

God, and as it is attained only as the mind withdraws from any

presentation of the senses or the imagination, it is independent

of any image.

We may also recall that for Descartes the existence of God is

immediately and evidently known because in clearly and

distinctly perceiving the divine nature one also perceives that

existence pertains to that nature. Aquinas, because he denies

that we can have such natural knowledge of the essence of God,

denies that the existence of God is self-evident. Presumably,

though, this would not be the case for the saints in heaven who

are not bound by dependence on the senses or reliance on

images. We would expect that they, enjoying the vision of the

essence of God, would have the kind of immediate and evident

knowledge of the existence of God that Descartes claims for

himself. And this, it turns out, is exactly what we find. Aquinas

writes that "just as it is evident to us that a whole is greater

than a part of itself, so to those seeing the divine essence in

itself it is supremely self-evident that God exists because His

essence is His being" (Summa contra Gentiles I, 11, V, 5). Once

again, Descartes claims to see what Aquinas believes God has

reserved only for the eyes of the beatified." (pp. 448-449)

13. ———. 1993. "Suarezian Foundations of Descartes' Ontological

Argument." Modern Schoolman no. 70:245-258.

14. Forgie, William J. 1974. "Existence assertions and the

ontological argument." Mind no. 83:260-262.

"Many philosophers have claimed that Descartes' ontological

proof rests on the assumption that existence is not a property

and have then tried to attack that assumption by arguing that

existence assertions are not subject-predicate assertions. I try

to show that this kind of attack on Descartes is misguided. I

distinguish a 'semantic' and an 'ontological' criterion of

propertyhood. I argue that 1) Descartes' argument at most

requires that existence be a property in the ontological, not the

semantic, sense; and that 2) if existence assertions are not

subject-predicate assertions it follows only that existence is not

a property in the semantic sense."

15. ———. 1976. "Is the Cartesian ontological argument defensible."

New Scholasticism no. 50:108-121.

"Consider the following traditional criticism of Descartes'

ontological argument. "Either Descartes' first premiss ('God is a

supremely perfect being') is a categorical assertion, in which

case his argument begs the question by assuming the existence

of a subject of such an assertion, or it is a disguised

hypothetical assertion, in which case Descartes' conclusion --'

God exists' -- will also be hypothetical and so will lack

existential import." Anthony Kenny has recently argued that

this criticism can be avoided by construing Descartes' first

premiss as a non-question-begging, but nevertheless

categorical, assertion. I consider a number of different ways of

so construing Descartes' initial premiss, e.g., as an assertion

about a being in fiction or (following Anselm) a being in the

understanding, or an assertion about a Meinongian "pure

object" (Kenny's example). I argue that construing Descartes'

first premiss in any of these ways does nothing to avoid the

heart of the traditional criticism."

16. ———. 1990. "The Caterus objection." International Journal

for Philosophy of Religion no. 28:81-104.

"A successful ontological argument must meet Caterus's

objection that the argument's conclusion lacks existential

import. Caterus thought this was true of Descartes's argument

because Descartes's conclusion was merely a hypothetical, or

conditional, statement. However, it is easy -- by a device I call

"subjectizing" the argument -t o produce an ontological

argument with a categorical, not hypothetical, conclusion.

Anselm's arguments, as well as certain contemporary modal

arguments, are "subjectized" and so appear to avoid the Caterus

objection. This paper examines the nature of the subjectizing

process and argues that even though it yields ontological

arguments with categorical conclusions it guarantees that those

conclusions still lack existential import."

17. Goudriaan, Aza. 1999. Philosophische Gotteserkenntnis bei

Suárez und Descartes in Zusammenhang mit der

niederlandischen reformierten Theologie und Philosophie des

17. Jahrunderts. Leiden: Brill.

English summary pp. 308-312.

18. Humber, James M. 2003. "The order and placement of

Descartes' proofs of God in the Meditations." Philosophical

Inquiry.International Quarterly no. 25:41-58.

19. Kenny, Anthony P. 1969. "Descartes' ontological argument." In

Fact and Existence, edited by Margolis, Joseph, 18-36. Oxford:

Basil Blackwell.

Symposium with Anthony Kenny (pp. 18-36), Norman Malcolm

(pp. 36-43); Terence Penelhum (pp. 43-55), comments by

Bernard Williams (pp. 55-56) and Ernest Sosa (pp. 56-58) and

reply by Anthony Kenny (pp. 58-62).

20. Miner, Robert C. 2002. "The dependence of Descartes'

ontological proof upon the doctrine of Causa Sui." Revista

Portuguesa de Filosofia no. 58:873-886.

"Can God be the efficient cause of Himself (Causa Sui)? It is

well known that Descartes answers this question in the

affirmative, but it is considerably less clear why. The main

contention of the essay is that Descartes advances the causa sui

doctrine because he came to think that the ontological proof of

Meditation V required it. We argue these contentions through a

close analysis of Descartes' initial articulation of causa sui in

response to Caterus, followed by attention to the reformulation

of the doctrine in response to the logical objections posed by

Arnauld. Our understanding of causa sui as a move made

within the horizon of the ontological proof not only illuminates

why Descartes would have defended a doctrine as conceptually

problematic as causa sui, but also provides an alternative to

Jean-Luc Marion's view that causa sui constitutes a third,

distinct proof for the existence of God."

21. Nicolle, Jean-Marie. 2008. "The mathematical analogy in the

proof of God's existence by Descartes." In Mathematics and the

divine. A historical study, edited by Koetsier, Teun and

Bergmans, Luc, 387-403. Amsterdam: Elsevier.

22. Nolan, Lawrence. 2005. "The ontological argument as an

exercise in Cartesian therapy." Canadian Journal of

Philosophy no. 35:521-562.

"I argue that Descartes intended the so-called ontological

"argument" as a self-validating intuition, rather than as a

formal proof. The textual evidence for this view is highly

compelling, but the strongest support comes from

understanding Descartes's diagnosis for why God's existence is

not immediately self-evident to everyone and the method of

analysis that he develops for making it self-evident. The larger

aim of the paper is to use the ontological argument as a case

study of Descartes's non-formalist theory of deduction and his

method of analysis, showing how he conceives the latter as a

form of philosophical therapy."

23. Nolan, Lawrence, and Nelson, Alan. 2006. "Proofs for the

existence of God." In The Blackwell Guide to Descartes'

Meditations, edited by Gaukroger, Stephen, 104-121. Malden:

Blackwell.

"We argue that Descartes's theistic proofs in the Meditations

are much simpler and straightforward than they are

traditionally taken to be. In particular, we show how the causal

argument of the "Third Meditation" depends on the intuitively

innocent principle that nothing comes from nothing, and not

on the more controversial principle that the objective reality of

an idea must have a cause with at least as much formal reality.

We also demonstrate that the so-called ontological "argument"

of the "Fifth Meditation" is best understood not as a formal

proof but as an axiom, revealed as self-evident by analytic

meditation."

24. Tweyman, Stanley. 1991. "Deus ex Cartesio." In René

Descartes. Critical Assessments. Vol. II, edited by Moyal,

Georges J. D., 329-343. London: Routledge.

25. Van Inwagen, Margery Naylor. 1969. Descartes' three versions

of the ontological argument, University of Rochester, New

York.

Available at ProQuest Dissertation Express. Order number:

7002919.

26. Wee, Cecilia. 2014. "Descartes's Ontological Proof of God's

Existence." British Journal for the History of Philosophy no.

20:23-40.

Pierre Gassendi (1592-1655)

Texts and translations

1. Gassendi, Pierre. 1962. Disquisitio metaphysica, seu

Dubitationes et instantiae adversus Renati Cartesii

metaphysicam et responsa. Paris: Vrin.

Recherches métaphysiques, ou Doutes et instances contre la

métaphysique de R. Descartes et ses réponses (Answer to

Descartes' reply to Gassendi's objections published in 1644).

Texte établi, traduit et annoté par Bernard Rochot.

2. ———. 1983. Objectiones Quintae adversus Descartes

Meditationes. Paris: Vrin.

Written in 1644.

Œuvres complètes edited by Charles Adam and Paul Tannery,

originally published 1897-1913 in 12 volumes.Vol. VII.

Studies

1. Forgie, William J. 2007. "Gassendi and Kant on existence."

Journal of the History of Philosophy no. 45:511-523.

"In rejecting Descartes's ontological proof for the existence of

God, Gassendi maintained that existence is not a property and

Kant said that it is not a "real predicate". It is commonly

supposed that both are making the same claim. Some have even

thought that they advance essentially the same argument for

that same claim. I believe none of this is correct. Gassendi and

Kant offer different arguments. And they are arguing for

different conclusions. These differences stem from a more

fundamental one: they mean different things by existence."

Henry More (1614-1687)

Texts

1. More, Henry. 1966. Antidotus adversus Atheismus.

Hildesheim: Georg Olms.

First edition 1652.

In: Opera omnia - Vol. I Opera theologica - Vol II - III Opera

philosophica - London 1674-1679.

Studies

Ralph Cudworth (1617-1688)

Texts

1. Cudworth, Ralph. 1966. The True Intellectual System of the

Universe. Hildesheim: Georg Olms.

First edition 1678.

Studies

Baruch Spinoza (1632-1677)

Texts and translations

1. Spinoza, Baruch. 1925. Renati Cartesi Principia philosophiae -

Cogitata metaphysica. Heidelberg: Carl Winters.

First edition 1663.

Critical edition in: Spinoza Opera, edited by Carl Gebhardt.

2. ———. 1925. Ethica more geometrico demonstrata.

Heidelberg: Carl Winters.

First edition 1677.

Critical edition in: Spinoza Opera, edited by Carl Gebhardt.

3. ———. 1986. Korte Verhandeling van God, de mensch en

deszelus welstand (Short Treatise on God, Man, and His Well-

Being). L'Aquila: Japadre.

Written in 1661; first edition 1854.

Critical edition with introduction and Italian translation by

Filippo Mignini: Breve trattato su Dio, l'uomo e il suo bene.

Studies

1. Bar-On, Abraham Zvie. 1983. "The ontological proof --

Spinoza's version. In comparison with those of St. Anselm and

Descartes." In Spinoza. His Thought and Work , edited by

Rotenstreich, Nathan and Schneider, Norma, 101-109.

Jerusalem: Israel Academy of Sciences and Humanities.

"My chief concern in this paper is the question : in what way, if

at all, did Spinoza incorporate the Ontological Proof of the

Existence of God (OP) into his philosophical system? It may be

proper, however, to first consider another question : what kind

of proof of the existence of God is it appropriate to call

'ontological' ? This cannot be gathered from Spinoza's writings

for the simple reason that the term was coined more than a

century after his death. It was done by Kant in his

Transcendental Dialectic within his classification of the

traditional arguments for the existence of God, each class to be

refuted in its turn. (1)

There is enough textual evidence to show that in the refutation

of the OP Kant was taking issue with an argument found in

Descartes's texts, first and foremost in his Fifth Meditation.

Once christened `ontological', however, arguments of this

pattern have been traced by post-Kantian scholars to works of

philosophers both preceding and succeeding Descartes. The

search for the origin led eventually to St. Anselm's Proslogion,

which has been recognized as containing the classical version of

the OP. Still, Descartes's rendition remained a milestone in the

history of the OP, both in view of Descartes's impact upon the

whole course of modern philosophy and of the importance of

the OP in the Cartesian system. This is particularly relevant to

our context in view of the considerable impact of Descartes

upon Spinoza's philosophy.

Under the circumstances a comparative analysis of St.

Anselm's, Descartes's and Spinoza's versions of the OP will

prepare the ground for dealing with my main question. In

adopting this strategy I follow Harry Wolfson. (2) In my view,

however, Wolfson's implementation of this method resulted in

a highly objectionable conception of the OP. Let us examine

Wolfson's argument to see what I have in mind."

(1) See Immanuel Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, translated by

Norman Kemp Smith, New York 1961, pp. 500 ff.

(2) See H. A. Wolfson, The Philosophy of Spinoza, I, New York

1958, pp. 158 ff.

2. Friedman, Joel I. 1982. "Was Spinoza fooled by the ontological

argument?" Philosophia no. 11:307-344.

"First, I give Spinoza's version of the ontological argument for

God's existence. Then I logically reconstruct this version,

showing how to avoid any first-order existence predicate, as

well as any misuse of proper names and definite descriptions.

Thus, I show how Spinoza may avoid objections of Kant, Frege,

and Russell. However, my logical reconstruction requires the

questionable premise: "every causally necessary being is

logically (metaphysically) necessary". Conclusion: modal

confusion is unavoidable in the ontological argument."

3. Garrett, Don. 1979. "Spinoza's 'Ontological' Argument."

Philosophical Review no. 88:198-223.

"Spinoza's arguments for the existence of God in proposition xi

of the Ethics are usually characterized as ontological, and are

often said, in spite of Spinoza's argumentation, essentially to

report the results of a private "rational perception." I argue that

Spinoza offers four interrelated arguments which resemble

ontological arguments in being essentially a priori and in

relying on a definition of "God," but which resemble

cosmological arguments in depending on a version of the

principle of sufficient reason. These arguments are valid; if

sound, they would show that a sufficiently rational being could

indeed "rationally perceive" the necessary existence of God."

4. Humber, James. 1972. "Spinoza's proof of God necessary

existence." Modern Schoolman no. 49:221-233.

5. Jarrett, Charles. 1976. "Spinoza's Ontological Argument."

Canadian Journal of Philosophy no. 6:685-691.

"I argue that Spinoza's ontological argument is successful when

it is understood to have two premises: (i) it is possible for God

to exist, (ii) it is necessary that, if God exists, he necessarily

does. The argument is valid in S5. Spinoza is in a position to

establish the second premise of the argument on the basis of his

definitions and axioms. The first premise was assumed to be

true, but, as Leibniz noted, it must be established for the

conclusion of the argument to be forthcoming. This is one of

the main problems with the argument, and it requires a

solution to the problem of the attributes. Certain alternate

interpretations of Spinoza are then argued to be deficient on

textual and logical grounds."

6. ———. 1978. "The Logical Structure of Spinoza's Ethics, Part I."

Synthese no. 37:15-65.

7. Lin, Martin. 2007. "Spinoza's arguments for the existence of

God." Philosophy and Phenomenological Research no. 75:269-

297.

"It is often thought that, although Spinoza develops a bold and

distinctive conception of God (the unique substance, or Natura

Naturans, in which all else inheres and which possesses

infinitely many attributes, including extension), the arguments

that he offers which purport to prove God's existence contribute

nothing new to natural theology. Rather, he is seen as just

another participant in the seventeenth century revival of the

ontological argument initiated by Descartes and taken up by

Malebranche and Leibniz among others. That this is the case is

both puzzling and unfortunate. It is puzzling because although

Spinoza does offer an ontological proof for the existence of God,

he also offers three other non-ontological proofs. It is

unfortunate because these other non-ontological proofs are

both more convincing and more interesting than his ontological

proof. In this paper, I offer reconstructions and assessments of

all of Spinoza's arguments and argue that Spinoza's

metaphysical rationalism and his commitment to something

like a Principle of Sufficient Reason are the driving force

behind Spinoza's non-ontological arguments."

8. Marcus, Ruth Barcan. 1983. "Bar-On on Spinoza's ontological

proof." In Spinoza. His thought and work , edited by

Rotenstreich, Nathan and Schneider, Norma, 101-119.

Jerusalem: The Israel Academy of Sciences and Humanities.

"Bar-On proposes to show how the ontological proof is

incorporated, if at all, into Spinoza's philosophical system.

Preliminary to that he wants, following Wolfson's strategy, to

consider the nature of the ontological proof. Preliminary to

that, in turn, he wants to show that Wolfson's claims about the

ontological proofs in Anselm, Descartes, and Spinoza are

"highly objectionable".

I should like in my comments to begin by defending Wolfson. It

seems to me that his claims are not "highly objectionable". They

are in fact well focussed and more consistent with Bar-On's

analysis than he believes them to be." p. 101

"I should like in conclusion to say something about the uses of

modal logic in our understanding of proofs which have been

classified as ontological. Some and perhaps much of the recent

revival of interest in such proofs stems from the revived interest

in modal logic and the belief that ontological arguments can be

translated into modal arguments. I do not propose to go into

those various efforts with respect to Anselm's and Descartes's

versions, although the extent to which those efforts succeed, fail

or are misapplied is itself illuminating. I should like just to

mention in passing one such attempt with respect to Spinoza.

In a paper "Spinoza's Ontological Argument" Charles Jarett (*)

argues that if we interpret the first part of the Ethics as

claiming that

(1) It is possible that God exists

(2) Necessarily (If God exists then he exists necessarily) it

follows in one of the strong modal systems (with some

constraints on what is known as the Barcan formula) that

(3) Necessarily God exists.

I do not propose to discuss whether such an argument can be

culled from the Ethics. A strong case has been made for it. As it

and many such attempts stand, it is not an ontological

argument which is being presented. It does not have the

requisite epistemological features. There is no conditional

which takes us from what is conceived to what is known or to

what exists. There is no argument to warrant the identification

of conceivable with possible. Indeed, if the modal operators are

taken as operators for logical, or what Kripke has lately called

metaphysical possibility and necessity, then modal arguments

like Jarett's, if valid, would remain valid in the absence of an

epistemological subject or an idea of God altogether. Still,

modal logic is not without its uses in sorting out some of the

confusions which stem from the interplay of modal and

epistemic notions and in clarifying such relationships as they

occur in rationalist arguments like the cogito and the

ontological proofs." (p. 119)

(*) C. J. Jarett, "Spinoza's Ontological Argument", Canadian

Journal of Philosophy , VI (1976), pp. 685-691.

9. ———. 1986. "Spinoza and the ontological proof." In Human

nature and natural knowledge. Essays presented to Marjorie

Grene on the occasion of her seventy-fifth birthday , edited by

Donagan, Alan, Perovich, Anthony N. and Wedin, Michael V.

Dodrecht: Reidel.

Reprinted in: R. B. Marcus - Modalities. Philosophycal essays -

New York, Oxford University Press, 1993, pp. 163-177.

"This paper attempts to characterize the "ontological proof" for

the existence of God. It discusses Wolfson's analysis of the

proof and argues that his characterization is not mistaken but

insufficient. It is then argued that the characterization here

proposed provides a good account of Anselm's and Descartes'

proof, but shows that there is no "ontological proof" in Spinoza.

The paper concludes by identifying a confusion between

metaphysical and epistemological notions, which conflates very

different arguments under the heading "ontological proof"."

10. Mignini, Filippo. 1990. "Per una storia dell'argomento

ontologico in Spinoza. Le "prove" del "Tractatus de intellectus

emendatione"." In L'argomento ontologico / The ontological

Argument / L'argument ontologique / Der Ontologische

Gottesbeweis , edited by Olivetti, Marco M., 203-221. Padova:

CEDAM.

11. Saccaro del Buffa, Battisti Giuseppa. 1990. "La dimostrazione

dell'esistenza di Dio dall'abbozzo del 1661 e dalla Korte

Verhandeling al "De Deo"." In Dio, l'uomo, la libertà. Studi su

"Breve Trattato" di Spinoza , edited by Mignini, Filippo, 95-

118. L'Aquila: Japadre Editore.

12. Singer, Brent A. 1990. "Spinoza, Heidegger, and the Ontological

Argument." Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology

no. 21:265-273.

"In spite of the prima facie differences between Spinoza and

Heidegger, I argue that Heidegger's views in his 1929 lecture,

Was ist Metaphysik? , are both consistent with, and

supplemental to, the basic premise of Spinoza's ontological

argument in Part One of his Ethics . According to this view,

being held out into the nothing, in Heidegger's sense, is a

condition without which substance can not be adequately

conceived, while at the same time, being held out into the

nothing does not preclude the possibility that substance,

defined as an infinite being without negation, does exist."

13. Sobel, Jordan Howard. 2000. "A 'Russell' of Spinoza's

ontological argument." In The Logic Yeabook 1999 , edited by

Childers, Timothy, 149-163. Praha: Filosofia.

"Spinoza's reasoning for proposition eleven of Ethics pivots on

the sentence 'The infinite substance cannot be conceived not to

exist'. This sentence figures in two inferences, for one of which

its description needs to have wide -- and its negation narrow -

scope, whereas for the other these scopes needs to be narrow

and wide respectively. That is how Spinoza managed to

persuade himself that he had demonstrated from certain

premises that the infinite substance necessarily exists, though

in fact this conclusion is not entailed by those premises."

Nicolas Malebranche (1638-1715)

Texts and translations

1. Malebranche, Nicolas. 1962. De la recherche de la vérité. Paris:

Vrin.

First edition 1674.

Critical edition in: Oeuvres complètes, edited by André

Robinet.

2. ———. 1962. Entretiens sur la métaphysique et la religion.

Paris: Vrin.

First edition 1688.

Critical edition in: Oeuvres complètes, edited by André

Robinet.

Studies

1. Lardic, Jean-Marie. 1996. "Malebranche et l'argument

ontologique." Revue Philosophique de la France et de

l'Étranger :503-519.

2. Rome, Beatrice K. 1963. The philosophy of Malebranche. A

study of his integration of Faith, Reason, and Experimental

Observation . Chicago: Henry Regnery.

Chapter III § e): God as Being. The Ontological Proof pp. 143-

150.

Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646-1716)

Texts and translations

1. Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm. 1676. Quod ens perfectissimum sit

possibile.

C. I. Gerhardt (ed.), Die philosophischen Schriften von

Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, Berlin, 1875 ss., vol. 7, pp. 261-262;

critical edition in G. W. Leibniz, Sämtliche Schriften und

Briefe, Leipzig-Berlin, Akademie Verlag, VI, 3, 1980, n. 79, pp.

571-573.

2. ———. 1678. Epistola ad Hermannum Conringium de

Cartesiana demonstratione existentiae Dei.

First edition: (excerpt) Theodor Wilhelm Ritmeier, Dissertatio

de praecipuis errorum causis in prima philosophia, Helmst,

1727, p. 29; C. I. Gerhardt (ed.), Die philosophischen Schriften

von Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, Berlin, 1875, vol. 1, p. 188;

critical edition in G. W. Leibniz, Sämtliche Schriften und

Briefe, Leipzig-Berlin, Akademie Verlag, II, 1, Darmstadt 1926;

second revised edition Berlin 1987, n. 162, pp. 578-584 (cfr. p.

583).

3. ———. 1697. Animadversiones in partem generalem

Principiorum Cartesianorum.

C. I. Gerhardt (ed.), Die philosophischen Schriften von

Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, Berlin, 1875 ss., vol. 4, pp. 350-392;

G. W. Leibniz, Opuscules philosophiques choisis, Paris: Vrin,

1962, pp. 31-160 (with French translation).

4. ———. 1700. De la démonstration cartesienne de l'existence de

Dieu.

C. I. Gerhardt (ed.), Die philosophischen Schriften von

Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, Berlin, 1875 ss., vol. 4, pp. 401-404.

5. ———. 1714. Monadologie.

First edition in a German translation by Heinrich Köhler, Des

Hn. Gottfried Wilh. von Leibnitz Lehrsätze über die

Monadologie imgleichen von Gott und seiner Existenz, seinen

Eigenschafften, und von der Seele des Menschen, Frankfurt

und Leipzig: Johann Meyer 1720, pp. 1-42; Latin translation by

Michael Gottlieb Hansch with the title Principia philosophiae,

Acta Eruditorum, février 1721, Supplementum, T. VII, XI, pp.

500-514; first edition of the original French text by Johann

Erdmann with the title La Monadologie, in God. Guil. Leibnitii

Opera Philosophica quae extant Latina, Gallica, Germanica

omnia, Berlino 1839, 1, 702-712.

Critical edition by André Robinet: Principes de la nature et de

la grâce fondés en raison, Principes de la philosophie ou

monadologie, Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 1954.

6. ———. 1684. "Meditationes de cognitione, veritate et ideis."

Acta Eruditorum no. Novembre:537-542.

C. I. Gerhardt (ed.), Die philosophischen Schriften von

Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, Berlin, 1875 ss., vol. 4, pp. 422-426;

critical edition in G. W. Leibniz, Sämtliche Schriften und

Briefe, Leipzig-Berlin, Akademie Verlag, VI, 4, 1999, n. 141,

585-592.

7. ———. 1701. "De la démonstration cartésienne de l'existence de

Dieu du R. P. Lamy." Mèmoires de Trévoux no.

Septembre:200-207.

C. I. Gerhardt (ed.), Die philosophischen Schriften von

Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, Berlin, 1875 ss., vol. 4, pp. 405-406.

Studies

1. Adams, Robert Merrihew. 1994. Leibniz. Determinist, Theist,

Idealist. New York: Oxford University Press.

See Chapters: 4. The Ens Perfectissimus 113; 5. The Ontological

Argument 135; 6. Existence and essence 157-176.

"The metaphysical core of Leibniz's philosophical theology has

attracted less attention than its intrinsic interest deserves. In

some ways it is also the core of his metaphysics. It is intricately

connected with his logical doctrines and is the context for his

fullest reflections about the nature of existence and of essence,

and also about the most general structural relationships of the

properties of things. These topics are discussed in Part II of the

book, in the framework of a comprehensive study of Leibniz's

treatment of the ontological argument for the existence of God,

which I regard as exceptionally interesting. I do not think

Leibniz's or any other version of the ontological argument is

likely to convince many people of the existence of God, but a

related argument, which seems to me to have more persuasive

force, and perhaps to be the most promising of all a priori

arguments for the existence of God, is discussed in Chapter 7.

One reason for the neglect of this part of Leibniz's thought is

that its fullest development, in most respects, came in his early

years, and many of the most important texts were quite

inaccessible until the relevant volume of the Academy edition of

Leibniz's works (A VI,iii) was published in 1980. I have tried to

give a full account of the most important texts." pp. 4-5

2. Bausola, Adriano. 1981. "Die Möglichkeit des Vollkommensten

Wesens und der Ontologische Gottesbeweis: die position von

Leibniz." Studia Leibnitiana no. 13:1-24.

3. ———. 2000. "Il perfezionamento dell'argomento ontologico

nel carteggio Leibniz-Eckhard." Rivista di Filosofia Neo-

Scolastica no. 92:241-260.

4. Blumenfeld, David. 1995. "Leibniz's Ontological and

Cosmological Arguments." In The Cambridge Companion to

Leibniz, edited by Jolley, Nicholas, 353-381. Cambridge:

Cambridge University Press.

5. Consuelo, Martínez Priego. 2000. Las formulaciones del

argumento ontológico de Leibniz. Navarra: Servicio de

publicaciones de la Univesidad de Navarra.

Recopilación, traducción, comentario y notas,

6. González, Ángel Luis, ed. 2004. Las demonstraciones de la

existencia de Dios según Leibniz. Pamplona: Eunsa.

7. Gotterbarn, Donald. 1976. "Leibniz's Completion of Descartes's

Proof." Studia Leibnitiana no. 8:105-112.

8. Hunter, Graeme. 2014. ""La plus belle proposition modale", ou

commnet Leibniz améliora la version cartésienne de l'argument

ontologique." In Descartes et se critiques, edited by Charles,

Sébastien and Malinowski-Charles, Syliane, 53-71. Paris:

Hermann.

9. Iwanicki, Joseph. 1933. Leibniz et les démonstrations

mathématiques de l'existence de Dieu. Strasbourg: Librairie

Universitaire d'Alsace.

10. Jalabert, Jacques. 1960. Le Dieu de Leibniz. Paris.

11. Janke, Wolfgang. 1963. "Das ontologische Argument in der

Frühzeit des Leibnizschen Denkens (1676-78)." Kant-Studien

no. 54:259-287.

12. Krauze-Blachowicz, Krystyna, and Kłos, Jan. 2017. "Content

Analysis of the Demonstration of the existence of God Proposed

by Leibniz in 1666." Roczniki Filozoficzne:57-75.

13. Latzer, Michael. 1997. "The Proofs for the Existence of God:

Henry of Ghent and Duns Scotus as Precursors of Leibniz."

Modern Schoolman no. 74:143-160.

14. Lenzen, Wolfgang. 1990. "Leibnizens ontologischer

Gottesbeweis und das Problem der unmöglichen Dinge." In

Mathesis rationis. Festschrift für Heinrich Schepers, edited by

Albert, Heinekamp, Lenzen, Wolfgang and Schneider, Martin,

285-300. Münster: Nodus.

Nachdruck in: W. Lenzen, Calculus Universalis, Paderborn,

Mentis, 2004, pp. 331-342.

15. ———. 2017. "Leibniz’s Ontological Proof of the Existence of

God and the Problem of »Impossible Objects«." Logica

Universalis no. 11:85-104.

16. Loewer, Barry. 1978. "Leibniz and the Ontological Argument."

Philosophical Studies no. 34:105-109.

"According to Leibniz, Descartes' ontological argument

establishes that if God possibly exists then God exists. To

complete the argument a proof that God possibly exists is

required. Leibniz attempts a proof-theoretic demonstration

that 'God exists' is consistent and concludes from this that 'God

possibly exists is true'. In this paper I formalize Leibniz's

argument in a system of modal logic. I show that a principle

which Leibniz implicitly uses, 'if a is consistent then a is

possibly true' is either mistaken or useless in completing the

ontological argument."

17. Look, Brandon C. 2006. "Some Remarks on the Ontological

Arguments of Leibniz and Gödel." In Einheit in der Vielheit:

Akten des VIII. Internationalen Leibniz Kongresses. Hannover

24-29 July 2006, edited by Herbst, Jürgen, Breger, Herbert

and Erdner, Sven, 510-517. Hannover: Hartmann.

18. Nicolosi, Salvatore. 1990. "L'argomento ontologico secondo

Leibniz tra riserve e integrazioni." In L'argomento Ontologico,

edited by Olivetti, Marco M., 223-235. Padova: CEDAM.

19. Riley, Patrick. 1983. "Leibniz' Unpublished Remarks on the

Abbé Bucquoi's Proof of the Existence of God (1711)." Studia

Leibnitiana no. 15:215-220.

"Leibniz' critical remarks on the Abbé Bucquoi's Pensées sur

l'Existence de Dieu -- written in November 1711, (1) between the

publication of his Essais de Theodicée (1710) (2) and his

departure for the final visit to Vienna (1712) that yielded the

Monadology and the Principles of Nature and Grace (3) -- are

published here, for the first time, by generous permission of the

Niedersächsische Landesbibliothek, Hannover. (4)

They do not revolutionize our view of Leibniz' philosophy; but

they do throw a little additional light on his doubts about

Descartes' version of the ontological proof of the existence of

God. (5) And they provide an opportunity to recall some of the

facts about the existence of the Abbé Bucquoi - one of the

liveliest philosophical adventurers of Leibniz' day."

(1) Leibniz' unpublished manuscript is listed in Kurt Müller and

Gisela Krönen (eds.), Leben und Werk von Gottfried Wilhelm

Leibniz: Eine Chronik (Frankfurt am Main, 1969), p. 227. Dr.

Gerda Utermöhlen, of the Leibniz-Archiv, Hannover, made it

possible for me to see and transcribe Leibniz' manuscript in

September 1982.

(2) Leibniz, Essais de Theodicee sur la Bonté de Dieu, la

Liberté de l'Homme, et l'Origine du Mal (Amsterdam, 1710).

(3) See Muller and Krönert, Leben und Werk von Gottfried

Wilhelm Leibniz, op. cit., pp. 232-247.

(4) Through the kind intercession of Dr. Gerda Utermöhlen.

(5) For a good brief account of these doubts, see Robert Latta's

edition of The Monadology and other Philosophical Writings

(Oxford Press, 1898), pp. 274-277. For a brilliant but less

sympathetic account, see Bertrand Russell, A Critical

Exposition of the Philosophy of Leibniz (Cambridge, 1900), pp.

172-175.

20. Tortolone, Gian Michele. 1990. "La trattazione dell'argomento

ontologico nel carteggio Leibniz-Jaquelot (1702-1704)."

Filosofia no. 41:69-101.

21. Woltzenlogel Paleo, Bruno, Benter, Matthias, Benzmüller,

Christoph, and Streit, David. 2016. "Analysis of an Ontological

Proof Proposed by Leibniz." In Death and Anti-Death, Volume

14: Four Decades after Michael Polanyi, Three Centuries after

G.W. Leibniz, edited by Tandy, Charles, 333-352. Ann Arbor

(MI): Ria University Press.

François Fénelon (1651-1715)

Texts and translations

1. Fénelon, François. 1990. Traité de l'existence de Dieu. Paris:

Éditions universitaires.

First edition 1713.

Édition critique établie par Jean-Louis Dumas.

Studies

Samuel Clarke (1675-1729)

Texts

1. Clarke, Samuel. 1998. A Demonstration of the Being and

Attributes of God. More Particularly in Answer to Mr Hobbes,

Spinoza and Their Followers. Cambridge: Cambridge

University Press.

First edition 1705.

Reprint: A Demonstration of the Being and Attributes of God

and Other Writings - Edited by Ezio Vailati.

Studies

Christian Wolff (1679-1754)

Texts and translations

1. Wolff, Christian. 1981. Theologia naturalis. Pars Posterior qua

existentia et attributa Dei ex notione entis perfectissimi et

natura animae demonstrantur, et Atheismi, Deismi, Fatalismi,

Naturalismi, Spinosismi, aliorumque de Deo errorum

fundamenta subvertuntur. Hildesheim: Georg Olms.

First edition 1737.

Reprint of the 1741 edition with introduction, notes and index

by Jean École.

Studies

1. Bissinger, Anton. 1975. "Das ontologische Argument bei

Christian Wolff." Analecta Anselmiana no. 4:243-247.

2. École, Jean. 1979. "Les preuves wolfiennes de l'existence de

Dieu." Archives de Philosophie no. 42:381-396.

3. Paolinelli, Marco. 1974. "San Tommaso e Christian Wolff

sull'argomento ontologico." Rivista di Filosofia Neo-Scolastica

no. 66:897-945.

David Hume (1711-1776)

Texts

1. Hume, David. 1993. Dialogues concerning natural religion.

New York: Oxford University Press.

First edition 1779 (on the a priori arguments for the existence

of God, see part IX).

Reprinted in: Principal writings on religion including

Dialogues concerning natural religion; The natural history of

religion - Edited with an introduction by J.C.A. Gaskin.

Studies

1. Stahl, Donald E. 1984. "Hume's Dialogue IX defended."

Philosophical Quarterly no. 34:505-507.

2. Stove, D.C. 1978. "Part IX of Hume's Dialogues ." Philosophical

Quarterly no. 28:300-309.

Alexander Baumgarten (1714-1762)

Texts and translations

1. Baumgarten, Alexander. 1963. Metaphysica. Hildesheim:

Georg Olms.

First edition 1740.

Reprint of the Seventh edition (1779): Hildesheim, Georg Olms,

1969.

English translation by Courtney D. Fugate and John Hymers:

Metaphysics. A Critical Translation with Kant's Elucidations,

Selected Notes and Related Materials, New York:

Continuum, 2013.

Studies

Immanuel Kant (1724-1804)

Texts and translations

1. Kant, Immanuel. 1979. The one possible basis for a

demonstration of the existence of God. Lincoln: University of

Nebraska Press.

Translation and introduction by Gordon Treash.

2. ———. 1998. Kritik der reinen Vernunft. Berlin: Akademie

Verlag.

First edition 1781, second edition 1787.

Reprint edited by Georg Mohr and Marcus Willaschek.

3. ———. 1998. Der einzig mögliche Beweisgrund zu einer

Demonstration des Daseyns Gottes. Darmstadt:

Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft.

First edition 1763.

I. Kant - Werke in sechs Bänden - Vol. II - Edited by Wilhelm

Weischedel.

Studies

1. Charles, Sébastien. 2000. "De l'utilisation critique d'un

exemple monétaire en philosophie: Kant face à Buffier." Kant-

Studien.Philosophische Zeitschrift der Kant-Gesellschaft no.

91:356-365.

"In this article, I establish a conceptual link between Claude

Buffier, a French Jesuit of the beginning of the eighteenth

century, and Immanuel Kant, pertaining to the question of the

refutation of the ontological argument. By using the same

'monetary' example, the two thinkers deal with the question of

exteriority and conceptualization.

However, there are differences in their treatment of the

ontological argument. After providing a detailed analysis of the

relevant points in Buffier's Metaphysical Conversations and

Kant's Critique of Pure Reason I argue that Buffier's work truly

influenced Kant, but I deny that the Konigsbergean was guilty

of plagiarism. Yet, even if they are concerned with the same

problem, there are obvious philosophical differences between

the French partisan of common sense and the German

philosopher."

2. Engel, Morris S. 1963. "Kant's 'Refutation' of the Ontological

Argument." Philosophy and Phenomenological Research no.

24:20-35.

3. Everitt, Nicholas. 1995. "Kant's Discussion of the Ontological

Argument." Kant-Studien.Philosophische Zeitschrift der Kant-

Gesellschaft no. 86:385-405.

4. "Traditional interpretations claim that Kant criticizes the

ontological argument for invoking a logically flawed concept of

necessary existence. They further claim that Kant produces

"good" arguments supporting this criticism. This paper claims

that none of Kant's arguments support the criticism, but that he

is not trying to produce such arguments anyway. His objections

to the ontological argument are epistemological, not logical. He

thinks that although we cannot have good reason to believe that

there is a necessarily existent being, we can certainly believe or

have faith that such a being exists, and hence that the concept

of such a being is logically in the clear."

5. Ferrari, Jean. 1990. "La critique kantienne de la preuve

ontologique, "dite cartesienne", de l'existence de Dieu." In

L'argomento Ontologico, edited by Olivetti, Marco M., 247-

254. Padova: CEDAM.

6. Forgie, William J. 1975. "Kant and the question 'Is existence a

predicate?'." Canadian Journal of Philosophy no. 5 (4):563-

582.

"Kant's arguments that existence is not a first-level property

can be seen as motivated by what I call his "doctrine of

isomorphism." The supposition that existence is a first-level

predicate is rejected because it conflicts with this doctrine. I

argue that there is no conflict provided one does not confuse

"intentional" and "extensional" claims about the object of a

concept. Thus Kant's arguments fail. Kant also claimed that

existence "is" a "second" -level property. but his argument for

that claim -- which anticipates Frege's argument for the same

view -- also fails."

7. ———. 1993. "Kant on the relation between the cosmological

and ontological argument." International Journal for

Philosophy of Religion no. 34:1-12.

8. "Kant maintained that the cogency of the cosmological

argument depends on that of the ontological, and that the

appeal to experience in the former is therefore superfluous. I

sketch a way of looking at both arguments which allows one to

reject Kant's charges. Central to that sketch is regarding the

common conclusion of both arguments, viz., that there

(necessarily) exists an "ens realissimum" (or supreme being, or

God), as a necessary, but a posteriori, proposition. The

cosmological arguer can thus quite coherently reject the

ontological argument and also maintain that empirical, a

posteriori, premisses are indispensable in any proof of a

supreme being."

9. ———. 1995. "The cosmological and ontological arguments:

how Saint Thomas solved the Kantian problem." Religious

Studies no. 31:89-100.

10. "Let us call the Dependency Theses (DT) the view, first stated

by Kant, that certain versions of the cosmological argument

depend on the ontological argument. At least two different

reasons have been given for the supposed dependence. Given

the DT, some of Aquinas' views about God's essence, and about

our knowledge of God's existence, can seem, at least at first, to

be inconsistent. I consider two different ways of defending

Aquinas against this suspicion of inconsistency. On the first

defense, based on a widespread understanding of his notion of

necessary being', Aquinas' views fall outside the scope of the

DT. The success of this defense is doubtful. There is, however,

another defense to be found in Aquinas' work, one directed not

to avoiding, but actually to rejecting, the DT. In this second

defense, the DT is not a correct assessment even of those views

that "do" fall within its scope. It success means that Aquinas

had available a principled refutation of the DT some five

hundred years before it was first formulated."

11. ———. 2000. "Kant and Frege: existence as a second-level

property." Kant-Studien.Philosophische Zeitschrift der Kant-

Gesellschaft no. 91:165-177.

12. Harris, Errol E. 1977. "Kant's refutation of the ontological

proof." Philosophy no. 52:90-92.

"Kant's refutation rests on the principle that without empirical

evidence no existence can be asserted, or proved, "a priori". But

he himself provides a cogent argument, in Kritik der reinen

vernunft A 657, B 679, why the idea of reason (which he

equates with the idea of God or ens realissimum) must be

affirmed as unreservedly objectively valid, because it is the

indispensable a priori condition of there being any empirical

evidence of the existence of anything whatsoever. And that is

precisely the nub of the ontological argument."

13. Herrlin, Olle. 1950. The Ontological Proof in Thomistic and

Kantian Interpretation. Leipzig: Otto Harrassowitz.

14. Hintikka, Jaakko. 1981. "Kant on existence, predication, and

the ontological argument." Dialectica no. 35:128-146.

Reprinted in: Simo Knuuttila and J. Hintikka (eds.) - The logic

of Being - Dordrecht, Reidel 1986 pp. 249-268.

"The ontological argument fails because of an operator order

switch between (1) "necessarily there is an (existentially)

perfect being" and (2) "there is a being which necessarily is

(existentially) perfect". Here (1) is trivially true logically but (2)

is problematic. Since Kant's criticisms were directed at the

notion of existence, not at the step from (1) to (2), they are

misplaced. They are also wrong, because existence can be a

predicate. Moreover, Kant did not anticipate Frege's claim that

"is" ("ist") is ambiguous between existence, predication,

identity, and class-inclusion. To restore the ontological

argument, an extra premise is needed to the effect (roughly)

that it is known who the existentially perfect being is. The

question is raised whether Kant could have meant the failure of

this extra premise by his thesis that existence is not a "real"

predicate."

15. Laberge, Pierre. 1973. La théologie kantienne précritique.

Ottawa: Éditions de l'Université d'Ottawa.

16. Logan, Ian. 2007. "Whatever happened to Kant's ontological

argument?" Philosophy and Phenomenological Research no.

74:346-363.

17. Marty, François. 1992. "L'argument ontologique dans l'Opus

postumum et l'influence de la Critique de la Faculté de Juger

dans l'Opus Postumum." Kant-Studien.Philosophische

Zeitschrift der Kant-Gesellschaft no. 83:50-59.

18. Nelson, Herbert J. 1993. "Kant on arguments cosmological and

ontological." American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly no.

67:167-184.

19. "Kant's rejection of speculative proofs of the existence of God,

his critique of the ontological argument, and his contention

that the cosmological argument is necessarily linked to the

ontological argument are familiar parts of the Critique of Pure

Reason. In spite of their familiarity, however, they remain

inadequately understood and appreciated in several respects.

First, the importance of Kant's criticism of theistic arguments

to the overall argument of the first Critique is sometimes

overlooked. I shall argue that a necessary condition of the

success of Kant's Critical enterprise is successful refutation of

the theistic proofs on grounds which do not presuppose the

distinctive conclusions of the Transcendental Aesthetic and the

Transcendental Analytic, i.e., which do not assume the

distinctive positions of Kant's Critical philosophy.

Second, the sense in which Kant takes the cosmological

argument to be necessarily linked to the ontological argument

is often misunderstood, and Kant's success in establishing that

link is overestimated. I shall argue that Kant fails to show that

the success of the cosmological argument is tied to that of the

ontological argument.

Third, the complexity of Kant's critique of the ontological

argument is often overlooked in summary invocations of the

dictum that existence is not a predicate. I shall exhibit some of

the dialectical complexity of that critique, and show that, even

if Kant succeeds in refuting the ontological argument, he fails to

discredit constitutive employment of the notion of a highest

reality (ens realissimum).

I shall conclude that Kant's critique of the theistic proofs fails to

support the restrictive epistemology of the Critical philosophy,

that the cosmological argument in particular emerges

unscathed from Kant's attack, and that, contrary to Kant, it is

the ontological argument which requires the cosmological

argument as a necessary, though not sufficient, condition of its

legitimacy." pp. 167-168.

20. Sala, Giovanni B. 1990. Kant und die Frage nach Gott.

Gottesbeweise und Gottesbeweiskritik in den Schriften Kants.

Berlin: Walter de Gruyter.

21. ———. 1996. "Le vie della ragione alla ricerca di Dio secondo

Kant: dall'ordine della natura all'imperativo della coscienza." In

Kant e la filosofia della religione. Tomo I, edited by Pirillo,

Nestore, 295-326. Brescia: Morcelliana.

22. Schmucker, Josef. 1983. Kants vorkritische Kritik der

Gottesbeweise. Ein Schlüssel zur Interpretation des

theologischen Haupstücks der transzendentalen Dialektik der

Kritik der reinen Vernunft, Franz Steiner: Wiesbaden.

23. Smith, Donald P. 2003. "Kant on the dependency of the

cosmological argument on the ontological argument."

European Journal of Philosophy no. 11:206-218.

24. Wood, Allen W. 1978. Kant's Rational Theology. Ithaca:

Cornell University Press.

Moses Mendelssohn (1729-1786)

Texts and translations

1. Mendelssohn, Moses. 1979. Morgenstunden oder Vorlesungen

über das Daseyn Gottes. Stuttgart: Reclam.

First edition 1786; reprint edited by Dominique Bourel.

English translation by Daniel O. Dahlstrom and Corey Dyck:

Morning Hours. Lectures on God's Existence, Dordrecht:

Springer, 2011.

Studies

1. Altmann, Alexander. 1979. "Moses Mendelssohn et les preuves

de l'existence de Dieu." Archives de Philosophie no. 42:397-

419.

"In the XVIIIth century the ontological proof of the existence of

God, together with the rational theology, was widely

undervalued, Moses Mendelssohn endeavored to show the

strength of the cosmological as well as of the ontological

argument. He followed, and also renewed, the ontology of the

Leibniz-wolff-Baumgarten school. Kant, while trying to show,

in his own critique, that the dogmatic metaphysics was an

illusion, acknowledged nevertheless that it reached his acme in

the Morgenstunden of Mendelssohn.

Mendelssohn was prevented by bad health from assimilating

Kant's critique, but was left unmoved by the refutation of the

proofs of the existence of God. He did his utmost to meet the

objections of Kant. He rightly felt he was not antipodal to Kant

who, though he criticized the theoretical foundations of rational

theology, never gave up his faith in God." (p. 397)

Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770-1831)

Texts and translations

1. Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich. 1986. Vorlesungen über die

Beweise vom Dasein Gottes (1829). Frankfurt: Suhrkamp.

First edition edited by Georg Lasson 1930.

Reprint: G: W. F. Hegel - Werke in 20 Bänden mit

Registerband. Vol. 17: Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der

Religion II. Vorlesungen über die Beweise vom Dasein Gottes.

2. ———. 2007. Lectures on the Proofs of the Existence of God.

New York: Oxford University Press.

Edited and translated, with introduction and notes, by Peter C.

Hodgson.

See The Ontological Proof (From the 1831 Lectures on the

Philosophy of Religion) pp. 187-194.

Studies

1. Calton, Patricia Marie. 2001. Hegel's Metaphysics of God. The

ontological proof as the development of a Trinitarian divine

ontology . Aldershot: Ashgate.

2. Girard, Louis. 1995. L'argument ontologique chez Saint

Anselme et chez Hegel . Amsterdam: Rodopi.

3. Lauer, Quentin. 1964. "Hegel on Proofs for God's Existence."

Kant-Studien.Philosophische Zeitschrift der Kant-Gesellschaft

no. 55:443-465.

Revised reprint in: Q. Lauer, Essays in Hegelian Dialectic, New

York: Fordham University Press, 1977, pp. 113-135.

"What is, perhaps, most remarkable in all this is the fact that

Hegel's philosophical concern with and extensive treatment of

God should have come in the immediate wake of Kant's

apparently irrefutable invalidation of all philosophical "proofs"

for the existence of God. On the other hand, nothing gives us a

clearer insight into the character of Hegel's philosophizing than

his contention--thrown in the teeth of romantics and

rationalists alike--that the proper task of philosophy is to think

the same content of which religion affords only a

representation (Vorstellung ). In this connection it is

significant that the form of argumentation to which he devotes

the most time and accords the most respect is the so-called

"ontological argument," which had been advanced by St.

Anselm. According to Kant all arguments for the existence of

God are ultimately reducible to the ontological argument and

are thus equally invalid. According to Hegel all arguments must

ultimately be reduced to the ontological argument and thus

share its validity as a description of the human spirit's elevation

to God. To understand this would require a complete grasp of

the "System" in its entirety and, above all, a minute

understanding of the Logic whose movement constitutes an

extended presentation of the ontological argument. It would in

addition require a most accurate understanding of Hegel's

severe and sometimes almost violent critique of Kant, which is

constantly cropping up in his writings -- nowhere more tellingly

than in his introduction to "Subjective Logic" ( Wissenschaft

der Logik II 213-234). In any event -- and paradoxically enough

-- whether one prefers to look upon Hegel as an atheist or a

theist, there is no way of grasping the movement of his

philosophizing without carefully studying his treatment of the

"proofs" for the existence of God." pp. 444-445.

4. Peperzak, Adriaan. 1990. "Le Proslogion d'Anselme aprés

Hegel." In L'argomento ontologico / The ontological Argument

/ L'argument ontologique / Der Ontologische Gottesbeweis ,

edited by Olivetti, Marco M., 335-352. Padova: CEDAM.

Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling (1775-

1854)

Texts and translations

1. Schelling, Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph. 1966. Philosophie der

Offenbarung (1841-1842). Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche

Buchgesellschaft.

First edition 1843.

Reprint in: F. W. J. Schelling - Ausgewählte Werke voll. 8-9

(from the edition of the Sämmtliche Werke, voll. 3-4 -

Stuttgart, J. G. Cotta, 1858.

2. ———. 1968. Zur Geschichte der neueren Philosophie.

Münchener Vorlesungen (1833-1834). Darmstadt:

Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft,.

First edition 1834.

3. ———. 1992. Urfassung der Philosophie der Offenbarung.

Hamburg: Felix Meiner.

Lectures delivered in 1831-1832, as transcribed by J. M. Wachtl

and published for the first time in 1992; edited by Walter E.

Ehrhardt.

Studies

1. Courtine, Jean-François. 1990. "La critique schellingienne de

l'ontothéologique (Le renversement de l'argument ontologique

au seuil de la philosophie positive)." In L'argomento ontologico

, edited by Olivetti, Marco M., 387-404. Padova.

2. Kinlaw, Jeffrey C. 2003. "Schelling's original insight: Schelling

on the ontological argument and the task of philosophy."

American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly no. 77:213-232.

"This paper concerns the way in which the transition from

negative to positive philosophy is executed in Schelling's

critique of modern philosophy. Schelling's original insight is

that the transition occurs within negative philosophy by means

of a twofold experience within philosophical reflection:(1)

recognizing the failure of the idealist project of the conceptual

determination of Being, and (2) the reversal of the idealist

conception of the relation between concepts and their objects. I

argue that Schelling uses a form of the ontological argument,

focusing on Anselm's formula aliquid, quo nihil maius cogitari

potest, both in his critique of traditional formulations of the

argument and to navigate the transition to positive

philosophy."

3. Tilliette, Xavier. 1963. "L'argument ontologique." Archives de

Philosophie :90-105.

Reprinted in: Xavier Tilliette - L'absolu et la philosophie.

Essais sur Schelling - Paris, Presses Universitaires de France,

1987 pp. 162-181.

Ludwig Feuerbach (1804-1872)

Texts and translations

1. Feuerbach, Ludwig. 1841. Das Wesen der Christentum. Leipzig:

O. Wigand.

2. ———. 1854. The Essence of Christianity. London: J. Chapman.

Translated by Marian Evans (George Eliot).

Reprinted with a new introduction by Wolfgang Vondey - New

York, Barnes & Noble Books, 2004.

Studies

Robert Flint (1838-1910)

Texts

1. Flint, Robert. 1877. Theism: being the Baird lecture for 1876.

Edinburgh: W. Blackwood.

Studies

Franz Brentano (1838-1917)

Texts and translations

1. Brentano, Franz. 1929. Vom Dasein Gottes. Leipzig: Felix

Meiner.

Aus seinem Nachlasse herausgegeben, eingeleitet und mit

erläuternden Anmerkungen und Register versehen von Alfred

Kastil.

2. ———. 1987. On the existence of God. Lectures given at the

Universities of Wurzburg and Vienna 1868-1891. Dordrecht:

Martinus Nijhoff.

Edited and translated by Susan F. Krantz.

Part One. Preliminar enquiries: II. The ontological argument

pp. 23-50.

Studies

1. Bausola, Adriano. 2000. "La dottrina sul giudizio di esistenza e

la critica ad alcuni argomenti per l'esistenza di Dio in Franz

Brentano." Rivista di Filosofia Neo-Scolastica no. 92:282-294.

2. Redmond, Walter. 2001. "Das ontologische Argument. Res,

Sachverhalte und mögliche Welten." Aletheia.An International

Journal of Philosophy no. 7:453-468.

"The article is a logical analysis of Brentano's objections against

St. Anselm's ontological reasoning for God's existence in the

context of J. Seifert's Gott als Gottesbeweis . One Anselmian

argument, which Brentano rejects, is seen to be valid when

interpreted in free logic. The conclusion of Brentano's

interpretation of a second argument is shown to be a key

premise in various recent modal ontological arguments

considered valid by many. Finally, the parallelism is pointed

out between Anselm's verbum (or vox ) plus its extranea

significatio and id ipsum quod res est intelligitur , Seifert's

conceptual-subjective and essential-objective aspects, and

propositions and states of affairs in possible worlds semantics."

Gottlob Frege (1848-1925)

Texts and translations

1. Frege, Gottlob. 1884. Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik. Ein

logisch mathematische Untersuchung über den Begriff der

Zahl. Breslau: Willhelm Koebner.

See § 53.

2. ———. 1950. The foundations of arithmetic. A logico-

mathematical enquiry into the concept of number. Oxford:

Blackwell.

German text and English translation by J.L. Austin.

Reprint of the English translation: Evanston, Northwestern

University Press, 1980.

§ 53.

3. Carnap, Rudolf. 2004. "The ontological proof of the existence of

God." In Frege's Lectures on Logic: Carnap's Student Notes,

1910-1914, 79-82. La Salle: Open Court.

Translated and edited, with introductory essay, by Erich H.

Reck and Steve Awodey; based on the German text, edited, with

introduction and annotations, by Gottfried Gabriel.

Studies

1. Forgie, William J. 1972. "Frege's Objection to the Ontological

Argument." Noûs no. 6:251-265.

""God possesses all perfections; existence is a perfection;

therefore, God possesses existence, i.e., God exists." Many

philosophers have claimed that:

1) Descartes' ontological proof of the existence of God rests on

the assumption that existence is a first-level, or first-order,

property (attribute, quality), a property of individuals such as

horses or buildings or you and me.

Some of these same philosophers have then gone on to argue

that:

2) Existence is actually a second-level property, a property of

concepts, or of properties, or even of propositional functions.

(A similar claim is made by saying that the concept of existence

is of second-level.)

3) Therefore, existence is not a first-level property.

4) Therefore, Descartes' argument fails.

Although I do not believe claim 1) has ever adequately been

made out, I shall, for the purpose of this paper, assume it to be

true. I shall also assume that the inference from claim 2) to

claim 3) is valid.

To my knowledge the most elaborate defense of the idea that

existence is a second-level property has been put forth by

Frege. In this paper I will discuss that defense and argue that it

fails."

2. Labenz, Piotr. 2006. "Does Frege's definition of existence

invalidate the ontological argument?" Sorites.An International

Electronic Magazine of Analytical Philosophy no. 17:68-80.

"It is a well-known remark of Frege's that his definition of

existence invalidated the ontological argument for the existence

of God. That has subsequently often been taken for granted.

This paper attempts to investigate, whether rightly so. For this

purpose, both Frege's ontological doctrine and the ontological

argument are outlined.

Arguments in favor and against both are considered, and

reduced to five specific questions. It is argued that whether

Frege's remark was right depends on what the answers to these

questions are, and that for the seemingly most plausible ones --

it was not."

Bibliography on the Modern Period

1. Dotto, Gianni. 1994. "Koyré e l'argomento ontologico." In

Alexandre Koyré. L'avventura intellettuale, 471-478. Perugia:

Vinti C.

2. Herrlin, Olle. 1950. The Ontological Proof in Thomistic and

Kantian Interpretation. Uppsala: Lundquistska Bokhandeln.

3. Marion, Jean-Luc. 1990. "L'Argument relève-t-il de

l'ontologie?" In L'argomento ontologico / The ontological

Argument / L'argument ontologique / Der Ontologische

Gottesbeweis, edited by Olivetti, Marco M., 43-69. Padova:

CEDAM.

4. Repris dans J.-L. Marion, Questions Cartésiennes. Méthode et

métaphysique, Paris, Presses universitaires de France, 1991,

Chapitre 7, pp. 221-258.

5. ———. 1992. "Is the Ontological Argument Ontological? The

Argument According to Anselm and Its Metaphysical

Interpretation According to Kant." Journal of the History of

Philosophy no. 30:201-218.

English translation of: L'argument relève-t-il de l'ontologie?

Reprinted in: J.-L. Marion, Cartesian Questions. Method and

Metaphysics, Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1999, Chapter

7 with the title: Is the Argument Ontological? The Anselmian

Proof and the Two Demostrations of the Existence of God in

the Meditations, pp. 139-160.

"In order to sketch a possible answer, one would have to

analyze conceptually what Kant calls the "ontological

argument". This analysis should proceed in three stages: (a)

determining the characteristics that Kant attributes to this

concept of "ontological argument"; (b) verifying whether, and

how, some of the thinkers from the metaphysical tradition

announce or sanction the characteristics of the "ontological

argument"; (c) deciding whether or not some of its figures -- in

particular, those conferred on it by Anselm and Descartes, who

do not use the qualifier "ontological" -- are exceptions to these

characteristics."

6. Micheletti, Mario. 1991. Pascal - Butler. L'argomento

ontologico. Studi sul pensiero etico-religioso inglese dei secoli

XVII e XVIII. Perugia: Editrice Benucci.

7. Park, Desirée. 1983. "Berkeley's Rejection of Anselm's

Argument." Anselm Studies.An Occasional Journal no. 1:103-

110.

8. Sillem, Edward Augustus. 1957. George Berkeley and the

Proofs for the Existence of God. London: Longmans, Green.

9. Tilliette, Xavier. 1962. "L'argument ontologique et l'histoire de

l'ontothéologie." Archives de Philosophie no. 25:128-149.

Bibliographia. Annotated bibliographies

Raul Corazzon || rc@ontology.co || Info

Selected Bibliography on the

History of the Ontological

Argument from Barth to the

Present Time (1931-2020)

A Selection of Primary Authors

Legenda: P = Pro (accept the proof); C = Contra (rejected the proof);

I = indifferent (take no position on the proof).

References are to the most important works where ontological

argument is discussed.

P Heinrich Scholz

P Karl Barth

P Robin George Collingwood

P Charles Hartshorne

C John Niemeyer Findlay

P Kurt Gödel

P Norman Malcolm

P Jan Berg

C John Howard Sobel

P Alvin Plantinga

C David Kellogg Lewis

P Robert Maydole

C Graham Oppy

P Alexander Pruss

Heinrich Scholz (1884-1956)

Texts

1. Scholz, Heinrich. 1961. "Der anselmische Gottesbeweis." In

Mathesis Universalis. Abhandlungen zur Philosophie als

strenger Wissenschaft, 62-74. Basel: Benno Schwabe.

Part one of the lecture course Einführung in die Kantische

Philosophie (1950-1951).

Studies

1. Peckhaus, Volker. 2008. "Logic and metaphysics: Heinrich

Scholz and the scientific world view." Philosophia Mathematica

no. 16:78-90.

"The anti-metaphysical attitude of the neo-positivist movement

is notorious. It is an essential mark of what its members

regarded as the scientific world view. The paper focuses on a

metaphysical variation of the scientific world view as proposed

by Heinrich Scholz and his Münster group, who can be

regarded as a peripheral part of the movement. They used

formal ontology for legitimizing the use of logical calculi.

Scholz's relation to the neo-positivist movement and his

contributions to logic and foundations are discussed. His

heuristic background can be drawn from a set of six

methodological 'articles of faith', formulated in 1942 and

published here for the first time."

Karl Barth (1886-1968)

Texts and translations

1. Barth, Karl. 1931. Fides quaerens intellectum. Anselm Beweis

der Existenz Gottes in Zusammenhang seines theologischen

Programms. Münich: C. Kaiser.

Second edition 1958.

2. ———. 1960. Anselm, Fides quaerens intellectum. Anselm's

proof of the existence of God in the context of his theological

scheme. London: SCM Press.

Translated by Ian W. Robertson; reprinted Pittsburgh,

Pickwick Press, 1975.

Studies

1. Bouillard, Henri. 1959. "La preuve de Dieu dans le Proslogion

et son interprétation par Karl Barth." In Spicilegium Beccense

I. Congrés International du IX centenaire de l'arrivée

d'Anselme au Bec , 191-207. Paris: Vrin.

2. Potter, Vincent G. 1965. "Karl Barth and the ontological

argument." Journal of Religion no. 45:309-325.

Robin George Collingwood (1889-1943)

Texts

1. Collingwood, Robin George. 1924. Speculum Mentis or the Map

of Knowledge. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

The 1919 Lectures on the Ontological Proof of the Existence of

God, Bodleian library, Collingwood dep. 2 (almost 100 pages)

are unpublished.

2. ———. 1998. An Essay on Metaphysics. Oxford: Oxford

University Press.

First edition 1940.

Revised edition, with an introduction by Rex Martin.

3. ———. 2005. An Essay on Philosophical Method. Oxford:

Oxford University Press.

First edition 1933.

Revised edition, with an introduction by James Connelly and

Giuseppina D'Oro.

Studies

1. D'Oro, Giuseppina. 2000. "On Collingwood's rehabilitation of

the ontological argument." Idealistic Studies.An

Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy no. 30:173-188.

"This paper assesses the nature of Collingwood's rehabilitation

of the ontological argument through a close reading of

Collingwood's private correspondence with Ryle following the

publication of "An Essay on Philosophical Method." The paper

asks whether Collingwood's rehabilitation of the ontological

proof entails that he is committed to a form of precritical,

dogmatic metaphysics, as Ryle suggests. The paper concludes

that Collingwood's rehabilitation of the ontological proof is

rather unorthodox and does not, contrary to what one might

expect, contradict the claim that existence is not a real

predicate."

2. ———. 2008. Collingwood and the metaphysics of experience .

New York: Routledge.

Chapter 5: Collingwood's 'rehabilitation' of the ontological

argument -- pp. 67-78.

"In this chapter I would like to consider a lively debate that

took place between Collingwood and Ryle in the aftermath of

the publication of An Essay on Philosophical Method (EPM),

The debate was prompted by Collingwood's reappropriation of

the ontological argument in Chapter 6 of EPM where he

defended what he regarded as a neglected kernel of truth in the

traditional proof. Ryle launched a fierce attack on

Collingwood's attempted rehabilitation of the ontological

argument in the pages of Mind, where he accused Collingwood

of ignoring crucial philosophical developments which had

occurred in the last two hundred years, in particular the thesis

that all existential propositions are knowable a posteriori and

the corollary that there can be no necessary existential

judgements. Collingwood newer took up Ryle's challenge

publicly, but did attempt to clarify his own position in a

number of private letters.(*) It was Errol Harris who replied to

Ryle publicly on Collingwood's behalf, locating Collingwood's

defence of the ontological argument in the tradition of Hegel's

objective or speculative idealism, thereby adding further fuel to

the controversy. As a result of Harris's reply on behalf of

Collingwood and the private exchange with Collingwood

himself Ryle responded with a further article aimed at

reasserting his original position that there can be no necessary

existential propositions." p. 67 (some notes omitted).

(*) The Collingwood-Ryle correspondence is deposited in the

Bodleian Library in Oxford, Collingwood Department 26/3.

3. Harris, Errol E. 1936. "Mr. Collingwood and the ontological

argument; reply to G. Ryle." Mind no. 45:474-480.

Reprinted in Hick, John and McGill, Arthur C. (ed.), The

many-faced argument. Recent studies on the ontological

argument for the existence of God, London: Macmillan, 1967.

4. ———. 1972. "Collingwood's treatment of the ontological

argument and the Categorical Universal." In Critical essays on

the philosophy of R. G. Collingwood , edited by Krausz,

Michael, 113-133. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

5. O'Neill, Michael J. 2006. "A peculiar "faith": on R. G.

Collingwood's use of Saint Anselm's argument." Saint Anselm

Journal no. 3:32-47.

"In this paper, I discuss the role of Anselm's ontological

argument in the philosophy of R. G. Collingwood. Anselm's

argument appears prominently in Collingwood's Essay on

Philosophical Method (1933) and Essay on Metaphysics

(1940), as well as in his early work Speculum Mentis (1924). In

the proof, Collingwood finds the central expression of the

priority of "faith" in the first principles of thought to reason's

activities. For Collingwood, it is Anselm's proof that clearly

expresses this relationship between faith and reason. The two

elements of this analysis that must be understood if one is to

understand Collingwood's use of the proof are what he means

by "the idea of an object that shall completely satisfy the

demands of reason" and the "special case of metaphysical

thinking." I analyze both of these elements and conclude by

showing how Anselm's proof is essential to Collingwood's

historical science of mind."

6. Ryle, Gilbert. 1935. "Mr. Collingwood and the ontological

argument." Mind :137-151.

Reprinted in Hick, John and McGill, Arthur C. (ed.), The

many-faced argument. Recent studies on the ontological

argument for the existence of God, London: Macmillan, 1967.

Also reprinted in: G. Ryle, Collected Papers , Vol. 2, Bristol:

Thoemmes Press, 1990.

7. ———. 1937. "Back to the ontological argument." Mind :53-47.

Reprinted in Hick, John and McGill, Arthur C. (ed.), The

many-faced argument. Recent studies on the ontological

argument for the existence of God, London: Macmillan, 1967.

Also reprinted in: G. Ryle, Collected Papers , Vol. 2, Bristol:

Thoemmes Press, 1990.

Charles Hartshorne (1897-2000)

Texts

1. Hartshorne, Charles. 1941. Man's vision of God and the logic of

Theism. Chicago: Willett, Clark and Co.

2. ———. 1944. "The formal validity and real significance of the

ontological argument." Philosophical Review no. 53:225-245.

3. ———. 1961. "The logic of the ontological argument." Journal of

Philosophy no. 58:471-473.

4. ———. 1962. The logic of perfection and other essays in neo-

classical metaphysics. La Salle: Open Court.

See in particular Chapter 2: Ten ontological or modal proofs

for God's existence pp. 28-117.

