Asian Economic Outlook and Integration Progress Annual Report 2022 PDF Free Download

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Asian Economic Outlook and Integration Progress Annual Report 2022 PDF Free Download

Asian Economic Outlook and Integration Progress Annual Report 2022 PDF free Download. Think more deeply and widely.

I
Boao Forum for Asia
Asian Economic Outlook and Integration Progress
Annual Report 2022
对外经济贸易大学出版社
中国·北京
II
图书在版编目CIP数据
博鳌亚洲论坛亚洲经济前景及一体化进程 2022 年度报
= Boao Forum for Asia Asian Economic Outlook
and Integration Progress Annual Report 2022: 英文
. —北京:对外经济贸易大学出版社,2022.3
ISBN 978-7-5663-2389-7
. ①博… . . ①经济一体化研究报告亚洲
2022英文 . F13
中国版本图书馆 CIP 数据核字(2022)第 066522
Boao Forum for Asia
Asian Economic Outlook and Integration Progress Annual Report 2022
责任编辑:谭利彬
出版发行:对外经济贸易大学出版社 邮政编码:100029
址:北京市朝阳区惠新东街 10 邮购电话:010 64492338
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9.5 2022 3月北京第 1
299 千字 2022 3月第 1次印刷
ISBN 978-7-5663-2389-7
200.00
III
TABLE OF CONTENTS
ACRONYMS ···························································································································································· IX
LIST OF CONTRIBUTORS ····································································································································· XI
FOREWORD ························································································································································· XIII
Part I Asian Economic Outlook
Overview ···························································································································································· 003
Chapter 1 Asian Economic Outlook and Policy ······················································································ 005
1.1 Economic Growth ········································································································································································· 005
1.2 Employment and Income ························································································································································ 011
1.3 Prices and Monetary Policies ················································································································································· 014
1.4 Trade and Investment ································································································································································ 018
1.5 Financial Markets ··········································································································································································· 026
Chapter 2 Hot Issues of Asian Economies ································································································ 035
2.1 Global Development Initiative ·············································································································································· 035
2.2 Climate Change and the Green Economy ····················································································································· 037
2.3 Post-Epidemic Normalization of the US and European Macroeconomic Policies ································ 039
2.4 New Developments in the Transformation of International Trade Rules ··················································· 043
Part II Asian Economic Integration Progress
Overview ···························································································································································· 053
Chapter 3 Merchandise Trade Integration in Asia ················································································· 057
3.1 Integration of Merchandise Trade ······································································································································· 057
3.2 Integration of Factory Asia ······················································································································································ 067
Chapter 4 Service Trade Integration of Asian Economies ···································································· 081
4.1 Asian Service Trade Integration ············································································································································ 081
4.2 The Present and Future of Digital Trade in Asia ·········································································································· 088
IV
4.3 Key Service Industry Analysis ················································································································································ 109
Chapter 5 FDI Integration in Asia ·············································································································· 115
5.1 Current Status of FDI Integration in Asia ························································································································ 115
5.2 Outlook of Cross-Border Investment in Asia ················································································································ 120
Chapter 6 Financial Cohesion and Development in Asia ····································································· 121
6.1 Financial Market Openness in Asia ····································································································································· 121
6.2 Progress in Asian Monetary Cooperation ······················································································································ 124
6.3 Development and Innovation of Asian International Financial Centers ···················································· 126
References ························································································································································· 133
Preparation Notes and Acknowledgements ······························································································ 135
V
LIST OF TABLES
Table 1.1 List of Benchmark Interest Rate Adjustments in Some Asian Economies, 2021
(basis point) ············································································································································································· 018
Table 1.2 Ten-Year Government Bond Yields of Some Asian Economies, 2021
(%, percentage point) ······················································································································································· 030
Table 1.3 NPL Ratios of Banks in Some Asian Economies, 2017-2020 (%) ····························································· 032
Table 3.1 ERI-ASIA for Selected Asian Economies ················································································································· 059
Table 3.2 Trade Dependence Index for Selected Asian Economies, 2020 (%) ···················································· 060
Table 3.3 Economies with the Largest Trading Partner from Asia, 2020 ································································· 064
Table 3.4 Trade Flows Among Asian Economies and Growth Rate Year-on-Year, 2020
(USD billion, %) ······································································································································································ 065
Table 3.5 Merchandise Exports by Asian Regions, 2020 (USD billion) ····································································· 067
Table 3.6 Trade Dependence Index of Intermediate Products Among Members of Factory
Asia, 2020 ·················································································································································································· 070
Table 3.7 Trade Dependence Index of Intermediate Products Among Members of Factory
Asia, 2019 ·················································································································································································· 071
Table 3.8 Trade Dependence Index of Intermediate Products of Major Asian Economies on
Factory Asia ············································································································································································· 072
Table 3.9 Parts and Components of Factory Asia Ranked Among the Top 22 in Terms of
Total Exports, 2020 (USD billion) ································································································································ 073
Table 3.10 Parts and Components of Factory Asia Ranked Among the Top 22 in Terms of
Total Exports, 2019 (USD billion) ································································································································ 074
Table 3.11 Dependency of 22 Parts and Components on Major Economies of Asia, EU27,
USMCA, CPTPP and RCEP, 2020 ·································································································································· 077
Table 3.12 Dependency of 22 Parts and Components on Major Economies of Asia, EU27,
USMCA, CPTPP and RCEP, 2019 ·································································································································· 078
Table 3.13 List of Chinas Parts and Components with Competitive Advantage, 2020 ··································· 079
Table 4.1 Service Exports of 25 Selected Economies (in Gross Terms and Value Terms), 2020
(USD100 million, %) ···························································································································································· 083
Table 4.2 Service Imports of 25 Selected Economies (in Gross Terms and Value Terms), 2020
(USD100 million, %) ···························································································································································· 084
VI
Table 4.3 The Services Content and Composition of the Manufacturing Export in Selected
Asian Economies, 2020 (USD100 million, %) ······································································································ 086
Table 4.4 Trade Balance of Services in 25 Asian Economies, 2020 (USD100 million) ····································· 087
Table 4.5 Top Ten Economies in Digitally-Deliverable Service Exports, 2020 ······················································ 096
Table 4.6 Top Five Economies in ICT or AI IP5 Family Patent Applications ··························································· 098
Table 4.7 Industries of Top Unicorns by Valuations, 2021 ································································································ 099
Table 4.8 Top Ten Companies by Market Capitalization in Internet and E-Commerce
Industries ·················································································································································································· 100
Table 4.9 The Most Visited Online Platforms in Southeast Asia, April 2021 ·························································· 101
Table 4.10 Digital Transformation Strategies in Selected Asian Economies ··························································· 103
Table 4.11 Data and Privacy Protection Policies in Selected Asian Economies ···················································· 106
Table 4.12 ICT Infrastructure and Education Gap in Asia ···································································································· 108
Table 4.13 Year-on-Year Change in Tourism Revenue of Major Asian Economies ·············································· 111
Table 4.14 Tourism Dependence Index on Asia and the Pacific Region for Selected Economies,
2017-2020 (%) ········································································································································································ 112
Table 4.15 Interdependence Among Different Asian and the Pacific Economies, 2020 (%) ························ 113
Table 5.1 Interdependence of FDI (Inward plus Outward), Selected Asian Economies, 2020 (%) ········· 116
Table 5.2 Interdependence of Inward FDI, Selected Asian Economies and the US, 2020 (%) ·················· 118
Table 5.3 Self-Dependence of Inward FDI in Asia, Selected Asian Economies, 2016-2020 (%) ···················· 118
Table 5.4 Interdependence Index for Outward FDI, Selected Asian Economies, 2020 (%) ························· 119
VII
LIST OF FIGURES
Figure 1.1 Weighted Real GDP Growth Rates of Asian Economies in Different Regions ································ 007
Figure 1.2 Unemployment Rates of Different Regions in Asia ························································································ 012
Figure 1.3 Inflation Trends of Asia ····················································································································································· 015
Figure 1.4 Year-on-Year Growth Rates of Asia's Imports and Exports ········································································· 019
Figure 1.5 Year-on-Year Growth Rates of Trade in Services in Asia ··············································································· 022
Figure 1.6 FDI Inflows in the World and Asia ····························································································································· 024
Figure 1.7 FDI Outflows in the World and Asia ························································································································· 025
Figure 1.8 Stock Index Rises and Falls of Some Asian Economies, 2021 ··································································· 027
Figure 1.9 Exchange Rates of Some Asian Currencies Against the US Dollar, 2021
(direct quotation method) ············································································································································· 028
Figure 3.1 ERI-ASIA for Selected Asian Economies, 2012-2020······················································································· 058
Figure 3.2 Trade Dependence Index for Selected Economies, 2016-2020 ····························································· 064
Figure 3.3 The Number of Economies with the Largest Trading Partner from Asia ·········································· 064
Figure 3.4 The Index of Self Dependence for Factory Asia, 2008-2020 ····································································· 068
Figure 3.5 Change in the Export of Parts and Components Ranked Top 22 of Factory Asia,
2019-2020 ················································································································································································ 076
Figure 4.1 Conceptual Framework of Digital Trade················································································································ 088
Figure 4.2 Sales and Proportion of E-Commerce in Various Economies, 2019 ····················································· 089
Figure 4.3 Sales and Growth Rate of Retail E-Commerce in Various Economies, 2020 ··································· 091
Figure 4.4 Global Distribution of the Market Size of Cross-Border E-Commerce, 2020 ·································· 092
Figure 4.5 Trading Volume and Forecast of the Cross-Border E-Commerce in Five Southeast
Asian Economies ·································································································································································· 092
Figure 4.6 Total Imports and Exports of Chinas Cross-Border E-Commerce and Growth Rate
(on a comparable basis) ·················································································································································· 093
Figure 4.7 Proportion and Year-on-Year Growth of the Top 10 Categories of Chinas Cross-Border
E-Commerce Export Retail, 2020 ······························································································································· 093
Figure 4.8 Proportion and Year-on-Year Growth of the Top 10 Categories of Chinas Cross-Border
E-Commerce Import Retail, 2020 ······························································································································ 094
Figure 4.9 Share of Digitally-Deliverable Services by Region, 2005-2020 ································································ 095
Figure 4.10 Growth Rates of Digitally-Deliverable Services by Region ········································································ 095
VIII
Figure 4.11 Sub-Sectors of Digitally-Deliverable Services by Region ············································································ 096
Figure 4.12 Share of Sub-Sectors in Digitally-Deliverable Services in Selected Economies ··························· 097
Figure 4.13 Share of Digital Revenue by Economy ··················································································································· 102
Figure 4.14 Year-on-Year Change in Global Arrivals to Asia by Region, 2020 ·························································· 110
Figure 4.15 Year-on-Year Change in Domestic Tourist Arrivals in China, 2020 ························································ 111
Figure 4.16 Tourism Dependence Index on Asia and the Pacific Region for Selected Economies,
2020 ····························································································································································································· 113
Figure 6.1 Capital Outflow Under Global Portfolios, 2017-2020 ···················································································· 122
Figure 6.2 Capital Inflow Under Global Portfolios, 2017-2020 ······················································································· 123
Figure 6.3 Capital Inflow Under Global Portfolios, 2009-2020 ························································································ 123
Figure 6.4 Growth Rate (Year-on-Year) of Capital Inflow Under Global Portfolios,
2010-2020 ················································································································································································ 124
Figure 6.5 Share of International Payments in Major Global Currencies, December 2021 ························ 126
Figure 6.6 GDP of Asian Financial Center Cities ······················································································································· 127
Figure 6.7 Evolution of the Proportion of Added Value of Financial Industry to GDP in
Singapore, Hong Kong SAR, China and Tokyo ·································································································· 128
Figure 6.8 The Share of Various Industries in Tokyos GDP, 2019 ···················································································· 128
Figure 6.9 The Evolution of Stock Market Capitalization of Chinese Mainland and Hong Kong
SAR, China ·················································································································································································· 130
Figure 6.10 Stock Market Capitalization of Tokyo Stock Exchange, Including First, Second and
the GEM ······················································································································································································ 130
Figure 6.11 Evolution of Total Annual Stock Trading Volume of Asian Financial Center
Stock Exchanges ·································································································································································· 131
Figure 6.12 Evolution of Total Annual Value of Stock Trading volume as a Percentage of
GDP on Asian Financial Center Stock Exchanges ···························································································· 131
Figure 6.13 Annual Turnover Ratio of Domestic Shares Traded on the Asian Financial
Center Stock Exchanges ·················································································································································· 132
IX
ACRONYMS
ACCP ASEAN Committee on Consumer Protection
ADB Asian Development Bank
AIIB Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank
ARP American Rescue Plan
BOI Thailand Board of Investment
CMI Chiang Mai Initiative
CMIM Chiang Mai Initiative Multilateralization
CPIS Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey
CPTPP Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership
DEPA Digital Economy Partnership Agreement
EAEU Eurasian Economic Union
ERI-ASIA Export Reliance Index on Asia
FAO Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
FDI Foreign Direct Investment
Fintech Financial Technology
FOMC Federal Open Market Committee
GDP Gross Domestic Product
GFCI Global Financial Center Index
GSCPI Global Supply Chain Pressure Index
IIF Institute of International Finance
ILO International Labor Organization
IMF International Monetary Fund
ITU International Technological University
JETRO Japan External Trade Organization
LCS Local Currency Settlement
LME London Metal Exchange
LPR Loan Prime Rate
OECD Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
OFDI Outward Foreign Direct Investment
OFDII Outward Foreign Direct Investment Index
RCEP Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership
RTA Regional Trade Agreement
SaaS Software-as-a-Service
SDR Special Drawing Rights
SWIFT Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunications
TPP Trans-Pacific Partnership
X
UNCTAD United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
UNDP United Nations Development Program
USMCA United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement
WEF World Economic Forum
WHO World Health Organization
WTO World Trade Organization
XI
LIST OF CONTRIBUTORS
Zhang Yuyan, Editor-in-Chief, Institute of World Economics and Politics, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences
Feng Weijiang, Institute of World Economics and Politics, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences
Xu Xiujun, Institute of World Economics and Politics, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences
Xiong Aizong, Institute of World Economics and Politics, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences
Jia Zhongzheng, Institute of World Economics and Politics, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences
Lin Guijun, Editor-in-Chief, University of International Business and Economics (UIBE)
Tu Xinquan, China Institute for WTO Studies, UIBE
Deng Shizhuan, Beijing University of Architecture
Pei Jiansuo, Renmin University of China
Wang Chunrui, University of International Business and Economics
Wang Fei, University of International Business and Economics
Gao Kailin, University of International Business and Economics
Li Siqi, China Institute for WTO Studies, UIBE
Du Yingxin, China Institute for WTO Studies, UIBE
Zhang Meng, University of International Business and Economics
Deng Haowen, HSBC Business School, Peking University
Cao Li, Editor-in-Chief, Boao Forum for Asia Academy
Wang Qianzheng, Boao Forum for Asia Academy
XII
XIII
FOREWORD
The year 2021 witnessed global economic recovery amid the on-going fight against the COVID-19
pandemic. The recovery, however, is decelerated and polarized owing to a wide range of factors
including incessant mutations of the virus, divided vaccination efforts, impeded core supply chains,
rising prices of global commodities and inflationary pressures, and constant international trade
frictions. To make it more complicated, the Russia-Ukraine conflict that erupted at the end of February
2022 has overwhelmingly impacted international energy markets, financial markets and global supply
chains, and disrupted the international political landscape. The great changes not seen in a century
have accelerated. This grave situation prompts every Asian country to address a key issue of how to
strike a balance between development and security.
In 2021, Asia remained a pivotal driving force behind global economic growth. The fight
against the pandemic and resumption of work and production across Asia has strongly boosted the
recovery of world economy and trade. In spite of the disrupted supply chains and virus variants,
economic and trade integration has maintained its momentum in Asia, trade dependency has
remained at a high level within the continent, and both ASEAN and China have retained their position
as hubs of trade in goods. Meanwhile, Asian factories have found their mutual dependency to be
bouncing back. The thriving new business models, represented by Asian digital trade, have gained a
competitive edge over their international counterparts and emerged as new driver for further
regional integration and global trade recovery, shrugging off the huge impact of the pandemic on
international tourism and travel. Moreover, the increasingly integrated production, trade, investment
and finance have increased national income and peoples wellbeing throughout Asia. However, new
variants of virus have caused waves of outbreaks in the densely populated Asia. Unemployment in
Asia, particularly in South Asia, has soared and tens of millions of people have been pushed back into
poverty. Asian countries need to achieve economic recovery while protecting the lives and health of
their workers, and address the increasing pressure on inclusive growth. In addition, as a response to
global inflation, advanced economies are adjusting their macro-economic policies, which is also
expected to produce obvious spillover effect on Asian economies.
Currently, Asian countries should work together in developing new solutions to global
governance. The enforcement of the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) has
created the world’s most populous free trade area with the largest size in economy and trade,
building an institutional foundation for Asia to promote regional economic growth, trade and
XIV
investment and to open wider to the rest of the world. Meanwhile, this progress can serve as a strong
boost to the necessary improvement of international trade rules to reflect new changes. To address
development deficits such as global income disparity, green gap and digital divide, Asian countries
need to strengthen policy coordination and alignment to achieve an balance of payments and debt
sustainability; drive joint development and adoption of green and digital technologies, and mobilize
financial resources regionally and globally; and deeply engage in the development of global rules on
green and digital governance so as to expand Asias leadership in green and digital endeavors. The
“Global Development Initiative” put forward by Chinese President set out new solutions for
addressing development deficit and building consensus on development in Asia and beyond.
We are convinced that Asian countries will continue to serve as a “stabilizer in world economy
and a “booster for multilateral cooperation. At Boao Forum for Asia (BFA), we will remain firmly
committed to promoting dialogues between Asia and the rest of the world, bridging differences and
enhancing global cooperation and development. This flagship report of Asian Economic Outlook and
Integration Progress has become an important vehicle for BFA to lead in-depth reflections and
stimulate broad discussions in Asia and beyond.
Secretary General
Boao Forum for Asia
Overview
001
Part I |
Asian Economic Outlook
Boao Forum for Asia Asian Economic Outlook and Integration Progress Annual Report 2022
002
Overview
003
Overview
Asian economic growth rebounded strongly in 2021.
According to the estimation of the International
Monetary Fund (IMF) in January 2022, the weighted
real GDP growth of Asian economies1 in 2021 would
be 6.3%, up 7.6 percentage points from 2020. Of the
47 Asian economies, all but Myanmar, Afghanistan,
Bhutan and Iran grew faster than in 2020. Measured
by purchasing power parity, Asia’s share in the world
economy in 2021 rose by 0.2 percentage points from
2020 to 47.4%.
On the employment front, overall unemployment
in Asia saw a decline, but still remained high. According
to the data of the International Labor Organization
(ILO), unemployment rate in Asia remained 5.15% in
2021, down 0.5 percentage point from 2020. In terms
of income, most economies continued their income
support policies from the previous year, but the
impact of the COVID-19 epidemic on the labor
markets remained significant. On the price front,
inflation continued to climb in Asia. In January 2021,
the region's overall inflation rate was 4.2%, but it rose
7.6% in December 2021, with inflation exceeding 10%
in several economies. In terms of foreign trade, Asia’s
overall performance was outstanding and the scale
hit a new high. In the first three quarters of 2021, Asia’s
trade in goods totaled USD11.9 trillion, up 29.7% year-
on-year. Asia has become increasingly attractive to
foreign investment. In 2021, foreign direct investment
in Asia reached USD696 billion, up 18% from 2020. In
financial markets, stock indices rose, most currencies
depreciated against the US dollar, bond yields climbed,
and real estate prices in most economies rose but risks
in the banking sector were generally under control.
1 Asian economies this report studies include Afghanistan, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Brunei, Cambodia, China,
Georgia, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, DPRK (Democratic People’s Republic of Korea), the Republic of
Korea, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Laos, Lebanon, Malaysia, Maldives, Mongolia, Myanmar, Nepal, Oman, Pakistan, Palestine, the Philippines,
Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Syria, Tajikistan, Thailand, Timor-Leste, Turkey, Turkmenistan, United Arab Emirates,
Uzbekistan, Vietnam and Yemen.
Looking ahead to 2022, there are still many
factors affecting Asia's economic growth, and the
following six deserve our particular attention.
(1) The development of the epidemic. As new
variants such as more transmissible Delta and
Omicron continue to emerge, they are weakening the
effectiveness of the original vaccines. At the
beginning of 2022, a number of Asian economies are
seeing new peaks of the epidemic outbreaks, with the
Republic of Korea (hereinafter referred to as Korea, or
ROK), Vietnam, Japan, Turkey, Indonesia, Malaysia,
Thailand and Singapore seeing more than 10,000 new
cases every day.
(2) Geopolitical situation after the Russia-
Ukraine conflict. The Ukraine crisis has triggered
geopolitical changes in Asia and Europe, not only
increasing the fragility of Asia’s economic recovery,
but also fueling higher commodity prices and higher
inflation. Rising risk aversion will trigger capital
outflows from the region, add disturbances to its
financial markets, and increase the vulnerability of
Asian economic recovery. In addition, the conflict
between Russia and Ukraine may also affect global
energy supply and energy transformation.
(3) The pace and intensity of monetary
policy adjustments in the US and Europe. The
Federal Reserve has officially announced a quarter
increase in interest rates, and the European Central
Bank has signaled a gradual shift towards the
adjustment of monetary policy. The normalization of
the US and European macroeconomic policies will
inevitably have an impact on the global capital
markets, currency markets, commodity prices and
Boao Forum for Asia Asian Economic Outlook and Integration Progress Annual Report 2022
004
debt, including in Asian economies. Affected by factors
such as supporting economic recovery, stabilizing prices
and monetary contraction in developed economies,
Asian monetary policy will be faced with difficult
choices.
(4) The debt problem in some economies.
According to the Institute of International Finance
(IIF), the total global debt hit a record high of USD303
trillion in 2021. The debt to GDP (Gross Domestic
Product) ratio of emerging market countries was
approximately 248% in 2021, an increase of more than
20% from the pre-epidemic level. As global interest
rates rise and financial conditions tighten, surging
global debt could increase economic fragility and
hinder the pace of economic recovery. If global
interest rates rise faster than expected and economic
growth slows, the external debts of some emerging
markets and developing countries, including Asia,
may face the risk of default.
(5) Supply of key primary products. A rapid
economic recovery and global energy transformation
have widened the gap between the supply and
demand of resources and commodities, and thus
increased the negotiating power of resource-rich
countries such as Indonesia and Mongolia in Asia. This
may help ease the financial difficulties exacerbated by
the pandemic.
(6) Political regime changes in some Asian
countries. The Republic of Korea has just completed
the general election in March 2022, and the
Philippines will hold the presidential election in May.
The policy programs of the new governments may
bring new impacts on the strategic landscape of
political and economic pattern of Northeast Asia and
Southeast Asia.
Overall, the Asian economy will still be in the
process of recovery in 2022, but the growth rate may
be moderate. According to the IMF calculation, the
weighted real GDP growth is expected to be 5.2%, 1.2
percentage points lower than in 2021. In view of the
growing number of negative factors, this report
believes that Asian economic growth in 2022 is likely
to be lower than the IMF forecast. The IMF already
pointed out that in April, it will lower its global
economic growth forecast for 2022 to reflect the
impact of the situation in Russia and Ukraine.
Asian Economic Outlook and Policy
005
Chapter 1
Asian Economic Outlook and Policy
1.1 Economic Growth
Since 2021, the COVID-19 epidemic, the biggest
uncertainty affecting global economic growth,
including Asia, has seen a spike in daily new cases due
to the spread of mutated strains of the virus. In
January and April of 2021, the global daily new cases
peaked at more than 850,000, and still peaked over
700,000 in August. Discovered and named in
November 2021, the latest Omicron variant quickly
overtook the previously dominant Delta strain to
spread around the world, even reaching 3.93 million
new cases a day in January 2022. As a result, global
supply chains of vital goods such as chips, vaccines,
raw materials and energy tightened, limiting the
strength of demand-driven economic recovery. In
spite of this, some countries, based on the judgment
that “Omicron variant, while more transmissible,
carries a significantly lower risk of hospitalization than
the Delta strain”, began to let go of social control in
order to promote faster economic recovery, along
with the “base effect” of the world economy that was
caught in a deep recession in 2020, and sparked a
relatively strong rebound of economic growth in
2021. In January 2022, the IMF estimated the global
economic growth rate in 2021 to be 5.9%, significantly
higher than the negative 3.1% growth rate in 2020.
Due to the “base effect” of the lower growth rate in
2020, the growth rate in 2021 was also higher than the
pre-epidemic average level of around 3.5%. The Asian
1 Palestine, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and Syria are not available in the IMF database.
economy also showed the characteristics of recovery,
which is consistent with our report’s prediction last
year that “recovery of Asian economy is a high
probability event”. According to the IMF’s data-based
calculation, the weighted real GDP growth of Asian
economies in 2021 was 6.3%, significantly higher than
the negative 1.3% growth in 2020 and also higher
than the global level (see Figure 1.1). The trend of
Asia's share has been rising in the world economy
continues. In terms of purchasing power parity (PPP),
the ratio was 45.9%, 46.4% and 47.2% from 2018 to
2020, respectively, and was expected to rise further to
47.4% in 2021. In 2022, Asian economy will still be in
the process of recovery. Although the growth rate
may converge, it will still be higher than the predicted
world output growth rate of 4.4%. Its weighted real
GDP growth rate will be 5.2%, according to the IMF
calculation, and its share in the world GDP based on
the PPP will continue to slightly increase to 47.7%.
1.1.1 Economic Growth Rebound Strongly in
2021
Most Asian economies saw growth picking up in 2021.
Specifically, of the 47 Asian economies1 for which the
IMF has data, all economies performed better in 2021
than in 2020 except Myanmar, Afghanistan, Bhutan
and Iran, where the real GDP growth was lower. Only 4 of
the 47 Asian economies—Myanmar, Afghanistan, Bhutan
and Yemen—registered negative growth, and 15 Asian
economies grew by more than 5% in real terms.
Boao Forum for Asia Asian Economic Outlook and Integration Progress Annual Report 2022
006
By region, based on the IMF forecast 1 in
October 2021 and its January 2022 data update for
some Asian economies2, all Asian regional economies3
had higher growth rates in 2021 than in 2020. The
weighted real GDP growth rate of South Asia was
7.9%, the highest among all Asian regions. This is
related to the base period effect of the region's largest
negative growth (-5.6%) by region in 2020. India, the
largest economy in South Asia, grew by 9% in 2021, a
V-shaped recovery despite a 7.3% contraction in the
previous year, giving a strong boost to regional
growth. The Maldives, the region’s fastest growing
economy, grew by 18.9% in 2021, though this was on
top of a whopping contraction of 32.0% in 2020.
Afghanistan’s GDP fell by 9.7% in 2021, as a result of
the regime change. Another economy in the region
that also suffered negative growth like Afghanistan
was Bhutan, recording negative growth of 1.9% in
2021 for the second consecutive year. All other
economies in the region registered positive growth in
2021, albeit at less than 5%.
West Asia was the second among Asian regions
with a growth rate of 6.1%. Lebanon topped the
region's growth rankings for 2021 with a 35.5%
growth rate, but this is related to the country’s huge
jump room left by a sharp 25% negative growth in
2020. Turkey, the largest economy in the region,
achieved 11% real GDP growth in 2021, on top of 1.8%
growth in 2020, a remarkable achievement. Israel’s
growth reached 7.1% in 2021, ranking third in the
region. With the exception of Lebanon, Turkey and
Israel, the rest of the region saw a relatively weak
recovery in 2021, with growth below 4%. Among
them, Yemen was the only country in the region to
register negative growth with a real GDP growth of
negative 2% in 2021, on top of a contraction of 8.5%
in 2020.
1 IMF. World Economic Outlook, October 2021.
2 IMF. World Economic Outlook, January 2022 Update.
3 According to the Boao Forum for Asia, Asia is divided into East Asia, South Asia, Central Asia and West Asia. East Asia includes Brunei,
Cambodia, China (Chinese mainland, Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of China, Macao Special Administrative Region of China
and Taiwan Province of China), Indonesia, Japan, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, the Republic of Korea, Laos, Malaysia,
Mongolia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, East Timor and Vietnam; South Asia includes Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan,
India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka; Central Asia includes Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan,
Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan; West Asia (the Asian economies in the Middle East) includes Bahrain, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait,
Lebanon, Oman, Palestine, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Turkey, the United Arab Emirates and Yemen.
Economic growth in East Asia is slightly lower
than in West Asia, with a weighted real GDP growth
rate of 6.0% in 2021, but given that the region is the
only region in Asia not to slip into negative growth in
2020, its current growth rate is no less difficult to be
achieved than West and South Asia. The region’s
economy with the highest growth rate in 2021 was
Macao Special Administrative Region of China, at
20.4%. As the region’s largest economy, China
(excluding Hong Kong Special Administrative Region
of China, Macao Special Administrative Region of
China, and Taiwan Province of China) recorded 8.1%
growth, ranking second in the region. The Hong Kong
Special Administrative Region of China ranked third in
the region with 6.4% growth. Other economies with
growth above 5% were Singapore (6.0%), Taiwan
Province of China (5.0%) and Mongolia (5.2%). Among
other high-income economies in the region, Korea
grew by 4% and Japan by just 1.6%. The only economy
with negative growth in the region was Myanmar,
which contracted by hefty 17.9% in 2021.
Central Asia recorded the lowest growth among
Asian regions in 2021, with a weighted real GDP
growth rate of only 4.5%, but all economies in the
region achieved positive growth. On the basis of
negative growth in 2020, Georgia and Armenia
achieved a significant rebound, with a growth rate of
7.7% and 6.5% respectively in 2021, ranking first and
second in the region. By comparison, Uzbekistan, on
top of the 1.7% growth in 2020, achieved an even
harder 6.1% growth in 2021, the third-highest in the
region. Similarly, Tajikistan achieved 5% growth in
2021, on top of 4.5% growth in 2020. All other
economies in the region grew by less than 5% in real
terms in 2021, with Kazakhstan, the largest economy,
growing by 3.7%.
Chapter 1 Asian Economic Outlook and Policy
007
Figure 1.1 Weighted Real GDP Growth Rates of Asian Economies in Different Regions
Source: Calculations based on the IMF data.
