
Krzysztof Stefański
90
saw themselves and their current and future enemies (with the exception
of the Soviet Union to some extent). The Japanese continued to be the
divine nation, spiritually preeminent over all other nations, while the
Chinese were considered to be animals rather than human beings. After
Nomonhan, the Russians gained a bit in Japanese eyes
16
. Previously, they
had been seen as primitive, cowardly people lacking intelligence,
imagination and fighting spirit (during the Nomonhan incident they
surpassed the Japanese in flexibility, imagination and organization, and
were not much less brave, which was partially admitted even by the
Kwantung Army)
17
. The Anglo-Saxons were supposed to be spoiled by
their welfare, democracy and individualism and consequently unable to
sacrifice their personal comfort for the sake of common interests and,
consequently, lacked fighting spirit.
The first six months after the attack on Pearl Harbor seemed to provide
evidence in favour of those circles of the Japanese military who neglected
the lesson of Nomonhan, treating the defeat as just a minor accident and
not the earnest of future calamities resulting from clashing with enemies
whose material strength surpassed that of Japan many times. As General
Tamada Yoshio conjectures in the closing section of his book, had the
lesson of Nomonhan been learnt in depth, Japan might have avoided the
insane engagement and hopeless fight against opponents much stronger,
leaving it no chance to achieve victory
18
. It was not the case, however.
The Japanese blitzkrieg of the first half a year of the Pacific War was again
rooted in quite a few weaknesses of the opponents. The most harmful of
them consisted in the disdain and disregard the Westerners, and in
particular the British, felt towards the Japanese and Japanese army, which
investigating the Nomonhan incident and continued assuming spiritualism – seishinshugi 精神主
義to be the cornerstone of the power of the IJA. Second, the Japanese economy was not strong
enough to provide both the IJA and IJN with sufficient equipment. Consequently, the armament of
the army, except for aeroplanes, despite improving with time, except for the final stage of the war,
remained inferior when compared with that used by the Allies. Japan’s armour and artillery was
much weaker in terms of both quality and quantity (comparison of the number of light tanks –
Type 95 Ha-Go九五式軽戦車ハ・ゴ, being the most prolific type of tanks used by the Japanese
during the Pacific War: 2,300 items; number of Soviet T-34 (produced until 1945): ca. 57,000!; or
American M4 Sherman: ca. 49,000, both types by far more powerful than Ha-Go).
16
Kotani 2009: 114, 115.
17
Coox, Tamada etc.
18
Tamada 1981: 214. Tamada Yoshio was one of the most successful Japanese commanders
during the battle of Nomonhan. As commander of the 4th Tank Regiment of the Kwantung Army,
he performed the first night attack in the history of armoured warfare, achieving considerable
success at the tactical level, though failed to gain the operational objective, i.e. pushing Soviet
lines to the Khalkhin river. On the other hand, he seems to be one of the most sober Japanese
officers of that period.