5. ———. 1962. "What did Anselm discover?" Union seminary

Quarterly Review no. 7:213-222.

6. ———. 1965. Anselm's discovery. A re-examination of the

ontological proof for God's existence. La Salle: Open Court.

7. ———. 1966. "Is the denial of existence ever contradictory?"

Journal of Philosophy no. 63:65-83.

"This article examines criticisms of the ontological argument

proposed by Plantinga and Alston. The conclusion is reached

that the denial of existence can be contradictory if this denial

implies that the ground of all possibility is itself but a mere

possibility, or that an indispensable predicate -- one whose

actualization or being instantiated is necessary to reality as

such -- is yet dispensable. It is conceded that the argument is a

proof for the divine existence only on the assumption that the

idea of God is logically admissible, and not an absurdity. It is

also shown that the argument need not beg the question by

assuming from the outset a subject of predication, God, but can

argue rather from the predicate divine and deduce from this

predicate the necessity of its instantiation in some suitable

actuality."

8. ———. 1983. "The Proslogion argument. Anselm and Aristotle's

First Law of Modality." Anselm Studies.An Occasional Journal

no. 1:51-58.

Studies

1. Brecher, Robert. 1975. "Hartshorne's Modal Argument for the

Existence of God." Ratio no. 17:140-146.

2. Brown, Charles D. 1976. "The Ontological Theorem." Notre

Dame Journal of Formal Logic no. 19:591-592.

3. Connelly, Robert J. 1969. "The ontological argument:

Descartes' advice to Hartshorne." New Scholasticism no.

43:530-554.

4. Dombrowski, Daniel A. 2006. Rethinking the ontological

argument. A neoclassical Theistic response . Cambridge:

Cambridge University Press.

5. Friedman, Joel I. 1980. "Necessity and ontological argument."

Erkenntnis no. 15:301-331.

"In this paper, I focus on Hartshorne's "de dicto" modal

reconstruction of the ontological argument for God's existence.

I consider "six" senses of necessity, and for all these senses, I

call into question either the truth of at least one of the premises

of the reconstructed argument or the truth of at least one of the

axioms of modal logic itself. the main conclusion is that it is

probably impossible to formalize within a "sound" modal logic

any traditional or semi-traditional version of the ontological

argument in such a way that it is both formally valid yet has

necessarily true, "a priori" known premises. I believe that any

claim to the contrary is based on acute modal confusion."

6. Goodwin, George L. 1978. The ontological argument of Charles

Hartshorne . Missoula: MT Scholars.

With a foreword by Charles Hartshorne.

7. ———. 1983. "The ontological argument in neoclassical context:

Reply to Friedman." Erkenntnis no. 20:219-232.

Reply to the article published in Erkenntnis , 15, 1980, 301-331.

"Professor Joel Friedman has contended that there is no

univocal sense of "de dicto" necessity in terms of which the five

axioms of Lewis' S5 system of modal logic and the two premises

of Hartshorne's ontological argument can be known "a priori"

to be true. Goodwin shows how Friedman's challenge can be

met in either Carnap's or Kripke's sense of logical necessity

when Hartshorne's temporal interpretation of possibility is

taken into account."

8. Lycan, Gregory W. 1968. "Hartshorne and Findlay on

'necessity' in the ontological argument." Philosophical Studies

(Ireland) no. 17:132-141.

9. Müller, Jörn. 2003. "Möglichkeit und Notwendigkeit der

Existenz Gottes: Anselms ontologischer Gottesbeweis in der

modallogischen Deutung von Charles Hartshorne."

Veritas.Revista de Filosofia no. 48:397-415.

"The author analyzes the validity of a certain variation of

Anselm's "ontological argument", namely the modal-logical

version from Charles Hartshorne. He firstly studies the origin

of Hartshorne's

arguments, whose starting point is an interpretation of Anselm;

secondly, the modal-logical argument from Hartshorne will be

presented together with its presuppositions and implications.

Finally, the author proposes an evaluation of Hartshorne's

approach."

10. Pailin, David A. 1969. "An introductory survey of Charles

Hartshorne's work on the ontological argument." In Analecta

Anselmiana. Untersuchungen über Person und Werk Anselms

von Canterbury , edited by Schmitt, Franciscus Salesius and

Kohlenberger, Helmut, 195-221. Frankfurt: Minerva.

"The importance of Hartshorne's use of the ontological

argument of a God's existence lies not merely in his recognition

of the second proof of Anselm's argument but more so in his di-

polar Panentheism as in his analyses of the meaning of

"necessary existence" which allows it to be significantly

attributed to an entity. Nevertheless, Hartshorne's claims that

the 'second proof' escapes the earlier criticisms of the

ontological argument and that necessary existence implies

factual existence are subject to criticism."

11. Purtill, Richard L. 1966. "Hartshorne's modal proof." Journal

of Philosophy no. 63:397-408.

"This paper restates and criticizes the modal version of the

ontological argument given by Charles Hartshorne in The logic

of perfection . I show that the argument is valid in modal

systems as strong as Lewis' S5 and that it is not subject to some

familiar refutations of the ontological argument. I argue that,

nevertheless, the ontological argument does not prove what it

sets out to, and that the value of Hartshorne's modal version of

the argument is that it enables us to state with some precision

why this is so."

12. ———. 1967. "Ontological modalities." Review of Metaphysics

no. 21:297-307.

"A formal proof, paralleling the argument given by Charles

Hartshorne in his reply to my "Hartshorne's modal proof," is

given and discussed. His version of the ontological argument in

modal logic seemed to offer a modalized ontological argument

valid for a system no stronger than Lewis' S3. However, a

logical mistake in one of the lemmas to the main proof

invalidates this aspect of the argument. (see section 8.5 of my

"Logic for philosophers," Harper and Row, 1971). The main

critical points of the paper were, however, independent of this

proof. The conclusion of the paper is that the ontological

argument is redundant if sound."

13. Shofner, Robert D. 1974. Anselm revisited. A study of the role

of the ontological argument in the writings of Karl Barth and

Charles Hartshorne . Leiden: Brill.

"This work traces the dimensions of two independent attempts

--- those of Karl Barth and Charles Hartshorne -- to set aside

the burden of the Kantian heritage in so far as it has influenced

the development of contemporary philosophical-theological

thinking. The focal issue throughout is the role that the

Anselmian formulation of the ontological argument plays in

these respective attempts. Such an issue is raised not out of an

historical-critical interest in the writings of the eleventh-

century saint, but because both Barth and Hartshorne have

found the Proslogion proof for God to be a particularly

propitious vantage point from which to gain a fresh perspective

on their own professional preoccupations. It is interesting to

note, however, that while Barth turns to a discussion of the

ontological argument as a phase in the development of a

methodological program which entails the rejection of natural

theology, Hartshorne undertakes a defense of the same

argument in an effort to establish an appropriate basis for the

acceptance of natural theology. The scope of the chapters to

follow has been shaped by the conviction that there is a

pressing need to account for this rather disconcerting

difference."

14. Towne, Edgar A. 1999. "Semantics and Hartshorne's Dipolar

Theism." Process Studies no. 28:231-254.

"The essay examines the syntactical, semantic and

philosophical issues raised by Charles Hartshorne's

formulation of the ontological argument for the existence of

God and by his effort to distinguish his dipolar panentheism

from supernatural theism. The essay shows how the argument

is invalid, admitted by Hartshorne. It shows Hartshorne's

metaphysics employs a natural language, not a modal one. It

elucidates the logical structure of dipolar theism. It shows faith

need not be contrary to reason though faith cannot expect

reason to prove theism. It shows that any non-dogmatic

rational inquiry into theistic belief must be open and on-going."

15. Viney, Donald Wayne. 1985. Charles Hartshorne and the

existence of God . Albany: State University of New York Press.

Chapter IV. The ontological argument pp. 45-57

16. Vitali, Theodore. 1980. "The ontological argument: model for

neoclassical metaphysics." Modern Schoolman no. 57:121-136.

"The ontological argument of Charles Hartshorne serves as the

speculative model for his neoclassical metaphysics.

Neoclassicism requires both the necessary existence of God and

his maximal relativity if its fundamental ontological principles

of world, order, and beauty are to be grounded. The ontological

argument proves directly the divine necessary existence and at

the same time grounds indirectly the divine relativity which

these fundamental principles require. The argument, therefore,

is neoclassicism's speculative model in that within this model

one is able to discover the structure of Charles Hartshorne's

entire metaphysics."

John Niemeyer Findlay (1903-1987)

Texts

1. Findlay, John Niemeyer. 1948. "Can God's existence be

disproved?" Mind no. 57:176-183.

Reprinted in:

A. Flew and A. MacIntyre (eds.) - New essays in philosophical

theology - London: SCM Press, 1957 pp. 47-56, with replies by

G. E. Hughes, pp. 56-67, A. C. A. Rainer, pp. 67-71, and a

rejoinder by J. N. Findlay, pp. 71-75.

J. N: Findlay - Language, truth and value - New York,

Humanities Press, 1963 pp. 96-108

A. Plantinga (ed.) - The ontological argument from St. Anselm

to contemporary philosophers - London, Macmillan, 1965, pp.

111-122.

"The course of philosophical development has been full of

attempted proofs of the existence of God. Some of these have

sought a basis in the bare necessities of thought, while others

have tried to found themselves on the facts of experience. And,

of these latter, some have founded themselves on very general

facts, as that something exists, or that something is in motion,

while others have tried to build on highly special facts, as that

living beings are put together in a purposive manner, or that

human beings are subject to certain improbable urges and

passions, such as the zeal for righteousness, the love for useless

truths and unprofitable beauties, as well as the many

specifically religious needs and feelings. The general

philosophical verdict is that none of these 'proofs' is truly

compelling. The proofs based on the necessities of thought are

universally regarded as fallacious: it is not thought possible to

build bridges between mere abstractions and concrete

existence. The proofs based on the general facts of existence

and motion are only felt to be valid by a minority of thinkers,

who seem quite powerless to communicate this sense of validity

to others. And while most thinkers would accord weight to

arguments resting on the special facts we have mentioned, they

wouldn't think such arguments successful in ruling out a vast

range of counter-possibilities. Religious people have, in fact,

come to acquiesce in the total absence of any cogent proofs of

the Being they believe in: they even find it positively satisfying

that something so far surpassing clear conception should also

surpass the possibility of demonstration. And non-religious

people willingly mitigate their rejection with a tinge of

agnosticism: they don't so much deny the existence of a God, as

the existence of good reasons for believing in him. We shall,

however, maintain in this essay that there isn't room, in the

case we are examining, for all these attitudes of tentative

surmise and doubt. For we shall try to show that the Divine

Existence can only be conceived, in a religiously satisfactory

manner, if we also conceive it as something inescapable and

necessary, whether for thought or reality. From which it follows

that our modern denial of necessity or rational evidence for

such an existence amounts to a demonstration that there

cannot be a God."

Studies

1. Blackman, Larry. 2005. "Another look at J.N. Findlay's

"Ontological Disproof of the Existence of God"." International

Journal of the Humanities no. 3:23-30.

"First published in 1948, J.N. Findlay's article, "Can God's

Existence Be Disproved?" remains interesting. Findlay argues

that a religious object possessing unsurpassable superiority (or

God), would be one whose existence is inescapable. By

"inescapable" he cannot mean "psychologically inconceivable",

because then the mere fact that there are unbelievers would

make atheism true. But if we interpret "inescapable" as

"logically inconceivable", then God's existence is inescapable,

that is, His nonexistence is logically inconceivable, only if He is

a necessarily existing being. Since, according to Findlay, there

are no necessarily existing beings, it follows that God does not

exist. In effect, he maintains that God is by definition a

necessarily existing being, but there are no such beings.

However, this "ontological disproof of the existence of God"

fails, because his claim that there are no necessarily existing

beings is unsupported. This paper suggests the plausibility of

the claim that there are necessarily existing beings without,

however, supposing that God is among them. Rather than

defending theism, the paper considers what would be required

to establish atheism, namely, the unintelligibility of the concept

of God due to certain antinomies. The position being advocated

is not, strictly speaking, atheism but, rather, conceptual

skepticism, that is, skepticism with regard to the very concept.

It might be described as functional atheism, inasmuch as it

entails suspending all matters having to do with God until the

conceptual problems are satisfactorily resolved. This

recommendation is different from the one offered by the logical

positivists in a bygone era, since it has nothing to do with

empirical verifiability. The antinomies are to a great extent "a

priori" and therefore rest on a rationalist, not an empiricist,

foundation."

2. Clarke, Bowman Lafayette. 1971. "Modal disproofs and proofs

for God." Southern Journal of Philosophy :247-258.

"This paper attempts to present J. N. Findlay's ontological

disproof of the existence of God as an extension of Hume and

Kant's treatment of the ontological argument. This modal

disproof is presented along side what is called the Leibnizian-

Hartshornean modal proof in order to reveal the modern

theistic modal paradox. In order to resolve this paradox, an

interpretation of 'possibility' is presented along the lines

suggested by Charles Hartshorne's justification of the premise

asserting the possibility of the existence of God, that is, in terms

of the other proofs."

3. Williams, John N. 1992. "Ontological disproof." Australasian

Journal of Philosophy :204-210.

Kurt Gödel (1906-1978)

Texts and translations

1. Gödel, Kurt. 1995. Unpublished essays and letters. New York:

Oxford University Press.

First draft written in 1941, revised in 1970; published in:

Collected works vol. III - Ontological proof - pp. 403-404.

2. ———. 2006. La prova matematica dell'esistenza di Dio.

Torino: Bollati Boringheri.

Indice: Prefazione di Gabriele Lolli; La prova matematica

dell'esistenza di Dio; Nota introduttiva di Robert Merrihew

Adams 23; Prova ontologica di Kurt Gödel 61; Testi collegati

alla prova ontologica 64; Appendici; A. Una dimostrazione

divina di Piergiorgio Odifreddi; B. Logica e teofilia.

Osservazioni su una dimostrazione attribuita a Gödel di

Roberto Magari, con presentazione di Gabrielle Lolli 95-120.

Studies

1. Adams, Robert Merrihew. 1995. "Introductory note to *1970."

In Kurt Gödel - Collected Works Vol. III: Unpublished Essays

and Lectures, edited by Feferman, Solomon, 388-402. New

York: Oxford University Press.

2. Anderson, Anthony C. 1990. "Some Emendations of Gödel's

Ontological Proof." Faith and Philosophy no. 7:291-303.

"A new version of the ontological argument for the existence of

God was outlined by Kurt Godel and elaborated by Dana Scott.

J. Howard Sobel has given a careful explication of the details

and has provided a powerful critique (1). I believe that Sobel’s

main objection is conclusive against the argument as sketched

by Godel. But it is possible to correct the argument, making

changes which can be independently motivated, and in such a

way that the revised argument is immune to the objection. And

a definition of one of Godel’s primitive concepts enables the

proof of some of his axioms. For the sake of those who do not

enjoy symbolism, I give a statement of Godel’s argument and

the suggested revisions in the vernacular. Some corollaries and

a lemma have been separated off in order to clarify the proof

and to isolate the difficulty. A brief statement of the formalities

is given in the appendix. To see a full formalization of Godel’s

original version, consult Sobel." (p. 191)

(1) Jordan Howard Sobel, “Godel’s Ontological Proof," in On

Being and Saying. Essays for Richard Cartwright, ed. Judith

Jarvis Thomson (Cambridge, Mass. & London, England: The

MIT Press, 1987). Sobel provides detailed renderings of both

Godel’s handwritten note and Scott's elaboration. Apparently

the contents of these have not appeared in print before.

3. ———. 2015. "Gödel’s ‘proof’ for the existence of God." In

Mathematicians and their gods: Interactions between

mathematics and religious beliefs, edited by Lawrence,

Snezana and McCartney, Mark, 279-289. New York: Oxford

University Press.

4. Anderson, Anthony C., and Gettings, Michael. 1996. "Gödel

Ontological Proof Revisited." In Gödel '96, edited by Hájek,

Petr, 167-172. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer.

"Gödel's version of the modal ontological argument for the

existence of God has been criticized by J. Howard Sobel (5) and

modified by C. Anthony Anderson (1). In the present paper we

consider the extent to which Anderson's emendation is defeated

by the type of objection first offered hy the Monk Gaunilo to St.

Anselm's original Ontological Argument. And we try to push

the analysis of this Gödelian argument a bit further to bring it

into closer agreement with the details of Gödel's own

formulation. Finally, we indicate what seems to be the rnain

weakness of this emendation of Gödel's attempted proof."

5. Bjørdal, Frode. 1999. "Understanding Gödel's ontological

argument." In The Logica Yearbook 1998, edited by Childers,

Timothy, 214-217. Praha: Filosofia.

6. Cook, Roy T. 2004. "God, the Devil, and Gödel's Other Proof."

In The Logica Yearbook 2003, edited by Behounek, Libor, 97-

109. Prague: Philosophia.

"Gödel's 1970 proof of the existence of a god-like being (i.e., a

being having all the 'perfective' properties) is investigated. The

proof is streamlined and reformulated within the weakest logic

possible - and intuitionistic version of second-order logic with a

modal operator no stronger than the system K. It is shown that

even in this weak context one can derive that it is necessary that

a god-like being is at least possible. Finally, the prospects for a

similar proof of the existence of the Devil (or, more carefully, a

being who lacks all perfective properties) is investigated.

Technical reasons are given for why such a parallel proof of the

existence of an evil being is not forthcoming."

7. Czermak, Johannes. 2002. "Abriss des ontologischen

Argumentes." In Kompendium zum Werk, edited by Köhler,

Eckehart, Buldt, Bernd, De-Pauli Schimanovich-Göttig,

Werner, Klein, Carsten, Stöltzner, Michael and Weibel, Peter,

309-324. Wien: Öbv & Hpt.

Kurt Gödel. Wahrheit & Beweisbarkeit. Vol.1: Dokumente und

historische analysen; Vol. 2: Kompendium zum Werk.

8. Fitting, Melvin. 2002. Types, Tableaux and Gödel's God.

Dordrecht: Kluver.

See Part III. Ontological arguments. Chapter 10. Gödel

argument, background 133; Chapter 11. Gödel argument,

formally 145-172.

"Finally, Part III is devoted to ontological proofs. Chapter 10

gives a brief history and analysis of arguments of Anselm,

Descartes, and Leibniz. This is followed by a longer, still

informal, presentation of the Gödel argument itself. Formal

methods are applied in Chapter 11, where Gödel's proof is

examined in great detail. While Gödel's argument is formally

correct, some fundamental flaws are pointed out. One, noted by

Sobel, is that it is too strong -- the modal system collapses. This

could be seen as showing that free will is incompatible with

Gödel's assumptions. Some ways out of this are explored.

Another flaw is equally serious: Gödel assumes as an axiom

something directly equivalent to a key conclusion of his

argument. The problematic axiom is related to a principle

Leibniz proposed as a way of dealing with a hole he found in an

ontological proof of Descartes. Descartes, Leibniz, and Gödel

(and also Anselm) all have proofs that stick at the same point:

showing that the existence of God is possible.

If the Gödel argument is what you are interested in, start with

Part III, and pick up earlier material as needed. Many of the

uses of the formalism are relatively intuitive. Indeed, in Gödel's

notes on his ontological argument, formal machinery is never

discussed, yet it is possible to get a sense of what it is about

anyway." (pp. XIII-XIV).

9. Fuhrmann, André. 2005. "Existenz und Notwendigkeit - Kurt

Gödels axiomatische Theologie." In Logik in der Philosophie,

edited by Spohn, Wolfgang, Schroeder-Heister, Peter and

Olsson, Erik J., 349-374. Heidelberg: Synchron Publishers.

Gödels ontologischer Beweis pp. 354-360.

10. Goldman, Randolph Rubens. 2000. Gödel's Ontological

Argument, University of California at Berkeley.

Available at ProQuest Dissertation Express. Order number:

9979637.

11. Gonçalves, Gomes Nelson. 2006. "Summum Bonum."

Analytica.Revista de Filosofia no. 10:43-105.

(The article is in Portuguese).

"This article contains a presentation of Gödel's ontological

proof, from both the intuitive and the formal points of view.

Two other contemporary variations of it are also presented. The

article

discusses the philosophical and the theological criticisms of the

proof. The conclusion to be drawn is that the soundness of

Gödel's reasoning is an important logical result, which

nevertheless demands further work of analysis. The

metaphysical idea of a positive property (or positive set) for

instance needs clarification."

12. Hájek, Petr. 1996. "Magari and Others on Gõdel's Ontological

Proof." In Logic and Algebra, edited by Ursini, Aldo and

Agliani, Paolo, 125-136. New York: Dekker.

"Gödel's proof of the necessary existence of God is analyzed

from the point of view of modal logic together with related

papers by Magari and Anderson. ln particular, Magari's claim

on redundance in axioms is analyzed and shown to be only true

for some extension of Godel's system (but true for Anderson's

modification, as it as shown elsewhere). Completeness of the

underlying modal logic is proved; and it is shown that the

"ontological" proof may use only the logic KD45 (logic of belief)

instead of S5 (logic of knowledge)."

13. ———. 2002. "A New Small Emendation of Gödel Ontological

Proof." Studia Logica no. 71:149-164.

"Two variants of monadic fuzzy predicate logic are analyzed

and compared with the full fuzzy predicate logic with respect to

finite model property (properties) and arithmetical complexity

of sets of tautologies, satisfiable formulas and of analogous

notion restricted to finite models."

14. ———. 2002. "Der Mathematiker und die Frage der Existenz

Gottes." In Kompendium zum Werk, edited by Köhler,

Eckehart, Buldt, Bernd, De-Pauli Schimanovich-Göttig,

Werner, Klein, Carsten, Stöltzner, Michael and Weibel, Peter,

325-336. Wien: Öbv & Hpt.

Kurt Gödel. Wahrheit & Beweisbarkeit. Vol.1: Dokumente und

historische analysen; Vol. 2: Kompendium zum Werk.

15. ———. 2011. "Gödel's Ontological Proof and Its Varians." In

Kurt Gödel and the Foundations of Mathematics. Horizons of

Truth, edited by Baaz, Matthias, Papadimitriou, Christos H.,

Putnam, Hilary W., Scott, Dana S. and Harper, Jr, Charles L.,

307-321. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

16. Hazen, Allen P. 1998. "On Gödel's Ontological Proof."

Australasian Journal of Philosophy no. 76:361-377.

"Gödel, in a cryptic note given to Dana Scott in 1970, introduces

the notion of a positive property. (Thus the formalized version

uses a Third-Order constant, the predicate P(F), expressing the

positivity of the property F). The plausibility of his 'axioms' and

the theological relevance of its conclusion depend on the

interpretation of this notion; Gödel says that it means 'positive

in the moral aesthetic sense (independently of the accidental

structure of the world)', but also allows that it may mean 'pure

"attribution" as opposed to "privation".' The evidence available

from his notebooks suggests that he never found an

interpretation of this notion that fully satisfied him, and it is

perhaps best to assume that he thought of his ontological

argument not as a conclusive proof of the existence of God, but

as an attempt at a reconstruction of Leibniz's argument. In any

event, he laid down certain axioms concerning the notion. Any

property entailed by a positive property is positive, and the

conjunction of two positive properties (the property, that is,

that an individual has if and only if it has both of the given

properties) is positive. Together, these amount to saying that

the positive properties form a filter on the Boolean algebra of

properties. (Gödel adds in a footnote that the positivity of

conjunctions of positive properties holds for arbitrary numbers

of conjuncts, not just for two: as we shell see, this includes

infinite numbers.) Further, positivity is a non-contingent

feature of a property: any property which is positive is

necessarily positive, and no property which is not positive could

be.

Another axiom said that, of any pair of properties consisting of

a property and its negation (the property necessarily holding of

all and only the individuals not possessing the first property),

precisely one is positive. (Positive properties form an

ultrafilter.) We are now In a position to prove our first theorem:

positive properties are at least possibly instantiated, Proof: the

contradictory property (self-non-identity) entails all properties,

including Its own negation (self-Identity), so if it were positive

both properties of such a pair would be positive. (As has been

noted by commentators, the proof uses only part of the strength

of the latest axiom: of a pair of a property and its negation at

most one is positive.)

Gödel's remaining axiom is formulated in terms of a defined

notion. First define a property to be an essence of an individual

if it is a property, possessed by the individual (Godel left this

clause out in (1), but this appears to have been an oversight - -it

is Included In related manuscripts), which entails every

property the individual has. The terminology is somewhat

unfortunate: the notion defined is close to Leibniz's notion of

the complete concept of an object, but is not at all what current

philosophical usage calls an essence. 'Essence' and

'essentialism' were bad words for most analytic philosophers of

the 1960s -- many found the doctrines of Kripke downright

shocking -- but, with the flowering of modal metaphysics since,

they have come to have well-understood and generally agreed

meanings, defined in terms of de re modal locutions. An

individual. x, has a property, F, essentially iff x has F and it is

necessarily the case that x, provided it exists, has F. An essence

of x, in this post-1970 sense, is a property which entails all and

only the properties x has essentially. To avoid confusion,

therefore, let us re-christen Gödel's notion: the property an

individual has that entails every property it has is its

character." (pp. 364-365)

Notes omitted.

17. Kegler, Jeffrey. 2008. The God Proof: CreateSpace.

A novel on the ontological proof, useful as a non-technical, but

reliable, introduction to Gödel's argument.

18. Koons, Robert C. 2006. "Sobel on Gödel’s ontological proof."

Philosophia Christi no. 8:235-247.

19. Kordula, Świętorzecka, ed. 2016. Gödel’s Ontological

Argument. History, Modifications, and Controversies.

Warszawa: Semper.

Contents: Preface; Chapter 1. Kordula Świętorzecka: Gödel’s

‘Ontologischer Beweis’. Remarks on Its Philosophical

Background and Variations; Chapter 2. Johannes Czermak:

From Ontological Proof to Theological Theories; Chapter 3:

Edward Nieznański: Gödel’s summum bonum versus Leibniz’s

ratio sufficiens; Chapter 4: Srećko Kovač, Kordula

Świętorzecka: Gödel’s “Slingshot” Argument and His Onto-

Theological System; Chapter 5. Srećko Kovač: Causal

Interpretation of Gödel’s Ontological Proof; Chapter 6. André

Fuhrmann: Blogging Gödel: His Ontological Argument in the

Public Eye; Bibliography.

20. Kovac, Srecko. 2003. "Some Weakened Gödelian Ontological

Systems." Journal of Philosophical Logic no. 32:565-588.

"We describe a K B Gödelian ontological system, and some

other weak systems, in a fully formal way using theory of types

and natural deduction, and present a completeness proof in its

main and specific parts. We technically and philosophically

analyze and comment on the systems (mainly with respect to

the relativism of values) and include a sketch of some

connected aspect of Gödel's relation to Kant."

21. Magari, Roberto. 1988. "Logica e teofilia." Notizie di logica no.

7:11-20.

Ristampato in: Kurt Gödel - La prova matematica

dell'esistenza di Dio - Trino, Bollati Boringhieri, 2006, pp. 99-

120.

22. Muck, Otto. 1992. "Eigenschaften Gottes im Licht des

Godelschen Arguments." Theologie und Philosophie no. 67:60-

85.

"In his sketch of an Ontological Proof (dated February 10th

1970) Kurt Gödel introduces the concept of a positive property

and proves the necessary existence of exact one being which

instantiates all positive properties -- he calls it 'summun

bonum'. Special emphasis in the discussion of this argument is

put on the logical structure of positive property and the

comparison with the concept of (pure) perfection as it is used in

traditional philosophy of God for dealing with divine

attributes."

23. ———. 1992. "Religioser Glaube und Gödels ontologischer

Gottesbeweis." Theologie und Philosophie no. 67:263-267.

"In discussing the rationality of religious belief, Franz von

Kutschera (Vernuft und Glaube, 1990) criticises attempts to

clarify divine attributes and to demonstrate the existence of

God, including Gödel's Ontological Proof. The article argues

that the criticism proposed neglects the concept of pure

perfection and that the logical structure of this concept can be

clarified in further developing Gödel's concept of positive

property."

24. Oppy, Graham. 1996. "Gödelian Ontological Arguments."

Analysis no. 56:226-230.

"The main thesis of this paper is that Gödel's ontological

argument is subject to a kind of objection which has hitherto

been overlooked, but which has often been levelled at other

ontological arguments, viz. that it can be paralleled by

apparently equally persuasive proofs of the existence of beings

in which no one should wish to believe. (Compare Gaunilo's

objection to St. Anselm: No one should wish to believe in the

existence of an island than which no greater island can be

conceived.) "

25. Park, Woosuk. 2003. "On the Motivations of Gödel's

Ontological Proof." Modern Schoolman:144-153.

"In recent years there has been a surge of interest in Gödel's

ontological proof of the existence of God. Gödel showed his

proof (Gödel *1970) to Scott, and Scott made a note of the proof

and presented it in his seminar at Princeton University in the

fall of 1970. From then on, Gödel's proof has become widely

circulated. It was finally published in Sobel 1987 as an appendix

and later included in volume three of Gödel's Collected Works.

Recent discussions of Gödel's proof mostly start from Sobel's

criticisms. As is well known, the most influential criticism of

Sobel is that Gödel's proof leads to a consequence unacceptable

to most philosophers, i.e. that all truths are necessary truths.

Anderson 1990 viewed this as the modal collapse of Gödel's

assumptions, and tried to save Gödel's proof by some plausible

modifications.

Anderson's emendation secured many interesting responses

including Oppy 1996, where a parody of the Gödelian proof

reminiscent of Gaunilo's objection to Anselm's proof is

presented. As one might expect, such a parody has invited

friends of ontological proofs to follow in the footsteps of

Anselm.

In spite of all this extensive concern, it is not certain whether

there is any improvement in understanding the motivations of

Gödel's ontological proof. Why was Gödel so preoccupied with

completing his own ontological proof? To the best of my

knowledge, no one has dealt with this basic question seriously

enough to answer it.

In this article, I propose to examine Gödel's ideas against a

somewhat larger background in order to understand his

motivation for establishing the ontological proof.

I shall point out that the value of Gödel's proof is to be found in

the possible role of his proof of the existence of God in his

philosophy as a whole as well as in its relative merit as an

ontological proof. Hopefully, my guiding question as to Gödel's

motivation will turn out to be extremely fruitful by enabling us

to fathom his mind regarding God and mathematics."

26. Perzanowski, Jerzy. 1991. "Ontological arguments II - Cartesian

and Leibnizian." In Handbook of Metaphysics and Ontology,

edited by Burkhardt, Hans and Smith, Barry, 625-633.

München: Philosophia Verlag.

27. Roetti, Jorge Alfredo. 2004. "El argumento ontológico: La

variante de Gödel de la versión de Leibniz." Dialogos.Revista

del Departmento de Filosofia Universidad de Puerto Rico no.

39:77-105.

"The paper contains a full version of the well-known Gödel's

variant of the ontological argument. It is based on the Leibniz's

version of the proof, the axiom systems of Gödel 1970 and of

Anderson 1990, with some weakenings. We discriminate

between several types of existence; the form of existence of God

we assert is, in a constructive fashion, a weaker one. Later we

deal with Kant's criticism against the predicate of existence and

offer several commentaries on the proof, and on topics such as

perfection and existence."

28. Scott, Dana. 1987. "Gödel's Ontological Proof." In On Being

and Saying. Essays for Richard Cartwright, edited by

Thomson, Judith Jarvis, 257-258. Cambridge: MIT Press.

29. Sobel, John Howard. 1987. "Gödel's Ontological Proof." In On

Being and Saying. Essays for Richard Cartwright, edited by

Thomson, Judith Jarvis, 241-261. Cambridge: MIT Press.

"Notes in Gödel's "Nachlass" contain a sketch of a theory that

culminates in a theorem that says that it is necessary that there

is a being that has every positive property. I observe that in the

theory a being with all positive properties would have only

necessarily instantiated properties, and demonstrate that

modalities collapse in the theory -- in it everything actual or

true is so of logical necessity."

30. ———. 2004. Logic and Theism. Arguments For and Against

Beliefs in God. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

31. Sobel, Jordan Howard. 2006. "To My Critics with Appreciation:

Responses To My Critics with Appreciation: to Taliaferro,

Swinburne, and Koons." Philosophia Christi no. 8:249-293.

32. Świętorzecka, Kordula, ed. 2015. Gödel's Ontological

Argument. History, Modifications, and Controversies.

Warszawa: Semper Wydawnictwo Naukowe.

Contents: Preface VII-IX; 1. Kordula Świętorzecka: Gödel's

'Ontologischer Beweis’. Remarks on Its Philosophical

Background and Variations 1; 2. Johannes Czermak: From

Ontological Proof to Theological Theories 47; 3. Edward

Nieznanski: Gödel's summum bonum versus Leibniz’s ratio

sufficiens 85; 4. Gödel's, Kordula Świętorzecka: Gödel's

"Slingshot” Argument and His Onto-Theological System 123; 5.

Gödel's: Causal Interpretation of Gödel’s Ontological Proof 163;

6. André Fuhrmann: Blogging Gödel: His Ontological

Argument in the Public Eye 203; Bibliography 227-233.

33. Szatkowski, Miroslaw. 2005. "Semantic Analysis of Some

Variants of Anderson-Like Ontological Proofs." Studia Logica

no. 79:317-355.

"The aim of this paper is to prove strong completeness

theorems for several Anderson-like variants of Gödel's theory

wrt. classes of modal structures, in which: (i). 1st order terms

receive only rigid extensions in the constant objectual 1st order

domain; (ii). 2nd order terms receive nonrigid extensions in

preselected world-relative objectual domains of 2nd order and

rigid intensions in the constant conceptual 2nd order domain."

34. ———. 2019. "Deficiencies of Gödel’s Ontological Proof." In Quo

Vadis,Metaphysics? Essays in Honor of Peter van Inwagen,

edited by Szatkowski, Miroslaw, 469-476. Berlin: de Gruyter.

35. Wang, Hao. 1996. A Logical Journey. From Gödel to

Philosophy. Cambridge: MIT Press.

See Chapter 3.2 Religion and Gödel's Ontological Proof pp. 111-

121.

Norman Malcolm (1911-1990)

Texts

1. Malcolm, Norman. 1960. "Anselm's ontological argument."

Philosophical Review:41-62.

Reprinted in: N. Malcolm - Knowledge and certainty. Essays

and lectures - Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1963, pp. 141-

162.

"I believe that in Anselm's Proslogion and Responsio editoris

there are two different pieces of reasoning which he did not

distinguish from one another, and that a good deal of light may

be shed on the philosophical problem of "the ontological

argument" if we do distinguish them. In Chapter 2 of the

Proslogion Anselm says that we believe that God is something a

greater than which cannot be conceived. (The Latin is aliquid

quo nihil maius cogitari possit. Anselm sometimes uses the

alternative expressions aliquid quo maius nihil cogitari potest,

id quo maius cogitari nequit, aliquid quo maius cogitari non

valet.) Even the fool of the Psalm who says in his heart there is

no God, when he hears this very thing that Anselm says,

namely, "something a greater than which cannot be conceived,"

understands what he hears, and what he understands is in his

understanding though he does not understand that it exists."

Studies

1. Morewedge, Parviz. 1970. "Ibn Sina (Avicenna) and Malcolm

and the ontological argument." Monist.An International

Quarterly Journal of General Philosophical Inquiry no.

54:234-249.

"Evidence is presented in support of the following theses: (1)

Prior to Anselm, Ibn Sina formulated a version of the

ontological argument which corresponds to Malcolm's second

version of this argument. (2) An examination of Ibn Sina's

formulation permits new criticism of Malcolm's version. The

latter makes the unwarranted deduction that in its

metaphysical use "the necessary existent" is identified with

"God" in its ordinary religious use. Further, Malcolm's informal

explication of "the necessary existent" in terms of "dependency

on privations" contains logical confusions. Departing from the

same premise as Malcolm, Ibn Sina deduces a different

conclusion, identifying "the necessary existent" not with a

substantial creator, but with the "source of the world's

dependence," analogous to the so-called "principle of sufficient

reason" used by the mystics. To clarify the alleged contentions

of the argument, analytical distinctions are drawn between

various metaphysical categories, e.g., "essence," "existence,"

and "substance"."

Jan Berg (1928-

Texts

1. Berg, Jan. 1961. "An examination of ontological proof."

Theoria.A Swedish Journal of Philosophy no. 27:99-106.

Studies

1. Mann, William E. 1967. "Definite descriptions and the

ontological argument." Theoria no. 33:211-229.

Somewhat revised version, incorporating new translations of

the passages of Anselm's works, in: Karel Lambert (ed.),

Philosophical Applications of Free Logic, New York: Oxford

University Press, 1991, pp. 257-272.

"Jan Berg has presented, in a painstaking and highly

compressed paper, St. Anselm's Ontological Argument ,

dressed in the garb of a formal language, L. L is the first-order

predicate calculus with identity and, particularly, with Russell's

theory of descriptions. It is the task of Berg's paper to

reconstruct Anselm's argument in L with an eye towards (1)

preserving historical accuracy and (2) preventing the argument

from begging the question. In this paper I will argue that he has

not completely satisfied either objective, and further, that the

reason he has not is that Russell's theory of descriptions is

particularly unsuitable for Anselm's argument. I will then

investigate the implications of reconstructing the argument in

L, supplemented not with Russell's theory, but with some

alternative theories."

John Howard Sobel (1929 - 2010)

Texts

1. Sobel, John Howard. 1987. "Gödel's Ontological Proof." In On

Being and Saying. Essays for Richard Cartwright, edited by

Thomson, Judith Jarvis, 241-261. Cambridge: MIT Press.

"Notes in Gödel's "Nachlass" contain a sketch of a theory that

culminates in a theorem that says that it is necessary that there

is a being that has every positive property. I observe that in the

theory a being with all positive properties would have only

necessarily instantiated properties, and demonstrate that

modalities collapse in the theory -- in it everything actual or

true is so of logical necessity."

2. ———. 2004. Logic and Theism. Arguments For and Against

Beliefs in God. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

3. ———. 2006. "To My Critics With Appreciation: Responses to

Taliaferro, Swinburne, and Koons." Philosophia Christi no.

8:249-292.

"This response to critics includes elaboration of ideas and

arguments in Logic and Theism regarding cumulative

arguments for theism, probabilities, 'fine-tuning' and many

worlds, and Gödel's ontological proof, probabilities subjective

and objective, and Mackiean doubts concerning the latter, are

explained. There is discussion of 'dividing the evidence' in

Bayesian confirmation exercises, with some of it allowed to

target 'priors' of hypotheses, and there is a note on my

problems with old evidence. Tentatively explored are Gödel's

considered modal opinions, which may have included that

every truth is necessary, and every falsehood impossible."

4. ———. 2007. "Born Again! Anselm in the Person of Charles

Hartshorne." In The Logic Yearbook 2006, edited by Tomala,

Andrej and Honzik, Radek, 223-235. Praha: Filosofia.

"Charles Hartshorne derives in a sentential modal logic, that

"perfection exists" from the premises that "perfection is not

impossible" and "perfection could not exist contingently."

These premises are, on certain assumptions, equivalent to

corollaries to which Anselm was committed of the premises of

the major argument in Proslogion 2, namely, that "

(S)omething-than-which-nothing-greater-can-be-thought

exists in the mind" and that "(T)hat-than-which-a-greater-

cannot-be-thought cannot exist in the mind alone," for the

conclusion that " something-than-which-a-greater-cannot-be-

thought exists both in the mind and in reality," which argument

is, on a generous construction, valid in a quantificational logic

for indefinite descriptions."

Studies

Alvin Plantinga (1932-

Texts

1. Plantinga, Alvin. 1966. "Kant's objection to the ontological

argument." Journal of Philosophy no. 63:537-545.

"The Ontological Argument for the existence of God has

fascinated and puzzled philosophers ever since it was first

formulated by St. Anselm, I suppose most philosophers have

been inclined to reject the argument, although it has an

illustrious line of defenders extending to the present and

presently terminating in Professors Malcolm and Hartshorne.

Many philosophers have tried to give general refutations of the

argument-refutations designed to show that no version of it can

possibly succeed-of which the most important is, perhaps,

Kant's objection, with its several contemporary variations. I

believe that none of these general refutations are successful; in

what follows I shall support this belief by critically examining

Kant's objection."

2. ———. 1967. God and other minds. A study of the rational

justification of belief in God. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Chapter Two: The Ontological Argument (I) 26; Chapter Three:

The Ontological Argument (II) 64-94.

3. ———. 1974. The nature of necessity. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

4. ———. 1974. God, freedom, and evil. New York: Harper & Row.

Studies

1. Coburn, Robert C. 1966. "Animadversions on Plantinga's Kant."

Journal of Philosophy :546-548.

"The bulk of the paper is devoted to an examination of the

'interpretations' which Alvin Plantinga suggests as to what Kant

was saying in his discussion of the ontological argument in the

first "Critique." I conclude with an independent account of

what Kant was getting at."

2. Grim, Patrick. 1981. "Plantinga, Hartshorne, and the

ontological argument." Sophia no. 20:12-16.

"R. L. Purtill has claimed that the ontological argument that

Plantinga presents in The nature of necessity is basically the

same as that offered in Hartshorne's The logic of perfection and

that it falls victim to the same criticisms. I argue that

Plantinga's ontological argument is different enough "not" to

fall victim to Purtill's criticisms. What makes Plantinga's

argument different, however, also makes it vulnerable to a

different criticism: the God of Plantinga's conclusion is not a

being greater than which none can be conceived."

3. Inwagen, Peter van. 1977. "Ontological arguments." Noûs no.

11:375-395.

"In this paper I shall delimit an infinite class of valid arguments

I shall call ontic arguments. These arguments proceed from a

premise that asserts of a set of properties that it satisfies certain

conditions, to the conclusion that there exists something that

exemplifies that set of properties. If the conclusion of an ontic

argument can be read as asserting the existence of a Deity, then

I call that argument an ontological argument. In the present

sense of this term, there are infinitely many ontological

arguments, all of them valid. I shall devote special attention to

one particular ontological argument, the most modest, since

many of its features are shared by all other ontological

arguments. I shall argue that anyone who wants to claim either

that this argument is sound or that it is unsound is faced with

grave difficulties.

I shall take it for granted that the connection between what I

call ontological arguments and traditional presentations of

"the" ontological argument (there is, of course, no one

argument that can be called the ontological argument) is plain.

I make the following historical claim without arguing for it:

Every well-known "version of the ontological argument" is

either, (I) essentially the same as one of the arguments called

ontological herein, or (ii) invalid or outrageously question-

begging, or (iii) stated in language so confusing it is not

possible to say with any confidence just what its premises are or

what their relation to its conclusion is supposed to be. I should

myself be inclined to place all historical "versions of the

ontological argument" in category (iii), but this is a function of

the way I read them: I would place many of the arguments

certain contemporary philosophers claim to see in the original

sources in one of the first two categories. I shall examine one

contemporary argument, that presented by Alvin Plantinga in

The nature of necessity (Chapter X) and in God, freedom, and

evil (pp. 85-112). Plantinga's argument falls into category (I). I

shall dispute Plantinga's contention that his argument can be

used to show that belief in God is not contrary to reason."

4. Purtill, Richard L. 1976. "Plantinga, necessity, and God." New

Scholasticism no. 50:36-60.

"This paper is a critical overview of Alvin Plantinga's recent

book entitled The nature of necessity . While noting the many

virtues of the work, I criticise Plantinga on a number of points,

major and minor. In particular I argue that Plantinga's notion

of an "essence" is lacking in content and that his formulation of

the ontological argument does not advance the question much

beyond the stage reached by Hartshorne's formulation of the

argument and criticisms of this formulation by myself and

others. Plantinga also fails to distinguish sufficiently between

narrowly logical necessity and broadly logical necessity and

between the direct and inverse probabilities involved in a

probabilistic version of the argument from evil. I also criticise

Plantinga's strategy of merely defending theistic belief as not

disprovable and in that sense rational; in my view this is too

modest an aim for the theistic philosopher."

5. Tooley, Michael. 1981. "Plantinga's defence of the ontological

argument." Mind no. 90:422-427.

"In chapter 10 of his book, The nature of necessity , Alvin

Plantinga contends that although many versions of the

ontological argument are unsound, there is at least one that is

valid, and whose premises may reasonably be accepted. It is

argued in this paper that Plantinga's defense of this contention

is unsatisfactory, and that the version of the ontological

argument which he offers is unacceptable for at least two

reasons. In the first place, it involves a form of argumentation

which if applied to structurally identical, and equally justified

premises, leads to contradictory conclusions. Secondly, the

crucial premise in Plantinga's argument can be seen to be

necessarily false, given an adequate account of the truth

conditions of modal statements."

David Kellogg Lewis (1941-2001)

Texts

1. Lewis, David. 1970. "Anselm and Actuality." Noûs no. 4:175-

188.

Reprinted in; Philosophical papers - vol. I Oxofrd, Oxford

University Press 1983 pp. 10-20 with Postscripts pp. 21-25.

"A version of Anselm's first ontological argument is symbolized

in non-modal logic with explicit reference to conceivable worlds

and beings that exist therein. An ambiguity appears: one

symbolization yields an invalid argument with credible

premises while another symbolization yields a valid argument

with premises we have no good, non-circular reason to accept.

The credibility of one premise of the second version turns on

the nature of actuality; I propose that "actual" is an indexical

term closely analogous to 'present'."

Studies

1. Spade, Paul Vincent. 1976. "Anselm and ambiguity."

International Journal for Philosophy of Religion no. 7:433-

445.

"David Lewis' analysis of Anselm's ontological argument shows

that something is wrong with it but not, despite his claim, what

is wrong with it. I offer a further analysis in the spirit of Lewis',

taking account of a four-fold ambiguity in the notion of

'greater'. When the ambiguity is resolved, it turns out that on

some readings the argument is valid but the premisses are not

each more plausible than the conclusion. On other readings the

argument is invalid but the premisses are trivially true. The

argument's illusion of plausibility trades on the ambiguity."

Robert Maydole (1941-

Texts

1. Maydole, Robert E. 1980. "A modal model for proving the

existence of God." American Philosophical Quarterly no.

17:135-142.

"In the first section of this paper I employ an ontological type

argument to show that the mere possibility of God's existence

implies, in a standard system of quantified modal logic, the

actual existence of God. I also show that there is at most one

God. In the second section I argue that the very idea of God is

meaningful. In the third section I use a cosmological argument

modeled on St Thomas' Third Way to prove that God exists.

The mediate conclusion is that God exists. In the final section

of the paper I discuss the plausibility of adopting the modal

logic previously employed."

2. ———. 2000. "The modal Third Way." International Journal of

Philosophy of Religion no. 47:1-28.

3. ———. 2003. "The modal perfection argument for the existence

of a Supreme Being." Philo.A Journal of Philosophy no. 6:299-

313.

"The 'modal perfection argument' (MPA) for the existence of a

Supreme Being is a new ontological argument that is rooted in

the insights of Anselm, Leibniz and Gödel. Something is

supreme if and only if nothing is possibly greater, and a

perfection is a property that it is better to have than not. The

premises of MPA are that supremity is a perfection, perfections

entail only perfections, and the negation of a perfection is not a

perfection. I do three things in this paper.

First, I prove that MPA is valid by construction a formal

deduction of it in second order modal logic. Second, I argue

that its premises are true. Third, I defend the argument of the

logic used against some likely objections."

4. ———. 2006. "On Oppy's objections to the modal perfection

argument." Philo.A Journal of Philosophy no. 8.

5. ———. 2006. "On Metcalf's objections to the modal perfection

argument." Philo.A Journal of Philosophy no. 8.

6. ———. 2009. "The Ontological Argument." In The Blackwell

Companion to Natural Theology, edited by Craig, William

Lane and Moreland, James Porter, 553-587. Malden: Wiley-

Blackwell.

Studies

1. Metcalf, Thomas. 2005. "Entailment and ontological

arguments: reply to Maydole." Philo.A Journal of Philosophy

no. 8:131-133.

"Robert Maydole has recently presented a sophisticated

ontological argument that he calls the modal perfection

argument for the existence of a Supreme Being. While this

ontological argument is probably better than most of its peers,

it is nonetheless open to at least one decisive objection. The

purpose of this brief comment is to develop that objection. I

claim that this objection indicates an important further point

about the concept of entailment and its role in ontological

arguments at large, the recognition of which helps to refute

other conceivable ontological arguments."

2. Oppy, Graham. 2004. "Maydole's 2QS5 argument." Philo.A

Journal of Philosophy no. 7:201-209.

3. ———. 2007. "Maydole's modal perfection argument (again)."

Philo.A Journal of Philosophy no. 10.

Graham Oppy (1960-

Texts

1. Oppy, Graham. 1991. "Makin on the ontological argument."

Philosophy no. 66:106-114.

"In "The Ontological Argument" (Philosophy 63, 1988, pp. 83-

91) Stephen Makin offers a defence of what he calls 'Anselm

Ontological Argument'. I am not much interested in the

question whether the argument which Makin defends can

properly be attributed to St. Anselm, though I suspect that

there is considerable room for disagreement on this score;

rather, I want to suggest that the argument which Makin offers

is quite clearly invalid (and hence unsound) and I also want to

suggest that it is very plausible to suppose that any version of

the ontological argument is vitiated by the same fallacy in

which Makin's argument is entrapped."

2. ———. 1993. "Makin's ontological argument (again)."

Philosophy no. 68:234-239.

"In 'The Ontological Argument Defended' (1), Stephen Makin

defends the following version of the ontological argument:

Makin's Argument

(Df) S is the concept: something than which nothing greater

can be conceived.

(A) If F is, and G is not, a selectively and intrinsically

necessarily exemplified concept, then, ceteris paribus, F's are

greater than G's.

Suppose:

(B) S is not (selectively and intrinsically) necessarily

exemplified.

Then:

But that is absurd. So the supposition (B) must be rejected:

(D) S is (selectively and intrinsically) necessarily exemplified.

(2)

I have two criticisms to make of this argument. First, it can be

paralleled to its discredit. And second, it can be shown

independently that the argument fails to establish the

conclusion that there actually exists a being than which none

greater can be conceived. I shall argue for each of these

contentions in turn."

(1) Stephen Makin, "The Ontological Argument Defended",

Philosophy 67 (1992), 247-255.

(2) Ibid., 248. I have changed the labelling of the sentences; I

shall use my own labelling of sentences throughout. Makin

explains the meanign of, and the need for, the qualification that

S be selectively and intrinsically necessarily exemplified at

250-252.

3. ———. 1995. Ontological arguments and belief in God.

Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

4. ———. 1996. "Gödelian ontological arguments." Analysis no.

56:226-230.

"There is now a considerable secondary literature on Gödel's

ontological arguments; in particular, interested readers should

consult Sobel 1987, Anderson 1990 and Adams 1995. In this

note, I wish to draw attention to an objection to these

arguments which has hitherto gone unnoticed. This objection

does not depend upon fine details of the formulation of the

arguments; I arbitrarily choose to develop the objection in

connection with the formulation provided by Anderson.

In brief, the argument I shall consider may be summarized

thus:

Definition 1: x is God-like iff x has as essential properties those

and only those properties which are positive.

Definition 2: A is an essence of x iff for every property B, x has

B necessarily iff A entails B.

Definition 3: x necessarily exists iff every essence of x is

necessarily exemplified.

Axiom 1: If a property is positive, then its negation is not

positive.

Axiom 2: Any property entailed by [= strictly implied by] a

positive property is positive.

Axiom 3: The property of being God-like is positive.

Axiom 4: If a property is positive, then it is necessarily positive.

Axiom 5: Necessary existence is positive.

Theorem 1: If a property is positive, then it is consistent [=

possibly exemplified].

Corollary 1: The property of being God-like is consistent.

Theorem 2: If something is God-like, then the property of being

God-like is an essence of that thing.

Theorem 3: Necessarily, the property of being God-like is

exemplified.

Given a sufficiently generous conception of properties, and

granted the acceptability of the underlying modal logic, the

theorems listed do follow from the axioms. (So say Gödel, Dana

Scott, Sobel, Anderson, and Adams. Who am I to disagree?)

Perhaps one might object to the conception of properties

and/or the modal logic. But one doesn't need to: the proof is

demonstrably no good even if these things are accepted.

The problem - as with virtually all ontological arguments

known to me - lies in the fact that there are parallel arguments

which can be constructed, which seem no less acceptable to

atheists and agnostics, but whose acceptance leads to absurd

results. (1)" p. 226.

(1) In Oppy (1995, p. 225), I write: 'It may be possible to

reinterpret the (Gödelian) proof in a damaging way, though I

have not been able to see how to do this.' I think that my vision

has now improved a little: hence the present paper.

5. ———. 2000. "Response to Gettings." Analysis no. 60:363-367.

In "Gödelian Ontological Arguments" (Analysis 56, 1996), I

argue that Gödel's ontological argument is subject to a Gaunilo-

style parody. In the present paper, I provide an emended

version of the argument that avoids objections raised by Mike

Gettings in his "Gödel's Ontological Argument: A Reply to

Oppy" (Analysis 59, 1999)."

6. ———. 2006. Arguing about Gods. Cambridge: Cambridge

University Press.

Chapter 2: Ontological arguments, pp. 49-96.

Studies

1. Gettings, Michael. 1999. "Gödel's ontological argument: a reply

to Oppy." Analysis no. 59:309-313.

"Graham Oppy has contributed recently to the discussion of

Gödel's ontological argument with an attempted refutation

(Oppy 1996). Although seemingly promising, I will show here

that this attempt fails to undermine Gödel's argument.

Very briefly, Gödel's argument proceeds in the following way.

(1) One begins with the primitive notion of a positive property.

A positive property is a 'great-making' property which entails

no defect. The property of Godlikeness (G) is defined in this

way: One is God-like iff one has as essential properties all and

only positive properties. Given a number of axioms concerning

positive properties, one can prove that a unique possible

individual instantiates God-likeness, i.e. that there is (at least)

one possible world inhabited by this unique God-like being.

Furthermore, necessary existence is a positive property. Thus,

in some possible world this unique God-like being necessarily

exists, and so, in SS modal logic, this being exists in the actual

world.

Oppy's strategy is the strategy which the monk Gaunilo used to

try to refute Anselm's ontological argument. This strategy

attempts to show that if the theist purports to have proven the

existence of God, the same reasoning may be used to prove the

existence of many theologically repugnant entities, e.g. demi-

gods, perfect islands, etc. Oppy's particular objection is

motivated in the following way: since the theist defines God-

likeness, the atheist may define a similar property, call it

`God*-likeness' ('G*'). Let God*-likeness be the property one

has iff one has as essential properties only and almost all of the

positive properties, including necessary existence (e.g., all

positive properties except omniscience, and only positive

properties). Since two things are identical only if they share the

same essential properties, the definition of God*-likeness

ensures that the atheist's being is distinct from God.

Furthermore, a God*-like being must also be necessarily

existent, since necessary existence is a property entailed by

God*likeness.

Oppy cannot draw the conclusion that such a being exists,

however. There is a crucial disanalogy between his argument

and the theist's. This disanalogy becomes evident when we look

at Oppy's argument, which he presents in two formulations.

These two formulations are similar, and I will show that the

first is defective, and argue that the second fails for similar

reasons." pp. 309-310.

(1) See Anderson 1990 for details of a strengthened formulation

of Gödel's argument. This is the formulation which both Oppy

and I address, although I will also consider a revision to this

argument. For now, 'Gödel's argument' and 'the theist's

argument' will refer to the formulation found in Anderson

1990.

Alexander Pruss (1973-

Texts

1. Pruss, Alexander. 2001. "Samkara's principle and two

ontomystical arguments." International Journal of Philosophy

of Religion no. 49:111-120.

"The S5-based ontological argument assumes (1) possibly there

is a maximally great being (MGB) and (2) that any MGB must

be essentially such and have necessary existence, so that by S5

there is a MGB. The weakest point is (1). Samkara (788-820

AD) argued that if something is impossible, then one cannot

have a seeming of it. Therefore, by modus tollens, if a mystic

has a (quasi-perceptual) seeming of a MGB, then possibly there

is a MGB, and hence (1) is true, and there is a MGB. A variant

based on a radical dependence ontological argument is also

discussed."

2. ———. 2008. "A Gödelian ontological argument improved."

Religious Studies no. 45:347-353.

Studies

Bibliography on the Contemporary Period

1. Adams, Robert Merrihew. 1969. The Modal Argument for the

Existence of God, Cornell University.

class="styel9">Available at ProQuest Dissertation Express.

Order number: 6913015.

2. ———. 1988. "Presumption and the Necessary Existence of

God." Noûs no. 22:19-32.

3. Alston, William. 1960. "The ontological argument revisited."

Philosophical Review no. 69:452-474.

class="styel9">Reprinted in: A. Plantinga (ed.) - The

ontological argument from St. Anselm to contemporary

philosophers - London, Macmillan, 1968 pp. 86-110.

"The ontological argument has often been criticized on the

grounds that it mistakenly supposes "exists" to be a predicate. I

am going to argue (1) that the way in which this criticism is

usually presented is faulty, (2) that these faults result from

overlooking certain basic features of the concept of existence,

and (3) that when these features are fully taken into account,

new and sounder reasons can be given for denying that "exists"

is a predicate and for rejecting the ontological argument. In the

first section I shall present the traditional kind of criticism in

what I take to be its strongest form; in the second, I shall try to

show that it does not hold up; in the third I shall attempt to

enrich it so as to avoid those defects.(*)" p. 452

(*) It may be helpful to relate this essay to Professor Norman

Malcolm's very interesting article, "Anselm's Ontological

Arguments," which recently appeared in the [Philosophical]

Review (LXIX, 1960, 41-62). There Malcolm distinguishes two

different arguments in Anselm's Proslogion. My treatment of

Anselm is restricted to what Malcolm calls the first argument,

and is concerned with the sort of considerations which are

commonly used in rejecting it. About what Malcolm calls the

second argument, I have nothing to say in this essay. My

opinion is that the second argument is ultimately dependent on

the first, but that is a long story."

4. Balaban, Oded, and Avshalom, Asnat. 1990. "The ontological

argument reconsidered." Journal of Philosophical Research no.

15:279-310.

5. Bausola, Adriano. 2000. "Per una ripresa dell'argomento

ontologico." Rivista di Filosofia Neo-Scolastica no. 92:349-

362.

6. Brown, Charles D. 1978. "The ontological theorem." Notre

Dame Journal of Formal Logic no. 19:591-592.

7. Duncan, Roger. 1980. "Analogy and the ontological argument."

New Scholasticism no. 54:25-33.

class="styel9">"St Thomas rejects the ontological argument but

does not deny that the concept of God entails his essence.

Instead, he relies on the distinction between a proposition's

being necessary and its being known "a priori", which is related

to the problem of knowing God's possibility "a priori", the

Achilles heel of contemporary modal arguments. Why can we

not know God's possibility "a priori"? The doctrine of analogy

claims that God-language is too obscure to authorize such

deductions. The rejection of irreducibly analogous language

leads to rationalism, which accepts the ontological argument,

or to fideism/agnosticism, which reject it. Modern philosophers

were in tacit agreement in ignoring the distinction between "a

priority" and necessity, and on the irrelevance of analogy.

Hence they oscillated between acceptance of the ontological

argument, and the total rejection of significant God-talk.

Recent trends are favorable to a reconsideration of both points,

and to an appreciation of their adumbration in the writings of

Aquinas."

8. Forgie, J.William. 2008. "How is the question 'is existence a

predicate?' relevant to the ontological argument?"

International Journal for Philosophy of Religion no. 64:117-

133.

9. Forgie, William J. 1991. "The modal ontological argument and

the necessary a posteriori." International Journal for

Philosophy of Religion no. 29:129-141.

class="styel9">"I consider modal ontological arguments of the

form, 'God is possible; therefore, God actually exists', which

conceive of God in terms of properties"indexed to the actual

world. The use of such indexed properties can ensure the

validity of these arguments but it also transforms their

possibility premisses into a posteriori claims. Because of this, a

typical inquirer is not going to be able to get into some desired

epistemic position toward the possibility premise (e.g., knowing

it, or determining that it is rationally acceptable) without first

having to get into that same position toward the conclusion of

the argument. Thus it is not clear for whom these arguments

could establish even the rationality of their conclusions."

10. Garcia de la Sienra, Adolfo. 2000. "The Ontological Argument."

In The Rationality of Theism, edited by Garcia de la Sienra,

Adolfo and Araujo, Alfredo, 127-142. Atlanta: Rodopi.

class="styel9">"Abstract. This paper presents a reconstruction

of Anselm's ontological argument within the framework of

Meinong's Gegenstandstheorie. It is shown that, within this

framework and assuming a certain basic theological view, the

argument has some force. Unlike many replies to the argument,

the paper concludes undermining the theological view rather

than the premise that existence is a predicate.

The ontological argument is an old piece of theological

reasoning that has a long and interesting history in the course

of Western philosophy. The main author of this argument was

the Eleventh-century English friar Anselm of Canterbury,

according to Koyré "one of the profoundest and most exalted of

spirits," but Descartes' formulation (which he produced without

being aware of Anselm's work) is deemed also as one of the

standard presentations of the argument.

I shall devote the first part of this chapter to present Anselm's

argument. I have found convenient and natural to present the

ontological argument within the framework of Meinong's

theory of objects, and that is why I shall devote the first section

of the first part to present Meinong's doctrine. In the second

and last part I will provide a Reformed assessment of the

ontological argument."

11. Goodwin, George L. 1990. "De re modality and the ontological

argument." Archivio di Filosofia:607-629.

12. Gracia, Jorge J.E. 1974. "'A supremely great Being'." New

Scholasticism no. 48:371-377.

13. Hájek, Petr. 2008. "Ontological Proofs of Existence and Non-

Existence." Studia Logica no. 90:257-262.

14. Henle, Paul. 1961. "Uses of the ontological argument."

Philosophical Review no. 70:102-109.

class="styel9">"That anyone should uphold the ontological

argument as demonstrative of the existence of God is

surprising, yet Professor Norman Malcolm seems perfectly

serious in his recent defense of one form of it. (1) He maintains

that the argument has two variants, one, which he rejects,

concludes that God exists and the other, which he accepts,

maintains that God has necessary existence. This acceptance is

the more remarkable because Malcolm does not base his

contention on any Neoplatonic identification of existence with

reality and fullness of being. Granted such a metaphysics, the

argument would, seem to follow, but Malcolm does not take

this approach and indeed professes to have difficulty in

comprehending the doctrine of negation and privation

characteristic, of it (p. 59). Without such metaphysical

buttressing, the argument is quite weak, but it may be well first

to show that something is wrong with it before going on to

consider what is wrong."

(1) "Anselm's ontological arguments" Philosophical Review, 69,

1960, pp. 41-62.

15. Herrschaft, Lutz. 1993. ""Das was ich mir vorstelle, ist darum

doch noch nicht": Der ontologische Gottesbeweis in der

neueren Diskussion." Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung

no. 47:461-476.

16. Inwagen, Peter van. 1998. "Ontological Arguments." Noûs:375-

395.

class="styel9">"This chapter gives a very compressed history of

the ontological argument from Anselm to Kant, and discusses

briefly a modern, modal version of the argument. It is argued

that Anselm's and Descartes's versions of the argument are

flawed, and that one cannot know the main premise of the

modal argument -- 'It is possible for there to be a perfect being

(a being that has all perfections essentially)' -- to be true

otherwise than by knowing, on some ground independent of the

modal argument, that a perfect being actually exists."

17. ———. 2007. "Some Remarks on the Modal Ontological

Argument." In Metaphysik heute -- Probleme und Perspektiven

der Ontologie / Metaphysics Today -- Problems and Prospects

of Ontology, edited by Lutz-Bachmann, Matthias and Schmidt,

Thomas M., 132-145. Freiburg: Verlag Karl Alber.

18. Jacquette, Dale. 1994. "Meinongian logic and Anselm's

ontological proof for the existence of God." Philosophical

Forum no. 25:231-240.

class="styel9">"The logic of existent and nonexistent objects

provides a formal theory of reference and true predication for

ordinary discourse, the semantics of ontological commitment,

and logic of fiction. The intensional logic proposed in what

follows offers a rigorous object theory semantics with

nonstandard propositional and predicate inference machinery.

The system is distinguished from previous formalizations of

object theory by formal criteria for nuclear (constitutive) and

extranuclear (nonconstitutive) properties, three-valued

propositional semantics for predications of nuclear properties

to incomplete nonexistent objects for which the objects

ostensibly are undetermined, nonstandard set theory semantics

with unrestricted comprehension for object theory predicate

semantics (licensed by existence restrictions on abstraction

equivalence), demonstrations of internal determinacy,

consistency, and Henkin completeness, nonstandard deduction

theorem, and consistency considerations in light of free

assumption and unrestricted comprehension."

19. Leftow, Brian. 1990. "Is God an abstract object?" Noûs no.

24:581-598.

20. Meixner, Uwe. 1992. "Der ontologische Gottesbeweis in der

Perspektive der Analytischen Philosophie." Theologie und

Philosophie no. 67:246-262.

21. Oakes, Robert. 1977. "A prolegomenon to future exploration of

the ontological argument." The Personalist no. 58:344-351.

class="styel9">"The objection which appears to bedevil modal

"as well as" non-modal versions of the ontological argument is

that no modality of 'real' (i.e., denotational) existence can be

contained in any concept whatever, and, consequently, that

'God exists' cannot constitute a conceptual truth. I attempt to

establish the rationality of maintaining that whether or not this

is so is irrelevant to the integrity of the modal version of the

ontological argument, since the falsity of the 'containment-

objection' is not a necessary condition of its being a conceptual

truth that God exists. In sum, I show that it is perfectly rational

to believe "both" that 'God exists' constitutes a truth-of-

meaning and that no modality of existence can be "contained"

in the concept of God."

22. Oppenheimer, Paul, and Zalta, Edward. 1991. "On the Logic of

the Ontological Argument." Philosophical Perspectives no.

5:509-530.

class="styel9">"In this paper, the authors show that there is a

reading of St. Anselm's ontological argument in Proslogium II

that is logically valid (the premises entail the conclusion). This

reading takes Anselm's use of the definite description "that

than which nothing greater can be conceived" seriously.

Consider a first-order language and logic in which definite

descriptions are genuine terms, and in which the quantified

sentence "there is an x such that..." does not imply "x exists".

Then, using an ordinary logic of descriptions and a connected

greater-than relation, God's existence logically follows from the

claims: (a) there is a conceivable thing than which nothing

greater is conceivable, and (b) if x doesn't exist, something

greater than x can be conceived. To deny the conclusion, one

must deny one of the premises. However, the argument

involves no modal inferences and, interestingly, Descartes'

ontological argument can be derived from it."