Note: The 2021 data are estimates and the 2022 data are predictions.
1.1.2 Bailout or Stimulus Policies Remain in
Place
In order to maintain social resilience in the face of
epidemic shocks and promote economic recovery,
Asian economies continued to implement relief or
support policies of appropriate intensity in 2021, but
policy adjustment that emphasizes preventing risks
and reserving policy maneuvering space became
more obvious.1
In East Asia, China introduced relevant measures
to maintain necessary support for economic recovery
while taking into account the need for stable growth
and forestalling risks. First, it lowered the deficit-to-
GDP ratio to enhance fiscal sustainability. In 2021, the
deficit was RMB3.57 trillion, RMB190 billion less than
in 2020, with a 3.2% deficit ratio. The deficit was mainly
for increasing financial support for major strategic
tasks, and no special government bonds were issued
to leave room for addressing new risks and challenges.
Second, it continued to cut taxes and fees, reducing
burdens on market entities by over RMB700 billion in
the whole of 2011. Third, it expanded direct funds to
RMB2.8 trillion, an increase of RMB1.1 trillion over the
previous year, to improve the efficiency of
government funds. Fourth, transfer payments were
expanded, increasing general transfer payments from
the central to local governments by 7.8%.2 Japan’s
1 This section provides an overview of the fiscal policies of the major economies in each Asian region. The report has a special chapter on
monetary policies.
2 Ministry of Finance Research Group. Report on the Implementation of China’s Fiscal Policy in the First Half of 2021. http://www.
mof.gov.cn/zhengwuxinxi/caizhengxinwen/202108/t20210827_3748539.htm.
3 Economist Intelligence Unit. Country Report: Japan, Generated on February 24th 2022.
4 Economist Intelligence Unit. Country Report: the Republic of Korea, Generated on February 24th 2022.
Fumio Kishida cabinet announced an unprecedented
fiscal stimulus package of 55.7 trillion yen (USD488
billion) in November 2021, aimed at supporting post-
epidemic economic recovery and promoting a “new
type of Japanese capitalism”, including cash handouts
to households and support for small businesses.
Japan’s deficit-to-GDP ratio was projected to be 8.8%
in 2021.3 Korea continued to take measures to increase
government spending to promote industrial upgrading,
business investment, and support infrastructure,
public health and employment. In August 2021, the
Korean government proposed fiscal spending of
604.4 trillion won (USD518.4 billion) for 2022, up 8.3%
from the same period last year, and the measures
taken to support business and household incomes
during the epidemic will continue into the first half of
2022. The Korea deficit-to-GDP ratio was projected to
be 3.1% in 2021.4
In South Asia, the Indian government continued
to increase spending on health, livelihood and
economic stimulus in response to the impact of the
epidemic. The expenditure of the fiscal 2021-2022 was
INR34.83 trillion, higher than the previous fiscal year’s
expenditure of INR30.42 trillion, which was later
revised to INR34.5 trillion. The fiscal deficit for 2021-
2022 is projected to be 6.5% of GDP, lower than the
previous fiscal year's revised 9.5%, but still higher than
Boao Forum for Asia Asian Economic Outlook and Integration Progress Annual Report 2022
008
the previous fiscal years forecast of 3.5%. Of this, the
budget expenditure on health and welfare was
INR2.33846 trillion (USD30.7 billion), an increase of
137% from INR944.52 billion (USD12.95 billion) in the
2020-2021 fiscal year. The capital expenditure budget
rised by 34.5% to INR5.54 trillion (USD75.98 billion)
from INR4.12 trillion (USD56.5 billion) in the 2020-2021
fiscal year, mainly reflecting the Indian government's
efforts to boost economic growth by investing in
infrastructure development. India is projected to have
a deficit of 6.9% in the 2021-2022 fiscal year. 1
Pakistan’s 2021-2022 fiscal budget includes the most
expansionary package since 2018 aimed at supporting
economic growth through increasing capital
expenditure. The Pakistani government also announced a
reduction in indirect tax burdens in manufacturing
sectors such as textiles. Pakistan is expected to have a
deficit of 6.4% in the 2021-2022 fiscal year.2
In West Asia, Saudi Arabia's fiscal situation has
improved significantly due to the strong growth of its
oil revenues brought by high oil prices, with the deficit
ratio in 2021 expected to moderate to 2.3% from 10%
in 2020. According to the budget approved by the
Saudi government in December 2021, the country’s
total fiscal revenue is expected to increase by more
than 23% in 2022, while total expenditure is expected
to decrease by 3.5%. In 2022, Saudi Arabia is likely to
have a fiscal surplus for the first time in nine years, with
fiscal policy focusing on improving public services,
enhancing fiscal sustainability and supporting the
private sector. 3 Israel introduced expansionary fiscal
policies in response to the impact of the pandemic,
though its stimulus package of ILS180 billion (USD54.8
billion) ended in June 2021. The 2021-2022 fiscal
budget, approved in November 2021, proposed a
gradual reduction in epidemic related spending and
emphasized integration with long-term goals while
keeping the size of the fiscal deficit under control.
Israels deficit-to-GDP ratio is expected to be 4.6% in
1 Zhang Yuyan (Ed.). Analysis and Forecast of World Economic Situation in 2022. Social Sciences Academic Press, 2022.
2 Economist Intelligence Unit. Country Report: Pakistan, Generated on February 24th 2022.
3 Saudi Arabia Announces Budget 2022, with a Focus on Service Improvement Fiscal Sustainability and Private Sector Empowerment.
https://www.mof.gov.sa/en/mediacenter/News/Pages/News_12122021.aspx.
4 Economist Intelligence Unit. Country Report: Israel, Generated on February 24th 2022.
5 Economist Intelligence Unit. Country Report: Turkey, Generated on February 24th 2022.
6 Economist Intelligence Unit. Country Report: Kazakhstan, Generated on February 24th 2022.
7 Shavkat Mirziyoyev Approves the 2021 State Program. https://tashkenttimes.uz/national/6370-shavkat-mirziyoyev-approves-the-2021-
state-program.
8 Economist Intelligence Unit. Country Report: Kazakhstan, Generated on February 24th 2022.
2021, a significant contraction from 11.5% the previous
year. 4 Turkey also continues to implement rescue
subsidies, including the elimination of minimum
wage income tax, subsidizing credit, and offering non-
deliverable forward to help exporters mitigate
currency volatility. The Turkish government has also
increased its contribution to private sector workers’
pensions from 25% to 30% and announced a 50% rise
in the minimum wage in 2022. Turkey’s fiscal deficit is
projected to be 2.9 % in 2021.5
In Central Asia, Kazakhstan maintained an
expansionary fiscal policy in 2021, providing support
such as subsidized loans to small and medium-sized
enterprises to help them withstand financial risks
posed by the pandemic. In addition, the government
has continued to implement social support programs
that subsidize essential goods and services such as
fuel, utilities and housing. Kazakhstan’s deficit-to-GDP
ratio is projected to be 2.6% in 2021.6 Uzbekistan has
also introduced a series of expansionary fiscal policies
to support related domestic industries. For example,
in order to support domestic tourism, between March
1, 2021 and June 1, 2022, the government of
Uzbekistan introduced a travel subsidy mechanism
that subsidized 25% airline fares, 15% air and train
fares and 10% costs of accommodation services (hotel
services) for tour operators and travel agencies.7 Due
to increased government spending, Uzbekistan’s
deficit-to-GDP ratio is expected to be 5.5% in 2021, up
from 4.4% in 2020.8
1.1.3 Economic Growth Reaching the Pre-
Epidemic Level
Although continued economic recovery is highly
probable, there are still many factors affecting Asia’s
economic growth prospects and its economic
recovery still remains fragile. Specifically, the following
six factors deserve our attention.
(1) The evolvement of the epidemic. The virus
variants, their accelerated spread and serious imbalances
Chapter 1 Asian Economic Outlook and Policy
009
in vaccination have added great uncertainties to the
economic recovery in Asia. The Delta variant, first
identified in India in the first half of 2021, briefly
became the most widespread COVID-19 variant
globally, but it was quickly overtaken by the more
infectious Omicron variant, discovered in South Africa
in November 2021. The World Health Organization
(WHO) said nearly 90 million cases have been
reported to be related with the Omicron variant
within 10 weeks of its discovery, more than the total
number of cases reported in the full year of 2020.1 Of
the global samples collected by the WHO between
February 4 and March 5, 2022, 99.7% was Omicron
variants and only 0.1% was Delta variants.2 Studies
show that the BA.2 sub-variant of the Omicron variant,
which can also infect those people who have
previously been infected with the COVID-19 virus, is
about 1.5 times more infectious than BA.1 and is more
infectious to people who have received vaccination
and even after a booster, although fully vaccinated
people are less likely to spread the virus than
unvaccinated people. 3 Vaccination imbalances can
exacerbate the risk of transmission in the context of
virus mutations. WHO Director General Tedros Adhanom
Ghebreyesu stressed that despite the increasing
availability of vaccines, there is still a serious imbalance
in global vaccination. By March 8, 2022, 63.4% of the
global population has received at least one dose of
COVID-19 vaccine, but only 13.6% of the population in
low-income countries has received at least one dose.4
In 2022, global vaccine coverage may continue to
maintain a differentiated trend. Virus mutation will
continue to occur with a high probability, and the
emergency of more virulent and fast-spreading variants
cannot be ruled out. The WHO has also warned that
unequal distribution of vaccines could further lead to
the mutation of the virus, while new vaccines and
specific drugs are expected to make progress, their
coverage will be limited in the short term. Asia has a
large population and a dense distribution. In this
context, mutated strains of the COVID-19 virus will
present an ongoing challenge for Asia.
1 WHO. Director-General's opening remarks at the media briefing on COVID-19, 1 February 2022.
2 WHO. COVID-19 Weekly Epidemiological Update. Edition 82, published 8 March 2022.
3 Spencer Kimball. WHO says new Omicron BA.2 subvariant will rise globally, but scientists don’t know if it can reinfect people. Published
Feb 8 2022. https://www.cnbc.com/2022/02/08/who-says-omicron-bapoint2-subvariant-will-rise-globally.html.
4 Coronavirus (COVID-19) Vaccinations, Our World in Data. https://ourworldindata.org/covid-vaccinations.
5 IMF. Rising Caseloads, A Disrupted Recovery, and Higher Inflation. World Economic Outlook Update, January, 2022.
(2) Geopolitical situation after the Russia-
Ukraine conflict. On February 21, 2022, Russian
President Vladimir Putin signed a presidential decree
announcing the recognition of the “Donetsk People's
Republic” and the “Luhansk People's Republic”. After
that, the US announced its first batch of sanctions
against Russia. On February 24, Putin announced a
special military operation in the Donbas region in a
nationally televised address. Subsequently, the US and
European countries announced to increase sanctions,
including the expulsion of major Russian financial
institutions from the Society for Worldwide Interbank
Financial Telecommunications (SWIFT) system and
other severe measures. No matter what the final
outcome is, the Russia-Ukraine conflict will have a
profound impact on the geopolitical landscape of
Europe and even the world. The prospect of a
prolonged Russia-EU confrontation is emerging, and
the direct impact of 2022 will be extremely heavy. The
prices of energy, wheats and other bulk commodities
have risen in response to the possibility. The
international financial market has fluctuated sharply,
and inflationary pressure in major countries has risen
significantly. The global supply chain was further
damaged. Geopolitical progress continued, and
uncertainty about the growth prospects of Asian
economies increased.
(3) The pace and intensity of monetary
policy adjustments in the US and Europe. Entering
2022, the continuously rising trend of global inflation
continues. The IMF expects global inflation to be
higher and more persistent than it forecast in October
2021, with an average inflation rate of 3.9% in
advanced economies and 5.9% in emerging market
and developing economies in 2022 before possibly
subsiding in 2023. 5 Specifically, the inflation rate
reached 7.8% in the US in February 2022 and
exceeded 5% in the eurozone in January. The US and
European central banks have gradually changed their
tune as inflation has proved deeper and more
persistent than expected. The Fed and the European
Central Bank (ECB) stuck to their view that inflation
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was temporary for most of 2021, but such a policy
tone began to change at the end of the year. On
December 15th, 2021, the Fed released the Statement
of the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC)
meeting in December, announcing the acceleration
of Taper, reducing the amount of asset purchases per
month from USD15 billion to USD30 billion beginning
in January 2022, and executing the final round of asset
purchases from mid-February to mid-March 2022. ECB
President Christine Lagarde said that while there were
good reasons not to respond as forcefully as the Fed
did to soaring inflation, it “stands ready to respond
with monetary policy” if necessary. JPMorgan predicts
that oil prices could hit USD125 to USD150 a barrel by
2022 because of supply chains and the conflict
between Russia and Ukraine. If that happens, global
inflation could hit 7%, forcing monetary authorities in
most advanced economies to slam on the brakes,
which would raise the risk of global growth going to
zero, and making it hard for Asian countries to escape.
(4) Debt issue in some economies. Aggravated
imbalances in global economic recovery have put
emerging market and developing economies under
greater pressures of soaring debt. Debt burdens on
emerging market economies had already risen
sharply before the epidemic outbreak and were
exacerbated by the epidemic, as public debt caused
by increasing spending related to the epidemic
reached record levels, while tax revenues fell
sharply. In particular, tightened monetary policy in
advanced economies will pose challenges on central
banks and governments in emerging market and
developing economies. Higher returns elsewhere will
prompt capital outflows from emerging market and
developing economies, putting downward pressure
on their currencies and leading to higher inflation,
particularly in Asia. If these economies do not tighten
monetary policy accordingly, the debt burden of their
foreign currency borrowers, both public and private,
will rise further. In general, economies with a high
ratio of foreign debt, heavy dependence on external
financing, poor economic fundamentals and a history
of default have a higher risk of sovereign debt. At
present, the debt evolution trend of Turkey and other
economies deserves special attention.
(5) Supply of key primary products. The game
between major powers obtaining key resources and
energy, ensuring secure supply and leading the
transformation of energy structure has become
increasingly fierce, and the supply and demand of
global primary products will continue to be in an
unbalanced state. Stable supply of resources, energy
and other primary products offers an important
guarantee for and serves as a driving force of
maintaining long-term and stable economic growth.
However, as a result of the epidemic and the Russia-
Ukraine crisis, the supply of food, metal mineral
resources and other primary products may be
interrupted or insufficient, and the price of these
products may fluctuate greatly due to the
expectation. The economic and financial sanctions
imposed by the US on Russia and other countries,
especially secondary sanctions, may further aggravate
the imbalance between supply and demand of global
primary products, and the risk of price fluctuations
may become more prominent. Disturbed by the
sanctions on Russia, the London Metal Exchange (LME)
nickel price rose by 100%, breaking the USD60,000,
USD70,000, USD80,000, USD90,000 and USD100,000
marks successively on March 8, 2022, rising by 248%
in two trading days to continuously hit a record high,
which is the reality of the huge price fluctuations of
primary products under the influences of geopolitics.
In addition, the transformation of global production
mode to low carbon has also brought great pressure
to the supply-demand relationship of primary products,
especially mineral resources. Low-carbon economic
development will greatly increase demands for copper,
nickel, cobalt, rare earth and other raw materials,
intensifying competitions for these resources among
major economies.
(6) Regime changes in some economies. In
2022, some medium-sized powers in Asia, such as
Korea and the Philippines, have just completed the
general election or will hold the presidential election.
The domestic and foreign policy adjustments carried
out by the new governments will reshape the
international environment for the economic development
of Asia, especially East Asian economies, to a certain
extent, and lead to changes in the regional and
international landscape.
On the whole, the Asian economy is likely to
continue to recover in 2022, but the growth rate may
be lower than that of 2021. The weighted real GDP
growth of Asian economies is expected to be around
5.2% in 2022, down from 6.3% of 2021, according to
Chapter 1 Asian Economic Outlook and Policy
011
the IMF forecast. Among them, South Asia continues
to maintain the leading position in growth rate,
followed by East Asia. West Asia and Central Asia
ranked third and fourth. Considering the delay of the
epidemic and the severe impact of the conflict
between Russia and Ukraine on energy, industrial
chain and financial markets, it is expected that the
growth rate in Asia in 2022 will be lower than the IMF
forecast.
1.2 Employment and Income
In 2021, the recovery of the global labor markets,
including Asian economies, stalled under the impact
of the pandemic, and actually has made no progress
since the fourth quarter of 2020. According to a report
released by the International Labour Organization
(ILO), global working time in 2021 was significantly
lower than the pre-epidemic level in the fourth
quarter of 2019, with the four quarters of 2021 being
4.5% (equivalent to 131 million full-time jobs1), 4.8%
(equivalent to 140 million full-time jobs), 4.7%
(equivalent to 137 million full-time jobs) and 3.2%
(equivalent to 95 million full-time jobs) lower than the
fourth quarter of 2019.2 From a regional perspective,
Northern and Southern Europe and Western Europe
are closer to the pre-epidemic baseline in 2021, with
a gap of 3.3%. In contrast, the gap between the
unemployment rates in America and Africa and those
before the epidemic was larger, with 5.5% and 5.2%
respectively. In 2021, the average unemployment rate
in Asia was 5.15%.
1.2.1 Unemployment Remains High
The COVID-19 epidemic has had a clear and lasting
negative impact on employment around the world,
including in Asian economies. According to the data
from the ILO, the global unemployment rate of over
15 years old was 5.4% in 2019, before the epidemic
outbreak, but rose sharply to 6.6% in 2020 and
remained relatively high at 6.2% in 2021, significantly
higher than the average 5.6% from 2010 to 2019.
Global unemployment is expected to reach 207
million people in 2022, about 21 million higher than
the 2019 level. The Asia-Pacific region is in a similar
situation, with the unemployment rate rising from
1 Assuming every week has 48 working hours.
2 ILO Monitor. COVID-19 and the World of Work. Eighth Edition. 27 October 2021.
4.3% in 2019 to 5.4% in 2020, remaining high at 4.8%
in 2021 and expected to fall slightly to 4.6% in 2022.
As far as major regions in Asia are concerned, the
jobless rate is relatively high in Central Asia, West Asia
and Arab countries, followed by South Asia and East
Asia. Southeast Asia has relatively low unemployment.
Overall, unemployment in Asia is better than in the
world as a whole. Even during the pandemic, Asia's
unemployment rate was about 0.9 percentage lower
than that in the world. Specifically, the unemployment
rate in Central and Western Asia rose from 9.4% before
the pandemic to 9.7% in 2020, 9.8% in 2021, and is
expected to continue to rise to 10.0% in 2022. The
unemployment rate in Arab countries rose sharply
from 8.2% in 2019 to 9.5% in 2020, further to 9.6%
in 2021, and is expected to fall slightly to 9.2% in
2022, but still significantly higher than the pre-
epidemic level. In South Asia, the unemployment rate
before the epidemic was 5.2% in 2019, rising sharply
to 7.4% in 2020, but falling to 6.0% in 2021 but still
significantly higher than the pre-epidemic level, and
is expected to fall further to 5.6% in 2022, still 0.3
percentage points higher than the long-term average.
Employment in East Asia was relatively less affected by
the epidemic, with the unemployment rate rising
from 4.3% before the epidemic to 4.8% in 2020, then
falling to 4.6% in 2021 and expected to further fall to
4.5% in 2022. The unemployment rate in Southeast
Asia rose from 2.5% before the epidemic to 3.0% in
2020 and 3.1% in 2021, and is expected to be 3.1% in
2022.
The changes in youth unemployment rates in
the wake of the epidemic are of particular concern.
According to the ILO data, unemployment among
young people aged 15-24 has increased in every
major Asian region during the pandemic, especially in
the regions where unemployment rates were
previously at a relatively high level. For example, the
youth unemployment rate rose from 22.9% in 2019 to
25.6% in 2020 in Arab countries, from 18.4% to 20.1%
in Southeast Asia, and from 18.6% to 19.3% in Central
and West Asia. The average unemployment rate in
Asia is expected to be 4.97% in 2022, down 0.19
percentage points from 2021 (see Figure 1.2).
Boao Forum for Asia Asian Economic Outlook and Integration Progress Annual Report 2022
012
Figure 1.2 Unemployment Rates of Different Regions in Asia1
Sources: ILO, WESODATA.
1.2.2 Continuity of Income Support Policy
The negative impact of the epidemic on labor
incomes in Asian economies remained in 2021, but to
varying degrees among different economies. For
example, after 2021, the average nominal monthly
income growth rate of employees in Indonesia was
still negative year-on-year, but the degree of
contraction was decreasing, from the negative
growth rate of 3.1% in the first quarter to negative
0.5% in the third quarter. In Thailand, the average
nominal monthly income of employees in the first
quarter of 2021 showed a minor positive year-on-year
growth of 0.1%. The year-on-year growth rate of
average nominal monthly income of employees in
Vietnam in 2021 once turned positive in the second
quarter, but showed significant negative growth in
the second half of the year, with the growth rate of the
four quarters being -2.7%, 4.5%, -5.0% and -4.9%
respectively, indicating that the epidemic still has
great uncertainties for the labor market.
In order to promote the smooth transition from
emergency responses to the epidemic to consolidation
of recovery, Asian economies generally adopted or
continued previous supporting policies for enterprises
and workers in vulnerable links of industrial or supply
1 The data of unemployment rate in Asia are calculated by the author. Based on the unemployment rate and labor force data from ILO,
Wesodata, we calculate the unemployment population of 47 Asian economies respectively and sum up the total unemployed population in
Asia, and then divide it by the total working population in Asia to calculate the Asian unemployment rate from 2019 to 2022.
chains as well as vulnerable groups in society in 2021.
Of course, some adjustments have been made in
terms of policy intensity to adapt to changed situations.
While new measures of temporary social quarantines
have been introduced as a result of the Omicron
variant, most economies have stressed the need to
suspend social controls when the outbreak is brought
under control to mitigate the impact of the epidemic
on economic recovery.
China stresses the importance of protecting
market entities, especially micro, small and medium-
sized enterprises, as well as protecting employment
and people's livelihood. In April 2021, the State
Administration of Taxation issued a notice on the
implementation of the Administrative Measures for
Government Procurement to Promote the Development of
Small and Medium-sized Enterprises (SMEs), which
explained the reserved procurement quota specifically
for SMEs and the granting of preferential price
evaluation to small and micro enterprises. In June, the
Ministry of Finance issued the measures for the
management of SMEs special development funds,
stressing that the fund will mainly be used to guide
local governments and other relevant parties to
improve the public service system and financing
Chapter 1 Asian Economic Outlook and Policy
013
service system for SMEs, improve the development
environment for SMEs, break through the shortcomings
and bottlenecks restricting their development, and
support their high-quality development. In August,
the State Council issued the 14th Five-Year Plan for
Promoting Employment; In the same month, the
General Office of the Ministry of Civil Affairs issued the
Notice on Further Ensuring the Basic Living Conditions of
People in Difficulties Affected by Disasters and Epidemics,
which set forth the work requirements for “giving full
play to the role of social assistance in ensuring the
basic living conditions of people in difficulties affected
by disasters and epidemics”. In November, the General
Office of the State Council issued a notice on further
intensifying assistance to SMEs, which says that under
the background of “rising raw material prices,
insufficient orders, difficulties in recruiting workers
and rising labor costs, slow payment of receivables,
high logistics costs, the spread of COVID-19, power
shortages in some areas, and SEMs being faced with
increasing cost pressure and operation difficulties”,
the country will help SMEs to cope with the difficult
situation by increasing financial support, further
cutting taxes and fees, alleviating the pressure of
rising costs, strengthening power supply, supporting
enterprises in stabilizing and expanding employment,
and ensuring payment to SMEs. In December, the
State Council held an executive meeting to deploy a
number of measures to clear up the arrears of SMEs.
In 2021, Japan continued its policy on small and
medium-sized enterprises and regional economy and
provided some supports to market players and
households in addressing risks associated with
COVID-19. In January 2021, the Small and Medium
Enterprises Bureau of Japan’s Ministry of Economy,
Trade and Industry (METI) announced that it would
extend the application deadline for the "Maintaining
Enterprise Subsidy Program" and "Support Enterprise
Rent Subsidy Program" to February 2021 to give more
enterprises the opportunity to receive financial
support to deal with the impact of the epidemic. In
July 2021, the METI released the solicitation of
“Promoting Investment in Japan to Strengthen Supply
Chain Plan” (the second version), and selected 151
projects with a capital scale of 209.5 billion yen. This
project aimed at supporting enterprises to build new
factories in Japan and introduce new facilities for
important products and materials to enhance supply
chain flexibility, as a way of dealing with the
interruption of economic activities associated with
supply chains caused by the epidemic, to address the
vulnerability of supply chains due to the high
concentration of production bases/manufacturing
plants. For the sake of basic necessities for people’s
livelihood, it put special emphasis on ensuring
domestic production bases to ensure stable supply at
the time of emergency.
Under the impact of a new round of epidemic
outbreaks, Korea has implemented the strictest
epidemic prevention and control measures in the
capital area since mid-July 2021, which has severely
impacted the “face-to-face service industries”, such as
catering, accommodation and retail, but the recovery
momentum of its job market remains firm, demonstrating
the elasticity and resilience of Korean economy. The
Korea’s total employment in December 2021 fell by
497,000 a month earlier to 27.3 million, the first
monthly decline since September, but the impact of
the Omicron variant and social distancing rules
reintroduced since mid-December was relatively
manageable. On this basis, government subsidies
were phased out, although most of the resulting job
losses occurred in the public sector, particularly in
health care, social care and social security. By contrast,
employment levels in the private sector, particularly in
key employment sectors, such as manufacturing,
trade and hotels and catering, remained stable.
India has expanded its health and welfare
budget expenditure to INR2.3384.6 trillion (USD30.7
billion) for the 2021-2022 fiscal year, up 137% from
INR944.52 billion (USD12.95 billion) in the previous
fiscal year, including INR350 billion (USD4.8 billion) for
COVID-19 vaccines. India has also proposed to invest
INR1.97 trillion (USD27.02 billion) over the next five
years through the Production Linked Incentive (PLI)
Scheme to support and nurture global champions
in manufacturing, helping them to possess core
competencies and cutting-edge technologies and
promote scale expansion in key industrial sectors. The
one-card national food ration scheme has been fully
implemented, allowing migrant workers with the card
to apply for food rations anywhere in the country.
Social security has been provided to temporary
workers and platform workers, minimum wage and
employee national insurance has been extended to all
Boao Forum for Asia Asian Economic Outlook and Integration Progress Annual Report 2022
014
categories of workers, restrictions on the types of
employment for women (including night shifts) have
been removed, and single window management and
online reporting have been implemented to reduce
the compliance burden on employers. In terms of
financial inclusion, the “Stand Up India” program has
been adopted to reduce the loan margin to 15%, in
order to provide loans for agriculture-related activities
for lower castes, tribal people and women. The
budget allocation to the medium, small and micro-
sized enterprises sector was INR157 billion, more than
doubled that of the previous fiscal year.
Turkey started a gradual normalization period of
easing epidemic restrictions in early March 2021.
However, due to the ever-increasing number of cases
following the relaxation, the Turkish government
decided to re-impose a “total lockdown” from April 29
to May 17. Restrictions were eased between May 17
and June 1, with a night curfew from 9 pm to 5 am on
weekdays and a total lockdown on weekends. In
response to repeated epidemic outbreaks, Turkey’s tax
breaks were extended well into 2021. For example, by
the end of June 2021, the value-added tax (VAT) rate
for commercial rental services would be reduced from
18% to 8%, the VAT rate for education services would
be reduced from 8% to 1%, and the VAT rate for some
cultural and travel services would be reduced from 8%
to 1%. As of March 2021, Turkey had implemented a
package of financial support plans, including additional
medical costs, cash assistance and unemployment
benefits, as well as the guarantee of loans to businesses
and households, extended state-owned bank loans
service, deferred tax for enterprises, equity injections
into public banks, and value-added tax breaks for some
commodities (such as food and accommodation
services). The total size of the fiscal support package is
12.7% of the country’s GDP. In May 2021, the Turkish
Ministry of Finance announced a new supportive
lending program for small and medium-sized
enterprises, whose turnover fell by 25% in 2020. The
Ministry of Finance, in cooperation with the Union of
Chambers and Commodity Exchanges of Turkey
(TOBB) and the Credit Guarantee Fund, would provide
specialized loans to small and medium-sized
enterprises. Small and medium-sized enterprises with
an annual turnover of less than 1 million Turkish lira
1 World Employment and Social Outlook. Trends 2022. Geneva: International Labour Office, 2022.
(USD118,371) per household were eligible for loans of
up to 50,000 Turkish lira (USD5,918), while small and
medium-sized enterprises with an annual turnover of
more than 1 million Turkish lira but less than 10 million
Turkish lira (USD1.18 million) can benefit from a loan
scheme of up to 200,000 Turkish lira (USD23,674). The
12-month loan would carry an annual interest rate of
17.5%, with an option for a six-month payment waiver.
In short, the impact of the pandemic is likely to
be repeated and long-lasting. According to the ILO,
key indicators of the labor markets in the world’s
major regions are unlikely to return to pre-pandemic
levels in 2021, with a full recovery still far off. In
contrast, Asia-Pacific and Europe are expected to
come closest to their recovery targets, while Latin
America and the Caribbean have the most negative
outlook. The COVID-19 pandemic has changed the
structure of the labor market, and a return to the pre-
pandemic baseline is likely to be insufficient to
compensate for the damage caused by the pandemic.1
In this context of huge uncertainty over the pandemic,
how to strike a balance between protecting workers
and ensuring supply chain resilience and robust
economic recovery, and then implement economic
policies with strategic flexibility for this purpose pose
challenges Asian economies have to face in 2022.
1.3 Prices and Monetary
Policies
Under the influence of multiple factors such as the
imbalance between supply and demand, inflation in
Asian economies generally rose in 2021, especially in
some Central and West Asian economies. It is
estimated that inflation will remain high in Asian
economies in 2022. Affected by this expectation,
some economies will shift from loose monetary policy
to a tight one, but some may still maintain previously
loose policy unchanged, and some may will even
lower policy interest rates. More Asian economies are
expected to join monetary tightening in the future as
the US Federal Reserve accelerates policy tightening.
However, under the pressure of economic growth,
some Asian economies may face a difficult policy
tradeoff between maintaining growth and stabilizing
prices when making monetary policies.
Chapter 1 Asian Economic Outlook and Policy
015
1.3.1 Continuous Rise in Inflation
Asian economies continued seeing rising inflation in
2021. A simple average of inflation rates across 33
Asian economies shows that the region’s overall
inflation rate was 4.2% in January 2021, and rose to
7.6% in December 2021 (see Figure 1.3). By region,
inflation rates in Central Asia were high and rose fast,
exceeding 10%, many regional economies in this
region exceeded 10% by the end of 2021. The inflation
rate in South Asia also rose rapidly. By the end of 2021,
it returned to the high level of early 2020, while
inflation in West Asia continued its upward trend in
the second half of 2020, but remained generally stable
in the second half of 2021, and the inflationary
pressures in East Asia were generally low, but also saw
a large increase in 2021.
Figure 1.3 Inflation Trends of Asia
Source: CEIC, February 2022.
Note: The regional inflation rate is a simple average of the inflation rates of all regional economies. East Asia does not include Brunei,
Cambodia, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Myanmar, East Timor; South Asia does not include Afghanistan, Bhutan,
Maldives; Central Asia excludes Turkmenistan; West Asia excludes Iraq, Kuwait, Lebanon, Syria and Yemen.
Inflation stayed high in Lebanon, Turkey, and
Iran in 2021, with Lebanon being one of the
economies that saw the highest inflation rates in the
world. Lebanon’s inflation rate dipped briefly in the
first half of 2021, but surged again in the second half
of the year, reaching 224.4% in December 2021.
Turkey’s inflation rate gradually climbed in 2021,
soaring to 36.1% in December and rising further to
48.7% in January 2022, the highest level since April
2002. Iran’s inflation rate always stayed at a high level,
after reaching close to 50% in April 2021, which began
to declined, but still remained at 35.2% in December
2021 and then rose slightly to 35.9% in January 2022.
In addition to the three countries, the inflation rates of
Mongolia, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Azerbaijan, Georgia,
Kyrgyzstan and other countries rose rapidly in 2021
and exceeded 10% successively. Despite a slight
decline in 2021, Uzbekistan’s inflation rate remained
above 10% for the whole year. Kazakhstan’s inflation
has remained relatively high, above 8% since July
2021, and the high inflation has sparked a wave of
protests and political unrest in several parts of the
country.
Inflation in some economies has risen rapidly
from low levels and inflationary pressures continue to
mount. Driven by higher oil and food costs, Koreas
inflation rate surged from 0.9% in January 2021 to
3.7% in December 2021, the highest since 2011 and
exceeding its central bank’s 2% target for nine
consecutive months. The situation is similar in Laos,
Myanmar, Singapore and Nepal. Inflation rate rose
from 2.0% in January 2021 to 5.3% in December 2021
Boao Forum for Asia Asian Economic Outlook and Integration Progress Annual Report 2022
016
in Laos and from 0.7% in January 2021 to 9.9% in
October 2021 in Myanmar. Singapore’s inflation rate
rose from 0.2% in January 2021 to 4.0% in December
2021, while Nepal’s inflation rate rose from 2.7% in
February 2021 to 7.1% in December 2021. Armenia's
inflation rate also rose from 1.6% in November 2020 to
9.6% in November 2021.
Although inflation rates have risen in some
economies, the overall inflation situation is under
control. In 2021, China's inflation rate showed a rising
trend amid fluctuations. China’s inflation rate reversed
the contractive trend of the previous two months,
turned from negative to positive in March 2021, rose
to 1.3% in May, then began to fall again. In October
2021, the inflation rate picked up again, rose to 2.3%
in November and fell to 1.5% in December. In the
whole of 2021, China's inflation rate was 0.9%,
generally running within a reasonable range.
Indonesia's inflation rate also peaked at 1.7% in May
2021 before falling, and then again soared to 1.9% in
December 2021, still within its central bank's inflation
target. Japan's prices returned to positive growth in
the second half of 2021, rising to 1.5% and 1.7% in
November and December 2021 respectively, but still
below the Bank of Japan's 2% inflation target. Malaysia
reversed the previous trend of falling prices in
February 2021, with inflation rising rapidly to 4.7% in
April and then falling to 3.2% in December 2021. Israel,
Jordan, the United Arab Emirates and other
economies also came out of deflation in 2021, and
even faced certain inflationary pressure. Driven by
rising food and fuel costs, India's inflation rate hit 6.3%
in May and June 2021, above the central bank’s 6%
inflation ceiling for two consecutive months. After
that, India’s inflation began to fall, but picked up again
from October 2021, reaching 5.6% in December 2021.
Inflationary pressures eased in some economies
in 2021. Vietnam’s inflation rate rose to 2.9% in May
2021, but gradually fell to 1.8% in December 2021. In
the whole of 2021, Vietnam’s inflation rate was 1.84%,
the lowest since 2016. After the end of deflation in
2020, Saudi Arabia’s inflation rate once rose rapidly,
reaching 6.2% in June 2021. As the base effect of the
1 In response to a drop in government revenues due to falling oil prices, the Saudi government raised the value-added tax rate from 5% to
15% from July 1, 2020, which led to a spike in Saudi inflation.
2 Gianluca Benigno, Julian di Giovanni, Jan J. J. Groen, and Adam I. Noble. A New Barometer of Global Supply Chain Pressures. The
Federal Reserve Bank of New York, Liberty Street Economics, January 4, 2022. https://www.newyorkfed.org/medialibrary/media/
research/blog/2022/2022_Barometer-Global-Supply-Chain-Pressures_data.
value-added tax introduced in July 2020 began to
weaken,1 the inflation rate dropped to 0.4% in July,
which had since picked up, but only 1.2% in
December 2021.
There are several reasons for rising inflation in
Asian economies. 1), The disruption of the supply
chain has led to rising inflation. Since the summer of
2021, the global COVID-19 epidemic has frequently
broken out, especially in Asia, which has forced the
governments to tighten prevention and control
measures, resulting in stagnation or the disruption of
the supply chain in Asia and beyond. At the same
time, some economies have politicized the issue of
supply chain security, further destabilizing the global
supply chain. According to The Global Supply Chain
Pressure Index (GSCPI) released by the Federal Reserve
Bank of New York, the global supply chain pressure
has been rising rapidly since 2021,2 which has caused
production stoppage, capacity reduction and serious
supply shortage, and directly pushed up the
enterprise production costs. 2), Strong demand has
driven up prices. In the face of the impact of the
epidemic, governments of all economies, including
Asian economies, have implemented large-scale
stimulus and supportive policies, accelerating
economic recovery and pushing up prices. 3), Due to
extreme weather events and energy and labor
shortages, international food prices have risen sharply.
According to the statistics of the UN Food and
Agriculture Organization (FAO), global food prices
continued rising in the second half of 2021, with the
global food price index rising from 113.5 in January
2021 to 135.7 in January 2022, an increase of 19.5%.
Soaring food prices have pushed up inflation in some
economies.
Inflation in Asian economies is expected to rise
in 2022 and even remain a high level in some
economies. The epidemic, together with the
international situation after the conflict between
Russia and Ukraine, are important variables affecting
the economic trend of the Asian region, and will
continue to have an impact on the stability of supply
chains in the region. Tight supply chains will bring
Chapter 1 Asian Economic Outlook and Policy
017
about price rise pressures. Global food and energy
prices are expected to remain high, driving consumer
prices to rise continuously through the producer-
price effect. But there are also factors that may cause
inflation to fall: (1) The economic growth of the Asian
economies is expected to decline from 2021, which
will ease the upward pressure on prices on the
demand side; (2) The policy stimulus intensity of the
economies inside and outside Asia will also be
reduced, and monetary policy in particular will be
tightened, which will help curb inflation.
1.3.2 Monetary Policy Faces Hard Choices
Some Asian economies have begun to tighten their
monetary policy amid rising inflationary pressures.
According to incomplete statistics, 12 Asian economies
raised interest rates a total of 33 times in total in 2021
(see Table 1.1). Changes in internal and external
conditions have promoted Asian economies to make
changes to their monetary policies. Internally, rising
prices have become the most immediate reason for
central banks to tighten monetary policies, while
growth rebounds sharply in most Asian economies in
2021 have also lowered their demand for monetary
policy stimulation. Externally, tightening of the
monetary policy by the Fed has also been a reason for
Asian economies to raise interest rates in response to
currency depreciation and capital outflow pressures.
Central Asian economies were the first to raise
interest rates in 2021, as they faced the largest
inflationary pressures. Kyrgyzstan has been in the
process of raising interest rates since 2020, and the
inflation rate still remained high in 2021. Therefore,
despite the great pressure of economic growth, the
central bank of Kyrgyzstan still raised the policy
interest rate from 5% to 5.5% in February 2021,
followed by a cumulative increase of 250 basis points
in April, July and November to 8%. Armenia and
Tajikistan also started raising interest rates in February
2021, raising rates six and four times respectively, each
with a total of 250 basis points. Georgia started to raise
interest rates in March 2021, with a total of 250 basis
points for four times in 2021. Kazakhstan's central
bank began raising benchmark interest rates for the
third time in a row in July 2021 in a bid to bring
inflation back to the target range.
Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Nepal and other countries in
South Asia also raised interest rates. In order to curb
inflation and currency devaluation, the Central Bank of
Pakistan raised the benchmark interest rate by 25 basis
points from 7% to 7.25% in September 2021, and then
sharply raised the interest rate by 150 basis points and
100 basis points respectively in November and
December. Meanwhile, in November 2021, Pakistan’s
central bank decided to increase the number of
annual monetary policy meetings from six to eight to
increase the flexibility of monetary policy to address
inflation. Sri Lanka and Nepal also raised interest rates
by 50 basis points each in August 2021 in response to
rising inflationary pressures. The ROK was the first
major economy in East Asia to raise rates, with its
central bank raising the benchmark interest rate from
a historic low of 0.5% to 0.75% in August 2021 and
further to 1% in November 2021.
Some central banks have cut interest rates to
stimulate their economies. Indonesia’s central bank
continued low interest rates and the loose monetary
policy in 2021, cutting the benchmark interest rate to
3.5% in February, the lowest level on record. To
support the development of the real economy, the
People’s Bank of China lowered the one-year loan
prime rate (LPR) by 5 basis points to 3.8% in December
2021, the first cut since April 2020. At the same time,
the central bank also lowered the reserve requirement
ratio for financial institutions by 0.5 percentage points.
Under the dual pressure of inflation and currency
depreciation, Turkey’s central bank continued the
process of raising interest rates in 2020 at the
beginning of 2021, raising interest rates by 200 basis
points to 19% in March 2021. However, in order to
stimulate economic growth, Turkey’s central bank cut
interest rates for four consecutive months from
September to December 2021, lowering the benchmark
interest rate by 500 basis points. Given severe inflation
and currency depreciation pressures, Turkey has less
room to cut interest rates further.
Some Asian economies have kept loose monetary
policies unchanged. Despite a continuous increase in
inflation, but considering the judgment that Japan’s
inflation in the long term will still be less than its 2%
inflation target, the Bank of Japan continued its loose
monetary policy, and even after the Fed’s decision to
cut large-scale asset purchases, Japan's central bank
governor, Haruhiko Kuroda said the bank has no
intention of exiting from its massive monetary stimulus
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plan quickly. Despite the inflationary pressures, India’s
central bank has kept its benchmark interest rate
unchanged since May 2020 to support the economic
recovery in the wake of the severe impact of the
pandemic on the economy. Under minor inflationary
pressure, Saudi Arabia, Thailand, Vietnam and other
economies also kept policy rates unchanged in 2021.
Table 1.1 List of Benchmark Interest Rate Adjustments in Some
Asian Economies, 2021 (basis point)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Armenia 25 50 50 50 25 50
Azerbaijan 25 50 25
China 5
Georgia 50 100 50 50
Indonesia 25
Kazakhstan 25 25 25
Korea, Republic of 25 25
Kyrgyzstan 50 100 100 50
Nepal 50
Pakistan 25 150 100
Sri Lanka 50
Tajikistan 25 100 100 25
Turkey 200 100 200 100 100
United Arab Emirates 5
Source: CEIC and the central banks of involved economies, February 2022. The interest rate in China refers to Loan Prime Rate (LPR).
Several Asian economies have continued to
raise interest rates in 2022. On January 14, 2022, the
Bank of Korea announced a further increase in its
benchmark interest rate to 1.25%, returning to the
pre-COVID-19 levels. In addition, Sri Lanka,
Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, Armenia and Kyrgyzstan also
implemented further rate hikes in January and
February 2022, respectively. Mongolia raised interest
rates in January 2022 for the first time since August
2016. However, the People’s Bank of China made an
even bigger cut in January 2022, lowering the one-
year lending interest rate further to 3.7%, a decline for
the second consecutive month. More Asian
economies are expected to join monetary tightening
as the risks of rising inflation still remain. In addition, the
accelerated withdrawal of monetary easing by the Fed
will also lead Asian economies to turn to monetary
tightening. However, monetary policy in some Asian
economies will also face a difficult tradeoff between
“supporting economic recovery” and “stabilizing
prices”.
1.4 Trade and Investment
With the recovery of the global economy, international
trade and investment resumed growth in 2021. Trade
and investment in Asia achieved a bigger rebound in
the year, and its share in global trade and investment
further increased. In 2022, international trade and
investment will still be affected by multiple factors,
but with continued liberalization and facilitation of
trade and investment, trade and investment in Asia is
expected to maintain a momentum of growth. On the
basis of the entry into force of the Regional
Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), China
and the ROK have applied to join the Comprehensive
Chapter 1 Asian Economic Outlook and Policy
019
and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership
(CPTPP), accelerating regional economic integration in
Asia, which will greatly boost global economic
recovery of trade and investment in the post-COVID-
19 era.
1.4.1 Foreign Trade Hit a New High
Asia’s foreign trade in goods has grown rapidly and its
share of world trade in goods has further increased.
According to World Trade Organization (WTO)
statistics, trade in goods of Asian economies gradually
recovered from the third quarter of 2020, and the total
volume in the first three quarters of 2021 reached
USD11.9 trillion, up 29.7% from the same period in
2020, accounting for 36.8% of the world's total trade
in goods, up 0.6 percentage points from the same
period in 2020. Of the total volume, the total exports
of goods were USD6.14 trillion, an increase of 29%
year-on-year, and the total imports of goods were
USD5.74 trillion, up 30.5% year-on-year (see Figure
1.4). There are several reasons for the rapid growth of
Asia’s foreign trade in goods: (1) the global economic
recovery has greatly improved the external demand
of Asian economies; (2) the domestic economic
recovery of Asian economies has boosted the growth
of imports; (3) the rising prices of bulk and energy
products have boosted the exports and imports of
some economies. In addition, the weakening of the
epidemic prevention and control measures, currency
depreciations and the low base effect in 2020 have all
contributed to the rapid growth of Asian economies'
foreign trade in 2021.
Figure 1.4 Year-on-Year Growth Rates of Asia's Imports and Exports
Source: WTO, February 2022.
From an individual country perspective, China is
actively accelerating the building of a new development
paradigm of “dual circulation”, with domestic circulation
as the mainstay, and domestic and international
circulations supporting each other, and the scale of its
foreign trade has reached a new high. According to
the statistics of China Customs, China's total import
and export of goods exceeded USD6 trillion in 2021,
reaching a record high and remaining the world's
largest, with an increase of 30% compared with 2020.
Of the volume, the exports of goods reached USD3.36
trillion, up 29.9% from 2020, and the imports of goods
were USD2.69 trillion, up 30.1% from 2020. Japan's
foreign trade has also developed rapidly. According to
statistics from the Japan External Trade Organization
(JETRO), Japan's total imports and exports of goods in
2020 were USD1.53 trillion, up 20% year-on-year. Of
the value, exports grew by 18.5% year-on-year, thanks
mainly to export products, such as steel, automobile
and semiconductor manufacturing equipment, and
imports increased by 21.4% year-on-year due to the
significant increase in the prices of imported products
such as crude oil and liquefied natural gas. The ROK's
total imports and exports of goods exceeded USD1
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trillion in 2021, up 28.5% from 2020, of which exports
of goods reached USD644.54 billion, up 25.8% year-
on-year, the largest increase since 2010 and the first
increase since the outbreak of COVID-19, and imports
of goods reached USD615.05 billion, up 31.5% year-
on-year.
On April 10, 2020, General Secretary of the Communist Party of China (CPC) Central Committee Xi Jinping
presided over the Seventh Meeting of the Financial and Economic Commission of the CPC Central
Committee, and proposed for the first time that China will build a new development paradigm with domestic
circulation as the mainstay, and domestic and international circulations mutually supporting each other. The
proposal was incorporated into the 14th Five-Year Plan for National Economic and Social Development of the
People's Republic of China and the Long-Range Objectives Through the Year 2035 on March 11, 2021. The building
of a new development paradigm based on “dual circulation” is a major strategic plan for China to promote its
open economy to a higher level in the context of significant changes at home and abroad. The new
development paradigm emphasizes the “dual circulation” of the domestic and international markets, not the
single circulation of the domestic market. Domestic circulation is the “great circulation” built on the unified
national market at home, not the “self-small circulation” pursued by every local region. Participating deeply
in the international circulation constitutes an essential part of China’s construction of a new development
paradigm. China is committed to open wider to the outside world at a higher level and make better use of
both domestic and international markets and resources. Domestic circulation and international circulation
reinforce and complement each other to promote mutual benefit, common prosperity and development
between China and the rest of the world.
The background under which China’s “dual circulation” development paradigm was proposed includes
three aspects: (1) to fend off the impact of the epidemic. COVID-19 is the most serious infectious epidemic in
the world in the past century, and also a major public health event that has spread faster and affected more
people since the founding of the People's Republic of China, and has proved to be the most difficult to
contain. The global transmission of the epidemic has had a far-reaching impact on both the internal and
external environment of China's economic development. (2) China has an inherent requirement for high-
quality economic development. Rapid development over the past four decades has made China the world's
second largest economy, and the contribution of external demand to its economic growth has significantly
decreased. After peaking at 67% in 2006, China's foreign trade dependence has fallen to 34% in 2021. As the
size of China's economy continues to grow, the path of relying on external demand to drive economic growth
is becoming more and more difficult to sustain. It is an inevitable choice for China to tap the potential of
domestic consumption and investment and shift economic growth to domestic demand. (3) economic
globalization has encountered headwinds. Because of strategic miscalculation on China-US relations by the
US, especially a trade war staged by the Donald Trump administration, there has been decoupling or partial
decoupling between China and the US in the areas of science and technology, economy and trade. China’s
traditional international economic circulation has obviously been weakened and even blocked, and the
global industrial and supply chains have been disrupted, pushing China to make a strategic choice for the
“dual circulation” economic development paradigm.
Since the “dual circulation” development paradigm was put forward, China’s economic development
has achieved remarkable results, which are mainly reflected in the following aspects:
First, the main role of “domestic circulation” has been strengthened. In 2021, China accelerated the
development of a complete domestic demand system, which plays a prominent role in driving economic
growth. Final consumption expenditure and total capital formation contributed 5.3 percentage points and
1.1 percentage points to economic growth respectively, and the contribution of domestic demand to
economic growth reached 79.1%, up 4.4 percentage points over the previous year. Specifically, on the one
Column 1.1 Dual Circulation of China’s Economy
Chapter 1 Asian Economic Outlook and Policy
021
hand, the scale of market sales has expanded, and residents' consumption has been steadily upgraded in the
midst of sustained recovery. Retail sales of consumer goods totaled RMB44.1 trillion in 2021, up 12.5% and up
3.9% on average over the past two years. Upgraded consumer demand continued to be released, with retail
sales of gold, silver and jewelry, and cultural and office supplies above the designated size increasing by 29.8%
and 18.8% respectively. The efforts to foster new types of consumption have accelerated, with online retail
sales reaching RMB13.1 trillion last year, up 14.1% from a year earlier. On the other hand, fixed asset investment
maintained growth, and the growth momentum of manufacturing investment in particular was good.
Investment in fixed assets (excluding rural households) reached RMB54.5 trillion in 2021, up 4.9%, with a two-
year average growth of 3.9%. Of this, infrastructure investment increased by 0.4%, manufacturing investment
by 13.5%, and real estate development investment by 4.4%. The country supported faster recovery of
manufacturing investment and private investment, and launched trials for real estate investment trusts (REITs)
in the infrastructure sector. Private investment reached RMB30.8 trillion, an increase of 7.0% year-on-year,
accounting for 56.5% of total investment.
Second, both domestic and international circulations continue to improve quality and efficiency. In the
face of the complex and grim international situation, China has unswervingly opened wider to the outside
world, and the positive momentum of foreign trade and foreign investment has been further consolidated.
In 2021, the net exports of goods and services contributed 1.7 percentage points, or 20.9%, to China’s
economic growth. Specifically, on the one hand, imports and exports continue to maintain rapid growth. In
2021, China successfully held major exhibitions such as the China Import and Export Expo, the China Import
and Export Fair, the China Service Trade Fair and the China Consumer Goods Fair, and its foreign trade grew
rapidly. The total value of imports and exports reached RMB39.1 trillion for the year, up 21.4%, of which exports
grew by 21.2% and imports by 21.5%, with a trade surplus of RMB4.368,7 trillion. Imports and exports of goods
denominated in the US dollars topped USD6 trillion for the first time in history, up 30% from the previous year,
the fastest growth since 2011. Among them, the import and export of general trade increased by 24.7%,
accounting for 61.6% of the total import and export volume, an increase of 1.6 percentage points over the
previous year. The import and export of private enterprises increased by 26.7%, accounting for 48.6% of the
total import and export volume, 2 percentage points higher than the previous year. On the other hand, the
scale of foreign investment utilization reached a new high. In 2021, China continued to shorten the negative
list for foreign investment, improve cross-border trade and investment facilitation, and make positive progress
in a number of landmark projects, with actual foreign investment in the year reaching RMB1.1 trillion, an
increase of 14.9% year-on-year. The number of freight trains between China and Europe has increased and
efficiency improved, with 15,000 trains running in the whole year, an increase of 22%.
Third, regional economic and trade cooperation has deepened. On January 1, 2021, the Regional
Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) entered into force, marking the launch of a free trade area with
the world's largest population, largest economic scale and greatest development potential. the RCEP will
enhance China's ability to make the best use of “two markets and two resources”, become a bridge and bond
linking the “dual circulations” of domestic and international markets, and inject new impetus to China's and
the world's economic growth. On December 30, 2020, negotiations on the China-EU Comprehensive
Agreement on Investment (CAI), regarded as an "important milestone" in China-EU relations, were completed
as scheduled. Although the European parliament has temporarily frozen discussions about the ratification of
the agreement, it is undeniable that the taking effect of the agreement will provide more opportunities and
system guarantee for bilateral investment, and will be of great significance to China’s efforts to build a new
development paradigm, promote global trade and investment liberalization and facilitation, and build an
open world economy.
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022
Since March 2021, India's foreign trade has
witnessed rapid growth, and its growth rate has
slowed down later, but still remained double digits. In
2021, India's total import and export of goods reached
USD964.79 billion, an increase of 49.1% compared
with 2020, among which the export of goods was
USD392.18 billion, an increase of 42% year-on-year,
and the import of goods was USD572.62 billion, an
increase of 54.4% year-on-year. Vietnam's import and
export of goods also performed well. According to
Vietnamese customs statistics, Vietnam’s total import
and export trade reached USD668.55 billion in 2021,
an increase of 22.6% compared with 2020, of which
exports accounted for USD336.31 billion, up 19%, and
imports accounted for USD332.23 billion, up 26.5%.
The record high trade volume has also made Vietnam
one of the world’s 20 largest trading economies. In
2021, Thailand's total import and export volume
reached USD538.77 billion, an increase of 23.1%
compared with 2020, of which the export volume
accounted for USD271.17 billion, an increase of 17.1%,
and the import volume accounted for USD267.6
billion, up 29.8%. The total value of Turkey's foreign
trade in 2021 was USD496.72 billion, up 27.6%
compared with 2019, with exports growing by 32.8%
and imports growing by 23.6%. Pakistan's total import
and export of goods exceeded USD100 billion in 2021,
up 48.7% compared with 2020, of which exports grew
by 28.8% and imports grew by 58.3%.
Asia’s trade in services has also rebounded
sharply. According to WTO statistics, starting from the
second quarter of 2021, Asian economies saw a sharp
year-on-year growth in trade in services, with exports
and imports growing by 26% and 22% respectively. In
the third quarter of 2021, Asia’s trade in services
continued to maintain a rapid growth momentum,
with exports and imports growing by 26% and 21%
respectively (see Figure 1.5). The recovery in Asia's
trade in services has largely kept pace with the rest of
the world, with export growth outpacing that of
North America and roughly matching that of Europe,
but import growth being lower than the world
average. Compared with trade in goods, the recovery
of trade in services in Asia has been slower and softer.
Figure 1.5 Year-on-Year Growth Rates of Trade in Services in Asia
Source: WTO, February 2022.
Chapter 1 Asian Economic Outlook and Policy
023
From the perspective of individual economies,
trade in services increased significantly in most
economies in 2021 compared with 2020. According to
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
(UNCTAD) estimates, Turkey's total trade in services
was USD61.88 billion in the first three quarters of 2021,
an increase of 49.8% from a year earlier, with exports
growing by 61.2% and imports growing by 33%,
making it the fastest growing economy in Asia in
terms of trade in services. During the same period, the
ROK’s imports and exports of service trade reached
USD171.71 billion, up 20.5% compared with 2020,
with exports up 31.9% and imports up 11.1%. India,
Bangladesh, Israel and Pakistan all saw double-digit
growth in total trade in services in the first three
quarters of 2021. In 2021, China’s trade in services
continued to grow rapidly, with total imports and
exports of services reaching RMB5.3 trillion, up 16.1%
year-on-year, of which service exports totaled
RMB2.54 trillion, up 31.4%, and service imports
reached RMB2.75 trillion, up 4.8%, with the service
trade deficit falling to the lowest level since 2011.
Japan, Singapore, Thailand, the Philippines and
Indonesia also registered growth to some extent in
trade in services in the first three quarters of 2021.
But there are also some economies that have
suffered contraction in their trade in services. In the
first three quarters of 2021, Malaysia's total trade in
services contracted slightly by 1.1% compared with
the same period in 2020, with exports of services
decreasing by more than 10%. Vietnam's total trade in
services fell by 14.8% year-on-year in the first three
quarters of 2021, while exports shrank as high as
56.7%. Laos was the Asian economy with the most
severe contraction in trade in services, with a decline
of 63.9% in the first three quarters of 2021 from a year
earlier, including a 73.8% drop in exports and 55.5%
drop in imports. Sri Lanka, Cambodia and other
countries also saw a substantial decline in trade in
services. However, on a quarterly basis, most Asian
economies saw year-on-year growth in trade in
services in the second quarter of 2021, indicating an
improvement in their trade in services for the whole
of 2021.
Asian economies have made rapid progress in
promoting foreign trade liberalization within and
outside the region. The RCEP entered into force on
January 1, 2022, marking the launch of the world’s
largest free trade area. Covering all aspects of trade
and investment liberalization and facilitation, the
RCEP will give a strong impetus into trade and
investment flows within the Asia-Pacific region and
help build a more open and inclusive world economy
that benefits all economies. In the meanwhile, there
were several free trade agreements involving Asian
economies that took effect in 2021, including Japan-
UK Free Trade Agreement, ROK-UK Free Trade
Agreement, Singapore-UK Free Trade Agreement,
Turkey-UK Free Trade Agreement, Vietnam-UK Free
Trade Agreement, China-Mauritius Free Trade Agreement,
and India-Mauritius Free Trade Agreement, etc. In
addition, China and the ROK also applied to join the
Comprehensive and Progressive Trans-Pacific Partnership
(CPTPP) in 2021, which will further promote economic
integration in the Asia-Pacific region.
1.4.2 Foreign Investment Becomes More
Attractive
Foreign direct investment flowing to Asian economies
has increased significantly. According to UNCTAD, the
volume of foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows to
Asian economies in 2020 amounted to USD588
billion, up 5.2% from 2019 and accounting for 63.3%
of total global FDI inflows, up 25.3 percentage points
from 2019 (see Figure 1.6). The FDI inflows to Asia are
expected to grow significantly in 2021. In January
2021, UNCTAD released its Global Investment Trends
Monitor report, which predicted that the global FDI in
2021 would reach USD1.65 trillion, an increase of 77%
from 2020 and exceeding the scale of 2019. It also
predicted that Asia would attract USD696 billion FDI
in 2021, up 18% from 2020.
From a specific perspective, most Asian economies
have seen a significant increase in FDI inflows. Driven
by strong FDI in the service sector, China remained the
world's leading investment destination in 2021, with FDI
inflows reaching USD173.48 billion, up 20.2% from
2020, according to China’s Ministry of Commerce. In
the first three quarters of 2021, the FDI flowing to
Japan reached USD21.44 billion, an increase of 109.1%
from the whole year of 2020, according to the Japan
External Trade Organization. According to data
released by the ROK’s Ministry of Trade, Industry and
Resources, the country attracted an FDI inflow of
Boao Forum for Asia Asian Economic Outlook and Integration Progress Annual Report 2022
024
USD29.51 billion, up 42.3% year-on-year, and the
actually used FDI was USD18.03 billion, up 57.5% year-
on-year, reversing the declining trend in previous two
consecutive years.
Figure 1.6 FDI Inflows in the World and Asia
Source: UNCTAD, February 2022.
Most Southeast Asian economies saw an
increase in their FDI inflows in 2021. According to the
Thailand Board of Investment (BOI), Thailand attracted
455.3 billion baht of foreign investment in 2021, about
2.7 times that in 2020. According to the Malaysian
Investment Development Authority (MIDA), Malaysia
attracted 106.136 billion ringgit of foreign direct
investment in the first three quarters of 2021, up
135.5% from the same period in 2020 and even 65.3%
from the whole of 2020. According to the Ministry of
Planning and Investment, foreign capital attracted to
Vietnam reached USD31.15 billion in 2021, up 9.2%
from 2020. According to the Indonesian Ministry of
Investment, Indonesia attracted USD31.09 billion FDI
in 2021, up 8.5% from 2020.
The FDI flowing to Saudi Arabia has also
doubled, thanks to an increase in cross-border
mergers and acquisitions. According to the Saudi
Investment Ministry, Saudi Arabia attracted 65.2
billion riyals of foreign investment in the first three
quarters of 2021, 4.9 times higher than the same
period in 2020. The UNCTAD expects foreign
investment flowing to Saudi Arabia would reach
USD23 billion in 2021. The FDI inflows to the United
Arab Emirates (UAE) are also expected to increase
significantly in 2021.