23. ———. 2007. "Reflections on the logic of the ontological

argument." Studia Neoaristotelica no. 4:28-37.

class="styel9">"In this paper, the authors evaluate the

ontological argument they developed in their 1991 paper as to

soundness. They focus on Anselm's first premise, which asserts:

there is a conceivable thing than which nothing greater is

conceivable. After suggesting reasons why this premise is false,

the authors show that there is a reading of this premise on

which it is true. Such a premise can be used in a valid and

sound reconstruction of the ontological argument. This

argument is developed in precise detail, but the authors show

that the conclusion, the formal version of which is a reading of

the claim that "God exists", doesn't quite achieve the end

Anselm desired."

24. Rescher, Nicholas. 1959. "The ontological proof revisited."

Australasian Journal of Philosophy no. 37:138-148.

class="styel9">Reprinted in: N. Rescher, Issues in

thePhilosophy of Religion, Frankfurt: Ontos Verlag 2007, pp.

13-24.

25. Shaffer, Jerome. 1962. "Existence, Predication, and the

Ontological Argument

" Mind no. 71:307-325.

class="styel9">"This is an examination of the ontological

argument and its consistency with existential propositions.

Clarification of the ontological argument is made in light of

Hume, Kant, and Carnap with regard to its empirical,

predicative, a priori, a posteriori and linguistic proofs and

refutations. A further refinement of the presentation is the

establishment of the intensional and extensional character of

the ontological argument."

26. Steinitz, Yuval. 1994. "Necessary Beings." American

Philosophical Quarterly no. 31:177-182.

class="styel9">"Anselm, Descartes and Leibniz held that there

are "necessary beings" whose existence is necessitated by the

very concept; Hume, Kant and Wittgenstein denied this.

Whether or not necessary beings exist cannot have a contingent

answer: this is the article's elementary premise. And this,

together with the law of the excluded middle, tells us that either

existence or non-existence must be derivable from the concept

of necessary beings; nonexistence, if the concept is self-

contradictory, and existence if the concept is not self-

contradictory. Also, if there is a positive ontological argument

concerning necessary beings, this could be constructed by

either of the following strategies: [a] by arguing that the

expression, "necessary beings do not exist," is self-

contradictory -- the classical strategy of Anselm, Descartes and

Leibniz; or [b] by claiming the coherence of necessary beings,

based on the fact that necessary beings either exist out of

necessity or are absent out of necessity. This is the view of

Hartshorne, Malcolm, and Plantinga, utilized in their respective

attempts to prove God's existence. Steinitz argues that their

ontological arguments are unsatisfactory, but that if we apply

the Hartshorne-Malcolm-Plantinga basic strategy to the sheer

concept of necessary beings -- rather than to more complicated

concepts, such as God or a most perfect being or an

unsurpassable greatness -- this helps to avoid some of the

difficulties. Swinburne, van Inwagen and others argue

convincingly that one can find a conclusive argument for the

coherence of any concept of any kind whatsoever. Yet, replacing

the concept of God with that of necessary beings can help

defend the possibility of an ontological argument, resulting in

an inconclusive yet reasonable justification for its coherence."

27. Stephanou, Yannis. 2000. "Necessary Beings." Analysis no.

60:188-193.

28. Szatkowski, Miroslaw. 2005. "Semantic analysis of some

variant of Anderson-like ontological proofs." Studia Logica no.

79:353-355.

29. Wainwright, William. 1988. "Is Necessary Existence a

Perfection?" Noûs no. 22:33-34.

class="styel9">"If God exists, he exists necessarily is a premise

in modal versions of the ontological argument. I argue that the

proposition isn't clearly entailed by theism. Appeals to intuition

aren't conclusive, and alleged proofs place controversial

constructions on divine attributes or employ controversial

philosophical theses. The proposition is, however, plausible."

30. Young, Michael J. 1974. "The ontological argument and the

concept of substance." American Philosophical Quarterly no.

11:181-191.

Bibliographia. Annotated bibliographies

Raul Corazzon || rc@ontology.co || Info

History of the Ontological

Argument for the Existence of God.

A Selection of Primary Sources

Immanuel Kant (1724-1804)

The first critique of the ontological argument is formulated in the

Latin Dissertation "Nova Dilucidatio" (1755).

"Proposition VI. To say that something has the ground of its

existence within itself is absurd.

For whatever contains within itself the ground of the existence of

some thing is the cause of that thing. Suppose, therefore, that there is

something which has within itself the ground of its own existence,

then it will be the cause of itself. Since, however, the concept of a

cause is by nature prior to the concept of that which is caused, the

latter being later than the former, it would follow that the same thing

would be simultaneously both earlier and later than itself, which is

absurd.

COROLLARY. If anything, therefore, is said to exist absolutely

necessarily, that thing does not exist because of some ground; it

exists because the opposite cannot be thought at all. This

impossibility of the opposite is the ground of the knowledge of

existence, but an antecedently determining ground is completely

absent. It exists; and in respect of the thing in question, to have said

and to have conceived this of it is sufficient.

SCHOLIUM. I find, indeed, the view repeatedly expressed in the

teachings of modem philosophers [Baumgartner and Wolff] that God

has the ground of His existence posited in Himself. For my part, I

find myself unable to support this view. To these good men it seems,

namely, somehow rather hard to deny that God, the ultimate and

most complete principle both of grounds and of causes, should

contain within Himself the ground of Himself. Thus they maintain

that, since one may not assert that there is a ground of God which is

external to Him, it follows that He contains concealed within Himself

the ground of Himself. But there could scarcely be anything more

remote from sound reason than this. For when, in a chain of

grounds, one has arrived at the beginning, it is self-evident that one

comes to a stop and that the questioning is brought to an end by the

completeness of the answer. Of course, I know that appeal is made to

the concept itself of God; and the claim is made that the existence of

God is determined by that concept. It can, however, easily be seen

that this happens ideally, not really. Form for yourself the concept of

some being or other in which there is a totality of reality. It must be

conceded that, given this concept, existence also has to be attributed

to this being. And, accordingly, the argument proceeds as follows: if

all realities, without distinction of degree, are united together in a

certain being, then that being exists. But if all those realities are only

conceived as united together, then the existence of that being is also

only an existence in ideas. The view we are discussing ought,

therefore, rather to be formulated as follows: in framing the concept

of a certain Being, which we call God, we have determined that

concept in such a fashion that existence is included in it. If, then, the

concept which we have conceived in advance is true, then it is also

true that God exists. I have said these things, indeed, for the sake of

those who support the Cartesian argument." (pp. 14-15).

Kant gives a proof of the existence of God in the Proposition VII:

"There is a Being, the existence of which is prior to the very

possibility both of Itself and of all things. This Being is, therefore,

said to exist absolutely necessarily. This Being is called God" (cfr. pp.

15-17).

This proof was abandoned in the other writings by Kant.

From: Immanuel Kant, A new elucidation of the first principles of

metaphysical cognition (1755), In: Theoretical Philosophy, 1755-

1770, Translated and edited by David Walford in collaboration with

Ralf Meerbote, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992.

Bibliographia. Annotated bibliographies

Raul Corazzon || rc@ontology.co || Info

Bibliography of the Sociology of

Religion

The Sociology of Early Christianity

Charisma and Its Routinization in Early Christianity

Messianism

Millenarism

Bibliographia. Annotated bibliographies

Raul Corazzon || rc@ontology.co || Info

Bibliographical study guides

Study guides to Western Philosophy

Introductory Works, Dictionaries, Encyclopedias

Bibliography of Philosophy and Manuals of Style

General Works on the History of Philosophy

Formal and Descriptive Metaphysics

Formal and Descriptive Ontology

Philosophical Logic and Philosophy of Logic

Bibliographia. Annotated bibliographies

Raul Corazzon || rc@ontology.co || Info

Philosophy Study Guide:

Introductory Works, Dictionaries,

Encyclopedias

Introductory Works

The purpose of the section "Study Guides to Western Philosophy" is

to give both the beginner and the more experienced reader a brief

guide to the introductory literature on general philosophy,

Bibliography of Philosophy and Manuals of Style, history of

philosophy, metaphysics, ontology, Philosophical Logic and

Philosophy of Logic.

In its initial form the pages will contain a selection of introductory

readings, with brief annotations on the content (for the most

important books, also the index will be included); subsequently these

will be expanded to include more specific essays on selected

problems; in the sections for beginners, preference will be given to

those books more readily available.

With the exception of the section " Philosophical Bibliographies"

only works in English will be cited (for the studies in French, Italian

and German, separated pages are in preparation).

If you want a first Introduction to philosophy you will find useful:

1. Craig, Edward. 2002. Philosophy. A Very Short Introduction.

New York: Oxford University Press.

Contents: List of illustrations IX; 1. Philosophy 1; 2. What

should I do? 11; 3. How do we know? 24; 4. What am I? 35; 5.

Some themes 45 6. Of 'isms' 6; 7. Some more high spots 74; 8.

What's in it for whom? 100; Bibliography 119; Index 127.

"We may be standing in the water, but why try to swim? In

other words, what is philosophy for? There is far too much

philosophy, composed under far too wide a range of conditions,

for there to be a general answer to that question. But it can

certainly be said that a great deal of philosophy has been

intended as (understanding the words very broadly) a means to

salvation, though what we are to understand by salvation, and

salvation from what, has varied as widely as the philosophies

themselves. A Buddhist will tell you that the purpose of

philosophy is the relief of human suffering and the attainment

of 'enlightenment'; a Hindu will say something similar, if in

slightly different terminology; both will speak of escape from a

supposed cycle of death and rebirth in which one's moral

deserts determine one's future forms. An Epicurean (if you can

find one nowadays) will pooh-pooh all the stuff about rebirth,

but offer you a recipe for maximizing pleasure and minimizing

suffering in this your one and only life.

(...)

The reader will notice that I haven't made any attempt to define

philosophy, but have just implied that it is an extremely broad

term covering a very wide range of intellectual activities. Some

think that nothing is to be gained from trying to define it. I can

sympathize with that thought, since most attempts strike me as

much too restrictive, and therefore harmful rather than helpful

in so far as they have any effect at all. But I will at least have a

shot at saying what philosophy is; whether what I have to offer

counts as a definition or not is something about which we

needn't, indeed positively shouldn't, bother too much." (pp. 4-

5).

2. Margolis, Joseph. 2006. Introduction to Philosophical

Problems. London: Continuum.

Second edition with a new Preface (First edition with the title

Knowledge and Existence: An Introduction to Philosophical

Problems, New York: Oxford University Press, 1973).

Contents: Preface (2006) IX; Preface to the First Edition XIII-

XX; I. Knowledge and Belief 1; II. Perception and Sensation 33;

III. Doubt and Certainty 66; IV. Existence and Reality 84; V.

Identity and Individuation 110; VI. Actions and Events 137; VII.

Language and Truth 169; VIII. Mind and Body 203; IX. Facts

and Values 240; Epilogue 262-288.

"Finally, I must say again that I have been very forcefully

impressed, in preparing this account, with the way in which an

unfolding problem simply drives one to explore topics that had

not initially seemed so sensitively linked with one's opening

concern. I have, in fact, deliberately tried to convey a clear

sense of this developing linkage. I begin with an analysis of

knowledge, that forces us at once to anticipate the need to

admit a public world, our principal access to it, the nature of

creatures capable of knowledge, and their primary way of

expressing what they know. Hence, it seemed fair to proceed

from a general account of knowledge (contrasted with belief) to

perception (contrasted with other forms of sentience) to the

boundaries of doubt and certainty regarding what we may

know. In the interests of an enlarging coherence, I found myself

obliged to distinguish between what is linguistically expressed

and what we may convey by way of linguistic models without

supposing an ability to use language (as in speaking of animal

beliefs and expectations) or an actual use of language (as when

beliefs are implied by one's actions); to distinguish between

determining what is true (against the backdrop of a public

world) and determining that there is a public world (given

which, questions of truth and falsity arise); and to coordinate

our analysis of perception (our principal access to the external

world) with the admission of such a world, as by the use of the

critical term 'exists'.

Hence, the first three chapters afford a provisional sense of

closure respecting knowledge - on the condition, that is, that

the essential features of the world of which, presumably, we

have knowledge would be disclosed. Accordingly, the fourth

and fifth chapters explore the difference between what we can

talk about and what, within that range, we say exists. There, we

are forced to notice a threatening gap between what we admit

exists (in accord with our principal means of access to the

external world) and what we judge to be the nature of whatever

there is in the world (the vexed question of the nature of

metaphysics); and, since whatever there is is identical with

itself, we are obliged to sort out the large variety of senses in

which the verb 'to be' is used (including, now, the 'is' of

existence and the 'is' of reference) in order to facilitate

whatever we may say about whatever exists (distinguishing,

say, the 'is' of identity, of spatiotemporal continuity, of present

time, of composition, and of predication).

These distinctions raise further problems, oblige us for instance

to decide whether we can refer to what does not exist and why it

is that we cannot always say the same thing, under given

linguistic circumstances, of what is self-identical. Here, we

come to see the respect in which questions of identity,

particularly where discontinuity and decomposition obtain, are

resolved in informal ways and the sense in which the very

meaning of identity is made difficult to explicate.

Also, recognizing that the enterprise of pursuing knowledge is

essentially the activity of men, chiefly by means of language, the

next three chapters provide a natural sequel. There, we are

drawn to examine the general nature of actions (contrasted

with physical events), the nature of language (with emphasis on

meaning and truth), and the nature of persons and creatures

that have minds (contrasted with physical bodies)." (from the

Preface to the First Edition).

3. Honer, Stanley M., Hunt, Thomas C., and Okholm, Dennis L.

2005. Invitation to Philosophy. Issues and Options. Belmont:

Wadsworth/Thomson Learning.

Tenth Edition (First edition: 1973).

Contents: Preface; Prologue; 1. What is Philosophy?; 2.

Philosophical Thinking; 3. Perception and Truth; 4.

Epistemology: How We Know; 5. Metaphysics: What is Real?;

6. Freedom and Determinism; 7.Philosophy and Religion;

8.Philosophy and Ethics; 9.Philosophy and Esthetics;

10.Philosophy and Human Nature; 11.Philosophy in Politics;

Epilogue; Appendix: Writing Philosophy Papers; Glossary;

Index.

"Honer (philosophy emeritus, Mt. San Antonio College) and his

co- authors provide an Introduction to the basic questions of

philosophy for undergraduates and lay readers. The authors

have substantially updated several chapters, including their

case studies, and have also added significantly to their glossary.

General topics include definitions of "philosophy" and

philosophical thinking. Other topics include perception and

truth, epistemology, metaphysics, freedom and determinism,

and philosophy's relationships with religion, ethics, aesthetics,

human nature, and politics. Chapters include study and

discussion questions, and online and print resources."

4. Creel, Richard E. 2001. Thinking Philosophically. An

Introduction to Critical Reflection and Rational Dialogue.

Malden: Blackwell.

" Thinking Philosophically consists primarily of the lectures I

used to give in my Introduction to Philosophy course - though

now they are considerably expanded and polished. By putting

into written form a great deal of obligatory, foundational

material that I used to deliver by lecture, I have freed in-class

time to engage students in discussions of that material and to

introduce them to primary sources by way of short handouts

that we read, interpret, and discuss in class. I frequently

present students with opposed primary source handouts on the

topic of the day - for example, Aristotle versus Schopenhauer

on happiness, Gorgias versus Hegel on human knowledge,

Clifford versus James on the ethics of belief, Bertrand Russell

versus Carl Jung on religious experience, Socrates versus

Thomas Hobbes on conscience. Sometimes a single handout

includes opposed ideas, such as Plato's treatment of The Ring

of Gyges or the short debate between Socrates and

Thrasymachus on justice. On other occasions a single handout

from one point of view can be provocative and illuminating,

such as Plato's Allegory of the Cave, with which I always begin

my Intro course, and to which I then refer at relevant points as

the course goes along. The short dialogues of Plato and some of

Descartes' Meditations also work well as in-class supplements

to Thinking Philosophically." (From the Preface).

5. Shand, John, ed. 2003. Fundamentals of Philosophy. New

York: Routledge.

Contents: List of contributors IX; Preface XI; Introduction 1; 1.

Alan Goldman: Epistemology 11; 2. Michael Jubien;

Metaphysics 36; 3. Greg Restall: Logic 64; 4. Piers Benn: Ethics

94; 5. Suzanne Stern-Gillet: Ancient philosophy: from Thales to

Aristotle 122; 6. Dermot Moran: Medieval philosophy: from

Augustine to Nicholas of Cusa 155; 7. Richard Franks: Modern

philosophy: the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries 204; 8.

Stephen Burwood: Philosophy of mind 234; 9. Alexander

Miller: Philosophy of language 262; 10. Alexander Bird:

Philosophy of science; 11: Dudley Knowles: Political philosophy

326; 12. Colin Lyas: Aesthetics 351; 13: W. Jay Wood:

Philosophy of religion 377; 14. Simon Glendinning: Continental

philosophy 408; Index: 443.

"This book is an accessible stimulating gateway to the central

areas of philosophy. The chapters are carefully arranged to

begin with what are usually regarded as the core areas of the

subject and then extend out to other important subjects of less

generality, not, one should emphasise, of less importance. The

prime purpose of the chapters is not to give comprehensive

coverage of each subject, but rather to open the door on the

subject for the reader and encourage thought about all the ideas

within. Someone once said to me that studying philosophy had

'opened doors'; if this book does that, it will have succeeded."

(from the Introduction).

6. Rescher, Nicholas. 2001. Philosophical Reasoning. A Study in

the Methodology of Philosophizing. Malden: Blackwell.

"This is a study in the methodology of philosophical inquiry. It

is, accordingly, a venture in metaphilosophy, that rather

neglected and nevertheless perhaps most controversial of

philosophical disciplines. The aim of the book is to expound

and defend the thesis that systematization is the proper

instrument of philosophical inquiry and that the effective

pursuit of philosophy's mission calls for constructing a

doctrinal system that answers our questions in a coherent and

comprehensive way. Both of these factors - comprehensiveness

and coherence - are indispensable with the adequacy of our

philosophizing, since the discipline is concerned with the big

picture that emerges from the harmonious coordination of the

essential details. Accordingly, philosophy does not reject or

other wise conflict with the cognitive materials obtained on

other fronts - science and everyday-life experience. Rather, it

exploits and coordinates them. Its coherentist methodology

requires it to accomplish its question resolving work with a

maximum utilization of, and a minimum disruption to, the

materials that our other cognitive resources provide.

Philosophy is caught up in something of a dilemma. On the one

hand, its admission as a legitimate and appropriate venture in

rational inquiry requires its looking to "the big picture" and

striving to counteract the fragmentation that accompanies the

specialization that pervades other cognitive domains. On the

other hand, it does not and cannot avert division of labor. It

remains committed to the quest for unity and coherence in our

understanding of the nature of things. But this task is

unquestionably difficult in a world where our knowledge is

exploding in scope and in complexity, and this has profound

implications for how we can pursue philosophy. In the end,

however, the fact remains that with this difficult task, as

elsewhere, we must and should endeavor to do the best we

can." (pp. 1-2).

7. Daly, Chris. 2010. An Introduction to Philosophical Methods.

Buffalo: Broadview Press.

Contents: Preface; Introduction; 1. Common sense; 2. Analysis;

3. Thought experiment; 4. Simplicity; 5. Explanation; 6.

Science; Conclusion; References; Index.

""Contemporary analytic philosophers are becoming more and

more explicit about methodological issues, from the relevance

of intuitions and thought experiments to talk about inference to

the best philosophical explanation and the 'cost and benefits' of

accepting their philosophical views. This is the first book to

survey the discussion of these methods. Daly has separate

chapters on common sense, analysis, thought experiments,

simplicity, explanations and naturalism. While aimed at upper

level undergraduates, this book can be profitably studied by

graduate students and researchers in philosophy who will learn

about their own perhaps unconscious methodological

preferences. Case studies illustrating each method also serve as

an overview of the latest trends in philosophy of mind,

metaphysics, epistemology, and early analytic philosophy."

Bernard Linsky, University of Alberta.

8. Grayling, Anthony C., ed. 1995. Philosophy 1: A Guide through

the Subject. New York: Oxford University Press.

Reprinted 1999.

Contents: List of Contributors VIII; Editor's Introduction 1; 1.

Epistemology by Scott Sturgeon, M. G. F. Martin, A. C. Grayling

7; 2. Philosophical logic by Mark Sainsbury 61; 3. Methodology

the elements of the philosophy of science by David Papineau

123; 4. Metaphysics by Tim Crane and David Wiggins 181; 5.

The philosophy of mind by Martin Davies 250; 6. Ancient

Greek philosophy I: The Pre-Socratics and Plato by Christopher

Janaway 336; 7. Ancient Greek philosophy II: Aristotle by

Hugh Lawson-Tancred 398. 8. Modern philosophy I: The

rationalists and Kant by Roger Scruton 440; 9. Modern

philosophy II: The empiricists by A. C. Grayling 484; 10. Ethics

by Bernard Williams 525; 11. Aesthetics by Sebastian Gardner

583; Index 629.

"Each of the chapters that follow is devoted to a major area of

philosophical endeavour. They are their own Introductions to

the questions they discuss, and therefore need little

supplementary Introduction here. But a preliminary note about

what each chapter contains will help with orientation, as

follows.

Chapter 1: Epistemology. Epistemology - sometimes called

'theory of knowledge' - concerns the nature and sources of

knowledge. The questions asked by epistemologists are, What is

knowledge? How do we get it? Are all our means of seeking it

equally good? To answer these questions we need to define

knowledge if we can, examine the means we employ in seeking

it, and confront sceptical challenges to our claims to have it.

Each of the three parts of Chapter 1 takes up one of these tasks.

The first considers the problem of giving an adequate

definition. The second examines one major means to

knowledge - sensory perception - and the third surveys

sceptical arguments and efforts to counter them.

Chapter 2: Philosophical Logic. Philosophical logic is in many

respects the workshop of philosophy, where a set of related and

highly important concepts come in for scrutiny, among them

reference, truth, existence, identity, necessity, and

quantification. These concepts are fundamental not just to

philosophical inquiry but to thought in general. This chapter

examines these concepts by focusing upon the question of

reference. The first two sections look at what seem to be the

most obvious examples of referring devices, names and

descriptions. The third concerns a problem about existence; the

fourth examines identity statements and the fifth considers the

question whether, when true, such statements are 'necessarily'

true. The final section examines some views about truth.

Chapter 3: Methodology. Epistemological discussions of the

kind pursued in Chapter 1 concern the concept of knowledge in

general. A more particular application of it concerns science,

one of the major fields of knowledge acquiring endeavour.

Philosophical investigation into the assumptions, claims,

concepts, and methods of science raises questions of great

philosophical importance. The elementary part of this inquiry,

here called Methodology, focuses largely on questions about the

concepts and methods used in and its problems; the concept of

laws of nature; realism, instrumentalism, and under-

determination of theory by evidence; confirmation and

probability; and the concept of explanation.

Chapter 4: Metaphysics. All the foregoing branches of

philosophy share certain problems about what ultimately exists

in the universe. These problems are the province of

Metaphysics. Its primary questions are, What is where, and

what is its nature? These questions immediately prompt others,

so many indeed - and so important - that some of them have

now come to constitute branches of philosophy in their own

right, for example, philosophy of mind and philosophical

theology. In addressing questions about the nature of reality,

the metaphysician has to examine concepts of time, free will,

appearance and reality, causality, universals, substance, and a

number of others besides. Here four of these topics are

considered: causation, time, universals, and substance. Note

that questions about causality also come up in the chapters on

Methodology and Mind, and the discussion of substance

connects with the discussion of Aristotle in the chapter on

Greek philosophy (see below) - thus exemplifying the

interconnectedness of philosophical inquiry.

Chapter 5: The Philosophy of Mind. Questions about the nature

of mind were once usually included in metaphysics, but their

great importance has led to so much debate, and to such

significant use of materials from the neighbouring fields of

psychology and brain physiology, that the philosophy of mind is

now treated separately. Chief among the points requiring

discussion are the relation of mind and brain, the nature of

phenomena have casual powers or are merely in some sense by-

products of brain activity. The sections in this chapter take up

each point in turn.

Chapter 6-9: The History of Philosophy. Because the problems

of philosophy are ancient and persistent, studying the history of

philosophy is an important part of a philosophical education. It

is not simply, or even very largely, that this study is interesting

for its own sake - although it certainly is - but rather, it is that

the outstanding philosophers of the past made contributions to

philosophy which we must grasp in the interests of our current

work. To study the history of philosophy is to study philosophy,

for almost all the great questions were formulated and explored

by our predecessors. Two main periods of the history of

Western thought are discussed in this volume: Greek

philosophy from about 600 BC until 322 BC (the date of

Aristotle's death), and Modern philosophy from Descartes to

Kant (the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries AD). The

Greeks initiated all of philosophy's major fields, and identified

their basic questions. Two of them, Plato and Aristotle, are

especially important. They and their forerunners, known as the

Pre-Socratics, are the subject of Chapters 6 and 7. The

philosophers of the Modern period who have done so much to

shape philosophical discussion since their day are Descartes,

Spinoza, Leibniz, and Kant (discussed in Chapter 8) and Locke,

Berkeley, and Hume (discussed in Chapter 9). They are

grouped in this way because the first three are usually

described as 'Rationalists' and the last three 'Empiricists' (Kant

occupies a position apart), some important differences between

rationalism and empiricism being at stake. But perhaps the best

order in which to read them, and to read about them, is:

Descartes, Locke, Berkeley, Hume, Spinoza, Leibniz, Kant.

Chapter 10: Ethics. The supreme importance of critical

reflection on the values by which we live is unquestionable. Our

values are the basis of our judgements about others, and of our

decisions about how to act and live. Ethics is the study of

theories about moral values, and of the concepts we use in

identifying and asserting them. An important distinction is

required here: a theory which prescribes how we should live is

called a 'first-order' or 'normative' morality. Reflective enquiry

into the assumptions, concepts, and claims of such first-order

moralities is often called 'metaethics'. Both are of crucial

interest in the study of ethics, as this chapter shows. It

discusses theories of ethics, examines some of the most

important ethical concepts, and investigates aspects of 'moral

psychology'.

Chapter 11: Aesthetics. Aesthetics in contemporary philosophy

concentrates upon discussion of the experience of appreciating

artistic and natural beauty, and investigates whether there is an

underlying unity in the nature of such experience. In this

chapter the three sections successively examine aesthetic

experience and judgement. fundamental concepts of the

philosophy of art, and theories about the nature of art." (from

the Editor's Introduction).

9. ———, ed. 1998. Philosophy 2: Further through the Subject.

New York: Oxford University Press.

Contents: Notes on the Contributors VII; Editor's Introduction

1; 1. The philosophy of psychology by Ned Block 4; 2. The

philosophy of language by Christopher Peacocke 72; 3. The

philosophy of mathematics by Michael Dummett 122; 4.

Philosophy and natural sciences by John Worrall 197; 5. The

philosophy of religion by M. W. F. Stone 267; 6. Political

philosophy by Alan Ryan 351; 7. The philosophy of social

sciences by David-Hillel Ruben 420; 8. Later ancient

philosophy by David Mitchell 470; 9. Medieval philosophy by

Christopher Hughes 517; 10. Kant by Sebastian Gardner 574;

11. Continental philosophy from Hegel by Michael Rosen 663;

12. Frege, Russell, and Wittgenstein by A. C. Grayling and

Bernhard Weiss 705; 13. Indian philosophy by Paul Williams

793; Index 849.

"The subjects introduced in this volume are various, and each

of the chapters is independent of the others. The only unifying

theme throughout is the approach: each chapter assumes that

its readers have some grounding in the basics of philosophy,

and (without attempting to be exhaustive: the bibliographies

point the way to further study) offers an account of some of the

key questions in the field under discussion. No area of

philosophy is entirely free of connections to and overlaps with

other areas, however, so it will be found that debate in one

chapter throws light on debate in others in a variety of ways - as

to which, more below.

Six chapters have as their titles 'The Philosophy of.....'. In its

more advanced regions philosophy often consists in reflection

on the assumptions, methods, and claims of an important area

of intellectual endeavour. The 'philosophy of' chapters focus on

crucial subjects: science mathematics, social science in general

and psychology in particular, language, and religion.

Two chapters extend the study of Philosophy's history into

periods often neglected in undergraduate study, the 'post-

Aristotelian' period of later ancient philosophy, and medieval

philosophy. Each is rich in intrinsic interest, and in importance

for developments in later philosophy.

The high importance of political philosophy demands that it

have a chapter to itself, which it gets here.

I have already mentioned the chapters that respectively survey

Indian philosophy and Continental philosophy; as with the

others in this volume, they are intended to be prefaces to the

further study invited by their bibliographies, but this is a point

worth iterating in their case because of their range.

The remaining two chapters discuss the work of individuals.

One is devoted to a single individual, Immanuel Kant; the other

introduces themes in the thought of three of the principal

founders of twentieth-century analytic philosophy: Gottlob

Frege, Bertrand Russell, and Ludwig Wittgenstein. The Kant

chapter surveys the work of a seminal modern thinker whose

views have been influential in epistemology, metaphysics,

ethics, and aesthetics across several traditions of philosophical

debate. The chapter on Frege, Russell, and Wittgenstein

introduces a number of the most central questions of

contemporary philosophy." (from the Editor's Introduction).

10. Cahn, Steven M. 2002. Philosophy for the 21st Century. A

Comprehensive Reader. New York: Oxford University Press.

"Introductory anthologies typically reflect the philosophical

viewpoints of one or more senior scholars, each of whom makes

editorial decisions in a variety of fields. This collection draws

on the judgments of a new generation of scholars, each of

whom has chosen the selections and provided Introductions in

one area of expertise: David Sosa (epistemology), L. A. Paul

(philosophy of science), Delia Graff (metaphysics). Jesse J.

Prinz (philosophy of mind), Robin Jeshion (philosophy of

language), Stuart Rachels (ethics), Cynthia A. Stark (political

philosophy), and Gabriela Sakamoto (philosophy of art). While

the choice of associate editors, the structure of the book, and

the contents of the first section are the responsibility of the

editor, the rest of the work has been done by the associate

editors. These philosophers are in the vanguard of 21 st-century

philosophy, and the choices they have made reflect their views

of the most important materials that should be mastered by

21st-century students.

Those who wish to learn more about a particular philosopher or

a specific philosophical issue are urged to consult the

Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Routledge, 1999), ed. Edward

Craig. It contains detailed entries with bibliographies on every

significant topic in the field.

Shorter entries, but informative and reliable, are to be found in

The Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy (Oxford and New York,

1994). ed. Simon Blackburn and The Cambridge Dictionary of

Philosophy. Second Edition (Cambridge and New York. 1999),

ed. Robert Audi." (from the Preface).

11. Cottingham, John, ed. 2008. Western Philosophy. An

Anthology. Malden: Blackwell.

Second edition (First edition 1996).

"There are many ways into Philosophy, and no good reason why

one particular branch of the subject should always form the

chosen route. One of the objects of this book is to provide,

within the compass of a single volume, a set of key introductory

materials for the widest possible range of courses, covering all

the main branches of the subject (or at least all those suitable

for teaching at a basic undergraduate level). Fundamental

issues in epistemology are dealt with in Part I ('Knowledge and

Certainty'). Part II ('Being and Reality') is concerned with

general metaphysics and ontology, while the philosophy of

mind is covered in Part III ('Mind and Body'). The important

issues of personal identity and the freedom of the will receive

separate treatment in Part IV ('The Self and Freedom'). The

philosophy of religion and the philosophy of science are dealt

with in Pan V ('God and Religion') and Part VI ('Science and

Method') respectively. The next two parts deal with moral

philosophy: Part VII ('Morality and the Good Life') tackles

theoretical and systematic issues in normative ethics, while Pan

VIII ('Problems in Ethics') covers a selection of key issues in

applied moral philosophy. Finally, Pan IX ('Authority and the

State') and Pan X ('Beauty and Art') deal respectively with

political philosophy and aesthetics.

Although the first two parts of the volume are devoted to

epistemology and metaphysics, traditionally considered as

having a 'foundational' role in philosophy, the issues raised

here are among the most demanding in the book, and there is

no compelling reason why any given introductory course should

have to begin with them. Each pan of the volume is intended to

be self-contained, and students and teachers are invited to

work on the various parts of the book in any order they see fit,

or indeed to concentrate on any particular part or parts in

isolation. That said, given the nature of philosophy there is

inevitably a fair amount of overlap between the topics raised in

various parts; where this happens footnotes are provided to

draw attention to connections with relevant texts or

commentary in other parts of the volume." (from the Preface,

XIV-XV).

12. Perry, John R., Bratman, Michael E., and Fischer, John Martin.

2010. Introduction to Philosophy. Classical and Contemporary

Readings. New York: Oxford University Press.

Fifth edition (First edition 1986).

"In this anthology we have collected a variety of readings for

use in a course or sequence of counts designed to introduce

students to philosophy. We have based the selection on two

courses we have taught numerous times at Stanford University:

"God, Self, and World" and "Value and Obligation." The first is

an Introduction to metaphysics and epistemology, the second

to ethics. These are one-quarter courses, usually taught in

sequence, with a fair number of students taking both.

These courses are built around classic texts supplemented by

shorter selections from the past and present. We have included

in this anthology not only texts that we have found successful

but also others that a survey of colleagues at Stanford and other

institutions have identified as suitable. Thus, the total number

of selections is larger than can be reasonably covered in even a

two-quarter sequence, and instructors will want to pick those

that fit their approach. We have included some footnotes from

the original selections but have eliminated others. In some

cases footnotes were eliminated because they could not be

understood in the context of the selection; in other cases this

was done simply to save space. The remaining footnotes have

been renumbered." (from the Preface to the First edition).

13. Solomon, Robert C. 2009. Introducing Philosophy: A Text with

Integrated Readings. New York: Oxford University Press.

Ninth edition (First edition 1989).

"This book derives from thirty years of teaching in very

different schools in various cities and states. It is based on the

belief that philosophy is a genuinely exciting subject, accessible

not only to specialists and a few gifted undergraduate majors

but to everyone. Everyone is a philosopher, whether enrolled in

a philosophy course or not. Most of us are concerned with the

same basic problems and use the same essential arguments.

The difference is that someone who has studied philosophy has

the advantage of having encountered stronger and more varied

arguments than might have been available otherwise. In this

book, the views of the major philosophers of the past twenty-

five hundred years are used to give students these various

arguments.

This approach offers introductory students direct contact with

substantial readings from significant works in the history of

philosophy, but removes the unreasonable demand that they

confront these often difficult works in full and without

commentary or editing, as they would in the originals or in

most anthologies. This book is not, however, a historical

Introduction but rather an Introduction to the problems of

philosophy and the various ways in which they have been

answered. The history of philosophy thus serves to illuminate

these problems and replies, not the other way around." (from

the Preface).

Dictionaries

1. Audi, Robert, ed. 1999. The Cambridge Dictionary of

Philosophy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Second expanded edition; the first edition was published in

1995.

"In the first half of this century, the major philosophical

dictionary published in English was James Mark Baldwin's

Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology, a multi-author work

published by Peter Smith of Gloucester, Massachusetts; it

appeared in 1901 in two volumes (followed by a bibliography in

1905) and was reprinted with revisions in 1925. In the second

half of the century, dictionaries of philosophy in English have

been much smaller than Baldwin's and either written by a

single author or, occasionally, prepared by a group of writers

rarely much larger than a dozen working within the confines of

a small space. Few of the entries in these books are longer than

500 words; the most typical have been sketches of 150 words or

less. This dictionary by contrast, is the work of an international

team that includes 381 carefully selected contributors

representing the major subfields of philosophy and many

philosophical traditions. It contains substantial treatments of

major philosophers, many of these entries running to several

thousand words. It has hundreds of entries, often of 500 to

1,000 words, on other significant thinkers, and thousands of

brief definitions of philosophically important terms. In

addition, it provides detailed overviews, some more than 6,000

words, of the subfields of philosophy, such as epistemology,

ethics, metaphysics, philosophy of mind, and philosophy of

science. It supplies numerous cross-references to help readers

in comprehending philosophical ideas, in understanding the

terminology of the discipline, and in appreciating philosophers

themselves. There are hundreds of entries on important terms

and thinkers from non-Western philosophy, for instance from

the Chinese, Indian, Japanese, and Korean traditions. The

dictionary also covers a number of philosophically significant

thinkers and terms from fields closely related to philosophy,

including computer science, economics, law, linguistics,

literature, mathematics, psychology and other behavioral

sciences, and religion. The Appendix defines logical symbols

and identifies other special symbols used in philosophy." (from

the Preface to the Firs Edition, XXVII-XXVIII).

"The widespread positive reception of the First Edition has

been gratifying, and a number of translations are proceeding,

into Chinese, Italian, Korean, Russian, and Spanish at this

writing. The field of philosophy has expanded, however, and

even apart from that I have become aware of several respects in

which the Dictionary can better serve its readers. The result is a

multitude of expansions in standing entries and the addition of

some four hundred new entries. This extended coverage

required sixty new authors, nearly half of them from outside

North America.

The new entries range across the entire field of philosophy. We

have made a special effort to increase our coverage of

Continental philosophy and of subfields where growth is

exceptionally rapid, such as ethics, philosophy of mind, and

political philosophy. We have also added numerous cross-

references. The cross-references are an element in the volume

that many readers have said they found not only valuable in

enhancing their initial understanding of an entry, but also

welcome as a source of intriguing connections and as an

invitation to browse.

In addition to citations of many living philosophers in the

Index of Names, there is now selective coverage of a number of

living philosophers in separate entries. With very few

exceptions, this (quite small) group includes only thinkers in

their mid-sixties or older. This constraint on inclusion is in part

dictated by the difficulty of providing an adequate portrait of

philosophers still actively advancing their positions, and it has

required omitting a number of distinguished younger

philosophers still making major changes in their views. Even

with much older thinkers we do presuppose that there will be

no significant developments, but only a greater likelihood of

discerning a rounded position that is unlikely to be abandoned.

In the difficult -- and in a sense impossible -- task of

determining entries on living thinkers, advice was sought from

both the Board and many other sources. We were also guided in

part by the extent to which contributors to the First Edition

relied on references to certain living thinkers. Given the

Dictionary's overall purposes and its wide audience, which

includes many readers outside philosophy, selection was

weighted toward writers whom many non-philosophers may

want to look up, and some weight was also given to

considerations of diversity. In keeping with the overall

purposes of the volume and the diversity of its readers, we have

also decided not to undertake the large task of covering either

living contributors to highly specialized subfields -- such as

logic or computer theory or much of philosophy of science -- or

philosophers whose main contributions are to the history

philosophy. There are, however, many important philosophers

in these fields.

A number are cited in the Index, which also lists many of the

thinkers who are mentioned by one or more contributors but

are not subjects of separate entries." (from the Preface to the

Second Edition, XXXIII).

2. Honderich, Ted, ed. 2005. The Oxford Companion to

Philosophy. New Edition. New York: Oxford University Press.

Second edition (First edition 1993).

"The brave, large aim of this book is to bring philosophy

together between two covers better than ever before. That is not

a job for one man, or one woman, or a few, or a team, although

it is tried often enough. So 249 of us have joined forces. The

philosophy brought together includes, first of all, the work of

the great philosophers. As that term is commonly used, there

are perhaps twenty of them. By anyone's reckoning, this

pantheon of philosophy includes Plato, Aristotle, Aquinas,

Hobbes, Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz, Locke, Berkeley, the

blessed Hume, Kant, Hegel, and Nietzsche. These, together

with others who stand a bit less solidly in the pantheon, are the

subjects of long essays in this book. Philosophy as this book

conceives it, secondly, includes all of its history in the English

language, a history mainly of British and American thinkers. In

this history there are many figures not so monumental as

Locke, Berkeley, and Hume. Among them, if they are not

admitted to the pantheon, are John Stuart Mill, Charles

Sanders Peirce, Bertrand Russell, and, if an Austrian can be

counted in this particular history, Ludwig Wittgenstein. They

also include Jonathan Edwards, Thomas Reid, William James,

and F. H. Bradley. Thirdly, if the book cannot include all of the

histories of philosophy in other languages than English, it does

attend to them. It attends to more than the great leaders of the

philosophies in these languages. Thus Descartes is joined by

such of his countrymen and countrywomen as Simone de

Beauvoir, Henri Bergson, and Auguste Comte. Kant and Hegel

are joined by J. G. Fichte, Jurgen Habermas, and Karl Jaspers.

There are also general entries on each of the national

philosophies, from Australian to Croat to Japanese to Russian.

A fourth part of the book, not an insignificant one, consists in

about 150 entries on contemporary philosophers, the largest

groups being American and British. It would have been an

omission to leave out contemporaries, and faint-hearted.

Philosophy thrives. Its past must not be allowed to exclude its

present. It is true, too, that one of these contemporaries may

one day stand in the pantheon. What has now been said of four

subject-matters within philosophy as the book conceives it can

be said differently. These subject-matters can be regarded less

in terms of individual thinkers and more in terms of ideas,

arguments, theories, doctrines, world-views, schools,

movements, and traditions. This contributes to another

characterization of the book, more complete and at least as

enlightening, perhaps more enlightening. In particular, it

brings out more of the great extent to which the book is about

contemporary philosophy rather than the subject's history.

There are perhaps a dozen established parts of philosophy:

epistemology, metaphysics, moral philosophy, political

philosophy, philosophical logic, logic, the philosophy of mind,

aesthetics, and so on. In the case of each of these, the book

contains a long essay on its history and another on its problems

as they now are, by contributors not at all new to them. In the

case of each of these established parts of philosophy, more light

is shed by very many additional entries -- for a start, by the

aforementioned entries on the great philosophers, on their

lesser companions in English-language history and other-

language histories, and on contemporaries now carrying on the

struggle. In the case of each of the established parts of

philosophy, there are also very many subordinate entries not

about individual philosophers." (from the Preface to the First

edition).

"In one way there is little need for an entry in this book to

contain cross-references to other entries. This is so since the

reader can safely assume that almost every philosophical term

which is used for an idea or doctrine or whatever also has an

entry to itself. The same is true of almost every philosopher

who is mentioned. That is not all. Entries can be counted on for

very many subjects which fall under such common terms as

'beauty', 'causation', 'democracy', 'guilt', 'knowledge', 'mind',

and 'time'-all such subjects which get philosophical attention.

Still, it seems a good idea to provide occasional reminders of

the general possibility of having more lights shed on something

by turning elsewhere. And there is often a good reason for

prompting or directing a reader to look elsewhere, a reason of

which a reader may be unaware.

So occasionally a term in an entry is preceded by an asterisk,

indicating that it is the heading or the first word of the heading

of another entry. For the same reason an asterisked term or

terms may appear on a line at the end of an entry. In some

cases the latter references are to related or opposed ideas or the

like. In order not to have the book littered with asterisks, they

have very rarely been put on the names of philosophers. But it

is always a good idea to turn to the entries on the mentioned

philosophers.

The cross-references are more intended for the browsing reader

than the reader at work. For the reader at work, there is an

Index and List of Entries at the back of the book. The Index and

List of Entries usually gives references to more related entries

than are given by cross-references in and at the end of an entry.

It is also possible to look up all the entries on, say, aesthetics or

American philosophy or applied ethics.

The book is alphabetized by the whole headings of entries, as

distinct from the first word of a heading. Hence, for example,

abandonment comes before a priori and a posteriori. It is wise

to look elsewhere if something seems to be missing." ( On

Using the Book).

At the end of the book there is also a useful appendix on

Logical Symbols as well as the appendices A Chronological

Table of Philosophy and Maps of Philosophy."

3. Bunnin, Nicholas, and Yu, Jiyuan, eds. 2004. The Blackwell

Dictionary of Western Philosophy. Malden: Blackwell.

"Although the Dictionary covers a wide historical range and

explores many subject areas, it focuses on terms and

individuals at the center of current philosophical discussion.

Many readers will consult the Dictionary for help in

understanding individual terms and the contributions of

individual philosophers, but others will explore a given

philosophical issue or area by reading a range of related entries.

A philosopher browsing through the text will learn much about

the history and structure of Western philosophy and its sources

of creative dispute. We hope that the Dictionary will be an

invitation to further thought and that it will not be taken as the

last word on any topic.

Entries for philosophical terms are intended to provide clear

and challenging expositions that give access to major

philosophical issues. Queries and objections are often included

to capture the perplexity arising from philosophical questions

and to encourage readers to be active and critical in their

response to the Dictionary as a whole.

Many entries give the derivations from Greek, Latin, French, or

German. Entries for terms state the areas of philosophy in

which the terms have their main use, provide cross-references

to entries on philosophers and other terms, and conclude with

illustrative quotations from a classical or modern source. The

reference section at the end of the book gives details of the

works cited in these quotations. Biographical entries discuss

the philosophical contributions and list at least some of the

major works of their subjects." (from the Preface).

4. Blackburn, Simon, ed. 2008. Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy.

New York: Oxford University Press.

Second revised edition (First edition 1994).

"It is now eleven years since the first edition of this Dictionary

was published, and time moves on. When I was writing the

original edition there were few comparable works to help the

job of compilation and selection. In the intervening years, a

great many have appeared, some of admirable weight and

authority. Now, as well, the resources of the web are

everywhere, and bring both a blessing and a curse: the blessing

of instant access to information which, only little more than a

decade ago, required ferreting out of patchy libraries and

archives, but the corresponding curse of overload. A good

curator, it is said, knows what to destroy, but it is hard for a

dictionary writer to opt out of the arms race of adding the

obscure and the marginal, the exotic and the antiquarian, when

there is so little cost to doing so. My own criteria remain

roughly as they did for the first edition, although I have allowed

myself a fair amount of expansion where I became persuaded

that the original was a little too sparse. But I have tried to keep

the likely needs of the user in mind, and at least some of those

needs are better met with reasonable brevity than massive

prolixity. The historian Macaulay says of some unfortunate that

the great weight of his learning had quite extinguished his

slender faculties, but as before I have been more concerned to

light up the faculties than to add to the learning. And, as before,

this is my excuse for refracting so much through my own

interests and judgments, rather than packaging the entries of

others." (from the Preface to the Second Edition).

5. Ayer, Alfred Julius, and O'Grady, Jane, eds. 1992. A Dictionary

of Philosophical Quotations. Malden: Blackwell.

"A. J. Ayer's suggestion that he should compile a dictionary of

philosophical quotations was one of those ideas the excellence

of which is attested by puzzlement that it has never been

thought of before. In this case, however, there is some reason

why, if it had been previously conceived, the idea had not been

put into practice. The sort of thing readers expect from a book

of quotations is a set of aphoristic utterances which trigger an

immediate response of pleasure, agreement, amusement or

awe, and which seem 'deep' without requiring to be sounded.

But, though incidentally full of stylishness and wit,

philosophical thought is not essentially aphoristic, and cannot

easily be boiled down into resonant sayings. It consists mainly

in intricate, often lengthy, argument, which usually invokes or

assumes understanding of the philosophical positions it

opposes.

The compiler of philosophical quotations is therefore in a

difficult position. To reproduce too many long closely argued

passages runs the risk of boring the reader; to produce only the

conclusions to such arguments would be baffling and

frustrating; and it is often misleading, distorting, or impossible

to convey an argument in small chunks or in passages full of

ellipses. Or where this can be done, there is the danger of

imposing a certain homogeneousness of quotability, and of

replacing ponderousness with pithiness at the cost of losing

philosophers' distinctiveness and style. Merely to reproduce

their peripheral witticisms would not do justice to them either.

I have used a combination of these various risk-involving

methods of quotation, trying to avoid the pitfalls of each.

Where possible, in order to supply the necessary presupposed

background to the arguments, I have selected quotations which

effectively cross-refer to, and complement, one another (Reid

attempting to refute Hume, Condillac appreciatively criticizing

Locke). This also, 1 hope, conveys a sense of philosophy as

shared and cumulative dispute, rather than just the solitary

musing it is often taken to be, and of how philosophers

constantly both build on and demolish one another. For readers

unused to philosophy there is a Glossary, in which I have aimed

not merely to define the philosophical terms used in the book,

but, given the limited space, to set them in the context of the

disputes in which they feature, and thus make clear their

significance." (from the Introduction).

General Encyclopedias

1. Edwards, Paul, ed. 1967. The Encyclopedia of Philosophy. New

York: Macmillan.

Eight volumes, plus a supplement edited by D. M. Borchert in

1996. This edition is now superseded by the new edition

published in 2005, but some articles are still of valuable

interest.

"The last and, in fact, the only previous major philosophical

reference work in the English language, J. M. Baldwin's

Dictionary of Psychology and Philosophy, appeared in 1901.

While it was in many ways an admirable work (it numbered

among its contributors men of such caliber as Charles Peirce

and C. E. Moore), the scope of Baldwin's Dictionary was quite

limited. The great majority of articles were exceedingly brief,

providing concise definitions of technical terms sometimes

accompanied by additional information of a historical nature.

Since then, especially in the light of the revolutionary

developments in philosophy and related fields, the need for a

truly encyclopedic presentation of philosophical theories and

concepts has become increasingly acute. The present

encyclopedia is intended to fill this need. It has been our aim to

cover the whole of philosophy as well as many of the points of

contact between philosophy and other disciplines. The

Encyclopedia treats Eastern and Western philosophy; it deals

with ancient, medieval, and modern philosophy; and it

discusses the theories of mathematicians, physicists, biologists,

sociologists, psychologists, moral reformers, and religious

thinkers where these have had an impact on philosophy. The

Encyclopedia contains nearly 1,500 articles of ample length

which can be of value to the specialist, while most of them are

sufficiently explicit to be read with pleasure and profit by the

intelligent nonspecialist. Some of the longer articles, such as

those dealing with the history of the various fields of

philosophical investigation or the work of the most influential

philosophers, are in effect small books, and even the shorter

articles are usually long enough to allow a reasonably

comprehensive treatment of the subject under discussion. We

believe that there is no philosophical concept or theory of any

importance that is not identified and discussed in the

Encyclopedia, although not every concept or theory has a

separate article devoted to it. In apportioning the space at our

disposal, we were guided by the thought that the majority of

readers would derive more benefit from, a smaller number of

long and integrated articles than from a multitude of shorter

entries. Throughout we have aimed at presentations which are

authoritative, clear, comprehensive, and interesting." (from the

Introduction).

2. Borchert, Donald M., ed. 2006. The Encyclopedia of

Philosophy. Second Edition. New York: Thomson Gale.

"Our strategy of building the Second Edition on the foundation

of the First Edition and the Supplement requires a few

additional comments.

Carefully and judiciously our editorial team selected those

entries from the First Edition and the Supplement that were so

well done that they merited retention. To virtually all of these

entries we added bibliographical updates and to many of them

we added substantive addenda. We prized these entries

because, appearing together with the new entries, they enabled

the reader to view high quality philosophizing over the course

of almost a half century thereby adding a measure of historical

gravitas to our project.

Notwithstanding our respect for the First Edition and the

Supplement, we added 450 entries on new topics, and nearly

300 completely fresh and newly authored treatments of

important topics that were originally covered within the First

Edition or Supplement. The presence of all of this new material

is a clear indication of the vigorous and innovative

philosophical activity that has occurred within the discipline

since the Encyclopedia made its debut almost four decades ago.

Entirely new subfields have appeared such as feminist

philosophy, the philosophy of sex and love, and applied ethics.

New

important topics in virtually every subfield have been explored

ranging from artificial intelligence to animal rights. New

scholars, whose distinctive contributions to the discipline

needed description in substantive personal entries, have

appeared on the philosophical landscape.

Among such individuals are Karl-Otto Apel, Mohammed

Arkoun, Nancy Cartwright, Daniel Dennett, Fred Dretske,

Ronald Dworkin, John Earman, Hassan Hanafi, Virginia Held,

Julia Kristeva, Jacques Lacan, John McDowell, Ruth Millikan,

Richard Montague, Thomas Nagel, Seyyed Hossein Nasr,

Martha Nussbaum, Derek Parfit, Hilary Putnam, Peter Singer,

Gregory Vlastos, Richard Wollheim, and many, many more.

We also added updates to 90 articles, with those updates

provided by their original authors. Additionally, 150 scholarly

updates to existing articles have been included by means of

"addenda," with each addendum compiled by an author other

than the original writer, thus allowing for a fresh perspective

that augments discussion of the topic at hand. Approximately

430 of the almost 1,200 classic First Edition or Supplement

articles that appear in the Second Edition have been

strengthened further by the inclusion of new bibliographic

citations. Classic articles from the First Edition and

Supplement are

clearly identifiable via specific dates in the author bylines that

follow each article. Author bylines followed by "(1967)" indicate

that the article originally appeared in the First Edition, while

bylines followed by "(1996)" indicate first publication within

the Supplement. The designation "(2005)" denotes first

publication within the Second Edition.

We have modified and expanded the philosophical

inclusiveness of the First Edition in several ways. Both the

analytic and continental philosophical traditions are well

represented in the new topics and new personal entries, as well

as in the style of presentation offered by our authors.

In addition, enhanced cultural diversity is evident in the major

space we have provided for topics relating to Buddhist

philosophy, Chinese philosophy, Islamic philosophy, and

Indian philosophy. Because of space limitations a number of

First Edition entries devoted to national philosophies (such as

American, British, and German) were not retained. The major

figures from those countries and their contributions to

philosophy have, however, been included in the Second Edition

via personal and topical entries. Importantly, we have retained

and expanded the entries on Japanese philosophy, Latin

American philosophy, and Russian philosophy, and have added

entries on African philosophy and Korean philosophy.

To preserve and enhance the detailed record of philosophical

bibliographies, dictionaries, encyclopedias, and journals

contained in the First Edition entries devoted exclusively to

these topics, we moved these articles to the last volume of the

Second Edition and increased substantially the space that had

been allocated to them in the First Edition. The very large

number of new philosophical bibliographies, dictionaries,

encyclopedias, and journals that have been published in a

multitude of languages during the last half century testifies not

only to the vitality of philosophy but also to the increasing

cultural diversity on its landscape." (from the Preface to the

Second Edition, pp. XII-XIII).

3. Craig, Edward, ed. 1998. Routledge Encyclopedia of

Philosophy. London, New York: Routledge.

"Planning of the Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy began

against the background of a single constraint: the project was to

be completable, with available means, within a reasonable

time-span. The grounds for this were partly economic, but only

partly. Since there was no other reason to offer a successor to

the justly famous Encyclopedia of Philosophy, edited by Paul

Edwards for Macmillan and The Free Press, other than the fact

that it had become in a number of respects out of date, it would

have made little sense to replace it by a project of such

proportions as to go out of date itself during the period of

production. We allowed ourselves a maximum of eight years,

later reduced to seven-and-a-half, from appointment of the

General Editor to publication. This of course suggested

advisable constraints on size. It was the firm intention that

within these limits our Encyclopedia should be as inclusive as

possible.

The first thing to be included was full and detailed coverage of

philosophy as understood by the Anglo-American academic

mainstream. One commercial and one intellectual

consideration made this mandatory. First, any project of this

size must aim to satisfy its principal market; and second, so

much of what belongs to the English-speaking philosophical

mainstream belongs to it by well-established right - no

encyclopedia of philosophy worthy of the name could possibly

fail to cover it extensively. But here the inclusivist policy got off

to a good start, for by the 1990s the mainstream itself had

become a much broader river than it had been twenty or thirty

years before, when a narrowly focused jet might have been a

more appropriate image. It was also far less clear where the

banks were, and we were glad not to have to concern ourselves

with that question. In the 1960s philosophy felt fairly sure of its

business and its boundaries; in the 1990s it does not have the

same confidence (though it does not lack individual confident

voices), and a clear mark of this is a greater tendency to look

around, historically and geographically, to see what the others

are doing. An editorial policy that was unwilling to reflect the

growing pluralism would be widely held to have imposed far

too much of itself on the material.

The clearest beneficiary of this policy has been what is

increasingly called 'world' philosophy. Chinese, Japanese and

Korean, Indian and Tibetan, Jewish, Arabic and Islamic,

Russian, Latin American and African philosophy have between

them 400 entries. We believe that the user of the Encyclopedia

can gain a thorough grounding in the philosophy of any of these

regions. Someone seeking a firm foothold in Buddhist

philosophy will find themselves as well served as those looking

for philosophical logic. Readers with an interest in Western

metaphysics are invited to pursue their interests to India. Back

in Europe, but equally suspect to many mainstreamers: the

devotee of later twentieth-century French thought will find

their interests well catered for. In all these cases, we believe, we

have provided more topics, more detail, and more

bibliographical information than any previous general

encyclopedia of philosophy.

It is one thing to be inclusive, another to ensure proper

treatment for everything one includes. Our strategy was that

Subject Editors should provide a perspective on their own area

that practitioners within it could at least recognize, and

preferably identify with, and therefore that they should have

the space, the words and the number of entries to do so. A

number of these areas are ones to which the Anglo-American

mainstream has assigned little importance. We wanted to

minimize the effect of this on the coverage of the outlying areas:

the periphery was not to be kept peripheral by being presented

as it appears from the centre. By far the main influence on the

shaping of each area was to be someone for whom that area was

the centre of their academic life. This was one of our reasons for

adopting the more complex editorial structure, with a layer of

specialist Subject Editors taking decisions about headwords,

word-counts and commissioning, though keeping in touch with

a General Editor while doing so, rather than having a Chief

Editor acting with the help of specialist advisers. Another

reason, of course, was the thought that one makes better use of

the available expertise by bringing it to bear directly, than by

applying it via a less expert intermediary." (from the General

Editor's Preface, VI).

4. ———, ed. 1999. Concise Routledge Encyclopedia of

Philosophy. London, New York: Routledge.

An abridged edition in one volume.

"The Concise Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy is a

complete Introduction to world philosophy. Its 2,000 plus

entries range from the Presocratics, Ancient Egypt and early

Chinese philosophy up to the present day, and across the world

to include the philosophies of the West, the Arab world, India,

East Asia, Latin America and Africa. Subject matter is broad

ranging, from aesthetics to mathematics, from philosophy of

religion to philosophy of science. Entries fall into three broad

types. First, lengthy entries provide Introductions to major

disciplines within philosophy (epistemology, ethics,

metaphysics and so on) and major time periods and regions

(ancient philosophy, medieval philosophy, Indian and Tibetan

philosophy and so on), defining the concepts, movements and

topics and summing up the major positions and debates within

each. Shorter entries, ranging from a few dozen words to

several hundred, then describe more specific concepts in

greater detail. Finally, biographical entries provide information

on the life, work and thought of hundreds of the world's

philosophers, from household names like Plato and Confucius

to others who, almost forgotten, none the less made important

contributions." (from the Introduction).

5. ———, ed. 2005. The Shorter Routledge Encyclopedia of

Philosophy. London, New York: Routledge.

" The Shorter REP has emerged out of our experience with

Concise REP, the first one-volume distillation of the original

ten-volume Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy published in

1998. Concise REP appearing in 2000, was composed of the

initial. introductory or summary sections of each of the 2.054

entries contained in the parent work, which it therefore

matched everywhere for breadth, but hardly anywhere for

depth. By virtue of its sheer range Concise REP fulfilled a need,

but we have heard from users and reviewers who would

evidently have preferred more depth -- and would have been

willing, we must presume, to sacrifice some breadth to get it.

Thinking about this valuable feedback quickly led to a different

conception of a single-volume reduction of the encyclopedia

that now embodied in Shorter REP. By excising much of the

more recondite material we have made it possible for a

considerable number of entries on the more central and

sought-after topics to be included in their entirety, even though

in some cases that meant as much as 15,000 words or more.

The Shorter REP accordingly contains just 957 entries, but of

these 119 are republished here in their full original length. and

marked out by hold typeface in the headwords at the top of the

page. The reader will find substantial essays on all the major

figures of the Western philosophical trait likewise on all major

topics and those we judged to be of most help to a student

readership. Further, we have reprinted in full all the 'Signpost'

entries. in which members of the original team of specialist

subject editors surveyed in brief, usually in about 2.000 words,

their specialist field. There are twenty-four of these. instantly

recognisable from their light-grey background: taken together

they offer the reader a highly informative outline sketch of

pretty much the whole of philosophy. Latin American. African.

Jewish, Arabic, Russian, Indian and East-Asian thought all

included. The Shorter REP is unashamedly 'Western' in its

emphasis. being designed to suit the needs of undergraduate

philosophy students and the courses they are most likely to

encounter. But so far as the stringencies of a single volume

allow it retains the spirit of inclusivity and comprehensiveness

that was such a feature of its ten-volume ancestor. Nowhere is

the 'Signpost' the only entry allotted to its area -- in every case

there are at least two others.

The inclusion of so many complete entries has had another

welcome effect, that of allowing us to do a little more justice to

at least some of the encyclopedia's most eminent authors:

Richard Rorty, Bernard Williams, Dagfinn Follesdal, Tim

Scanlon. Philip Kitcher, Timothy Williamson, Onora O'Neill,

Gary Gutting, Anthony Appiah, Frank Jackson, Michael

Friedman, Dan Garber, Malcolm Budd, Terry Irwin and the list

runs on, though I have to stop, apologetically. somewhere.

Entries by all these and many others appear in their original

shape, unabridged.

The Shorter REP is not just a selective rearrangement of the old

material. Admittedly hardly anything has been rewritten

specifically for The Shorter REP, just two very short entries in

fact. but it nevertheless contains a good deal that is new when

compared with the original 1998 publication. Any slight

suggestion of paradox is easily dispelled: since October 2000

the Routledge Encyclopedia has been available on the Internet

as REP Online, in which form it has seen additions (at present

towards 100 new entries) and a number (now approaching

thirty) of updates and revisions, concentrating on entries near

the top of our list of user-statistics. Some of the revised entries

embody only minor changes. perhaps the retention of a recent

book or article, others differ much more from their first

versions, as for Wittgenstein (by Jane Heal), which as well as

various smaller adjustments now has a whole new section on

recent interpretative controversy about Wittgenstein's

Tractatus. In one absolutely central case, of obvious prime

interest to students, we have a completely rewritten

replacement entry: this is David Hume. by Don Garrett. All this

new material in REP Online was available to us as we made our

selections for The Shorter REP and a good deal of it is now to

be found here." (from the Introduction, VII).

6. Parkinson, George Henry Radcliffe, ed. 1988. An Encyclopedia

of Philosophy. London: Routledge.

American edition titled: The Handbook of Western Philosophy,

New York, Macmillan, 1989.

"This encyclopaedia of philosophy is intended for a very wide

audience. It is intended for the general reader, who wants to

know what philosophy is; for the sixth-former, who may have

experienced for the first time the fascination of the problems of

philosophy and who may be thinking about studying the subject

at a university; and for university students of philosophy who

want a general map of the various regions of philosophy that

picks out the important features and relates them to each other.

Finally, although this encyclopaedia is not a reference work for

the specialist, it is hoped that it may be of some use to teachers

of philosophy, who may find it helpful from time to time to see

how their own special area of interest is related to other areas.

An encyclopaedia, by its nature, should aim at being

comprehensive; but comprehensiveness has to be weighed

against two other factors-size (which also means expense) and

intelligibility. A one-volume encyclopaedia, such as this is,

could achieve a fair measure of comprehensiveness, but the

material that it contained would have to be compressed. Such

an encyclopaedia would be useful only to someone who already

has some knowledge of the subject, or who wants to pick up bits

of information-the exact title of a book, perhaps, or a date. The

present encyclopaedia, however, is meant to give its readers

some understanding of philosophy, and this means that limits

have had to be placed on its scope. It has been decided that it

should be an encyclopaedia of contemporary philosophical

thought, an account of die current state of philosophical

thinking. This does not mean that the history of the subject will

be neglected. It is my belief that current philosophical problems

have their roots in the past, and can best be understood by

tracing them back to those roots. But there will be no

discussion of issues that belong wholly to the past.

There is another restriction on the scope of this encyclopaedia.

One of the most striking features of recent Western

philosophical thought is the existence within it of two broad

traditions, which arc commonly called the continental and the

Anglo-Saxon traditions. The continental tradition is by no

means confined to the continent of Europe, but has ninny

adherents in America; it descends from a method of inquiry

known as phenomenology, expounded in the first instance by

Brentano and Husserl, and developed by (among others)

Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty. More recently, some continental

philosophers have found inspiration in 'structuralist' methods

of inquiry drawn from linguistics; others have moved on from

structuralism, though in what direction is not wholly clear. The

Anglo-Saxon tradition goes back to the British empiricists of

the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries-to Locke. Berkeley

and Hume-but it is not restricted to philosophers of the

English-speaking world; it has also taken root in continental

Europe, particularly in West Germany and in the Scandinavian

countries. Now, there is nothing new in the coexistence of

different philosophical traditions; what is new and disturbing is

the fact that, in the main, the attitude of these two traditions

towards one another is one of mutual incomprehension.

Attempts have been made,and are being made, to end this state

of affairs, but it cannot be said that they have had much

success. Most of the contributors to this book are firmly within

the Anglo-Saxon tradition, and it seemed to me that an attempt

to deal adequately with the continental tradition would add

considerably to the length and difficulty of the encyclopaedia. I

have therefore decided, with regret, to omit those parts of the

continental tradition that have made little or no impact on the

Anglo-Saxon tradition. For similar reasons, no attempt will be

made to give an account of oriental philosophy." (from the

Preface, IX-X).

7. Bunnin, Nicholas, and Tsui-James, E.P., eds. 2003. The

Blackwell Companion to Philosophy. Malden: Blackwell.

Second edition (First edition 1996).

"This Companion complements the Blackwell Companions to

Philosophy series by presenting a new overview of philosophy

prepared by thirty-five leading British and American

philosophers. Introductory essays by John Searle and Bernard

Williams, which assess the changes that have shaped the

subject in recent decades, are followed by chapters exploring

central problems and debates in the principal subdisciplines of

philosophy and in specialized fields, chapters concerning the

work of great historical figures and chapters discussing newly

developing fields within philosophy. Throughout

the course of its chapters, the Companion examines the views

of many of the most widely influential figures of contemporary

philosophy.

Although wide-ranging, the Companion is not exhaustive, and

emphasis is placed on developments in Anglo-American

philosophy in the latter part of the twentieth century. A premise

underlying the Companion is that major participants in

philosophical debate can provide accounts of their own fields

that are stimulating, accessible, stylish and authoritative.

In its primary use, the Companion is an innovative textbook for

introductory courses in philosophy. Teachers can use the broad

coverage to select chapters in a flexible way to support a variety

of courses based on contemporary problems or the historical

development of the subject. Specialist chapters can be used

selectively to augment standard introductory topics or to

prepare students individually for term papers or essays.