South Asia was the only region in Asia that saw
a decline in FDI inflows in 2021. According to the
UNCTAD, the FDI inflows to South Asia in 2021 are
expected to fall to USD54 billion, down 24% from
2020. Among these, the FDI inflows to India are
expected to decrease by 26%, mainly due to a decline
in cross-border Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A) deals.
According to an estimate by the State Bank of
Pakistan, the FDI attracted to Pakistan would fall to
USD5.94 billion in 2021, down 7.9% from 2020.
At the same time, Asian economies also
remained an important source of foreign investment
in the world. According to the UNCTAD, the global
outward direct investment was USD1.22 trillion in
2020, down 39.4% from 2019. Among them, the
outward direct investment of Asian economies was
USD509.23 billion. Although it decreased by 15.1%
compared with 2019, it still accounted for 68.8% of the
total outward direct investment, an increase of 19.7
percentage points compared with 2019 (see Figure
1.7). With the recovery of the economy, Asian
economies are expected to see a return to growth in
their outward direct investment in 2021.
By specific economies, China's outbound investment
Chapter 1 Asian Economic Outlook and Policy
025
continued to maintain steady growth in 2021, with a
total outbound FDI volume of USD145.19 billion, up
9.2% year-on-year. Chinese outward investors made a
total of USD113.64 billion of non-financial direct
investment in the 6,349 overseas enterprises of 166
countries and regions in 2021, an increase 3.2% year-
on-year. After a sharp decline in 2020, Japan's outward
FDI also recovered in 2021. According to the Japan
External Trade Organization (JETO), Japan's outward
direct investment in the first three quarters of 2021
was USD124.9 billion, up 8% from the whole of 2020.
Starting from the second quarter of 2021, the ROK’s
outward direct investment reversed its previous
negative growth and reached USD45.28 billion in the
first three quarters of 2021, up 17.5% year-on-year,
according to the ROK Ministry of Strategy and Finance.
Figure 1.7 FDI Outflows in the World and Asia
Source: UNCTAD, February 2022.
In 2021, Asian economies adopted a series of
policy measures to attract and promote inbound and
foreign investment. China continued to open up at a
higher level and further shorten the negative list for
foreign investment in 2021. The 2021 negative lists for
foreign investment in China and in pilot free trade
zones have been shortened to 31 items and 27 items,
or by 6.1% and 10% respectively, and the areas outside
the negative lists are put under management in
accordance with unified principles for domestic and
foreign investment, and foreign-invested enterprises
are given national treatment. In February 2021, the
Indonesian government promulgated a presidential
decree on investment and business fields, making
fundamental changes to the foreign investment
access system mainly based on the negative list
management model, replacing it with a list-based
access model that encourages investment, further
opening up relevant industries for foreign investment
and reducing foreign investment restrictions. In June
2021, the Turkish government released Turkey’s
Foreign Direct Investment Strategy (2021-2023),
which aims to improve the quantity and quality of the
FDI in Turkey, especially aims to attract knowledge-
intensive, high value-added investments, while
creating high-quality jobs.
Asian economies have continued to strengthen
international investment cooperation. By 2021, Asian
economies had participated in 950 investment
agreements that contain investment provisions, of
which 926 were on a bilateral basis. In 2021, Asian
economies signed a number of major international
investment agreements with economies within and
outside the region, including Georgia-Japan Bilateral
Investment Agreement, the UAE-North Macedonian
Bilateral Investment Treaties, Israel-ROK Free Trade
Agreement, Angola-Turkey Bilateral Investment Agreement,
the Bilateral Investment Agreement between the Democratic
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Republic of Congo and Turkey, and the Bilateral
Investment Agreement between the Democratic
Republic of Congo and the UAE, etc.
1.5 Financial Markets
In 2021, stock markets in most Asian economies were
on an upward trend, with some stock market indexes
registered large gains. More Asian economies saw
their currencies appreciated more than depreciated,
even with large appreciations of some currencies. Ten-
year bond yields rose in most Asian economies, and
property prices also rose in the vast majority of Asian
economies, and by a large margin in some cases. Non-
performing loan ratios increased in the banking sector
in most Asian economies, but capital adequacy ratios
were good and risks were generally manageable.
1.5.1 Stock Indexes Generally Rise
Stock markets in most Asian economies rose in 2021,
with some stock market indexes receiving large gains.
According to the CEIC database, stock indexes rose in 28
Asian economies and fell in 7. Mongolia’s TOP20 index
rose the most, by 130.3% (see Figure 1.8), followed by
Syria’s Damascus Stock Exchange weighted index, a
rise of 116.4%, and then by Sri Lanka's Colombo Stock
Exchange (CSE) index, gaining 80.5%. In contrast,
Cambodia’s Cambodia Securities Exchange (CSX)
composite index fell the most, by 26.9%, followed by
the Hang Seng index of Hong Kong Special Administrative
Region of China, a fall of 14.1%, and then China's China
Security Index (CSI) 300 index, a fall of 5.2%.
Meanwhile, the ROK’s Kospi rose by 3.6%, Japan's
Nikkei 225 rose by 4.9% and India's Sensex rose by
22.0%. Ample global liquidity and a modest economic
recovery driven by the progress in Corona Virus
Disease 2019 (COVID-19), vaccination were the main
reasons for the better performance of most Asian stock
markets.
Due to its better economic development and
effective epidemic prevention and control, China's
macroeconomic policies have remained relatively
tightened. China has also carried out drastic reforms
in real estate, Internet, education training, energy and
other fields, resulting in large fluctuations in the stock
prices of enterprises in related industries during the
transformation process. The occasional cluster outbreaks
of the novel coronavirus variants in China have also
affected the recovery pace of some sectors such as
the service sector, which ultimately hit the stock
market. The short-term influx of foreign capital into
Mongolia’s smaller stock market was the main reason
for its surge. Bolstered by strong private sector
performance and good corporate earnings and
expectation in a loose monetary environment, Sri
Lanka's stock market index continued to rise to a
record high.
Recently, conflicts broke out between Russia
and Ukraine. Regional tensions continued, and
geopolitical risks rose. The sanctions imposed by the
US and its allies on Russia have been comprehensively
upgraded. The commodity market prices have
fluctuated violently, seriously affecting the global
industrial chain and supply chain. Inflation in
developed economies is hitting new highs and the
Federal Reserve has announced a 25 basis point
increase in interest rates. These influencing factors
intersected and superimposed with each other. Market
risk appetite decreased and risk aversion increased
significantly. The withdrawal of international capital
accelerated, and the capital markets of Asian economies
suffered a great impact. Compared with the closing
price of the last trading day in 2021, as of the closing
price on March 15, 2022, China's CSI 300 index fell
19.4%, Hong Kong Hang Seng Index fell 21.3%, Hong
Kong Hang Seng technology index fell 38.8%, Japan's
Nikkei225 index fell 12.0%, Korea composite index fell
12.0%, India Mumbai Sensex index fell 4.3%, and Iran's
Tehran Stock Exchange’s Price and Dividend Index
(TEDPIX) index fell 4.6%. In addition, the US Dow Jones
Industrial Average fell 7.7%, the National Association of
Securities Dealers Automated Quotations (NASDAQ)
composite index fell 17.2%, the UK Financial Times
Stock Exchange (FTSE) 100 index fell 2.8%, the German
Deutscher Aktien Index (DAX) index fell 12.4%, the
French Cotation Assistée en Continu 40 (CAC40) index
fell 11.2%, and the European Stoxx 50 index fell 13.0%.
Compared with the stock markets of the US and
Europe, the stock markets of Asian economies have
suffered significantly more. Among them, Hong Kong
Hang Seng Index and Hong Kong Hang Seng
technology index have fallen into a technical bear
market, and China's CSI 300 index also took a hit. China
Chapter 1 Asian Economic Outlook and Policy
027
needs to encourage capital to enter the market,
increase market liquidity, and stabilize market
confidence to prevent systemic financial risks caused
by stock market risk spillover.
Figure 1.8 Stock Index Rises and Falls of Some Asian Economies, 2021
Note: Rising and falling percentage of stock indexes = (closing price of the last trading day in 2021 - closing price of the last trading day in
2020) *100%/ closing price of the last trading day in 2020. The Chinese data is the CSI 300 index.
Source: CEIC Database, February 2022.
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1.5.2 Depreciations of Most Asian Currencies
Against the Dollar
More Asian economies saw depreciations of their
currencies other than appreciations, even with large
depreciations of some currencies. In terms of home
currency-dollar exchange rates (the direct pricing
method), five economies in the region saw their
currencies appreciated in 2021, 23 saw their currencies
depreciated, and two saw their currencies unchanged
due to being pegged to the dollar, according to CEIC
data (see Figure 1.9). Among the appreciating
currencies, Armenia's dram rose the most against the
dollar, about 8.1%, followed by Georgia's lari, the
second, about 5.5%, and then by China's yuan, the
third, about 2.3%. In contrast, most economies have
seen their currencies depreciated. The Turkish lira fell
the most against the dollar, about 76.8%, followed by
Myanmar’s kyat, the second, about 33.8%, and then by
Laos' kip, the third, about 19.1%. In addition, the
Japanese yen depreciated about 11.6% against the
dollar, the Korean won depreciated about 9.4%
against the dollar, and the Indian rupee devalued
about 1.9% against the dollar. The reasons for the
currency depreciations in most Asian economies are
as follows: first, the currencies of most Asian
economies appreciated relative to the US dollar in
2020, resulting in a high base; second, in 2021, the US
and other developed economies recovered quickly,
strengthening the appreciation expectation of the
US dollar. As a result, most Asian currencies
depreciated against the dollar. The Turkish lira suffered
its worst performance in nearly two decades, making
it the worst-performing currency of all emerging
market economies. On the one hand, in addition to
the impact of the epidemic, Turkey is facing serious
inflation and other problems. In particular, its
Consumer Price Index (CPI) in December 2021 rose
36.08% compared to the same period in 2020, hitting
a new high since September 2002. On the other hand,
the US dollar appreciation expectations continue to
heat up, leading to a continuous rise in the dollar
index. In addition, Turkey's complex geopolitical
relations have led to the accumulation of geopolitical
risks and other factors, thus resulting in the substantial
devaluation of the Turkish lira against the US dollar.
Figure 1.9 Exchange Rates of Some Asian Currencies Against the
US Dollar, 2021 (direct quotation method)
Sources: CEIC database, January 2022.
Chapter 1 Asian Economic Outlook and Policy
029
In 2021, the yuan and the US dollar showed a
rare synchronous strengthening, with the yuan
generally rising against the dollar. The main reasons
were: (1) China’s strong export led to strong demand
for settlement of foreign exchange. Statistics from the
General Administration of Customs showed that the
total value of China's trade in goods in 2021 was
RMB39.1 trillion (USD6.05 trillion), a record high, of
which exports grew by 21.2%. Thanks to strong goods
exports, banks' surplus on foreign exchange settlement
and sales averaged USD25.6 billion a month in 2021,
about 2.1 times the monthly average in 2020 and the
highest since 2014. Among them, the current account
surplus of foreign exchange settlement and sales
averaged USD18.7 billion a month, becoming the
main source of banks’ foreign exchange settlement
and sales surplus. This fully reflects the phenomenon
that strong trade leads to a strong exchange rate.
(2) the renminbi-denominated assets became more
attractive and foreign capital inflows reached a record
high. Statistics from China's Ministry of Commerce
shows that in 2021, the actual use of foreign investment
in China reached USD173.48 billion (excluding banking,
securities and insurance), up 20.2% year-on-year and
hitting a new record high. Statistics from China's State
Administration of Foreign Exchange shows that
foreign investors increased their holdings of domestic
bonds by USD166.6 billion, making renminbi assets an
important part of foreign capital allocation. (3) China’s
steady economic recovery is the cornerstone of a
stronger yuan. China's economic growth slowed
quarter by quarter in 2021 due to repeated epidemic
outbreaks and a relatively high base, but the annual
growth rate was still as high as 8.1% and the two-year
average growth rate was 5.1%. China has maintained
its leading position in economic development and
epidemic prevention and control, far outperforming
the US and other developed economies and
providing a solid foundation for the stronger RMB
against the US dollar.
After entering 2022, the currencies of major
Asian economies showed a trend of appreciation and
then depreciation. Compared to the closing price on
December 31st, 2021, the overall appreciation of the
RMB against the US dollar as of February 28th, 2022 was
approximately 0.7%. As of the closing on January 24th,
2022, the Japanese yen appreciated by about 1.1%
against the US dollar. However, with the outbreak of
the conflict between Russia and Ukraine, market
uncertainty gradually increased, and the international
exchange rate market fluctuated sharply. The Federal
Reserve began to raise interest rates, and the US dollar
has already entered the appreciation channel. The risk
aversion of international capital has increased
significantly, which has caused some depreciation
pressure on the currencies of Asian economies. It is
worth noting thatin terms of the central parity of the
US dollar against the RMB, the average central parity
of the RMB from February 24th to March 11th appreciated
by 0.45% compared with the average from February
1st to 23rd. Supported by strong economic fundamentals
and international capital inflows, the RMB initially
presents the characteristics of a safe haven currency,
even against the background of Russia and Ukraine
conflict. In the future, the direction of the conflict
between Russia and Ukraine, the pace and intensity of
the Fed's rate hike and the trend of COVID-19 will have
a greater impact on the exchange rate trend of Asian
economies.
1.5.3 A Rise of Bond Yields
Ten-year bond yields have risen in most Asian
economies. According to monthly statistics from
Investing.com, the ten-year bond yields rose in 18
Asian economies (see Table 1.2): Japan, Jordan, Israel,
Kazakhstan, Taiwan Province of China, Indonesia,
Qatar, Korea, India, Hong Kong Special Administrative
Region of China, Thailand, Singapore, Malaysia, Pakistan,
Bangladesh, the Philippines, Sri Lanka and Turkey, and
fell in only 2 economies: China and Vietnam. Based on
the 10-year treasury yields (closing price) in December
2021, there were 7 economies with a return ratio
above 5% and 13 economies with a return ratio below
5%. Turkey's 10-year bond return ratio was relatively
high at 23.1%, and Japan's 10-year bond yield was
relatively low, at about 0.1%. In addition, China's 10-
year bond yield was around 2.8%, the Korea’s was
around 2.3% and India's was around 6.5%. The rise in
the 10-year bond yields in most Asian economies is
linked to a pick-up in inflation and base effects.
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Table 1.2 Ten-Year Government Bond Yields of Some
Asian Economies, 2021 (%, percentage point)
Economies Dec. 2011 Dec. 2020 Change Economies Dec. 2021 Dec. 2020 Change
China 2.8 3.2 -0.4 India 6.5 5.9 0.6
Vietnam 2.1 2.5 -0.4 Hong Kong SAR, China 1.4 0.8 0.7
Japan 0.1 0.02 0.05 Thailand 2.0 1.2 0.8
Jordan 4.9 4.7 0.2 Singapore 1.7 0.8 0.8
Israel 1.0 0.8 0.2 Malaysia 3.6 2.7 0.9
Kazakhstan 10.6 10.2 0.4 Pakistan 11.5 9.9 1.6
Taiwan, China 0.7 0.3 0.4 Bangladesh 7.5 5.8 1.7
Indonesia 6.4 5.9 0.4 the Philippines 4.7 3.0 1.8
Qatar 2.2 1.7 0.5 Sri Lanka 12.2 8.0 4.3
Korea,
Republic of 2.3 1.7 0.5 Turkey 23.1 12.5 10.5
Note: Changes in 10-year government bond yield = closing price on last trading day of December 2021 – closing price on last trading day of
December 2020. The data for some Asian economies are unavailable.
Source: Investing.com, February 2022.
Inflation expectations generally have a positive
correlation with treasury yields. The higher inflation
expectations, the steeper the yield curve and the
higher return ratio investors would demand to
compensate for higher inflation in the future. Japan's
10-year bond yields, which have been low for a long
time, have rebounded in 2021 as monthly core
inflation turned from negative to positive and inflation
expectations rose. Turkey's 10-year bond yields were
relatively high, mainly due to high inflation, the
collapse of the lira and the build-up of geopolitical
risks. The negative impact of the epidemic has
brought "triple pressure" to China's economic
development, with economic growth falling quarter
by quarter and inflation pressure remaining low.
China's moderately relaxed monetary policy to meet
the reasonable liquidity needs of financial institutions
has further boosted the market's expectation of a
loose monetary policy, leading to higher bond buying
demand and lower 10-year government bond returns.
1.5.4 Revival of the Real Estate Market
Property prices rose in the vast majority of Asian
economies, and by a large margin in some economies.
Of the Asian economies with quarterly statistical data
included in the CEIC database, 13 saw real estate price
rises in the third quarter of 2021, including Turkey,
Kazakhstan, Korea, Taiwan Province of China, Japan,
Singapore, Thailand, the Philippines, Brunei, Hong
Kong Special Administrative Region of China,
Indonesia and Mongolia, and only Malaysia suffered a
0.7% drop in real estate prices year-on-year. A few
economies in the region saw a considerable increase
in property prices. Turkey's real estate prices saw the
biggest increase of approximately 33.4%, followed by
Kazakhstan, a 27.1% increase, and then the ROK, about
a 15.1% increase. In comparison, some Asian economies
have seen smaller real estate price increases, of which
Mongolia's real estate saw the smallest price increase
of about 1.3%. Indonesia's property prices rose by
about 1.4%, Hong Kong Special Administrative Region
Chapter 1 Asian Economic Outlook and Policy
031
of China about 3.8%, Chinese mainland real estate
prices rose 7.0% year-on-year and Japan's real estate
prices rose 8.2%.
Since the outbreak of the epidemic, the US and
other developed economies have implemented ultra-
loose macro policies, and interest rates in many
economies have been lowered to the lowest levels in
history, resulting in excess global liquidity and a
general rise in the prices of real estate, precious
metals, securities and other assets. This is the main
reason for the rise in real estate prices in most Asian
economies. Turkey's house price growth has been
among the highest in Asia and the world. On the one
hand, it’s because of the steep depreciation of the
Turkish lira against the US dollar, which has made
imported materials used in construction more expensive.
On the other hand, the sharp depreciation of the lira
triggered the enthusiasm of foreign buyers. In
November 2021, foreigners bought 7,363 homes in
Turkey, a 50% increase from the previous year and the
highest ever recorded since 2003 when Turkey began
to have such kind of statistics. At the same time, Turkey
was also facing serious inflation, and loose monetary
policies, such as lowering the benchmark interest rate,
further boosted inflation expectations and increased
depreciation pressure on the lira, ultimately leading to
large increases in house prices.
Affected by the supply side, the demand side
and the tightening of financial policies, China's real
estate market in 2021 was obviously divided, with
housing prices generally showing a trend of “first rise
and later fall”. On a quarterly basis, some hot cities saw
rising enthusiasm for real estate, but after entering the
third quarter, real estate sales data showed a downward
trend due to the increasing effects of regulation
policies such as the guiding prices adopted for
second-hand houses, the tightening of bank credit
policies and the increasing debt risks of some real
estate enterprises. In the fourth quarter, real estate
sales rose month-by-month under the incentive of
stable expectations. In terms of the whole year,
statistics released by the National Bureau of Statistics
of China on January 17, 2022 shows that in 2021,
China's commercial housing sales area, sales volume
and real estate development investment increased by
1.9%, 4.8% and 4.4% over the previous year respectively,
with the growth rates all decreasing from 2020. The
average selling price of commercial housing was
RMB10,139 per square meter, up 2.8% from the
previous year, the slowest growth rate in nearly five
years. In general, against the backdrop of "housing is
for living in, but not for speculation”, China's
comprehensive regulation of the real estate market
aimed at "stabilizing land prices, housing prices and
expectations" led to a mild rise in real estate prices
throughout the year.
1.5.5 Risks in the Banking Sector Generally
Under Control
Non-performing loan (NPL) ratios of the banking
sector in most Asian economies have risen. According to
World Bank statistics, among comparable Asian
economies, the banks’ NPL ratio increased in 17 Asian
economies in 2020 compared with 2019, and
decreased in 6 Asian economies (see Table 1.3) in 2020
compared with 2019. Specifically, banks in Kyrgyzstan,
the United Arab Emirates and the Philippines saw the
largest increase in their NPL ratios, with an increase of
2.4 percentage points, 1.7 percentage points and 1.6
percentage points respectively, while banks in Israel,
Malaysia and Nepal saw smaller increases in their NPL
ratios, with an increase of 0.09 percentage points, 0.05
percentage points and 0.02 percentage points
respectively. In contrast, banks in India, Bangladesh
and Maldives saw large declines in their NPL ratios,
with a decline of 1.3 percentage points, 1.2 percentage
points and 1.1 percentage points respectively. In 2020,
banks in all Asian economies (with available data)
except Kyrgyzstan saw their NPL ratios below the
international warning line of 10%, which shows that
the banking system of most Asian economies is
relatively sound, and the probability of systemic
default risk is low.
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Table 1.3 NPL Ratios of Banks in Some
Asian Economies, 2017-2020 (%)
Economies 2017 2018 2019 2020
Macao SAR, China 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.3
Korea, Republic of 0.4 0.3 0.3 --
Hong Kong SAR, China 0.7 0.5 0.6 0.9
Singapore 1.4 1.3 1.3 --
Israel 1.3 1.2 1.4 1.5
Uzbekistan 1.2 1.3 1.5 2.1
Vietnam 1.8 1.8 1.5 --
Malaysia 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.6
Cambodia 2.1 2.0 1.6 1.8
Nepal 1.7 1.6 1.7 1.7
Kuwait 1.9 1.6 1.8 --
Saudi Arabia 1.6 2.0 1.9 2.2
China 1.7 1.8 1.9 1.8
Georgia 2.8 2.7 1.9 2.3
the Philippines 1.6 1.7 2.0 3.5
Indonesia 2.6 2.3 2.4 2.8
Thailand 3.1 3.1 3.1 3.2
Brunei 3.7 4.7 3.9 3.9
Sri Lanka 2.5 3.4 4.7 4.9
Turkey 2.8 3.7 5.0 3.9
Armenia 5.4 4.8 5.5 6.6
Jordan 5.3 5.4 -- --
United Arab Emirates 5.3 5.6 6.5 8.2
Kyrgyzstan 7.4 7.3 7.7 10.1
Kazakstan 9.3 7.4 8.1 --
Bhutan 8.4 7.0 8.4 --
Pakistan 8.4 8.0 8.6 9.2
Bangladesh 8.9 9.9 8.9 7.7
India 10.0 9.5 9.2 7.9
Maldives 10.5 8.9 9.4 8.3
Afghanistan 12.2 8.9 -- --
Lebanon 5.7 10.3 15.2 --
Iraq 14.8 17.5 16.2 --
Notes: NPL ratio = Banks’ NPLs *100%/ total loans, that is, the amount of NPLs are divided by the total loan portfolio (including the NPL
before deducting the special loan loss reserve). The economies in this table are ranked according to the 2019 data. Data are unavailable
for some Asian economies. -- means data unavailability.
Source: World Development Indicators (WDI) database, January 2022.
Chapter 1 Asian Economic Outlook and Policy
033
In addition, banking institutions in most Asian
economies have good capital adequacy ratios, with
risks generally under control. The main risk indicators
of China’s banking sector are generally within a
reasonable range. Although there is pressure for the
rebound of non-performing loans, the risks are
generally under control. As of the end of the fourth
quarter of 2021, the NPL ratio of China’s commercial
banks was 1.73%, down 0.02 percentage points from
the end of the previous quarter, according to
information released by the China Banking Regulatory
Commission (CBRC) in February 2022. Capital
adequacy ratio was 15.13%, up 0.33 percentage from
the end of last quarter, of which, Tier 1 capital
adequacy ratio was 12.35%, up 0.23 percentage from
the end of the previous quarter, and core Tier 1 capital
adequacy ratio was 10.78%, up 0.12 percentage from
the end of the previous quarter. Japanese banking
institutions had a capital adequacy ratio of 11.7% in
the third quarter of 2021; Korean banking institutions
had a capital adequacy ratio of 15.65% in the second
quarter of 2021; Singapore's banking institutions had
a capital adequacy ratio of 17.4% at the end of 2020;
Malaysian banking institutions had a capital adequacy
ratio of 18.1% in the first quarter of 2021; Thai banking
institutions had a capital adequacy ratio of 19.9% at
the end of 2021; the Philippine banking institutions
had a capital adequacy ratio of 17.4% in the third
quarter of 2021; Indonesian banking institutions had
a capital adequacy ratio of 25.68% in November 2021;
Vietnam's banking institutions had a capital adequacy
ratio of 11.01% in the second quarter of 2021;
Cambodian banking institutions had a capital
adequacy ratio of 22.31% at the end of 2021; Laos
banking institutions had a capital adequacy ratio of
13.1% in the third quarter of 2020; Brunei banking
institutions had a capital adequacy ratio of 19.87% in
the third quarter of 2021; Myanmar's banking
institutions had a capital adequacy ratio of 10.89% at
the end of 2018; Indian banking institutions had a
capital adequacy ratio of 15.6% at the end of 2020;
Saudi banking institutions had a capital adequacy
ratio of 23.8% at the end of 2020; and Pakistan's
banking institutions had a capital adequacy ratio of
13.8% at the end of 2021. The capital adequacy ratios of
banking institutions in these Asian economies all meet
the regulatory requirements of Basel Agreement III.
Recently, the US, Europe and other developed
economies are gradually withdrawing from
quantitative easing monetary policies, which will
cause the flow of international capital to developed
economies, and bring about disturbance to the global
financial market. Sound risk control indicators and
fundamentals will provide supports for Asian banking
institutions to fend off possible risks.
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Chapter 2 Hot Issues of Asian Economies
035
Chapter 2
Hot Issues of Asian Economies
1 234
2.1 Global Development
Initiative
In recent years, many economies have clearly lacked
impetus for development, and global development
imbalances have become increasingly prominent. The
COVID-19 pandemic has led to a sharp downturn in
the world economy and accelerated the accumulation of
some long-term problems. According to the IMF
statistics, the world economy recorded the lowest
level of growth in 2020 since the Great Depression of
the 1930s, with an economic growth rate of negative
3.1%.1 Despite a sharp rebound in the world economy
in 2021 driven by base effects and policy factors, there
are still increasing risk factors hindering global
economic growth and increasing downward pressure
on the economy. At the same time, income
distribution inequality and uneven development
space have become prominent problems facing the
international community and major causes of social
unrest in many economies. Over the past few
decades, the global distribution of wealth has
become increasingly unequal. According to the
Global Wealth Report by Credit Suisse Research
Institute, the number of adults with a wealth of more
than USD1 million in 2020 was 56 million, accounting
for 1.1% of the global adult population, with a total
wealth of USD191.6 trillion, or 45.8% of the world’s
1 IMF. World Economic Outlook:Rising Caseloads, A Disrupted Recovery, and Higher Inflation, January 2022.
2 Credit Suisse Research Institute. Global Wealth Report 2021. June 2021.
3 United Nations. The Sustainable Development Goals Report 2021. New York: United Nations, 2021.
4 Xi Jinping. Strengthening Confidence to Overcome Difficulties and Build a Better World—Speech at the General Debate of the 76th United
Nations General Assembly. People’s Daily, September 22, 2021.
total wealth. During the same period, the number of
adults with wealth less than USD10,000 was 2.879
billion, accounting for 55.0% of the global adult
population, with a total wealth of USD5.5 trillion, or
1.3% of global total wealth.2 According to the United
Nations (UN) Sustainable Development Report 2021, the
number of people living in poverty increased by 120
million in 2020 from the previous year, and the
extreme poverty rate rose by 1.1 percentage points
from the previous year to 9.5%, the first increase in the
past 22 years.3
At the general debate of the 76th session of the
United Nations General Assembly on September 21,
2021, Chinese President Xi Jinping put forward the
Global Development Initiative for the first time,
outlining a systematic policy and action framework for
inclusive development to bring global development
to a new stage of balanced, coordinated and inclusive
development. Xi stressed the need for global joint
efforts to address global threats and challenges and
build a community with a shared future for mankind.4
The initiative advocates adhering to the people-
centered development philosophy, regarding
improving people's well-being and realizing people’s
all-round development as the starting point of all
work, viewing the yearning of all countries’ people for
a better life as the working target, holding fast to
development as the key to solve all problems and
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going all out to resolve difficult problems, to create
more opportunities for development and work that
will not allow any country and any person left behind;
It also advocates following the guide of practical
cooperation, grasping the pulse of the global
development and urgent demand, taking poverty
reduction, food security, and epidemic prevention and
vaccine, development financing, climate change and
green development, industrialization, digital
economy and connectivity as key areas of cooperation,
and working out cooperation ideas and proposals to
transform develop consensus into practical action.1
The Belt and Road Initiative proposed by President Xi
Jinping has become a popular public good for
international development and the largest platform for
development cooperation. The great progress and
achievements made by the international community
in jointly building the Belt and Road demonstrate that
to address various global issues and challenges and
bridge the deficit in global governance, we must first
focus on development and address the development
deficit facing mankind. The Global Development
Initiative, which is forward-looking and of great
realistic significance, is an important public good and
cooperation platform proposed by President Xi
Jinping for the international community following the
Belt and Road Initiative he put forward, which fully
reflects the strong desires of the people of the
countries all over the world for happiness and
development, and fully embodies the new
development concepts of “innovation, coordination,
green, open, and sharing”.