Chapters include initial summaries, boxed features, cross-

references, suggestions for further reading, references and

discussion questions. In addition, terms are marked for a

common glossary. These features and the problem-setting

nature of the discussions encourage students to see the subject

as a whole and to gain confidence that explorations within

philosophy can lead to unexpected and rewarding insights. In

this aspect, the Companion reflects the contributors' experience

of small group teaching, in which arguments and perspectives

are rigorously tested and in which no solution is imposed.

In its secondary use, the Companion will accompany students

throughout their undergraduate careers and will also serve the

general reader wishing to understand the central concepts and

debates within philosophy or its constituent disciplines.

Students are unlikely to read the whole volume in their first

year of study, but those continuing with philosophy will find

their appreciation of the work deepening over time as they gain

insight into the topics of the more advanced chapters. The

Companion will help them to formulate questions and to see

connections between what they have already studied and new

terrain.

In its final use, the Companion bears a special relationship to

the Blackwell Companions to Philosophy series. Many readers

will wish to read the integrated discussions of the chapters of

the present Companion for orientation before turning to the

detailed, alphabetically arranged articles of the volumes in the

Companion series. Although conceived as a separate volume,

the Companion to Philosophy will serve as a useful guide to the

other excellent Companions in what amounts to a

comprehensive encyclopedia of philosophy.

The general reader might begin with the introductory essays

and turn to chapters on Epistemology, Metaphysics, Ethics and

Political and Social Philosophy, or to historical chapters from

Ancient Greek Philosophy to Hume. Cross-references and

special interests will lead readers to other chapters." (from the

Preface to the First Edition).

"We thank readers for their gratifying response to the first

edition of the Companion.

The second edition provides new chapters on Philosophy of

Biology; Bioethics, Genetics and Medical Ethics;

Environmental Ethics; Business Ethics; Ethnicity, Culture and

Philosophy; Plato and Aristotle; Francis Bacon; Nietzsche;

Husserl and Heidegger; and Sartre, Foucault and Derrida.

There are significant revisions or extensions to chapters on

Metaphysics, Philosophy of Language, Philosophy of Mind,

Political and Social Philosophy, Philosophy of Religion,

Philosophy and Feminism, and Hobbes. The discussion of

Descartes, Spinoza and Leibniz is now divided between two

chapters, and in a new section Malebranche is considered along

with Descartes in the first of these.

A longer chapter on Medieval Philosophy replaces the chapter

by C. F. J. Martin, who was unavailable to extend his work. We

welcome our new contributors and hope that readers will

continue to be challenged and delighted by the Companion as a

whole." (Preface to the Second edition).

Bibliographia. Annotated bibliographies

Raul Corazzon || rc@ontology.co || Info

Study Guide for the History of

Philosophy (General Works)

General Histories of Philosophy

1. Laerke, Mogens;, Smith, Justin E. H.;, and Schliesser, Eric, eds.

2013. Philosophy and Its History. Aims and Methods in the

Study of Early Modern Philosophy. New York: Oxford

University Press.

2. Verene, Donald Phillip. 2008. The History of Philosophy. A

Reader's Guide. Evanston: Northwestern University Press.

"Despite the aversion to the Western canon within the world of

letters generally and the aversion to the study of the history of

philosophy in particular, interest in the canon has prevailed.

There are those who will not give it up and who still desire the

education that the great works can provide. I am one of those

who would wish to sail between the Scylla of analysis and the

Charybdis of suspicion, with the desire to return to the Ithaca

of the canon. To understand what I intend by the list of 100

great philosophical works in chapter 2, I refer the reader to my

comments on the nature of a canon in the introductory chapter.

The list of 100 great philosophical works is not intended as a

perfect or a hard-and-fast list, and the overview or outline of

the history of philosophy that follows the list, in chapter 3, is

intended as an indication of the periods, figures, and major and

minor works to be kept in mind in the study of the history of

philosophy. I have presented this in schematic form. It does not

purport to be a history of philosophy. For that one must go to

the histories of philosophy listed at the end of the outline.

The outline is an interpretation of the history of philosophy.

Because the canon has disappeared so much from our

consciousness, the outline provides an overview, a reminder of

what is there in the history of philosophy. The reader may wish

first to look at the outline, then move on to the essays of part 2,

and from them to come back to the outline as a guide to think

through and absorb its order. The method of this book is not

that of a linear argument. It is set up dialectically, with

interplay between the two rhetorical forms of presentation,

narratio and ratio, the narration (the essays) versus the list

and outline. It may thus serve the reader as a touchstone and a

guide to return to at various times-to enter the reading of works

in the history of philosophy or to discover those works and

movements of which perhaps the reader was not well aware.

The list of 100 great works and those works in the outline as

well as the commentaries on them which are interspersed

throughout the outline are drawn from the resources of my

personal library. The commentaries are selected from ones I

have used. Very likely there are glaring omissions. I have

generally not included commentaries on individual thinkers,

only works on periods or movements. It has not been my

intention to write a textbook, taking a neutral position on the

subject. This book is directed toward anyone who may have an

interest in the history of philosophy and who may find what it

presents useful.

This personal approach is evident in the three essays that

follow in part 2. The first offers a view of philosophical reading

and the philosophical use of language; the second a view of the

origin of philosophy and the philosopher developed through the

speculative use of the history of philosophy, moving from

ancient to Renaissance to modern; and the third an exposition

of how the philosophy of history affects the conception of the

history of philosophy, using Vico and Hegel as holders of two

views. These essays present rhetorical, humanist, and historical

perspectives on the study and nature of philosophy and the

history of philosophy. They are intended as suggestive rather

than definitive accounts, with which the reader should feel free

to disagree. As with the particular canon that each reader must

develop from the larger, more general canon of the history of

philosophy, each reader must come to some conclusions about

the meaning of this history, about what aspects of it make it

agile and alive.

Because some may wish not only to read the history of

philosophy but also to write about it, I have included some

practical advice on this topic in part 3, as well as a chapter on

philosophical literacy containing 700 terms, names, and works

that should be known or become known to those who study the

history of philosophy and the field of philosophy generally.

These are all taken from standard encyclopedias and reference

works in philosophy. To my knowledge no one has as yet

advanced such a literacy list in philosophy. It may interest the

reader as a simple gauge of what should be philosophical

common knowledge." (pp. XIII-XV).

3. Parkinson, George Henry Radcliffe, and Shanker, Stuart, eds.

1993. Routledge History of Philosophy. London, New York:

Routledge.

Contents: Volume I: From the Beginning to Plato, Editor:

C.C.W. Taylor; Volume II: Aristotle to Augustine, Editor: David

Furley; Volume III: Medieval Philosophy, Editor: John

Marenbon; Volume IV: The Renaissance and Seventeenth

Century Rationalism, Editor G.H.R. Parkinson; Volume V:

British Empiricism and the Enlightenment, Editor: Stuart

Brown; Volume VI: The Age of German Idealism, Editor Robert

C. Solomon and Kathleen M. Higgins; Volume VII: Metaphysics

Under Attack: The Nineteenth Century, Editor: C.L. Ten;

Volume VIII: Continental Philosophy in the Twentieth Century,

Editor: Richard Kearney; Volume IX: Philosophy of the English

Speaking World in the Twentieth Century 1: Logic,

Mathematics and Science, Editor S.G. Shanker; Volume X:

Philosophy of the English Speaking World in the Twentieth

Century 2: Meaning, Knowledge and Value, Editor: John

Canfield.

"The Routledge History of Philosophy provides a chronological

survey of the history of Western philosophy, from its

beginnings up to the present time. Its aim is to discuss all major

philosophical developments in depth, and with this in mind,

most space has been allocated to those individuals who, by

common consent, are regarded as great philosophers. But

lesser figures have not been neglected, and it is hoped that the

reader will be able to find, in the ten volumes of the History, at

least basic information about any significant philosopher of the

past or present. (...) In speaking of 'What is now regarded as

philosophy', we may have given the impression that there now

exists a single view of what philosophy is. This is certainly not

the case; on the contrary, there exist serious differences of

opinion, among those who call themselves philosophers, about

the nature of their subject. These differences are reflected in the

existence at the present time of two main schools of thought,

usually described as ''analytic' and 'continental' philosophy. It

is not our intention, as general editors of this History, to take

sides in this dispute. Our attitude is one of tolerance, and our

hope is that these volumes will contribute to an understanding

of how philosophers have reached the positions which they now

occupy. One final comment. Philosophy has long been a highly

technical subject, with its own specialized vocabulary. This

History is intended not only for the specialist but also for the

general reader. To this end, we have tried to ensure that each

chapter is written in an accessible style; and since technicalities

are unavoidable, a glossary of technical terms is provided in

each volume. In this way these volumes will, we hope,

contribute to a wider understanding of a subject which is of the

highest importance to all thinking people." (from the General

Editors' Preface).

4. Copleston, Frederick. 2003. A History of Philosophy. London /

New York: Continuum.

Contents: 1. Greece and Rome; 2. Medieval Philosophy; 3. Late

Medieval and Early Renaissance Philosophy; 4. The

Rationalists; 5. British Philosophy; 6. The Enlightenment; 7.

German Philosophy; 8. Utilitarianisim to Early Analytic

Philosophy; 9. French Philosophy; 10. Russian Philosophy; 11.

Logical Positivism and Existentialism.

The original edition (first nine volumes) was published between

1946 and 1974; the tenth volume was added in 1986, and the

eleventh is a collection of essays, already published with the

title: Contemporary Philosophy Studies of Logical Positivism

and Existentialism, New York, Continuum, 1956.

" How to Study the History of Philosophy.

1. The first point to be stressed is the need for seeing any

philosophical system in its historical setting and connections.

This point has already been mentioned and does not require

further elaboration: it should be obvious that we can only grasp

adequately the state of mind of a given philosopher and the

raison d'être of his philosophy if we have first apprehended its

historical point de depart. The example of Kant has already

been given; we can understand his state of mind in developing

his theory of the a priori only if we see him in his historical

situation vis-à-vis the critical philosophy of Hume, the

apparent bank ruptcy of Continental Rationalism and the

apparent certainty of mathematics and the Newtonian physics.

Similarly, we are better enabled to understand the biological

philosophy of Henri Bergson

if we see it, for example, in its relation to preceding mechanistic

theories and to preceding French "spiritualism."

2. For a profitable study of the history of philosophy there is

also need for a certain "sympathy," almost the psychological

approach. It is desirable that the historian should know some

thing of the philosopher as a man (this is not possible in the

case of all philosophers, of course), since this will help him to

feel his way into the system in question, to view it, as it were,

from inside, and to grasp its peculiar flavour and

characteristics. We have to endeavour to put ourselves into the

place of the philosopher, to try to see his thoughts from within.

Moreover, this sympathy or imaginative insight is essential for

the Scholastic philosopher who wishes to understand modern

philosophy. If a man, for example, has the background of the

Catholic Faith, the modern systems, or some of them at least,

readily appear to him as mere bizarre monstrosities unworthy

of serious attention, but if he succeeds, as far as he can

(without, of course, surrendering his own principles), in seeing

the systems from within, he stands much more chance of

understanding what the philosopher meant.

We must not, however, become so preoccupied with the

psychology of the philosopher as to disregard the truth or

falsity of his ideas taken in themselves, or the logical

connection of his system with preceding thought. A

psychologist may justly confine himself to the first viewpoint,

but not an historian of philosophy." (pp. 8-9).

5. Popkin, Richard Henry, ed. 1999. The Columbia History of

Western Philosophy. New York: Columbia University Press.

"There have been many histories of philosophies, but few

presented in one large volume for the educated layman. Two

such ventures that have endured for many decades, The Story

of Philosophy by Will Durant and Bertrand Russell's A History

of Western Philosophy, are eminently readable, but cover only

the high spots of the field.

Durant, who was a very popular lecturer on philosophy at

Columbia University, primarily discusses only a few of the great

men. Nevertheless, his popularization has been a gateway into

philosophy for a great many readers during much of this

century.

Russell wrote his book hastily out of financial desperation while

jobless in New York City at the beginning of World War II.

Since Russell was a scholar of very few of the topics he covered,

and uninterested or hostile to others, his opus is most engaging

as Russelliana but hardly as history of philosophy. Both

Durant's and Russell's works are still in print and are widely

available in paperback editions.

This work is not intended to compete with these classics.

During the last half century the number of new serious

scholarly findings and interpretations concerning various

portions of the history of philosophy has increased enormously.

Previously unknown materials by and about various major

figures in the history of philosophy have been discovered. The

manuscripts of important figures from ancient times to the

present have been or are being edited, increasing our

understanding of the authors.

For example, an edition of John Locke's writings based on

previously unknown manuscripts has begun to see print; the

edition of G. W. Leibniz's unpublished writings started in the

1920s continues to produce new volumes. New historical

perspectives are being cast upon the materials, so that they can

now be seen in their full intellectual and social contexts instead

of as just isolated systems of ideas.

All of this has led to many multivolume histories of different

portions of the history of philosophy. The enormous German

Überweg history of philosophy, long the standard one for

detail, is now in the process of being redone with a substantial

increase in depth of coverage and amount of material; when

completed, it will finally consist of dozens of highly specialized

volumes. Large histories of various periods in the history of

philosophy have also been issued, as well as countless volumes

about individual philosophers.

In the light of all that has been discovered, edited, and

reinterpreted, it seems appropriate to attempt to put together

much of the new material and many of the new interpretations,

as well as updated explanations and analyses of the accepted

history of philosophy, in a form in which nonprofessional

readers can appreciate the riches now available in the field. I

have been concerned to give due attention to certain portions of

the history of philosophy that much too often have been

overlooked." (from the Introduction by R. H. Popkin, pp. XV-

XVI).

6. Kenny, Anthony P. 2004. A New History of Western

Philosophy. New York: Oxford University Press.

Contents: 1. Ancient Philosophy (2004); 2. Medieval

Philosophy (2005); 3. The Rise of Modern Philosophy (2006);

4. Philosophy in the Modern World (2007).

"Why should one study the history of philosophy? There are

many reasons, but they fall into two groups: philosophical and

historical.

We may study the great dead philosophers in order to seek

illumination upon themes of present-day philosophical inquiry.

Or we may wish to understand the people and societies of the

past, and read their philosophy to grasp the conceptual climate

in which they thought and acted. We may

read the philosophers of other ages to help to resolve

philosophical problems of abiding concern, or to enter more

fully into the intellectual world of a bygone era.

In this history of philosophy, from the beginnings to the

present day, I hope to further both purposes, but in different

ways in different parts of the work, as I shall try to make clear

in this Introduction. But before outlining a strategy for writing

the history of philosophy, one must pause to reflect on the

nature of philosophy itself. The word 'philosophy' means

different things in divergent mouths, and correspondingly 'the

history of philosophy' can be interpreted in many ways. What it

signifies depends on what the particular historian regards as

being essential to philosophy.

This was true of Aristotle, who was philosophy's first historian,

and of Hegel, who hoped he would be its last, since he was

bringing philosophy to perfection. The two of them had very

different views of the nature of philosophy. Nonetheless, they

had in common a view of philosophical progress: philosophical

problems in the course of history became ever more clearly

defined, and they could be answered with ever greater accuracy.

Aristotle in the first book of his Metaphysics and Hegel in his

Lectures on the History of Philosophy saw the teachings of the

earlier philosophers they recorded as halting steps in the

direction of a vision they were themselves to expound." (p. XI)

(...)

"Most histories of philosophy, in this age of specialization, are

the work of many hands, specialists in different Welds and

periods. In inviting me to write, single-handed, a history of

philosophy from Thales to Derrida, Oxford University Press

gave expression to the belief that there is something to be

gained by presenting the development of philosophy from a

single viewpoint, linking ancient, medieval, early modern, and

contemporary philosophy into a single narrative concerned

with connected themes. The work will appear in four volumes:

the first will cover the centuries from the beginning of

philosophy up to the conversion of St Augustine in ad 387. The

second will take the story from Augustine up to the Lateran

Council of 1512. The third will end with the death of Hegel in

1831. The fourth and final volume will bring the narrative up to

the end of the second millennium."(p. XVIII)

(...)

"I shall attempt in these volumes to be both a philosophical

historian and a historical philosopher. Multi-authored histories

are sometimes structured chronologically and sometimes

structured thematically. I shall try to combine both approaches,

covering in each volume first a chronological survey, and then a

thematic treatment of particular philosophical topics of abiding

importance. The reader whose primary interest is historical will

focus on the chronological survey, referring where necessary to

the thematic sections for implication. The reader who is more

concerned with the philosophical issues will concentrate rather

on the thematic sections of the volumes, referring back to the

chronological surveys to place particular issues in context." (p.

XX - from the Introduction to the first volume).

7. Schrift, Alan D., ed. 2011. The History of Continental

Philosophy. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Volume 1: Kant, Kantianism, and Idealism: The Origins of

Continental Philosophy, Edited by Thomas Nenon.

Introduction, Thomas Nenon; 1. Immanuel Kant's Turn to

Transcendental Philosophy, Thomas Nenon; 2. Kant's Early

Critics: Jacobi, Reinhold, Maimon, Richard Fincham; 3.

Johann Gottfried Herder, Sonia Sikka; 4. Play and Irony:

Schiller and Schlegel on the Liberating Prospects of Aesthetics,

Daniel Dahlstrom; 5. Fichte and Husserl: Life-world, the Other,

and Philosophical Reflection, Robert R. Williams; 6. Schelling:

Philosopher of Tragic Dissonance, Joseph P. Lawrence; 7.

Schopenhauer on Empirical and Aesthetic Perception and

Cognition, Bart Vandenabeele; 8. G.W.F. Hegel, Terry Pinkard;

9. From Hegelian Reason to the Marxian Revolution, 1831-48,

Lawrence S. Stepelevich; 10. Saint-Simon, Fourier, and

Proudhon: "Utopian," French Socialism, Diane Morgan.

Volume 2: Nineteenth-Century Philosophy: Revolutionary

Responses to the Existing Order, Edited by Alan D. Schrift and

Daniel Conway.

Introduction, Daniel Conway; 1. Feuerbach and the Left and

Right Hegelians, William Clare Roberts; 2. Marx and Marxism,

Terrell Carver; 3. Søren Kierkegaard, Alastair Hannay; 4.

Dostoevsky and Russian Philosophy, Evgenia Cherkasova; 5.

Life after the Death of God: Thus Spoke Nietzsche, Daniel

Conway; 6. Hermeneutics: Schleiermacher and Dilthey, Eric

Sean Nelson; 7. French Spiritualish Philosophy, F.C.T. Moore;

8. The Emergence of Sociology and its Theories: From Comte to

Weber, Alan Sica; 9. Developments in Philosophy of Science

and Mathematics, Dale Jacquette; 10. Peirce: Pragmatism and

Nature after Hegel, Douglas R. Anderson; 11. Aesthetics and the

Philosophy of Art, 1840-1900, Gary Shapiro.

Volume 3: The New Century: Bergsonism, Phenomenology

and Responses to Modern Science, Edited by Keith Ansell-

Pearson and Alan D. Schrift.

Introduction, Keith Ansell-Pearson; 1. Henri Bergson, John

Mullarkey; 2. Neo-Kantianism in Germany and France,

Sebastian Luft and Fabien Capeillères; 3. The Emergence of

French Sociology: Émile Durkheim and Marcel Mauss, Mike

Gane; 4. Analytic and Continental Traditions: Frege, Husserl,

Carnap, and Heidegger, Michael Friedman and Thomas

Ryckman; 5. Edmund Husserl, Thomas Nenon; 6. Max Scheler,

Dan Zahavi; 7. The Early Heidegger, Miguel de Beistegui; 8.

Karl Jaspers, Leonard H. Ehrlich; 9. Phenomenology at Home

and Abroad, Diane Perpich; 10. Early Continental Philosophy of

Science, Babette Babich; 11. Ludwig Wittgenstein, John Fennell

and Bob Plant; 12. Freud and Continental Philosophy, Adrian

Johnston; 13. Responses to Evolution: Spencer's Evolutionism,

Bergsonism, and Contemporary Biology, Keith Ansell-Pearson,

Paul-Antoine Miquel and Michael Vaughan.

Volume 4: Phenomenology: Responses and Developments,

Edited by Leonard Lawlor.

Introduction, Leonard Lawlor; 1. Dialectic, Difference and the

Other: The Hegelianizing of French Phenomenology, John

Russon; 2. Existentialism, S. K. Keltner and Samuel J. Julian;

3. Sartre and Phenomenology, William L. McBride; 4.

Continental Aesthetics: Phenomenology and

Antiphenomenology, Galen A. Johnson; 5. Merleau-Ponty at

the Limits of Phenomenology, Mauro Carbone; 6. The

Hermeneutic Transformation of Phenomenology, Daniel L.

Tate; 7. The Later Heidegger, Dennis Schmidt; 8. Existential

Theology, Andreas Grossmann; 9. Religion and Ethics, Felix Ó

Murchadha; 10. The Philosophy of the Concept, Pierre Cassou-

Noguès; 11. Analytic Philosophy and Continental Philosophy:

Four Confrontations, Dermot Moran.

Volume 5: Critical Theory to Structuralism: Philosophy,

Politics and the Human Sciences, Edited by David Ingram.

Introduction, David Ingram; 1. Carl Schmitt and Early Western

Marxism, Christopher Thornhill; 2. The Origins and

Development of the Model of Early Critical Theory in the Work

of Max Horkheimer, Erich Fromm, and Herbert Marcuse, John

Abromeit; 3. Theodor Adorno, Deborah Cook; 4. Walter

Benjamin, James McFarland; 5. Hannah Arendt: Rethinking

the Political, Peg Birmingham; 6. Georges Bataille, Peter Tracey

Connor; 7. French Marxism in its Heyday, William McBride; 8.

Black Existentialism, Lewis R. Gordon; 9. Ferdinand de

Saussure and Linguistic Structuralism, Thomas F. Broden; 10.

Claude Lévi-Strauss, Brian C. J. Singer; 11. Jacques Lacan, Ed

Pluth; 12. Late Pragmatism, Logical Positivism, and their

Aftermath, David Ingram.

Volume 6: Poststructuralism and Critical Theory's Second

Generation Edited by Alan D. Schrift.

Introduction, Alan D. Schrift; 1. French Nietzscheanism, Alan

D. Schrift; 2. Louis Althusser, Warren Montag; 3. Michel

Foucault, Timothy O'Leary; 4. Gilles Deleuze, Daniel W. Smith;

5. Jacques Derrida, Samir Haddad; 6. Jean-François Lyotard,

James Williams; 7. Pierre Bourdieu and the Practice of

Philosophy, Derek Robbins; 8. Michel Serres, David F. Bell; 9.

Jürgen Habermas, Christopher F. Zurn; 10. Second Generation

Critical Theory, James Swindal; 11. Gadamer, Ricoeur, and the

Legacy of Phenomenology, Wayne J. Froman; 12. The

Linguistic Turn in Continental Philosophy, Claire Colebrook;

13. Psychoanalysis and Desire, Rosi Braidotti and Alan D.

Schrift; 14. Luce Irigaray, Mary Beth Mader; 15. Cixous,

Kristeva, and Le Doeuff: Three "French Feminists," Sara

Heinämaa; 16. Deconstruction and the Yale School of Literary

Theory, Jeffrey T. Nealon; 17. Rorty Among the Continentals,

David R. Hiley.

Volume 7: After Poststructuralism: Transitions and

Transformations, Edited by Rosi Braidotti.

Introduction, Rosi Braidotti; 1. Postmodernism, Simon Malpas;

2. German Philosophy after 1980: Themes Out of School, Dieter

Thomä; 3. The Structuralist Legacy, Patrice Maniglier; 4.

Italian Philosophy Between 1980 and 1995, Silvia Benso and

Brian Schroeder; 5. Continental Philosophy in the Czech

Republic, Josef Fulka, Jr.; 6. Third Generation Critical Theory:

Benhabib, Fraser, and Honneth, Amy Allen; 7. French and

Italian Spinozism, Simon Duffy; 8. Radical Democracy, Lasse

Thomassen; 9. Cultural and Postcolonial Studies, Iain

Chambers; 10. The "Ethical Turn" in Continental Philosophy in

the 1980s, Robert Eaglestone; 11. Feminist Philosophy: Coming

of Age, Rosi Braidotti; 12. Continental Philosophy of Religion,

Bruce Ellis Benson; 13. The Performative Turn and the

Emergence of Post-Analytic Philosophy, José Medina; 14. Out

of Bounds: Philosophy in an Age of Transition, Judith Butler

and Rosi Braidotti.

Volume 8: Emerging Trends in Continental Philosophy, Edited

by Todd May.

Introduction, Todd May; 1. Rethinking Gender: Judith Butler

and Feminist Philosophy, Gayle Salamon; 2. Recent

Developments in Aesthetics: Badiou, Rancière, and Their

Interlocutors, Gabriel Rockhill; 3. Rethinking Marxism, Emily

Zakin; 4. Thinking the Event: Alain Badiou's Philosophy and

the Task of Critical Theory, Bruno Bosteels; 5. Rethinking

Anglo-American Philosophy: The Neo-Kantianism of Davidson,

McDowell, and Brandom, John Fennell; 6. Rethinking Science

as Science Studies: Latour, Stengers, Prigogine, Dorothea

Olkowski; 7. European Citizenship: A Post-Nationalist

Perspective, Rosi Braidotti; 8. Postcolonialism,

Postorientalism, Postoccidentalism: The Past That Never Went

Away and the Future That Never Arrived, Eduardo Mendieta; 9.

Continental Philosophy and the Environment, Jonathan

Maskit; 10. Rethinking the New World Order: Responses to

Globalization/American Hegemony, Todd May; Chronology;

Bibliography; Index.

Some Advanced Readings

1. Schürmann, Reiner. 2003. Broken Hegemonies. Bloomington:

Indiana University Press.

Translated by Reginald Lilly from the French Des hégémonies

brisées, Mauvezin, T.E.R. Trans Europ Repress, 1993.

"These analyses are first of all historical. They take up a debate,

more than a century old, concerning epochs and the thresholds

that separate them. But rather than constructing the ages and

their transitions-moments of objective Spirit, constellations of

the veiling and unveiling of being, epistemological apparatuses

of knowledge/ power-I thought it useful to read the languages

that Western philosophy has spoken since its birth. At their

best, philosophers have made an effort not to be carried away

by the fad of the day that passes for common sense; no thought,

however, has ever resisted being carried away by its own

language. Far from mastering a language, concepts live on it;

they are born of words. Hasn't each of our historical idioms

always instituted its own fantasmic reality? I have asked myself

which have been, concretely, those human additions of which

Nietzsche speaks. Might they always come down to a certain

organization of nouns linked in one way or another to the

predominant languages? Would "reality" then exist in a Greek,

a Latin, a modern vernacular? And might it be this by giving

birth to the centuries that spoke those languages and relied

upon common nouns as if upon courts of ultimate authority

that are essentially self-evident? It will be necessary, if such

questions merit consideration, to define epochs by means of the

fantasmic organization instituted by a language." (p. 4)

"The history I will attempt to retrace is the one in which the

Aristotelian hoson was maximized: the history of norms. I

understand this term in its strongest sense, the sense in which

it names the authoritative representation that serves, during a

given linguistic era, to constitute the phenomenality of

phenomena and thereby to legitimize all theoretical and

practical rules. In the normative sense, a fantasm cannot be

exhausted in regulatory representations. It designates the

sovereign principle to which the professional philosopher refers

all laws of knowledge and acting, but which in turn cannot be

referred to anything else,' the principle that serves as the

ultimate reason for all generic principles, the trans-regional

canon for all regional canons. This principle makes, absolutely

though fantasmically, e pluribus unum-from many, one-not as

does a major premise from which other propositions would

follow, but rather as a burgeoning production center. Fantasms

rule by authorizing not the deduction of a finite corpus of

conclusions, but the indefinite association of representations

that require that one follow them. Well, such representations

are called laws. Hence if laws are measured against the

fantasmic authority, then this fantasmic authority will be

normative in the sense that one refers to it as to the law of laws.

Is it not the basics of the trade to secure a foundation, not one

that is grounded but one nevertheless capable of anchoring the

premises which instruct me in what I may know and what I

should do? Understood in this way, a norm is not justified, and

in this respect it is fantasmic. But it justifies all that may

become a phenomenon during the linguistic epoch that bears

its hallmark; in this respect it is hegemonic. If it may be proven

that such a referent, non-referable to some superior authority,

remains for as long as a language preponderates, then the

history to be traced will be that of the Greek, Latin, and modern

hegemonic fantasms." (pp. 7-8)

"Because beginnings are compact but ends are revealing, I will

read only the opening and closing documents of each linguistic

epoch. I intend to analyze the inaugural discourses that

institute a law, as well as those that destitute it. When a

fantasm attains hegemony, everything proceeds as if

philosophy had no other strategy to follow than natalit j–6Ý™

C–Ý™y alone, maximization, tragic denial. But all this is so

only as if for the strategy of mortality is never obliterated-

singularization is not obliterated, neither is the tragic double

bind. The instituting discourses already express the double

bind, and the destituting discourses will draw their final

consequences from it.

I shall not stop to read instituted discourses that repeat the law

for long periods. Therefore, I will say very little about the "one"

as manifested in fourth century Attic thought, nor will I

hesitate, furthermore, to skip over the thirteenth century

scholastic apex of the Latin fantasm, nor, with the German

fantasm, to take a shortcut in the trajectory from idealism to

materialism and nihilism in the nineteenth century. If these

philosophical summits inspire awe it is because they closely

resemble the knowledge a neurotic patient imputes to his

therapist. And by presuming that each hegemonic fantasm

opens onto a non-fortuitous conjunction of legislation and

transgression that are equally normative, the therapy effectively

takes on the public function given to those who are at the

summits: ideal Platonic pacification, the Thomist "grand

system" (if that is the summum of Latin thought), the Hegelian

dialectic reconciling all oppositions. But in a retrospective

reading these cures prove deceptive. Neoplatonists, medieval

nominalists, and phenomenologists of occurrent being are

there to remind us that there is no recovery from the tragic

glimpsed at the beginnings.

Hence a warning about the relative volume of the synopses: In

the following pages we shall read less about the moments of

fantasmic destitution than about those of institution, for at the

commencement of each of the periods examined I will seek to

isolate the fissure that ends up by shattering an epochal

symbolic order. The ends will prove to be, if not foreseeable, at

least expected.

Through centuries of usage, a language deploys the full range of

resources contained in its words. As a closing document for the

Greek regime, I will read a treatise by Plotinus describing the

one as the event of unification which gathers the singular

givens together. Here we will see a return of the middle voice in

which I will discern a law of impurity, a principle of

contamination, an a priori of a counter-law which, by virtue of

our mortality, always disperses nomotheses among the

singulars and time. Our limiting of the Greek one to its

instituting and destituting moments should not be construed to

suggest that the language of Plotinus and Parmenides were the

same. But what could that mean, the same language? We do not

inhabit a language the way a fossil is embedded in a monolith.

Nevertheless, the semantic displacements from Parmenides to

Plotinus were just shifts. By contrast, with the passage to Latin,

an abrupt deployment of contiguous territories took place, a

rupture. As we shall see, these contiguities will require that we

diachronically stretch out the guiding thread, which is what our

topology is. If we come upon thresholds of incommensurability

in our history, these can only be the fractures left behind by

translations. The transition into a new linguistic epoch casts an

aura of irreality on fantasmic "reality." Here my interest in

languages is above all aimed at rescuing the discussion of

historical periodization from arbitrariness, which is why I shall

pay attention to the great translators, to those who shatter

historical continuity-Cicero and Luther." (pp. 39-40).

2. Deely, John. 2001. Four Ages of Understanding. The First

Postmodern Survey of Philosophy from Ancient Times to the

Turn of the Twenty-First Century. Toronto London Buffalo:

University of Toronto Press.

"It is not enough to distinguish the history of philosophy from

philosophy, philosophical from exegetic problems, if we do not

at the same time realize that the history of philosophy is

philosophy itself as so far actually realized in civilization. An

exclusively synchronic development of philosophical problems

generates mainly a blindness to one's own presuppositions and

to the manner in which historical context shapes in essential

ways contemporary consciousness - and unconsciousness - of

basic philosophical problems. To see that there is more to be

done is quite a different matter than proceeding as if nothing

had been done before us. Only an inclusive historical approach

has even a ghost's chance of restoring perspective and balance,

of forcing the needed reassessment to a successful outcome.

My hope is that this book will help make it unconscionable for

professors to continue to teach philosophy in the manner that

has long become customary - as though the history counted for

nothing, or provided only a side-show, especially that part of its

history I make known in this book as the Latin Age, to which

age, especially in its closing centuries (the period between

Ockham and Poinsot or Descartes), we owe the general notion

of sign taken for granted today insofar as it is a warranted

notion and not a mere nominalism. Besides, the history of

philosophy is not only philosophy itself as realized in

civilization, but also a story, and a good one. Mates has

suggested that to tell a story or even to criticize what others

have said or done is incompatible with the search for truth in

history. I couldn't disagree more, for it is on narrative that we

live as distinctively human animals, and every good narrative

has to have a beginning, a middle, and an end, however

provisional. My aim has been to tell a 'story of philosophy'

somewhere near as well as it deserves to be told in order for

something of the many truths at stake to come alive for those

who happen to hear the tale - not the only one to be told, to be

sure, but still a story of philosophy in the grand manner such a

story requires to match its destiny. I have tried to equip the

reader, as it were, with seven-league boots, making it possible

to traverse twenty-four centuries in such a way as to obtain a

vantage opening as far into the future of philosophy, I dare say,

as at least the lifetime of anyone born by the time of publication

of this book. The last word in any history is never spoken till the

race itself is extinct, and not even then. So this is not a history

for all time, but only for the first quarter or so, with luck the

first half, of the twenty-first century; after which the

postmodernism of which it speaks as harbinger will be spoken

of rather with words of hindsight and Minerva, according to the

saying of Hegel, that the owl of wisdom only flies toward

evening." (from the Preface).

3. Weitz, Morris. 1988. Theories of Concepts. A History of the

Major Philosophical Tradition. New York: Routledge.

"Having already canvassed open concepts, both contemporary

formulations of them and some of their variety, most recently

in The Opening Mind: a philosophical study of humanistic

concepts (1977), it seems to me that absolutely basic to further

exploration in the area of conceptualization is a thorough

inquiry into the history of traditional theories of concepts. Such

an inquiry would be valuable if only to test the accuracy of

contemporary criticisms of these theories as a series of

mistaken views about concepts as entities, or concepts as

erroneous readings of the meanings of words, or concepts as

unintelligible abstractions, or - my own view - concepts as

closed in their definitive properties, conditions or criteria.

Many contemporary philosophers, whether they subscribe to

open concepts or to concepts as dispositions, not entities, have

offered one or other wholesale doctrine about traditional

theories of concepts. The doctrine, as attribution and as

condemnation, in this regard, much resembles recent attempts

to foist mistaken naming theories of words or denotative

theories of meaning and language on traditional philosophy, to

be contrasted with some modern, correct theory of naming and

meaning, put forth by the particular philosopher-historian in

question. Because much evidence by way of historical Analysis

of traditional theories of language and meaning has it

companied and supported this contemporary critique of them,

one would naturally suppose that similar evidence is available

to indicate the wholesale condemnation of traditional theories

of concepts.

To my amazement and incredulity, I could find no book on the

history of philosophical theories of concepts. There are, of

course, encyclopedia articles on CONCEPTS; however, these

are, without exception, either too brief, too general or

delinquent, contain too many inaccuracies and, on the whole,

simply repeat the historical cliches of their predecessors.

Dictionaries, too, are unhelpful, as are the more detailed

Etymologies and Lexicons. What, then, of independently

written essays or chapters of books on the different

philosophers? Here, one finds a great deal on Kant's or Frege's

theory of concepts, and much on Aquinas' or Leibniz'. But there

is nothing, except paragraphs in chapters of books or in essays,

on Plato's theory of concepts and, even more surprising, on

Descartes', since he is preoccupied with what he refers to as

'concepts' when he turns from Meditation to Reply, for

example. And the little that there is on these two philosophers -

that, for example, Plato's theory of concepts is that concepts are

forms among the forms; or that Descartes means by a concept a

variant of an idea - it soon became apparent to me is incorrect.

To one, like myself, who is not a specialist in the history of

philosophy, this whole business of an individual philosopher's

theory of concepts and of the history of theories of concepts,

from Plato on, became confusing. The hope persisted that

somewhere, someone -surely some German scholar, whose

colleagues had devoted their lives to Plato's theory of justice or

to the etymology of arete - had written a long, accurate history

of philosophical theories of concepts.

That I could find no such survey dictated the writing of this

book, entirely concerned with the history of philosophical

theories of concepts. If I am right in claiming that such a survey

does not exist, then this history of philosophical theories of

concepts is the first. And in this regard, it will have realized one

of its aims even if, disagreed with, in its parts or as a whole, it

only provokes others to do the history better or differently.

But, it may be asked, is this history needed ? Obviously, it

seems so to me, first, because any important idea and related

set of doctrines about it that have a history enjoin and invite

meticulous delineation of them. Second, no contemporary

criticism of traditional theories of concepts nor, I think, any

putatively original and true theory of concepts and the having

of them can long ignore the competing theories of the past.

Recent claims about the modernity of the dispositional theory

of concepts are falsified and the truth of many variants of this

theory are challenged by Plato's theory which, if my

interpretation of it is correct, is not only the first dispositional

theory of concepts as abilities to move about intellectually and

morally in the world, but also the first to imply that concepts

are such abilities only on the condition that these are closed,

ultimately beholden to the forms or definitions of the forms or

of certain classes of things. However, the basic reason why a

survey of theories is required -certainly the reason why I have

devoted this book to it - is that a philosopher's theory of

concepts is not simply incidental to his work but fundamental

in his philosophy in that it determines the overall condition or

criterion of what he takes to be the correct statements and

solutions of his problems.

Why such a theory is needed perhaps also suggests why it has

not yet been done: because such a survey, at least as I have

conceived it, as a history of the nature and role of concepts, not

simply of their ontology, depends on the recent shift in

philosophy itself from analysis to the elucidation of concepts.

For it is only when elucidation replaces analysis that one can

generalize from the elucidation of particular concepts to the

overall elucidation of theories of concepts, both past and

present. Thus, I have tried to understand the different theories

of concepts, not to analyze or to recast the concepts dealt with

in the history of philosophy. What do philosophers say or imply

concepts are in the concepts they employ? Do they subscribe to

the doctrine that all concepts, hence their conveying words, are

governed by necessary and sufficient conditions or criteria?

How do their theories play the roles they do in their

philosophies? These are the questions I have set myself.

But, it may also be asked: Is there a history of theories of

concepts? Negative answers range from the denial that there

are concepts and therefore any theory of them, let alone a

history of such theories, to the acceptance of at least concept-

talk in the history of philosophy, some articulate theories of

concepts, but the rejection of anything as pi and as a history of

theories of concepts.

If we distinguish, as we must, between Are there concepts? and

What are concepts? the affirmative answer to the first, that

concepts are neutral intermediaries between words and things,

irreducible to anything else, commits us to no affirmative

answer to the second, as to what they are, whether sensible,

supersensible or neutral entities or dispositions. However, my

answer and argument for it (given in chapter 1 of The Opening

Mind) are not relevant to the argument of this book: that there

is a history of theories of concepts; that this history

encompasses both explicit and implicit theories; and that these

theories, different as they are in their ontological answers to

Introduction

what concepts are, concur in the major doctrine that all

concepts are and must be governed by definitive sets of

properties or criteria.

That there have been explicit theories of concepts cannot be

denied, however these theories are assessed, as fabrications or

as ontological truths. Surely, Aquinas, Kant, Frege, and Moore,

among many others, both affirmed concepts and theorized

about their status and roles. What can be questioned and

denied is that these articulated theories point to a history of a

single subject rather than, say, to the ambiguity of a 'concept,'

in one language or another.

If this objection to a history of philosophical theories stands, it

rules out not only my proposed history but all the Encyclopedia

articles as well that attempt to trace the history of the words for

concept and explicit theories of them, which I question on

grounds of inadequacy, not of dubiety. What these articles show

is that though 'concept' is ambiguous, theories of concepts are

more multiple than ambiguous.

Indeed, this query about the history of philosophical theories of

concepts as a single subject much resembles similar worries

expressed by those who question the very possibility of a

history of (philosophical) theories of tragedy or morality. Here,

too, the argument has been that there can be no such history

because there is no single subject. Tragedies differ and

moralities are too diverse to yield any univocal meaning of

'tragedy' or 'morality.' All the historian can do is to trace the

diversity. It is therefore a conceptual illusion to suppose, for

example, that Greek tragedy or Aristotle's theory of tragedy

and, say, modern tragedy or Schopenhauer's or Nietzsche's

theory of tragedy, are historical points in the same continuum,

that can then serve as a single subject for the philosophical

elucidation of tragedy. So, too with, say, Plato's theory of

morality as against, say, Kant's. Here, too, critics of any

putative history of philosophical theories of morality stress that

since Plato meant by 'moral' something entirely different from

what Kant meant by 'moral,' there cannot be any univocal

history of the subject of philosophical theories of morality." (pp.

XIII-XVI).

4. Arrington, Robert L., ed. 2001. A Companion to the

Philosophers. Malden: Blackwell.

"The goal of this book is to present the thoughts and theories of

the major figures in the dominant philosophical traditions

throughout history. To be sure, most of the essays are on

"Western" thinkers, which label encompasses European,

American and other English-speaking philosophers. But the

rich history of philosophical thought in India and China is well

represented, by no means comprehensively so but in such a way

as to convey a picture of major trends of thought. Moreover, a

representative sample of Japanese thinkers is included and

philosophical thought in Africa is also represented. The

concluding section deals with some major Jewish and Islamic

thinkers. Inevitably, such a project as this can only proceed

selectively and an editorial task that must be faced at the

beginning is to choose figures that loom large in the editor's

view of the history of philosophy. Obviously, not everyone will

agree with this selection.

I hope these essays will provide stimulating reading for those

who sample them. They are written at a level that is appropriate

for a reader who is approaching these figures for the first time.

But some philosophy is difficult and although an effort has

been made to keep technical terminology and mind-boggling

argumentation to a minimum, some of the essays will stretch

the minds of many readers. Stretching the mind, however. Is a

major part of what philosophy is supposed to do -- the results,

one hopes, are deeper insights into the human condition.

A bibliography Is appended at the end of each essay. It gives a

list of the major works of the philosopher under discussion in

the essay and it also indicates works written about the

philosopher which will provide additional information and a

deeper understanding of the figure.

The authors of the essays are authorities on the thinkers about

whom they write. In most instances, they have written other

essays or books about the philosophers in question.

The essays in the book are grouped together in accordance with

the philosophical traditions within which the thinkers are

usually placed. Sometimes, to be sure, the placement is a bit

arbitrary. Spinoza, for instance, is included among the

European and American thinkers, although he was a Jewish

philosopher. Similarly, Averroes and Avicenna are to be found

in the section on Jewish and Islamic thinkers, although they are

frequently studied as part of Western philosophy. The location

of an essay is largely determined by the distinctive tradition

with which the thinker discussed primarily engaged. Spinoza,

for instance, was concerned first and foremost about the

problems inherited from Descartes and the history of European

philosophy: Averroes and Avicenna engaged with a distinctive

Islamic set of issues, although their philosophies were heavily

influenced by earlier Western thinkers.

To assist the reader in tracing the lines of connection (historical

and Intellectual) among the various philosophers, the names of

other thinkers whose work bears some significant relationship

to the thought of the philosopher being discussed are given In

small capitals. In the case of some of the essays. peculiarities of

style are indicated in the "guide to the entries" on the title page

of the section." (from the Preface).

5. Waithe, Mary Ellen, ed. 1987. A History of Women

Philosophers. Dordrecht: Springer.

Vol. 1: Ancient Women Philosophers, 600 B.C.-500 A.D (1987);

Vol. 2: Medieval, Renaissance and Enlightenment Women

Philosophers, 500-1600 (1989); Vol. 3: Modern Women

Philosophers, 1600-1900 (1991); Vol. 4: Contemporary Women

Philosophers, 1900-Today (1994).

"Two events led to the creation of our four-volume series on the

history of women philosophers. The first occurred on a

sweltering October afternoon in 1980 when I sought comfort in

the basement library of City University of New York's Graduate

Center. I came upon a reference to a work by Aegidius

Menagius, Historia Mulierum Philosopharum, published in

1690 and 1692. I had never heard of any women philosophers

prior to the 20th century with the exceptions of Queen

Christina of Sweden, known as Descartes' student, and

Hildegard von Bingen, who lived in the 12th century. Two

months later, the second event occurred. I went to the Brooklyn

Museum to see Judy Chicago's Dinner Party, a sculptural

history of the achievements of women. Part of the exhibit

consisted of posters listing the names, nationalities and dates of

birth of accomplished women, together with brief descriptions

of their accomplishments. Some of those listed were identified

as "philosophers."

It took sixteen months to obtain a copy of Menagius' book. (A

modern English translation of Mulierum by Beatrice Zedler (*),

a participant in the Project on the History of Women in

Philosophy, is available through University Press of America.)

Although Menage footnoted his sources, the abbreviation

conventions used by him made it difficult to duplicate his

research. Little did I know then about the existence of reference

works giving commonly used abbreviations for early scholarly

materials. My problem was compounded by the need to locate

editions of the source materials that would have been available

to Menage. As it turns out, many of the women he listed as

philosophers were astronomers, astrologers, gynecologists. or

simply relatives of male philosophers. Nevertheless, the list of

women alleged to have been philosophers was impressive." (pp.

IX-X).

"Research about the history of women philosophers has

proceeded in several stages: first, creating a compendium of

names, nationalities, and dates of birth of women alleged to

have been philosophers. Second, confirming or disconfirming

the allegations. In the first stage of research, names appearing

in Menage's and Chicago's lists were checked in general

encyclopedias, history books, encyclopedias and histories of

philosophy, religion, astronomy, mathematics. science, etc.

Some of these entries would name other women alleged to be

philosophers; names which would then be added to the list.

Books about "famous ladies" and "notable females" were read

in full, yielding more new names, and frequently, biographical

sketches and bibliographical information. As word of the

Project spread, new information about previously unknown

women philosophers was received. Some of the information

came from scholars who were later to become collaborators in

the Project; some came from well-wishers impressed by the

scope and significance of our work. The same basic method of

research was used for the compendium-creating stage for all

four volumes. But the methods of research for the second stage

- confirming that the woman actually was a philosopher -

varied somewhat with each volume's research. Verifying

information about pre-17th century women was much more

difficult than verifying information about modern and

contemporary women philosophers. In order to locate reliable

sources about the ancient and pre-modern philosophers, we

frequently relied on "free association" of the names with names

of male colleagues, male relatives, subject headings for topics

the women wrote about, or with names of schools of philosophy

and locations with which the women were associated." (pp.

XIII-XIV).

(*) Gilles Méenage, The History of Women Philosophers,

translated from the Latin with an Introduction by Beatrice H.

Zedler, Lanham, University Press of America, 1984.

6. Warren, Karen J. 2009. An Unconventional History of

Western Philosophy. Conversations between Men and Women

Philosophers. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield.

"This book is an outgrowth of what has come to be known as

"the recovery project" in philosophy.

"The recovery project" refers primarily to those efforts to

rediscover the names, identities, and philosophical

contributions of women philosophers whose existence has been

virtually overlooked, neglected, ignored, or lost in the

traditional or canonical account of the history of Western

philosophy, especially from 600 B.C.E. to 1600 C.E. It was

initiated by philosophers who raised a simple but basic

question that, at the time, had mostly not been asked (despite

how obvious the question seems now): "Could there really have

been no women philosophers throughout the history of

Western philosophy?" They knew there had to have been

women philosophers, but who were they?

Rediscovering these women philosophers has been a labor-

intensive effort, undertaken by a handful of dedicated people.

Mary Ellen Waithe's pioneering work in the already classic four

volume set, A History of Women Philosophers, was a decisive

turning point in the generation of the names, lives, and writings

of many forgotten women philosophers (1) (see Introduction to

chapter 4). Many of the commentators in this textbook

provided early translations or commentaries on texts in

Waithe's series; others published articles and books on

individual women philosophers as part of the recovery project.

(2)

Their recovery work has generated an ever-burgeoning

scholarly literature on women philosophers who currently are

absent in the history of Western philosophy (see appendix A).

This recovery work in philosophy also continues to be

important and actively engaged in by scholars. That this book

focuses on filling a critical gender omission in the history of

Western philosophy by including women alongside their

historical male philosopher contemporaries neither diminishes

the significance of the on-going recovery project work nor

overrides the gratitude and admiration due those scholars who

are continuing the work, especially in this historically gender-

exclusive field, philosophy, to which all contributors to this

book have dedicated our professional lives.

This book builds on the success of the recovery project by

extending it to the inclusion of women philosophers with their

historical male philosopher contemporaries in each of the four

main historical periods in the history of Western philosophy:

ancient, medieval, modern, and contemporary philosophy.

With the publication of this book it is no longer scholarly

accurate, appropriate, acceptable, or necessary to describe,

conceptualize, or teach the history of Western philosophy

without women." (from the Preface by K. J. Warren, XIII-XIV).

(1) See references to Mary Ellen Waithe in lead essay, note 3.

(2) See resources in lead essay, note 3.

Note 3. Four types of source materials were used or consulted

for those portions of the book I wrote:

(1) Lecture notes from more than thirty years of teaching,

primarily for the lead essay, on almost all the men and women

philosopher pairs in each chapter and for background

philosophical content of the chapter Introductions; (2)

"recovery project" texts, primarily to learn about the women

philosophers in each chapter (and others in the history of

Western philosophy), to write the biographies of the women

philosophers and to generate the list of women philosophers in

appendix A; (3) Internet Websites, primarily for biographical

information for the chapter Introductions and the glossary; and

(4) some

secondary source material on or in the history of Western

philosophy, primarily for those philosophers whom I have not

taught.

(2) The "recovery project "material includes the following:

Alic, Margaret. Hypatia's Heritage: A History of Women in

Science From Antiquity Through the Nineteenth Century

(Boston: Beacon Press, 1986).

Allen, Sister Prudence RSM. The Concept of Woman: The

Aristotelian Revolution, 750 B.C.-A.D. 1250 (Grand Rapids,

MI: William B. Freedman Publishing Co., 1985).

Allen, Sister Prudence RSM. The Concept of Woman, vol. 2,

The Early Humanist Revolution, 1250-1500 (Grand Rapids,

MI: William B. Freedman Publishing Co., 2002).

Atherton, Margaret, ed. Women Philosophers of the Early

Modern Period (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing Co.,

1994).

Barth, Else M. Women Philosophers: A Bibliography of Books

Through 1990 (Bowling Green, OH:Philosophy Documentation

Center, 1992).

Broad, Jacqueline. Women Philosophers of the Seventeenth

Century (New York: Cambridge UniversityPress, 2002).

Dykeman, Therese Boos, ed. American Women Philosophers,

1650-1930: Six Exemplary Thinkers (Lewiston, NY: Edwin

Mellen Press, 1993).

Dykeman, Therese Boos, ed. The Neglected Canon: Nine

Women Philosophers (Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers,

1999).

Gardner, Catherine Villanueva. Rediscovering Women

Philosophers: Philosophical Genre and the Boundaries of

Philosophy (Boulder, CO: Westview, 2000).

Gould, Vivian. Daughters of Time, 2000 Notable Women:

Antiquity to 1800 (North Charleston, SC: Book Surge, 2005).

Kersey, Ethel M. Women Philosophers: A Bio-Critical Source

Book (New York: Greenwood Press, 1989).

McAlister, Linda Lopez, ed. Hypatia: A Journal of Feminist

Philosophy, Special Issue on the History of Women in

Philosophy 4, no. 1 (Spring 1989).

Ménage, Gilles. The History of Women Philosophers trans.

Beatrice H. Zedler (Lanham, MD: University Press of America,

1984).

Rogers, Dorothy, and Therese Boos Dykeman , eds. Hypatia: A

Journal of Feminist Philosophy, Special Issue on Women in the

American Philosophical Tradition, 1800-1930 19, no. 2 (Spring

2004).

Simons, Margaret A., ed. Hypatia: A Journal of Feminist

Philosophy, Special Issue on the Philosophy of Simone de

Beauvoir 14, no. 2 (Fall 1999).

Tougas, Cecile T., and Sara Ebenreck, eds. Presenting Women

Philosophers (Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press,

2000).

Waithe, Mary Ellen, ed. A History of Women Philosophers, vol.

1, Ancient Women Philosophers 600 Bc-500 AD (Dordrecht,

The Netherlands: Martinus Nijholf Publishers, 1987). Excerpts

are published with kind permission of Springer Science and

Business Media.

Waithe, Mary Ellen, ed. A History of Women Philosophers, vol.

2, Medieval, Renaissance and Enlightenment Women

Philosophers 500-1600 AD (Dordrecht, The Netherlands:

Kluwer Academic Publisher, 1989). Excerpts are published with

kind permission of Springer Science and Business Media.

Waithe, Mary Ellen, ed., A History of Women Philosophers,

vol. 3, Modern Women Philosophers 1600-1900 (Dordrecht,

The Netherlands: Kluwer Academic Publisher, 1991). Excerpts

are published with kind permission of Springer Science and

Business Media.

Waithe, Mary Ellen, ed., A History of Women Philosophers,

vol. 4, Contemporary Women Philosophers 1900-Present

(Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Kluwer Academic Publisher,

1995). Excerpts are published with kind permission of Springer

Science and Business Media.

Warnock, Mary, ed. Women Philosophers (London: Orion

Publishing Group, 1997).

(3) The Internet sites I consulted were: [omitted: the list is now

obsolete]

(4) The secondary sources included:

Ayer, A. J., and Raymond Winch, eds. British Empirical

Philosophers: Locke, Berkeley, Hume, Reid and J. S. Mill (New

York: Simon & Schuster, 1968).

Baird, Forrest E., and Walter Kaufmann. Twentieth-Century

Philosophy, vol. 5 (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall,

1997).

Copleston, Frederick, SJ. A History of Philosophy, vols. 1-9

(New York: Doubleday, 1993).

Edwards, Paul, ed. The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, vols. 1-8

(New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., 1967).

Hornblower, Simon, and Anthony Spawforth, eds. Oxford

Classical Dictionary, 3rd ed. (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge

University Press, 1996).

Lloyd, Genevieve, ed. Feminism & History of Philosophy (New

York: Oxford University Press, 2002).

Popkin, Richard H., ed. This Philosophy of the Sixteenth and

Seventeenth Centuries (New York: Free Press, 1966).

Russell, Bertrand. A History of Western Philosophy (New York:

Simon & Schuster, 1972).

Solomon, Robert C. Introducing Philosophy: A Text with

Integrated Readings, 8th ed. (New York: Oxford University

Press, 2005).

Ward, Julie K. ed. Feminism and Ancient Philosophy (New

York: Routledge, 1996).

Weitz, Morris, ed. Twentieth-Century Philosophy: The

Analytic Tradition (New York: Free Press, 1966)." (pp. 23-25)

(from: Lead Essay: 2,600 Years of the History of Western

Philosophy Without Women. THIS BOOK AS A UNIQUE,

GENDER-INCLUSIVE ALTERNATIVE by Karen J. Warren

(pp. 1-26).

Bibliographia. Annotated bibliographies

Raul Corazzon || rc@ontology.co || Info

Study Guide for Formal and

Descriptive Metaphysics

Introductory Readings

1. Carroll, John W., and Markosian, Ned. 2010. An Introduction

to Metaphysics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

2. Aune, Bruce. 1985. Metaphysics. The Elements. Minneapolis:

University of Minnesota Press.

Content: Preface. Chapter 1. What is metaphysics?. Chapter 2.

Existence. Chapter 3. Universals and Particulars. Chapter 4.

Linguistic arguments for abstracta. Chapter 5. Changing things.

Chapter 6. Worlds, objects, and structure. Chapter 7. Meaning,

truth and metaphysics. Chapter 8. Appearance and reality.

Chapter 9. Metaphysical freedom. Notes. References. Index.

"I had two principal aims in writing this book. The first was

somewhat personal: I wanted to work out my views on the main

problems of metaphysics. (...)

My other aim was pedagogical: I wanted to produce a

systematic book on metaphysics that would be understandable

by the general reader and that would be useful for students in

the sort of middle-level course on metaphysics that I teach,

from time to time, at the University of Massachusetts at

Amherst. (...)

The students attending my course are advanced

undergraduates and beginning graduate students, and I wanted

to have available for them a text that deals with the basic issues

of metaphysics in a systematic way and that prepares them for

advanced work on specialized topics. A systematic text is

important, in my view, because many subjects of general

interest in metaphysics, such as the mind-body problem or the

perplexities about freedom and determinism, can be adequately

discussed only if various issues in basic ontology are already

settled, or at least understood. Of course, careful thought about

complex or derivative issues often requires one to back up and

reconsider one's position on fundamentals. Still, an orderly

presentation of issues is, as I see it, particularly desirable in a

subject like metaphysics. The difficulty I had in writing the

book is at least partly owing to the difficulty of presenting

issues in an appropriate order.

Metaphysics is an ancient subject on which an enormous

amount has been written. To make up one's mind about such

subjects as the nature of particulars, the reality of attributes

and facts, the possibility of alternative ontologies, and the

nature of time, truth, and change (to name just a few), one

should be familiar with the jungle of considerations that bear

upon them. I have tried to help the reader gain this familiarity

by discussing arguments and claims of numerous philosophers,

past and present. Having lived through more than one

"revolution" in philosophy, I am well aware of the attractions of

finding some method that will sweep away all the problems. I

now regard such methods as illusory, but the first step in

applying them is, in any case, to discover what the problems

are. I have done my best to describe these problems, and I offer

my solutions for what they are worth.

Although I am far from doctrinaire on matters of philosophical

method, I cannot deny that my approach to metaphysics

belongs to the tradition of analytic philosophy. The reader will

quickly see, for example, that my approach to ontology owes a

great deal to Bertrand Russell, but I have tried to show that

Russell's approach grows naturally out of Aristotle, the

philosopher who wrote the first systematic treatise on

metaphysics. Since analytic philosophers influenced by Russell

have relied heavily on such technical devices as the so-called

existential quantifier, I have made a special effort to come to

terms with those devices early in my discussion. The elements

of mathematical logic should be as familiar to undergraduates

as high school algebra, but they are not -- and I have therefore

offered clear explanations of the few logical symbols that I

introduce." (from the Preface).

3. Benardete, José A. 1989. Metaphysics. The Logical Approach.

New York: Oxford University Press.

4. Körner, Stephan. 1984. Metaphysics. Its Structure and

Function. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Contents: Preface XI; Introduction 1; Part I. On the

organization of beliefs and attitudes. 1. On the cognitive

organization of experience 7; 2. On the organization of practical

attitudes 20; 3. On aesthetic attitudes 31; 4. Immanent and

transcendent philosophy 42; Part II. On immanent and

transcendental metaphysics. 5. The principles of logic as

supreme cognitive principles 53; 6. On mathematical thinking

as possible source of immanent metaphysics 63; 7. On

predictive and instrumental thinking about nature as a possible

source of immanent metaphysics 76; 7. On thinking about

persons and mental phenomena as a possible source of

immanent metaphysics 89; 9. On thinking about social

phenomena and history as a possible source of immanent

metaphysics 103; 10. On delimiting a person's immanent

metaphysics 114; 11. Transcendent metaphysics and the

applications of concepts 125; 12. Transcendent metaphysics and

the limits of conceptual thinking 137; 13 On antimetaphysical

errors and illusions 149; Part III. Stability and change in

metaphysics. 14. On internal strains 165; 15. On external

pressures exerted by methodological and other arguments 180;

16. On metaphysical pluralism, intrametaphysical and

metaphysical progress 194; 17. Some speculations about

transcendent reality 208; Summary of these 222; Index 234.

"It is not the purpose of this essay to expound and to defend a

particular system of immanent or transcendent metaphysics,

but to inquire into the common structure and function of such

systems, whether explicitly formulated, e.g., by philosophers,

philosophically minded theologians or scientists, or only

implicitly accepted. Such an inquiry appears no less worthwhile

than are more familiar inquiries into the common structure and

function of, say, geometries, scientific theories or legal systems.

It resembles them in method and should, if properly executed,

counteract the tendency towards an intolerant metaphysical

dogmatism without supporting a boundless pluralism. For it is

intended not only to exhibit the possible variety of

metaphysical systems, but also the strong constraints on it.

The essay falls into three parts. The first examines the

organization - whether imposed or found - of a person's beliefs

about the public world of his experience. It also considers the

organization of his practical, including his moral, attitudes

towards this world, as well as the nature of aesthetic attitudes

and of aesthetic representation.(...)

The second part of the essay begins by illustrating the variety

and function of categorial frameworks. The function of

categorial frameworks consists chiefly in providing their

acceptors with criteria of "meaningfulness", as opposed to mere

linguistic intelligibility, of "coherence", as opposed to mere

logical consistency, of "explanatory power", as opposed to mere

descriptive or prognostic effectiveness. Loyalty to these criteria,

which may be combined with ignorance or confusion about

their origin in their acceptor's immanent metaphysics, plays an

important part in the choice of theories or the direction of

research. The procedure of exhibiting the actual and potential

variety of categorial frameworks is endowed with some

orderliness by showing that, and how, principles of immanent

metaphysics may have their origin in special disciplines or

regions of thought: logic; mathematics; predictive and

instrumental thinking within and outside the sciences; thinking

about persons and mental phenomena; thinking about social

phenomena and history. (...)

Whereas the first two parts of the essay are mainly devoted to

an inquiry into the static structure of systems of metaphysical

beliefs, the third part inquires into their changes as a result of

internal strains and external pressures. The latter are exerted

by appeals to philosophical methods which are claimed to yield

absolutely valid premises for the derivation of the one and only

true system of metaphysics, as well as by more modest

arguments which try to transfer the convictions felt by their

proponents to those to whom they are addressed. An

examination of these arguments, which results in rejecting

arguments of the first type and in accepting arguments of the

second, leads to a critique of various concepts of progress, be it

progress within a system of metaphysical beliefs or progress of

metaphysics itself.

Although this critique might well have concluded the essay, I

thought it appropriate to add a chapter indicating in the barest

outline my own categorial framework and transcendent

metaphysics. It is meant to enable readers to judge how far I

have avoided the danger of confusing my metaphysics with

metaphysics in general." (pp. 1-4).

5. Martin, Gottfried. 1968. General Metaphysics. Its Problems

and Method. London: George Allen and Unwin.

Original edition: Allgemeine Metaphysik, Berlin, Walter de

Gruyter, 1966; translated by Daniel O'Connor.

6. Hamlyn, David W. 1984. Metaphysics. Cambridge: Cambridge

University Press.

Contents: Preface VII; 1. Introduction 1; 2. Appearance and

reality 11; 3. Ontology 34; 4. Substance; 5. Particular and

general; 6. Simples substances: monism and pluralism; 7.

Space and time; 8: Minds; 9. Persons and personal identity 187;

10. Epilogue: man and nature 219; Bibliography 221; Index

226.

"My own approach to the subject might be put as follows: one

way of construing metaphysics is to say that it is concerned to

set out in the most general and abstract terms what must hold

good of conscious beings and the world in which they live if that

world is to constitute reality for them. For this purpose the

metaphysician has to set out in the most intelligible form what

that reality consists of, given an adequate framework of

representation of what it is for something to constitute reality

for someone. That will certainly entail saying something about

things, their spatio-temporal framework and the persons, or at

any rate selves, for whom they are things. I shall try to work out

in subsequent chapters what that means.

Chapter 2 will discuss in greater detail the metaphysics of

appearance and reality, and Chapter 3 the general nature of a

philosophical ontology. Chapter 4 investigates the notion of

substance - the kind of thing that has often been claimed as

basic for ontology. I shall be concerned with the necessary

features of substances and how they affect other matters such

as their individuation. One commonly recognized characteristic

of substances is particularity, and that will lead me in Chapter 5

to discuss the distinction between the particular and the

general and also the general problem of universals. A

characteristic that is sometimes thought, although mistakenly,

to belong necessarily to substance is simplicity of an absolute

kind, and on that idea whole systems have been erected,

particularly those of monism and pluralism (when the latter

constitutes a reaction to the former). I shall illustrate that fact

in Chapter 6 by reference to the monism of absolute idealism as

found in Bradley and the pluralism of the logical atomism of

Russell and the early Wittgenstein. I shall do that because apart

from the relative unfamiliarity of these systems to some readers

they afford a comparatively recent example of the opposition

between monism and pluralism. They also illustrate one

particular working-out of metaphysics in the style of Hegel

together with a reaction to it.

I shall then proceed in Chapter 7 to an examination of the

frameworks in which substances are generally taken to exist;

the frameworks provided by space and time. I shall not there

consider all questions that might be asked about space and

time, since some such questions belong more appropriately to

philosophy of science. The questions raised will be those that fit

in with the conceptions of metaphysics expounded in the

chapters leading up to Chapter 7. In Chapters 8 and 9 I turn to

ourselves, discussing first the notion of mind and the place that

the mind has in the scheme presented, and second the

conception of selves or persons for whom the reality outlined is

what it is. A final epilogue will put the issues in perspective and

explain why certain questions sometimes discussed under the

heading of metaphysics are not discussed here (which is not to

say that they should not be discussed)" pp. 8-9.

7. Inwagen, Peter van. 2009. Metaphysics. Boulder: Westview

Press.

Third edition. (First edition 1993, second edition 2002).

Contents: Preface to the Third Edition IX-X; 1. Introduction 1;

Part One: The Way the World Is 23; Introduction 23; 2.

Individuality 27; 3. Externality 53; 4. Temporality 71; 5.

Objectivity 93; Part Two: Why the World Is 109; Introduction

109; 6. Necessary Being: The Ontological Argument 115; 7.

Necessary Being: The Cosmological Argument 145; Part Three:

The Inhabitants of the World 169; Introduction 169; 8. What

Rational Beings Are There? 175; 9. The Place of Rational Beings

in the World: Design and Purpose 187; 10. The Nature of

Rational Beings: Dualism and Physicalism 209; 11 The Nature

of Rational Beings: Dualism and Personal Identity 235; 12 The

Powers of Rational Beings: Freedom of the Will 253; 13

Concluding Meditation 273; Coda: Being 277; Bibliography 315;

Index 319-329.

8. Gracia, Jorge J.E. 1999. Metaphysics and Its Task. The Search

for the Categorial Foundation of Knowledge. Albany: State

University of New York Press.