Despite being one of the fastest growing regions
in the world, Asia's economy has also been hit hard by
the COVID-19 outbreak. As the epidemic continues to
spread across the globe, it is difficult to predict when
it will end. In addition, the frequent emergence of
virus variants has made the global epidemic
prevention and control situation more difficult to
predict, and the emergence of mutated virus strains
with stronger virulence and faster transmission
cannot be ruled out in the future. The epidemic
remains the primary obstacle to economic recovery in
Asia. Even leaving aside the pandemic, Asia's
economic growth will still face constraints from
various non-pandemic factors, some of which have
1 China’s Stance on UN Cooperation. People’s Daily, October 23, 2021.
even been exacerbated by the response to the
pandemic. For example, some countries may be
slower in promoting structural reforms, the trend of
population aging in major economies will become
increasingly aggravated, and developed economies
may adjust their monetary policies. In order to
promote the common development of the world,
including Asia, China has not only helped developing
countries deal with debt and poverty through debt
relief and aid in the short run, but has also made
continuous effort to promote economic globalization
in a more open, inclusive, balanced and win-win
direction and promote more just and reasonable
development of the global governance system in the
long run. What China advocates is development-
oriented global governance. In early January 2022,
Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi visited five African
and Asian countries and proposed the convening of a
development forum of Indian Ocean island countries
at an appropriate time, saying that the global
development initiative meets the needs of post-
epidemic recovery and sustainable development of
Indian Ocean island countries. On January 25, 2022,
China and five Central Asian countries held a video
summit marking the 30th anniversary of the
establishment of diplomatic ties, during which the
implementation of the global development initiative
was an important agenda. In the next three years,
China will provide USD500 million in free assistance to
Central Asian countries for livelihood projects, and
5,000 quotas for seminars to help Central Asian
countries train professionals in healthcare, poverty
reduction, agricultural development, connectivity,
information technology and other fields to boost the
internal driving force of their development.
The historical experience of Asian development
shows that only development can serve as the master
key to solving many problems, and only common
development can provide an important guarantee for
peace and security. The Global Development Initiative
can promote more solid recovery and sustainable
development in Asia in the following aspects:
(1) Promote innovation-driven development, to
foster a dynamic growth model. At present, human
society is undergoing the fourth industrial revolution,
breakthroughs are being made in frontier areas such
Chapter 2 Hot Issues of Asian Economies
037
as information technology, life sciences, intelligent
manufacturing and green energy, the cycle of new
materials, new products and new forms of business is
shortening, and the Asian economy is entering a
crucial stage of shifting from old to new drivers of
growth. It is the common aspiration of all countries to
open up new sources of growth for the Asian
economy through innovation, structural reform, new
industrial revolution and digital economy.
(2) Promote coordinated and interconnected
development to foster an open and win-win
cooperation model. A high degree of interconnection
of the economies and markets among Asian countries
are one of the major features of today’s Asia and also
an irreversible trend of the times. Asian countries
cannot achieve their own development in isolation,
nor can they solve various development problems on
their own. In the face of global development challenges,
it is all the more important to work together to build an
open world economy and continue to promote trade
and investment liberalization and facilitation.
(3) Promote equitable and inclusive development
to foster a balanced development model that benefits
all. The development imbalance in today's world is
reflected not only in the North-South development
gap between emerging markets and developing
countries and developed countries, but also in the
development gap between different groups within a
country. This gap is also evident in Asia, where it has
given rise to many contradictions, conflicts and
destabilizing factors. The root cause is the lack of
inclusive development. In the course of development,
only inclusiveness and benefits for all can bring
benefits to people of all countries.
2.2 Climate Change and the
Green Economy
As the global climate continues to warm up,
unexpected global natural disasters are increasingly
characterized by high frequency, strong impact and
wide distribution. Their impact on human health, life
safety, economy and society has been growing, and
has become an important bottleneck restricting
1 ADB. A Region at Risk: The Human Dimensions of Climate Change in Asia and the Pacific, July 2017.
2 McKinsey Global Institute. Climate Risk and Response in Asia, November 24, 2020.
3 William J. Ripple, et al. World Scientists’ Warning of a Climate Emergency 2021. BioScience, Vol. 71, No. 9, 2021, page 894–898.
4 IPCC. AR6 Climate Change 2021: The Physical Science Basis, August 9, 2021.
global sustainable development. Asia is no exception.
In 2017, an Asian Development Bank study said that
continued climate change would have devastating
consequences for countries in the Asia-Pacific region,
which would not only potentially severely affect
future growth, but would also erode current
development gains and reduce quality of life. 1 In
November 2020, the McKinsey Global Institute
released a report stating that climate change has
become a key growth challenge in Asia, and climate
change would likely cause greater impacts to Asia
than to many other regions. The study found that an
average of USD2.8 trillion to USD4.7 trillion of Asia's
annual GDP could be at risk by 2050 as rising
temperatures and humidity prevent people from
working effectively outdoors.2
After a brief slowdown following the outbreak of
the COVID-19 pandemic, there was a “retaliatory”
increase in human carbon emissions. In April 2021, the
concentration of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere
reached the highest monthly level ever recorded, and
glaciers in Greenland and Antarctica were melting
31% faster than 15 years ago. In July, thousands of
scientists renewed in the Bioscience Journal “The World
Scientists' Warning: A Climate Emergency for 2021”,
declaring that humanity was approaching or had
already passed the tipping point for maintaining
global or regional climate stability.3 In August 2021,
the United Nations Intergovernmental Panel on
Climate Change (IPCC) pointed out that the earth is in
a climate red alert, with extreme weather events
bringing increasingly devastating disasters to many
countries. Even if all countries start to drastically
reduce carbon emissions from today, the total
increase in global warming is still likely to reach 1.5
degrees Celsius over the next 30 years. Thanks to
global warming, some extreme weather conditions in
2021 will become the new climate normal for the
world in the future.4
In 2021, Asia’s major economies were all affected
by extreme weather disasters. China's Ministry of
Emergency Management and the Academy of
Disaster Reduction and Emergency Management
under the Ministry of Education jointly selected the
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038
world's top 10 natural disaster events in 2021, four of
which happened in Asia. The first was the Typhoon Rai
that hard-hit the Philippines hard. On December 16,
2021, Typhoon Rai, the 22nd typhoon of 2021, made
landfall on Siargao Island, a resort island in North
Surigao province of Mindanao, the Philippines. It then
swept northwest along Mindanao and Mishaye
Islands, making eight landfalls in the Philippines. In the
following 10 days, Rai left at least 378 people dead, 60
missing, 742 injured and 3.95 million affected in the
Philippines. Economic losses were estimated at more
than 20.4 billion Philippine pesos (approximately
RMB2.59 billion). The second was heavy rains in
Indonesia and East Timor that caused severe flooding.
On April 3 to 4, affected by a tropical cyclone,
Southeast Indonesia and parts of East Timor were hit
by heavy rain, causing severe flooding. The disaster
killed at least 222 people in both countries, left dozens
missing and displaced tens of thousands. The third
was the heavy floods caused by the breaking of
glaciers in northern India. On February 7, a glacier
broke off in Jemori District of Uttarakhand, India,
causing massive floods in the two local rivers,
damaging local houses, two hydropower stations, six
bridges, construction tunnels, oil sites and other
facilities in the area. Thousands of people in the
surrounding area had to be evacuated, and more than
207 people were dead or missing. The fourth was
heavy rains in India and Nepal that caused floods and
landslides. On October 15, heavy rains hit India's
northeastern state of Akhand, the southwestern state
of Kerala and parts of Nepal, triggering such natural
disasters as flash floods and landslides. Within a week,
the disaster killed at least 201 people in India and
Nepal and affected the livelihoods of millions.
As global warming continues, extreme floods,
droughts and typhoons are likely to occur more
frequently, which will inflict greater economic losses
and casualties on all countries and disrupt normal
economic and social order. Reducing carbon
emissions to deal with climate change has become
the mainstream consensus in today’s world. To cope
with climate change, it has become an irresistible
trend to practice the concept of green development,
promote energy transition and develop green
economy. Green development means that people
1 Xi Jinping. Speech at the General Debate of the 75th Session of the United Nations General Assembly. People’s Daily, September 23, 2020.
and nature live and coexist in harmony. Human
activities and economic development must respect
the laws of nature and follow the trend of natural
development, otherwise they will be punished by
nature. As a part of nature, man and nature are in
essence in a symbiotic relationship. Therefore, the
emphasis on green development means that in the
process of development, we should not only utilize
and transform nature, but also protect nature and take
the road of sustainable development. Under the
influence of climate change and other factors, low-
carbon and green development of resources and
energy has become a trend, and the commitment to
peaking carbon emissions and realizing carbon
neutrality has become a widely accepted "political
correctness". In response, several Asian governments,
including China, Japan, Korea and India, have made
climate pledges to achieve net zero emissions.
As Asia’s largest economy, China has taken an
active part in global climate change governance,
stepped up efforts to address climate change, and
accelerated the overall green transformation of its
economic and social development. Since the 18th
Communist Party of China (CPC) National Congress,
the Chinese government has repeatedly stressed the
importance of environmental protection and clearly
pointed out the dialectical relationship between
environmental protection and economic development,
highlighting China's unswervingly clear attitude and
firm determination to uphold ecological civilization
and environmental protection. On September 22,
2020, Chinese President Xi Jinping solemnly declared
at the general debate of the 75th Session of the United
Nations General Assembly that China would increase
its nationally determined contribution, adopt more
effective policies and measures, strive to peak carbon
dioxide emissions by 2030 and achieve carbon
neutrality by 2060. 1 The time span from carbon
emissions peaking to carbon neutrality to which
China made a commitment is far shorter than that of
developed countries, which fully demonstrates
China's responsibility to promote global green
transformation and lead global climate governance.
In 2020, the Japanese government set a goal of
achieving net zero greenhouse gas emissions by 2050.
To achieve carbon neutrality by 2050, the Japanese
Chapter 2 Hot Issues of Asian Economies
039
government issued a "Green Growth Strategy" at the
end of 2020, which promotes greenhouse gas
emission reduction in 14 key areas, including offshore
wind power, electric vehicles, hydrogen energy,
shipping, aviation and residential buildings. In April
2021, Then-Prime Minister Yoshihide Suga said that
Japan aimed to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by
46% in 2030 compared with 2013, and would work
toward a 50% reduction. In May 2021, Japan passed
the revised Global Warming Countermeasures and
Promotion Act, clarifying its target of greenhouse gas
emission reduction for the first time in the legal form.
The law will go into effect in April 2022. Under the new
law, local governments, including Japan's metropolitan
prefectures, will be obliged to set specific targets for
renewable energy, and develop incentives for
expanding solar and other renewable energy sources.
The ROK government also announced in 2020
that it would achieve carbon neutrality by 2050. In
August 2021, the National Assembly of Korea voted to
pass the Basic Law on Carbon Neutrality and Green
Growth to Address the Climate Crisis (hereinafter
referred to as the Basic Law on Carbon Neutrality), and
set out the country's mid-and long-term emission
reduction targets. In October 2021, the Korean
government set the national greenhouse gas
emission reduction target for 2030 and the carbon
neutrality implementation plan for 2050, and made
the emission reduction target proposed in the Basic
Law on Carbon Neutrality more specific, cutting its
greenhouse gas emission target for 2030 by 40% from
the 2018 level. In an effort to get industries to work
together to meet the new emission reduction target,
the ROK government said it planned to reduce the
share of electricity generated by coal to 21.8% and
increase the share of renewable energy to 30.2%. It
also said by 2025, 4.5 million vehicles on the road will
be electric or hydrogen powered, and related
infrastructure such as charging stations will be added.
At the 26th United Nations Climate Change
Conference (COP26) in 2021, Indian Prime Minister
Narendra Modi said India would strive to achieve net
zero emissions by 2070. Modi also said India would
increase its non-fossil fuel power generation capacity
target to 500 gigawatts by the end of 2030, with
renewables accounting for 50% of power generation,
and would reduce carbon intensity—the amount of
1 ECB’s Lagarde repeats pledge for gradual policy shift. https://www.fxempire.com/news/article/ecbs-lagarde-repeats-pledge-for-gradual-
policy-shift-898376.
carbon dioxide emitted per unit of GDP—by 45% by
2030. India currently accounts for 5 % of global carbon
emissions and about 40% of renewable energy.
The Belt and Road Initiative proposed by China
has also vigorously promoted green and sustainable
development in Asian countries. In the process of
high-quality Belt and Road cooperation, China has
actively promoted international climate negotiations
and policy coordination of policies on climate change,
participated in and led the updating and expansion of
international standards and rules on climate change,
and effectively helped developing countries mitigate
and adapt to the impact of global climate change. On
June 24, 2021, the Belt and Road High-level Meeting
for International Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region
was successfully held and two cooperation initiatives
were launched, one of which is the Belt and Road Green
Development Partnership Initiative, which aims to
strengthen cooperation in green infrastructure, green
energy and green finance. As a multilateral
development financial institution under the Belt and
Road international cooperation framework, the Asian
Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) has played an
important role in promoting green economy and has
pledged to increase financing to combat climate
change. It is expected that by July 1, 2023, all AIIB
investment projects will be fully consistent with the
goals of the Paris Agreement, and the AIIB’s cumulative
climate financing is expected to reach USD50 billion
by 2030.
2.3 Post-Epidemic
Normalization of the US and
European Macroeconomic
Policies
At present, the world economy is recovering steadily,
and the ultra-loose monetary policies implemented
by major economies in response to the epidemic are
on the way out, but their expansionary fiscal policies
are still in place. In March 2022, the Federal Reserve
officially raised interest rates by 25 basis points, and
the withdrawal of its loose monetary policy has
accelerated. The main leader of the European Central
Bank (ECB) said that the policy adjustment of the ECB
would be "gradual".1 The shift toward normalization
Boao Forum for Asia Asian Economic Outlook and Integration Progress Annual Report 2022
040
of the US and European macroeconomic policies will
inevitably have an impact on the capital markets,
exchange rate markets, commodity prices and debt,
including those in Asian economies.
2.3.1 Macroeconomic Policies of the US
At present, the US interest rate hike has been
implemented, and the exit of loose monetary policy
has been accelerated. The Federal Open Market
Committee (FOMC) pointed out in a statement issued
on March 16th, 2022 that the conflict between Russia
and Ukraine and related events may bring additional
upward pressure on inflation and have a negative
impact on economic activities.1
The inflation in the US has skyrocketed to its
highest level in nearly four decades while the
unemployment rate has declined to a record low,
which is the main reason to prompt the Fed to
accelerate its exit from the ultra-loose monetary
policy. According to the data released by the US
Department of Labor on February 10, 2022, the US’s
Consumer Price Index (CPI) increased by 7.5% year-
on-year in January 2022, exceeding 5% for the eighth
consecutive month. It has been the largest increase
since February 1982. Core inflation, which excludes
energy and food prices, rose 6% from a year earlier, the
biggest increase since August 1982. Rising prices of
energy and autos continue to be the main drivers of
soaring prices in the US in January, while labor
shortages, generous government assistance, ultra-low
interest rates and strong consumer demand have
combined to keep inflationary pressures high through
2021. For the time being, labor shortages and supply
chain bottlenecks will continue to keep inflation high
in the US. According to the data released by the US
Department of Labor on February 4, 2022, the US
unemployment rate inched up 0.1 percentage point
month-on-month to 4% in January 2022, while the
unemployment rate continued to fall from 5.9% to
3.9% between June and December 2021, the lowest
since COVID-19. According to the Beige Book of
Economic Conditions released by the Federal Reserve
on January 13, 2022, the US economy maintained a
moderate expansion at the end of 2021, but
companies still faced supply chain disruptions and
labor shortages, and the momentum of economic
recovery continued to be under pressure. As raw
1 Federal Reserve issues FOMC statement. https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/pressreleases/monetary20220316a.htm.
material prices, logistics costs and wages rose,
manufacturing and services costs have both seen a
rise, pushing up inflation significantly. As inflationary
pressure continues to rise and employment continues
to improve, the impetus for the Fed to accelerate its
exit from the ultra-loose monetary policy is growing.
Meanwhile, the US fiscal policy is still
expansionary. In order to deal with the continuing
impact of the epidemic, on the basis of previous
rounds of expansionary fiscal policies, US President
Joe Biden signed the American Rescue Plan (ARP) of
USD1.9 trillion on March 11, 2021, aiming to help
accelerate economic recovery by further expanding
fiscal spending. For families, the plan included
immediate relief of up to USD1,400 per person, and for
businesses, it provided USD7 billion in additional
assistance to pay for exemptible wage protection
scheme loans. Tens of billions of dollars have been
allocated in aid to the hardest-hit industries like
airlines and as key tax credits. For state and local
governments, the ARP provided USD350 billion to
support emergency needs and consolidate the
foundation for long-term economic recovery. In
November 2021, Biden signed an infrastructure
investment bill totaling about USD1 trillion, the largest
investment in roads, bridges, railways and mass transit
in decades. The bill includes funding for existing
federal public works projects and an extra investment
of about USD550 billion in infrastructure over five
years. In addition, Biden's "Build Back Better" bill,
covering clean energy, universal preschool, subsidized
child care, health care, affordable housing and care for
the elderly, is also in bipartisan negotiations. Much of
this expansionary spending is financed by US
government borrowing, which is bound to raise the
scale of the US government's debt in the long run.
In fact, since the outbreak of the international
financial crisis in 2008, the US has been implementing
expansionary fiscal policies on the whole. Especially
since the outbreak of COVID-19, the US government
has launched several rounds of fiscal rescue measures,
resulting in the scale of federal government debt
repeatedly reaching record highs. According to
statistics from the US Treasury Department, the debt
of the US federal government exceeded USD30 trillion
as of January 31, 2022, a new record high, which was
Chapter 2 Hot Issues of Asian Economies
041
a jump of nearly USD7 trillion from the pre-epidemic
late January 2020. According to the Treasury
Department estimates, the US’s total debt may be
about 130.7% of the GDP in 2021, well above the
international warning line of 60%. In the 2021 fiscal
year, the US federal deficit reached USD2.8 trillion, the
second highest on record, with a deficit ratio of 12.4%.
The Congressional Budget Office forecasts the US
fiscal debt will increase by another USD13.6 trillion in
the next 10 years, with a debt to GDP ratio of 140%.
At present, the development trend of the US
federal government debt is worrisome and its room of
fiscal policy maneuvering has been greatly compressed.
In particular, with the Fed’s phasing out of the
quantitative easing monetary policy and starting the
cycle of interest rate hikes, the burden of debt interest
on the US government will become increasingly
heavy. If the US’s economic growth has been low or
even negative in the long term, its expansionary fiscal
policy would be unsustainable given that it would
severely reduce the US’s ability to respond to future
economic crises or other shocks.
2.3.2 European Macroeconomic Policy
At present, the European Central Bank holds a
"gradual" policy adjustment position. On February 3,
2022, the ECB announced that it would keep its three
key interest rates unchanged. In terms of major
interest rate adjustments, the ECB has kept the main
refinancing rate unchanged at 0%, the deposit facility
rate unchanged at -0.5%, and the marginal lending
facility rate unchanged at 0.25%. In terms of asset
purchases, the temporary pandemic emergency
purchase program (PEPP) implemented in response
to COVID-19 will end in March 2022 as originally
planned. At the same time, the ECB will temporarily
expand its regular asset purchase program (APP) in
the second quarter of 2022 and the third quarter,
respectively with 40 billion euros and 30 billion euros
per month, and will return to 20 billion euros a month
in the fourth quarter, to help ease the negative impact
to be brought about by the exit of the emergency
asset purchase plan.
The record high inflation rate and record low
unemployment rate are the main reasons for the ECB's
attitude towards interest rate hikes from "dovish" to
"hawkish". Inflation in the euro zone continues to rise
to record highs and inflationary pressure has
increased significantly. Data released by Eurostat on
February 2, 2022 showed that inflation in the euro
zone reached a record 5.1% in January 2022, driven by
a sharp increase in energy prices. From January to
December 2021, inflation in the euro zone continued
to climb from 0.9% to 5.0%, mainly driven by energy
and food costs. The ECB forecasts that eurozone
inflation will reach 3.2% in 2022 and will fall to 1.8% in
2023 and 2024. At the same time, the unemployment
rate has reached a record low in Europe. The
unemployment rate in the eurozone fell to 7% in
December 2021, down 0.1 percentage points month-
on-month and the lowest level since Eurostat compiled
the data in April 1998, and the unemployment rate
across the European Union (EU) fell to 6.4%, the lowest
level since January 2000. Given that inflation
continues to hit record highs and unemployment
continues to hit record lows, the ECB has expressed
deep concern about inflation although it has
maintained its three main interest rates unchanged.
As to whether interest rates will be raised in
Europe in 2022, ECB President Christine Lagarde
believes the ECB's decision will be based on data,
while on December 16, 2021, she stressed the
prospect of an interest rate hike as "very unlikely".
Lagarde’s fine-tuning was interpreted by the market
as a sign that the ECB is no longer ruling out an
interest rate hike this year, and the policy tone is
shifting from "dovish" to "hawkish". The ECB has come
under increasing pressure amid persistently high
inflation, low unemployment and growing
expectations of interest rate rises by the Fed. On that
basis, Goldman Sachs and Deutsche Bank both
forecast the ECB could end its bond-buying program
under its regular asset purchase program in June and
raise rates by 25 basis points each in September and
December. The ECB's exit from ultra-loose policy
could come much earlier after a sustained surge in
inflation.
Moreover, the UK has led the way in raising
interest rates. The Bank of England raised its
benchmark interest rate by 15 basis points to 0.25%
on 16 December 2021, the first increase since the
COVID-19 outbreak, as a result of rising inflationary
pressures and a recovering job market. On February 3,
2022, the Bank of England raised the benchmark
interest rate by another 25 basis points to 0.5% and
Boao Forum for Asia Asian Economic Outlook and Integration Progress Annual Report 2022
042
started quantitative tightening, stopping the
reinvestment of maturing assets, selling all the
previously purchased corporate bonds and promising
to gradually reduce its holdings of Gilts in a
predictable manner. The Bank said further "moderate
tightening" was likely in the coming months.
On fiscal policy, Europe's expansionary fiscal
policy is still continuing. At present, the global
pandemic has added uncertainty to the economic
recovery, which means that Europe still needs
expansionary fiscal policy to support its recovery
process. The German Federal Government has
implemented three supplementary budget measures,
namely, an increase in fiscal expenditure of 156 billion
euros in March 2020, accounting for 4.7% of GDP; an
increase in government spending by 130 billion euros,
or 3.9% of GDP, in June 2020, and an increase in fiscal
spending by 60 billion euros, or 1.7 percent of GDP, in
March 2021. These fiscal expenditures were mainly
used for medical resources, temporary work subsidies,
child care benefits for low-income families, small and
medium-sized enterprises or self-employed workers,
and unemployment insurance. In addition to the
federal government’s fiscal stimulus, many German
regional governments have also announced
economic support measures, mainly including up to
141 billion euros in direct support and about 70 billion
euros in state-level loan guarantees.
France has also adopted proactive fiscal policies
to counter the adverse impact of the epidemic. From
March to November 2020, France introduced four
amendments to its budget law, which increased its
fiscal expenditure on fighting the epidemic to about
180 billion euros, accounting for about 8% of its GDP.
France included additional funds in its 2021 budget
additional funds to support epidemic emergency
treatment programs, which continued to grow as
containment measures escalated and eventually
amounted to about 3% of the GDP. In addition, the 2021
budget also incorporates the key elements of the fiscal
plan introduced in September 2020 to support
France's economic recovery. The recovery plan, which
provides around 100 billion euros over two years (of
which around 40 billion euros comes from the EU
recovery fund), focuses on supporting the ecological
transformation of the economy, improving the
competitiveness of French businesses and supporting
social and territorial cohesion.
At present, EU countries are universally faced
with the task of controlling the epidemic as soon as
possible, promoting economic recovery and
achieving long-term emission reduction targets, all of
which require a significant increase in public fiscal
spending. At the same time, many EU governments
are already heavily in debt, which has already
exceeded the prescribed upper ceiling of public debt,
and therefore face huge pressure to reduce debt in
the future. EU countries are in urgent need of a public
fiscal policy that can ensure both economic growth
and financial stability. The urgent task now facing the
EU is to appropriately revise the fiscal system that has
severely restricted government spending in the past
and to find a common fiscal rule that balances public
investment with debt reduction.
2.3.3 The Impact of the US and European
Macroeconomic Policy Normalization
The impact of the US and European macroeconomic
policy normalization is mainly reflected in the
following four aspects:
(1) To attract the flow of international capital to
the US and Europe
The Fed has accelerated to reduce the scale of
bond purchases, and begun to enter the cycle of
interest rate hikes ahead of time, strengthening
expectations for a stronger dollar. The ECB has ended
its emergency asset purchase program as planned,
turned cautious in raising interest rates and lowered
expectations for a weaker euro. The timing, intensity
and speed of the exit from ultra-loose monetary
policies in the US and Europe differ, but the
expectations for advanced economies to return to a
new normal are gradually warming, and the
attractiveness of assets denominated in dollars or
euros will increase, which will lead to the flow of
international capital from Asian economies to the US
or Europe. In the short term, the rapid and frequent
inflow and outflow of international capital will affect
the expectations of market investors and easily lead to
capital market turbulences and even a financial or
debt crisis. In particular, Asian economies with small
individual market size, such as Mongolia, Syria and Sri
Lanka, have just experienced a sharp rise in their stock
markets in 2021, and if international capital accelerates
arbitrage flight, their stock indexes may plunge,
highlighting the need for them to take preventive and
response measures in advance.
Chapter 2 Hot Issues of Asian Economies
043
(2) To exacerbate volatility in global exchange
rate markets
The variants of the novel coronavirus have
repeatedly hit the global economic recovery, and
destabilizing and uncertain factors still remain in
international economic and financial operations. In
particular, the gradual return to normal macroeconomic
policies of developed economies will bring new
disturbances to the international exchange rate
market. In 2021, the US and Europe continued to see
economic recovery, with rising inflationary pressure
and low unemployment rates. Given that it has
become increasingly difficult to sustain the loose
macro policies adopted in response to the epidemic,
it is inevitable for the US and Europe to exit such loose
macro policies at the right time. This will continue to
reinforce appreciation expectations of the dollar and
euro and also serves as one of the reasons for the
relative depreciation of most Asian currencies. The
Turkish lira plunged 76.8% against the dollar, the
Myanmar currency lost 33.8% and the Laos kip 19.1%.
Once the cycle of interest rate rises begins in
advanced economies, the flow of international capital
to the US and Europe will accelerate, which is likely to
further strengthen the dollar and euro and lead to
relative depreciation of more Asian currencies. At the
same time, differences in the pace of the exit of the US
and Europe from loose macroeconomic policies have
accelerated the dollar's appreciation cycle against the
euro, and the resulting gap in expectations is likely to
exacerbate volatility in international currency markets.
(3) To disturb commodity prices
Given that international commodities are mostly
traded in dollars, their price movements are influenced
not only by supply and demand, but also by changes
in the value of the dollar. Assuming that the market
supply and demand is stable, a stronger dollar will
lead to a downward trend of commodity prices amid
fluctuations. If the dollar continues to rise and raw
materials are in short supply, it will bring uncertainty
to the import costs of crude oil, coal, iron ore and grain
for Asian economies, especially for big demand countries
such as China and India, disrupt the production costs
of enterprises in Asian economies on the supply chain,
thus bringing new challenges to the global industrial
and supply chains.
(4) To push up the risk of debt default
The process of starting to raise interest rates in
advanced economies such as the US and Europe
would not only raise funding costs for market players
in the region, but also increase the interest burden on
economies with foreign debt denominated in dollars
or euros, which, if combined with a stalled economic
recovery, could trigger a debt crisis. According to the
Global Debt Monitor released by the Institute of
International Finance (IIF) on February 23, 2022, the
outstanding global debt reached a record high of
USD303 trillion in 2021. Among them, emerging
market countries' debt-to-GDP ratio was about 248%,
an increase of more than 20% from the pre-pandemic
level. Emerging markets and developing countries
and low-income developing countries in Asia
generally face the problem of rising debt levels. As
global interest rates rise and financial conditions
tighten, surging global debt could increase economic
fragility and hinder the pace of economic recovery. If
global interest rates rise faster than expected and
economic growth slows, global debts, including in
Asia, will be at risk of default.
2.4 New Developments in the
Transformation of International
Trade Rules
In recent years, unilateralism and protectionism have
repeatedly hit the WTO-centered multilateral trading
system. The WTO has been in difficulties of trade
negotiations, policy monitoring and dispute settlement.
Since 2018, major members such as the US, the
European Union, Japan, Canada and China have put
forward a number of proposals on WTO reform, but
there is great divergence among members on how to
proceed (see Column 2.1). After the outbreak of the
COVID-19 pandemic, the prospect of the WTO reform
is unpredictable. On the one hand, the COVID-19
pandemic may aggravate the inward-looking policies
of some economies and affect the political will and
diplomatic resources of countries to promote the
WTO reform. On the other hand, business models
related to the digital economy have shown unique
advantages during the pandemic, providing a
“window of opportunity” for countries to promote
negotiations on new issues such as e-commerce, and
update the WTO rules.
While the pace of the WTO reform is slow, the
signature and implementation of regional trade
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agreements (RTAs) accelerate. Today, RTAs have
covered more than half of international trade. RTAs,
especially the super-large RTA emerging in recent
years, have become an important force to promote
the formulation of international economic and trade
rules and global development. A growing number of
RTAs contain provisions that go further than
multilateral rules and cover new issues not covered
by multilateral negotiations, such as the digital economy,
environmental protection and sustainable development.
Against all the pandemic odds, on January 1, 2022, the
Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership
(RCEP), a RTA with the largest population in the world,
came into force. It voiced strong opposition against
unilateralism and trade protectionism and supports to
free trade and the multilateral trading system, which
helped boost confidence for the regional or even
global post-pandemic economic recovery.
2.4.1 The Latest Situation and Characteristics
of RTAs
By the end of 2021, there are 352 RTAs in force
worldwide. 2009 is the peak of the number of new
RTAs that come into force. In 2017 and 2018, this
number went into a trough with the withdrawal of the
US from the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement
(TPP) and UK’s exit from the EU in 2018. Although the
number of new RTAs in force has remained at a low
level since 2018, different regions are still active in RTA
negotiations. The RTAs that came into force in 2018
include EU-Japan, EU-Singapore, EU-Vietnam, Peru-
Australia, Chile-Indonesia free trade agreements, the
Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-
Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) and US-Mexico-Canada
Trade Agreement (USMCA). To some extent, the
decline in the number of new RTAs is related to the
negotiation and establishment of mega-RTAs. In
addition to the CPTPP which has 11 members, a
mega-RTA with 15 members, which has the largest
population and the most diverse membership so
far—the RCEP also entered into force on January 1,
2022. Furthermore, the UK, China and the Republic of
Korea successively applied to join the CPTPP in 2021,
which also indicates the possibility of the
enlargement of existing mega-RTAs.
The surge in the number of RTA in force in 2021
mainly comes from the re-negotiation of RTAs of the
1 Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU).