9. Jubien, Michael. 1997. Contemporary Metaphysics. An

Introduction. Malden, Massachusetts: Blackwell Publishers.

Contents: Preface IX; 1. Metaphysics 1; 2. Numbers 24; 3.

Platonism 36; 4. Identity 63; 5. Is truth 'relative'? 77; 6. Color

92; 7. Determinism, freedom and fatalism 107; 8. Modality 130;

9. Things and their parts 154; 10. Is there truth in fiction? 175;

11. Cosmology 188; Index 203.

"This book treats several topics that happen to be very

prominent in recent metaphysics. I hope the treatments are not

only interesting in their own right, but also serve as good

preparation for understanding contemporary discussions. I

have tried to present a range of positions on issues, often

advocating a particular view, but other times simply presenting

alternatives and mentioning strengths and weaknesses. (In

some cases the positions I advocate are well known and widely

accepted, in others they are not.)

There is an underlying ontological and methodological theme

that unites the various discussions in the book: Platonism

concerning properties, relations, and propositions. I introduce

the theme in chapter 1, where philosophy itself is characterized

as the study (and especially the analysis) of certain general

concepts, and these concepts in turn are seen as objective

entities, typically Platonic properties. In chapter 3, Platonism is

defended as a theoretical hypothesis that helps explain a variety

of related everyday phenomena, including our ability to have

beliefs about our surroundings, the capacity of our language to

refer to external entities, and our ability to communicate with

each other. (The postulation of these Platonic entities is likened

to the postulation of quarks in physics.)

The Platonist theme appears in the remaining chapters as a

methodological tool, as when we insist on knowing just what

proposition is being expressed or asserted, what possessing

such and such a property entails, and the like. I hope it emerges

from the book that the acceptance of this Platonist ontology

promotes a sharpness of focus on philosophical material in

general that is not otherwise so easily obtained." (from the

Preface).

10. Loux, Michael J. 2006. Metaphysics. A Contemporary

Introduction. New York: Routledge.

Contents: Preface; Introduction; Chapter One: The problem of

universals I - Metaphysical realism; Chapter Two: The problem

of universals II - Nominalism; Chapter Three: Concrete

particulars I - Substrata, bundles, and substances; Chapter

Four: Propositions and their neighbours; Chapter Five: The

necessary and the possible; Chapter Six: Causation Chapter

Seven: The nature of time Chapter Eighth: Concrete particulars

2: Persistence through time Chapter Nine: The challenge of

Anti-Realism; Bibliography; Index.

Third edition (first edition 1998, second edition 2002). From

the Preface: "Metaphysics is a discipline with a long history;

and over the course of that history, the discipline has been

conceived in different ways. These different conceptions

associate different methodologies and even different subject

matters with the discipline; and anyone seeking to write an

introductory text on metaphysics must choose from among

these different conceptions. For reasons I try to make clear in

the Introduction, I have chosen to follow a very old tradition

(one that can be traced back to Aristotle) that interprets

metaphysics as the attempt to provide an account of being qua

being. On this conception, metaphysics is the most general of

all the disciplines; its aim is to identify the nature and structure

of all that there is. Central to this project is the delineation of

the categories of being. Categories are the most general or

highest kinds under which anything that exists falls. On this

conception of metaphysics, what the metaphysician is supposed

to do is to identify the relevant kinds, to specify the

characteristics or categorial features peculiar to each, and to

indicate the ways those very general kinds are related to each

other. It turns out, however, that metaphysicians have

disagreed about the categorial structure of reality. They have

disagreed about the categories the metaphysician ought to

recognize; and even where they have agreed about the

categories to be included in our metaphysical theory, they have

disagreed about the characteristics associated with those

categories and about the relations of priority that tie the various

categories together. These disagreements have given rise to

debates that lie at the very core of the philosophical enterprise;

those debates are the focus of this book."

11. Lowe, Ernest Jonathan. 2002. A Survey of Metaphysics. New

York: Oxford University Press.

Contents: 1. Introduction: the nature of metaphysics 1; Part I:

Identity and change. 2. Identity over time and change of

composition 23; 3. Qualitative change and the doctrine of

temporal parts 41; 4. Substantial change and spatiotemporal

coincidence 59; Part II: Necessity, essence, and possible worlds.

5. Necessity and identity 79; 6. Essentialism 96; 7. Possible

worlds 115; Part III: Causation and conditionals. 8.

Counterfactual conditionals 137; 9. Causes and conditions 155;

10. Counterfactuals and event causations 174; Part IV: Agents,

actions, and events. 11. Event causation and agent causation

195; 12. Actions and events 214; 13. Events, things and space-

time 23; Part V: Space and time 14. Absolutism versus

relationalism 255; 15. Incongruent counterparts and the nature

of space 271; 16. The paradoxes of motion and the possibility of

change 288; 17. Tense and the reality of time 307; 18. Causation

and the direction of time 325; Part VI: Universals and

particulars 19. Realism versus nominalism 347; 20. The

abstract and the concrete 366; Bibliography 386; Index 396.

"The conception of metaphysics that informs A Survey of

Metaphysics is, however, a fairly traditional and still very

widely shared one-namely, that metaphysics deals with the

most profound questions that can be raised concerning the

fundamental structure of reality. According to this conception,

metaphysics goes deeper than any merely empirical science,

even physics, because it provides the very framework within

which such sciences are conceived and related to one another.

A core text in metaphysics written from this point of view must

aim, first and foremost, to elucidate certain universally

applicable concepts -- for example, those of identity, necessity,

causation, space, and time -- and then go on to examine some

important doctrines which involve these concepts, such as the

thesis that truths of identity are necessary and the claim that

temporally backward causation is impossible. In addition, it

must endeavour to provide a systematic account of the ways in

which entities belonging to different ontological categories-for

example, things, events, and properties-are interrelated.

These, accordingly, are the main objectives of A Survey of

Metaphysics. A subsidiary objective is to explain and defend

the conception of metaphysics which informs the book: for

students need to be aware of the many and varied opponents of

metaphysics and how they may be countered.

I should emphasize that my aim in this book is to provide a

survey of major themes and problems in modern metaphysics,

not a comprehensive survey and critique of the views of major

contemporary metaphysicians, much less a systematic history

of the subject. Consequently, I tend not to engage in direct

debate with the published work of other philosophers, past or

present -- although I do refer to it very frequently and have

included an extensive bibliography of mostly recent

publications. Such direct engagement would have made the

book considerably longer and more complex than it already is

and, I think, less useful to its intended audience, who need to

understand the issues before engaging in current debate or

historical investigation for themselves. It should also be

stressed, however, that the book is by no means narrowly

partisan, in the sense of promoting my own opinions on

particular issues whilst excluding mention of others. At the

same time, I try to avoid bland neutrality in matters of

controversy." (from the Preface).

12. ———. 1998. The Possibility of Metaphysics. Substance,

Identity, and Time. New York: Oxford University Press.

Contents: 1. The possibility of metaphysics 1; 2. Objects and

identity 28; 3. Identity and unity 58; 4. Time and persistence

84; 5. Persistence and substance 106; 6. Substance and

dependence 136; 7. Primitive substances 154; 8. Categories and

kinds 174; 9. Matter and form 190; 10. Abstract entities 210; 11.

Facts and world 228; 12. The puzzle of existence 248;

Bibliography 261; Index 269.

From the Preface: "My overall objective in this book is to help

to restore metaphysics to a central position in philosophy as the

most fundamental form of rational inquiry, with its own

distinctive methods and criteria of validation. In my view, all

other forms of inquiry rest upon metaphysical presuppositions

thus making metaphysics unavoidable-so that we should at

least endeavour to do metaphysics with our eyes open, rather

than allowing it to exercise its influence upon us at the level of

uncritical assumption. I believe that this is beginning to be

acknowledged more widely by philosophers as various research

programmes for instance, in the philosophy of mind and in the

philosophy of quantum physics-are being seen to flounder

through inadequacies in their metaphysical underpinnings. For

that reason, I hope that a book like this will prove to be a timely

one.

Because Chapters 1 and 2 partly serve to introduce themes

explored in greater detail later in the book, I have not written

an Introduction as such. Doing so would have involved

unnecessary repetition. However, it may help the reader if I

supply here a brief synopsis of the book's contents. In Chapter

1, I attempt to characterize the distinctive nature of

metaphysics as an autonomous intellectual discipline and

defend a positive answer to Kant's famous question, 'How is

metaphysics possible?', distinguishing my own answer from

that of various other schools of thought, including some latter-

day heirs of Kantianism. A key ingredient in my defence of

metaphysics is the articulation of a distinctive and, in my view,

indispensable notion of metaphysical possibility-conceived of

as a kind of possibility which is not to be identified with

physical, logical, or epistemic possibility.

Chapter 2 is devoted to an examination of two of the most

fundamental and all-pervasive notions in metaphysics-the

notion of an object and the notion of identity and explores their

interrelationships. In the course of this exercise a central

ontological distinction-that between concrete and abstract

objects is brought to the fore, my contention being that this is

at bottom a distinction between those objects that do, and those

that do not, exist in time." (from the Preface).

13. Macdonald, Cynthia. 2005. Varieties of Things. Foundations of

Contemporary Metaphysics. Malden: Blackwell.

14. DeAngelis, William James. 1997. "Metaphysics I (1900-1945)."

In Routledge History of Philosophy. Volume X: Philosophy of

Meaning, Knowledge and Value in the Twentieth Century,

edited by Canfield, John V., 76-107. New York: Routledge.

15. Linsky, Bernard. 1997. "Mataphysics Ii (1945 to the Present)."

In Routledge History of Philosophy. Volume X: Philosophy of

Meaning, Knowledge and Value in the Twentieth Century,

edited by Canfield, John V., 108-133. New York: Routledge.

16. Ando, Takatura. 1963. Metaphysics. A Critical Survey of Its

Meaning. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff.

Contents: Introduction 1; I. The Origin of the Concept of

Metaphysics 3; II. The Tradition of the Concept of Metaphysics

17; III. Kant and Metaphysics 40; Iv. Metaphysics and Dialectic

71; V. Metaphysics in Recent Philosophy 95; Vi. Conclusion

124-125.

"No science is subject to such contrary evaluations as

metaphysics. Sometimes it is called the queen of all the

sciences, sometimes it is outcast and forsaken like Hecuba. (1)

The evaluation has changed several times even since Kant. In

the present situation, the number of its admirers is matched by

the number of its denigrators, and the final outcome hardly

seems to be predictable. Such instability is admittedly natural

to a position of great honour. But the problem is not, as Kant

considered it, just a matter of the ability of metaphysics to

perform its task. What is most perplexing is that we cannot find

any single definition of metaphysics common to both its

admirers and its denigrators. This, I think, is the most

important reason why there has been no correct evaluation of

metaphysics. The neglect of definition which, as Socrates

maintained, should be the primary subject of philosophy, has

resulted in many of the disputes of contemporary philosophy.

So as to shed some light on this confusion, the present inquiry

aims at a concise survey of the usage of the term metaphysics.

Metaphysics must not be defined a priori; we must reach a

definition inductively from the history of metaphysics. For we

have without doubt a history of thought which is called

metaphysics. An a priori concept, which ignores this history,

cannot claim universal validity. Even when one wishes to

express a completely original thought, one is not allowed to

neglect the history of the concepts one employs.

The history of metaphysics either covers the whole history of

philosophy or at least forms more than half of it. But a History

of Metaphysics cannot explain the concept of metaphysics

itself. In order to make a History of Metaphysics out of the

whole of philosophy, one must implicitly presuppose a

definition of metaphysics. Therefore, a classification of what

philosophers meant by the term must precede a History of

Metaphysics. This is just what this inquiry aims at. A

comprehensive enumeration of historical usages would not

necessarily be effective. Such a task should be entrusted to a

lexicon of philosophy.

Our scope must be limited to the most important usages. It is

not certain whether the various usages may be reduced to a

single meaning or whether they form a continuous series of

development. Any metaphysical presupposition must be strictly

prohibited. The attempt to arrive at a systematic explanation is

of course of extreme importance. But it must be preceded by

plain observation of historical facts." (Introduction, 1-2).

(1) Kant, Kritik der reinen Vernunft, Vorrede.

Handbooks and Dictionaries

1. Beebee, Helen, Effingham, Nikk, and Goff, Philip, eds. 2011.

Metaphysics. The Key Concepts. New York: Routledge.

2. Kim, Jaegwon, Sosa, Ernest, and Rosenkrantz, Gary S., eds.

2009. A Companion to Metaphysics. Malden: Blackwell.

Second revised edition (First edition 1995).

"The 264 alphabetically-arranged entries include contributions

from many of the world's most distinguished metaphysicians.

From the Introduction: "Because it is the most central and

general subdivision of philosophy, and because it is among the

oldest and most persistently cultivated parts of the field,

metaphysics raises special difficulties of selection for a

companion such as this. The difficulties are compounded,

moreover, by two further facts. First, metaphysics is not only

particularly old among fields of philosophy; it is also

particularly widespread among cultures and regions of the

world. And, second, metaphysics has provoked levels of

scepticism unmatched elsewhere in philosophy; including

scepticism as to whether the whole subject is nothing but a

welter of pseudo-questions and pseudo-problems. In light of

this a project such as ours needs to delimit its approach. In

accomplishing this, we had to bear in mind the space

limitations established by the series, and also the fact that other

volumes in the series would be sure to cover some questions

traditionally viewed as metaphysical. These considerations led

to our including some such questions, which we thought would

be covered more extensively in Samuel Guttenplan's A

Companion to the Philosophy of Mind, for example, or in Peter

Singer's A Companion to Ethics, but which should be treated in

this Companion, if only briefly and for the sake of a more

complete and self-contained Companion to Metaphysics. In

addition, we tried to give a good sense of the sorts of sceptical

objections that have been raised to our field as a whole. As for

the spread of metaphysics across cultures, traditions, and

regions of the world, we opted again to include some coverage

of the non-western, while at the same time keeping our focus

firmly on the western tradition from the Greeks to the present.

What is more, even within the western tradition we needed to

be selective, especially once we came to the present century."

3. Burkhardt, Hans, and Smith, Barry, eds. 1991. Handbook of

Metaphysics and Ontology. Munich: Philosophia Verlag.

"The present work seeks to document the most important

traditional and contemporary streams in the two overlapping

fields of metaphysics and ontology. Both disciplines were, even

just a few years ago, seen by many of negligible contemporary

interest.

The editors, neither of whom had shared this general opinion,

were none the less surprised to see how much valuable work

had been achieved in these areas not only in the past but also in

our own century. The intensity of contemporary work in

metaphysics and ontology points indeed to a healthy renewal of

these disciplines, the like of which has not been seen, perhaps,

since the 13th century".(...)

Of the two editors of this Handbook -- who bear equal

responsibility for all its parts and moments -- one is and

admirer of Leibniz and the 17th-century rationalists and thus

finds himself strongly allied to certain modern deductive

trends. The other feels more at home in the 13th or 14th

centuries and is accordingly critical of the over-enthusiastic and

often over-simplistic use of formal logical techniques in

contemporary metaphysics. The editors are however equally

convinced that it is precisely the tension between the deductive

and descriptive approaches to the problems of metaphysics and

ontology which will be responsible for the future creative

advances in these fields. And they are convinced also that such

advances can be furthered by an understanding of the history of

metaphysics and ontology., an understanding -- guided by the

most sophisticated modern research and by the use of the most

sophisticated modern techniques -- of the sort this Handbook

has been designed to facilitate." (from the Introduction).

4. Loux, Michael J., and Zimmermann, Dean W., eds. 2003. The

Oxford Handbook of Metaphysics. New York: Oxford

University Press.

Contents: Notes on the contributors X; Introduction by Michael

J. Loux & Dean W. Zimmerman 1; Part I. Universals and

particulars 1. Nominalism by Zoltán Gendler Szabó 11; 2.

Platonistic theories of universals 46; 3. Individuation by E. J.

Lowe 75; Part II. Existence and identity 4. Identity by John

Hawthorne 99; 5. Existence, ontological commitment, and

fictional entities by Peter van Inwagen 131; Part III. Modality

and possible worlds 6. The problem of possibilia by Kit Fine

161; 7. Reductive theories of modality by Theodore Sider 180;

Part IV. Time, space-time, and persistence 8. Presentism by

Thomas M. Crisp 211; 9. Four-dimensionalism by Michael C.

Rea 246; 10. Space-time substantivalism 281; 11. Persistence

through time by Sally Haslanger 315; Part V. Events, causation,

and physics 12. Events by Peter Simons 357; 13. Causation and

supervenience by Michael Tooley 386; 14. Causation in a

physical world by Hartry Field 435; 15. Distilling metaphysics

from quantum physics by Tim Maudlin 461; Part VI. Persons

and the nature of mind 16. Material people by Dean W.

Zimmerman 491; 17. The ontology of the mental by Howard

Robinson 527; 18. Supervenience, emergence, realization,

reduction by Jaegwon Kim 556; Part VII. Freedom of the will

19. Libertarianism by Carl Ginet 587; 20. Compatibilism and

incompatibilism: some arguments by Ted Warfield 613; Part

VIII. Anti-realism and vagueness 21. Realism and anti-.realism:

Dummett's challenge by Michael J. Loux 633; 22. Ontological

and conceptual relativity and the Self by Ernest Sosa 665; 23.

Vagueness in reality by Timothy Williamson 690; Index 717-

724.

"Most philosophers today who identify themselves as

metaphysicians are in basic agreement with the Quinean

approach to systematic metaphysics exemplified in the work of

Chisholm and Lewis. Indeed, it is probably not much of an

exaggeration to say that today's crop of metaphysicians can be

divided fairly exhaustively into those most influenced by the

one or the other. That division is reflected in the debates

discussed in the chapters that follow. Those chapters approach

the field topically. Each focuses on a fundamental metaphysical

issue; the aim is to provide an account of the nature and

structure of the debate over the issue. But the chapters are not

merely about metaphysics; they are also exercises in

metaphysics with authors attempting to advance the debate

over the relevant issues. The first three focus on the traditional

dichotomy of universal and particular. Zoltán Szabó discusses

nominalistic accounts of the phenomena central to the debate

over universals; whereas Joshua Hoffman and Gary

Rosenkrantz focus on Platonistic accounts of universals. E. J.

Lowe closes Part I by discussing problems surrounding the

individuation of particulars. Next, there follows a pair of

chapters on very general ontological issues. John Hawthorne

deals with the concept of identity, and Peter van Inwagen

discusses the phenomenon of ontological commitment and

attempts to show how the case of fictional discourse is to be

accommodated.

Modal issues have been pivotal in recent analytic metaphysics.

Here, the central debate has been between those endorsing

non-reductive theories of modality and those insisting on

reductive accounts of modal phenomena. In his contribution

Kit Fine deals with approaches of the first sort; whereas Ted

Sider examines approaches of the second sort. In addition,

discussion of non-reductive theories can be found in Hoffman

and Rosenkrantz's chapter on Platonistic theories of universals.

Part IV focuses on issues bearing on the metaphysics of time

and space. One important debate on the nature of time pits

what are called presentists against those who construe time as a

fourth dimension on a par with the three spatial dimensions.

Thomas Crisp examines presentist theorists; whereas Michael

Rea discusses fourdimensionalism. In his chapter, Graham

Nerlich discusses issues bearing on the debate over the status of

space-time. Finally, Sally Haslanger discusses the different

approaches to questions about persistence through time and

their theoretical roots in the metaphysics of time.

Part V deals with a series of interrelated issues about events,

causation, and physical theory. In the first chapter Peter

Simons discusses recent debates about the existence and nature

of events. Michael Tooley and Hartry Field each contribute a

chapter on causation. Tooley focuses on broader issues about

the analysis of our concept of causation; whereas Field

examines the more particular case of causation in physical

theory. Finally, we have a chapter by Tim Maudlin on the

metaphysical implications of quantum mechanics.

The next three chapters focus on questions about the

metaphysics of persons and the mental. Dean Zimmerman

examines materialist accounts of persons. His chapter is

followed by two more general discussions of the metaphysical

status of the mental. The first, by Howard Robinson, focuses on

general ontological questions about the nature and structure of

perceptual and conceptual episodes. The second, by Jaegwon

Kim, considers the way questions about supervenience and

reduction have come together in recent attempts at providing

materialist accounts of intentional phenomena. Then we have

two chapters on the problem of freedom of the will. Carl Ginet

examines libertarian approaches; whereas Ted Warfield

discusses compatibilist accounts of freedom.

Part VII bears broadly on realism and attempts to delineate

alternatives to realism. Michael Loux discusses the very

influential debates over realism and anti-realism that

originated with Michael Dummett and dominated the British

philosophical scene in the 1970s, 1980s, and early 1990s.

Ernest Sosa considers approaches to questions about realism

that have their origin in facts bearing on ontological relativity.

Finally, Timothy Williamson attempts to lay out the central

features of metaphysical debates over the nature of vagueness"

pp. 6-7.

5. Rosenkrantz, Gary S., and Hoffman, Joshua. 2011. Historical

Dictionary of Metaphysics. Lanham: Scarecrow Press.

Collections of Essays

1. Le Poidevin, Robin, Simons, Peter M., McGonigal, Andrew, and

Cameron, Ross P., eds. 2009. The Routledge Companion to

Metaphysics. New York: Routledge.

Table of Contents: General Introduction Robin Le Poidevin

Part 1: History of Metaphysics Peter Simons 1. Pre-Socratic

Themes: Being, Not-being and Mind David Sedley 2. Plato:

Arguments for Forms Richard Patterson 3. Aristotle: Form,

Matter and Substance Stephen Makin 4. Aristotle: Time and

Change Ursula Coope 5. Medieval Metaphysics 1: The Problem

of Universals Claude Panaccio 6. Medieval Metaphysics 2:

Things, Non-things, God and Time John Marenbon 7.

Descartes: The Real Distinction Dugald Murdoch 8. Hobbes:

Matter, Cause and Motion George MacDonald Ross 9. Spinoza:

Substance, Attribute and Mode Richard Glauser 10. Locke: The

Primary and Secondary Quality Distinction Lisa Downing 11.

Leibniz: Mind-body Causation and Pre-established Harmony

Gonzalo RodriguePereyra 12. Berkeley: Arguments for Idealism

Tom Stoneham 13. Hume: Necessary Connections and Distinct

Existences Alexander Miller 14. Kant: The Possibility of

Metaphysics Lucy Allais 15. Hegel and Schopenhauer: Reason

and Will Rolf-Peter Horstmann 16. Anti-Metaphysics I:

Nietzsche Maudemarie Clark 17. Bradley: the Supra-relational

Absolute William Mander 18. Whitehead: Process and

Cosmology Peter Simons 19. Heidegger: The Question of Being

Herman Philipse 20. Anti-Metaphysics II: verificationism and

kindred views Cheryl Misak 21. Metaphysics revivified Avrum

Stroll Part 2: Ontology: On What Exists Ross P. Cameron 22.

To Be Christopher Daly 23. Not to Be Graham Priest 24. Razor

Arguments Peter Forrest 25. Substance David Robb 26.

Intrinsic and Extrinsic Properties Ross P. Cameron 27.

Universals: The Contemporary Debate Fraser McBride 28.

Particulars Herbert Hochberg 29. Persistence, Composition

and Identity Nikk Effingham 30. Relations John Heil 31. Facts,

Events and States of Affairs Julian Dodd 32. Possible Worlds

and Possibilia John Divers 33. Mathematical Entities Peter

Clark 34. Fictional Objects Richard Hanley 35. Vagueness

Elizabeth Barnes 36. Minor Entities: Surfaces, Holes and

Shadows Roberto Casati 37. Truth-Makers and Truth-Bearers

John Bigelow 38. Values Kevin Mulligan Part 3: Metaphysics

and Science Robin Le Poidevin 39. Space, Absolute and

Relational Tim Maudlin 40. The Infinite Daniel Nolan 41. The

Passage of Time Eric Olsen 42. The Direction of Time D. H.

Mellor 43. Causation Michael Tooley 44. Laws and Dispositions

Stephen Mumford 45. Probability and Determinism Philip

Percival 46. Essences and Natural Kinds Alexander Bird 47.

Metaphysics and Relativity Katherine Hawley 48. Metaphysics

and Quantum Physics Peter J. Lewis 49. Supervenience,

Reductionism and Emergence Howard Robinson 50.

Biometaphysics Barry Smith 51. Social Entities Amie L.

Thomasson 52. The Mental and the Physical Louise Antony 53.

The Self John Campbell A Short Glossary of Metaphysics Peter

Simons and Ross P. Cameron.

2. Gale, Richard M., ed. 2002. The Blackwell Guide to

Metaphysics. Malden: Blackwell.

3. Crane, Tim, and Farkas, Katalin, eds. 2004. Metaphysics. A

Guide and Anthology. New York: Oxford University Press.

4. Hoy, Ronald C., and Oaklander, Nathan, eds. 2004.

Metaphysics. Classic and Contemporary Readings. Belmont:

Thomson/Wadsworth.

Table of Contents: Part I: TIME. 1. Parmenides: Being Is Not

Temporal. 2. Wesley C. Salmon: A Contemporary Exposition of

Zeno's Paradoxes. 3. Aristotle: Time Is a Measure of Change. 4.

St. Augustine: What Is Time? 5. Isaac Newton: Time Is

Absolute. 6. Henri Bergson: Time Is the Flux of Duration. 7.

John M. E. McTaggart: Time Is Not Real. 8. Donald C.

Williams: The Myth of Passage. 9. D. H. Mellor: McTaggart,

Fixity and Coming True. 10. John Perry: Time, Consciousness

and the Knowledge Argument. Further Reading. Part II:

IDENTITY. 11. Plato: Phaedo. 12. Aristotle: On Substance. 13.

Thomas Hobbes: Of Identity and Diversity. 14. John Locke: Of

Identity and Diversity.15. Thomas Reid: Of Identity and on Mr.

Locke's Theory of Personal Identity. 16. David Hume: Of

Identity and Personal Identity. 17. Roderick M. Chisholm:

Problems of Identity. 18. David Armstrong: Identity Through

Time. 19. John Perry: The Bodily Theory of Personal Identity,

The Third Night from A Dialogue on Personal Identity and

Immortality. 20. Derek Parfit: Personal Identity. 21. Jennifer

Whiting: Friends and Future Selves. 22. Thomas Nagel. The

Self as Private Object. Further Reading. Part III: MIND. 23.

Aristotle: On the Soul. 24. René Descartes: Meditations on First

Philosophy. 25. Franz Brentano: The Distinction Between

Mental and Physical Phenomena. 26. Daniel C. Dennett:

Intentional Systems. 27. Ruth Garrett Millikan: Biosemantics.

28. David M. Armstrong: The Nature of Mind. 29. Hilary

Putnam: Philosophy and Our Mental Life. 30. Thomas Nagel:

What Is It Like to Be a Bat? 31. Frank Jackson: Epiphenomenal

Qualia. 32. Paul Churchland: Reduction, Qualia, and the Direct

Inspection of the Brain. 33. John Searle: Reductionism and the

Irreducibility of Consciousness. 34. Patricia Smith Churchland:

Dualism and the Arguments against Neuroscientific Progress.

Further Reading. Part IV: FREEDOM. 35. Aristotle: Fatalism,

Voluntary Action, and Choice. 36. L. Nathan Oaklander:

Freedom and the New Theory of Time. 37. Thomas Aquinas:

Whether There Is Anything Voluntary In Human Acts? 38. St.

Augustine: God's Foreknowledge and Human Freedom. 39.

William L. Rowe: Predestination, Divine Foreknowledge, and

Human Freedom. 40. David Hume: On Liberty and Necessity.

41. Thomas Reid: Of the Liberty of Moral Agents. 42. George E.

Moore: Free Will. 43. Roderick M. Chisholm: Human Freedom

and the Self. 44. Harry Frankfurt: Alternative Possibilities and

Moral Responsibility. 45. Robert Kane: Responsibility, Luck,

and Chance: Reflections on Free Will and Indeterminism. 46.

Daniel C. Dennett: A Hearing for Libertarianism. 47. Robert

Brandom: Freedom and Constraint by Norms. Further

Reading. Part V: GOD. 48. Aquinas: Five Ways. 49. Rene

Descartes: Meditations on First Philosophy, Meditations III, IV

and V. 50. William Rowe: The Cosmological Argument. 51.

Bruce Russell and Stephen Wykstra: The "Inductive" Argument

From Evil: A Dialogue. 52. Phillip Quinn: Creation,

Conservation and the Big Bang. 53. Adolf Grünbaum:

Theological Misinterpretations of Current Physical Cosmology.

Further Reading. Part VI: KNOWING REALITY. 54. Berkeley:

A Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Understanding.

55. Hume: An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding. 56.

Charles Sanders Peirce: The Fixation of Belief and How to

Make our Ideas Clear. 57. Wilfrid Sellars: Philosophy and the

Scientific Image of Man. 58. Willard V. O. Quine: Ontological

Relativity. 59. Richard Rorty: The World Well Lost. 60. William

Alston: Yes, Virginia, There is a Real World. Further Reading.

5. Schoedinger, Andrew, ed. 1990. Introduction to Metaphysics.

The Fundamental Questions. Buffalo, New York: Prometheus

Books.

Contents: Introduction; Part One: The Question of Universals;

Introduction; 1. Aristotle: The Categories (Chapters 1-5); 2.

Peter Abelard: On Universals; 3. John Locke: Of the

signification of words, and general terms; 4. George Berkeley:

First principles of human knowledge; 5. D. F. Pears: Universals;

6. Renford Bambrough: Universals and family resemblances; 7.

Rudolf Carnap: Empiricism, semantics, and ontology; Select

Bibliography; Part Two: The question of causation;

Introduction; 8. David Hume: of the idea of necessary

connection; 9. John Stuart Mill: Of the law of universal

causation; 10. Bertrand Russell: On the notion of cause; 11. C. J.

Ducasse: On the nature and the observability of the causal

relation; 12. R. G. Collingwood: On the so-called idea of

causation; 13. Roderick M. Chisholm: Law statement and

counterfactual inference; 14. Richard Taylor: The metaphysics

of causation. Select Bibliography: Part Three: The question of

personal identity; Introduction; 15. René Descartes: On

Thinking things and the soul; 16. John Locke: The body, the

soul, and the person; 17. Joseph Butler: Of personal identity;

18. David Hume: On personal identity; 19. Sydney Shoemaker:

Personal identity and memory; 20. Anthony Quinton The soul;

21. P. F. Strawson: Persons; Select Bibliography;Part Four:

Introduction; 22. Alasdair MacIntyre: Determinism; 23. A. I.

Melden Willing; 24. Arthur C. Danto: Basic actions; 25. Richard

Taylor: Causal power and human agency; 26. Donald Davidson:

Actions, reasons, and causes; 27. Alvin I. Goldman: Intentional

action; 28. Andrew B. Schoedinger: Beliefs, wants, and

decisions; Select Bibliography; Part Five: Problems of Artificial

Intelligence; Introduction; 29. Allen Newell, J. C. Shaw, and

Herbert Simon: Elements of a theory of human problem

solving; 30. Michael Scriven: The complete robot: a

prolegomena to androidology; 31. Keith Gunderson: The

imitation game; 32: Arthur C. Danto: On consciousness in

machines; 33. Paul Ziff: The feelings of robots; 34. Hilary

Putnam: Minds and machines; 35. Paul Weiss: Love in a

machine age; Select Bibliography.

"The word 'metaphysics' is derived from the two Greek words

meta and physica, and literally means 'beyond physics.' The

Ancient Greeks were very much interested in understanding the

workings of the world around them. Hence, in the most general

of ways, they sought an understanding of physics. This is most

clearly evident in their preoccupation with the notion of

change. What happens, they wondered, when a log burns and

turns to ashes? How is it that the color of a tree's leaves

change? Answers to these and other questions led some to

conclude that the world must be composed of fundamental

elements, i.e., atoms (the cheek word for unbreakable units),

and that the world must function according to the law of

conservation of energy (though they didn't express it in this

formal way). Along with their quest for an understanding of

physics came the realization that an in-depth explanation of the

physical workings of the world required going beyond the

physical in order to explain it adequately. Concepts with no

physical referents are necessary in order to account for that

which is physical. Consequently, metaphysics constitutes the

foundation upon which the physics qua physical rests.

The notion of 'property' is a good case in point. If we were to

inquire of a scientist if physical things possessed properties, he

would undoubtedly respond in the affirmative. Such a response

would commit him to the existence of properties. But what is a

property? The concept of a property is that of something

nonphysical. A little reflection will determine that we cannot

account for anything physical without making reference to its

properties or characteristics. Yet when going beyond the

specific properties of a physical thing to analyze the concept of

a property, all reference to the particular (physical) thing

disappears. At that point, we have gone beyond physics and

enter the realm of metaphysics." (from the Introduction).

6. Cooper, David Edward, ed. 2000. Metaphysics. The Classic

Readings. Malden: Blackwell.

Table of ContentsSeries Preface. Introduction. 1. Tao Te Ching,

Selected Chapters. 2. Plato, Phaedrus 245-50: Plato. 3.

Metaphysics Books VII-VIII (Selected Chapters): Aristotle. 4.

(A) Sayings On 'Conditioned Genesis'. (B) Lalitavistara, XIII

95-117. (C) Nagarjuna, Madhyamaka-Karika, Dedication and

Chapter 25: Gotama (The Buddha). 5. Brahmasutrabhasya

(Selections): Samkara. 6. Principles of Philosophy Part I: René:

Descartes. 7. Ethics Part I: Benedict De Spinoza. 8. An Essay

Concernin g Human Understanding Book II, Chapters 8 and

23 (1-11): John Locke. 9. Monadology: G. W. Liebnitz. 10. The

Principles of Human Knowledge, Part I: 1-37: George Berkeley.

11. Critique of Pure Reason Second Edition, Transcendental

Aesthetic, 1-3, 8: Immanuel Kant. 12. The World As Will and

Representation, Vol II, Chapter 18: Arthur Schopenhauer. 13.

An Examination of Sir William Hamilton's Philosophy,

Chapter 11: John Stuart Mill. 14. Appearance and Reality,

Chapters 13 and 14: F. H. Bradley. 15. 'The One and The Many':

William James. 16. The Philosophy of Logical Atomism,

Lecture VIII: Bertrand Russell. 17. A. N. Whitehead, Process

and Reality, Part I, Chapters 1 and 2 (Selected Sections): A. N.

Whitehead. 18. Being and Time, 14-15, 19, 21: Martin

Heidegger. Index.

7. Beebee, Helen, and Dodd, Julian, eds. 2007. Reading

Metaphysics. Selected Texts with Interactive Commentary.

Malden: Blackwell.

Contents: Sources and Acknowledgements; Introduction;

Introduction; Derek Parfit: 'Personal Identity'; Commentary on

Parfit; Marya Schechtman: 'Personhood and Personal Identity';

Commentary on Schechtman; Further Reading; Essay

Questions: Introduction; Peter van Inwagen: 'The

Incompatibility of Free Will and Determinism'; Commentary

on van Inwagen; Daniel Dennett: 'Could Have Done Otherwise'

(extract from Elbow Room); Commentary on Dennett; Further

Reading; Essay Questions; Appendix; Introduction; Donald

Davidson: 'On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme';

Commentary on Davidson; Thomas Nagel: 'Thought and

Reality' (extract from The View from Nowhere); Commentary

on Nagel; Further reading; Essay questions; Introduction;

Michael Devitt: '"Ostrich Nominalism" or "Mirage Realism"?';

Commentary on Devitt; D. M. Armstrong: 'Against "Ostrich"

Nominalism: A Reply to Michael Devitt'; Commentary on

Armstrong; Further reading; Essay questions; Introduction;

David Lewis: extract from Counterfactuals; Commentary on

Lewis; Saul Kripke: extract from Naming and Necessity;

Commentary on Kripke; Further reading; Essay questions;

Introduction; David Lewis: extract from On the Plurality of

Worlds; Commentary on Lewis; Sally Haslanger: 'Endurance

and Temporary Intrinsics'; Commentary on Haslanger; David

Lewis: 'Tensing the Copula'; Commentary on Lewis; Further

reading; Essay questions; Bibliography; Index.

8. Rea, Michael C., ed. 2009. Arguing About Metaphysics. New

York: Routledge.

9. Kim, Jaegwon, Korman, Daniel Z., and Sosa, Ernest, eds. 2011.

Metaphysics. An Anthology. Oxford: Blackwell.

Second revised edition (First edition 1999).

Part I: Ontology 1; 1. "On What There Is" (W. V. Quine) 7; 2.

"Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology" (Rudolf Carnap) 16; 3.

"Holes" (David and Stephanie Lewis) 27; 4. "Beyond Being and

Nonbeing" (Roderick M. Chisholm) 32; 5. "Does Ontology Rest

on a Mistake?" (Stephen Yablo) 40; 6. "Fictional Objects"

(Amie L. Thomasson) 59; 7. "On What Grounds What"

(Jonathan Schaffer) 73; Part II: Identity 97; 8. "The Identity of

Indiscernibles" (Max Black) 103; 9. "Primitive Thisness and

Primitive Identity" (Robert M. Adams) 109; 10. "Identity and

Necessity" (Saul Kripke) 122; 11. "Contingent Identity" (Allan

Gibbard) 141 12. "Can There Be Vague Objects?" (Gareth Evans)

158 13. "Vague Identity" (Robert C. Stalnaker) 159 Part III:

Modality 167; 14. "Modalities: Basic Concepts and Distinctions"

(Alvin Plantinga) 173; 15. "Actualism and Thisness" (Robert M.

Adams) 187; 16. "A Philosopher's Paradise: The Plurality of

Worlds" (David Lewis) 208; 17. "Possible Worlds" (Robert C.

Stalnaker) 230; 18. "Modal Fictionalism" (Gideon Rosen) 236;

19. "Essence and Modality" (Kit Fine) 255; Part IV: Properties

267; 20. "Natural Kinds" (W. V. Quine) 271; 21. "Causality and

Properties" (Sydney Shoemaker) 281; 22. "The Metaphysic of

Abstract Particulars" (Keith Campbell) 298; 23. "New Work for

a Theory of Universals" (David Lewis) 307; 24. "Universals as

Attributes" (D. M. Armstrong) 332; Part V: Causation 345; 25.

"On the Notion of Cause" (Bertrand Russell) 351; 26. "Causes

and Conditions" (J.L. Mackie) 362; 27. "Causal Relations"

(Donald Davidson) 378; 28. "Causality and Determination"

(G.E.M. Anscombe) 386; 29. "Causation" (David Lewis) 397;

30. "Causal connections" (Wesley C. Salmon) 405; 31.

"Causation: Reductionism Versus Realism" (Michael Tooley)

419 32. "Two Concepts of Causation" (Ned Hall) 432; Part VI:

Persistence 455; 33. "Identity Through Time" (Roderick M.

Chisholm) 461; 34. "Identity, Ostension, and Hypostasis" (W.

V. Quine) 472; 35. "Parthood and Identity Across Time" (Judith

Jarvis Thomson) 480; 36. "Temporal Parts of Four-

Dimensional Objects" (Mark Heller) 492; 37. "The Problem of

Temporary Intrinsics" (David Lewis) 504; 38. "Endurance and

Temporary Intrinsics" (Sally Haslanger) 506; 39. "All the

World's a Stage" (Theodore Sider) 511; Part VII: Persons 527;

40. "Persons and Their Pasts" (Sydney Shoemaker) 533; 41.

"The Self and the Future" (Bernard Williams) 552; 42.

"Personal Identity" (Derek Parfit) 562; 43. "Survival and

Identity" (David Lewis) 575; 44. "Lonely Souls: Causality and

Substance Dualism" (Jaegwon Kim) 588; 45. "The Ontological

Status of Persons" (Lynne Rudder Baker) 597; 46. "An

Argument for Animalism" (Eric T. Olson) 610; Part VIII:

Objects 621; 47. "When are Objects Parts?" (Peter van Inwagen)

627; 48. "Many But Almost One" (David Lewis) 642; 49.

"Existential Relativity" (Ernest Sosa) 652; 50. "The Argument

from Vagueness" (Theodore Sider) 661; 51.

"Epiphenomenalism and Eliminativism" (Trenton Merricks)

673; 52. "Against Revisionary Ontology" (Eli Hirsch) 686; 53.

"Strange Kinds, Familiar Kinds, and the Charge of

Arbitrariness" (Daniel Z. Korman) 703.

"This Anthology, intended to accompany A Companion to

Metaphysics (Blackwell, 1995), brings together 53 selections

which represent the best and most important works in

metaphysics during this century. The selections are grouped

under ten major metaphysical problems and each section is

preceded by an Introduction by the editors. Some of the

problems covered are existence, identity, essence and essential

properties, "possible worlds", things and their identity over

time, emergence and supervenience, causality, and

realism/antirealism. The coverage is comprehensive and

should be accessible to those without a background in technical

philosophy."

10. Blackman, Larry Lee, ed. 1984. Classics of Analytical

Metaphysics. New York: University Press of America.

Table of Contents: Preface. Introduction. PART I. Philosophical

background. 1. Gottlob Frege: On concept and objet 2. Gottlob

Frege: On sense and meaning 3. F. H. Bradley: Substantive and

adjective 4. F. H. Bradley: Relation and quality 5. Alexius

Meinong: The theory of objects PART II. Philosophical analysis

1. F. H. Bradley: On appearance, error, and contradiction 2.

Bertrand Russell: Some explanations in reply to Mr. Bradley 3.

F. H: Bradley: Reply to Mr. Russell's explanations 4. Bertrand

Russell: The philosophy of Logical Atomism DISCUSSION: 1.

Gustav Bergmann: Facts and things 2. Gustav Bergmann:

Sketch of ontological analysis 3. Panayot Butchvarov: The

limits of ontological analysis PART III: Universals and

Particulars 1. Bertrand Russell: On the relations of universals

and particulars 2. G. F. Stout: The nature of universals and

propositions 3. G. E. Moore and G. F. Stout: Are the

characteristics of particular things universal or particular? 4.

DISCUSSION: 1. H. H. Price: Universals and resemblances 2.

Panayot Butchvarov: The identity and resemblance theories

PART IV. Identity and Individuation. 1. G. E. Moore: Identity

DISCUSSION: Max Black: The identity of indiscernibles 2.

Edwin B. Allaire: Bare particulars 3. V. C. Chappell: Particulars

re-clothed 4. Edwin B. Allaire: Another look to bare particulars

5. Panayot Butchvarov: Identity PART V. Names and

descriptions: Bertrand Russell: On denoting DISCUSSION: 1.

P. F. Strawson: On referring 2. Bertrand Russell: Mr. Strawson

on referring 3. Herbert Hochberg: Strawson, Russell, and the

King of France PART VI. Intentionality 1. G. E. Moore: The

refutation of Idealism 2. G. E. Moore: Beliefs and propositions

3. Bertrand Russell: Propositions and facts with more than one

verb DISCUSSION: 1. Gustav Bergmann: Intentionality 2.

Herbert Hochberg: Intentions, facts and propositions.

"The purposes of this book are: (1) to make available in a single

volume many of the "classics" of analytical metaphysics, works

by GottIob Frege, Bertrand Russell, G. E. Moore, and others

roughly in the years 1890-1925, (2) to bring together a similar

number of recent "discussions" of issues raised in the earlier

papers, and (3) to provide an Introduction both to metaphysics

and to twentieth-century analytical philosophy. In selecting the

"classics" my guiding principle has been to include works which

have been most influential and which exhibit the most

important themes of the movement. The papers by Frege,

Russell, Moore, and G. F. Stout have these characteristics.

Alexius Meinong's 'The Theory of Objects" merits inclusion not

only because Russell found the admission of "nonexistent

objects" so repugnant, but, also, because in trying to grasp the

relation between thought and reality, a number of thinkers in

the analytical tradition, such as Gustav Bergmann and Panayot

Butchvarov, have been so strongly attracted to Meinongian

positions. The selections by F. H. Bradley are important, not

because they are pieces of analytical philosophy (which they are

not), but because they represent the kind of thinking against

which Russell and the others reacted. All of the "discussion"

articles have appeared since 1950. My aim has been to include

those which are most closely allied to the "Classics" in style and

in substance and which therefore show the continuity of the

earlier and more recent thought. Of necessity, some excellent

papers, which in every way qualify as works of analytical

metaphysics, were excluded. The ones that remain seem to lend

themselves most strikingly to the thematic unity of the book. As

the reader will discover, certain topics, such as the nature of

identity, the existence of universals, the status of nonexistent

objects, the viability of artificial languages, and the very

possibility of analysis, are almost constantly the focus of

concern." (from the Preface).

11. Sider, Theodor, Hawthorne, John, and Zimmermann, Dean W.,

eds. 2008. Contemporary Debates in Metaphysics. Malden:

Blackwell.

Notes on contributors Introduction1.1 Abstract entities: Chris

Swoyer (University of Oklahoma) 1.2 There are no abstract

objects: Cian Dorr (University of Pittsburgh) 2.1 Nailed to

Hume's cross?: John W. Carroll (North Carolina State

University) 2.2 Causation and laws of nature: Reductionism:

Jonathan Schaffer (University of Massachusetts-Amherst) 3.1

Concrete possible worlds: Phillip Bricker(University of

Massachusetts- Amherst) 3.2 Ersatz possible worlds: Joseph

Melia (University of Leeds) 4.1 People and their bodies: Judith

Jarvis Thomson (MIT) 4.2 Persons, bodies, and human beings:

Derek Parfit (All Souls College, Oxford) 5.1 The privileged

present: defending an "A-theory" of time: Dean Zimmerman

(Rutgers University) 5.2 The tenseless theory of time: J. J. C.

Smart (Australian National University) 6.1 Temporal parts:

Theodore Sider (Rutgers University) 6.2 Three-dimensionalism

vs. four-dimensionalism: John Hawthorne (Rutgers University)

7.1 Incompatibilism: Robert Kane (University of Texas at

Austin) 7.2 Compatibilism, incompatibilism, and

impossibilism: Kadri Vihvelin (University of Southern

California) 8.1 The moon and sixpence: a defense of

mereological universalism: James van Cleve (University of

Southern California) 8.2 Restricted composition: Ned

Markosian (Western Washington University) 9.1 Ontological

arguments: interpretive charity and quantifier variance: Eli

Hirsch (Brandeis University) 9.2 The picture of reality as an

amorphous lump: Matti Eklund (Cornell University) Index.

12. Hales, Steven, ed. 1999. Metaphysics. Contemporary

Readings. Belmont, California: Wadsworth/Thomson

Learning.

TABLE OF CONTENTS: Editor's Preface. I. EXISTENCE.

Michael Burke, Introduction to Existence. Nicholas Rescher,

On Explaining Existence. Derek Parfit, Why is Reality as It Is?

Robert Nozick, Why Is There Something Rather Than Nothing?

Bibliography of Further Readings. II. REALISM/ANTI-

REALISM. Simon Blackburn, Introduction to the Realism

Debates. Michael Dummett, Realism and Anti-Realism. Hilary

Putnam, Why There Isn't a Ready-Made World. Ernest Sosa,

Putnam's Pragmatic Realism. Michael Devitt, A Naturalistic

Defense of Realism. Michael Devitt, Postscript to A Naturalistic

Defense of Realism. Bibliography of Further Readings. III.

TRUTH. Frederick Schmitt, Introduction to Truth. Alfred

Tarski, The Semantic Conception of Truth. Susan Haack, The

Pragmatist Theory of Truth. Nicholas Rescher, Truth as Ideal

Coherence. Paul Horwich, The Disquotational Conception of

Truth. Marian David, Truth as Correspondence. Bibliography of

Further Readings. IV. ABSTRACTA: PROPERTIES,

NUMBERS, PROPOSITIONS. Bob Hale, Introduction to

Abstracta. W.V. Quine, On What There Is. Rudolf Carnap,

Empiricism, Semanitcs, and Ontology. Alonzo Church, On

Carnap's Analysis of Statements of Assertion and Belief. W.V.

Quine, Meaning and Truth. Paul Benacerraf, What Numbers

Could Not Be. David M. Armstrong, Universals as Attributes.

Bibliography of Further Readings. V. SECONDARY

QUALITIES. Edward Averill, Introduction to Secondary

Qualities. David M. Armstrong, The Secondary Qualities. Paul

A. Boghossian and David Velleman, Colour as a Secondary

Quality. C.L. Hardin, Color and Illusion. Bibliography of

Further Readings. VI. CONCRETA: EVENTS. Jonathan

Bennett, Introduction to Events. Donald Davidson, The

Individuation of Events. JaegwonKim, Events as Property

Exemplifications. Lawrence Lombard, Events. Bibliography of

Further Readings. VII. CONCRETA: SUBSTANCE. Ernest

Jonathan Lowe, Introduction to Substance. James Van Cleve,

Three Versions of the Bundle Theory. Gary Rosenkrantz and

Joshua Hoffman, The Independence Criterion of Substance.

Peter Simons, Particulars in Particular Clothing: Three Trope

Theories of Substance. Bibliography of Further Readings. VIII.

DEPENDENT PARTICULARS: HOLES, BOUNDARIES, AND

SURFACES. Scott H. Hestevold, Introduction to Dependent

Particulars. David Lewis and Stephanie Lewis, Holes. Roberto

Casati and Achille C. Varzi. Immaterial Bodies. Roderick

Chisholm, Boundaries as Dependent Particulars. Avrum Stroll,

Two Conceptions of Surfaces. Bibliography of Further

Readings. IX. MEREOLOGY. Peter Simons, Introduction to

Mereology. W.V. Quine, Identity, Ostension, and Hypostasis.

Mark Heller, Temporal Parts of Four-Dimensioned Objects.

Peter Van Inwagen, Four-Dimensional Objects. James Van

Cleve, Mereological Essentialism, Mereological Conjunctivism,

and Identity Through Time. BIBLIOGRAPHY OF FURTHER

READINGS.

"Metaphysics is one of the oldest and most central divisions of

philosophy, an its study is found in full flower among the

Greeks of the fifth century B.C.E. The word metaphysics itself

comes from a first-century B.C.E. edition of certain collected

writings of Aristotle, assembled under the title Ta Meta ta

Phusika, which means no more than 'what comes after the

writings on nature' (ta phusika). The topics treated by Aristotle

in posthumous edition became the focus of the specialty of

metaphysics. Aristotle set out three main tasks in Ta Meta ta

Phusika. The first was the study of first principles of logic and

causation. The second chore was the reasoned investigation of

the nature of divinity. The third was ontology: the exploration

of being qua being, or intrinsic nature of existence. In the past

two thousand years, the first assignment has been divided

variously among logicians, philosophers of science, and

scientists. The second task has become the specialized subject

of the philosophy of religion. It is the third task, that of

ontology, which remains to metaphysics proper today.

Ontology has three primary objectives. The first is to establish

the basic categories of what there is, or the taxonomy of the

ultimate furniture of reality. In one respect, a kind of taxonomy

is implied by the very divisions of this book, in which, for

example, an entire part is devoted to one kind of thing (such as

truth) and another whole part is devoted to another kind of

thing (such as events). (...) The second task of ontology is to

investigate the relations that hold among different types of

things. (...) The third objective of ontology is to delineate the

relations that obtain among things in the same category. (...)

Though no single book could cover every issue in metaphysics,

the volume you are holding surveys some of the most

prominent topics in contemporary metaphysics. Each of the

nine parts of the book is introduced by a leading scholar on the

topic of that part, and each of the articles is accompanied by

study questions to help you quickly grasp the key points of the

article. In addition, extensive further readings at the end of

each part allow you to delve more deeply. (from the Preface for

the Students).

13. Laurence, Stephen, and Macdonald, Cynthia, eds. 1998.

Contemporary Readings in the Foundations of Metaphysics.

Oxford: Blackwell.

Contents: List of Contributors for State of the Art Essays.

Acknowledgements. Introduction: Metaphysics and Ontology:

Stephen Laurence and Cynthia MacDonald. Part I:

Methodology and Ontological Commitment: State of the Art

Essay. 1. The Nature of Metaphysics: Peter van Inwagen.

Readings. 2. Descriptive and Revisionary Metaphysics: Susan

Haack. 3. On What There Is: W. V. O. Quine. 4. Ontological

Commitments: William P. Alston. 5. Quantifiers: Susan Haack.

6. Identity and Substitutivity: Richard Cartwright. Part II:

Possible Worlds and Possibilia: State of the Art Essay.

7. Possible Worlds and Possibilia: William G. Lycan. Readings.

8. Possible Worlds: David Lewis. 9. Possible Worlds: Robert

Stalnaker. 10. Ways Worlds Could Be: Peter Forrest. Part III:

Universals and Properties: State of the Art Essay. 11. Universals

and Properties: George Bealer. Readings.

12. On Properties: Hilary Putnam. 13. New Work for a Theory

of Universals: David Lewis. 15. A Theory of Structural

Universals: John Bigelow and Robert Pargetter. Part IV:

Substances: State of the Art Essay. 16. Beyond Substrata and

Bundles: A Prolegomenon to a Substance Ontology: Michael J.

Loux. Readings. 17. Bare Particulars: Edwin B. Allaire. 18.

Particulars Re-Clothed: V. C. Chappell. 19. Another Look at

Bare Particulars: Edwin B. Allaire. 20. Three Versions of the

Bundle Theory: James Van Cleve. Part V: Events: State of the

Art Essay. 21. Ontologies of Events: Lawrence Brian Lombard.

Readings. 22. The Individuation of Events: Donald Devidson.

23. Events as Property Exemplifications: Jaegwon Kim.

Part VI: Tropes: State of the Art Essay. 24. Tropes and Other

Things: Cynthia Macdonald. Readings. 25. The Metaphysic of

Abstract Particulars: Keith Campbell. 26. Particulars in

Particular Clothing: Three Trope Theories of Substance: Peter

Simmons. Part VII: Mathematical Objects:

State of the Art Essay. 27. Mathematical Objectivity and

Mathematical objects: Hartry Field. Readings. 28. Philosophy

of Logic: Hilary Putnam.

29. What Numbers Could Not Be: Paul Benacerraf. Index.

From the Introduction: "One of the most fundamental

questions in metaphysics is which (...) metaphysical categories

of entities exist.

Philosophers have differed markedly over which categories they

believe to exist. In David Lewis's suggestive phrase, they have

varied widely from 'All-ists' to None-ists', with None-ists

accepting only the existence of actual ordinary physical objects,

and All-ists accepting all manner of further category of

existents (David Lewis 'Noneism or Allism?' Mind vol. 99: 393,

January 1990, pp. 23-31). As Lewis remarks, most philosophers

fall somewhat in between. Even among philosophers who

accept a given category of existents, there is still room for

disagreement, however. One might accept the existence of a

certain kind of entity without believing that that category of

entities is basic. For example, one might think that there are

such things as states of affairs, but hold that they are nothing

over and above the particular objects and properties and

relations involved in them. A theorist who took this view would

insist that although states of affairs form a metaphysical

category, they do not form a basic metaphysical category.

Taking another example, one might hold that although there

are particular objects, these objects are nothing more than

'bundIes' of properties, and do not constitute a category of

entities in addition to the category of properties. A theorist who

took this view would likewise insist that although particular

objects form a metaphysical category, they do not form a basic

metaphysical category. As these examples illustrate, disputes

over whether or not a given category is basic are closely

connected to questions about the natures of such entities.

Together, these two sorts of questions -- questions about which

metaphysical categories of entities there are and questions

about the natures of different kinds of entities -- constitute the

central questions in that part of metaphysics called 'ontology'.

Ontology is plausibly viewed as the very foundation of

metaphysics; and it is the focus of this Reader."

14. Inwagen, Peter van, and Zimmermann, Dean W., eds. 1998.

Metaphysics. The Big Questions. Oxford: Blackwell.

Contents: Preface. Introduction: What is Metaphysics? Part I:

What are the most General Features of the World?:

Introduction. A. What is the Relationship between an

Individual and its Characteristics? 1. Universals and

Resemblances: Chapter 1 of Thinking and Experience: H. H.

Price. 2. The Elements of Being: D. C. Williams. 3. The

Principle of Individuation: an Excerpt from Human

Knowledge, its Scope and Limits: Bertrand Russell. 4. Distinct

Indiscernibles and the Bundle Theory: Dean W. Zimmerman.

B. What is Time? What is Space? 5. Time: an Excerpt from The

Nature of Existence: J. McT. E. McTaggart. 6. McTaggart's

Arguments against the Reality of Time: an Excerpt from

Examination of McTaggart's Philosophy. 7. The Notion of the

Present: A. N. Prior. 8. The General Problem of Time and

Change: an Excerpt from Scientific Thought: C. D. Broad. 9.

The Space-Time World: An Excerpt from Philosophy and

Scientific Realism: J. J. C. Smart. 10. Topis, Soris, Noris: an

Excerpt from The Existence of Space and Time: Ian Hinckfuss.

11. Some Free Thinking about Time: A. N. Prior. 12. The Fourth

Dimension: an Excerpt from The Ambidextrous Universe:

Martin Gardner. 13. Incongruent Counterparts and Higher

Dimensions: James Van Cleve. 14. Achilles and the Tortoise:

Max Black. 15. A Contemporary Look at Zeno's Paradoxes: an

Excerpt from Space, Time and Motion: Wesley C. Salmon. 16.

Grasping the Infinite: José A. Bernadete. 17. The Paradoxes of

Time Travel: David Lewis. C. How do things Persist through

Changes of Parts and Properties? 18. Of Confused Subjects

which are Equivalent to Two Subjects: an Excerpt from The

Port-Royal Logic: Antoine Arnauld and Pierre Nicole. 19.

Identity Through Time: Roderick M. Chisholm. 20. Identity,

Ostension, and Hypostasis: W. V. O. Quine. 21. Identity: an

Excerpt From Quiddities: W. V. O. Quine. 22. In Defense of

Stages: Postscript B to 'Survival and identity': David Lewis. 23.

Some Problems About Time: Peter Geach. 24. The Problem of

Temporary Intrinsics: an Excerpt from On the Plurality of

Worlds: David Lewis. 25. Temporary Intrinsics and

Presentism: Dean W. Zimmerman. D. How do Causes Bring

about their Effects? 26. Constant Conjunction: an excerpt from

A Treatise of Human Nature: David Hume. 27. Efficient Cause

and Active Power: an excerpt from Essays on the Active Powers

of the Human Mind: Thomas Reid. 28. Psychological and

Physical Causal Laws: an Excerpt from The Analysis of Mind:

Bertrand Russell. 29. Causality: an Excerpt from A Modern

Introduction to Logic: L. Susan Stebbing. 30. Causality and

Determination: G. E. M. Anscombe. Part II: What is our Place

in the World?: Introduction. A. How is the Appearance of a

Thing Related to the Thing that Appears? 31. The Theory of

Sensa: an Excerpt from Scientific Thought: C. D. Broad. 32.

Qualities: an Excerpt from Consciousness and Causality: D. M.

Armstrong. 33. The Status of Appearances: an Excerpt from

Theory of Knowledge, 1st edition: Roderick M. Chisholm. B.

What is the Relation Between Mind and Body? 34. Which

Physical Thing am I?: an Excerpt From 'Is There a Mind Body

Problem?': Roderick M. Chisholm. 35. Personal Identity: a

Materialist Account: Sydney Shoemaker. 36. Dividend Minds

and the Nature of Persons: Derek Parfit. 37. Body and Soul: an

Excerpt from The Evolution of the Soul: Richard Swinburne.

38. The Puzzle of Conscious Experience: David Chalmers. C. Is

it Possible for us to Act Freely?

39. Free Will as Involving Determination and Inconceivable

Without it: R. E. Hobart. 40. Human Freedom and the Self:

Richard M. Chisholm. 41. The Mystery of Metaphysical

Freedom: Peter van Inwagen. 42. The Agent as Cause: Timothy

O'Connor. Part III: Is There Just One World?: Introduction. 43.

Speaking of Objects: W. V. O. Quine. 44. After Metaphysics,

What?: Hilary Putnam. 45. Truth and Convention: Hilary

Putnam. 46. Nonabsolute Existence and Conceptual Relativity:

an Excerpt from 'Putnam's Pragmatic Realism': Ernest Sosa.

47. Addendum to 'Nonabsolute Existence and Conceptual

Relativity': Objections and Replies: Ernest Sosa. Part IV: Why

is There a World?: Introduction. A. Is There an Answer? 48.

The Problem of Being: Chapter 3 of Some Problems of

Philosophy: William James. 49. The Puzzle of Reality: Derek

Parfit. 50. Reply to Parfit: Richard Swinburne. B. Does the

Answer Involve a Necessary Being? 51. The Cosmological

Argument and the Principle of Sufficient Reason: William L.

Rowe. 52. The Ontological Argument: Chapters II-IV of the

Proslogion: St. Anselm. 53. Anselm's Ontological Arguments:

Norman Malcolm. Part V: Is Metaphysics Possible?:

Introduction. 54. The Rejection of Metaphysics: Chapter 1 of

Philosophy and Logical Syntax: Rudolf Carnap. 55.

Postmodernism, Feminism, and Metaphysics: an excerpt from

Thinking Fragments: Jane Flax. 56. Metaphysics and Feminist

Theory: Excerpts from 'Feminist Metaphysics' and 'Anti-

Essentialism in Feminist Theory': Charlotte Witt. 57.

Nonabsolute Existence and Conceptual Relativity: An Excerpt

From "Putnam's Pragmatic Realism": Ernest Sosa 58.

Addendum to "Nonabsolute Existence and Conceptual

Relativity": Objections and Replies: Ernest Sosa 59. The

Problem of Being: Chapter 3 of Some Problems of Philosophy:

William James 60. Why Anything? Why This? Derek Parfit 61.

Reply to Parfit: Richard Swinburne 62. The Cosmological

Argument: An Excerpt from A Demonstration of the Being and

Attributes of God: Samuel Clarke 63. The Cosmological

Argument and the Principle of Sufficient Reason: William L.

Rowe 64. The Ontological Argument: Chapters II-IV of the

Proslogion: St. Anselm 65. Anselm's Ontological Arguments:

Norman Malcolm Index.

"With the exception of the final group of essays, all the readings

are made to fall under a series of questions about 'the world'.

We assume that the world includes everything that there is --

that is, all that exists. The first and largest part 'What are the

most general features of the world,?' includes readings on the

problem of universals, the nature of particular things and the

manner of their persistence through time, rival theories of the

passage of time, absolute space and incongruent counterparts,

causation, and a budget of paradoxes: McTaggart's paradox,

paradoxes of motion, of the infinite, of time travel, and of

intrinsic change. The second, and second largest, part asks,

'What is our place in the world?'. Here are questions about the

relation between the way things appear to us and the way they

are (sense data, secondary qualities), personal identity (two

forms of materialism, a version of Cartesian dualism, and

Derek Parfit's 'Buddhism'), the nature of phenomenal

experience, and free will. Part Three raises the question of 'anti-

realism': Is there just one world, one complete inventory of

what there is? Or does what there is vary from community to

community or person to person? Part Four begins with

reflection on whether there could be an answer to the question,

'Why is there a world?' -- that is, why is there something, rather

than nothing? The part ends with two attempts to answer the

question by appeal to a necessary being (the Deity of the

cosmological and ontological arguments). The final part

includes challenges to the very possibility of metaphysics from

both positivist and postmodern perspectives". (from the

Preface).

15. Loux, Michael J., ed. 2001. Metaphysics. Contemporary

Readings. New York: Routledge.

Contents: Introduction; Part One: Universals; 1. The Problem

of Universals, Michael J. Loux; 2. The World of Universals,

Bertrand Russell; 3. Universals and Resemblance, H. H. Price;

4. On What There Is, W. V. Quine; 5. The Elements of Being,

David Armstrong; 6. Properties and States of Affair

Intentionally Considered, Roderick Chisholm; Part Two:

Particulars; 1. The Ontological Structure of Concrete

Particulars, Michael j. Loux; 2. The Identity of Indiscernibles,

Max Black; 3. The Identity of Indiscernibles, A. J. Ayer; 4. Bare

Particulars, Edwin Allaire; 5. Three Versions of Bundle Theory,

James Van Cleve, 6. A Fourth Version of Bundle Theory, Albert

Casullo; 7. Bodies, P. F. Strawson; Part Three: Possible Worlds;

1. Modality and Possible Worlds, Michael J. Loux; 2. Possible

Worlds, David Lewis; 3. Actualism and Possible Worlds, Alvin

Plantinga; 4. Counterparts or Double Lives, David Lewis; 5.

Two Concepts of Possible Worlds, Peter van Inwagen; 6.

Identity and Necessity, Saul Kripke; Part Four: Causation; 1.

Cause and Effect, Michael J. Loux; 2. Causality in Everyday Life

and in Recent Science, Moritz Schlick; 3. Cause, A.C. Ewing; 4.

Causes and Conditions, John L. Mackie; 5. Causality and

Determination, G. E. M. Anscombe; 6. Causation, David Lewis;

Part Five: Time; 1. Time: The A-Theory and the B-Theory,

Michael J. Loux; 2. Time, J. M. E. McTaggart; 3. Ostensible

Temporality, C. D. Broad; 4. Time and Eternity, Richard Taylor;

5. The Notion of the Present, A. N. Prior; 6. The Space-Time

World, J. J. C. Smart; 7. The Need for Time, D. H. Mellor; 8.

How Fast Does Time Pass?, Ned Markosian; Part Six:

Persistence Through Time; 1. Endurantism and Perdurantism,

Michael J. Loux; 2. Temporal Parts of Four Dimensional

Objects, Mark Heller; 3. Identity Through Time, Roderick

Chisholm; 4. Endurance and Indiscernibility, Trenton

Merricks; 5. Personal Identity, Derek Parfit; 6. Survival and

Identity, David Lewis; 7. Personal Identity: The Dualist Theory,

Richard Swinburne; Part Seven: Realism and Anti-Realism; 1.

Realism and Anti-Realism, Michael J. Loux; 2. Realism,

Michael Dummett; 3. Ontological Relativity, W. V. Quine; 4. A

Problem About Reference, Hilary Putnam; 5. Objectivity, Peter

van Inwagen; 6. Yes, Virginia, There Is a Real World, William

Alston.

16. Hazlett, Allan. 2010. New Waves in Metaphysics. New York:

Palgrave Macmillan.

17. "Metaphysics." 2001. Philosophical Perspectives no. 15.

Edited by James E. Tomberlin.

18. Rockmore, Tom, ed. 2010. The Proceedings of the Twentieth

World Congress of Philosophy. Volume 2: Metaphysics.

Bowling Green: Philosophy Documentation Center.

19. Tooley, Michael, ed. 1999. Laws of Nature, Causation, and

Supervenience. New York: Garland.