UK after its exit from the EU. Besides the RCEP, India-
Mauritius, China-Mauritius, EAEU1-Serbia and Ukraine-
Israel free trade agreements, the new RTAs that come
into force are those signed by the UK, including 32
RTAs signed with the EU, Mexico, Chile, Japan, Korea
and other countries before 2021, and 5 RTAs signed
with Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway, Serbia,
Albania and Ghana respectively in 2021.
In terms of geographical distribution, Europe is
the region with the largest number of RTAs, followed
by East Asia, South America and North America.
Europe and the Asia Pacific have become the most
active regions of RTAs in the world.
The development of RTAs shows the following
characteristics:
First, the breadth and depth of RTA
provisions continue to expand. Today’s RTAs cover
extensive policy areas, with an increasing number of
topics that are beyond the scope of the multilateral
trade regulations. According to the statistics of the
World Bank, in recent years, the average number of
policy areas included in the RTAs has risen from 8 in
the 1950s to 17 now. The contemporary issues in the
RTA negotiations have gone beyond the traditional
border measures to regulation and coordination of
domestic policies that are “behind the borders”. Also,
the new generation of RTAs is also deepening on
various issues. Taking as an example the issue of state-
owned enterprises (SOEs), an area covered in current
new generation of RTAs (such as CPTPP and USMCA),
provisions in these RTAs include the definitions of SOEs
and the obligations that SOEs need to comply with
in their international economic activities, including
nondiscriminatory treatment and commercial
considerations, non-commercial assistance, transparency
and so on, which have also become increasingly
stricter than before.
Second, with the rise of cross-regional and
multi-regional agreements, a complex RTA network
has emerged. In recent years, mega-RTAs with great
influence such as the CPTPP and RCEP have emerged
one after another. RTAs are no longer promoted only
by developed countries, and developing countries
have also become an important driving force. Some
emerging economies in the Asia-Pacific region have
put forward proposals of RTAs and actively promoted
Chapter 2 Hot Issues of Asian Economies
045
the negotiation process. Looking ahead to the future
of the development of international trade regulations,
RTAs will become an important platform of regional
rule-making, which will make the RTA network more
complex and form a trend that regionalism and
multilateralism go hand in hand.
Third, major powers continue to be the
center while emerging economies’ influence has
been enhanced. A series of unilateralism and
protectionism actions of the US have exerted great
impact on the global trade. As the leading force of the
global economy, major powers continue to play a
leading role in the regional agreements. At the same
time, the influence of emerging economies on the
rule-making in international trade has been increasing. In
the future, emerging economies and developed
economies will have intensified competition on rule-
making, and the transformation of international trade
regulations is thus under great uncertainty.
Fourth, close economic cooperation in the
Asia-Pacific region invigorates the regional
economic development. In 2020, the global
economic growth fell sharply due to the impact of the
epidemic. At the same time, unilateralism, trade
protectionism and economic nationalism are on the
rise, bringing uncertainty to the economic globalization
together with the epidemic. In this context, economic
cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region has stood out
with many highlights. With the entry into force of
CPTPP and RCEP, the advantages of having a complete
system of supply chain and close connection
between upstream and downstream sectors in the
Asia-Pacific region will be more prominent, and the
economic potential will be more released. As a region
that is constantly opening up, developing at a high
speed and integrating with each other, the Asia-Pacific
region will play an important role in the global
economic development in the 21st century and make
more contributions to the world economy.
2.4.2 RCEP: Opening a New Chapter in Asia-
Pacific Economic Integration
On 1 January 2022, the RCEP agreement signed by ten
ASEAN countries, China, Japan, Korea, Australia and
New Zealand, entered into force. At a time when the
downward risks of the global economy are exacerbated
by the COVID-19 pandemic and the prospects of
economic globalization are becoming increasingly
gloomy, the RCEP’s entry into force will bring bright
prospects for economic integration in the Asia-Pacific
region and inject a momentum to the world economy.
As an RTA covering the largest geographic area,
benefiting the largest number of people, with the
largest economic scale and the greatest development
potential in the world, the RCEP’s entry into force is of
great significance to economies in the Asia-Pacific region
and beyond. First, RCEP is a modern, comprehensive,
high-quality and mutually beneficial large-scale RTA.
The successful signing of the RCEP will boost
confidence in economic growth and inject certainty
into regional development and the world economy.
Second, RCEP fills in the gaps in the institutional
framework of economic integration in Asia, especially
in East Asia. It will significantly improve the level of
economic integration in East Asia and set a good
example for trade and investment liberalization and
facilitation. RCEP is the first RTA to include the three
major economies of East Asia, marking a milestone in
regional economic integration. Third, RCEP will
promote the integration of regional industrial, supply
and value chains. RCEP will facilitate the free flow of
economic factors, strengthen division and cooperation
in production among its members, promote the
expansion and upgrading of the consumer market,
and build a deep-seated industrial and supply chain
system in the region.
First, the RCEP is comprehensive, high-
standard and inclusive.
In addition to the preamble, the RCEP agreement
contains 20 chapters and four annexes, covering
trade in goods, rules of origin, trade in services,
investment, trade facilitation, intellectual property
rights, e-commerce, cooperation among members
and other rules. As an integrator of trade and
investment rules in the region, RCEP emphasizes
rule-based and development-based orientation. RCEP
has achieved a comprehensive rule arrangement, which
is high-standard, inclusive, principled and flexible.
RCEP will promote intra-regional trade and
investment liberalization and facilitation. Over 90
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046
percent of trade in goods between RCEP members
will be tariff-free, effectively boosting trade in
agricultural products and auto parts within the region.
In the area of trade in services, the openness of all
members is significantly higher than that of the 10+1
agreements concluded with ASEAN. Seven countries
including Japan, the Republic of Korea, Australia,
Singapore, Brunei, Malaysia and Indonesia made
commitments by means of negative list. Eight
countries including China made their commitments
through positive list, which will be converted into
negative list within six years after the RCEP takes
effect. Members will achieve greater openness level in
sectors such as construction, engineering, tourism,
finance, transportation, logistics and other fields.
Demand for manufacturing-related services will be
boosted, and a regional manufacturing- related service
network will be formulated. In the field of trade
facilitation, RCEP members will implement higher
obligations compared with that in the WTO Trade
Facilitation Agreement. Members will take trade
facilitation measures to simplify customs clearance
procedures, strengthen the inspection quarantine of
animal and plant, and reduce unnecessary technical
barriers to trade. These measures will help significantly
reduce intra-regional trade cost and release huge
trade growth potential. In foreign investment area,
members made commitments by means of negative
list in five non-service sectors, including manufacturing,
agriculture, forestry, fisheries and mining, and will
implement measures regarding investment protection,
promotion and facilitation. This will help foster a
transparent, stable, open and convenient regional
investment environment.
RCEP will promote the integrated development
of industries and markets in the region. RCEP uses
accumulative rules of origin to facilitate the flow of
intermediate goods within the region. On the one
hand, it will increase the flexibility and diversity of the
layout of industrial and supply chain, promote the
formation of an advanced transnational industrial
system, create industrial agglomeration effect and
scale effect, and realize the optimal allocation of
resources and efficiency improvement. On the other
hand, it will greatly stimulate the logistics demand,
strengthen regional logistics network, and drive
the development of logistics industry between
economies in this region.
RCEP will contribute to the development of
regional digital economy. RCEP has achieved
comprehensive and high-level provisions on electronic
commerce in the Asia-Pacific region for the first time.
It promotes paperless trade, electronic authentication
and signature, protects personal information of e-
commerce users, the rights and interests of online
consumers, and strengthens regulatory cooperation
against unsolicited electronic messages. It also
reached agreement on key issues such as cross-border
transfer of information and location of computing
facilities. The above measures will provide institutional
assurance for the RCEP members to strengthen the
cooperation in electronic commerce and create a
good environment for its development. These
measures will also enhance mutual policy trust, mutual
regulatory recognition, and corporate communication
among members in electronic commerce, so as to
promote the digital transformation of traditional
industries and digital economy development, and
enhance Asian economies’ ability to participate in
global rules construction in digital trade.
RCEP will promote inclusive and sustainable
development in the region. Considering the
differences in economic development among members,
RCEP follows gradual and flexible principle and
provides transitional periods and exception clause for
the least-developed economies and certain members. It
also sets up two chapters, respectively on small and
medium enterprises and economic and technological
cooperation. These two chapters stipulate that all
parties will cooperate to implement technical assistance
and capacity-building pr0jects, so as to make full use
of RCEP to promote domestic economy, share the
fruits, and enhance efficient and inclusive development
in the region.
Second, RCEP will become the main platform
and driving force for economic and trade
cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region.
RCEP is a new starting point for Asian economy
to move towards a better future and also an important
beginning of a new landscape of global economic
governance. On the one hand, driven by both market
and institutional forces, RCEP will become the main
platform for economic and trade cooperation in the
Asia-Pacific region. Relying on Japan’s financial, capital
and technological advantages, China and the Republic
of Korea’s advantages in high-end manufacturing,
Chapter 2 Hot Issues of Asian Economies
047
emerging digital industry and whole industrial chain,
labor force advantage in Southeast Asia and resource
advantages in Oceania, RCEP can gather the world’s
most complete manufacturing categories, covering
from the high-end to the low-end of the industrial
supply chain. In this way, an effective closed-loop
industrial supply chain could be formed within the
region to remedy the shortcomings of production
and supply chains in members. This prospect will
enhance the resilience of the regional industrial
system, and create new growth momentum in the
Asia-Pacific region in medicine, biology, and science
and technology. On the other hand, the entry into
force of the RCEP shows to the world that openness
and cooperation is the only path for mutual benefit
and win-win outcomes for all economies. It is a major
breakthrough to reduce the negative impact of anti-
globalization trends and increase confidence in
economic and trade cooperation in the Asia-Pacific
region. RCEP’s successful experience will serve as a
driving force for expanding and deepening regional
economic and trade cooperation in the future. It is
expected to promote the establishment of the China-
Japan-Korea free trade agreement, contribute to the
WTO reform, and build a more open, inclusive,
balanced and win-win world economy.
1. Procedural Issues
1.1 Reforming the WTO Negotiation Mechanism
WTO members put forward flexible and open negotiation approach to solve the deadlock in multilateral trade
negotiations. The EU believes that plurilateral negotiations that are open to all WTO members and subject to
most-favored-nation (MFN) principle should be actively pursued in areas where multilateral consensus is
difficult to achieve. Canada proposes ways to modernize the WTO rules, including the “open” plurilateral
agreements that negotiating outcomes are subject to MFN principle, and “closed” plurilateral agreements
that negotiating outcomes apply only to the signatories. Although China is open to plurilateral negotiations,
it emphasizes the necessity of the principle of “consensus” in negotiations, and believes that the issues and
results of WTO reform should be decided by consensus.
1.2 Reforming the WTO Dispute Settlement Mechanism
The WTO Appellate Body has been paralyzed due to the US’s continued blockage of its appointment, which
has greatly damaged the effectiveness of WTO judicial arbitration. In November 2018, China, the EU and other
members submitted two proposals to the WTO on the reform of the Appellate Body. In September 2019,
following the participation of Thailand and Malaysia, 116 members jointly submitted a proposal about starting
the appointment of Appellate Body. However, facing the general consensus of WTO members, the US’s
position has not changed. Considering the impossibilities to solve the Appellate Body crisis in the short-term,
the EU, China and other WTO members sought for an alternative plan. On 30 April 2020, the Multiparty Interim
Appeal Arbitration Arrangement (MPIA), which has been joined by more than 20 WTO members including
the EU and China, came into effect. MPIA is a temporary and alternative plan during the suspension of the
Appellate Body to avoid the appealed cases remain in limbo.
1.3 Reforming the WTO Notification and Transparency Obligations
The US, EU and Japan actively call for the strengthening of WTO notification and transparency obligations in
the field of trade in goods, suggesting that WTO members who fail to effectively fulfill their notification
obligations be punished. In this regard, Canada and China hold a balanced position, emphasizing the
necessity of providing motivations and technical assistance to backward members. The African Group, Cuba
and India hold an opposing position. They emphasize the capacity gap between developing and developed
Column 2.1 Column New Issues on the Multilateral
Trading System Reform and Regional
Trade Agreements Development
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members, propose to grant more special and differential treatment to developing members and strengthen
notifications by developed members regarding agriculture, trade in services and measures on intellectual
property rights.
2. Substantive Issues on WTO
2.1 Updating Rules for New Issues
WTO members generally believe that WTO rules need to keep pace with the times, and have promoted
plurilateral negotiations on some new issues, including e-commerce, investment facilitation, services
domestic regulation, micro, small and medium-sized enterprises, as well as trade and environment. On 4
December 2020, the negotiation on Services Domestic Regulation was successfully concluded with the
participation of 67 members. On 10 December 2020, 112 members claimed to conclude the negotiation by
the end of 2022. On 14 December 2020, Australia, Singapore and Japan, which are the three leading parties
of the e-commerce negotiation participated by 86 members, announced that they would complete
substantive negotiations in 2022. On 15 December 2020, negotiations of three joint initiatives on “Trade and
Environmental Sustainability” “Plastics Pollution and Environmentally Sustainable Plastics Trade” and “Fossil
Fuel Subsidy Reform” were launched.
2.2 Strengthening the Rules on “Non-Market Oriented” Issues
In seven joint statements, the US, EU and Japan called for stronger WTO rules on “non-market oriented” issues
such as state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and industrial subsidies. Regarding regulations on SOEs and “public
bodies”, the US, EU and Japan advocate addressing market distortions caused by SOEs and “public bodies”
and demand more transparency obligations on these entities. Regarding regulations on industrial subsidies,
the US, EU and Japan propose to expand the scope of prohibited subsidies, justify a reversal of the burden of
proof for certain types of subsidies, clarify the “external benchmark” for calculating subsidy benefits in
countervailing investigations, and regulate subsidies that cause overcapacity. Regarding regulations of “non-
market oriented” policies and practices in third countries, the US submitted a proposal of “The Importance of
Market-Oriented Conditions to the World Trading System” in February 2020, adding “enterprises are able to
freely access relevant information on which to base their business decisions” as a new “market-oriented”
criteria. China and other developing economies, especially emerging economies, will face a long-term game
with the US, EU and Japan on this issue.
2.3 Improving Rules on Doha Round Issues
China, Canada, India and other WTO members put forward in their WTO reform proposals that the remaining
issues of the Doha Round should be pushed forward. China proposes to address the inequity of disciplines in
agriculture, improve trade remedy rules and conclude negotiations on fisheries subsidies. Canada raises
concerns about tariff escalation and tariff peaks, agricultural support and development issues. India, Oman
and some African and Latin American economies submitted a proposal of “Strengthening the WTO to
Promote Development and Inclusivity” to the WTO, proposing to address Doha remaining issues including
the implementation issues of WTO agreements (e.g. agriculture, trade-related investment measures, trade-
related intellectual property rights, subsidies and countervailing duties), the special and differential treatment,
the agriculture domestic supports and public stockholding, the special safeguard mechanism for agriculture,
and fisheries subsidies. These issues are of great significance to enhancing the relevance of WTO in global
economic governance and meeting the goal of global sustainable development. However, the current
obstacle lies in that the US, EU, Japan and other developed members are only making efforts in promoting
negotiations on fishery subsides, while lacking political momentum and negotiation efforts for other Doha
remaining issues.
Chapter 2 Hot Issues of Asian Economies
049
3. The Development of New Issues in RTAs
3.1 The Development of RTA E-Commerce Provisions in the Digital Age
Due to the slow progress of WTO multilateral rulemaking in the field of global digital trade, the formulation
of new international rules takes place more at the RTA level. The US, Singapore and Australia were the initial major
players that start to promote e-commerce chapters in RTAs. Since then, Canada, the EU and Japan, as well as the
Republic of Korea and China in recent years, have also actively participated in the formulation of RTA digital trade
rules. To date, almost half of WTO members have at least one RTA with an e-commerce chapter. However, the e-
commerce provisions in different RTAs vary greatly. Some RTAs involve a wide range of issues about e-commerce,
while some RTAs only include zero tariff for cross-border e-commerce in line with the multilateral rules, and provisions
about the strengthening of cooperation between regulatory authorities.
At present, the global digital trade rules are mainly dominated by the US and EU, and their differences
are reflected in their RTAs. The position of US is represented by provisions in TPP and USMCA, which excludes
local data storage requirements and emphasizes free cross-border flow of data; The EU explicitly requires data
storage localization, emphasizes the protection of personal information and privacy, and adheres to cultural
exceptions. As a big country in the global digital economy, in recent years, while improving its own digital
economy governance, China has actively participated in global digital governance cooperation through RTAs,
and has formally applied in 2021 to join the Digital Economy Partnership Agreement (DEPA) signed by
Singapore, Chile and New Zealand in 2020. With regard to the regulation of digital economy, China
emphasizes digital sovereignty, and its RTAs include provisions aimed at ensuring national security and data
security, such as local data storage requirement. Japan actively participates in the formulation of global digital
trade rules both at the WTO and at the regional level. It coordinates with the US and EU in digital trade rules
through its RTA with the EU and digital trade agreement with the US. On the one hand, Japan advocates the
free flow of data across borders and the elimination of digital divide between economies; On the other hand,
it also attaches importance to the protection of personal privacy and digital intellectual property rights. The
RTAs signed by the Republic of Korea also emphasize the protection of consumer privacy and personal data,
and include provisions of paperless trade that requires publication of documents on trade regulation and
regards their paper and electronic versions as equally authentic; in other aspects, the Republic of Korea’s
e-commerce provisions in its RTAs show great heterogeneity and flexibility.
3.2 The Development of RTA Sustainability Provisions
Sustainable development is defined as “the development which meets the needs of the present without
compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs”. The United Nations 2030 Agenda
for Sustainable Development puts forward three major tasks: the coordinated promotion of economic
growth, social development and environmental protection. It is more important and urgent to make sure that
trade effectively promotes sustainable development for the current global economy under the clouds of
“anti-globalization” and the COVID-19 pandemic. Sustainability clauses first appeared in the RTAs by a handful
of economies such as the US, Canada and the EU. Now more and more RTAs, including those developing
ones (such as Chile and Peru), contain sustainability objectives and relevant clauses, but different RTAs
incorporate sustainable development clauses to different degrees. At present, more comprehensive and in-
depth sustainability provisions are found in RTAs led by developed economies such as the CPTPP and USMCA,
including innovative cooperation mechanisms, provisions to address conflicts between trade and sustainable
development, measures to promote compliance with international or domestic environmental and labor
laws, and regulatory commitments to promote social or environmental objectives; while some other RTAs
only mentioned the importance of sustainable development with no real commitments undertaken. The
sustainability provisions in some RTAs have gone beyondsoft law and incorporated Investor-State Dispute
Settlement (ISDS) mechanism. However, there is still no consensus to create binding sustainable
development provisions that are subject to dispute settlement. Currently, most economies prefer a “soft law”
approach to sustainable development issues in RTAs, in the form of cooperation mechanisms, consultation
requirements, enforcement mechanisms, and reaffirmation of international standards.
Boao Forum for Asia Asian Economic Outlook and Integration Progress Annual Report 2022
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Overview
051
Part II |
Asian Economic
Integration Progress
Boao Forum for Asia Asian Economic Outlook and Integration Progress Annual Report 2022
052
Overview
053
Overview
In 2020, COVID-19 inflicted heavy losses on the global
economy. With the support of the pandemic prevention
and control measures and macro stimulus policies, the
global economy has re-embarked on the track of
recovery, and the pace of economic integration in the
Asia has been sustained. In 2020, intra-regional trade
in the Asia-Pacific region accounted for 58.5%1 of the
total regional trade, the highest share since 1990. On
January 1st, 2022, the Regional Comprehensive
Economic Partnership (RCEP) officially came into
effect. So far, Brunei, Cambodia, Laos, Singapore,
Thailand and Vietnam, as well as China, Japan, the
Republic of Korea, Australia and New Zealand, have
officially begun to implement the agreement,
marking the sailing of the world's most populous and
largest economic and free trade area. Asia is providing
new impetus to the world in both economic recovery
and the construction of economic and trade rules.
In 2020, facing the demand contraction and
supply shocks caused by global COVID-19, the world
economy fell into recession, and the global trade in
goods declined significantly. In this context, the
export dependency on Asia for Asian economies
continued to increase and has reached new high
since 2012. The degree of trade dependence among
Asian economies also remained high, with ASEAN and
China enjoying their status as the regional center of
gravity. Although bilateral trade in Asia generally
contracted, the trade in goods with China by most
Asian countries increased, helping anchor regional
trade stability against the shocks. Vietnam had
exceptional performance in trade in goods. China’s
export to Vietnam exceeded 100 billion USD and kept
growing. However, the COVID-19 pandemic continues
to pose uncertainties for the future. While world trade
had a strong recovery in 2021, its trend remains
1 Data is from the Asian Development Bank.
uncertain in 2022. Nevertheless, with the RCEP
coming into force and tariff barriers and non-tariff
barriers being significantly reduced, many Asian
economies, and RCEP and CPTPP members may show
higher dependence on trade in goods from the
region .
The Asian Factory is largely a natural product of
the opening up of some Asian economies, driven by
market forces. China has become the center of this
international production network thanks to its huge
domestic market and ample processing capacity.
However, China-U.S. trade frictions and the impact of
COVID-19 have raised concerns about the stability of
Global Value Chains (GVCs) in Asia. Factory integration
in Asia peaked in 2011 and exhibited a downward
trend since then. The fall became most acute in 2019
at the peak of China-US trade conflict. However, the
self-dependence of Asian Factory picked up after the
outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic. The trade
disputes and the pandemic have not altered the
intermediate product market landscape in Asia.
Before the outbreak of COVID-19, global trade in
services had been growing faster than trade in goods,
playing an increasingly important role in GVCs and
becoming a new driving force for world economy. The
importance of trade in services of Asia and developing
economies has been on the rise. By the traditional
measurement or by value-added, the 25 Asia-Pacific
economies have become more integrated in service
trade compared to outside the region. Despite the
heavy blow of the pandemic, the integration of trade
in services in the Asia-Pacific has been particularly
strong, thanks to their geographical proximity as well
as the increasing contribution of service export
attached with manufacturing goods.
Digital economy and other new forms of
Boao Forum for Asia Asian Economic Outlook and Integration Progress Annual Report 2022
054
business have expanded the boundaries of trade in
services. Over the years, Asia's trade in digital services
has maintained steady growth, with its share of global
digital services trade rising from 16.6% in 2005 to
25.5%. Within Asia, nearly half of digital services
exports were concentrated in East Asia (46.7%),
followed by Southeast Asia (22.4%), South Asia (20.1%)
and West Asia (10.7%). Among the top ten economies
in the global digital services trade in 2020, the US
ranked first, with Asia accounting for four seats
and Europe for five seats. Asian digital platform
companies have been active in Internet and e-
commerce. In the field of e-commerce, more Asian
entities appeared in the top 10 list by market value,
with China, Singapore and Korea occupying six
positions in total. The development of digital
platforms in Asia also pushed up the digital economy
revenues, which brought Asia’s share in the world
close to 50%. Asian countries' digital transformation
strategies will bring new growth opportunities for
digital trade. With the RCEP coming into force, the
cross-border e-commerce market in Asia will enjoy
huge institutional and opening-up dividends, and
embrace significant cost reduction and further
consolidation of the industrial and value chains in the
region.
In 2020, due to huge uncertainties caused by
COVID-19, many countries have adopted strict entry
restrictions, including mandatory testing, quarantines
and border closures. Tourism in Asia has been hit hard.
According to the United Nations World Tourism
Organization (UNWTO), there were only 400 million
global tourist arrivals in 2020, a year-on-year drop of
74% from 2019. Asia and the Pacific saw an 84% drop
in arrivals due to stricter entry restrictions, while this
number in Africa, Middle East, and Europe and the
Americas recorded 77%, 73% and 68%. In contrast to
hard-hit international tourism, domestic tourism has
been picking up in Asia.
In terms of international direct investment (FDI)
inflow and outflow, Asian economies outperformed
the global average in 2020. In particular, the amount
of FDI flowing into and out of developing Asia has
increased. This shows the resilience and recovery in
investment in Asia amid the ongoing COVID-19
pandemic.
The main source of FDI in Asia is still from within.
While the extent of dependency of Asian economies
on the inward FDI from within remained stable, their
outward FDI dependency on economies within the
region fluctuated greatly and increased dramatically
in 2020. The self-dependence of Asia’s direct
investment (inflows and outflows) rose to nearly 65%
in 2020, showing that Asian economies have maintained
sufficient investment resilience and that the regional
production chains have not been significantly
affected by the COVID-19 and the China-US trade
disputes.
Asia’s financial cohesion has played an important
role in promoting economic growth and safeguarding
regional and global financial stability. At the end of
2020, the total portfolio investment outflow from
Asian economies reached 11.55 trillion US dollars, an
increase of 15.8%. This figure roughly equaled the
growth rate in 2019, slightly higher than the global
level. In 2020, the portfolio investment inflow to Asia
amounted to 8.9 trillion US dollars, growing by 18.40%
and 4 percentage points higher than that in 2019. This
indicates that Asian financial markets have
maintained their attractiveness even during the
pandemic. Among the top ten economies in terms of
the global portfolio investment, only Japan is from
Asia. China is one of the major economies with the
most rapid growth (including outflow and inflow) in
recent years.
Reinforcing the global and regional financial
safety net is a key component in Asian currency
cooperation. The IMF’s lending capacity has been
augmented in September 2021, with issuance of 650
billion USD Special Drawing Rights. In April 2021, the
special draft of Chiang Mai Initiative Multilateralization
(CMIM) signed by the “10+3” financial ministers and
central bank governors, and the Head of Hong Kong
Monetary Authority, came into force. Local currency
funding provisions will promote the use of Asian
currencies. Moreover, since 2020, many central banks
and monetary authorities in Asia have further
promoted bilateral currency cooperation with regard
to local currency swaps and settlements.
According to the GFCI Index 2021, Hong Kong
special Administrative Region of China, Singapore,
Shanghai, Beijing, and Tokyo are listed among the top
10 global financial centers. Asian stock markets are
developing quickly. In 2021, Tokyo Stock Exchange
stood out from its Asian peers by the total stock
trading volume. China had 6 IPOs out of the largest 10
Overview
055
around the globe. Paytm from India and Bukalapak
from Indonesia debuted in their local stock exchanges
as their landmark IPOs. To better attract potential
listing companies (in particular Unicorns) and all
overseas investors, exchanges in Asia have been
actively adopting new technologies. The market force,
technology, and rules and regulations have facilitated
growth of Fintech companies in Asia’s international
financial centers.
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Chapter 3 Merchandise Trade Integration in Asia
057
Chapter 3
Merchandise Trade
Integration in Asia
1
3.1 Integration of
Merchandise Trade
This section is to measure the Asian economic
integration process in merchandise trade. It is
explained from the three dimensions of integration,
i.e., export reliance on Asia, merchandise trade
interdependence, and bilateral trade flows. The
COVID-19 pandemic in 2020 had resulted in great
demand contraction and supply shocks, which in turn
led to a global recession, as well as a slowdown in
global trade. However, it is found that Asia’s
integration process continues to progress, and the
overall export reliance on Asia has hit a new high since
2012. The role of China and ASEAN as trading hubs
within Asia had not changed. The bilateral trade
between Asian economies dropped dramatically in
1 According to the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Asian economies include Turkey, Bahrain, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait,
Lebanon, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, United Arab Emirates, Yemen, Palestine in West Asia; Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan,
Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia in Central Asia; Japan, the Republic of Korea, Mongolia, Democratic People’s
Republic of Korea (DPRK) in Northeast Asia; Myanmar, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam,
East Timor, Brunei in Southeast Asia; Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Sri Lanka, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan in South Asia, as well
as Chinese mainland (hereinafter referred to as China), Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of China, Macao Special Administrative
Region of China and other parts of Asia (including Taiwan Province of China). This classification method is the same as the previous part
of this report.
2 Export exposure to Asian economies captures the extent to which one economy relies on Asian economies in trade for goods, which is a
ratio of merchandise exports destined to Asian economies total exports. The higher exports share, the more exports dependence on Asian
economies. Trade openness is an indicator of one economy’s dependence on trade in economic activities, calculated as ratio of imports and
exports on goods and services to GDP. The higher trade openness, the more reliance on trade in economic activities. Merchandise exports
concentration is a measure of the dispersion of exporting categories, calculated using Herfindahl-Hirschman method. In particular, the index
is calculated at the SITC-3 digit level and the trading partners are set to Asian economies. The higher exports concentration means that an
economy is more vulnerable in face of change in trade pattern. To alleviate concerns of the fluctuations in annually economic data, all sub-
indices are calculated as the average of value of the two latest years. Because we need to normalize the sub-indices, and without loss of
generality, we contain countries and areas other than Asian economies (such as Asian regions, European Union, ASEAN, CPTPP countries).
2020, but most economies documented an upward
trend in bilateral trade with China. In 2022, the
pandemic is still one of the biggest uncertainties
affecting Asian trade in goods. By contrast, the
operation of Regional Comprehensive Economic
Partnership (RCEP) Agreement will deepen the
process of trade integration in Asia.
3.1.1 Overall Trend of Asia’s Trade Integration
This section employs the Export Reliance Index on
Asia (ERI-ASIA) to describe the overall trend of the
trade integration of Asian economies.1 The ERI-ASIA is
to measure an economy’s export dependence on
Asia. This is a composite index, which contains three
sub-indices, i.e., export exposure to Asia, trade
openness, and merchandise exports concentration.2
Specifically, this index is the geometric means of the
three normalized sub-indices above. The index ranges
Boao Forum for Asia Asian Economic Outlook and Integration Progress Annual Report 2022
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from 0 to 100, where a higher ERI-ASIA implies that an
economy is more dependent on Asian economies as
a whole. As shown in Figure 3.1, the ERI-ASIA hit a new
high of 14.12 in 2020. It is a remarkable increase
because of the slowdown in global trade. The global
trade in goods decreased by 5.6 percent year on year
for 2020, while Asian trade in goods decreased by 5
percent. For Asian economies as a whole, the total
exports and imports dropped by 3.2 percent and 7
percent, respectively. According to available trade
data from World Integrated Trade Solution (WITS),
only 4 out of 35 Asian economies, i.e., China, Hong
Kong Special Administrative Region of China, Vietnam
and Cambodia, had witnessed positive growth in total
trade in goods. Bilateral trade between Asian
economies shrunk significantly, and the integration of
merchandise trade moved forward with great
difficulty.
Figure 3.1 ERI-ASIA for Selected Asian Economies, 2012-2020
Source: Author’s calculations based on WITS and UNCTADstat.
Table 3.1 presents the ERI-ASIA for selected Asian
economies from 2016 to 2020. As shown in data, there
were significant differences in the ERI-ASIA index
among the selected Asian economies and other
major economies such as European Union (EU) and
the US. It is noteworthy that Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region of China, Macao Special
Administrative Region of China and Singapore were
still the top three economies, with an ERI-ASIA of
50.84, 42.38 and 40.93, respectively. In contrast, China,
Japan and India were the bottom three economies,
with an ERI-ASIA of 9.48, 10.18 and 10.57, respectively.
This is mainly due to the differences in economic sizes
among the Asian economies. In line with this
explanation, the US and the European Union also
reported a lower ERI-ASIA. ERI-ASIA of the US was
6.84 and that of EU was 7.43. Australia, New Zealand
and UK witnessed a larger ERI-ASIA, which were 25.10
and 19.06, and 11.10, respectively.
More importantly, all of the selected economies
(except for India) experienced an increase in ERI-ASIA
for 2020, suggesting that their dependence on Asia
had been deepening. The ERI-ASIAs of the Philippines,
Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of China
and Malaysia increased the most, but those of the
Republic of Korea, Indonesia and Thailand increased
the least. It had been the third year that the
Philippines and Malaysia ranked the top 3 economies
with the largest increases in ERI-ASIA. It is worth
noting that, it was the second year in a row for Hong
Kong Special Administrative Region of China to
witness an increase in this index, partially alleviating
the concern that the increase in 2019 was accidental.
Economies outside Asia had also experienced a
Chapter 3 Merchandise Trade Integration in Asia
059
remarkable increase in their ERI-ASIAs. The ERI-ASIA for
Australia increased by 4.1, followed by New Zealand
and the US. On the other hand, the ERI-ASIA of the EU
increased by less than 0.5, while that for UK remained
constant.
The rise of ERI-ASIAs among the world's major
economies is mainly attributed to the success of
China and other Asian economies in epidemic
prevention and control. Therefore, these increases may
only be a short-term phenomenon. Nonetheless, the
interdependence between Asian economies has a
chance to move on, as the RCEP agreements have
come into force gradually in its member states. Given
the economic size of the RCEP, as well as population
size, there is no doubt that its implementation will
strengthen Asia’s impact on global trade in the future.
Table 3.1 ERI-ASIA for Selected Asian Economies
Economies 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 Changes
China 7.84 8.83 7.92 8.05 9.48 1.43
Japan 6.90 8.75 8.50 8.74 10.18 1.43
Korea, Republic of 15.16 18.58 21.04 20.96 20.96 0.00
Hong Kong SAR, China 70.43 65.12 46.76 48.45 50.84 2.38
Macao SAR, China 30.31 -- 34.92 40.97 42.38 1.41
South Asia 8.80 10.65 11.06 10.74 9.74 -1.01
India 9.41 10.94 11.15 10.93 10.57 -0.36
Sri Lanka 12.89 13.70 -- -- -- --
ASEAN 15.86 17.65 17.94 18.28 19.43 1.15
Singapore 37.49 38.73 39.19 39.30 40.93 1.63
Malaysia 20.98 23.17 24.92 25.96 27.65 1.69
Thailand 6.36 11.92 12.03 11.81 12.03 0.22
the Philippines 21.03 21.92 20.65 21.91 24.37 2.46
Indonesia 10.55 11.70 11.69 11.69 12.28 0.59
Vietnam 19.29 23.87 24.16 21.83 23.05 1.22
Asia 9.00 11.76 12.35 12.70 14.12 1.42
Australia* 16.73 19.03 19.25 21.04 25.10 4.06
New Zealand* 14.75 16.24 16.39 17.33 19.06 1.73
the US* 5.82 6.78 5.54 5.59 6.84 1.26
EU27* 4.60 7.00 6.93 7.01 7.43 0.42
UK* 9.10 10.00 10.28 11.04 11.10 0.06
Notes: The last column is the difference between 2020 and 2019. The economies with a star are outside Asia, so the indices are not entirely
comparable with their counterparts. -- represents missing values.
Source: Author’s calculations based on WITS and UNCTADstat.
The global pandemic has caused severe
disruptions in supply chains, frequent shipping
backlogs at the ports, and a slowdown in global trade.
Therefore, it is striking to see the increases in ERI-ASIAs
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for selected Asian economies and the other major
economies around the world. This achievement was
largely attributed to the efforts made by Asian
economies to contain the domestic spread of the
coronavirus. Note that developed economies such as
the US have struggled to curb their domestic
epidemic. By contrast, developing economies in Asia
have made significant progress in the containment of
the pandemic. In particular, once the domestic
epidemic was brought under control, Chinese
governments had committed to revitalizing business.
A bundle of fiscal and monetary policies had been
implemented to fix the supply chain crisis. China’s
imports and exports in goods had seen a rapid
recovery, thereby playing the role of a stabilizer for
merchandise trade in Asia.
Looking forward to 2022, global trade will
continue its recovery in 2021, though the COVID-19
pandemic may still be one of the biggest
uncertainties. Thankfully, the positive signals are also
strong. On 1 January 2022, RCEP entered into force in
ten countries. Those economies are six ASEAN
members including Brunei, Cambodia, Laos,
Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam, and four non-
ASEAN countries including China, Japan, Australia and
New Zealand. In addition, the Republic of Korea and
Malaysia started to implement the agreements in
February and March 2022, respectively. The final entry
into force of the RCEP agreement has injected new
impetus into Asian integration. It offers huge potential
for cooperation in respect of regional supply chains
and value chains, and Asian economies are expected
to further increase their export reliance on Asia.
3.1.2 Trade Interdependence Among Key
Members: Past and Present
This section is an update of the status of trade
interdependence among the major Asian economies
by our traditional measure, i.e., the trade dependence
index. The index ranges from 0 to 100 percent,
capturing the extent to which one economy’s total
trade in goods relies on the other economy.1
Table 3.2 presents the merchandise trade inter-
dependence of selected Asian economies for 2020.
Overall, it is shown that Asian economies remained
heavily dependent on Asia, so did RCEP countries and
CPTPP countries. The trade dependence on Asia
remained 70 percent for ASEAN countries, followed by
the Republic of Korea and Japan, i.e., 62 percent and 60
percent, respectively. China's overall trade dependence
on Asia remained at about 50%. Finally, the trade
dependence on Asian economies is 66 percent and 52
percent for RCEP countries and CPTPP countries,
respectively.
1
Table 3.2 Trade Dependence Index for Selected Asian Economies, 2020 (%)
Of On ASEAN China India Japan Korea,
Republic of Asia RCEP CPTPP
ASEAN 21.16 19.41 2.46 7.67 5.79 69.65 37.01 23.08
China 15.14 -- 1.94 7.02 6.31 50.08 32.60 24.56
India 11.45 12.09 -- 2.21 2.59 55.50 18.05 13.35
Japan 15.05 23.91 1.08 -- 5.58 60.02 24.73 14.91
Korea, Republic of 14.68 24.63 1.72 7.26 -- 62.31 24.74 24.12
RCEP 17.73 22.82 1.98 5.92 4.60 65.99 31.28 21.26
CPTPP 12.43 19.42 1.48 3.82 4.77 51.58 23.27 15.40
Source: Author’s calculations based on WITS and UNCTADstat.
1 This measure is calculated as the ratio of economy X’s total merchandise trade (imports and exports) with economy Y over the economy’s
total merchandise trade with the world. In one extreme case, if the index for economy X on economy Y is equal to zero, the economy is not
trading with the latter economy. If the index is equal to one, then the former economy trades with the latter economy, not with all other
economies.
Chapter 3 Merchandise Trade Integration in Asia
061
The impact of the global COVID-19 pandemic
has not affected the status of China and ASEAN as
Asian hubs for trade in goods. First, intra-regional
trade interdependence between ASEAN member
states was 21 percent for 2020, a decrease of one
percent; while the trade dependence on ASEAN was
above 15 percent for China, Japan, the Republic of
Korea and RCEP member states. Second, Japan, the
Republic of Korea and RCEP countries reported a trade
dependence on China of 20 percent or larger. The
trade dependence on China for ASEAN and CPTPP
countries was also close to 20 percent. Yet, it is
noteworthy that India’s trade dependence on the two
trading hubs remained at a low level, around 12
percent in 2020. Third, thanks to the success in the
epidemic containment, China was the first major
economy to reopen its factories. Its industrial chains
and supply chains were operating stably, and several
production lines even turned back to China again.
Consequently, most economies in Asia, as well as
economies outside Asia, have seen a remarkable
increase in their trade dependence on China.
Figure 3.2 provides a direct way to detect the
evolution of the trade inter-dependence among the
selected economies from 2016 to 2020. It is found that
differences are significant in terms of the pattern of
trade inter-dependence for different economies. First,
although the trade dependence on Asia remained at
about 70 percent for ASEAN, it had been declining
since 2017. In addition, not only the intra-ASEAN trade
dependence but also the bloc’s trade dependence on
other economies such as Japan had declined. By
contrast, the dependence on China had moved up
from 16.49 percent in 2016 to 19.41 percent in 2020,
an increase of 3 percent. Second, the trade dependence
on Asia fluctuated around 50 percent for China, though its
dependence on a single economy varied significantly. On
the one hand, China’s dependence on Japan and the
Republic of Korea kept declining in recent years. On
the other hand, its dependence on ASEAN, RCEP and
CPTPP countries was growing. What is worth
mentioning is that, China’s dependence on ASEAN
had moved to 15.14 percent in 2020, increasing by 2.5
percentage points from 2016. Third, India, similar to
China, also reported an increasing trade dependence
on ASEAN but a decreasing trade dependence on
Japan and the Republic of Korea. But unlike China,
India's trade dependence fluctuated greatly and the
upward trend was not clear. Fourth, the different
patterns for two representative developed economies,
Japan and the Republic of Korea, also deserved more
attention. Japan’s trade dependence on Asia was
mainly increasing, while that of the Republic of Korea
was declining in recent two years. In addition, their
trade inter-dependence had witnessed a slight
decrease in the past five years. Japan’s trade
dependence on ASEAN and China remained constant,
but that of the Republic of Korea experienced
consecutive increases recently. Finally, the RCEP
countries documented a fluctuating trade dependence
on Asia, which was about 65 percent in 2020. It was
found, however, that the trade dependence on Asia had
increased to 51.6 percent for CPTPP countries. RCEP
and CPTPP economies turned out to be less
dependent on Asia economies as a whole, but their
dependence on China was upward.
Figure 3.3 plots the number of economies
reporting Asian economies as their largest trading
partners. According to the available trade data from
WITS, 35 out of 134 economies reported that their
largest trading partners were from Asia, of which 20
economies belong to Asia themselves. This number
was 37 in 2019 meaning a slight decrease. The
number of economies in 2020 reporting China as their
largest trading partners was 24 in 2020, and in 2019
the number was 21. The number of economies
reporting ASEAN as their largest trading partners
decreased to nine economies in 2020. In previous year
the number is 12. Table 3.3 provides the list of specific
economies. It is shown that economies reporting
ASEAN as their largest trading partners were also
mainly Asian economies, including China, Singapore
and Malaysia. On the other hand, economies reporting
China as their largest trading partners distribute unevenly
around the world. Most economies were also Asian
economies such as Japan and the Republic of Korea;
other economies included the EU from Europe, Brazil
and Chile from South America, Ethiopia and Tanzania
from Africa, and Australia and New Zealand from
Oceania. This result suggests an enhancement of the
status of China in global trade, though this country
bore the first brunt of the COVID-19 pandemic.
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Chapter 3 Merchandise Trade Integration in Asia
063
Boao Forum for Asia Asian Economic Outlook and Integration Progress Annual Report 2022
064
Figure 3.2 Trade Dependence Index for Selected Economies, 2016-2020
Source: Author’s calculations based on WITS and UNCTADstat.
Figure 3.3 The Number of Economies with the Largest Trading Partner from Asia
Notes: In addition to the individual economies, we include two other regional economic integration organizations, i.e., the EU and ASEAN.
The sample restricts to economies with complete trade data from 2016 to 2020, including 135 economies.
Source: Author’s calculations based on WITS.
Table 3.3 Economies with the Largest Trading Partner from Asia, 2020
The Largest Partner Economies
ASEAN China; Singapore; Brunei; the Philippines; Malaysia; Thailand; Laos; Cambodia; Fiji
China
European Union; Japan; Korea, Republic of; India; Indonesia; Hong Kong SAR, China; Taiwan,
China; Mongolia; Myanmar; Pakistan; Qatar; Vietnam; Australia; New Zealand; Brazil; Chile;
Peru; Uruguay; Burundi; Democratic Republic of the Congo; Republic of the Congo;
Ethiopia; Kenya; Tanzania
United Arab Emirates Uganda
Palestine Israel
Source: Author’s calculations based on WITS.
Chapter 3 Merchandise Trade Integration in Asia
065
1
3.1.3 Trade Flows Among Selected Asian
Economies
Table 3.4 presents the trade flows matrix for major
Asia-Pacific economies in 2020 (Panel A), as well as the
growth rates in Panel B.1 Affected by the pandemic,
bilateral trade flows shrunk significantly in 2020.
However, the scale of bilateral trade with China
expanded, suggesting that China is a stabilizer in
regional trade.
Table 3.4 Trade Flows Among Asian Economies and Growth
Rate Year-on-Year, 2020 (USD billion, %)
To
ASEAN China India Indonesia Japan
Korea,
Republic
of
Malaysia the
Philippines Thailand Vietnam Australia New
Zealand
From
ASEAN 289.5 216.6 42.8 38.3 100.3 56.4 53.0 26.8 43.2 35.7 31.1 4.9
China 383.7 -- 66.7 41.0 142.6 112.5 56.4 41.8 50.5 113.8 53.5 6.1
India 29.6 19.0 -- 4.4 4.0 4.5 6.2 1.4 3.8 4.5 3.5 0.4
Indonesia 36.5 31.8 10.4 -- 13.7 6.5 8.1 5.9 5.1 4.9 2.5 0.5
Japan 92.3 141.4 9.1 9.2 -- 44.7 12.6 8.8 25.5 17.1 12.1 1.8
Korea,
Republic of 89.1 132.6 12.0 6.3 25.1 -- 9.1 7.1 6.9 48.5 6.2 1.5
Malaysia 65.1 37.8 7.3 7.0 14.7 8.2 -- 4.2 10.8 7.4 5.8 0.9
the
Philippines 10.2 9.6 0.6 0.5 9.9 2.5 1.8 -- 2.9 1.3 0.4 0.0
Thailand 55.5 29.8 5.5 7.6 22.9 4.2 8.7 5.1 -- 11.2 9.8 1.2
Vietnam 23.1 48.9 5.2 2.8 19.3 19.1 3.4 3.6 4.9 -- 3.6 0.5
Australia 26.1 100.1 6.9 3.6 30.3 15.9 4.8 1.5 2.8 4.4 -- 6.9
New Zealand 3.8 10.8 0.3 0.7 2.3 1.1 0.7 0.5 0.6 0.5 5.3 --
Panel A Trade Flows (USD billion)
To
ASEAN China India Indonesia Japan
Korea,
Republic
of
Malaysia the
Philippines Thailand Vietnam Australia New
Zealand
From
ASEAN
-9.72 7.58 -17.80 -18.54 -5.24 -0.87 -15.20 -13.10 -10.12 -5.98 -9.93 -14.09
China
6.50 -- -10.94 -10.25 -0.41 1.37 7.52 2.65 10.75 16.13 11.18 6.16
India
-13.53 10.01 -- -3.36 -16.04 -2.95 -1.19 -13.42 -12.80 -18.36 16.72 14.41
Indonesia
-11.97 13.64 -11.92 -- -14.62 -10.06 -7.63 -12.87 -17.78 -4.12 7.63 7.26
Japan
-13.11 4.99 -17.06 -34.23 -- -3.41 -5.23 -17.30 -15.43 3.85 -16.19 -20.89
Korea,
Republic of
-6.32 -2.68 -20.83 -17.42 -11.71 -- 2.64 -14.81 -11.86 0.76 -21.59 5.08
Malaysia
-5.10 12.12 -19.61 -5.47 -6.59 1.10 -- -4.47 -19.93 -12.18 -15.50 -19.35
the
Philippines
-5.65 -1.96 1.08 -45.26 -7.03 -21.74 -3.87 -- -3.02 0.32 -10.21 -16.49
Thailand
-7.26 6.01 -22.35 -10.46 -1.12 -6.59 -12.74 -21.52 -- -3.79 3.19 -12.98
Vietnam
-7.19 17.97 -21.60 -16.21 -5.66 -3.06 -10.60 -4.57 -2.89 -- 3.63 -8.08
Australia
-6.84 -2.83 -28.98 -11.61 -23.12 -8.84 -21.68 -23.77 -9.92 5.08 -- -2.29
New Zealand
-4.38 -2.27 -34.38 0.26 0.04 -0.11 -1.74 -18.29 -5.50 1.53 -7.93 --
Panel B Growth Rate Year-on-Year (%)
Source: WITS, UNCTADstat.
1 Along the row-wise, it gives the value of exports from one economy to its trading partner (in billion US dollars), e.g. the ASEAN economies
export to ASEAN, China, Indonesia, India, Japan, among others; while column-wise indicates how much one economy import from its
trading partners, such as the ASEAN economies import from ASEAN, China, Indonesia, India, Japan and others.
Boao Forum for Asia Asian Economic Outlook and Integration Progress Annual Report 2022
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The intra-ASEAN exports in goods fell below
USD300 billion in 2020, down 9.7 percent year-on-
year. Besides, bilateral exports between ASEAN and
Asia-Pacific economies other than China had also
witnessed negative growth. Exports to Indonesia,
India and Malaysia decreased by more than 15
percent year-on-year. On the other hand, ASEAN’s
imports from India, Japan and Indonesia fell by more
than 10 percent year-on-year. Japan experienced a
sharp decline in exports to economies other than
China and Vietnam. Its exports to Indonesia was even
worse, falling by more than 34 percent year-on-year.
Japan's imports to economies other than New
Zealand were all negative. In contrast, the total trade
in goods between China and ASEAN, which was
China's largest trading partner in 2020, amounted to a
historic high. It was shown that China’s total exports
to ASEAN were USD383.7 billion, up 6.5 percent, and
its total imports from ASEAN amounted to USD216.6
billion, up 7.6 percent. Bilateral trade between China
and other economies recorded generally positive
growth. In particular, import trade increased
significantly.
It is worth noting that the trade performance of
Vietnam in the Asia-Pacific region has been
impressive. Consistent with the forecast in our reports
last year, China’s exports to Vietnam exceeded
USD100 billion for the first time in 2020, amounting to
USD113.8 billion. Meanwhile, the imports from
Vietnam were also close to USD50 billion, amounting
to USD48.9 billion. In addition, the exports of other
Asia-Pacific economies to Vietnam also experienced
positive growth. Total exports from the Republic of
Korea to the country were USD48.5 billion, an increase
of less than one percentage point; and total exports
from Japan to the country were USD17.1 billion, an
increase of 3.8 percentage points. Exports to Vietnam
from Australia and New Zealand also moved up in
2020, but the absolute size was still small when
compared to economies like the Republic of Korea.
This achievement was largely due to the effective
containment measures on its domestic epidemic.
The bilateral trade between China and Australia
was quite resilient, even under the pressure from the
pandemic and tensions in bilateral relationships. The
total exports from Australia to China had fallen but
remained higher than USD100 billion, down 3.8
percent; while the country’s imports from China
moved up to USD53.5 billion, up 11.2 percent. In
addition, some other economies also saw an increase
in bilateral trade with Australia and New Zealand. For
instance, the total exports from India to those two
countries had been up by 16.7 percent and 14.4
percent, respectively.
Table 3.5 presents the merchandise exports in
2020 by 1-digit SITC sections and five regions of Asia.
There were significant differences in export types in
different regions of Asia with obvious comparative
advantages. Northeast Asia is the largest manufacturing
hub in Asia, and its exports of machinery and transport
equipment (SITC 7) reached about USD231,8 billion in
2020, accounting for two-thirds of Asia’s exports. Its
exports of chemicals (SITC 5) and manufactured
goods (SITC 6) accounted for 60 percent. The primary
export categories of Southeast Asia were also
machinery and transport equipment (SITC 7), but the
exports were only a quarter of Northeast Asia.
However, Southeast Asian economies have
comparative advantages in primary commodities.
Among them, the amounts of exports of animal and
vegetable fats, oils and waxes (SITC 4) were USD39.6
billion, accounting for about 90 percent of the total
exports of Asia. Meanwhile, Southeast Asian
economies were also the largest exporters in food and
live animals (SITC 0), beverages and tobacco (SITC 1),
and non-edible ingredients (SITC 2). The amounts of
these exports are USD97.5 billion, USD8.1 billion and
USD43.9 billion, respectively. In contrast, exports in
fuels were dominated by West Asian economies, and
its exports in fuels (SITC 3) amounted to USD251.8
billion, accounting for more than 50 percent of Asia.
South Asia's main exports were finished goods
classified by raw material (SITC 6) and machinery and
transport equipment (SITC 7), which accounted for
about 40 per cent of exports. Exports of various
commodities from Central Asia were relatively small,
with the bulk of exports being fossil-fuel related
products. Exports of fossil fuel lubricants and related
raw materials (SITC 3) amounted to USD40.3 billion.
Compared with 2019, the positive growth was
generally seen in vegetable, grease and wax products
and miscellaneous products. However, other
Chapter 3 Merchandise Trade Integration in Asia
067
commodities such as mineral fuel, lubricants and
related raw materials generally showed negative
growth, which was mainly affected by the fall in
international oil prices.
Table 3.5 Merchandise Exports by Asian Regions, 2020 (USD billion)
Regions Northeast Asia Southeast Asia South Asia Central Asia West Asia Asia
Food and live animals 84.2 97.5 37.7 5.2 28.3 257.0
Beverages and tobacco 6.7 8.1 1.2 1.2 5.2 23.0
Crude materials 35.4 43.9 12.6 7.2 10.4 113.6
Fuels 67.9 101.5 28.1 40.3 251.8 495.8
Animal and vegetable fats, oils,
and waxes 1.8 39.6 1.7 0.3 2.3 45.8
Chemicals 339.2 107.6 54.0 3.6 73.4 608.9
Manufactured goods 602.4 125.7 76.5 12.3 73.0 927.8
Machinery and transport
equipment 2,317.7 608.2 51.2 2.0 73.5 3,282.7
Miscellaneous goods 720.9 197.0 43.9 1.2 45.2 1,037.2
Commodities n.e.s. 127.7 64.6 0.4 7.9 171.5 376.1
Total 4,303.8 1,393.7 307.4 81.1 734.8 7,167.9
Source: WITS.
In summary, although the bilateral trade between
Asian economies shrunk significantly because of the
COVID-19 pandemic in 2020, the role of China and
ASEAN as trading hubs within Asia had not changed.
In particular, China played a role in stabilizing Asian
trade in goods, as well as global trade. The trade
performance of Vietnam was outstanding. It was the
first time that the exports from China to Vietnam
surmounted USD100 billion, and its imports from
Vietnam also continued a soaring trend. Trade in
goods had seen a slowdown across different regions
of Asia, with fuels exports dropping the most. It is
worth mentioning that the pandemic is still one of the
biggest uncertainties in the future. Global trade
experienced a recovery in 2021, but whether this
trend would continue is quite uncertain. However,
given the gradual entry into force of the RCEP
agreement, substantial tariff cuts, as well as the
removal of non-tariff barriers, can be expected. Thus, it
is likely that Asian economies, RCEP countries and
CPTPP countries will become more dependent on
Asia in terms of merchandise trade.
3.2 Integration of Factory Asia
Factory Asia is developed naturally through the
opening up of some Asian economies driven by
market forces. China became the center of this
international production network due to its vast
domestic market and well-developed processing
capacity. However, people began to worry about the
stability of Asian global value chain because of two
big shocks, the first being the fact that China and the US
began to impose tariffs on each other during the first half
of 2018, and the second being the global spread of
COVID-19 since early 2020.
What impacts will COVID-19 have on the
integration process of Factory Asia? This sub-section
will continue to analyze the changes in the degree of
interdependency of Factory Asia1 based on the
relations of major economies on the trade of parts and
components, and the dynamics of dependency of
major parts and components so as to track the
integration process of Factory Asia.
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3.2.1 Stability of Factory Asia
At the beginning of 2020, China and the US signed the
first stage economic and trade agreement after tariff
disputes for more than one year, and the tense trade
situation eased temporarily. However, due to the
global spread of COVID-19 and the unavailability of
data, this report cannot fully present the impact of
Sino-US trade war and COVID-19 epidemic on Factory
Asia, yet the limited data available can still provide
some enlightenment.
From 2019 to 2020, the dependence of
intermediate trade of Factory North American
including the US, Canada and Mexico, on itself
decreased significantly from 0.42 to 0.40, indicating
the decrease of self-sufficiency level of Factory North
American under the turbulent situation. In contrast,
the dependence of intermediate trade of Factory Asia
and Factory Europe on themselves increased
moderately. The self-dependence index of Factory
Europe increased from 0.599 to 0.602 and that of
Factory Asia increased from 0.570 to 0.580. There has
been no fundamental change in the degree of
integration of the world’s three major factories on the
whole by 2020.
Figure 3.4 shows the changing trend of Factory
Asia’s self-dependence from 2008 to 2020. It can be
seen that the integration of Factory Asia reached its
peak in 2011, and began to show a gradual downward
trend. In 2019, in particularly, when the Sino-US trade
war was most intense, the self-dependence of Factory
Asia decreased significantly. It should be noted that
since 2008, there has been gradual decrease in the
self-dependence of Factory Asia. In 2020, the self-
dependence still remained above 0.57. Beyond all
expectations, the self-dependence of Factory Asia
appeared to be rallying since the breakout of COVID-
19 epidemic in 2020.
1
Figure 3.4 The Index of Self Dependence for Factory Asia, 2008-2020
Source: author’s calculation, based on UN Comtrade database. http://comtrade.un.org.db.
1 We take economies X and Y in a region as examples to explain the calculation method of dependence index: (a) TDxy, which is the trade
dependence index of X on Y, equals to the trade volume of X to Y (export plus import) divided by the total trade volume of X to the rest of
the world. This indicator measures the closeness of X to Y compared with the closeness of X to the rest of the world. It is worth noting that
under normal circumstances, the trade dependence of X on Y is not equal to that of Y on X, i.e., usually TDxy is not equal to TDyx. (b)
TDxa, which is the trade dependence index of X on Region A (e.g. Asia), equals to X’s trade volume (export plus import) to Region A divided by
X’s total trade volume to the rest of the world. (c) TDa, which is the trade dependence index of Region A (e.g. Asia), equals to the volume of trade
within Region A (export plus import) divided by the total volume of trade between Region A and the rest of the world (including trade with other
economies in the region). This indicator measures the degree of interdependence of economies in a region through trade.
Chapter 3 Merchandise Trade Integration in Asia
069
Table 3.6 shows that in 2020, the major
economies in Asia still maintained a high degree of
dependence on trade of intermediate products.
Among them, Hong Kong Special Administrative
Region of China still had the highest degree of
dependence on Factory Asia, with the degree of
dependence as high as 0.79. In the long term, for
Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of China,
the degree of trade dependence on intermediate
products in Asia has been above 0.7 and kept
rising. Other economies with high dependence on
Factory Asia included: Indonesia (0.73), the Philippines
(0.72), Korea (0.66), Malaysia (0.66), Thailand (0.64),
Vietnam (0.64), Japan (0.61), and Singapore (0.61).
Only 2 Asian economies, China and India, had
dependence degree below 0.5, with 0.44 and 0.43
respectively. Despite the global spread of COVID-
19 in 2020, the dependence of most Asian
economies on Factory Asia increased year by year
from 2001 to 2020, such as Japan, the Republic of
Korea, India, Indonesia, Singapore, Malaysia and
Thailand. India, in particular, starting from 0.26 in
2001, increased its dependence on Factory Asia to
0.43 in 2020 through its active participation in the
Asian global value chain.
In 2020, China remained the center of Factory
Asia, which can be seen from the scale of China’s
intermediate trade and the other economies’
intermediate trade dependence on China. In terms of
the trade scale of parts and components, China is 3.6
times that of the Republic of Korea, 2.9 times of Japan
and 1.5 times of ASEAN. Through the comparison
between Table 3.6, Table 3.7 and Table 3.8, we can see
that from 2019 to 2020, the dependence of major
Asian economies (Japan, the Republic of Korea, India,
Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, the Philippines
and Vietnam) on China in the area of trade of
intermediate products increased more or less. For
example, Japan’s dependence on China in trade of
intermediate products was 0.29 in 2019 and 0.31 in
2020; Thailand’s dependence on China in trade of
intermediate products was 0.18 in 2019 and increased
to 0.21 in 2020. Meanwhile, the dependence of EU,
North America, CPTPP and RCEP on Chinas parts and
components kept increasing, from 0.08, 0.16, 0.20
and 0.13 in 2019 to 0.10, 0.18, 0.22 and 0.14 in
2020. Overall, despite the Sino- US trade conflict and
the impact of COVID-19 epidemic, the interdependence
pattern of Factory Asia remained stable by the end
of 2020. China’s position in Asia’s global value
chain had not yet shown signs of weakening.
However, with a gradual declining self-dependence
of Factory Asia in the long term, further internal
market reforms in Asia are becoming urgent.
3.2.2 Distribution of Competitiveness of Asian
Products
Under the impact of Sino-US trade conflict and
COVID-19 epidemic, people are concerned about
supply interruption and global value chain
transfer. This section describes the evolution of
competitive advantage of products of Factory Asia in
the global value chain. Generally speaking, an export
product can be said to have competitive advantage
when it has high volume of export. We choose the
top 22 intermediate products based on their export
volume and compare the changes in their competitive
advantage between 2019 and 2020. From Table 3.9
and Table 3.10 we can see that in 2020, the export of
aircraft, space shuttle and other equipment parts
(SITE7929) from Asia fell out of the top 22 list. However,
we are unable to determine whether this change is
temporary or permanent or due to some random
incidents because of limited data. Meanwhile, the
competitiveness of intermediate glass products
(SITE664) has improved and entered the top 22 list.