Analytical Metaphysics. A Collection of Essays. Vol. 1.

20. ———, ed. 1999. Time and Causation. New York: Garland.

Analytical Metaphysics. A Collection of Essays. Vol. 2.

21. ———, ed. 1999. The Nature of Properties. New York: Garland.

Analytical Metaphysics. A Collection of Essays. Vol. 3.

22. ———, ed. 1999. Particulars, Actuality, and Identity over Time.

New York: Garland.

Analytical Metaphysics. A Collection of Essays. Vol. 4.

23. ———, ed. 1999. Necessity and Possibility. New York: Garland.

Analytical Metaphysics. A Collection of Essays. Vol. 5.

24. Rea, Michael C., ed. 2008. Foundations. New York: Routledge.

Critical Concepts in Philosophy: Metaphysics. Vol. 1.

25. ———, ed. 2011. Modality and Modal Structure I. New York:

Routledge.

Critical Concepts in Philosophy: Metaphysics. Vol. 2.

26. ———, ed. 2011. Modality and Modal Structure Ii. New York:

Routledge.

Critical Concepts in Philosophy: Metaphysics. Vol. 3.

27. ———. 2011. The Metaphysics of Material Objects I: Identity

and Individuation. New York: Routledge.

Critical Concepts in Philosophy: Metaphysics. Vol. 4.

28. ———, ed. 2011. The Metaphysics of Material Objects Ii:

Composition and Vagueness. New York: Routledge.

Critical Concepts in Philosophy: Metaphysics. Vol. 5.

29. Zimmermann, Dean W., ed. 2004. Oxford Studies in

Metaphysics. Volume 1. New York: Oxford University Press.

30. ———, ed. 2006. Oxford Studies in Metaphysics. Volume 2.

New York: Oxford University Press.

31. ———, ed. 2007. Oxford Studies in Metaphysics. Volume 3.

New York: Oxford University Press.

32. ———, ed. 2007. Oxford Studies in Metaphysics. Volume 4.

New York: Oxford University Press.

33. ———, ed. 2010. Oxford Studies in Metaphysics. Volume 5.

New York: Oxford University Press.

34. Zimmermann, Dean W., and Bennett, Karen, eds. 2011. Oxford

Studies in Metaphysics. Volume 6. New York: Oxford

University Press.

Bibliographia. Annotated bibliographies

Raul Corazzon || rc@ontology.co || Info

Study Guide for Formal and

Descriptive Ontology

Introduction

A few data about contemporary formal ontologists - by Roberto Poli

(Trento University).

"A small dictionary of philosophers who have explicitly dealt with

formal ontology would be useful. Two observations are important:

(1) in this section the expression "formal ontology" will be used in the

broad sense to refer to both the formal ontology and the formalized

ontology described in the previous section; (2) the qualification

"explicitly" is crucial. In effect, the range of formal ontology (in the

sense given sub (1) above) is so broad and so ramified that it is

difficult to say who has not dealt with it. But if we employ as our

criterion the use of the expression "formal ontology" (or something

similar) in a sense consistent with the one specified, we find that the

list of authors diminishes considerably.

The point of departure is obviously Husserl's Logical Investigations.

The author who more than anyone else has developed the categorial

analysis of ontology is Nicolai Hartmann. As regards

phenomenologists, the Husserlian who has paid closest attention to

the theme is Roman Ingarden, especially in his monumental work

Der Streit um die Existenz der Welt. Formal domain ontologies have

been developed by Ingarden himself (the domain of artistic

phenomena with particular regard to literary works and the domain

of values), Hartmann (natural world, social world, art, values),

Scheler (values), Reinach (law), Stein (the concept of person), and

Plessner (the social world).

Among analytic philosophers, we find a constant interest in the

relationships between the dimensions of the formal and of ontology

from Carnap onwards. Authors who warrant at least brief mention

are certainly Goodman, Prior and Quine. More difficult to classify for

various reasons are the theories of Bunge and Sommers.

Johansson has developed an innovative categorical approach which

reveals the influence of the Brentanian tradition (Husserl and Marty

in particular) as well as the Marxian tradition, especially in his

analysis of social action.

Nino Cocchiarella, Kit Fine and Jerzy Perzanowski are perhaps the

most notable of philosophers currently conducting explicitly formal

analysis. Cocchiarella has worked in particular on problems of

predication and nominalization (issues explicitly analyzed by

Husserl), systematically reconstructing so-called theories of

universals (nominalism, conceptualism and realism, the latter two

with important variants) in a formally homogeneous environment.

Of Fine' many works, particular mention should be made of those

which formally reconstruct various fundamental concepts of the

philosophical tradition (the concept of substance among others),

often starting from their Aristotelian bases. Perzanowski has

developed an innovative account of ontology within a Leibnizian

framework. From a formal point of view, a distinctive feature of his

position is the idea that there are formal structures which precede

the distinction between the propositional and the predicative levels

and require particular algebraic codification (Perzanowski, The Way

of Truth, in: Roberto Poli & Peter Simons (eds.) - Formal Ontology

Dordrecht, Kluwer, 1996). One aspect to be noted is that all three of

these philosophers work in explicitly formal terms while

simultaneously paying close attention to Husserlian matters

(Cocchiarella has analysed the already mentioned problems of

predication and nominalization; Fine has developed a sophisticated

algebraic reconstruction of the third Logical Investigation;

Perzanowski was one of Ingarden' pupils).

In the past twenty years, a group of mainly (but not exclusively)

analytic philosophers have drawn on the work of one of Brentano'

pupils to develop new formal tools. I am obviously referring to so-

called Meinongian semantics, the history of which divides into two

main periods. The first was during the mid-1980s and is particularly

closely associated with Lambert, Parsons, Rapaport, Sylvan and

Zalta.

These are authors whose names establish further connections with

free logics, relevant logics and paraconsistent logics. The second,

more recent, period is associated especially with the names of

Jacquette and Pasniczek.

One author who has engaged in dialogue with those just mentioned,

although he developed his own and original point of view, was

Hector-Neri Castañeda, whose guise theory proposes a wide series of

predicative structures both ontological and cognitive. Castañeda'

premature death prevented further development of his theory and it

remains incomplete.

Also to be mentioned is a minor, mainly American philosophical

tradition which although it lies outside the analytic tradition has

nevertheless made a major contribution to formal ontology. I refer to

the tradition of "dynamic ontology" developed by Peirce, Whitehead,

Buchler and Hartshorne and which a fine book by Rescher has

recently revitalized (cfr. Rescher, Process Metaphysics, Albany, State

University of New York Press, 1996). Also linked with this tradition is

the interesting school of "process theology".

Despite its apparent diversity, the "dynamic" tradition in the

English-speaking countries has taken up positions which come

significantly close to those developed by the German-speaking sister

tradition associated with the names of Brentano, Husserl, Meinong

and Hartmann. Thorough comparison between the two traditions

has yet to be made (worth mentioning among the few that I know is

Mohanty Nicolai Hartmann and Alfred Whitehead, A study in

recent Platonism, Calcutta, Progressive Publishers, 1957).

Other areas of inquiry are Perry and Barwise' situation semantics

and Suszko' non-Fregean logics. While the work of the former two

authors is so well known that it requires no Introduction, Suszko'

deserves closer analysis. This I shall provide below when discussing

the problem of the identity connective.

Lying midway between the analytic and phenomenological traditions

are the studies of Barry Smith and Peter Simons, who deal in

particular with the theory of parts and the development of a general

mereology which, according to Smith, constitutes the fundamental

instrument of ontology.

Studies which find inspiration in phenomenology and draw their

tools from algebraic topology has been developed by Jean Petitot,

who studied under René Thom and has continued his catastrophe

theory.

Finally, my own work seeks to overcome the limitations of the two

schools of dynamic philosophy (the German "camp" of Brentano and

his followers, and the American "camp" of Peirce and Whitehead) by

developing a dynamic theory of substances which comprises various

interacting sub-theories, principally those of particulars, of the levels

of reality, and of wholes (Poli Alwys. Ontology for knowledge

engineers, Ph. D. thesis, Utrecht, 2001).

These, therefore, are names of the philosophers currently at the

forefront of work in ontology." pp. 186-188.

From: Roberto Poli, Descriptive, Formal and Formalized Ontologies,

in: Denis Fisette (ed.), Husserl's Logical Investigations

Reconsidered, Dordrecht, Kluwer, 2003 pp. 183-210.

Suggested Introductory Works

1. Jacquette, Dale. 2002. Ontology. Montreal & Kingston: McGill-

Queen's University Press.

Content: Preface XI; Acknowledgements XV; Introduction:

Being as such 1; First Part: Pure philosophical ontology. 1.

What is to be (on Heidegger) 12; 2. Combinatorial ontology 42;

3. Why there is something rather than nothing 89; 4. Why there

is only one logically contingent actual world 109; 5. Concepts of

existence in philosophical logic and the analysis of being qua

being 134; Second Part: Applied ontology and the metaphysics

of science. 6. Ontological commitment (on Quine) 156; 7.

Appearance, reality, substance, transcendence 182; 8. Physical

entities: space, time, matter and causation, physical states of

affair and events, natural laws 193; 9. Abstract entities,

particular and universal: numbers, sets, properties, qualities,

relations, propositions, and possibilities, logical, mathematical

and metaphysical laws 206; 10. Subjectivity of mind in the

world of objective physical facts 233; 11. God, a divine

supernatural mind? 253; 12. Ontology of culture: language, arts

and artefacts 265; Conclusion: scientific-philosophical ontology

275; Notes 281; Bibliography 309; Index 329-348.

"This book investigates and proposes a theory to solve the most

fundamental problems of being. I know how that sounds. But

trying to understand the meaning, the undeniable but non-self-

explanatory fact and nature of existence, is indispensable to

philosophy. Accordingly, we must not shrink from the task,

whatever difficulties are entailed. I distinguish between pure

philosophical and applied scientific ontology. Pure

philosophical ontology deals with such questions as what is

meant by the concept of being, why there exists something

rather than nothing, and why there exists exactly one logically

contingent actual world. Applied scientific ontology advances a

preferred existence domain consisting of three categories of

existent entities, including existent (we can also say actual)

objects, existent states of affairs, and the actual world. The

actual world is itself an entity, one that contains all other

entities; it contains all and only actual states of affairs,

involving all and only existent objects. The entities included in

a theoretical ontology are those minimally required for an

adequate philosophical semantics, the things to which we must

be able to refer in order to make sense of meaningful thought

and discourse, especially in the sciences. These are the objects

that we say exist, to which we are ontologically committed.

(...)

Pure philosophical ontology, indispensable as groundwork, is

only the first major step toward a complete fully integrated

ontology. When we know what it means for something to exist,

we can then proceed to the details of applied scientific ontology,

defending the choice of a particular domain of existent entities.

It is in this branch of ontology that we explain the concepts and

clarify the existence conditions of physical entities and declare

ourselves in favour of or opposed to the existence of numbers,

sets, universals, relations, propositions, and abstract objects

generally, minds and persons, God as a divine supernatural

mind, language, art and other cultural artefacts. The traditional

controversies of descriptive and speculative metaphysics are

located here, where the stakes are higher than in pure

philosophical ontology, in arguments for the existence or

nonexistence of specific contested entities.

The two components, pure philosophical and applied scientific

ontology, complement one another. No metaphysics of being

can claim to be complete if it does not keep each separate and

in its proper place while providing satisfactory answers to both

specialized sets of problems. It is as much a mistake to

investigate only the more tractable problems of applied

scientific ontology, say, of whether or not numbers or

universals exist, while giving up on pure philosophical

ontology, as it would be to devote attention exclusively to the

fundamental problems of pure philosophical ontology to the

neglect of making substantive commitments to the existence of

real entities in applied scientific ontology. We should not try to

establish a domain of existent entities that is not guided by a

prior clarification of the concept of being; but having addressed

the problems of pure philosophical ontology, we must then

move on to fill in the details of a preferred existence domain as

a contribution to applied scientific ontology." (from the

Preface).

2. Campbell, Keith. 1976. Metaphysics. An Introduction. Encino:

Dickenson.

Contents: Preface: III-IV; Part I. Metaphysics. Its program and

problems. 1. A sketch of the background 1; 2. Metaphysics in

recent years 13; Part II. One branch of cosmology. The

philosophy of matter; 3. The framework of concrete

particularism 25; 4. Classical atomism 44; 5. Primary and

secondary qualities 59; 6. Alternative particularist systems 75;

7. Atomism and modern physics 95; Part III. A first survey of

ontology; 8. The tasks of ontology 107; 9. Quine's canonical

notation 125; 10. Regimentation or paraphrase 137; 11.

Constructions which have non paraphrase 162; 12. Ontic

commitment and reduction to a minimum domain 174; 13.

Events and sets 194; 14. Universals and Tropes 206; Glossary

220; Bibliography 235; Index 243-248.

"This book is a text, not a treatise; it is distinctive in its

selection and arrangement, rather than the novelty of its

material. It is designed for students taking their first courses in

metaphysics, and one year in philosophy together with some

acquaintance with logic should be sufficient preparation.

The work is in three parts. The first is an introductory section

in which the aims, methods, and vicissitudes of Western

metaphysics are briefly set forth. This part is included to give

students a grasp of what metaphysical thinking is, and more

confidence that they know where they are and where they can

expect to be going. I hope it will reduce the bewilderment which

philosophy so easily engenders in those who approach it. This

section is swift and summary. It is not an impartial review, but

a broad-stroke sketch of how one man sees the subject. I make

no effort to conceal my own opinions here or elsewhere, for in

my estimation a bland neutrality serves only to mask the

interest, conviction, and even passion in the real life of

metaphysics. Those with different views will be able to take

steps to correct my exaggerations, misrepresentations, and

omissions.

In part II, one branch of cosmology, the philosophy of matter,

is treated through a study of atomism as a specimen of theories

based on concrete particulars. My approach is quasi-historical;

the career of atomism from Newton's time to its contemporary

demise is used to illustrate the variety of ways in which

cosmologies are vulnerable and resilient. This example

provides opportunities for discussion of the relations between

science and metaphysics, problems of deduction, and doctrines

of primary and secondary qualities. The alternative cosmologies

of Spinoza, Leibniz, and Boscovich are introduced by way of

contrast. Although there is no attempt at a scholarly treatment,

this section does aim to provide some understanding, which

every educated person ought to have, of the development of one

set of ideas crucial in modern thought.

Part III concerns ontology and is contemporary in theme. It

deals with the problems of establishing an inventory of

categories of being-in the sense in which concrete particulars

constitute one category, and events, sets, or universals are other

candidates. Quine's doctrines of canonical notation and ontic

commitment are expounded and are then used in a discussion

of various candidate categories which introduces the work of

Davidson, Goodman, Putnam, and D.C. Williams. I have

endeavored to make this abstract material sufficiently

comprehensible to allow its inclusion in undergraduate courses

at an earlier stage than is at present possible. In the final

chapter I try to stimulate further investigation of Williams'

doctrine of tropes, or property instances, as a basic category.

Parts II and III are substantially independent, each containing

material for a course of about thirty lectures or their equivalent.

Although the ontology of part III comes earlier in the order of

reason and is more nearly a first philosophy, I recommend that

where both parts are being treated, they be tackled in the order

in which they are printed. Part II is less formidably abstract

and, being concerned with the character of the material world,

lies closer to people's natural concerns and curiosities.

For a course in which part II is given the chief place, the works

of Spinoza, Leibniz, and Boscovich, all available in paperback,

offer suitable further reading. R. Harré's Matter and Method

handles some of the same themes, and for a course with more

emphasis on philosophy of science, J. J. C. Smart's Between

Science and Philosophy or Philosophy and Scientific Realism

would be a suitable companion. Work centered on part III calls

for study of Quine's Word and Object or Ways of Paradox. The

Bibliography furnishes further suggestions and information.

Metaphysics abounds, to the confusion of the beginner, in

technical terms and jargon titles for doctrines. In keeping with

the book's purpose as a text, a Glossary has been appended,

giving explanations of all such expressions used.

Metaphysics has a rich and many-stranded history, and no one

book in this field can hope to be comprehensive. Of the several

traditions in formulating and addressing metaphysical issues,

this text stays most closely with that branch of empiricism

which takes metaphysical problems to rise from, and stand

under the judgment of, the more concrete knowledge of the

sciences. And within this manner of approach, there are further

limitations. The reader is warned that he will find no attempt at

even superficial treatment of the philosophy of necessity, or of

mind, or of philosophical theology. Nor is there any attack on

the metaphysical problems generated by epistemology-the

character of sense data, for example-or on those which arise in

moral philosophy, such as the reality of free will or the

ontological status of values." (from the Preface).

3. Grossmann, Reinhardt. 1992. The Existence of the World. An

Introduction to Ontology. London, New York: Routledge.

Contents: I. The Discovery of the World: Timeless Being 1; II.

The Battle Over the World: Universals 14; III. The Structure of

the World: The Categories 46; IV. The Substratum of the

World: Existence 91; V. The Enigma of the World: Negation

120: Bibliography 134; Index 137-139.

" The nature of classification.

Ontology asks and tries to answer two related questions. What

are the categories of the world? And what are the laws that

govern these categories? In chemistry, for comparison, we

search for the chemical elements and the laws of chemistry; in

physics, for elementary particles and their laws. Categories are

for ontology what these basic building blocks of the universe

are for the natural sciences. But ontology is not a science

among sciences. Its scope is vastly larger than that of any

science. And its point of view is totally different from that of the

sciences. To see how ontology differs from science, we must

first of all understand the notion of a category. Our first

question therefore is: what is a category?

(...)

The principle of the classification of the elements, however, is

the same as at Empedocles's time: Things are distinguished

from each other by means of the properties which they have.

Let us call this 'the principle of classification'.

(...)

Someone must have realized that the foundation of all

classifications of individual things, namely, the distinction

between these things and their properties, is itself a

classification. But it is a classification, not of individual things -

individual amounts of water or earth, or individual bits of gold

or iron, or individual whales or carps - but of entities in general.

It is a classification of any kind of existent. It divides up

everything there is into two large groups of existents, namely,

into individual things, on the one hand, and their properties, on

the other. Every 'ordinary' classification rests on this most

fundamental classification of things into individuals and their

properties. In order to distinguish this classification from all

others, we shall speak of a 'categorization'. Entities, we shall

say, are categorized. The kinds of thing which the

categorization distinguishes are then called 'categories'. We

know that there are at least two categories, that is, two kinds of

entity (existent), namely, individual things and properties of

individual things." (pp. 1-3).

4. Butchvarov, Panayot. 1979. Being Qua Being. A Theory of

Identity, Existence, and Predication. Bloomington: Indiana

University Press.

Contents: Ackowledgments IX; Introduction 1; 1. The apparent

distinctness of identicals 9; 2. Objects and entities 39; 3.

Indiscernibility 64; 4. Existence 82; 5. Essence 122; 6.

Substances 154; 7. Qualities 184; 8. Accidental connections 212;

Appendix A. Relations 239; Appendix B. Idealism 248; Notes

256; Index 267-274.

"The inquiry into being qua being has been identified with

metaphysics. But it would be better to use the term

'metaphysics' more broadly, namely, for the branch of

philosophy that has as its subject matter the nature of the

world, or of reality, rather than the nature of our knowledge, or

of our language, or of our sciences about the world. We may

then distinguish several levels of metaphysical inquiry. On the

least fundamental level metaphysics is concerned with the most

general description of the actual world, with the most general

kinds of things there are and with the way they fit together. It

asks such questions as whether God exists, whether there are

both minds and bodies or only minds or only bodies, and if

there are both minds and bodies, how they are related. On this

level it is closely connected with epistemology, since the main

philosophical difficulties such questions pose for us are

epistemological in character.

On a more fundamental level, presupposed by the first,

metaphysics inquires into the nature of all possible, or at least

all conceivable, comprehensible worlds, and thus only

indirectly into the nature of the actual world. Can there be a

world that consists only of individuals and not also of

properties and relations? Or a world that consists only of

properties and relations? Can there be nonidentical but

indiscernible things? Questions related to those on the previous

level can now be asked in complete independence from the

usual epistemological considerations. Can there be a world

unless there is God? Can there be a world without bodies?

Without minds? On this level metaphysics is closely connected

with logic. (Immediately following his Introduction of the

notion of a science of being qua being Aristotle offers a defense

of the laws of noncontradiction and excluded middle.) But this

connection is no more limited to formal logic than the notion of

necessary truth is limited to the truths of formal logic. The

criterion of possibility on which it would rely can hardly be

mere formal consistency; it must be conceivability or

comprehensibility (not of propositions, but of what

propositions purport to describe), for, whether we like it or not,

we have no other general and ultimate criterion of possibility.

This is why, on this level, metaphysics is also connected with

phenomenology, i.e., with the philosophical description of the

most general character of the objects of consciousness qua

objects of consciousness.

On the third and most fundamental level metaphysics is

concerned with the concepts and principles on the basis of

which the questions belonging to the other two levels, i.e., the

questions about what things there are or at least there can be,

must be answered. Instead of these questions, it asks, what is it

for something to be in a world, or for something to be a world?

It is on this level, I suggest, that metaphysics is best described

as the inquiry into being qua being, or, we might also say, as

protometaphysics. Any conception of a world presupposes the

conception of what it is for something to exist in that world.

Any conception of a thing presupposes the conception of what

it is for it to be the subject of predication, both accidental and

essential. Any conception of a thing presupposes the conception

of what it is for it to be identifiable, not in the sense of being

merely singled out but also in the sense of being singled out

again or in a different way, of being recognized, of being the

subject of a true informative identity judgment.

It follows that the concepts of existence, identity, essential

predication, and accidental predication cannot be understood

as standing for constituents of the world, presumably for

certain properties or relations. They are the concepts in terms

of which we must understand what it is for something to be in

the world, what it is for something to have a property or be

related to another thing, and what it is for something to be a

property or a relation. Yet they apply to any possible world;

indeed nothing would be a world were it not for their

applicability to it. We may call such concepts, which apply

without standing for anything, transcendental. The inquiry into

being qua being, or protometaphysics, may then be called a

transcendental inquiry." (from the Introduction).

5. Bar-On, Abraham Zvie. 1996. Ontological Analysis. The

Classical Model. Lanham: University Press of America.

Translated from the Hebrew by Lenn J. Schramm.

Contents: Preface XI; 1. The framework of the discussion 1; 2.

Ontological reasoning in ancient thought 35; The entity whose

existence is supposed to be necessary 83; 4. The ontological

status of the Self 129; 5. Necessity, possibility, and freedom in

human affairs 165; Notes 209; Bibliography 219; Index 227.

"The idea behind this volume is that the best way to study

ontology is through a close critical analysis of the major

ontological problems the 'historical' ones-that is, the problems

that gave birth to this field and continue to engage thinkers and

scholars to this very day. The totality of Being of Parmenides

and the principle of the oneness of being, thought, and

language; the debate between idealism and materialism, as

illuminated by Plato; the Aristotelian categories and the

relationship between the individuum and the collective, or the

species and the genus; Anselm's fascinating attempt to prove

necessary existence-and that of God, no less-through purely

conceptual means; the ontological status of the 'I'; the

antinomy of necessity and freedom: these are the issues

addressed in this volume. They also demarcate the horizon of

present-day ontological discussion." (from the Preface).

"The Subdivisions of Philosophy

By way of Introduction to this volume, which aims to explore

the classical model of ontological analysis, I shall try to

elucidate the concept of ontology that underlies the chapters to

follow. It is customary today to apply the term 'ontology' to one

of the main branches or subdivisions of philosophical inquiry,

alongside epistemology, logic, ethics, aesthetics, and so on.

Although this terminology of philosophical branches or

subdisciplines is common parlance, among philosophers and

laymen alike, it is not unambiguous. Its first and clearest use is

practical and methodological: the concept of subdisciplines

helps us organize the study of philosophy in schools and

universities and label the field of specialization of advanced

students, allows us to apply sophisticated analytical tools to one

phase or segment of philosophical inquiry and discussion, even

when other phases or segments are not yet ready for this

application, and the like.

On the other hand, the concept of subdisciplines, in the sense

alluded to above, harbors the danger of fragmenting

philosophy, whose broad overview-its synopsis-is, according to

many philosophers throughout the ages, part of its very

essence. This fragmentation might lead to philosophy's

disappearance from the world or from the map of man's

intellectual occupations.

One way to ward off the danger inherent in the division into

subdisciplines is to provide a systematic delineation of their

boundaries. The first step in such a demarcation is to discern

the unique elements of each subdiscipline, that is, to

differentiate among them. Yet we cannot get to the bottom of

these differences without comprehending -- in advance or as

part of this demarcation -- the common element that underlies

the various subdisciplines. In this way, drawing the boundaries

of the different branches of philosophical thought may lead us

to a new and more profound awareness of the common stem of

this field of intellectual endeavor.

One of the practical advantages of dividing philosophy into

subdisciplines is the fact, encouraging in and of itself, that

those who immerse themselves for a time in philosophy, with

the proper approach, find themselves at home with these

divisions. When they encounter some philosophical argument,

problem, or theory, they have no trouble allocating it to one of

the recognized subdisciplines (except for a small number of

borderline cases that belong simultaneously to more than one

subdiscipline). But even veteran philosophers would be hard

put to set forth clear reasons for their attribution in every case.

They would find it even more difficult to give a general

characterization of the subdiscipline to which they had

allocated the argument, problem, or theory. There is no royal

road to such characterizations. Every serious attempt to

provide them will inevitably turn into a complex and wearisome

intellectual exercise.

The attempt made below to give a general characterization of

ontology consists of two steps: (1) a description and analysis of

various approaches -- both historical and contemporary --

towards ontological questions, as regards their identification,

interpretation, and treatment; and (2) a clarification of several

basic ontological distinctions." (pp. 1-2).

6. Quinton, Anthony. 1973. The Nature of Things. London:

Routledge & Kegan Paul.

7. Peacocke, Christopher. 1992. A Study of Concepts. Cambridge:

MIT University Press.

8. Williams, Christopher J.F. 1992. Being, Identity, and Truth.

New York: Oxford University Press.

9. Loux, Michael J. 1978. Substance and Attribute. A Study in

Ontology. Dordrecht: Kluwer.

10. Hawley, Katherine. 2001. How Things Persist. New York:

Oxford University Press.

11. Peterson, Philip L. 1997. Fact Proposition Event. Dordrecht:

Kluwer.

12. Rundle, Bede. 2004. Why There Is Something Rather Than

Nothing. New York: Oxford University Press.

More Advanced Works

1. Bergmann, Gustav. 1992. New Foundations of Ontology.

Madison: University of Wisconsin Press.

Edited by William Heald.

Contents: Foreword by Edwin B. Allaire IX-XII; Editor's Note

XIII-XX; Editor's Introduction 3; 1. Simples and canons 43; 2.

Facts and modes 61; 3. Diversity and order 101; 4. Functions

and analiticity 134; 5. Thought and language 201; 6. Classes

239; 7. The Linguistic Turn contained 317; Glossary 357; Index

369-372.

"During the last two decades of his life-from the publication of

Realism in 1967 until his death in 1987 - Gustav Bergmann

published only five essays. One, 'Diversity,' his presidential

address to the Western Division of the American Philosophical

Association, appeared in 1968; the other four, between 1977

and 1981.

In those decades Bergmann worked as hard and as steadily as

he ever had; and he was a hard worker indeed. In the twenty-

five years prior to Realism, Bergmann published over a

hundred essays, many of which are contained in four essay

collections, and Philosophy of Science.

In his presidential address Bergmann made known his

dissatisfaction with certain aspects of his ontology, in particular

his assays of the facts expressed by universal and existential

statements. (See 'Generality and Existence,' Theoria, 28, 1962.)

He thus set about to rethink his system. New Foundations of

Ontology is the result.

The manuscript seems to have been begun sometime in 1974

and completed in late 1975. Bergmann decided to delay its

publication: he had reservations about the penultimate chapter,

which deals with classes and arithmetic. He never returned to

the manuscript per se. Instead, he led himself into the depths of

set theory, a subject he had once known well. (Bergmann

earned a PhD in mathematics and from 1928 to 1935 published

eight papers in mathematics proper.) " (from the Foreword).

2. Cocchiarella, Nino. 2007. Formal Ontology and Conceptual

Realism. New York: Springer.

"Theories about the ontological structure of the world have

generally been described in informal, intuitive terms, and the

arguments for and against them, including their consistency

and adequacy as explanatory frameworks, have generally been

given in even more informal terms. The goal of formal ontology

is to correct for these deficiencies. By formally reconstructing

an intuitive, informal ontological scheme as a formal ontology

we can better determine the consistency and adequacy of that

scheme; and then by comparing different reconstructed

schemes with one another we can better evaluate the

arguments for and against them and come to a decision as to

which system it is best to adopt.

This book is divided into two parts. The first part is on formal

ontology and how different informal ontological systems can be

formally developed and compared with one another. The main

point is that a formal ontology connects logical categories --

especially the categories involved in predication -- with

ontological categories.

The second part of this book is on the formal construction and

defense of a particular formal ontology called conceptual

realism, which is based on a unified account of general and

singular reference in a conceptualist theory of predication. An

intensional logic based on deactivated (nominalized) referential

and predicable concepts is part of this ontology as well as an

analysis of plural reference and predication in terms of a logic

of classes as many. A natural realism and an Aristotelian

essentialism based on a logic of natural kinds is also part of the

framework, which is put forward here as the best formal

ontology to adopt."

3. Correia, Fabrice. 2005. Existential Dependence and Cognate

Notions. München: Philosophia Verlag.

"This is a work in analytic metaphysics. Its main purpose is to

clarify a notion of central importance in metaphysics since

Aristotle, to wit the notion of existential dependence. All

currently available analyses of the notion are examined and

then rejected, and a new account is defended. This work is the

first comprehensive one on the topic. The first chapter is

devoted to introducing and explaining some notions which are

crucial for the central parts of the work, namely the notions of

existence, necessity, (individual and plural) quantification and

essence. In chapters 2 and 4 focus is made on the relation of "

simple" existential dependence, the relation which holds

between two objects when the first cannot exist without the

other. Three accounts of simple dependence - each endorsed by

some contemporary philosophers, among them Kit Fine, E.

Jonathan Lowe, Kevin Mulligan, Peter Simons and Barry Smith

- are presented and then rejected. A new account, inspired by

suggestions by Fine and Lowe, is defended. According to that

account - the " foundational" account - simple dependence is to

be defined in terms of a relation called grounding, which is

presented in chapter 3. Chapters 5 and 6 deal with relations

belonging to the family of simple dependence, among others (i)

generic dependence, (ii) various forms of temporal dependence,

and (iii) supervenience, a complex dependence relation largely

invoked in current debates on the philosophy of mind. It is

shown that foundationalist accounts of these notions - i.e.

accounts framed in terms of grounding - are superior to other

existing accounts. These chapters also contain some

applications of the foundational conception of dependence, in

particular a characterization of substances and a formulation of

the distinction between two well known conceptions of

universals, the Aristotelian and the Platonician conception. The

last part of the work is a technical appendix where one can find,

among other things, a system for the logic of essence, which is

proved to be sound and complete with respect to a possible

world semantics."

4. Hirsch, Eli. 2011. Quantifier Variance and Realism. Essays in

Metaontology. New York: Oxford University Press.

5. Horgan, Terence E., and Potrc, Matjaz. 2008. Austere Realism.

Contextual Semantics Meets Minimal Ontology. Cambridge:

MIT Press.

6. Inwagen, Peter Van. 1990. Material Beings. Ithaca: Cornell

University Press.

7. ———. 2001. Ontology, Identity, and Modality. Essays in

Metaphysics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

8. Jubien, Michael. 1993. "Ontology, Modality, and the Fallacy of

Reference." In. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

9. Millikan, Ruth. 1984. Language, Thought and Other Biological

Categories. New Foundations for Realism. Cambridge: MIT

University Press.

10. Oderberg, David S. 2007. Real Essentialism. New York:

Routledge.

11. Simons, Peter. 1987. Parts. A Study in Ontology. New York:

Oxford University Press.

12. Vallicella, William. 2002. A Paradigm Theory of Existence.

Onto-Theology Vindicated. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic

Publishers.

Contents: Preface XI-XII; 1. The idea of a paradigm theory of

existence 1; 2. Is existence a first-level property? 37; 3. The 'no

difference' theory 67; 4. Is existence a property of properties?

93; 5. Mondial attribute theories 127; 6. The ontology of the

contingent existent 159; 7. The ground of the contingent

existent 195; 8. The paradigm existent 249; References 273;

Index 279-281.

"The heart of philosophy is metaphysics, and at the heart of the

heart lie two questions about existence. What is it for any

contingent thing to exist? Why does any contingent thing exist?

Call these the nature question and the ground question,

respectively. The first concerns the nature of the existence of

the contingent existent; the second concerns the ground of the

contingent existent. Both questions are ancient, and yet

perennial in their appeal; both have presided over the burial of

so many of their would-be undertakers that it is a good

induction that they will continue to do so.

For some time now, the preferred style in addressing such

questions has been deflationary when it has not been

eliminativist. Ask Willard Quine what existence is, and you will

hear that 'Existence is what existential quantification

expresses.'(1) Ask Bertrand Russell what it is for an individual

to exist, and he will tell you that an individual can no more exist

than it can be numerous: there just is no such thing as the

existence of individuals.(2) And of course Russell's eliminativist

answer implies that one cannot even ask, on pain of

succumbing to the fallacy of complex question, why any

contingent individual exists: if no individual exists, there can be

no question why any individual exists. Not to mention Russell's

modal corollary: 'contingent' and 'necessary' can only be said de

dicto (of propositions) and not de re (of things). At the source

of the Russellian-Quinean stream stands the imposing figure of

Frege, perhaps the greatest of logicians, and certainly the

greatest since Aristotle. But logic is not metaphysics, and we

shall see that existence cannot come into focus through the

lenses of logic alone. It is, as Santayana once said, 'odious to the

logician.' (3) This is part of its charm, as the resolute reader will

no doubt come to appreciate.

The critical task of this book is to put paid to deflationary and

eliminativist accounts, thereby restoring existence to its rightful

place as one of the deep topics in philosophy, if not the deepest.

The constructive task is to defend the thesis that the nature and

ground questions admit of a unified answer, and that this

answer takes the form of what I call a paradigm theory of

existence. The central idea of the paradigm theory is that

existence itself is nothing abstract (hence not a property or a

concept or a quantifier or anything merely logical or linguistic

or representational) but is instead a paradigmatically existent

concrete individual. The idea is not merely that existence itself

exists -- which would be true if one said that existence is a

property and one held a realist theory of properties -- but that

existence exists in a plenary concrete sense that it cannot be the

business of a preface to explain. But the idea may be limned as

follows. Existence itself exists of absolute metaphysical

necessity and the contingent existent exists in virtue of its

dependence on self-existent existence. I submit that this robust

theory of existence can be as rigorously defended as any

deflationary theory." (from the Preface)

(1) W. V. Quine, "Existence and quantification" in Ontological

relativity and other essays New York: Columbia University

Press, 1969) p. 97

(2) Bertrand Russell, "The philosophy of Logical Atomism" in

Logic and knowledge, ed. R. C. Marsh (New York, G. P.

Putnam's Sons, 1956), pp. 232 ff.

(3) George Santayana, Scepticism and animal faith (New York:

Dover Publications, Inc. 1955) p. 48.

13. Wilson, Fred. 2007. Acquaintance, Ontology, and Knowledge.

Collected Essays in Ontology. Frankfurt: Ontos Verlag.

DICTIONARIES OF ONTOLOGY

1. Burkhardt, Hans, and Smith, Barry, eds. 1991. Handbook of

Metaphysics and Ontology. Munich: Philosophia Verlag.

"The present work seeks to document the most important

traditional and contemporary streams in the two overlapping

fields of metaphysics and ontology. Both disciplines were, even

just a few years ago, seen by many of negligible contemporary

interest.

The editors, neither of whom had shared this general opinion,

were none the less surprised to see how much valuable work

had been achieved in these areas not only in the past but also in

our own century. The intensity of contemporary work in

metaphysics and ontology points indeed to a healthy renewal of

these disciplines, the like of which has not been seen, perhaps,

since the 13th century".(...)

Of the two editors of this Handbook -- who bear equal

responsibility for all its parts and moments -- one is and

admirer of Leibniz and the 17th-century rationalists and thus

finds himself strongly allied to certain modern deductive

trends. The other feels more at home in the 13th or 14th

centuries and is accordingly critical of the over-enthusiastic and

often over-simplistic use of formal logical techniques in

contemporary metaphysics. The editors are however equally

convinced that it is precisely the tension between the deductive

and descriptive approaches to the problems of metaphysics and

ontology which will be responsible for the future creative

advances in these fields. And they are convinced also that such

advances can be furthered by an understanding of the history of

metaphysics and ontology., an understanding -- guided by the

most sophisticated modern research and by the use of the most

sophisticated modern techniques -- of the sort this Handbook

has been designed to facilitate." (from the Introduction).

Collections of Essays

1. Bogen, James, and McGuire, James E., eds. 1985. How Things

Are. Studies in Predication and the History of Philosophy and

Science. Dordrecht: Reidel.

Contents: Acknowledgements IX; James Bogen: Introduction 1;

Robert G. Turnbull: Zeno's Stricture and Predication in Plato,

Aristotle, and Plotinus 21; Frank A. Lewis: Form and

Predication in Aristotle's Metaphysics 59; Deborah K. Modrak:

Forms and Compounds 85; Alan Code: On the Origins of Some

Aristotelian Theses About Predication 101; Frank A. Lewis:

Plato's Third Man Argument and the 'Platonism' of Aristotle

133; Marilyn McCord Adams: Things versus 'flows', or Ockham

on Predication and Ontology 175; Calvin G. Normore: Buridan's

Ontology 189; James E. McGuire: Phenomenalism, Relations,

and Monadic Representation: Leibniz on Predicate Levels 205;

Robert M. Adams: Predication, Truth, and Transworld Identity

in Leibniz 235; Wilfrid Sellars: Towards a Theory of Predication

285; Alan Code: On the Origins of Some Aristotelian Theses

About Predication: Appendix on 'The Third Man Argument'

323; Notes on the Contributors 327; Bibliography 329; Index of

Labeled expressions 337; Name index 339; Subject Index 343-

345.

2. Coffa, Alberto J. 1991. The Semantic Tradition from Kant to

Carnap to the Vienna Station. New York: Cambridge

University Press.

3. Dejnozka, Jan. 1996. The Ontology of the Analytic Tradition

and Its Origins. Realism and Identity in Frege, Russell,

Wittgenstein, and Quine. Lanham: Littlefield Adams Books.

Paperback edition reprinted with corrections, 2002; reprinted

with further corrections, 2003.

Contents: Preface XI, 1. Introduction 1; 2. Is Frege a radical

relativist? 3. Frege: existence defined as identifiability 103; 4.

Russell's robust sense of reality 123; 5. Russell's forty-four 'No-

entity without identity theories 149; 6. The ancient realist basis

of conceptual relativity 215; 7. The ontology of the analytic

tradition 233; Notes 273; Bibliography 305;Index of names

327; Index of subjects 333; About the author 337.

"The recent renaissance in Frege-Russell studies, though

including some excellent work, has confined its quest for the

origins of analytic philosophy to the nineteenth century. My

book goes well beyond Frege-Husserl comparisons and

historical studies of Russell's idealistic upbringing to give a

philosophical evaluation of what the analytic movement really

amounts to. My thesis is that a single kind of ontology, 'no

entity without identity' ontology, is fundamental to all of

Russell's major works from 1900 to 1948, to the work of Frege,

Wittenstein, and Quine -- and also to substance metaphysics,

its origin over two thousand years ago. Thus my aim is to show

that the analysts, far from ending traditional ontology, at

bottom continued and even developed it. I cannot see how our

understanding of the pluralistic, diverse analytic movement,

not to mention the pluralistic, diverse history of Western

philosophy, could be more deeply transformed or unified, if I

am right.

My methodology was to read the major books of the analysts,

many of their lesser works, and a great deal of the secondary

literature, gleaning like Rachel in the field of wheat for

anything I could find on 'no entity without identity', then to

create from scratch new portraits of Frege and Russell as the

true analytic progenitors of this kind of ontology.

The specific thesis of my book is that there is a general kind of

ontology, modified realism, which the great analysts share not

only with each other, but with most great Western

philosophers. Modified realism is the view that in some sense

there are both real and rational (or linguistic) identities. In

more familiar language, it is roughly the view that there are

both real distinctions and distinctions in reason (or in

language). More precisely, it is the view that there is at least

one real being which is the basis for accommodating possibly

huge amounts of conceptual relativity, or objectual identities'

"shifting" as sortal concepts or sortal terms 'shift.' Therefore I

hold that on the fundamental level of ontology, the linguistic

turn was not a radical break from traditional substance

metaphysics. I also hold that the seeming conflict in the

analysts between private language arguments, which imply

various sorts of realism, and the conceptual 'shiftability' of

objects, which suggests a deep ontological relativity, is best

resolved by, and is in fact implicitly resolved by, their respective

kinds of modified realism. There are many different sorts of

modified realism, but all of them share a common general

form." (from the Preface).

4. Hill, Claire Ortiz. 1991. Word and Object in Husserl, Frege, and

Russell. The Roots of Twentieth-Century Philosophy. Athens,

Ohio: Ohio University Press.

Reprinted 2001.

Contents: Abbreviations IX; Preliminary terminological

comments XI; Glossary XIII; Acknowledgments XIV;

Introduction 1; Part One: Logic, realism and the foundations of

arithmetic; 1. The argument that Frege influenced Husserl 7; 2.

Husserl, Frege, and psychologism 13; 3. Sense, meaning, and

noema; 4. Husserl's 1891 critique of Frege 43; 5. Frege's review

and the development of Husserl's thought 57; Conclusion:

analiticity 91; Part Two: Conceptual clarity. Introduction 99; 6.

Intensions and extensions 103; 7. Presentation and ideas 125;

8. Function and concept 137; 9. On denoting 147; Conclusion:

The way things are 163; Notes 175; Bibliography 191; Index 215.

"As a book by the founder of phenomenology that examines

Frege's ideas from Brentano's empirical standpoint, Husserl's

Philosophy of Arithmetic is both an early work of

phenomenology and of logical empiricism. In it Husserl

predicted the failure of Frege's attempt to logicize arithmetic

and to mathematize logic two years before the publication of

the Basic Laws of Arithmetic in 1893. I hope to show that

Husserl did so in terms that would prefigure both the account

Frege would give of his error after Russell encountered the

paradoxes ten years later and the discussions of Principia

Mathematica. Moreover, in locating the source of Frege's

difficulties in the ambiguous theory of identity, meaning, and

denotation that forms the basis of Frege's logical project and

generates Russell's contradictions, Husserl's discussions

indicate that these contradictions may have as serious

consequences for twentieth century philosophy of language as

they have had for the philosophy of mathematics.

This book is about these Austro-German roots of twentieth

century philosophy. It is mainly about the origins of analytic

philosophy, about the transmission of Frege's thought to the

English speaking world, and about the relevance of Husserl's

early criticism of Frege's Foundations of Arithmetic to some

contemporary issues in philosophy. It is more about Husserl

the philosopher of logic and mathematics than it is about

Husserl the phenomenologist, and it is principally addressed to

those members of the philosophical community who, via

Russell, have been affected by Frege's logic.

This makes it very different from work on Husserl and Frege

that has focused on the importance of Frege's criticism of

Husserl's Philosophy of Arithmetic and attendant issues. The

goal of this book is quite the opposite. It studies the

shortcomings in Frege's thought that Husserl flagged and

Russell endeavored to overcome. One possible sequel to this

book would be a thorough study of Husserl's successes and

failures in remedying the philosophical ills he perceived all

about him, but that goes beyond the scope of this work, which

follows the issues discussed into the work of Russell and his

successors." (pp. 3-4).

5. ———. 1997. Rethinking Identity and Metaphysics. New

Haven, London: Yale University Press.

6. Hochberg, Herbert. 1978. Thought, Fact and Reference. The

Origins and Ontology of Logical Atomism. Minneapolis:

University of Minnesota Press.

Contents: Preface VII; Introduction IX; I. The analysis of

perception 3; II. Idealism, realism and common sense 30; III.

Thought and belief 53; IV. Moore and Bradley on particulars,

predicates and predication 87; V. Names, individual concepts,

and ontological reduction 122; VI. Frege's account of reference

and thought 147; VII: Russell's critique of Frege and the origins

of the theory of descriptions 170; VIII. Descriptions,

substitution, and intentional contexts 198; IX. Existence,

predicates and properties 231; X. Facts and possibilities 271;

XI: Russell's theory of judgment and Sellars' critique of it 309;

XII: The structure of thought: Part I 347; XIII: The structure of

thought: Part II 380; XIV. Logic fact and belief; XV. Difference,

existence and universality 444; Notes 457; Name index 485;

Subject index 487-489.

"As with the idealists Moore and Russell opposed, facts have

once again become unpopular. In defending the atomist's

correspondence theory of truth, I shall consider Frege's early

attack on that theory as well as recent criticisms that reproduce,

wittingly or unwittingly, the familiar idealistic patterns. In

returning to the idealist's arguments, some 'analytic'

philosophers echo themes revived by Sartre, without providing

the detailed argument of the latter. By contrast, Sellars attacks

atomism at a seemingly vulnerable point. He argues that the

atomists did not and cannot resolve Bradley's puzzles about

predication. This is a dominant theme behind his attempt to

defend the current revival of nominalism-a gambit he shares

with Quine. It also reveals a link between the new nominalism

and the revival of idealism. Bradley's views thus affect a

number of issues discussed, including the connection of

Russell's theory of descriptions with questions about concepts,

particulars, predication, and judgment. This theory, in turn,

provides an obvious link with Russell's critique of Frege, which

is explicated and defended. One of the surprising features of

recent philosophy has been the unfair, unfounded, and often

abusive commentary on Russell's early work and, in particular,

his criticism of Frege. Unfortunately, the prevalent assumption

that Russell both misunderstood Frege and was guilty of

elementary errors has prevented an adequate understanding of

the origin of his theory of descriptions and his analysis of

judgment. The early critique of Frege helps to clarify basic

features of Russell's philosophy and reveals further connections

with the views of Bradley and Moore. It is also crucial for the

comprehension of Russell's views about names, reference,

existence, and truth. These are important for the analysis of

intentional contexts presented in this book. The examination of

such fundamental aspects of Russell's philosophy naturally

involves a consideration of recent criticisms of Russellian

themes by Strawson, Sellars, Carnap, Quine, and others.

What is attempted is the resolution of some issues that

preoccupied Russell, Wittgenstein, Moore, and their

successors, as well as an explication of some links between

Logical Atomism and Moore's early assault on idealism. The

book is thus a partial study of the ontology and the history of

Logical Atomism." (from the Introduction).

7. Knuuttila, Simo, and Hintikka, Jaakko, eds. 1986. The Logic of

Being. Historical Studies. Dordrecht: Reidel.

Contents: Acknowledgments VII; Introduction by Knuuttila

and Hintikka: IX-XVI; Charles H. Kahn: Retrospect on the verb

'To Be? and the concept of Being 1; Benson Mates: identity and

predication in Plato 29; Russell M. Dancy: Aristotle and

existence 49; Jaakko Hintikka: The varieties of Being in

Aristotle 81; Sten Ebbesen: The Chimera's Diary 115; Klaus

Jacobi: Peter Abelard's investigations into the meaning and

functions of the speech sign 'Est' 145; Hermann Weidemann:

The logic of Being in Thomas Aquinas 181; Simo Knuuttila:

Being qua Being in Thomas Aquinas and John Duns Scotus

201; Lilli Alanen: On Descartes's argument for Dualism and the

distinction between different kinds of Beings 223; Jaakko

Hintikka: Kant on existence, predication, and the Ontological

Argument 249; Leila Haaparanta: On Frege's concept of Being

269; Index of names 291; Index of subjects 297-300.

"The last twenty years have seen remarkable developments in

our understanding of how the ancient Greek thinkers handled

the general concept of being and its several varieties. The most

general examination of the meaning of the Greek verb ' esti' '

einai' ' on ' both in common usage and in the philosophical

literature has been presented by Charles H. Kahn, most

extensively in his 1973 book The Verb 'Be' in Ancient Greek.

These discussions are summarized in Kahn's contribution to

this volume. By and large, they show that conceptual schemes

by means of which philosophers have recently approached

Greek thought have not been very well suited to the way the

concept of being was actually used by the ancients. For one

thing, being in the sense of existence played a very small role in

Greek thinking according to Kahn.

Even more importantly, Kahn has argued that Frege and

Russell's thesis that verbs for being, such as ' esti', are multiply

ambiguous is ill suited for the purpose of appreciating the

actual conceptual assumptions of the Greek thinkers. Frege and

Russell claimed that a verb like 'is' or ' esti' is ambiguous

between the 'is' of identity, the 'is' of existence, the copulative

'is', and the generic 'is' (the 'is' of class-inclusion). At least a

couple of generations of scholars have relied on this thesis and

frequently criticized sundry ancients for confusing these

different senses of ' esti' with each other. Others have found the

distinction between the different Fregean senses in this or that

major Greek philosopher, or otherwise used the distinction as

an integral part of their interpretative framework. Kahn's

results show that all these lines of argument are highly suspect.

Independently of Kahn, Michael Frede (in his

Habilitationsschrift published in 1967 under the title

Prädikation and Existenzaussage) reached the conclusion that

Plato did not - at least not in the Sophist - accept anything like

the Frege-Russell distinction, thus striking another blow

against the received views. We hoped to include excerpts of

Frede's little classic here. Unfortunately, for reasons beyond

our help this turned out to be impossible." p. IX

(...)

"All these different investigations naturally raise the question:

What is the origin of the Frege-Russell distinction? What is its

background? In her paper, 'On Frege's Concept of Being', Leila

Haaparanta discusses Frege's treatment of being in its

historical setting. One of the crucial ingredients in Frege's

treatment of being is his idea that existence is a second-level

concept (property of a concept). Haaparanta sees the

foundation of this assumption in Frege's ideas about the

identification (individuality) and existence of individuals

(objects), incorporated in Frege's treatment of the senses by

means of which we can grasp an individual object. These were

according to her inspired by Kant's ideas, especially by Kant's

distinction between the predicative and existential uses of 'is'.

Even though Kant did not subscribe to or even anticipate the

Frege-Russell distinction, he thus seems to have inspired it."

(pp. XV-XVI).

8. "Language, Mind, and Ontology." 1998. Philosophical

Perspectives no. 12.

Edited by James E. Tomberlin

Contents: Part I: The Sixth Philosophical Perspectives Lecture.

Tyler Burge: Computer Proof, Apriori Knowledge, and Other

Minds 1; Part II: Intensionality and Intentionality. Joseph

Almog: The Subject Verb Object Class I 39; Joseph Almog: The

Subject Verb Object Class II 77; Akeel Bilgrami: Why Holism is

Harmless and Necessary 105; Robert Brandom: Actions,

Norms, and Practical Reasoning 127; Kirk Ludwig and Greg

Ray: Semantics for Opaque Contexts 141; Matthew McGrath:

Proportionality and Mental Causation: A Fit? 167; Part III:

Language, Ontology and Truth. Harry Deutsch: Identity and

General Similarity 177; Frank Jackson: Reference and

Description Revisited 201; Mark Norris Lance: Some

Reflections on the Sport of Language 219; Huw Price: Three

Norms of Assertibility, or How the MOA Became Extinct 241;

Mark Richard: Commitment 255; Part IV: Rule-Following. C. B.

Martin and John Neil: Rule and Powers 283; Scott Soames:

Facts, Truth Conditions, and the Skeptical Solution to the Rule-

Following Paradox 313; Part V: The Nature of the Mental. John

O'Leary-Hawthorne and Jeffrey K. McDonough: Numbers,

Minds, and Bodies: A Fresh Look at Mind-Body Dualism 349;

David Papineau: Mind the Gap 373; Timothy Williamson: The

Broadness of the Mental: Some Logical Considerations 389;

Part VI: Consciousness and Qualia: A Symposium. Karen

Neander: The Division of Phenomenal Labor: A Problem for

Representational Theories of Consciousness 411; Georges Rey:

A Narrow Representationalist Account of Qualitative

Experience 435; Michael Tye: Inverted Earth, Swampman, and

Representationism 459; William G. Lycan: In Defense of the

Representational Theory of Qualia (Replies to Neander, Rey,

and Tye) 479; Part VII: Naturalism and Actualism: An

Exchange. James E. Tomberlin: Naturalism, Actualism, and

Ontology 489; Michael Devitt: Putting Metaphysics First: A

Response to James Tomberlin 499; Terence Horgan:

Actualism, Quantification, and Contextual Semantics 503-509.

9. Allaire, Edwin B., ed. 1963. Essays in Ontology. The Hague:

Martinus Nijhoff.

Contents: Editor's Preface V; Authors' Note IX; Introduction

XI; PROBLEMS. I. Edwin B. Allaire: Existence, Independence,

and Universals 3; II. Edwin B. Allaire: Bare Particulars 14; III.

Herbert Hochberg: Elementarism, Independence, and

Ontology 22; IV. Reinhardt Grossmann: Particulars and Time

30;

V. Reinhardt Grossmann: Conceptualism 40; VI. Reinhardt

Grossmann: Sensory Intuition and the Dogma of Localization

50; VII. Reinhardt Grossmann: Common Names 64; SYSTEMS.

VIII. Robert G. Turnbull: Ockham's Nominalistic Logic: Some

Twentieth Century Reflections 79; IX. Edwin B. Allaire:

Berkeley's Idealism 92; X. Reinhardt Grossmann: Frege's

Ontology 106; XI. Herbert Hochberg: Moore's Ontology and

Non-Natural Properties 121; XII. Edwin B. Allaire: The

"Tractatus": Nominalistic or Realistic? Allaire 148; XIII.

Herbert Hochberg: Of Mind and Myth 166; XIV. May

Brodbeck: The Philosophy of John Dewey 188; Index 216.

AUTHORS' NOTE. Essays IV, VII, XII have not been previously

published. The others appeared originally as follows: I.

"Existence, Independence, and Universals" in The

Philosophical Review, 69, 1960, 485-496; II. "Bare Particulars"

in Philosophical Studies, hi, 1963, 1-8; III. "Elementarism,

Independence, and Universals" in Philosophical Studies, 12,

1961, 36-43; V. "Conceptualism" in The Review of Metaphysics,

14, 1960, 243-254; VI. "Sensory Intuition and the Dogma of

Localization" in Inquiry, 5, 1962, 238-251; VIII. "Ockham's

Nominalistic Logic: Some Twentieth Century Reflections" in

The New Scholasticism, 36, 1962, 313-329; IX. "Berkeley's

Idealism" in Theoria, 29, 1963; X. "Frege's Ontology" in The

Philosophical Review, 70, 1961, 23-40; XI. "Moore's Ontology

and Non-Natural Properties" in The Review of Metaphysics, 15,

1962, 365-395; XIII. "Of Mind and Myth" in Methodos, 11,

1959, 123-145; XIV. "The Philosophy of John Dewey" in The

Indian Journal of Philosophy, 3, 1961, 69-101.

"Certain words are crucial in ontological discourse. 'Exist',

'individual', 'particular', 'universal', 'simple', and 'independent'

are obvious examples. These essays examine how philosophers

have used some of those words. The purpose of the

examination is to make sense out of the ontological doctrines in

which the crucial words occur as well as out of the arguments

that have been made for and against the doctrines. This

common purpose is one good reason for bringing the essays

together. Nor is it the only one. The several essays share an

awareness of the dialectical connections among the several

issues with which they deal. Also, the realism-nominalism issue

is the central one; and the essays are all realistic. That is

another good reason for bringing them together.

The authors believe that they share a method. If they are right,

then there is a third good reason for bringing them together.

But it seems pointless to attempt here a statement of the

method. A method is best judged by watching it in operation.

Even though the essays are all realistic, their defense of realism

is both varied and complex. For this there are three reasons.

First, none of the essays defends uncritically any traditional

position. Rather, each defends some proposition or

propositions which by the method may be shown to be

connected with some traditional position. Second, they all put

less weight on the proposition itself than on the intellectual

motives which have led philosophers to propound it and on the

arguments by which they support it. Third, they all make a

special point of exploring the dialectical ramifications of the

realism-nominalism issue. That is why the common purpose

will be best served by allowing each essay to speak for itself."

(Introduction).

10. Bottani, Andrea, Carrara, Massimiliano, and Giaretta,

Pierdaniele, eds. 2002. Individuals, Essence, and Identity.

Themes of Analytic Metaphysics. Dordrecht: Kluwer.

11. Bottani, Andrea, and Davies, Richard, eds. 2006. Modes of

Existence. Papers in Ontology and Philosophical Logic.

Frankfurt: Ontos Verlag.

12. Carrara, Massimiliano, and Sacchi, Elisabetta, eds. 2006.

Propositions. Semantic and Ontological Issues. Amsterdam:

Rodopi.

13. Centi, Beatrice, and Huemer, Wolfgang, eds. 2009. Values and

Ontology. Problems and Perspectives. Frankfurt: Ontos Verlag.

14. Chalmers, David, Manley, David, and Wasserman, Ryan, eds.

2009. Metametaphysics. New Essays on the Foundations of

Ontology. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

15. Faye, Jan, Scheffler, Uwe, and Urchs, Max, eds. 2000. Things,

Facts and Events. Amsterdam: Rodopi.

16. Hochberg, Herbert, and Mulligan, Kevin, eds. 2004. Relations

and Predicates. Frankfurt: Ontos Verlag.

17. Malinowski, Jacek, and Pietruszczak, Andrzej, eds. 2006.

Essays in Logic and Ontology. Amsterdam: Rodopi.

18. Morscher, Edgar, and Weingartner, Paul, eds. 1979. Ontology

and Logic / Ontologie Und Logik. Berlin: Duncker & Humblot.

Proceedings of an International Colloquium (Salzburg, 21-24

September 1976).

19. Mulligan, Kevin, ed. 1992. Language, Truth and Ontology.

Dordrecht: Kluwer.

20. Munitz, Milton K., ed. 1973. Logic and Ontology. New York:

New York University Press.

Contents: Milton K. Munitz: Foreword V; Charles H. Kahn: On

the theory of the verb 'To be' 1; Joseph Owens: The content of

existence 21; Jaakko Hintikka: Quantifiers, language-games

and transcendental arguments 37; Alex Orenstein: On

explicating existence in terms of quantification 59: Milton K.

Munitz: Existence and presupposition 85; Bas . Van Fraassen:

extension. intension, and comprehension 101; Nino B.

Cocchiarella: Whither Russell's paradox of predication? 133;

Fred Sommers: Existence and predication 159; Henry Hiz: On

assertions of existence 175; Alvin Plantinga: Transworld

identity or worldbound individuals? 193; Nicholas Rescher: The

ontology of the possible 213; Stephan Körner: Individuals in

possible worlds 229; Hugues Leblanc: On dispensing with

things and worlds 241; Richmond H. Thomason: Perception

and individuation 261; Peter T. Geach: ontological relativity

and relative identity 287-302.

"The following essays represent the contributions to a seminar

on ontology held under the auspices of the New York University

Institute of Philosophy for the year 1970-1971.

The possibility of establishing fruitful links between logic and

ontology had already been made evident in earlier work by

Frege, Lesniewski, Russell, Quine, and Goodman. More recent

investigations have sought to expand and deepen these studies,

although by no means always through adhering to paths

previously established. Developments in modal logic, model

theory, and presupposition-free logics have brought to the fore

the need to deal with such central concepts as 'existence,'

'possibility,' 'individuation,' 'identity,' and 'necessity,' among

others. The studies here included, by some of the leading

investigators in the field, are typical of the most promising and

exciting research of recent analytic philosophy. Along with

those papers whose orientation to ontology is derived primarily

from the preoccupations of logicians, a number of additional

studies are included that give testimony to the lively and

creative resurgence of interest in ontology in contemporary

philosophy." (Foreword).

21. Munn, Katherine, and Smith, Barry, eds. 2008. Applied

Ontology. An Introduction. Frankfurt: Ontos Verlag.

22. Poidevin, Robin Le, ed. 2008. Being. Developments in

Contemporary Metaphysics. Cambridge: Cambridge University

Press.

23. Poli, Roberto, and Seibt, Johanna, eds. 2010. Theory and

Applications of Ontology. Dordrecht: Springer.

Vol. 1: Philosophical Perspectives Vol. 2: Computer

Applications.

24. Poli, Roberto, and Simons, Peter, eds. 1996. Formal Ontology.

Dordrecht: Kluwer.

Contents: Foreword VII; Roberto Poli: Res, Ens and Aliquid 1;

Nino B. Cocchiarella - Conceptual Realism as a Formal

Ontology 27; Jerzy Perzanowski: The Way of Truth 61; Fred

Sommers: Existence and Correspondence-to-Fact 131; David M.

Armstrong: A World of States of Affairs 159; Mieczyslaw

Omyla: A Formal Ontology of Situations 173; Karel Lambert:

Attributives, their First Denotative Correlates, Complex

Predicates and Free Logics 189; Liliana Albertazzi: Formal and

Material Ontology 199; Jean Petitot and Barry Smith: Physics

and the Phenomenal World 233; Peter M. Simons and Charles

W. Dement: Aspects of the Mereology of Artifacts 255; Ingvar

Johansson - Physical Addition 277; Index of names 289.

25. Schalley, Andrea C., and Zaefferer, Dietmar, eds. 2007.

Ontolinguistics. How Ontological Status Shapes the Linguistic

Coding of Concepts. Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter.

26. Sen, Pranab Kumar, ed. 1983. Logical Form Predication and

Ontology. Delhi: Macmillan India.

27. Smith, Barry, ed. 1982. Parts and Moments. Studies in Logic

and Formal Ontology. Munich: Philosophia Verlag.

Reprinted 2001.

28. Valore, Paolo, ed. 2006. Topics on General and Formal

Ontology. Milano: Polimetrica.

Bibliographia. Annotated bibliographies

Raul Corazzon || rc@ontology.co || Info

Philosophical Logic and Philosophy

of Logic

Introductory Readings

1. Priest, Graham. 2000. Logic: A Very Short Introduction. New

York: Oxford University Press.

"This book is an Introduction to logic, as contemporary

logicians now understand the subject. It does not attempt to be

a textbook, however.

There are numerous such books currently available. The point

of this one is to explore the roots of logic, which sink deep into

philosophy.

Some formal logic will be explained along the way.

In each of the main chapters, I start by taking up some

particular philosophical problem or logical puzzle. I then

explain one approach to it. Often this is a fairly standard one;

but in some of the areas there is no standard answer: logicians

still disagree. In such cases, I have just chosen one that is

interesting. Nearly all the approaches, whether standard or not,

may be challenged. I finish each chapter with some problems

for the approach that I have explained. Sometimes these

problems are standard; sometimes they are not. Sometimes

they may have easy answers; sometimes they may not. The aim

is to challenge you to figure out what you make of the matter.

Modern logic is a highly mathematical subject. I have tried to

write the material in such a way as to avoid nearly all

mathematics. The most that is required is a little high-school

algebra in the last few chapters. It is true that you will need the

determination to master some symbolism that may be new to

you; but this is a lot less than is required to have a basic grasp

of any new language. And the perspicuity that the symbolism

gives to difficult questions makes any trouble one may have in

mastering it well worth it. One warning, though: reading a book

on logic or philosophy is not like reading a novel. There will be

times when you will have to read slowly and carefully.

Sometimes you may have to stop and think about things; and

you should be prepared to go back and reread a paragraph if

necessary.

The final chapter of the book is on the development of logic. In

this, I have tried to put some of the issues that the book deals

with in an historical perspective, to show that logic is a living

subject, which has always evolved, and which will continue to

do so. The chapter also contains suggestions for further

reading.

There are two appendices. The first contains a glossary of terms

and symbols. You may consult this if you forget the meaning of

a word or symbol. The second appendix contains a question

relevant to each chapter, with which you can test your

understanding of its main ideas." (from the Preface).

2. Hurley, Patrick J. 2008. A Concise Introduction to Logic.

Belmont: Thomson / Wadsworth.

Tenth revised edition (First edition 1982).

Brief Contents: Part I. Informal Logic. 1. Basic Concepts 1; 2.

Language: Meaning and Definition 74; 3. Informal Fallacies

113; Part II. Formal Logic. 4. Categorical Propositions 189; 5.

Categorical Syllogisms 244; 6. Propositional Logic 290; 7.

Natural Deduction in Propositional Logic 350; 8. Predicate

Logic 406; Part II. Inductive Logic. 9. Analogy and Legal and

Moral Reasoning 468; 10. Causality and Mill's Methods 487; 11.

Probability 510; 12. Statistical Reasoning 526; 13.

Hypothetical/Scientific Reasoning 546; 14. Science and

Superstition 568; Appendix Logic and Graduate-Level

Admissions tests 595; Answers to selected Exercises 605;

Glossary/index 672.

"The most immediate benefit derived from the study of logic is

the skill needed to construct sound arguments of one's own and

to evaluate the arguments of others. In accomplishing this goal,

logic instills a sensitivity for the formal component in language,

a thorough command of which is indispensable to clear,

effective, and meaningful communication. On a broader scale,

by focusing attention on the requirement for reasons or

evidence to support our views, logic provides a fundamental

defense against the prejudiced and uncivilized attitudes that

threaten the foundations of our democratic society. Finally,

through its attention to inconsistency as a fatal flaw in any

theory or point of view, logic proves a useful device in

disclosing ill-conceived policies in the political sphere and,

ultimately, in distinguishing the rational from the irrational,

the sane from the insane.

To realize the benefits offered by the study of logic, one must

thoroughly understand the central concepts of the subject and

be able to apply them in actual situations. To promote the

achievement of these goals, this text presents the central

concepts of logic clearly and simply. Examples arc used

extensively, key terms are introduced in boldface type and

defined in the glossary/index, and major points are illustrated

in graphic boxes. Furthermore, to ensure sufficient practice in

applying the basic principles, the book includes over 2,000

exercises selected to illustrate the main points and guard

against the most typical mistakes. In most cases, every third

exercise is answered in the back of the book.

New to This Edition.

In this Tenth Edition, the coverage of Inductive Logic in Part

III has been broken up into six separate chapters to allow for

greater flexibility in using the text in class. This change also

facilitates customization through our Custom program, which

lets you select course materials to create an affordable text that

matches your syllabus.

Also new in this edition, thirteen pages devoted to "Eminent

Logicians" highlight the contributions of key logicians in

history. The inclusion of these features should help to

humanize logic and make it more interesting by connecting it

with historical figures who devoted much of their lives to

advancing the science of logic.

A new method for testing sorites has been introduced into

Section 5.7. This method, which resembles the rules method for

syllogisms, is often simpler to apply because it does not require

that intermediate conclusions be drawn.

In Section 8.6 the restriction on universal generalization for

arguments involving relational predicates and overlapping

quantifiers has been replaced by a slightly stricter version. To

my considerable surprise, a very good logician came up with an

invalid argument that got past the earlier formulation of this

restriction.

Also, in Chapter 14 (formerly Section 9.6) more treatment is

accorded Ockham's razor in connection with explanations.

The "Logic and Graduate-Level Admissions Tests" appendix,

which draws a connection between logic and earning a good

score on tests such as the LSAT, GMAT, and MCAT, has been

completely rewritten and expanded, paying greater attention to

logical strategies." (pp. XVII-XVIII).

3. Govier, Trudy. 2010. A Practical Study of Argument. Belmont:

Wadsworth.

Seventh revised edition (First edition 1985).

Contents: Preface X-XIII; 1. What Is an Argument? (And What

Is Not) 1; 2. Pinning Down Argument Structure 22; 3. Looking

at Language 57; 4. Good Arguments: An Introduction 87; 5.

Premises: What to Accept and Why 116; 6. Working on

Relevance 148; 7. Deductive Arguments: Categorical Logic 178;

8. 8. Deductive Arguments: Propositional Logic 216; 9. An

Introduction to Inductive Arguments 255; 10. Causal Inductive

Arguments 286; 11. Analogies: Reasoning from Case to Case

318; 12. Conductive Arguments and Counter-considerations

352; Appendix: Summary of Fallacies 378; Answers to Selected

Exercises 386; Index 414.

"This book is written for all those interested in arguments and

arguing-and especially for students enrolled in courses

designed to improve their critical thinking abilities. My goal in

this work is to present enough theory to explain why certain

kinds of argument are good or bad and enough illustrations and

examples to show how that theory can be applied.

The book includes lively illustrations from contemporary

debates and issues and ample student exercises. Responses to

some exercises are provided within the book, while the

remainder are answered in a manual available to instructors. A

central new feature of the seventh edition is that for most of the

exercises in the text, on-line supplementations are available.

These developments have been made possible by the sustained

and energetic efforts of Dr. Jim Freeman of Hunter College,

New York. The on-line material includes fill-in-the-blank, true-

false, and multiple choice examples; all are machine gradable.

Students get immediate feedback on whether their answers are

correct, and instructors get reports of the percentage of correct

examples the students completed, for each exercise assigned.

I present an integrated treatment of cogent argument and

fallacies and of formal and informal strategics for analysis and

evaluation. In addition to the highly significant feature of Dr.

Freeman's exercise material, this seventh edition includes

updated examples; a reordering of some early material on

language, clarity and argument; compression of exposition at

some points; and a strengthened discussion of inductive

reasoning. In recognition of students' increased used of

Internet materials for personal and academic research, relevant

pointers on evaluating information from the Internet are

included.

My interest in the theory and practice of argument stems from

an occasion many years ago when I was asked to review a

manuscript on informal Slacks. At the time, I was teaching an

elementary course on banal logic to a large group of students

who were not too keen on the subject. The greater practicality

of the informal logic and the lively interest of the examples in

that manuscript led to my own fascination with practical

argumentation. I began to study texts in that field and

developed my own course on practical reasoning. From that

work, this text was generated. Along with many other people, I

have done further research on the philosophy of argument

since that time, and I have tried to take account of new

developments here. Some themes relatively unexplored in the

field of argument analysis when this book was first written

remain of great interest to theorists today. The topics of

conductive argument and analogical arguments are two

examples.

This book combines a detailed nonformal treatment of good

and bad arguments with a solid treatment of two central areas

of formal logic: categorical logic and propositional logic. In

addition to the interpretation and evaluation of arguments, the

book also explores issues relevant to their construction. The

first edition, written between 1982 and 1984, was novel in its

combination of discussions of cogent and fallacious arguments,

its synthesis of informal and formal approaches, and its

sustained effort to present a coherent general theory of

argument. Since the early 1980s other authors have adopted a

similar approach; thus the combination of topics is less unusual

than it was previously. The second edition of this text was

written in 1986, the third in 1990, the fourth in 1995, the fifth

in 1999, and the sixth in 2003. This current edition, the

seventh, was prepared in the summer of 2008.

The importance of cogent argumentation is a persistent theme

in this work. The types of arguments treated in this book are

integral to the development of many areas including law;

philosophy; physical, biological, and social science; literature;

and history." (pp. X-XI).

4. Gensler, Harry J. 2010. Introduction to Logic. New York:

Routledge.

Second revised edition (First edition 2002).

Contents: Preface IX-X; 1. Introduction 1; Part One: Syllogistic,

Informal, and Inductive Logic. 2. Syllogistic Logic 7; 3.

Meaning and definitions 34; 4. Fallacies and Argumentation

55; 5. Inductive Reasoning 80; Part Two: Classical Symbolic

Logic 6. Basic Propositional Logic 118; 7. Propositional Proofs

153; 8. Basic Quantificational Logic 182; 9. Relations and

Identity 205; Part Three: Advanced Symbolic Systems. 10.

Basic Modal Logic 228: 11. Further Modal Systems 248; 12.

Deontic and Imperative Systems 267: 13. Belief Logic 290; 14. A

Formalized Ethical Theory 313: Part Four: Further Vistas. 15.

Metalogic 336; 16 History of Logic 351; 17. Deviant Logics 363;

18. Philosophy of Logics 373; Appendix: For Further Reading

383; Answers to Selected Problems 384; index 415.

"This is a comprehensive Introduction to Logic. It covers:

syllogisms;

informal aspects of reasoning (like meaning and fallacies);

inductive reasoning;

propositional and quantificational logic;

modal, deontic, and belief logic;

the formalization of an ethical theory about the golden rule;

and metalogic, history of logic, deviant logic, and philosophy of

logic.

Because of its broad scope, this book can be used for basic logic

courses (where teachers can choose from a variety of topics) or

more advanced ones (including graduate courses). The teacher

manual and the end of Chapter 1 both talk about which

chapters are suitable for which type of course.

The first Routledge edition came out in 2002. Key features

included: (a) clear, direct, concise writing; (b) interesting

examples and arguments, often from everyday life or great

philosophers; (c) simpler ways to test arguments, including the

star test for syllogisms and an easier way to do proofs and

refutations; (d) wide scope of materials (likely the widest of any

logic text); (e) suitability for self-study and preparation for tests

like the LAST; (f) reasonable price (a third of the cost of some

competitors); and (g) the companion LogiCola instructional

program (which randomly generates problems, gives feedback

on answers, provides help and explanations, and records

progress). I'm happy with how the first edition has been

received, often with lavish praise.

I have made many improvements to this second edition. I have

arranged the chapters in a more logical way; so they now go,

roughly, from easier to harder material. I added new chapters

on history of logic, deviant logic, and philosophy of logic; so the

book is even broader in scope than before. I beefed up informal

fallacies, added inference to the best explanation, and corrected

some typos. I overhauled three difficult sections: on relational

translations, belief-logic proofs, and completeness. I did much

tweaking of explanations (for example, see the sections on the

star test, Venn diagrams, and proofs). I tweaked some

exercises. I added an appendix on suggested further readings. I

added a real index (previously there was only an index of

names); so now it's easier to research a topic. And I added a

convenient list of rules to the inside covers." (pp. IX-X).

5. Guttenplan, Samuel. 1997. The Languages of Logic. An

Introduction to Formal Logic. Malden: Blackwell.

Second edition (First edition 1986).

6. Kelley, David. 1998. The Art of Reasoning. New York: W. W.

Norton.

Third revised edition (first edition 1988; second expanded

edition 1994).

7. Smullyan, Raymond. 1968. First-Order Logic. New York:

Springer-Verlag.

Reprinted New York, Dover, 1995.

8. McCulloch, Gregory. 1989. The Game of the Name. Introducing

Logic, Language, and Mind. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

9. Kalish, Donald, Montague, Richard, and Mar, Gary. 1980.

Logic. Techniques of Formal Reasoning. New York: Hartcourt

Brace.

First edition 1964; Second revised edition 1980; from 1992

distributed by Oxford University Press.

Contents: Chapter I. 'NOT' and 'IF' p. 1; Chapter II. 'AND', 'OR',

'IF AND ONLY IF' p. 50; Chapter III: 'ALL' and 'SOME' p. 117;

Chpater IV. 'ALL' and 'SOME' continued p. 201; Chapter V. 'IS'

(in one sense) p. 263; Chapter VI. 'THE' 306; Chapter VII.

Additional derivational procedures p. 346; Chapter VIII. 'THE'

again: A Russellian theory of descriptions p. 392; Chapter IX.

Automatic procedures p. 411; Chapter X. Definitions: formal

theories p. 438; Chapter XI. Variable-bindings operators p.

475; Bibliography p. 509; Index of proper names p. 515; Index

of subjects p. 517.

"This edition, like the preceding one, is an Introduction to logic,

requiring no prior knowledge of philosophy or mathematics. It

does not aim at communicating or justifying results about

logical systems but instead at imparting a skill-the ability to

recognize and construct correct deductions and refutations.

Metamathematical results are sometimes mentioned, but only

incidentally and as an aid to understanding.

The subjects treated are the same as in the first edition; they

are the sentential calculus, the quantifier calculus, the identity

calculus, the description calculus, some automatic proof

procedures, and a detailed development of a familiar

mathematical theory. The treatment of the latter two subjects

remains unchanged, except for the placement of the chapter on

automatic procedures. In the present edition, as in the earlier

one, the four systems of logic are developed by the simple and

intuitive techniques of natural deduction; but here the

development is continuous and initially unsupplemented.

(...)

Symbolic rather than English arguments are the central subject

matter of our text, as its title suggests. But here as in the earlier

edition arguments of English play a motivating role. We say

that an English argument is valid (in a particular branch of

logic) if and only if it has (within that branch) a valid

symbolization. In the earlier edition, in sections titled

'Paradoxical inferences', some intuitively invalid English

arguments that appear to have valid symbolizations were

considered. Then it was claimed that these English arguments

cannot be symbolized and hence do not constitute fallacies, for

their symbolizations are blocked by subtle restrictions imposed

on the notion of a scheme of abbreviation. This attempt to

preserve the adequacy of the characterization of validity of

English arguments was a step beyond that taken by most, if not

all, Introductions to classical logic. And it was the point of

departure for the profound investigations of the structure of

ordinary language by our late colleague Professor Richard

Montague (see Montague Formal philosophy: selected papers

by Richard Montague, edited and with an Introduction by R.

H. Thomason, New Haven and London, 1974 and Barbara H.

Partee (editor), Montague grammar, New York, 1976)." (from

the preface to the Second Edition).

10. Hintikka, Jaakko, and Bachman, James. 1991. What If...?

Toward Excellence in Reasoning. London: Mayfield.

Contents: Preface XI-XIV; Part One: Introduction to the

interrogative model of reasoning p. 1; 1. Inquiry as inquiry p. 3;

2. Interrogative games: the structure of the reasoning process

p. 29; 3. Interrogative argument analysis p. 48; 4. Argument

construction and argumentative essays p. 68; Part Two: Logical

inference in detail p. 81; 5. Deductive logic and its role in

reasoning p. 83; 6. Representing statements p. 101; 7.

Statement logic and the table method p. 117; 8. Complex

conclusions in statement logic p. 134; 9. Statement logic in

everyday English p. 144; Part Three: Interrogative moves in

detail p. 159; 11. Three further aspects of interrogative moves p.

183; 12. Strategies for reasoning with uncertain answers p. 207;

13. Strategies for evaluating oracles p. 220; Part Four:

Advanced topics in interrogative reasoning p. 235; 15. First-

order predicate logic in English p. 267; 16. Presuppositions of

"Wh-" questions p. 277; 17. Advanced strategies in reasoning p.

285; 18. Strategic parallels between deduction and

interrogation p. 306; 19. Models of scientific reasoning p. 323;

20. Definition and identification p. 334; Conclusion: p. 359; 21.

Argument analysis and evaluation p. 361; Appendixes, Glossary

and Index. Appendix A: Argument sketches for exercises in

argument analysis, construction, and evaluation p. 375;

Appendix B: Recreational questioning games p. 407; Appendix

C: Puzzles, problems and mistakes in inquiry p. 411; Glossary p.

429; Clues and solutions for selected exercises p. 437; Index p.

460-465.

"Many college and university courses aim at improving

students' reasoning. The recorded history of recommendations

for achieving this goal stretches back to Aristotle. We venture

adding to this history because for several years Jaakko Hintikka

and various associates have been developing a comprehensive

theory for understanding the nature of reasoning that sheds

new light on how students may be encouraged and enabled to

achieve creatively disciplined reasoning skills. This theory, the

interrogative approach to inquiry, makes it possible to integrate

deductive logic and informal reasoning into a unified whole. Its

core is what is known as the interrogative model of reasoning.

The interrogative model, which is used consistently throughout

the book, offers a uniform framework for studying and teaching

both formal logic and argumentation theory, including the

analysis, evaluation, and construction of arguments in ordinary

English. As in the old Socratic method, reasoning is cast in the

form of a sequence of questions and answers, interspersed with

logical (i.e., deductive) inferences.

The interrogative model distinguishes definitory rules, which

are concerned with reasoning correctly, from strategic rules,

which tell how to reason effectively. The former define what is

admissible in reasoning, while the latter show students how to

make creative use of what is allowed by the definitory rules.

Strategic rules thus serve as signposts on the way to excellence

in reasoning. By stressing strategic rules this text stays focused

on the pursuit of excellence in reasoning.

In the interrogative model all inferences are required to be

deductive. This eliminates the problem that an inference might

introduce an element of uncertainty. Thus all inferences are

strictly truth preserving.

The effect is to locate problems with uncertainty in the process

of discovering and gathering information rather than in the

inference process. The interrogative model can then deploy

many different insights to develop strategies for coping with

uncertainty about the information available to the reasoner.

The Instructor's Manual directs interested readers to a

bibliography of the original research on the interrogative

model." (from the Preface).

11. Sommers, Fred, and Englebretsen, George. 2000. An Invitation

to Formal Reasoning. The Logic of Terms. Aldershot: Ashgate.

Contents: Preface p. X; Chapter 1. Reasoning 1; Chapter 2.

Picturing propositions 25; Chapter 3. The language of logic (I)

p. 49; Chapter 4. The language of logic (II) p. 77; Chapter 5.

Syllogistic 109; Chapter 6. Relational syllogisms p. 139; Chapter

7. Statement logic p. 163; Chapter 8. Modern predicate logic p.

213; Rules, laws and principles p. 253; A note of further reading

p. 259-260.

"It seems to be a fairly widely held belief among contemporary

teachers of logic that one must introduce logic via the

propositional, and then predicate, calculus. In particular, one

would not, even if he or she believed otherwise, properly or

fairly serve novice students by offering them instead something

like syllogistic logic. Nonetheless, we intend to do just that

here: introduce the subject of formal logic by way of a system

that is 'like syllogistic logic'. Our system, like old-fashioned,

traditional syllogistic, is a term logic. Our version of logic

('term-functor logic', TFL) shares with Aristotle's syllogistic the

insight that the logical forms of statements that are involved in

inferences as premises or conclusions can be construed as the

result of connecting pairs of terms by means of a logical copula

(functor). This insight contrasts markedly with that which

informs today's standard formal logic ('modem predicate logic',

MPL). That version of logic is due to the work of the great

nineteenth century innovator in logic, Gottlob Frege. (...) Today

the hegemony of MPL is almost complete. Still, there is a price

to be paid. MPL is indeed powerful, but it is not simple and the

logical forms which it ascribes to statements are remote from

their natural language forms. Traditional formal logic lacked

the scope enjoyed by MPL by not being able to analyze a

number of types of inference. Yet it did at least enjoy the double

advantage of (i) being simple to learn and use and (ii)

construing the logical forms of statements as close to their

natural language forms. Clearly a system of formal logic which

has the power of MPL and the simplicity and naturalness of

traditional logic would provide the best of both logical worlds.

Beginning in the late 1960s Fred Sommers set himself the task

of developing a system of formal logic (viz., TFL) that was

powerful natural and simple. The challenge faced by Sommers

in accomplishing this was threefold. The first was to extend the

power of term logic by incorporating into it the kinds of

inferences beyond the powers of traditional logic. Those

inferences were of three types: inferences involving statements

with relational expressions, inferences involving statements

with singular terms, and inferences involving unanalyzed

statements. The second challenge was to offer a theory of

logical form, or syntax, that was natural in the way that the

syntax of MPL was not. The third challenge was to provide a

symbolic algorithm (a system of symbols along with rules for

manipulating them) much simpler than the one employed by

MPL (viz., 'the first-order predicate calculus with identity').

During the past three decades Sommers has perfected just such

a system of formal logic. TFL is at least as powerful as MPL,

and it is far simpler and more natural." (from the Preface).

Philosophy of Logic and Philosophical Logic

1. Irvine, Andrew D. 1996. "Philosophy of Logic." In Routledge

History of Philosophy. Volume Ix: Philosophy of Science, Logic

and Mathematics in the Twentieth Century, edited by Kearney,

Richard, 9-49. New York: Routledge.

2. Putnam, Hilary. 1971. Philosophy of Logic. New York: Harper &

Row.

3. Quine, Willard van Orman. 1970. Philosophy of Logic.

Harvard: Harvard University Press.

4. Fisher, Jennifer. 2008. On the Philosophy of Logic. Belmont:

Thomson Wadsworth.

5. Haack, Susan. 1978. Philosophy of Logics. Cambridge:

Cambridge University Press.

Contents: Preface XI, Notation and abbreviations XV; 1.

'Philosophy of logics' 1; 2. Validity 11; 3. Sentence connectives

28; 4. Quantifiers 39; 5. Singular terms; 56; 6. Sentences,

statements, propositions 74; 7. Theories of truth 86; 8.

Paradoxes 135; 9. Logic and logics152; 10. Modal logic 170; 11.

Many-valued logic 204; 12. Some metaphysical and

epistemological questions about logic 221; Glossary 243; Advice

on reading 253, Bibliography 255; Index 267.

"My concern, in this book, is with the philosophy, rather than

the history, of logic. But my strategy has been devised with an

eye to the history of the interplay of formal and philosophical

issues which I have just sketched. I begin with a consideration

of some problems raised by the standard logical apparatus - the

interpretation of sentence connectives, sentence letters,

quantifiers, variables, individual constants, the concepts of

validity, truth, logical truth; I turn, from chapter 9 onwards, to

a consideration of the way some of these problems motivate

formal innovations, 'extended' and 'deviant' logics, and to the

ways in which these new formalisms lead, in turn, to a

reevaluation of the philosophical issues; and I conclude, in the

final chapter, with some questions - and rather fewer answers -

about the metaphysical and epistemological status of logic, the

relations between formal and natural languages, and the

relevance of logic to reasoning.

And two recurring themes of the book also reflect this historical

perspective. What seem to me to be the vital philosophical

issues in logic are focussed by consideration (i) of the plurality

of logical systems and (ii) of the ways in which formal calculi

bear on the assessment of informal argument. More

specifically, I shall be urging that, in view of the existence of

alternative logics, prudence demands a reasonably radical

stance on the question of the epistemological status of logic,

and that the interpretation of formal results is a delicate task in

which judicious attention to the purposes of formalisation is

highly desirable.

I have tried to produce a book which will be useful as an

Introduction to the philosophical problems which logic raises,

which will be intelligible to students with a grasp of elementary

formal logic and some acquaintance with philosophical issues,

but no previous knowledge of the philosophy of logic. But I

haven't offered simple answers, or even simple questions; for

the interesting issues in philosophy of logic are complex and

difficult. I have tried instead to begin at the beginning, to

explain technicalities, and to illustrate highly general problems

with specific case studies. To this end I have supplied, for those

new to the subject, a glossary of possibly unfamiliar terms used

in the text, and some advice on finding one's way about the

literature; while, for those anxious to go further, I have

included a generous (but I hope not intimidating)

bibliography." (from the Preface).

6. Grayling, Anthony. 1997. An Introduction to Philosophical

Logic. Oxford: Blackwell.

Third revised edition (First edition 1982; second edition 1990).

Contents: Preface V, 1. Philosophical logic, the philosophy of

logic, philosophy and logic 1; 2. The proposition 12; 3.

Necessity, analiticity, and the a priori 33; 4. Existence,

presuppositions and descriptions 88; 5. Truth: the pragmatic,

coherence and correspondence theories 122; 6. Truth:

semantics, deflation, indefinability and evaluation 147; 7.

Meaning, reference, verification and use 188; 8. Truth,

meaning, realism and anti-realism 234; 9. Realism, anti-

realism, idealism, relativism 285; Bibliography 324; Index 336.

"The topics to be discussed are: the proposition, analyticity,

necessity, existence, identity, truth, meaning and reference.

These, at least, are the topics mentioned in chapter headings. In

fact the list is more extensive, for in the course of these

chapters there are also discussions of possible worlds, realisms

of related sorts, anti-realism, and other questions. It is not

possible to give an overview of philosophical logic without

ranging widely in this way, but it will be clear that because each

topic invites, and indeed commands, whole volumes to itself,

the discussions I give do not pretend to be more than prefaces

to the detailed treatments found in the original literature.

These topics are collected under the unifying label

'philosophical logic' for three principal reasons. It marks their

interrelatedness, for a good understanding of any of them

requires an understanding of the others. It marks their central

importance in all serious philosophical discussion. And it

reflects the influence of developments in logic since the late

nineteenth century, which have afforded an access of power in

dealing with many philosophical problems afresh, not only

because we have become technically better equipped for the

task, but also because developments in logical machinery have

promoted and facilitated a certain methodological style which

has proved extraordinarily fruitful in philosophy. That

methodological style is analysis.

The invention of symbolic calculi would not have impelled

philosophical developments by itself had it not been for the

fact, quickly spotted by Frege and Russell, that they

immediately prompt a range of philosophical questions,

centrally among them questions about the nature of meaning

and truth - which is in short to say, language; and language

vitally interests philosophers because it provides our route to a

philosophical understanding of thought and the world. The

greatest single impetus to current preoccupations with

philosophical logic comes indeed from interest in language, to

understand which we need progress in this area. (pp. 1-2).

7. Hausman, Alan, Kahane, Howard, and Tidman, Paul. 2009.

Logic and Philosophy. A Modern Introduction. Boston:

Wadsworth.

Eleventh edition (First edition 1969).

8. Engel, Pascal. 1992. The Norm of Truth. An Introduction to the

Philosophy of Logic. Toronto: Toronto University Press.

Contents: Acknowledgements VIII; List of logical symbols XII;

Introduction 1;

Part 1. Elementary structures 13

1. Propositions 15; 2. The meaning of propositional connectives

35; 3. Subject and predicate 56; 4. Varieties of quantification

68;

Part 2. Truth and meaning 93

5. Theories of truth 95; 6. Truth, meaning and realism 118;

Part 3. Limits of extensionality 143

7. Modalities, possibles and essences 145; 8. Reference and

propositional attitudes 161; 9. Identity 183; 10. Vagueness 199;

Part 4. The domain of logic 217

11. The province of logic 219; 12. Logical necessity 254; 13.

Logic and rationality 291; Conclusion 321; Notes 324;

Bibliography 356; Glossary-Index 371; Name Index 379.

"This book is an Introduction to the philosophy of logic. But

'philosophy of logic' is an umbrella term which covers a variety

of different questions and styles of enquiry. I do not think that

there is a single, well established, conception of the subject, and

the one offered in this book does not pretend to represent them

all. Although I shall not attempt to give a precise definition, it

will be useful to indicate where my own treatment and choice of

topics differs from other approaches.

By 'logic' I shall mean, in the usual sense, the theory of

inferences that are valid in virtue of their form. It is in general

admitted that this definition applies only to deductive logic,

and that the theory of inductive inferences does not belong to

'formal logic' in the ordinary sense. (...)

Our present use of the term 'philosophical logic' is mostly post-

Fregean and post-Russellian. Frege called 'logic' not only his

own formal system, but also his reflections about the nature of

his formalism and about meaning and truth in general.

Although Frege himself does not use the term 'philosophical

logic', it is clear that these reflections are close to our

contemporary understanding of that term. His insistence on the

fact that 'logic' in the wide sense is concerned with language in

general and should be kept separate from both psychology and

the theory of knowledge justifies Dummett's claim that Frege's

inquiries belong also to the philosophy of language and that

this discipline holds for him the position of a primary

philosophy. Russell proposed explicitly the term philosophical

logic for a general enquiry into the nature of 'logical forms'. By

this he did not mean only a study of the structure of logical

languages, but also of the logical structures of natural

languages, which would have both epistemological and

ontological consequences.'

Our present conceptions of philosophical logic bear strongly

their Fregean and Russellian heritages. Philosophical logic is

taken to be continuous with the philosophy of language, and to

use logic as a tool for the analysis of thought. But there are two

main versions of what philosophical logic is, which differ in the

respective weight or authority that is granted to logical analysis.

One of them assigns precise limits to this authority, and can be

called informal philosophical logic, whereas the other aims at

contorting and extending this authority, and can be called

formal philosophical logic." (from the Introduction).

9. Wolfram, Sybil. 1989. Philosophical Logic. An Introduction.

London: Routledge.

Contents: Preface XIII; 1. Introduction 1. 2. Reference and truth

26; 3. Necessary truth and the analytic-synthetic distinction 80;

4. Aspects of truth 129; 5. Negation 162; 6. Existence and

identity 191; 7. Aspects of meaning 229; Appendix:

Examination questions 252; Bibliography of works referred to

263; Glossary 270; Index 278.

"Logic may be said to be the study of correct and incorrect

reasoning. This includes the study of what makes arguments

consistent or inconsistent, valid or invalid, sound or unsound

(on these terms see 1.2.1). It has two branches, known as

formal (or symbolic) logic and philosophical logic.

One of the branches of logic, formal logic, codifies arguments

and supplies tests of consistency and validity, starting from

axioms, that is, from definitions and rules for assessing the

consistency and validity of arguments.' At the present time

there are two main systems of formal logic, usually known as

the propositional calculus and the predicate calculus. The

propositional calculus concerns relations of what it terms

'propositions' to each other. The predicate calculus codifies

inferences which may be drawn on account of certain features

of the content of 'propositions'.

The other branch of logic, philosophical logic, which is my

concern here, is very much more difficult to delimit and define.

It can be said to study arguments, meaning, truth. Its subject

matter is closely related to that of formal logic but its objects

are different. Rather than setting out to codify valid arguments

and to supply axioms and notations allowing the assessment of

increasingly complex arguments, it examines the bricks and

mortar from which such systems are built. Although it aims,

among other things, to illuminate or sometimes question the

formalization of arguments into systems with axioms which

have been effected, it is not restricted to a study of arguments

which formal logic has codified." (pp. 1-2).

10. Lambert, Karel, and Fraasen, Bas C.van. 1972. Derivation and

Counterexample. An Introduction to Philosophical Logic.

Encino: Dickenson.

"Since there are already many elementary logic texts in

existence, and since logic is taught today at many levels, we

shall explain, first, the specific purposes to which we think this

text is suited, and second, how this text differs from other

similar texts.

In many philosophy departments today a distinction is drawn

between the following topics in undergraduate logic teaching:

(a) general Introduction,

(b) techniques of deductive logic,

(d) philosophical uses of logic.

In addition there are texts and courses devoted to advanced

work in mathematical logic for students wishing to specialize.

We conceive the present text to be usable in the teaching of (b)-

(d), to students who either have had a general Introduction to

logic or who are allowed (and this is frequent enough) to begin

symbolic logic without such an Introduction. Topics that we

would normally expect to have been covered on the

introductory level include the nature of arguments and validity,

the use/mention distinction, the nature of definition, and

perhaps the use of Venn diagrams and truth-tables. A good

example of a book designed especially for this general

introductory level is Wesley Salmon's Logic (Prentice-Hall,

1963).

After the introductory level, the instructor generally has a

choice (or the student is offered a choice) whether to emphasize

the philosophical side or the mathematical side of logic. Here

our text is designed specifically for those whose interest is in

philosophical aspects and uses of logic.

With this aim in mind, we have introduced a number of

innovations into the exposition, but at the same time have

made sure that the standard body of elementary symbolic

logic is covered.

(...)

Our main innovations, however, are in the third part, which

covers the logic of singular terms. Here we extend the language

of classical logic by admitting singular terms, and extend our

rules so as to license inferences involving such terms. The

resulting extensions of classical logic are called free logic and

free description theory. We take care to discuss explicitly the

philosophical basis of such notions as possible worlds, domains

of discourse, existence, reference and description, utilized in

the first three parts, and to compare our approach with

historical precedents. This is done, to some extent, as these

notions are introduced, and also to some extent in Parts Four

and Five.

Although there are today many good treatments of metalogic

available, they are generally aimed at more advanced levels of

instruction. We have aimed to make our presentation of

metalogic more elementary than is usual. First of all, as soon as

the student is able to use deductive techniques, he is also in a

position to prove the admissibility of further deductive rules. By

placing such admissibility proofs in Parts One and Two, a

certain amount of proof theory is taught along with the

deductive techniques. Part Four is devoted to semantics, that is,

to a scrutiny of the adequacy of the logical system developed in

the first three parts. Since the book is aimed specifically at the

philosophy student, we treat only the finite cases; we believe

that in this way the student will be able to master the main

theoretical concepts and methods without the use of

sophisticated mathematical techniques. It must be noted that

here the previous parallel development of the tableau rules

greatly simplifies the presentation.

In Part Five, we discuss the philosophical basis of the logic of

existence and description theory, with special reference to the

question of extensionality. In addition, we discuss the

philosophical uses of free logic in connection with set theory,

intentional dosicourse, thought and perception, modal

concepts, and the concept of truth. The term "philosophical

logic" is used increasingly to designated a specific discipline

(indeed, the newly created Journal of Philosophical Logic will

be entirely devoted to it), and we hope that Part Five will

provide a useful Introduction to some of its main areas of

research." (from the Preface IX-XI).

11. Burgess, John P. 2009. Philosophical Logic. Princeton:

Princeton University Press.

12. Read, Stephen. 1995. Thinking About Logic. An Introduction to

the Philosophy of Logic. New York: Oxford University Press.

Contents: Introduction 1; 1. Truth, pure and simple: language

and the world 5; 2. The power of logic: logical consequence 35;

3. To think but of an If: theories of conditionals 64; 4. The

incredulous stare: possible worlds 96; 5. Plato's beard: on what

there is and what there isn't 121; 6. Well, I'll be hanged! The

semantic paradoxes 148; 7. Bald men forever: the sorites

paradoxes 173; 8. Whose line is it anyway? The constructivist

challenge 203; Select bibliography 241; Glossary 248; Index

253.

"This book is an Introduction to the philosophy of logic. We

often see an area of philosophy marked out as the philosophy of

logic and language; and there are indeed close connections

between logical themes and themes in the analysis of language.

But they are also quite distinct. In the philosophy of language

the focus is on meaning and reference, on what are known as

the semantic connections between language and the world.

In contrast, the central topic of the philosophy of logic is

inference, that is, logical consequence, or what follows correctly

from what. What conclusions may legitimately be inferred from

what sets of premisses? One answer to this question makes play

with the notion of truth-preservation: valid arguments are

those in which truth is preserved, where the truth of the

premisses guarantees the truth of the conclusion. Since truth

itself is arguably the third member of a closely knit trio

comprising meaning, reference, and truth, the connection with

philosophy of language is immediately secured. (...)

It is with these issues of truth and correct inference that we are

to engage in this book; and central to that engagement, we will

find, is paradox. Paradox is the philosophers' enchantment,

their fetish. It fascinates them, as a light does a moth. But at the

same time, it cannot be endured. Every force available must be

brought to bear to remove it. The philosopher is the shaman,

whose task is to save us and rid us of the evil demon.

Paradox can arise in many places, but here we concentrate on

two in particular, one set united by semantic issues, the other

by a fuzziness inherent in certain concepts. In both cases the

puzzle arises because natural, simple, and what seem clearly

reasonable assumptions lead one very quickly to contradiction,

confusion, and embarrassment. There is something awful and

fascinating about their transparency, there is an enjoyment in

surveying their variety, the rich diversity of examples.

But their real philosophical value lies in the purging of the

unfounded and uncritical assumptions which led to them. They

demand resolution, and in their resolution we learn more about

the nature of truth, the nature of consequence, and the nature

of reality, than any extended survey of basic principles can give.

Only when those seemingly innocent principles meet the

challenge of paradox and come under a gaze tutored by

realization of what will follow, do we really see the troubles that

lie latent within them.

We start, therefore, at the heart of philosophy of logic, with the

concept of truth, examining those basic principles which seem

compelling in how language measures up to the world. But I

eschew a simple catalogue of positions held by the great and the

good. That could be very dull, and perhaps not really instructive

either. Rather, I try to weave a narrative, to show how natural

conceptions arise, how they may be articulated, and how they

can come unstuck. I hope that the puzzles themselves will

capture the readers' imaginations, and tempt them onwards to

further, more detailed reading, as indicated in the summary to

each chapter. The idea is to paint a continuous picture of a

network of ideas treated in their own right and in their own

intimate relationships, largely divorced from historical or

technical detail." pp. 1-3 (from the Introduction).

13. Sainsbury, Mark. 2001. Logical Forms. An Introduction to

Philosophical Logic. Oxford: Blackwell.

Second revised edition (First edition 1991).

Contents: Preface to the first edition VI; Preface to the second

edition VII; Introduction 1; 1. Validity 5; 2. Truth functionality

54; 3. Conditionals and probabilities 122; 4. Quantification 153;

5. Necessity 257; 6. The project of formalization 339; Glossary

392; List of symbols 403; Bibliography 406; Index 419.

"This book is an Introduction to philosophical logic. It is

primarily intended for people who have some acquaintance

with deductive methods in elementary formal logic, but who

have yet to study associated philosophical problems. However,

I do not presuppose knowledge of deductive methods, so the

book could be used as a way of embarking on philosophical

logic from scratch.

Russell coined the phrase 'philosophical logic' to describe a

programme in philosophy: that of tackling philosophical

problems by formalizing problematic sentences in what

appeared to Russell to be the language of logic: the formal

language of Principia Mathematica. My use of the term

'philosophical logic' is close to Russell's. Most of this book is

devoted to discussions of problems of formalizing English in

formal logical languages.

I take validity to be the central concept in logic. In the first

chapter I raise the question of why logicians study this property

in connection with artificial languages, which no one speaks,

rather than in connection with some natural language like

English. In chapters 2-5 I indicate some of the possibilities and

problems for formalizing English in three artificial logical

languages: that of propositional logic (chapter 2), of first order

quantificational logic (chapter 4) and of modal logic (chapter

5). The final chapter takes up the purely philosophical

discussion, and, using what has been learned on the way,

addresses such questions as whether there was any point in

those efforts at formalizing, what can be meant by the logical

form of an English sentence, what is the domain of logic, and

what is a logical constant.

In this approach, one inevitably encounters not only questions

in the philosophy of logic, but also questions in the philosophy

of language, as when one considers how best to formalize

English sentences containing empty names, or definite

descriptions, or adverbs, or verbs of propositional attitude."

(pp. 1-2).

14. Englebretsen, George, and Sayward, Charles. 2011.

Philosophical Logic. An Introduction to Advanced Topics. New

York: Continuum.

Contents: List of Symbols X; 1. Introduction 1; 2. Sentential

Logic 13; 3. Quantificational Logic 52; 4. Sententia Modal Logic

74; 5. Quantification and Modality 93; 6. Set Theory 103; 7.

Incompleteness 130; 8. An Introduction to Term Logic 139; 9.

The Elements of a Modal term Logic 166; References 176;

Rules, Axioms, and Principles 177; Glossary 184; Index 195-198.

"Post-Fregean mathematical logic began with a concern for

foundational issues in mathematics. However, by the 1930s

philosophers had not only contributed to the building and

refinement of various formal systems, but they had also begun

an exploitation of them for primarily philosophical ends. While

many schools of philosophy today eschew any kind of technical,

logical work, an ability to use (or at least a familiarity with) the

tools provided by formal logic systems is still taken as essential

by most of those who consider themselves analytic

philosophers. Moreover, recent years have witnessed a growing

interest in formal logic among philosophers who stand on

friendly terms with computer theory, cognitive psychology,

game theory, linguistics, economics, law, and so on. At the

same time, techniques developed in formal logic continue to

shed light on both traditional and contemporary issues in

epistemology, metaphysics, philosophy of mind, philosophy of

science, philosophy of language, and so forth.

In what follows, students who have already learned something

of classical mathematical logic are introduced to some other

ways of doing formal logic: classical logic rests on the concepts

of truth and falsity, whereas constructivists logic accounts for

inference in terms of defense and refutation; classical logic

usually makes use of a semantic theory based on models,

whereas the alternative introduced here is based on the idea of

truth sets; classical logic tends to interpret quantification

objectually, whereas this alternative allows for a substitutional

interpretation of quantifiers. As well, a radically different

approach, fundamentally different from any version of

mathematical logic, is also introduced. It is one that harkens

back to the earliest stages in the history of formal logic but is

equipped with the resources demanded of any formal logic

today." (pp. 1-2).

Advanced Readings

1. Sher, Gila. 1991. The Bounds of Logic. A Generalized

Viewpoint. Cambridge: MIT Press.

2. Sider, Theodore. 2010. Logic for Philosophy. New York: Oxford

University Press.

3. Mason, Richard. 2000. Before Logic. Albany: State University

of New York Press.

4. Hanna, Robert. 2006. Rationality and Logic. Cambridge: MIT

Press.

5. Gibson, Martha I. 2004. From Naming to Saying. The Unity of

the Proposition. Malden: Blackwell.

6. McGinn, Colin. 2000. Logical Properties. Identity, Existence,

Predication, Necessity, Truth. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

7. Malatesta, Michele. 1997. The Primary Logic. Instruments for

a Dialogue between the Two Cultures. Leominster: Gracewing.

Contents: Foreword 13; Chapter I. Philosophy of language and

elements of semiotics 15; Chapter II. Elements of metalogic 31;

Chapter III. From formal logic to symbolic logic 51; Chapter IV.

Sentence logic or the logic of sentences. Truth tables 75;

Chapter V. Symbolic languages 103; Chapter Vi. Well-formed

and badly formed formulae evaluation 121; Chapter VII.

Tautologies, schemes and rules of inference 139; Chapter VIII.

Polyadic connectives 165; Bibliography 191-204.

"In our day there are excellent Introductions and first-class

manuals, compendia and treatises on mathematical logic, or

symbolic logic, or logistic, as it should be called with greater

precision.

The present work differs from more widely diffused and better-

known ones because of the generous space devoted to the

philosophical problems of language. Without an adequate

understanding of these problems, there is a risk of losing sight

of the value - and at the same time of the utility - of a technique

which, far from being an end in itself, has proved to be an

irreplaceable instrument for approaching the most difficult

philosophical questions. Anyone who follows any review of

analytical philosophy or indeed of philosophical logic, will be

well aware of this. For an initial orientation in the use of

logistical proceedings in extra-mathematical contexts, the

reader should refer to the excellent volumes: Logico-

philosophical Studies edited by Albert Menne - Reidel,

Dordrecht 1962 - and Intentionality, Mind and Language

edited by Ausonio Marras - University of Illinois Press, Urbana,

Chicago, London 1972 -where it is possible to see, de facto, how

the Platonists, empiricists, conventionalists, nominalists,

phenomenists, phenomenologists and neo-Scholastics all meet

around the same problems and use the same rigorous

instruments.

A second point in which the present work differs from others is

that it introduces the reader not only to standard symbology

and those of the Principia Mathematica and of Hilbert, but

also to the symbology of Jan Lukasiewicz, thus putting the

student in a position to tackle the reading of basic texts such as

those of Prior, or the Polish logicians on dialectics - texts which

are absolutely unintelligible to those who have not mastered

symbolic language, at first sight so strange and far removed, in

terms of grammatical rules, from natural languages.

A third and final point in which the present work differs from

others is in its rich documentation of logical sources, both

ancient and mediaeval. Problems which seem to have been

conceived in the 1970s to 1990s are found to have existed

already in the time of the ancients, or the men of mediaeval

times. The constant reference to the past not only constitutes

an indirect contribution to the history of logic, and hence to the

history of philosophy and culture in general, of which logic is an

essential part, but it also allows us to understand humanity

better today. From the comparison between the men of

yesterday and those of today, we can better understand the men

of all times, provided that the problems are not flattened out

and points of view are not superimposed or perspectives

confused."(from the Foreword).

8. Davies, Martin. 1981. Meaning, Quantification, Necessity:

Themes in Philosophical Logic. London: Routledge.

9. Rescher, Nicholas. 1969. Topics in Philosophical Logic.

Dordrecht: Reidel.

Dictionaries of Logic

1. Detlefsen, Michael, McCarty, David Charles, and Bacon, John

B., eds. 1999. Logic from a to Z. New York: Routledge.

Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy Glossary of Logical and

Mathematical Terms.

2. Williamson, Jon, and Russo, Federica, eds. 2010. Key Terms in

Logic. New York: Continuum.

"This volume sets out to provide a reference for students

starting out in philosophy, as well as those in other disciplines -

such as computing, mathematics, psychology and law - in

which logic features prominently.

Logic can be thought of in a variety of ways. It is sometimes

viewed as the study of consistency, concerned with asking when

statements are consistent and when they are inconsistent. But

logic is more often conceived of as the study of consequence -

what follows from what. Thus deductive logic studies valid

consequence (situations in which the truth of the premisses of

an argument forces the truth of its conclusion) while inductive

logic studies plausible or probable consequence (situations in

which the premisses render the conclusion more probable or

sufficiently probable). Important goals of logic include

characterizing interesting consequence relationships (e.g.,

deductive consequence, inductive consequence) and providing

practical methods for answering questions about these

consequence relationships (e.g., truth tables, semantic trees

and proof are three ways of determining whether a conclusion

follows from given premisses in deductive logic).

Logic is sometimes held to be the theory of reasoning. While it

certainly leaches us a lot about how we can and ought to

reason, logics are occasionally applied to tasks that do not

obviously concern reasoning, such as to the modelling of

hardware in computer science, and so some philosophers view

logic and reasoning as somewhat different. Logic is often also

distinguished from decision-making: logic is thought to be

about theoretical relationships between statements while

decision-making is apparently guided by pragmatic

considerations such as the utilities or values attached to

actions. On the other hand, logics (in particular inductive

logics) are sometimes justified by appealing to pragmatic goals

such as the goal of minimizing loss and it is clear that the

relationship between logic and decision-making is rather

subtle.

There is no need to decide these subtle questions in order to

study and enjoy logic -- at the very least, logic studies

consequence and this is enough to make logic crucial to

philosophy and to other disciplines concerned with cogent

argument. But bewildering terminology can delay the study and

enjoyment of logic; it is hoped that this volume will help the

reader to understand some of the key jargon. The volume is

organized in three parts: Key Terms, Key Thinkers and Key

Texts (divided into Textbooks and Classics). Entries are

arranged alphabetically in each part and a list of symbols used

in the book is in the front of the volume.

The volume is a collaborative effort, with entries provided by a

multitude of authors. Each entry is initialled and the authors

are listed in the front of the volume." (pp. 1-2).

3. Cook, Roy T. 2009. A Dictionary of Philosophical Logic.

Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.

4. Feys, Robert, and Fitch, Frederic Brenton. 1969. Dictionary of

Symbols of Mathematical Logic. Dordrecht: North-Holland.

5. Marciszewski, Witold, ed. 1981. Dictionary of Logic as Applied

in the Study of Language: Concepts, Methods, Theories. The

Hague: Martinus Nijhoff.

6. Gensler, Harry J. 2006. Historical Dictionary of Logic.

Lanham: Scarecow Press.

7. Gabbay, Dov M., and Woods, John, eds. 2009. The

International Directory of Logicians. Who's Who in Logic.

London: Kind's College Publications.

Collections of Essays

1. Heijenoort, Jean van, ed. 1967. From Frege to Gödel. A Source

Book in Mathematical Logic, 1879-1931. Cambridge: Harvard

University Press.

2. Strawson, Peter Frederick. 1967. Philosophical Logic. New

York: Oxford University Press.

Contents: Introduction 1; 1. The thought: a logical inquiry by

Gottlob Frege 17; 2. Meaning by H. P. Grice 59; 3. Truth by

Michael Dummett 49; 4. Singular terms and predication by P.

F. Strawson 69; 5. Proper names by John R. Searle 89; 6. Is

existence a predicate? (1) by D. F. Pears 97 (2) by James

Thomson 103; 7. The a priori and the analytic by Anthony

Quinton 107; 8. The meaning of logical connectives (1) The

runabout inference ticket by A. N. Prior 129 (2) Tonk, plonk

and plink by Nuel D. Belnap 132; 9. Types and ontology by Fred

Sommers 138; Notes on the contributors 170; Bibliography 171;

Index of names 176.

"Wittgenstein, in the Tractatus [5.49] , seems to suggest that

the whole of formal logic-or at least the calculus of truth-

functions and the predicate-calculus-is really implicit in the

single idea of a proposition in general, that it could in principle

be excogitated by pure reflection on this idea alone.'

Wittgenstein's suggestion does not itself belong to formal logic.

It belongs to philosophical logic. For it is, or may be, the

beginning of an answer to some typical questions asked in

philosophical logic: viz., What is really distinctive of the forms

and constants of logic? or, What general elucidatory account

can be given of the notion of a logical particle?

Each of the notions so far introduced forms the topic of a

similar question asked in philosophical logic. What, exactly, is a

proposition? What is meant by saying that a proposition is

true? What, in general, is the nature of that relation which

holds between propositions when one follows from, or is

deducible from, another? The attempt to find satisfying

answers to these questions forces the philosopher to ask many

others, about the nature and functioning of language and of

linguistic expressions of many types. For propositions cannot

be a subject of study unless they are expressed; and formal logic

would have none but a purely mathematical interest unless it

were related to actual discourse. So many questions concerning

modes of actual discourse, the theory of meaning, the nature

and conditions of linguistic communication, come within the

scope of the philosophical logician's inquiries." (from the

Introduction).

3. Philosophical Logic. 1967. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff.

Tulane Studies in Philosophy. Vol. XVI.

4. Davis, J.W., Hockney, D.J., and Wilson, W.K., eds. 1969.

Philosophical Logic. Dordrecht: Reidel.

5. Lambert, Karel, ed. 1970. Philosophical Problems in Logic.

Some Recent Developments. Dordrecht: Reidel.

6. Körner, Stephan, ed. 1976. Philosophy of Logic. Papers and

Discussions. Berkely: University of California Press.

7. Copi, Irving, and Gould, James, eds. 1978. Contemporary

Philosophical Logic. New York: St. Martin's Press.

8. Agazzi, Evandro, ed. 1981. Modern Logic. A Survey. Dordrecht:

Reidel.

Historical, Philosophical, and Mathematical Aspects of Modern

Logic and its Applications.

9. Hughes, R.I.G., ed. 1993. A Philosophical Companion to First-

Order Logic. Indianapolis: Hackett.

10. Wolenski, Jan, ed. 1993. Philosophical Logic in Poland.

Dordrecht: Reidel.

11. Smiley, Timothy John, ed. 1998. Philosophical Logic. Oxford:

Oxford University Press for the British Academy.

12. Goble, Lou, ed. 2001. The Blackwell Guide to Philosophical

Logic. Oxford: Blackwell.

Contents: List of contributors VII; Preface IX; Introduction:

Lou Goble 1; 1. Classical logic I - First-order logic: Wilfrid

Hodges 9; 2. Classical logic II - Higher-order logic: Stewart

Shapiro 33; 3. Set theory: John P. Burgess 55; 4. Gödel's

incompleteness theorems: Raymond Smullyan 72; 5. Truth Anil

Gupta; 6. Logical consequence: Patricia A. Blanchette 115; 7.

Modal logic: M. J. Cresswell 136; 8. Deontic logic: Risto

Hilpinen 159; 9. Epistemic logic: J.-J. Ch. Meyer 183; 10.

Temporal logic: Yde Venema 203; 11. Intuitionistic logic: Dirk

Van Dalen 224; 12. Free logics: Karel Lambert 258; 13.

Relevant logics: Edwin D. Mares and Robert K. Meyer 280; 14.

Many valued logics: Grzegorz Malinowski 309; 15.

Nonmonotonic logic: John F. Horty 336; 16. Probability, logic,

and probability logic: Alan Hájek 362; 17. Conditionals:

Dorothy Edgington 385; 18. Negation: Heinrich Wansing 415;

19. Quantifiers: Dag Westertähl 437; 20. Logic and natural

language: Alice ter Meulen 461; Index 484.

"What is philosophical logic? Philosophical logic is philosophy

that is logic, and logic that is philosophy. It is where philosophy

and logic come together and become one. Philosophical logic is

not a special kind of logic, some species distinct from

mathematical logic, symbolic logic, formal logic, informal logic,

modern logic, ancient logic, or logic with any other familiar

modifier. There is only logic. Logic is the theory of consequence

relations, of valid inferences. As such, it can be investigated and

presented in many ways, although the mathematical methods

of modern formal or symbolic logic have proved extraordinarily

fruitful.

Within logic so construed, there are still, of course, many

different sorts - as witnessed by the variety of chapters of this

volume. Philosophical logic comprises the sorts of logic that

hold greatest interest for philosophers. Philosophical logic

develops formal systems and structures to be applied to the

analysis of concepts and arguments that are central to

philosophical inquiry. So, for example, such traditional

philosophical concepts as necessity, knowledge, obligation,

time and existence, not to mention reasoning itself, are usefully

investigated through modal logic, epistemic logic, deontic logic,

temporal logic, free logic, probability logic, nonmonotonic

logic, etc. Similarly, logical investigation has contributed

immeasurably to our understanding of the structure of

language, including the languages of our normal use as well as

the formal languages of logic itself, and this resounds

throughout philosophy. By the same token, many of the

developments within philosophical logic have been motivated

by broad philosophical concerns. Intuitionistic logic reflects a

particular perspective on the nature of judgment and truth.

Many-valued logic grew out of Lukasiewicz's effort to construct

a logic that could avoid the conclusions of fatalism or

determinism. Other developments within philosophical logic

were driven by philosophical concern regarding logic itself.

Relevant logic sprang from a critique of the classical

consequence relation; so did free logic." (from the

Introduction).

13. Jacquette, Dale, ed. 2002. A Companion to Philosophical

Logic. Oxford: Blackwell.

Preface; Acknowledgments; List of Contributors;

Introduction: Logic, philosophy, and philosophical logic: Dale

Jacquette

Part I: Historical development of logic.

1. Ancient Greek philosophical logic: Robin Smith; 2. History of

logic: medieval: B.G. Sundholm and E.P. Bos; 3. The rise of

modern logic: Rolf George and James Van Evra;

Part II: Symbolic logic and ordinary language

4. Language, logic, and form: Kent Bach; 5. Puzzles about

intensionality: Nathan Salmon; 6. Symbolic logic and natural

language: Emma Borg and Ernest Lepore;

Part III: Philosophical dimensions of logical paradoxes

7. Logical paradoxes: James Cargile; 8. Semantical and logical

paradox: Keith Simmons; 9. Philosophical implications of

logical paradoxes: Roy A. Sorensen;

Part IV: Truth and definite description in semantic analysis:

10. Truth, the Liar, and Tarski's semantics: Gila Sher; 11. Truth,

the Liar, and Tarskian truth definition: Greg Ray; 12.

Descriptions and logical form: Gary Ostertag; 13. Russell's

theory of definite descriptions as a paradigm for philosophy:

Gregory Landini;

Part V: Concepts of logical consequence

14. Necessity, meaning, and rationality: the notion of logical

consequence: Stewart Shapiro; 15. Varieties of consequence : B.

G. Sundholm 16. Modality of deductively valid inference : Dale

Jacquette;

Part VI Logic, existence, and ontology

17. Quantifiers, being and canonical notation: Paul Gochet; 18.

From logic to ontology: some problems of predication, negation

and possibility: Herbert Hochberg; 19. Putting language first:

the "liberation" of logic from ontology: Ermanno Bencivenga;

Part VII: Metatheory and the scope and limits of logic

20. Metatheory: Alasdair Urquhart; 21. Metatheory of logics

and the characterization problem: Jan Wolenski; 22. Logic in

finite structures: definability, complexity, and randomness:

Scott Weinstein;

Part VIII: Logical foundations of set theory and mathematics

23. Logic and ontology: numbers and sets: José Benardete; 24.

Logical foundations of set theory and mathematics: Mary Tiles;

25. Property-theoretic foundations of mathematics: Michael

Jubien;

Part IX: Modal logics and semantics

26. Modal logic: Johan van Benthem; 27. First order alethic

modal logic: Melvin Fitting; 28. Proofs and expressiveness in

alethic modal logic: Maarten de Rijke and Heinrich Wansing;

29. Alethic modal logics and semantics: Gerhard Schurz; 30.

Epistemic logic: Nicholas Rescher; 31. Deontic, epistemic, and

temporal modal Logics: Risto Hilpinen;

Part X: Intuitionistic, free, and many-valued logics

32. Intuitionism: Dirk van Dalen and Mark van Atten; 33.

Many-valued, free, and intuitionistic logics: Richard Grandy;

34. Many-valued logic: Grzegorz Malinowski;

Part XI: Inductive, fuzzy, and quantum probability logics

35. Inductive logic : Stephen Glaister; 36. Heterodox

probability theory: Peter Forrest; 37. Why fuzzy logic?: Petr

Hájek;

Part XII: Relevance and paraconsistent logics

38. Relevance logic: Edwin Mares; 39. Paraconsistency: Bryson

Brown; 40. Logicians setting together contradictories: a

perspective on relevance, paraconsistency, and dialetheism:

Graham Priest;

Part XIII: Logic, machine theory, and cognitive science

41. The logical and the physical: Andrew W. Hodges; 42.

Modern logic and its role in the study of knowledge: Peter A.

Flach; 43. Actions and normative positions: A modal-mogical

approach: Robert Demolombe and Andrew J.I. Jones;

Part XIV: Mechanization of logical inference and proof

discovery

44. The automation of sound reasoning and successful proof

finding: Larry Wos and Branden Fitelson; 45. A computational

logic for applicative Common LISP: J. Strother Moore and Matt

Kaufmann; 46. Sampling labelled deductive systems: D.M.

Gabbay.

Resources for further study; Index.

14. ———, ed. 2002. Philosophy of Logic. An Anthology. Oxford:

Blackwell.

Contents: Preface IX; Acknowledgments X; Introduction: Logic

and philosophy of logic: Dale Jacquette 1

Part I. Classical logic

Introduction to Part I: 9

1. The laws of logic: Arthur Pap 13; 2, Russell's mathematical

logic: Kurt Gödel 21; 3. Which logic is the right logic?: Leslie H.

Tharp 35; 4. What can logic do for philosophy?: Karl Popper 46

Part II. Truth, propositions, and meaning

Introduction to Part II: 55

5. Truth and meaning: Donald Davidson 59; 6. Outline of a

theory of truth: Saul A. Kripke 70; 7. Tarski's theory of truth:

Hartry Field 86; 8. Types and ontology: Fred Sommers 103; 9.

Propositions: George Bealer 120

Part III. Quantifiers and quantificational theory

Introduction to Part III: 143

10. Logic and existence: Czeslaw Lejewski 147; 11. A plea for

substitutional quantification: Charles Parsons 156; 12.

Nominalism and the substitutional quantifier: Ruth Barcan

Marcus 161; 13. Interpretations of quantifiers: Thomas Baldwin

169; 14. Language-games for quantifiers: Jaakko Hintikka 183

Part IV: Validity, inference, and entailment

Introduction to Part IV: 201

15. Bolzano's concept of consequence: Rolf George 205; 16. On

the concept of logical consequence: Alfred Tarski 210; 17. The

pure calculus of entailment: Alan Ross Anderson and Nuel

Belnap, Jr. 216; 18. Formal and material consequence: Stephen

Read 237; 19. Tarski on truth and logical consequence: John

Etchemendy 247

Part V: Modality, Intensionality, and propositional attitude

Introduction to Part V: 271

20. What are possible worlds?: John E. Nolt 275; 21.

Quantifiers and propositional attitudes: W. V. Quine 285; 22.

Counterpart theory and quantified modal logic: David Lewis

292; 23. Interpretation of quantifiers: Dagfin Follesdal 301; 24.

A backward look at Quine's animadversions of modalities: Ruth

Barcan Marcus 308; 25. Quantifying in: David Kaplan 318; 26.

Substitutivity and the quantifying in: Graeme Forbes 338; 27.

The intensionality of ontological commitment: Michael Jubien

356

Index 362.

"The essays in this anthology include some of the most

important recent scholarship in philosophy of logic. I have

deliberately avoided republishing papers that are readily

available in other anthologies, or that are more closely related

to philosophy of language or philosophy of mathematics,

regardless of their influence in contemporary work in logic. My

intention has been to make this volume a more unique

distinctive resource that will complement rather than duplicate

other selections of readings currently available. Although some

of the papers are more technical than others, all are intended

for and can be read with good understanding by beginning

students in philosophy who have completed a first course in

symbolic logic.

My choice of papers has been guided by a sense of major issues

in philosophy of logic that have shaped recent discussion and

contributed to ongoing research programs in theoretical and

applied philosophical logic. To this end, I have organized the

papers thematically rather than chronologically, to give the best

overview of philosophical issues connected with logical analysis

and the development of formal systems of symbolic logic. The

papers range from general topics in classical logic to specialized

investigations of the concept of meaning and truth, the

interpretation of quantifiers in predicate logic, the theory of

valid inference and logical entailment, and problems of alethic

modality, intensionality, and propositional attitude. These are

undoubtedly among the central problems of philosophical logic

reflecting some of the most intriguing new directions in the

field, but they by no means exhaust the possibilities." (from the

Preface).

15. Bottani, Andrea, and Davies, Richard, eds. 2006. Modes of

Existence. Papers in Ontology and Philosophical Logic.

Frankfurt: Ontos Verlag.

16. Jacquette, Dale, ed. 2007. Philosophy of Logic. Amsterdam:

North-Holland.

17. Shapiro, Stewart. 2007. The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of

Mathematics and Logic. New York: Oxford University Press.

18. Gabbay, Dov M., and Guenthner, Franz, eds. 1983. Handbook

of Philosophical Logic. Dordrecht: Kluwer.

First edition in 4 volumes (1983-1989).

Second edition in 16 volumes (2001a-2010).

Natural Language and Logic

1. Lepore, Ernest. 2001. Meaning and Argument. An

Introduction to Logic through Language. Malden: Blackwell.

2. McCawley, Jamed D. 1981. Everything That Linguists Have

Always Wanted to Know About Logic*

*but Were Ashamed to Ask. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.

3. Cannon, Douglas. 2003. Deductive Logic in Natural Language.

California Road: Broadview Press.

4. Sommers, Fred. 1982. The Logic of Natural Language. Oxford:

Oxford University Press.

5. Gardies, Jean-Louis. 1985. Rational Grammar. München:

Philosophia Verlag.

Translation of: Esquisse d'une Grammaire Pure, Paris, Vrin,

1975, by Kevin Mulligan.

Philosophy of Modalities

1. Garson, James W. 2006. Modal Logic for Philosophers.

Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

2. Girle, Rod. 2009. Modal Logics and Philosophy. Montreal:

McGill-Queen's University Press.

Second edition (First edition 2001).

3. Forbes, Graeme. 1985. The Metaphysics of Modality. Oxford:

Clarendon Press.

4. ———. 1989. Languages of Possibility. An Essay in

Philosophical Logic. Oxford: Blackwell.

Non-Classical Logics

1. Priest, Graham. 2008. An Introduction to Non-Classical Logic.

From If to Is. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Second edition (First edition 2004).

Contents: Preface to the First Edition XVII; Preface to the

Second Edition XXI; Mathematical Prolegomenon p. XXVII-

XXXII; Part I. Propositional Logic. 1. Classical Logic and the

Material Conditional p. 1; 2. Basic Modal Logic p. 20; 3. Normal

Modal Logics p. 36; 4. Non-normal Modal Logics; Strict

Conditionals p. 60; 5. Conditional Logics 82; 6. Intuitionistic

Logic p. 103, 7. Many-valued Logics p. 120; 8. First Degree

Entailment p. 142; 9. Logic with Gaps, Gluts and Worlds p. 163;

10. Relevant Logics p. 188; 11. Fuzzy Logics p. 221; 11a.

Appendix: Many-valued Modal Logics 241; PostScript: An

Historical Perspective on Conditionals 259; Part II.

Quantification and Identity 261; 12. Classical First-order Logic

263; 13. Free Logics 290; 14. Constant Domain Modal Logics

309; 15. Variable Domain Modal Logics 329; 16. Necessary

Identity in Modal Logic 349; 17. Contingent Identity in Modal

Logic 367; 18. Non-normal Modal Logics 384; 19. Conditional

Logics 399; 20. Intuitionist Logic 421; 21. . Many-valued Logics

p. 456; 22. First Degree Entailment p. 476; 23. Logic with Gaps,

Gluts and Worlds p. 504; 24. Relevant Logics 535; 26. Fuzzy

Logics 564; Postscript: A Methodological Coda 584; References

p. 587; Index of Names p. 603; Index of Subjects p. 607-613..

"Around the turn of the twentieth century, a major revolution

occurred in logic. Mathematical techniques of a quite novel

kind were applied to the subject, and a new theory of what is

logically correct was developed by Gottlob Frege, Bertrand

Russell and others. This theory has now come to be called

'classical logic'. (...)

Despite this, many of the most interesting developments in

logic in the last forty years, especially in philosophy, have

occurred in quite different areas: intuitionism, conditional

logics, relevant logics, paraconsistent logics, free logics,

quantum logics, fuzzy logics, and so on. These are all logics

which are intended either to supplement classical logic, or else

to replace it where it goes wrong. The logics are now usually

grouped under the title 'non-classical logics'; and this book is

an Introduction to them.

The subject of non-classical logic is now far too big to permit

the writing of a comprehensive textbook, so I have had to place

some restrictions on what is covered. For a start, the book is

restricted to propositional logic. This is not because there are

no non-classical logics that are essentially first-order (there are:

free logic), but because the major interest in non-classical logics

is usually at the propositional level. (Often, the quantifier

extensions of these logics are relatively straightforward.)

Within propositional logics, I have also restricted the logics

considered here to ones which are relevant to the debate about

conditionals ('if ... then ...' sentences). Again, this is not because

this exhausts non-classical propositional logics (there is

quantum logic, for example), but because taking the topic of

conditionals as a leitmotiv gives the material a coherence that it

might otherwise lack. And, of course, conditionals are about as

central to logic as one can get.

The major semantical technique in non-classical logics is

possible-world semantics. Most non-classical logics have such

semantics. This is therefore the major semantical technique

that I use in the book. In many ways, the book could be thought

of as a set of variations on the theme of possible-world

semantics. It should be mentioned that many of the systems

discussed in the book have semantics other than possible-world

semantics - notably, algebraic semantics of some form or other.

Those, however, are an appropriate topic for a different book."

(from the Preface to the First Edition, XVII-XVIII)

"The first edition of Introduction to Non-Classical Logic deals

with just propositional logics. In 2004, Cambridge University

Press and I decided to produce a second volume dealing with

quantification and identity in non- classical logics. Late in the

piece, it was decided to put the old and the new

volumes together, and simply bring out one omnibus volume.

The practical decision caused a theoretical problem. Was it the

same book as the old Introduction or a different one? The

answer -- as befits a book on non-classical logic -- was, of

course, both. So the name of the book had to be the same and

different. We decided to achieve this seeming impossibility by

adding an appropriate sub-title to the book, 'From If to Is'.

Though there are many propositional operators and

connectives, the conditional, 'if', is perhaps the most vexed. It

is, at any rate, the focus around which the old Introduction

moves. Whether or not 'if' is univocal is a contentious matter;

but 'is' is certainly said in many ways. There is the 'is' of

predication (Ponting is Australian'), the 'is' of existence ('There

is a spider in the bathtub', 'Socrates no longer is'), and the 'is' of

identity ('2 plus 2 is 4'). All of these are in play in first-order

logic; they provide the focus around which the new part of the

book moves." (from the Preface to the Second Edition, XXI).

2. Bremer, Manuel. 2005. An Introduction to Paraconsistent

Logics. Bern: Peter Lang.

3. Haack, Susan. 1996. Deviant Logic, Fuzzy Logic. Beyond the

Formalism. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

First edition with the title Deviant Logic, 1974.

4. Mares, Edwin D. 2004. Relevant Logic. A Philosophical

Interpretation. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

5. Restall, Greg. 2000. An Introduction to Substructurals Logics.

New York: Routledge.

6. Benthem, Johann van. 1987. A Manual of Intensional Logic.

Stanford: CSLI.

Second edition revised and expanded (first edition 1984).

7. Schurz, Gerhard. 1997. The Is-Ought Problem. An

Investigation in Philosophical Logic. Dordrecht: Kluwer.

Bibliographia. Annotated bibliographies

Raul Corazzon || rc@ontology.co || Info

Study Guide for Bibliographies of

Philosophy and Manuals of Style

General Bibliographies of Philosophy

1. Guerry, Herbert. 1977. A Bibliography of Philosophical

Bibliographies. Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press.

Contents: Acknowledgments VII; Introduction IX-XIII; I.

Bibliographies of individual philosophers 1; II. Subect

bibliographies 179; Index 313-332.

"The present work attempts to list philosophical bibliographies

published in all countries since about 1450, when printing was

invented, through the year 1974. Non-specialists and

undergraduates will find references to the standard

bibliographical aids appropriate to their interests and courses.

Advanced scholars are directed to the more specialized and

abstruse bibliographies. My aim has been to include only

bibliographies that have been published separately or appeared

as contributions to journals, though I have included a few

significant bibliographies which were published as appendixes

to monographs or as parts of larger bibliographies. This

restriction was necessary in order to make the task of compiling

the bibliography manageable. Bibliographies are always

incomplete, and all subject bibliographies are slightly out of

date from the time of publication. The present volume is no

exception. Like Mozart's Don Giovanni, I have tried to make my

collection as extensive as possible, knowing all the while that

true completeness is a daydream. Moreover, when I began my

work, I had intended to describe each work cited. As the

number of entries grew, it became clear, given my present

circumstances, that the annotation of each item would be

impossible. I therefore elected to write as many annotations as

I could for the present edition and complete them in a

subsequent larger work. The bibliographies in this volume are

divided into two alphabetically arranged lists, numbered

consecutively. The first list (1-1395) contains bibliographies on

the works of, and literature about, individual philosophers. The

second list (1396-2353) contains bibliographies on

philosophical topics. Bibliographies that cover more than one

topic are cross-indexed; thus a bibliography on the doctrine of

Platonic ideas appears under the subject heading "Ideas

(Platonic)," but is also referred to by number in the entries

under the author heading 'Plato." Bibliographies of works on or

within a school of philosophy bearing the name of an individual

(for example, "Cartesianism," "Cartesians," "Marxism,"

"Marxism-Leninism") are listed among the bibliographies on

that individual (for example, under "Descartes, René," or

"Marx, Karl").

(...)

The definition of "philosophy" is complicated by the fact that

much of what used to count as philosophy no longer does. The

Bibliotheca Philosophica by Paulus Bolduanus in 1616 and the

work of the same name by Burkhard GoIthelf Struve in 1804

contain much that we would not call philosophy today.

Some of what Europeans in the last hundred years have called

philosophy, Americans now term psychology or sociology or

educational theory. Some of what has passed for philosophy in

Britain and America in the last fifty years would not be

recognized as such in other countries.

The implication is that one must define "philosophy" broadly.

The meanings of words change not only from time to time but

also from place to place. Words are in some respects like

natural species, neither being static. In some organisms that

reproduce asexually (some bacteria, for example), the

differentiation of one species from another is somewhat

subjective. Similar problems arise in differentiating the more

complex forms of life that reproduce sexually. The ability to

cross usually is taken as the identity mark of species, yet there

exist "distinct species" of plants and animals that cannot cross

with one another, but can both cross with a third "species."

Problems concerning the delimitation or specification of

concepts are analogous.

My criteria for the philosophical, therefore, have been rather

broad. If a bibliography covers a thinker or a topic that might

be considered in a philosophy course or in a work on the history

of philosophy, or if the bibliogr€@ê[aphy has been published in

a journal that appears in any of the lists of philosophical

journals, then I have tended to include it. Nevertheless, I have

eliminated some bibliographies that seemed to me to be purely

in the field of religion, which comprises its own distinct area of

scholarship. I have not restricted myself solely to Western

philosophy. If Western thinkers preponderate here, it is

because the materials available to me dealt almost exclusively

with Western works and because non-Western patterns of

scholarship have not produced much in the way of

bibliographies. If there is a disproportionately large number of

bibliographies on semi-philosophical figures and problems, this

is a reflection of the work previously done by compilers of

bibliographies: the large number of people interested in belles-

lettres, for example, insures that the number of Voltaire

bibliographies will be large; the zeal that so often accompanies

faith in an idea (Christianity, Marxism, occultism) guarantees

that the number of bibliographies of works related to these

faiths will be large.

Four centuries ago Montaigne, lamenting an affliction endemic

to scholarship, wrote: "There is more ado to interpret

interpretations than to interpret the things, and more books

upon books than upon all other subjects; we do nothing but

comment upon one another."8 Nevertheless, I offer the reader

not only another book about books, but in effect, a book about

books about books. My purpose, of course, is to make the vast

literature of philosophy more open to philosophers and

students of philosophy, many of whom probably would write

better in the end if they would read a little more and write a

little less." (from the Introduction).

2. Totok, Wilhelm, ed. 1964. Handbuch der Geschichte der

Philosophie. Frankfurt: Klostermann.

This work, conceived as a supplement to Friedrich Ueberweg'

Grundriss der Geschichte der Philosophie (twelfth edition

1923-1928), is the most complete bibliography on the history of

philosophy for the publications from 1920 up to 1980, with an

Introduction listing works on the methodology of research in

philosophy and on the general history of philosophy,

dictionaries, introdutions and works on the philosophical

disciplines; articles from over 400 periodicals are cited.

Six volumes (1964-1990): 1. Altertum: indische, chinesische,

griechisch-römische Philosophie; 2. Mittelalter; 3. Renaissance;

4. Frühe Neuzeit: 17. Jahrhundert; 5. Bibliographie 18. und 19.

Jahrhundert; 6. Bibliographie 20. Jahrhundert.

A second expanded and updated edition of the first volume was

published in 1997.

3. Bynagle, Hans Edward. 2006. Philosophy. A Guide to the

Reference Literature. Westport: Libraries Unlimited.

Third edition (first edition 1986; second edition 1997).

Contents: Preface; Chapter 1: Introduction; Part I. General

sources. Chapter 2: General Bibliographic and Research

Guides; Chapter 3: Chapter 3: General Bibliographies; Chapter

4: General Indexes, Abstract and Review Sources, and Serial

Bibliographies; Chapter 5: National and Regional

Bibliographies and Indexes; Chapter 6: General Internet

Resources and Gateways; Chapter 7: General Encyclopedias,

Dictionaries and Handbooks; Part II. History of Philosophy.

Chapter 8: Comprehensive History Sources; Chapter 9: Non-

Western Philosophy; Chapter 10: Western Philosophy: General,

National, and Regional; Chapter 11: Western Philosophy:

Ancient; Chapter 12: Western Philosophy: Medieval and

Renaissance; Chapter 13: Western Philosophy: Modern through

Nineteenth Century; Chapter 14: Western Philosophy:

Twentieth and Twenty-first Century; Part III. Branches of

Philosophy. Chapter 15: Aesthetics, Philosophy of Art, and Art

Criticism; Chapter 16: Epistemology, Metaphysics, and

Philosophy of Mind; Chapter 17: Ethics; Chapter 18: Logic and

the Philosophies of Mathematics, Science, and Social Sciences;

Chapter 19: Philosophy of Education; Chapter 20: Philosophy

of religion; Chapter 21; Social, Political, and Legal Philosophy;

Chapter 22: Other Branches and Special Topics; Part IV.

Miscellanea. Chapter 23: Sundry Currents, Schools, and

Movements; Chapter 24: Directories and Miscellaneous

Reference Sources; Appendix 1: Core Academic Titles;

Appendix 2: Titles especially Suited for Public and School

Libraries; Author Index; Title Index; Subject Index.

"This guide to reference sources in philosophy has been

compiled and written with a diversity of users in mind. It is

intended for professional philosophers and teachers of

philosophy; for students of philosophy at both undergraduate

and graduate levels; for librarians, as an aid in reference service

and collection development; and, to a lesser extent, for the

general reader or inquirer who may come to philosophy with

little of no background. Not everyone, needless to say, will be

equally well served by every part of this guide, and that is

undoubtedly true also of the work as a whole. Nonetheless, I

have tried to keep all of these potential audiences in mind

throughout, and have tried in particular to gear the level of

information provided in the annotations to the audience(s)

most likely to take an interest in them and to use and benefit

from the work in question. That same principle applies to the

Introduction (ch. 1), which is addressed primarily to those

without a close acquaintance with the field of philosophy,

though readers who are not in that position may find parts of it

helpful as well.

The present guide succeeds two previous editions of

Philosophy: A Guide to the Reference Literature, also

published by Libraries Unlimited (1st ed., 1986, 2nd ed., 1997).

The most radical departure from its predecessors is represented

by its organization. It employs what is predominantly a subject

arrangement classifying sources first of all in relation to the

various divisions of philosophy and its history, in contrast to

the primary arrangement by types of reference sources

(bibliographies, indexes, dictionaries and encyclopedias, etc.)

employed previously." (from the Preface).

4. Follon, Jacques. 1993. Guide bibliographique des études de

philosophie. Paris: Vrin.

From the English Preface: "In the course of their studies, most

students of philosophy at university or even in secondary

education will sooner or later be called upon to produce a piece

of original work. Whether this be an M.A. thesis, a doctoral

dissertation, or simply a paper to be presented in some course,

seminar or exam, such work always requires active research.

However, faced with this requirement, many find themselves

completely disheartened by the scope and complexity of the

task. There are as well many young teachers of philosophy who

experience serious difficulties in compiling the material

necessary to prepare their lectures, which are meant to

introduce to the discipline which they themselves are teaching.

It is precisely to these two categories of "apprentice

philosophers" that the present work is addressed: not, of

course, in order to teach them the art of composition or

pedagogics (in these two fields, innumerable and excellent

manuals already exist), but rather to furnish them with a choice

of bibliographical references which should prove useful in

carrying out philosophical research or in preparing a course in

philosophy. With this end in mind, the present short work does

not whatsoever pretend to be exhaustive. On the contrary:

instead of overwhelming the reader with a mass of information

that might easily have discouraged him (or her), I have simply

had the intention to provide an accessible guide, which points

out the most important and most interesting tools for research

or for the preparation of a course. There are a number of

previous publications some aspects of which have served as a

model for my own project; above all, I must mention the book

by L. De Raeymaeker, Introduction à la philosophie, 6th ed.,

Louvain, Publications universitaires, 1967, especially pages 231

to 304 ("Renseignements bibliographiques"); but also R. T. De

George, A Guide to Philosophical Bibliography and Research,

New York, Meredith, 1971; and H. J. Koren, Research in

Philosophy. A Bibliographical Introduction to Philosophy and

a few Suggestions for Dissertations, Pittsburgh (Pa.),

Duquesne University Press, 1966; and finally, the unpublished

lecture notes of the late Canon C. Wenin, who used to teach the

"Introduction to philosophy" course at the Institut Supérieur de

Philosophie at Louvain-la-Neuve. For the updating of

bibliographical data, I have extensively drawn on the appendix

to vol. I (L'univers philosophique) of the Encyclopédie

philosophique universelle, edited under the direction of A.

Jacob, Paris, P.U.F., 1989 (pp. 1741-1908)."

5. Gerber, William, and Farmer, Michael J. 2006.

"Bibliographies." In Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Second

Edition. Volume 10, edited by Borchert, Donald M., 67-177.

New York: Thomson Gale.

"The First Edition of the Encyclopedia of Philosophy included

bibliographical essays dealing with philosophy dictionaries and

encyclopedias, philosophy journals, and philosophy

bibliographies. To preserve and enhance these essays, they

have been reproduced in this Second Edition along with

detailed updates. The updates to the bibliographies cover

material published between 1965 and mid-2005. All of the

references appear in OCLC's WorldCat bibliographic database

and are thus available either in mid- to large-size academic

libraries, or through interlibrary loan. While the bibliographies

are extensive, they are not exhaustive. This is especially true in

the case of the journal bibliography, where less readily available

non-English-language journals have been excluded, as have

journals published for short periods of time. Accessibility was

deemed to be more important than exhaustive coverage. The

subject coverage includes both general philosophical works and

works from the major sub-domains of philosophy. The

bibliographic lists show that philosophy is a vital, worldwide

discipline.

A perusal of the journal bibliography will show that new

journals are appearing every year, and the dictionary and

encyclopedia bibliography identifies publications in fifty

different languages. The constant stream of new journals and

the accumulation of philosophical resources in so many

languages are indicators of a truly vibrant discipline."

W. Gerber is the author of the articles in the First Edition

(1967); the updates in the Second Edition (2005) are by M. J.

Farmer.

6. The Philosopher's Index. An International Index to

Philosophical Periodicals. 1940.

"The Philosopher's Index is the world's most current and

comprehensive bibliography of scholarly research in

philosophy, serving the philosophical community worldwide.

Today, The Index contains more than 450,000 records drawn

from over 680 journals, originating from more than 50

countries. The literature coverage dates back to 1940 and

includes print and electronic journals, books, anthologies,

contributions to anthologies, and book reviews. Covering

scholarly research in all major areas of philosophy, The Index

features informative, author-written abstracts. The extensive

indexing, which includes proper names along with subject

terms, enhances the search capability. The Philosopher's Index

is owned and published by the Philosopher's Information

Center."

7. Bibliographie de la Philosophie / Bibliography of Philosophy.

1954. Paris: Vrin.

"The present publication is not only international in scope but

also polylingual, providing abstracts in the language of origin

for books in English, French, German, Italian, and Spanish, and

in either English or French for books in other languages. In a

typical year, well over a thousand books are covered in the

Bibliographie. The signed abstracts are intended to be factual

and not critical. They vary in length from a few to sometimes

more than 30 lines. Entries and abstracts are contributed via

"centers of philosophical bibliography" in over 50 countries

represented in the Institut International de Philosophie, the

Paris-based organization responsible for the Bibliographie and

one of several international bodies (UNESCO is another)

associated with its publication.

The Bibliographie employs a systematic arrangement with 10

broad and rather standard divisions (philosophy in general;

logic and philosophy of science; ethics and values; etc.).

Indexes are not provided in each quarterly issue -- only

cumulated annual indexes in the final issue of each volume.

One index formerly combined authors, titles, and title

catchwords, but has been reduced since volume 34 (1987) to

just an author index, except for anonymous works or others

listed by title only. A second, labeled "Index of Names,"

combines publishers, translators, authors of prefaces, and

individuals mentioned in titles or in abstracts. Volume 41

(1994) brought the addition of a subject index, divided into

three distinct parts: (I) periods; (2) doctrines, disciplines, and

trends of thought; and (3) concepts and categories.

A Glossaire / Glossary, published as a supplement in 1995, lists

translation equivalents for frequently occurring terms and

expressions across the five languages used in the

Bibliographie." (from H. E. Bynagle - A Guide to the Reference

Literature, pp. 33-34).

8. Répertoire bibliographique de la philosophie / International

Philosophical Bibliography. 1991. Louvain: Institut supérieuer

de Philosophie.

From the Introduction: "The aim of the bibliography is to list

philosophical literature as such; the adjective is understood

rather strictly, with the result that scientific disciplines which

are related to philosophy, and even the auxiliary sciences of

philosophy, are not treated of in their own right; the increasing

volume of this literature, plus the availability of specialized

bibliographical guides to it, preclude the possibility of

incorporating it into the bibliography. Only publications

relating to the methods or the philosophy of the sciences,

together with publications of a general nature relative to the

objects treated of by these disciplines, are referred to. This rule

applies particularly to the following disciplines: symbolic logic,

linguistics, psychology, aesthetics and theology.

In principle, the bibliography is confined to philosophical

literature published in the following languages: Dutch, English,

French, German, Italian, Latin, Portuguese, Spanish and

Catalan. The published works in other languages are only

indicated in the cases where they are accompanied by a

summary in one of the languages mentioned above."

9. Philosophie. Liste mondiale des périodiques spécialisés /

Philosophy. World list of specialized periodicals. 1967. Paris:

Mouton.

A bilingual (French and English) work that lists philosophical

periodicals by country and indexes them by subject, by

publishing bodies, and by titles.

"One of the main tasks of the Service for the Exchange of

Scientific Information of the Maison des Sciences de l'Homme

is to describe for researchers the most useful tools of

documentation in their different fields.

It is obvious that amongst these tools scientific periodicals

occupy an important place. Articles, more often than books,

keep up to date with research trends and provide information

on the current scientific scene. Although the periodicals

containing these articles are a relatively adaptable and rapid

means of providing information, they are often difficult to

trace. This is mostly due to their vast and ever-increasing

number; also to a confusing duplication of titles, uncertainties

about which periodicals are connected to which others,

irregular intervals of publication, sudden disappearances and

reappearances of titles -- in short, to the particularly unstable

existence of these periodicals.

In 1964, in order to introduce a little clarity into this apparent

disorder, and thus facilitate specialised research, the Service for

the Exchange of Scientific Information drew up for the

International Committee for Social Sciences Documentation

the third edition of the World List of Social Science Periodicals,

published by UNESCO in 1966. The present list provides an

inventory of the principal periodicals in the field of philosophy

and though complete in itself, is a continuation of the first list.

Soon lists of periodicals in other subjects will appear:

psychology, linguistics, African studies.

The SELECTION of periodicals has been made according to the

criteria already established for social science journals. Only

periodicals of a scientific character have been listed, i.e. those

publishing original studies and articles by university or other

specialists. This implies, a priori, the exclusion of all

publications whose contents consist of translations, reprints or

unsigned articles, and of doctrinal or propagandist periodicals

designed to publicise or disseminate an ideology - of whatever

kind - rather than to advance knowledge.

In the specialised branches of the subject it is difficult to know

where to draw the line, as the distinction between philosophy in

the strict sense of the word, and the history of ideas or some

ideological si and is not always clear. On the whole we have

attempted to distinguish between periodicals devoted to

philosophical research and those whose principal purpose is to

propagate a specific ideology. We have, however, taken it into

account that in some countries this latter category also prints

pure philosophical studies, and in these cases the titles have

been included in the list." (from the Preface).

10. Hogrebre, Wolfram, Konig, Gert, and Kamp, Rudolf. 1972.

Periodica philosophica. Eine internationale Bibliographie

philosophischer Zeitschriften von den Anfangen bis zur

Gegenwart. Düsseldorf: Philosophia Verlag.

"This is an international listing of some 5,000 journals, both

extant and defunct, in the field of philosophy broadly defined

(broadly enough to include borderline journals in religion,

psychology, general humanistic studies, etc.). Data provided

typically include country and dates of publication, first and (if

applicable) last issue numbers, sponsoring organization(s), and

previous and subsequent titles. A special section, labeled

Kettenregister ("chain index"), diagrams complex series of title

changes, splits, mergers, and so forth. There is also a classified

subject index and a country index." (from H. E. Bynagle - A

Guide to the Reference Literature, p. 28).

11. Ruben, Douglas H. 1985. Philosophy Journals and Serials: An

Analytical Guide. Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood.

"Traditionally, philosophy comprises five general fields of

study: logic, aesthetics, ethics, politics, and metaphysics. In all

five fields is represented the continuum from historical to

modern contemporary evolutions in philosophical criticism.

This book surveys mainly the twentieth-century evolutions of

philosophy in an analytic review of English-language serials

published all over the world. (...) The bibliography of 335

entries that follows includes newsletters, bulletins, and serials.

Three basic criteria determined their selection. First, did the

serial have a regular frequency of publication? Irregularity of

distribution poses a problem because readers want a

continuous flow of information. Second, did the serial contain

articles, summaries, reviews, or some section in the English-

language? Publications in Poland, France, Italy, and Israel, for

instance, may circulate to English-speaking subscribers without

ever or only rarely printing English articles or translations. But

these were excluded from the survey. Finally, did the serial

serve as a critical forum for discussion within the five

traditional field of philosophy? Ideally, the content of journals

determines the appropriate field. But in practice even the most

specialized journal in, say, aesthetics, may accept articles

outside of the field proper, thereby creating an overlap. One

alternative to reduce overlap was to expand beyond the five

sub-fields to the following list: aesthetics, epistemology, ethics,

morality, philosophy of religion, metaphysics (cosmology),

philosophy of anthropology, philosophy of education,

philosophy of history, philosophy of politics (law), philosophy

of social sciences, semantics (language), logic, and general

issues. Further divisions of philosophy covered in the journals

may be found through the Subject Index." (from the Preface).

12. Plott, John C., and Mays, Paul D. 1969. Sarva-Darsana-

Sangraha. A Bibliographical Guide to the Global History of

Philosophy. Leiden: Brill.

"The purpose of this Bibliography and its annotations can be

stated in a very few but powerful words: To make some

contribution to the development of WORLD COMMUNITY by

facilitating the study of, or at least Introduction to, the major

philosophers in World History (or global or globalizing history,

if one prefers that new terminology); and to so arrange them in

historical order that this Bibliography will make possible in

American Philosophy Departments the teaching of the Global

History of Philosophy instead of, or in addition to, the present

courses in the History of (only) Western Philosophy.

Heretofore most of the Materials covered in this survey have

been dealt with primarily by those working in the field of

"Comparative" Philosophy, or in the "Asia Studies" field, or the

"East-West" nexus. This has been necessary for a preparation

for what is yet to be realized, but it is not sufficient. It is hoped

that the historical approach to the field will vindicate itself from

the Materials here presented.

(...)

As to mechanics of the apparatus, the following remarks are in

order: Cross-references have been kept to a basic minimum,

although some will be found, where that has been considered

necessary. Needless to say, very few books indeed fit into one

single category or even, for that matter, into any single system

of classification. In an historical survey in particular, the 'lines'

between Intellectual or Cultural History and the (global)

History of Philosophy very often become blurred or -- to use

another metaphor - sometimes the 'lines' even get crossed and

even tangled up, so that one very often gets the wrong number,

no matter how many times he dials! Oversights and

underestimations, of course, are almost unavoid able in

constituting what is virtually a New Field. Estimations of

importance are necessary in order to give coherency, even

though of course, others of many camps, and often for

diametrically opposed reasons, will disagree. It seems that

among philosophers even more than in matters political, you

can please some of the people some of the time ... but to please

all of the people all the time - not even God seems able to do

that!

The single starred (•) entries are those considered as most

essential for the continuation of the basic themes or else those

which commend themselves for some particular reason or other

usually mentioned in the Annotation.

Those double starred (**) are the "sine qua non" books, or

books otherwise recommended for special attention. In a few

cases, publishers or dates are not listed. In almost all of these, it

is because references thus far available have been incomplete,

or because of private printings or customs differing from

modern western custom in matters of publication." (pp. XI and

XV).

13. Risse, Wilhelm. 1998. Bibliographia Philosophica Vetus.

Repertorium generale systematicum operum philosophicorum

usque ad annum MDCCC typis impressorum. Hildesheim:

Georg Olms.

"In something of a tour de force, Risse has compiled a

comprehensive short-title bibliography that attempts to include

all independently published works of Western philosophy from

the invention of printing, ca. 1455, up to 1800, in (he carefully

qualifies) all Western languages accessible to him. This

includes not only works of philosophers who lived and wrote

within the specified timeframe, but also editions of

philosophers from the ancient, medieval, and early Renaissance

periods. They amount to an estimated 76,400 titles. These are

divided over eight volumes of varying length, defined by a

combination of subject-field and genre categories (...)

Parts 1-7 are uniformly arranged chronologically by year of

publication, within each year alphabeticalfy by author. Each

part includes an author index, index of titles of anonymous

works, index of authors who are the subjects of others'

commentaries, and a topical index. Part 8, which lists printed

academic theses in volumes 1-2, is arranged alphabetically by

author of the originaf thesis (disputatio), regardless of

publication year.

Under each thesis entry it lists, where applicable, published

responses to it by other writers. The latter are also indexed in

volume 3 of Part 8 with references hack to the relevant entries

in volumes 1 and 2.

The ninth volume, titled Syllabus auctorum, contains a

complete author index, with birth and death dates, places of

birth and activity, and profession (as available); a concordance

of Latin and vernacular place names; and a short list of

abbreviations of monastic orders.

For nearly every entry in this bibliography Risse provides,

besides the customary bibliographic data, one or more location

codes for holding libraries where exemplars are available.

These included numerical codes for major German research

libraries, alphabetical codes for some 350 additional libraries in

Europe and America. As Risse notes, many of the works listed

are rare, and some were found only in "smaller" libraries

(preface). Those he has personally inspected are marked by an

asterisk."

From: Hans E. Bynagle - Philosophy. A guide to the reference

literature. Third edition - Westport, Libraries Unlimited, 2006,

pp. 127-128.

14. Redmond, Walter Bernard. 1972. Bibliography of the

Philosophy in the Iberian Colonies of America. The Hague:

Martinus Nijhoff.

"CONTENT

The first part of this bibliography is a catalogue of philosophical

writings from colonial Latin America which, on the basis of the

secondary literature, are presumed to be extant. It is followed

by a short appendix listing some colonial authors whose

philosophical works are lost, but which perhaps still exist. The

second part of the bibliography contains the secondary

literature: studies on the philosophy of colonial Latin America

as well as subsequently published texts and translations of the

works of the colonial authors. It also contains non-

philosophical works to which reference is made in the first

section. A brief digest of the content of each philosophical work

follows the entry.

SCOPE

The colonial material belongs to two philosophical currents

which are discernible in the period: "pure" scholasticism, an

extension of the Iberian scholastic renaissance of the 16th

century and lasting well into the 19th century, and "modern"

scholasticism, which was influenced by the newer ideas from

Europe and usually attempted to reconcile them to the

traditional philosophy. This modern scholasticism, already

present in the 17th century, becomes a strong force in the

second half of the 18th century. Both the "pure" and the

"modern" scholasticism tend to be supplemented after 1810 by

non-scholastic philosophies. Hence works written after this

date have generally not been registered in this bibliography,

except for a few important works continuing the modern

scholastic tendency.

Most of the primary documents are the traditional philosophy

(and theology) cursus (classroom treatises on logic, physics,

psychology, metaphysics, ethics, and the various theology

courses) and conclusions (or theses, asserta, etc.; lists of

opinions defended in scholastic functions), but some other

material has also been included (articles in periodicals, "study

plans", etc.)." (p. VIII).

Bibliographies on Women Philosophers

1. Barth, Else M. 1992. Women Philosophers. A Bibliography of

Books through 1990. Bowling Green: Bowling Green State

University.

"Philosophical books written or edited by women are included

whatever their subject matter or point of view. Judgments of

quality, too, do not come into play, and the only bounds are

certain limitations of language and geography dictated by

practical considerations: Eastern Europe and non-English-

speaking countries outside Europe are not covered. Doctoral

dissertations, even those not published. are included "wherever

possible" (p. 3), that is, if the information was somewhat

readily available. More than 2,800 items are listed, and more

than 1,900 names appear in the author index. Entries are not

annotated." (from H. E. Bynagle, A Guide to the Reference

Literature, p. 31).

2. Hutchings, Noël, and Rumsey, William D., eds. 1997.

Collaborative Bibliography of Women in Philosophy. Bowling

Green: Bowling Green State University.

"Lists and often annotates more than 11.000 philosophical

works produced by more than 3,500 women, from the pre-

Socratics to near the close of the twentieth century. It is not

restricted to "philosophers" in a narrow sense, including for

instance such figures as Theosophist Helena Blavatzky and

writer Virginia Woolf. The "collaborative" description

incorporated in the title reflects the fact that this print volume

derived from an online bibliography that invited contributions,

corrections, and suggestions from anyone-and provided a

mechanism for submitting them-while maintaining editorial

control to assure acceptable levels of authenticity and scholarly

quality. Lamentably, this online project, known as Noema:

Collaborative Bibliography of Women in Philosophy despite

holding up an intriguing model for the future of Web-based

bibliography, went off-line in July 2003. With it have vanished,

at least for now, additions entered subsequent to this print

version, which even by mid-2001 (my latest figures) had

expanded the bibliography to more than 16,000 records

representing over 5,000 women.

Entries are arranged alphabetically by authors' last names.

Books and (occasionally) works in nonprint media are listed

first, then articles, as applicable, by date of publication within

each category. There is an index of named persons and

subjects. Topical entries in this index tend to be overly broad:

an article on adultery, for instance, can't be found under that

subject entry (there isn't one) or even under "sex, philosophy

of," but only under "ethics, applied." As for indexed names,

their most distinctly valuable aspect would seem to be the

references to women philosophers writing about other women

philosophers. These render this in some measure a secondary

bibliography on women philosophers, though not in a full-

fledged sense: a work about a woman philosopher written by a

male would find no place here." (from H. E. Bynagle - A Guide

to the Reference Literature, pp. 31-32).

Bibliographies on the History and

Historiography of Philosophy

1. Schneider, Ulrich Johannes. 1992. "A Bibliography of

Nineteenth-Century Histories of Philosophy in German,

English, and French (1810-1899)." Storia della Storiografia no.

21:141-169.

Revised reprint in: U. J. Schneider, Philosophie und

Universität. Historisierung der Vernunft im 19. Jahrhundert,

Hamburg, Felix Meiner, 2000, pp. 317-355.

"Until the eighteenth century, the history of philosophy,

understood as the 'lives and opinions' of philosophers, was

mainly the work of scholars; Johann Jakob Brucker's Historia

critica philosophiae in 1766-1767, when it was printed for the

last time in six enormous quarto volumes, is an example of this

kind of work (2). At the end of the eighteenth century, a new

generation of historians (mainly German) transformed the

scholarly tradition by making it the place for a general

problematization of philosophical thought, past and present; in

addition, they presented the history of philosophy as a

narrative. The first document of this new historical interest in

philosophy's past is the Geschichte der Philosophie by Wilhelm

Gottlieb Tennemann, which appeared in eleven volumes

between 1798 and 1819 (3). Ever since, this historical interest

has remained very productive, and the nineteenth century

already witnessed a rapid increase in books on the history of

philosophy.

The following bibliography documents this increase in the

number of books presenting and (re)presenting the historical

knowledge about philosophy. Their sheer number is

astonishing and makes it almost impossible to highlight

individual historians, as one can for earlier centuries (4). In the

nineteenth century, this interest in the history of philosophy

evidently became more general. There are reasons other than

literary or intellectual ones which may explain this increase in

the number of works similar in title and in form. Most of the

authors of these histories of philosophy were school or

university teachers of philosophy, that is to say pedagogical

mediators of philosophical knowledge, including the historical

knowledge of philosophy.

The bibliography presented here is not, and cannot be,

complete. Apart from all the usual bibliographical

uncertainties, the very category of the history of philosophy

resists precise definition. All the titles listed make the history of

philosophy the subject of a narrative. The variations are

nonetheless considerable. Some of the books are of several

hundred pages, some of less than one hundred. The inclusion of

small books is undoubtedly problematic. There are other works

which do not make the history of philosophy their explicit

subject (and which therefore are not listed here), which

nevertheless treat it at greater length than some of those

included. With regard to the manifold forms of

historiographical work within the area of philosophy, the

following list shows not much more than the tip of the iceberg.

The bibliography presented here should serve as a basis for

further investigation, into the ways of making past events

present, the practice of reading old texts and the technique of

presenting historical knowledge about philosophy. As in

previous centuries, nineteenth-century historical work on

philosophy was not autonomous; in ways which have not been

sufficiently recognized, it fulfilled pedagogical and institutional

needs, and complied with numerous interests which have not

yet been analyzed; it dealt with issues which the quantity of

titles proves to be urgent, but which are still far from being

understood." (pp. 141-142)

(2) Brucker is made an essential figure in Lucien Braun's

history of the history of philosophy -- the only complete history

of its kind (from the beginnings up to Hegel); cfr. L. Braun,

Histoire de l'histoire de la philosophie (Paris, 1974; German

transl. Geschichte der Philosophiegeschichte, Darmstadt,

1990).

(3) Tennemann's work is central in my essay on the origins of

the modem, narrative historiography of philosophy; cfr. U. J.

Schneider, Die Vergangenheit des Geistes. Eine Archäologie

der Philosophiegeschichte (Frankfurt am Main, 1990).

(4) Giovanni Santinello has established an Italian research

group offering interpretations of modem European philosophy

historians and their work; cfr. Storia delle storie generali della

filosofia, ed. G. Santinello (Brescia, 1979 sqq.). Already

published vol. I, Dalle origini rinascimentali alla historia

philosophica (Brescia, 1981); vol. II, Dall'età cartesiana a

Brucker (Brescia, 1979); vol. III (in two parts). Il secondo

illuminismo e l'età kantiana (Padova, 1988). Still to come vol.

IV, L'età hegeliana and vol. V. Il secondo Ottocento [the two

last volumes was published in 1995-2004 (Vol. IV, in two parts)

and in 2005].

Style Manuals and Student Guides

General Manual of Style:

1. The Chicago Manual of Style: The Essential Guide for Writers,

Editors and Publishers. 2010. Chicago: University of Chicago

Press.

Sixteeenth edition.

"This, the sixteenth edition of The Chicago Manual of Style,

marks the first edition to be prepared and published

simultaneously in print and online. As opportunities for

publishing have grown dramatically in an era of electronic

publication and distribution, the guiding principles for this

edition have been twofold: to recognize the continuing

evolution in the way authors, editors, and publishers do their

work, on the one hand, and to maintain a focus on those

aspects of the process that are independent of the medium of

publication, on the other.

(...)

This edition marks an evolution of more than forty years,

starting with the landmark twelfth edition, published in 1969.

As part of this evolution, and as with the fifteenth edition,

Chicago consulted a broad range of scholars and professionals

in the fields of publishing and academics throughout the

revision process. We also continued to benefit from the many

helpful comments and suggestions sent to us by our readers,

many of whom come from fields outside of scholarly

publishing. Their input, in particular, helped us to keep in mind

those principles of writing and editing that remain true

regardless of the medium or field of publication." (From the

Preface).

2. Turabian, Kate L. 2007. A Manual for Writers of Research

Papers, Theses, and Dissertations. Chicago: University of

Chicago Press.

Seventh edition.

"For this seventh edition, Wayne C. Booth, Gregory G. Colomb,

and Joseph M. Williams have expanded the focus of the book.

The new part 1, "Research and Writing: From Planning to

Production," is adapted from their Craft of Research (Chicago:

University of Chicago Press, 2003). This part offers a step-by-

step guide to the process of research and its reporting, a topic

not previously covered in this manual but inseparable from

source citation, writing style, and the mechanics of paper

preparation. Among the topics covered are the nature of

research, finding and engaging sources, taking notes,

developing an argument, drafting and revising, and presenting

evidence in tables and figures. Also included is a discussion of

presenting research in alternative forums. In this part, the

authors write in a familiar, collegial voice to engage readers in a

complex topic. Students undertaking research projects at all

levels will benefit from reading this part, though advanced

researchers may wish to skim chapters 1-4.

The rest of the book covers the same topics as past editions, but

has been extensively revised to follow the recommendations in

The Chicago Manual of Style, 15th edition (2003), to

incorporate current technology as it affects all aspects of

student writing, to provide updated examples, and to be easier

to read and use." (from the Preface).

3. MLA Handbook for Writers of Research Papers. 2009. New

York: Modern Language Association of America.

Seventh edition.

"The seventh edition of the MLA Handbook is accompanied for

the first time by a Web-based component that helps users learn

MLA style and understand better the activities of researching

and writing a paper. Students, instructors, and librarians have

shown great interest in gaining access to the MLA Handbook

on the Web, and we responded by developing a site that

contains the full text of the book with complementary

materials. The site includes sample papers with step-by-step

narratives showing how the papers were prepared, and each

narrative can be explored from a number of perspectives. For

example, if you are having trouble defining a topic. you can look

at the ways the authors of the sample papers did it. If you are

unsure how to evaluate sources for inclusion in your project,

you can follow the steps outlined in the narratives. We hope

that the new electronic component will help students in every

stage of their work. Scholarly research is increasingly

conducted in a digital environment, and we are pleased to

usher the MLA Handbook into that world." (from the

Foreword).

4. Booth, Wayne C., Colomb, Gregory G., and Williams, Joseph M.

2008. The Craft of Research. Chicago: University of Chicago

Press.

Third edition (First edition 1995).

"The aim of the third edition of The Craft of Research is the

same as the first two: to meet the needs of all researchers, not

just first-year undergraduates and advanced graduate students,

but even those in business and government who do and report

research on any topic, academic, political, or commercial. We

wrote it to

* guide you through the complexities of turning a topic or

question into a research problem whose significance matches

the effort that you put into solving it

* help you organize and draft a report that justifies the effort

* show you how to read your report as your readers will so that

you can revise it into one that they will read with the

understanding and respect it deserves

Other handbooks touch on these matters, but this one, we

think, is different. Most current guides acknowledge that

researchers rarely move in a straight line from finding a topic to

stating a thesis to filling in note cards to drafting and revision.

Experienced researchers loop back and forth, move forward a

step or two before going back in order to move ahead again,

change directions, all the while anticipating stages not yet

begun. But so far as we know, no other guide tries to explain

how each part of the process influences all the others -- how

asking questions about a topic prepares the researcher for

drafting, how drafting can reveal problems in an argument,

how writing an Introduction can send you back to a search for

more sources." (from the Preface).

5. Harvey, Gordon. 2008. Writing with Sources. A Guide for

Harvard Students. Indianapolis: Hackett.

Second revised edition (First edition 1998).

"Acknowledging your sources is therefore at once an obligation,

a service, and an advantage. With a primary source (like the ant

statistics), although you go on to give your own interpretation

of its data, you're obliged first to tell your reader in a citation

exactly what data you are interpreting, who assembled it, and

where to find it -- so they can gauge, as you have done, its

reliability. But your citation also alerts others who may want to

use the data; and by allowing others to test and verify your

conclusions, it enhances your credibility. Likewise with a

secondary source (...), you're obliged to credit other people for

work they have done and you have built upon; it's dishonest

and ungenerous not to credit them. But citing the secondary

source also alerts other readers to its existence, and has distinct

advantages for you. Where you accept and build upon an idea,

citing saves you from having to demonstrate the truth of the

idea all over again, and it enlists the source's authority on your

behalf. Where you instead challenge or qualify an idea, citing its

source makes your argument interesting as a challenge or

qualification to a published position.

In both cases, careful citing suggests to your reader that you are

a trustworthy analyst, strong enough in your own reading and

thinking to acknowledge other opinions in your pursuit of the

truth. The fear some students have, initially, that citations will

make their paper appear less thoughtful could not be less

warranted.

Although procedures for using and citing sources differ some

what from discipline to discipline, and the best authority for

questions about using sources in a particular course is always

its instructor, there is considerable common ground among the

disciplines. This book summarizes that common ground. It

describes the main methods of integrating sources into your

paper and for citing them, the basic standards for

acknowledging them, and the ways in which they are most

commonly misused-along with some steps you can take to

avoid misuses in your own writing." (from the Introduction).

6. Lipson, Charles. 2006. Cite Right. A Quick Guide to Citation

Styles - MLA, APA, Chicago, the Sciences, Professions, and

more. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Second revised edition May 2011.

"There are three reasons to cite the materials you use:

* To give credit to others' work and ideas, whether you agree

with them or not. When you use their words, you must give

them credit by using both quotation marks and citations.

* To show readers the materials on which you base your

analysis, your narrative, or your conclusions.

* To guide readers to the materials you have used so they can

examine it for themselves. Their interest might be to confirm

your work, to challenge it, or simply to explore it further.

Taken together, these citations fully disclose your sources.

That's important for academic integrity in several ways.

First, good citations parcel out credit. Some belongs to you for

the original work you did; you need to take full responsibility

for it. Some belongs to others for their words, ideas, data,

drawings, or other work. You need to acknowledge it, openly

and explicitly.

Second, if you relied on others' work in order to tell your story,

explain your topic, or document your conclusions, you need to

say exactly what you used. Take a simple paper about World

War I. No one writing today learned about it firsthand. What

we know, we learned by reading books and articles, by

examining original documents and news reports, by listening to

oral histories, by reviewing data compiled by military

historians, and perhaps by viewing photographs or movies.

When we write about the war, then, we should say how we

acquired our information. The only exception is "commonly

known information," something that everyone in the field

clearly understands and that does not require any

substantiation.(1) There's no need for a footnote to prove

Woodrow Wilson was actually president of the United States.

But if you referred to his speech declaring war, you would need

a proper citation. If you used his words, you'd need quotation

marks, too.

Third, your readers may want to pursue a particular issue you

cover. Citations should lead them to the right sources, whether

those are books, interviews, archival documents, Web sites,

poems, or paintings. That guidance serves several purposes.

Skeptical readers may doubt the basis for your work or your

conclusions. Others may simply want to double-check them or

do more research on the topic. Your citations should point the

way.

What citations should not do is prance about, showing off your

howl-edge without adding to the reader's. That's just bragging.

Beyond this question of style (and good manners), there is the

basic issue of honesty. Citations should never mislead your

readers. There are lots of ways to mislead or misdirect your

readers; accurate citations avoid them. For example, they

should not imply you read books or articles when you really

didn't. They should not imply you spent days in the archives

deciphering original documents when you actually read them in

an edited book or, worse, when you "borrowed" the citation

from a scholar who did study the originals. Of course, it's fine to

cite that author or an edited collection. That's accurate. It's fine

to burrow into the archives and read the original yourself. It's

dishonest, though, to write citations that only pretend you did.

Good citations should reveal your sources, not conceal them.

They should honestly show the research you conducted. That

means they should give credit where credit is due, disclose the

materials on which you base your work, and guide readers to

that material so they can explore it further. Citations like these

accurately reflect your work and that of others. They show the

ground on which you stand." (Chapter 1).

(1). What counts as common knowledge depends on your

audience.

7. Spatt, Brenda. 2011. Writing from Sources. Boston:

Bedford/St. Martin's.

Eighth Edition (First edition 2003).

"The big news about the sixth edition of Writing from Sources

is its intensive focus on the Internet. For many students, the

Web now serves as more than just an effective means of gaining

and distributing information-it has become a way of life, a

source of instant knowledge, a shortcut to research.

Unfortunately, the Web is at once the friend and the enemy of

serious research. As instructors increasingly realize, in

comparison with print sources Web material remains

unreliable, its quality often abysmal. Whether or not you use a

trustworthy search engine or consult a respected database, you

are likely to encounter far more dross than gold. And too often

our students, seduced by the abundance of online sources and

the speed of surfing, lack the knowledge to make the crucial

distinctions between a good Web site, a bad one, and one that

falls somewhere in between." (p. V)

(...)

Here is a summary of the changes in and additions to the sixth

edition of Writing from Sources that enhance its usefulness as

a text, a reader, an exercise book, and a research-essay guide:

An entirely new guide to locating print and Web sources using

databases, directories, and search engines

A revised and expanded guide to evaluating print and Web

sources, explaining-with copious illustrations-how to avoid the

pitfalls inherent in Web research

· A realistic methodology for using computers to take notes

from sources and organize them on the screen

A new sample research essay using endnotes in Chapter 9,

incorporating a fairly sophisticated level of documentation in

exploring the topic of cannibalism from a historical and

anthropological perspective

A revised selection of reference sources, emphasizing electronic

databases across the disciplines, contained in Appendix A

Expanded and updated guidelines for documenting sources in

MLA and APA styles, contained in Appendix B

An entirely new casebook of readings on "Genetic Engineering

and Cloning," contained in Appendix E, that can provide the

basis for a complete research essay or, alternatively, can be

supplemented by student research

A new model for synthesizing sources, in Chapter 4, built

around the topic of promotion in elementary school." (from To

the Instructor VI-VII).

8. Blanshard, Brand. 2004. On Philosophical Style. South Bend:

St. Augustine Press.

Original edition: Manchester, Manchester University Press,

1954.

"The more perfectly one's style fits the inner man and reveals

its strength and effect, the clearer it becomes that the problem

of style is not a problem of word and sentences merely, but of

being the right kind of mind. "He who would not be frustrated

in his hope to write well in laudable things," said Milton, "ought

himself to be a true poem." Does that make the problem of style

insoluble? Yes, I am afraid it does. But it shows also that the

problem we have been discussing is no petty or merely

technical one, but very far-reaching indeed. We may have to

agree with Professor Raleigh that "to write perfect prose is

neither more nor less difficult than to lead a perfect life."

(Conclusion).

9. Baggini, Julian, and Fosl, Peter S. 2010. The Philosopher's

Toolkit. A Compendium of Philosophical Concepts and

Methods. Malden: Wiley-Blackwell.

Second revised edition (First edition 2003).

"Philosophy can be an extremely technical and complex affair,

one whose terminology and procedures are often intimidating

to the beginner and demanding even for the professional. Like

that of surgery, the art of philosophy requires mastering a body

of knowledge, but it also requires acquiring precision and skill

with a set of instruments or tools. The Philosopher's Toolkit

may be thought of as a collection of just such tools. Unlike

those of a surgeon or a master woodworker, however, the

instruments presented by this text are conceptual - tools that

can be used to analyse, manipulate and evaluate philosophical

concepts, arguments and theories.

The Toolkit can be used in a variety of ways. It can be read

cover to cover by those looking for instruction on the essentials

of philosophical reflection. It can be used as a course book on

basic philosophical method or critical thinking. It can also be

used as a reference book to which general readers and more

advanced philosophers can turn in order to find quick and clear

accounts of the key concepts and methods of philosophy. The

aim of the book, in other words, is to act as a conceptual

toolbox from which all those from neophytes to master artisans

can draw instruments that would otherwise be distributed over

a diverse set of texts and require long periods of study to

acquire.

For this second edition, we have expanded the book from six to

seven sections, and reviewed and revised every single entry.

These sections progress from the basic tools of argumentation

to sophisticated philosophical concepts and principles. The text

passes through instruments for assessing arguments to

essential laws, principles and conceptual distinctions. It

concludes with a discussion of the limits of philosophical

thinking.

Each of the seven sections contains a number of compact

entries comprising an explanation of the tool it addresses,

examples of the tool in use and guidance about the tool's scope

and limits. Each entry is cross-referenced to other related

entries. Suggestions for further reading are included, and those

particularly suitable for novices are marked with an asterisk.

There is also a list of Internet resources at the back of the book.

Becoming a master sculptor requires more than the ability to

pick up and use the tools of the trade: it requires flair, talent,

imagination and practice. In the same way, leaning how to use

these philosophical tools will not turn you into a master of the

art of philosophy overnight. What it will do is equip you with

many skills and techniques that will help you philosophize

better." (Preface).

10. Martinich, Aloysius. 2005. Philosophical Writing. An

Introduction. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.

Third edition (First edition 1989; Second edition 1996).

Contents: Notes to the Second Edition. Introduction. Part I:

Author and Audience. Part II: Logic and Argument for Writing.

Part III: The Structure of a Philosophical Essay. Part IV:

Composing. Part V: Tactics for Analytic Writing. Part VI: Some

Constraints on Content. Part VII: Some Goals of Form.

Part VIII: Problems with Introductions. Appendix A: "It's

Sunday Night and I have an Essay Due Monday Morning."

Appendix B: Glossary of Philosophical Terms. Index."

"It is often advisable to preview a book. That advice holds here.

Skim the entire book before reading it more carefully.

Depending on your philosophical background, some parts will

be more informative than others. Chapter 1 discusses the

concepts of author and audience as they apply to a student's

philosophical prose. Both students and their professors are in

an artificial literary situation. Unlike typical authors, students

know less about their subject than their audience, although

they are not supposed to let on that they do. Chapter 2 is a

crash course on the basic concepts of logic. It contains

background information required for understanding

subsequent chapters. Those who are familiar with logic will

breeze through it, while those with no familiarity with it will

need to read slowly and carefully. Chapter 3 discusses the

structure of a philosophical essay and forms the heart of the

book. The well-worn but sound advice that an essay should

have a beginning, a middle, and an end applies to philosophical

essays too. Chapter 4 deals with a number of matters related to

composing drafts of an essay. Various techniques for

composing are discussed. Anyone who knows how to outline,

take notes, revise, do research and so on might be able to skip

this chapter. Chapter 5 explains several types of arguments

used in philosophical reasoning, such as dilemmas,

counterexamples and reductio ad absurdum arguments.

Chapter 6 discusses some basic requirements that the content

of an essay must satisfy. Chapter 7 discusses goals for the form

of your writing: coherence, clarity, conciseness, and rigor.

Chapter 8 discusses some standard problems students have

with the first few pages of an essay.

Like essays, most books have conclusions that either

summarize or tie together the main strands of the work. It

would have been artificial to do so in this case, however, since

the book as a whole does not develop one main argument but

consists of a number of different topics that should be helpful

to the student. Appendix A, "It's Sunday Night and I Have an

Essay Due Monday Morning," is included for those who bought

this book but never got around to reading much of it, and can

serve as a conclusion. Many of my students who used one of the

first two editions let me know that this was the first part of the

book they read, on a Sunday night about six weeks into the

semester.

In order to serve the needs of a wide range of students, the level

of difficulty varies from elementary to moderately advanced.

Even within individual chapters, the level of difficulty can vary

significantly, although each section begins with the simplest

material and progresses to the most difficult. Thus, a chapter

on a new topic might revert from complex material in the

previous chapter to a simple level. I believe that intelligent,

hardworking students can move rather quickly from

philosophical innocence to moderate sophistication.

At various points, I have presented fragments of essays to

illustrate a stylistic point. The topics of these essay fragments

are sometimes controversial and the argumentation

provocative. These passages are meant to keep the reader's

interest and do not always represent my view. It would be a

mistake to focus on the content of these essay fragments when

it is their style that is important. Also, it is quite likely that the

reader will disagree with a few or even many of the stylistic

claims I make. If this leads readers to at least think about why

they disagree, and to discover what they prefer and why, then a

large part of my goal will have been achieved.

In the following pages, I often contrast rhetorical elements with

logical elements. Going back as far as Socrates, rhetoric has

often had a bad name in philosophy. No negative attitude

toward rhetoric is implied in this book. "Rhetoric," as I use it,

refers to style, that is, to those elements of writing that facilitate

communication; and it is a presupposition of this book that

these elements are extremely important. After all, like any

essay, a philosophical essay that fails to communicate fails in

one of its central purposes.

Philosophical Writing is intended to be practical. It is supposed

to help you write better and thereby improve your ability to

present Philosophical Writing is intended to be practical. It is

supposed to help you write better and thereby improve your

ability to present your thoughts. Since almost any class may

require you to write an essay that analyzes some kind of

concept, the skills gained in learning to write about

philosophical concepts may prove useful in writing other types

of essays." (from the Introduction 5-7).

11. Holowchak, M.Andrew. 2004. Critical Reasoning and

Philosophy. A Concise Guide to Reading, Evaluating, and

Writing Philosophical Works. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield.

"Critical Reasoning and Philosophy: A Concise Guide to

Reading, Evaluating, and Writing Philosophical Works is the

culmination of several years of thinking about an integrative,

cooperative, and critical approach to teaching introductory

courses in philosophy. Philosophers are wedded to a specific

type of analytic methodology that requires the honing and use

of critical-reasoning skills at different levels: on the one hand,

recognizing, reconstructing, and evaluating arguments (usually,

those of other philosophers); on the other hand, being able to

express themselves philosophically in coherent and tightly

argued essays that move philosophical debate forward, however

slowly. Students being introduced to philosophy need exposure

to these skills and cannot fully appreciate the need for

philosophical analysis without them.

Thus, I have created this text to complement most

introductory-level philosophy courses. Its aims, as the title

suggests, are to teach students how to read, evaluate, and write

philosophy. The book begins analytically by giving students the

tools and skills to recognize, break down, and analyze

arguments before formally responding to them in writing. It

ends synthetically in that, by a book's end, students will have

learned how to advance and defend a philosophical position of

their own in a critical essay.

The text comprises six sections, each of which contains a

number of modules (nineteen in all). These modules are short,

self-teaching units that are designed to make critical evaluation

of philosophy user-friendly. The large number of modules and

small size of each make, I hope, for ready and easy assimilation

of the material. Section One looks at introductory issues

through three modules (one on philosophy, one on critical

reasoning, and one on how to read philosophy). Section Two

concerns recognition and reconstruction of arguments in two

modules. Section Three comprises two modules on

diagramming arguments. The fourth section, on argument

evaluation, has five modules that concern principles and

components of evaluation, common deductive and inductive

arguments, and common fallacies. Section Five, which is mostly

non-philosophical in scope, looks at tips for proper writing in

four modules. There are three modules in the final section: one

on evaluative essays (focusing on evaluating a philosophical

view), one on critical essays (focusing on defending a thesis of

one's own), and one on a much neglected topic in philosophy

classes-revising and rewriting essays.

The nineteen modules are complemented by five appendices.

Appendix A offers some practice exercises for argument

diagramming from famous philosophers. Appendices B and C

give, respectively, a sample evaluative essay and a sample

critical essay in an attempt to illustrate the principles and

suggestions in the final section. These samples are taken from

actual essays from students. Appendices D and E complement

the final module on revising and rewriting essays. Appendix D

is a sample comment sheet that offers guidelines for students to

critically analyze each other's papers. Appendix E is a plan-for-

revision sheet that offers guidelines for revising an essay that

protects students from beginning a hasty revision.

Overall, I have used drafts of these modules in my introductory

courses and have found them to be very helpful tools. I am

confident that, even if students cannot distinguish Aristotle

from aerosol years after one of my introductory courses, they'll

remember many things about what makes an argument good

(or bad) and they'll be capable of using these in their everyday-

life decisions. I am sure that other philosophers, especially

those who find content-based-only approaches to introductory

courses on philosophy too limited, will discover that Critical

Reasoning and Philosophy is a valuable and effective

complement to their courses.

There are a number of other books on the market with similar

aims. Many of these are fine books (I list some in my

bibliography), yet I have found none that balances concern for

reading, evaluating, and writing philosophy in a compendious,

user-friendly format-hence, the motivation for writing my own

book. In addition, I have chosen a module-based approach to

this book so as to introduce students to critical-reasoning skills

in short, digestible units that can be learned piecemeal and

spread out over the course of a term." (from the Preface, X-XI).

12. Mogck, Brian David. 2008. Writing To Reason. A Companion

for Philosophy Students and Instructors. Malden: Wiley-

Blackwell.

"I began to compose this companion after grading a stack of

midterm papers two feet tall. I noticed that I was making

mostly the same comments on each student's paper. It seemed

more economical to write the comments once, and refer the

students to the master copy of comments as needed.

If an instructor is grading hundreds of papers, it is often

impossible to continue writing detailed criticisms and

explanations of mistakes pertaining to the composition of an

essay, while remaining engaged with its philosophical content.

Consequently, instructors' comments might tend to become

less detailed or thorough by the hundredth paper. And the

comments that are made can become impatient in tone and

cryptic in content. Neither is constructive. Using this

companion to address the most common problems students

have with philosophical composition will facilitate more

substantive, philosophical engagement between instructors and

their students.

(...)

This is a relatively short companion. But it contains a number

of instructions that you will not be able to internalize

immediately. After all, writing is a craft that improves only with

disciplined practice. And, even if this companion is successful,

it only covers some of the most common characteristics of good

writing in philosophy.

Students sometimes find that they arc asked to write a

philosophy paper without first having an idea of what it means

to do philosophy or how philosophical writing differs from

writing in other disciplines. Part H explains one view of what it

means to do philosophy, how to succeed in a philosophy course,

how to approach a philosophy paper, and the requirements of

academic integrity. Chapter 8 is the most difficult and

controversial chapter of this companion, because it is an

account of what philosophers are doing when they are doing

philosophy. This is neither easy to explain nor likely to elicit

much agreement among philosophers. For this reason, your

instructor may or may not recommend that you read it,

depending on his or her judgment as to whether that view fits

well with his or her goals for the course. That is just fine, as

Part I is the practical part of the companion.

In order to use Part I effectively, I would recommend that you

first look it over to identify those points that you are

encountering for the first time and those points that you

suspect are problematic in your own writing. Later, as you

compose your paper and work through the drafting process,

you can refer back to those points and check them off to make

sure that you have addressed them. (Other checklists can be

found in sections 1.1, 1.4, and 14).

Your instructor will also refer you in either of two ways to

specific parts of the companion. First, he or she might write a

numeral in the margin of your paper -- for example, "5" --

indicating that there is a problem in your paper that is

addressed in § 5 of this book. Second, he or she might highlight

a theme that is problematic in the essay -- for example, the

thesis is unclear -- by writing the keyword "Thesis" on your

paper. You may then look up the keyword in the Keywords

Cross-referenced table (see Appendix I) to find the sections of

this companion that contain specific commentary and advice

addressing that issue." (from the Preface).

13. Seech, Zachary. 2009. Writing Philosophy Papers. Belmont:

Wadsworth.

Fifth revised edition (First edition 1993).

"Writing Philosophy Papers goes beyond general instructions

on paper writing. The whole book focuses on how to write

philosophy papers. The kinds of

papers most often assigned in philosophy classes are explained,

and a whole chapter is devoted to writing the traditional

philosophy paper: the thesis defense paper. Chapter 7 explains

how to use specific philosophical resources, with a strong

emphasis on Internet research.

Whether it's a question about organization, documentation,

research, or writing style, the student will now have the answer

before submitting a paper to the professor. This should be a

relief both to the professor who reads and grades the papers

and to the student who can hardly do a good job of writing a

paper if the task itself is unclear. Professors assign different

types of papers. Writing Philosophy Papers shows students

that many paper assignments are hybrids of the basic kinds. In

this book the students learn the basic skills, although the actual

instructions for their specific classroom assignments will vary.

Professors may also specify a preferred style of documentation.

Footnotes and endnotes are illustrated in this book. So is the

MLA parenthetical documentation. Both methods are clearly

displayed in a sample paper in Appendix B. In-text citation and

the number system of documentation are also explained.

Documentation of Internet sources is illustrated also.

The focus is on philosophy. The many examples throughout

Writing Philosophy Papers are from philosophical concepts or

primary and secondary sources in philosophy. In addition,

there is a discussion of philosophy courses, philosophical

topics, philosophical reasoning, philosophy journals and

research books, as well as the Internet and other research

sources." (from the Preface).

Bibliographia. Annotated bibliographies

Raul Corazzon || rc@ontology.co || Info

Bibliographies on various religions

Bibliography

This page is under construction

Bibliographia. Annotated bibliographies

Raul Corazzon || rc@ontology.co || Info

About this project

Four websites:

The first website, Theory and History of Ontology, created April

13th, 2000 at the address www.formalontology.it, moved August

13th 2010 to a new address: www.ontology.co.

The second, History of Logic from Aristotle to Gödel, created

January 5th, 2016, contains also the pages previously published

under the section "History of Logic" in Theory and History of

Ontology.

The third, Theory and History of Rhetoric created March 25th 2025,

will be devoted to the historical development of rhetoric and theory

of argumentation.

The fourth and last, Bibliographia. Annotated bibliographies

created December 5th, 2016, contains bibliographical resources on

philosophy and religion.

About this website

The site "Bibliographia. Annotated bibliographies" was created

March 13th 2017; this mobile version is available when the screen

resolution is less than 480 x 500 pixels.

The site is best viewed with a recent version of one of the following

browsers: Brave, Chrome, Edge, Firefox, Maxthon, Opera, Safari, UC

Browser.

Please note that Internet Explorer is no longer supported by

Microsoft as of June 15, 2022.

How to Cite This Website

If you want to cite or link a page of my site please use the main

address www.bibliographia.co because the mirror site will not be

indexed by the Search Engines to avoid duplicated content.

Note on the Fonts

These fonts are used:

For the text: Georgia (Windows, Apple Mac, Linux);

For the terms in Ancient Greek: Georgia (Windows, Apple Mac,

Linux).

For the transliteration of Arabic terms: Arial MS Unicode (Windows,

Apple Mac, Linux).

For the logical symbols: Lucida Sans Unicode (Windows); Lucida

Grande (Apple Mac); Lucida Sans or DejaVu Sans Condensed

(Linux);

If you need to download one of these fonts use these links:

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Arial MS Unicode

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Bibliographia. Annotated bibliographies
Raul Corazzon || rc@ontology.co || Info
General Index
Bibliography on Philosophy
Bibliographies of Biblical studies
Bibliography on the Early Christian
Literature (I-II Centuries)
Bibliography on the Religious Literature of
the Early Judaism
Bibliography on the Philosophy and
Phenomenology of Religion
Bibliography of the Sociology of Religion
Bibliographical study guides

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Bibliographia. Annotated bibliographies

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Bibliographia. Annotated

Bibliographies on Religion and

Philosophy

What's New: Last Update: September 13th, 2025.

This website is devoted to bibliographical resources on philosophy

and religion.

I will begin with Bibliographies on the history of early Christianity;

the planned sections are:

Bibliographies of philosophy: on arguments not treated in my other

websites.

Hebrew Bible: Bibliographies on the formation of the Pentateuch,

the Canon, the psuedepigrapha, textual criticism and the history of

the research.

New Testament: Bibliographies on the synoptic question, the

gospels, the letters, Acts of Apostles and Revelation, the formation of

the Canon, the psuedepigrapha, textual criticism and the history of

the research.

Literature of the Early Christianity: Bibliographies on the Apostolic

Fathers, orthodoxy and heresy.

Literature of the Early Judaism: Bibliographies on the birth of

Judaism and the Parting of the Ways between Christianity and

Judaism.

Philosophy and Phenomenology of Religion: Definition of 'Religion',

Analytic and Continental perspectives; the dichotomy between

Sacred and Profane; the debate over the existence of God.

Sociology of Religion: The Sociology of Early Christianity; Charisma

and Its Routinization in Early Christianity; Messianism and

Millenarism from a sociological perspective.

Study Guides: this section contains Bibliographies on dictionaries

and encyclopedias of philosophy, manuals of style for philosophy

students and a selection of introductory readings on history of

philosophy, metaphysics, ontology and the philosophy of logic.

Other religions: This section will contain bibliographies on the most

important religions other than Christianity and Judaism.

Currently this site is in an early stage of development: only few

sections are available; if you are interested, please be patient: in the

next future I will add more pages. This is my third website after

“Theory and History of Ontology and “History of Logic” that I will

continue to develope.

Bibliographia. Annotated bibliographies
Raul Corazzon || rc@ontology.co || Info
What's New on This Site: Recently
Modified Pages
Recent Updates
September 13th, 2025: Added Annotated bibliography of Peter
Abelard: I. Literary Works
September 13th, 2025: Added Annotated bibliography of Peter
Abelard: II. Logical, theological and ethical works
August 30th, 2025: Added Abelard and Heloise. Bibliography of the
English Studies
August 30th, 2025: Updated Abelard's Philosophy. Bibliography of
the English Studies
August 20th, 2025: Updated Peter Abelard. Bibliography on His
theology and the doctrine of the Trinity
August 12th, 2025: Updated Peter Abelard. Bibliography on His
Ethics and Moral Philosophy
September 10th, 2024: Added Bibliography on mental language in
the Middle Ages
July 1st, 2024: Added From Greek to Latin. The development of the
Latin philosophical vocabulary
December 8th, 2023: Updated Boethius' Contribution to the
Quadrivium. Selected Bibliography

Bibliographia. Annotated bibliographies
Raul Corazzon || rc@ontology.co || Info
Contents of the projected pages
Bibliographies on Philosophy
Boethius
Boethius' Contribution to Quadrivium. Annotated Bibliographyy
Peter Abelard
Bibliography on Abelard theology and His doctrine of the Trinity
Bibliography on Abelard Ethics and Moral Philosophy
Bibliography of the Medieval Theories of
Mental Language
Annotated bibliography of studies in English:
A - Kel
Kin - O'Ca
Pan - Z
Annotated bibliography of studies in other languages:
French, Italian, German, Portuguese, Spanish, Latin
Bernard Bolzano
Bibliography on Bolzano's Practical Philosophy: Religion, Politics,
Aesthetics
Bernard Bolzano

Bibliography on Bolzano's Practical Philosophy: Religion, Politics,

Aesthetics

Philosophy from Greek to Latin. The

development of Latin philosophical

vocabulary

Studies in English A - J

Studies in English K - Z

Studies in French, Italian, German

Questions of Biblical Criticism

Hebrew Bible Textual Criticism

History of the Hebrew Bible Critical Research

New Testament Textual Criticism

History of New Testament Critical Research

Hebrew Bible

(Under construction)

New Testament

The Synoptic Gospels

The Synoptic Problem

The Gospel of Matthew

The Gospel of Mark

The Gospel of Luke

The Pauline Epistles

1 Thessalonians, 1 Corinthians, 2 Corinthians, Philippians, Philemon,

Galatians, Romans

Early Developments of Christianity

The Acts of the Apostles

Deutero-Pauline Epistles

2 Thessalonians, Colossians, Ephesians

Pastoral Epistles

1 Timothy, 2 Timothy, Titus

The Epistle to the Hebrews

The Catholic Epistles: James, 1 Peter, 2 Peter, Judas

The Johannine Literature

The Gospel of John

The Epistles: 1, 2, 3 John

The Christian Apocalyptic

The Book of Revelation

The Canon of the New Testament

The Formation of the Canon

The New Testament Apocrypha

on the Apocryphal Literature

General Studies on the Apocryphal Literature

New Testament Apocrypha

Apocryphal Gospels

Apocryphal Acts

Apocryphal Letters

Apocryphal Apocalypses

Early Christian Orthodox Literature (I-II

Centuries)

Apostolic Fathers

Clement of Rome (fl. c. 95)

Ignatius of Antioch (fl. c. 100-115)

Polycarp of Smyrna (69- 155)

Didaché (100-150)

The Epistle of Barnabas (130-131)

Papias of Hierapolis (c. 60-130)

Quadratus of Athens (d. 129)

Papias of Hierapolis (c. 60-130)

Epistle to Diognetus (130 ? - late 2nd century ?)

The Shepherd of Hermas (90-150)

Christian Writers of the Second Century

Justin Martyr (c. 100-165)

Aristide of Athens, Apology (c. 120-138)

Clement of Alexandria (c. 150-215)

Tertullian (155-c. 220)

Melito of Sardis (d. 180)

Irenaeus (early 2nd century – died c. 202)

Athenagoras of Athens (c. 133-c.190)

Theophilus of Antioch (d. 183-185)

Hippolitus of Rome (170-235)

Bibliography on the Early Christian Heterodox Literature (I-II

Centuries))

The Problem of the Birth of Heresy

Dissent in the First Century

The Bauer Thesis: The Origins of Orthodoxy and Heresy

Simon Magus

Ebionism

Nicolaism

Heresies of the Second Century

Christian Gnosticism

Sethianism

Marcionism

Montanism

Ebionites

Nazarenes

Elchasaites

Philosophy and Phenomenology of Religion

History of the Ontological Argument for the

Existence of God

General Introduction

General Works on the History of the Ontological Argument

Anselm of Canterbury's argument in the Proslogion

The Medieval Period from Anselm of Canterbury to Duns Scotus

The Modern Period from Suárez to Frege

The Contemporary Period from Barth to the Present Time

A Selection of Primary Texts

Fundamental Questions

The Sacred

Monotheism and Polytheism

Sociology of Religion

The Sociology of Early Christianity

Charisma and Its Routinization in Early Christianity

Messianism

Millenarism

Bibliographical study guides

Study Guides on Western Philosophy

Introductory Works, Dictionaries, Encyclopedias

Bibliography of Philosophy and Manuals of Style

General Works on the History of Philosophy

Formal and Descriptive Metaphysics

Formal and Descriptive Ontology

Philosophical Logic and Philosophy of Logic

Bibliographia. Annotated bibliographies
Raul Corazzon || rc@ontology.co || Info
Bibliographies on Philosophy
Boethius
Boethius' Contribution to Quadrivium. Annotated Bibliographyy
Peter Abelard
Bibliography on Abelard theology and His doctrine of the Trinity
Bibliography on Abelard Ethics and Moral Philosophy
Bibliography of the Medieval Theories of
Mental Language
Annotated bibliography of studies in English:
A - Kel
Kin - O'Ca
Pan - Z
Annotated bibliography of studies in other languages:
French, Italian, German, Portuguese, Spanish, Latin
Bernard Bolzano
Bibliography on Bolzano's Practical Philosophy: Religion, Politics,
Aesthetics
Philosophy from Greek to Latin. The
development of Latin philosophical
vocabulary
Studies in English A - J