As we can see from Figure 3.5, the competitiveness
of Asia’s office machines and other equipment
parts (SITC759) increased in 2020, the export
competitiveness of telecommunication equipment
parts (SITC764) declined, while the export of other
parts and components remained basically stable,
and the trade war and COVID-19 epidemic had not yet
had a great impact on the trade pattern of these
products.
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Table 3.9 Parts and Components of Factory Asia Ranked Among
the Top 22 in Terms of Total Exports, 2020 (USD billion)
SITC Section SITC
Heading Name of Parts and Components Total Value of
Export
6- Manufactured
goods classified
chiefly by material
625 Rubber tyres, interchangeable tyre treads, tyre flaps and inner
tubes for wheels of all kinds 32.2
641 Paper and paperboard 22.0
65 Textile yarn, fabrics, made-up articles, n.e.s., and related products 206.4
664 Glass 18.5
667 Pearls and precious or semiprecious stones, unworked or worked 33.1
67 Iron and steel 132.0
691 Structures and parts of structures, n.e.s, or iron, steel or aluminum 22.6
699 Manufactures of base metal, n.e.s. 54.3
7- Machinery and
transport
equipment
713 Internal combustion piston engines and parts thereof, n.e.s. 36.5
714 Engines and motors, non-electric (other than those of groups 712,
713 and 718); parts, n.e.s., of these engines and motors 33.3
747
Taps, cocks, valves and similar appliances for pipes, boiler shells,
tanks, vats or the like, including pressures-reducing valves and
thermostatically controlled valves
28.1
748
Transmission shafts (including camshafts and crankshafts) and
cranks; bearing housings and plain shaft bearings; gears and
gearing; ball or roller screws; gearboxes and other speed changers
(including torque converters); flywheels and pulleys (including
pulley blocks); clutches and shaft couplings (including universal
joints); articulated link chain; parts thereof
16.5
759 Parts and accessories (other than covers, carrying cases and the
like) suitable for use solely or principally with office machines 266.7
764 Telecommunications equipment, n.e.s. and parts, n.e.s., and
accessories of apparatus falling within division 76 324.5
772
Electrical apparatus for switching or protecting electrical circuits
or for making connections to or in electrical circuits (e.g., switches,
relays, fuses, lighting arresters, voltage limiters, surge suppressors,
plugs and sockets, lamp-holders and junction boxes); electrical
resistors (including rheostats and potentiometers), other than
heating resistors; printed circuits; boards, panels (including
numerical control panels), consoles, desks, cabinets and other
bases, equipped with two or more apparatus for switching,
protecting or for making connections to or in electrical circuits, for
electrical control or the distribution of electricity (excluding
switching apparatus of subgroup 764.1)
119.6
773 Equipment for distributing electricity, n.e.s. 45.7
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(continued)
SITC Section SITC
Heading Name of Parts and Components Total Value of
Export
7- Machinery and
transport
equipment
776
Thermionic, cold cathode or photo-cathode valves and tubes (e.g.,
vacuum or vapour or gas-filled valves and tubes, mercury arc
rectifying valves and tubes, cathode-ray tubes, television camera
tubes); diodes, transistors and similar semiconductor devices;
photosensitive semiconductor devices; light-emitting diodes;
mounted piezoelectric crystals; electronic integrated circuits and
microassembles; parts thereof
689.4
77812 Electric accumulators (storage batteries) 37.6
784 Parts and accessories of the motor vehicles of groups 722, 781, 782
and 783 94.3
8- Miscellaneous
manufactured
articles
813 Lighting fixtures and fittings, n.e.s. 40.7
8211 Seats (other than those of heading 872.4), whether or not
convertible into beds and parts thereof 36.3
8931 Articles for the conveyance or packing of goods, of plastics;
stoppers, lids, caps and other closures, of plastics 19.2
Source: author’s calculation, based on UN Comtrade database. http://comtrade.un.org.db.
Table 3.10 Parts and Components of Factory Asia Ranked Among
the Top 22 in Terms of Total Exports, 2019 (USD billion)
SITC Section SITC
Heading Name of Parts and Components Total Value of
Export
6- Manufactured
goods classified
chiefly by material
625 Rubber tyres, interchangeable tyre treads, , tyre flaps and inner
tubes for wheels of all kinds 36.0
641 Paper and paperboard 21.5
65 Textile yarn, fabrics, made-up articles, n.e.s., and related products 178.0
667 Pearls and precious or semiprecious stones, unworked or worked 46.8
67 Iron and steel 143.7
691 Structures and parts of structures, n.e.s., or iron, steel or aluminium 23.2
699 Manufactures of base metal, n.e.s. 54.8
7- Machinery and
transport
equipment
713 Internal combustion piston engines and parts thereof, n.e.s. 44.9
714 Engines and motors, non-electric (other than those of groups 712,
713 and 718); parts, n.e.s., of these engines and motors 36.3
747
Taps, cocks, valves and similar appliances for pipes, boiler shells,
tanks, vats or the like, including pressures-reducing valves and
thermostatically controlled valves
28.5
Chapter 3 Merchandise Trade Integration in Asia
075
(continued)
SITC Section SITC
Heading Name of Parts and Components Total Value of
Export
7- Machinery and
transport
equipment
748
Transmission shafts (including camshafts and crankshafts) and
cranks; bearing housings and plain shaft bearings; gears and
gearing; ball or roller screws; gearboxes and other speed changers
(including torque converters); flywheels and pulleys (including
pulley blocks); clutches and shaft couplings (including universal
joints); articulated link chain; parts thereof
18.3
759 Parts and accessories (other than covers, carrying cases and the
like) suitable for use solely or principally with office machines 81.2
764 Telecommunications equipment, n.e.s. and parts, n.e.s., and
accessories of apparatus falling within division 76 500.4
772
Electrical apparatus for switching or protecting electrical circuits
or for making connections to or in electrical circuits (e.g., switches,
relays, fuses, lighting arresters, voltage limiters, surge suppressors,
plugs and sockets, lamp-holders and junction boxes); electrical
resistors (including rheostats and potentiometers), other than
heating resistors; printed circuits; boards, panels (including
numerical control panels), consoles, desks, cabinets and other
bases, equipped with two or more apparatus for switching,
protecting or for making connections to or in electrical circuits, for
electrical control or the distribution of electricity (excluding
switching apparatus of subgroup 764.1)
121.2
773 Equipment for distributing electricity, n.e.s. 46.2
776
Thermionic, cold cathode or photo-cathode valves and tubes
(e.g., vacuum or vapour or gas-filled valves and tubes, mercury arc
rectifying valves and tubes, cathode-ray tubes, television camera
tubes); diodes, transistors and similar semiconductor devices;
photosensitive semiconductor devices; light-emitting diodes;
mounted piezoelectric crystals; electronic integrated circuits and
microassembles; parts thereof
592.4
77812 Electric accumulators (storage batteries) 34.2
784 Parts and accessories of the motor vehicles of groups 722, 781,
782 and 783 106.6
7929
Parts, n.e.s. (not including tyres, engines and electrical parts), of
the goods of aircraft and associated equipment; spacecraft
(including satellites) and spacecraft launch vehicles; parts thereof
21.7
8- Miscellaneous
manufactured
articles
813 Lighting fixtures and fittings, n.e.s. 36.3
8211 Seats (other than those of heading 872.4), whether or not
convertible into beds and parts thereof 33.1
8931 Articles for the conveyance or packing of goods, of plastics;
stoppers, lids, caps and other closures, of plastics 17.5
Source: author’s calculation, based on UN Comtrade database. http://comtrade.un.org.db.
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Figure 3.5 Change in the Export of Parts and Components Ranked
Top 22 of Factory Asia, 2019-2020
Source: author’s calculation, based on UN Comtrade database. http://comtrade.un.org.db.
We now examine the changes in the competitive
advantage of Asian economies in intermediate
products. Table 3.11 and Table 3.12 show the trade
dependence of the top 22 intermediate products on
different economies in 2020 and 2019 respectively.
We can see that jewelry (SITC667) mainly depended
on India and Hong Kong Special Administrative
Region of China, which implies that the two
economies have competitive advantage in the
production of this category of products. However, the
dependence of jewelry (SITC 667) on India decreased
from 0.28 in 2017 to 0.20 in 2020, and the dependence
on Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of China
also decreased from 0.22 to 0.15 during the same
period. This situation indicates that other economies
seem to be eroding the competitiveness of India and
Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of China in
such products.
Singapore was the largest supplier of turbojet or
propeller engine parts (SITC714) in Asia. From 2019 to
2020, Singapore’s competitive advantage was further
strengthened as the dependence of such intermediate
products on Singapore increased from 0.10 to 0.12.
From the data of 2020, Japan and the Republic of
Korea had a limited dominance position in these 22
products in Asia. Only piston internal combustion
engine (SITE713) had the highest dependence on
Japan, which was 0.06 (see Table 3.11). On the whole,
the distribution of competitive advantage of Japan’s
parts and components had not changed significantly
from 2019 to 2020.
Among the 22 most important parts and
components, 20 of them were dominated by China in
2020 (see Table 3.13), while the number was 18 in
2019. The two new types of products included glass
(SITC664) and piston internal combustion engine
(SITC713). This showed that despite the impact of
Sino-US trade conflict and COVID-19 epidemic, China
still had competitive advantage in a wide range of
products.
Chapter 3 Merchandise Trade Integration in Asia
077
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079
Table 3.13 List of China’s Parts and Components with Competitive Advantage, 2020
SITC
Heading Name of Parts and Components
1 625 Rubber tyres, interchangeable tyre treads, tyre flaps and inner tubes for wheels of all kinds
2 641 Paper and paperboard
3 65 Textile yarn, fabrics, made-up articles, n.e.s., and related products
4 664 Glass
5 67 Iron and steel
6 691 Structures and parts of structures, n.e.s., or iron, steel or aluminium
7 699 Manufactures of base metal, n.e.s.
8 713 Internal combustion piston engines and parts thereof, n.e.s.
9 747 Taps, cocks, valves and similar appliances for pipes, boiler shells, tanks, vats or the like,
including pressures-reducing valves and thermostatically controlled valves
10 748
Transmission shafts (including camshafts and crankshafts) and cranks; bearing housings
and plain shaft bearings; gears and gearing; ball or roller screws; gearboxes and other
speed changers (including torque converters); flywheels and pulleys (including pulley
blocks); clutches and shaft couplings (including universal joints); articulated link chain;
parts thereof
11 759 Parts and accessories (other than covers, carrying cases and the like) suitable for use solely
or principally with office machines
12 764 Telecommunications equipment, n.e.s. and parts, n.e.s., and accessories of apparatus
falling within division 76
13 772
Electrical apparatus for switching or protecting electrical circuits or for making connections
to or in electrical circuits (e.g., switches, relays, fuses, lighting arresters, voltage limiters,
surge suppressors, plugs and sockets, lamp-holders and junction boxes); electrical resistors
(including rheostats and potentiometers), other than heating resistors; printed circuits;
boards, panels (including numerical control panels), consoles, desks, cabinets and other
bases, equipped with two or more apparatus for switching, protecting or for making
connections to or in electrical circuits, for electrical control or the distribution of electricity
(excluding switching apparatus of subgroup 764.1)
14 773 Equipment for distributing electricity, n.e.s.
15 776
Thermionic, cold cathode or photo-cathode valves and tubes (e.g., vacuum or vapour or
gas-filled valves and tubes, mercury arc rectifying valves and tubes, cathode-ray tubes,
television camera tubes); diodes, transistors and similar semiconductor devices;
photosensitive semiconductor devices; light-emitting diodes; mounted piezoelectric
crystals; electronic integrated circuits and microassembles; parts thereof
16 77812 Electric accumulators (storage batteries)
17 784 Parts and accessories of the motor vehicles of groups 722, 781, 782 and 783
18 813 Lighting fixtures and fittings, n.e.s.
19 8211 Seats (other than those of heading 872.4), whether or not convertible into beds and parts
thereof
20 8931 Articles for the conveyance or packing of goods, of plastics; stoppers, lids, caps and other
closures, of plastics
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Chapter 4 Service Trade Integration of Asian Economies
081

Chapter 4
ServiceTradeIntegrationof
AsianEconomies
Before the outbreak of COVID-19, global trade in
services continued to grow faster than trade in goods.
Trade in services is playing an increasingly important
role in global value chains and has become a new
driving force for world economic growth. The portion
of service trade provided by Asian countries and the
group of developing countries out of the world total
continues to rise. China, India and other developing
countries are already among the world's top ten
service import and export countries. In 2020, COVID-
19 wreaked havoc on the world. Lockdown and
quarantine measures adopted by countries to combat
the epidemic have put heavy pressure on global trade.
International trade in goods and services fell by 9.6%,
outpacing the decline in global GDP. Global and Asian
trade in services has recovered in 2021. In the third
quarter of 2021, the export of global service trade
increased by 25%, of which the export of Asian service
trade increased by 26%, higher than that of North
America (18%) and Europe (25%). Amid the recovery
in trade in services, the transport and tourism sectors
rebounded strongly. In the second quarter of 2021,
the transportation industry and tourism industry
increased by 45% and 69% respectively. Although the
impact of low base in 2020 cannot be ignored, strong
consumer demand and the recovery of international
shipping industry are also important reasons. In the
third quarter of 2021, the two industries maintained a
high growth trend, with growth rates of 45% and 54%
respectively.
The rise of new business forms such as digital
economy has widened the boundary of service trade.
Over the years, Asian digital service trade has
maintained steady growth, and its share in global
digital service trade has climbed from 16.6% in 2005
to 25.5%. Among the top ten digital service trade
exporting economies in the world in 2020, Asia
occupies four seats, with India, China, Singapore and
Japan ranking fifth, sixth, ninth and tenth respectively.
Taking cross-border e-commerce as an example, in
2020, the scale of cross-border e-commerce market in
the Asia-Pacific region reached USD450 billion,
USD143 billion in Western European countries and
USD109 billion in North America, accounting for
53.6%, 18.9% and 14.4% of the global cross-border
e-commerce market respectively.
Even during the epidemic period, the dependence
of trade in services of Asia-Pacific economies on the
region remained unabated. Looking ahead, the
integration process of service trade in Asia-Pacific
economies will continue to advance. With the
increase of the added value of the service industry in
the manufacturing industry of the Asia-Pacific
economic system, the transformation and upgrading
of the manufacturing industry of the Asia Pacific
economic system is expected to make a new
breakthrough.
4.1 Asian Service Trade
Integration
In this section, we will analyze the service trade
of major countries and regions in Asia by utilizing the
value-added decomposition method based on the
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world multi-regional input-output table (2021
version) prepared by the Asian Development
Bank. We take 25 Asian economies as research objects
based on data availability to analyze their service trade
of 2020 and the possible impact on Asian economic
integration. 1 Meanwhile, we will tentatively analyze
the impact of COVID-19 epidemic of 2019 on Asia’s
service trade based on the computation results. We
will first analyze the import and export of service
industry in the selected economies via both
traditional and value-added statistical standards, 2
then the position of service industry in the process of
Asian economic integration from the perspective of
production division of manufacturing industry. Finally,
we will analyze the balance of trade in services and
gains from trade of 25 economies.3
First, from the perspective of traditional and
value-added statistics, the degree of regional
integration of 25 Asia-Pacific economies in the field of
service trade is strengthening compared with other
regions. Table 4.1 shows the service exports of 25
economies of 2020 calculated by two statistical
standards (traditional and value-added). It also lists the
average annual growth rates between 2015 and
2020. As can be seen from Table 4.1, the service
exports of 25 economies reached a total of
USD1,201.78 billion in 2020, with average annual
decrease of 3.46% between 2015 and 2020. A total of
USD810.67 billion was exported to outside the region
(an average annual decrease of 6.53%). Although the
service export to within the region was only
USD391.11 billion, it grew annually by 5.67%. The
scales of the three service exports aforementioned of
2020 were lower than those of 2019.4 It is evident that
the impact of COVID-19 pandemic in 2020 on the
service trade of Asian economies is more serious than
in 2019, yet the service trade within 25 economies is
least affected. If we look at the service export from the
value-added standard, the average annual growth of
the value-added export of the service industry within
the region is 7.49%, significantly higher than 5.67%
which is calculated by traditional caliber.
The service trade export of Asia-Pacific major
economies is becoming more and more dependent
on the region. From the data of specific economies,
18 of 25 economies experienced negative growth in
service export. On an economy-by-economy basis, 18
of the 25 economies reported negative growth in
service exports. This is mainly because the service
trade of these economies experienced a long period
of recovery and growth in 2015, and was in a good
shape. The full outbreak of the pandemic in 2020 has
dealt a heavy blow to the trade in services. Therefore,
the average annual growth rate of trade in services
during this period (2015-2020) was relatively low. Of
the four economies with large service sector exports
(more than USD100 billion), China and Singapore
were the most affected. China's exports in services fell
to USD235.2 billion from USD468.9 billion in 2019,
while Singapore's fell to USD187.56 billion from
USD268 billion. India and Japan maintained their
dominant position in service exports, which bucked
the trend and increased during the pandemic. The
two economies grew 14.07% and 4.56% respectively.
However, if we distinguish exports to within the
region from exports to outside the region, all these
four economies experienced positive growth in
service exports to within the region, and this growth
rate was significantly higher than that to outside the
region in all these economies except India. As
illustrated in Table 4.1 of the value-added exports of
service industry of all economies, only nine had negative
average annual growth rates. Adding Australia and
Korea to the aforementioned four economies, the

1 These 25 economies are Australia, China, Indonesia, India, Japan, Korea, Taiwan Province of China, Bangladesh, Malaysia, the Philippines,
Thailand, Vietnam, Kazakhstan, Mongolia, Sri Lanka, Pakistan, Laos, Brunei, Bhutan, Kyrgyzstan, Cambodia, Maldives, Nepal, Singapore
and Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of China.
2 Trade in services is profoundly different from trade in goods. In the context of global value chain, the import and export of service industry
goes beyond the four forms of service trade defined in the GATS concluded during the Uruguay Round of GATT. An important part of
today’s service trade is the indirect import or export of services value-added, which plays an important part in the division of international
production and the import and export of manufactured products.
3 In the following analysis, for the convenience of expression, we refer the trade between and among 25 economies as intra-regional export
or import, and that between 25 economies and other economies as inter-regional export or import.
4 In 2019, 25 economies exported a total of USD1,794.6 billion of services, including USD413.3 billion to within the region and USD1,381.2
billion to outside the region. (see Boao Forum for Asian Economic Integration, Annual Report 2021)
Chapter 4 Service Trade Integration of Asian Economies
083
Table 4.1 Service Exports of 25 Selected Economies (in Gross Terms and Value Terms),
2020 (USD100 million, %)
Economies
Gross Exports in Services Value-Added in Service Trade
Gross Intra-Region Inter-Region Value-Added Intra-Region Inter-Region
Amount AAGR Amount AAGR Amount AAGR Amount AAGR Amount AAGR Amount AAGR
Australia 455.0 -7.95 270.8 -0.57 184.3 -14.79 -1,025.5 1.02 650.7 7.41 374.8 -6.33
China 2,352.0 -10.33 664.3 3.29 1,687.8 -13.53 8,130.5 1.63 1,999.9 5.69 6,130.6 0.49
Indonesia 147.0 6.71 92.3 9.78 54.8 2.51 328.8 1.01 192.1 7.58 136.6 -5.30
India 1,980.2 14.07 225.5 2.87 1,754.8 16.17 2,228.2 7.62 370.8 4.01 1,857.4 8.44
Japan 1,717.6 4.56 607.6 18.73 1,110.0 -0.12 2,909.8 2.17 1,213.5 9.78 1,696.3 -1.74
Korea,
Republic of 763.3 -4.35 401.6 4.47 361.7 -10.53 1,452.2 -1.87 707.1 4.05 745.0 -6.02
Taiwan, China 501.6 -6.31 265.8 6.48 235.8 -13.98 827.3 1.87 427.9 10.47 399.4 -4.16
Bangladesh 71.7 18.44 18.3 93.47 53.4 12.16 137.4 5.25 25.8 21.37 111.6 2.92
Malaysia 222.8 -7.74 155.1 20.76 67.7 -24.33 518.4 2.66 294.0 23.96 224.3 -8.72
the Philippines 304.2 2.15 84.6 -4.15 219.6 5.40 307.6 2.34 105.0 0.72 202.7 3.24
Thailand 410.8 -10.38 138.4 -11.11 272.4 -9.99 778.7 0.01 334.1 1.92 444.6 -1.29
Vietnam 234.7 -0.34 50.5 -12.37 184.3 5.48 424.8 11.30 145.8 8.74 279.0 12.79
Kazakhstan 51.9 -21.31 17.1 20.56 34.8 -26.77 146.7 -6.91 45.0 11.40 101.7 -11.15
Mongolia 11.0 5.46 6.1 23.97 4.9 -5.17 16.4 3.38 9.7 5.97 6.8 0.25
Sri Lanka 29.6 -13.99 8.3 -4.17 21.3 -16.54 35.5 -10.54 8.5 -5.48 27.0 -11.84
Pakistan 41.8 -10.39 13.1 -9.83 28.7 -10.64 66.3 -7.41 18.2 -6.18 48.1 -7.86
Laos 4.8 -15.93 2.2 4.23 2.6 -22.90 6.8 -10.46 3.6 6.60 3.1 -19.23
Brunei 3.7 -7.70 3.1 -5.34 0.6 -16.13 4.0 -6.79 3.1 -3.42 0.9 -14.70
Bhutan 2.0 -4.84 0.4 -16.47 1.6 1.14 2.2 0.43 0.6 -7.56 1.6 5.39
Kyrgyzstan 4.6 -12.06 1.4 -3.16 3.2 -14.77 6.0 -5.62 1.7 -0.12 4.3 -7.31
Cambodia 31.6 4.55 4.4 5.29 27.2 4.43 31.1 6.47 6.5 10.99 24.6 5.44
Maldives 17.9 -9.39 3.4 -0.45 14.4 -10.93 13.0 -6.15 2.9 -0.91 10.0 -7.41
Nepal 13.2 6.78 7.2 13.01 6.0 1.34 10.0 4.16 5.2 8.76 4.9 0.32
Singapore 1,875.6 -0.18 639.6 15.67 1,236.0 -4.83 1,464.9 4.41 541.7 16.03 923.2 0.01
Hong Kong
SAR, China 768.7 -13.01 229.8 1.40 538.9 -16.52 800.7 -7.43 266.9 8.96 533.8 -11.88
Total 12,017.3 -3.46 3,911.1 5.67 8,106.7 -6.53 21,672.8 1.65 7,380.4 7.49 14,292.3 -0.74
Source: Based on ADB’s 2021 version of the World Input-Output Table.
Note: AAGR refers to the average annual growth rate between 2015 and 2020.
number of economies whose exports exceeded
USD100 billion increased to six. If we further
investigate the value-added service exports to within
the region, only four economies experienced negative
annual growth, while all of them are relatively smaller-
sized ones. With the exception of India, the
Philippines, Vietnam and Bhutan, the average annual
growth rates of intra-regional value-added service
Boao Forum for Asia Asian Economic Outlook and Integration Progress Annual Report 2022
084
exports were all higher than those to outside the
region. We can basically reach the same conclusion
when analyzing the service import and value-added
service import of 25 economies in Table 4.2
(corresponding service imports).
Table 4.2 Service Imports of 25 Selected Economies (in Gross Terms and Value Terms),
2020 (USD100 million, %)
Economies
Gross Imports in Services Value-Added in Service Trade
Imports Intra-Region Inter-Region Value-Added Intra-Region Inter-Region
Amount AAGR Amount AAGR Amount AAGR Amount AAGR Amount AAGR Amount AAGR
Australia 331.4 -10.59 92.9 -15.08 238.4 -8.38 854.1 -1.41 368.0 1.05 486.0 -3.05
China 3,541.7 6.52 1,051.1 11.97 2,490.6 4.64 7,416.3 8.70 2,397.3 11.97 5,019.0 7.33
Indonesia 248.1 1.77 103.6 -3.51 144.6 6.92 600.7 1.81 309.4 2.41 291.4 1.19
India 1,141.1 24.97 260.9 21.13 880.2 26.27 1,741.3 13.22 511.0 11.16 1,230.2 14.14
Japan 1,826.3 10.99 423.3 4.15 1,403.0 13.68 2,927.6 5.90 1,029.4 3.44 1,898.2 7.39
Korea,
Republic of 977.1 6.08 312.7 13.35 664.4 3.47 1,587.2 7.41 631.2 9.95 956.0 5.91
Taiwan, China 368.8 -1.29 146.3 9.55 222.5 -5.85 677.8 6.34 310.0 10.14 367.8 3.67
Bangladesh 96.4 4.90 47.3 -4.43 49.0 24.34 217.8 6.29 111.1 4.11 106.7 8.88
Malaysia 317.0 -2.63 159.7 13.33 157.3 -10.68 492.9 2.03 269.8 13.02 223.0 -5.72
the Philippines 154.3 0.95 52.6 -1.29 101.8 2.25 322.6 3.82 145.8 5.63 176.8 2.45
Thailand 507.0 4.52 235.0 18.73 272.1 -2.38 654.7 8.37 310.6 13.41 344.1 4.78
Vietnam 162.4 7.72 45.9 3.39 116.5 9.77 463.4 9.96 258.5 13.72 204.9 6.12
Kazakhstan 86.7 -6.07 16.3 4.39 70.4 -7.76 168.8 -0.92 43.9 5.96 124.9 -2.80
Mongolia 25.2 19.95 8.4 25.79 16.8 17.56 25.9 12.14 10.3 13.42 15.6 11.34
Sri Lanka 21.7 -2.41 7.1 -14.33 14.6 9.77 53.7 -4.66 25.6 -6.47 28.1 -2.80
Pakistan 63.7 -4.40 17.3 -15.77 46.3 3.61 156.8 -1.50 58.4 -3.94 98.5 0.13
Laos 6.0 -4.95 2.1 -5.20 3.9 -4.82 19.4 0.38 12.4 2.75 7.0 -3.13
Brunei 13.5 -4.82 6.7 22.14 6.8 -14.43 22.1 3.19 11.5 20.23 10.6 -5.83
Bhutan 1.4 -16.88 0.9 5.50 0.5 -28.58 3.1 -9.45 2.2 -1.32 0.9 -20.13
Kyrgyzstan 5.7 -14.27 1.8 8.16 4.0 -18.69 12.6 -7.77 3.8 -3.29 8.8 -9.38
Cambodia 22.8 7.89 5.9 -4.78 16.9 15.99 56.1 17.65 34.4 19.76 21.7 14.71
Maldives 7.0 -9.88 1.0 -24.40 6.0 -5.04 8.1 2.73 2.8 1.63 5.2 3.36
Nepal 13.1 5.13 7.1 6.78 6.0 3.37 38.3 6.72 23.7 6.19 14.6 7.60
Singapore 1,755.1 7.70 611.8 13.43 1,143.3 5.25 677.4 9.17 243.8 13.12 433.6 7.27
Hong Kong
SAR, China 518.6 -15.11 293.4 -12.45 225.2 -17.97 478.9 -11.79 255.5 -9.40 223.4 -14.11
Total 12,212.1 -3.15 3,911.1 5.67 8,301.2 -6.08 19,677.6 -0.30 7,380.4 7.49 12,297.0 -3.68
Source: Based on ADB’s 2021 version of the World Input-Output Table.
Note: AAGR refers to the average annual growth rate between 2015 and 2020.
Chapter 4 Service Trade Integration of Asian Economies
085
These analyses show that, on the one hand, the
geographical proximity of Asian economies has
played a role in maintaining economic integration, on
the other hand, the contribution of service export
attached with manufacturing goods plays an important
role in maintaining division of labor and cooperation
and economic integration among Asian economies.
Secondly, the servitization of manufacturing
industry is of great significance to the transformation
and upgrading of manufacturing industry. It is evident
that the share of services value-added in the
manufacturing industry of 25 economies as a whole is
increasing, 1exhibiting the servitization trend of
manufacturing. The total merchandise exports of 25
economies increased by 3.67% annually from 2015 to
2020, and the added value of service industry
included increased by 5.73% annually, which was
2.06% higher than the former. Through individual
investigation of the 25 economies, we can find that
except for six economies, i.e., India, Bangladesh,
Pakistan, Kyrgyzstan, Maldives and Nepal, the average
annual growth rates of the added value of service
industry in the other 19 economies are higher than those
of merchandise exports, i.e., the manufacturing industry of
the remaining 19 economies shows servitization
orientation in varying degrees.
From the last row of Table 4.3, we can see that the
total merchandise exports of 25 economies in 2020
were USD5,347.29 billion. The added value of the
service industry amounted to USD1,602.51 billion, and
the added value of the overseas service industry was
USD370.81 billion. In other words, the added value of
the service industry of the exporting economies in the
total merchandise exports was USD1,231.7 billion. If we
take into account the manufacturing exports and goods
exports of economies other than these 25 economies,
the added value of indirect service exports would be
higher. Compared with USD2,167.26 billion in Table
4.1, which is the total value-added service exports of
the 25 economies, the indirect value-added exports of
services can be truly considerable.

1 We analyze the added value of service industry in the manufacturing exports of 25 economies in Table 4.3. This analysis helps us to
understand the service export, especially indirect value-added service export which are mentioned above from the perspective of production
division and cooperation.
2 see Boao Forum for Asian Economic Integration, Annual Report 2021.
3 Table 4.4 shows that in 2020 China’s service trade deficit is USD118.97 billion, and its intra-regional service trade deficit is USD38.69
billion, the highest among 25 economies, accounting for 32.5% of its total service trade deficit. Australia, Japan and Taiwan Province of
China are the three economies with relatively larger surplus in terms of intra-regional service trade among 25 economies, with a surplus of
USD17.78 billion, USD18.43 billion and USD11.95 billion respectively.
Despite the impact of COVID-19 epidemic, the
service industry of 25 economies has played an ever
stronger role in Asian economic integration by directly
or indirectly participating in the production division
and cooperation of the manufacturing industry in the
region. Although the overseas value-added of the
service industry of most economies in Table 4.3 is
lower than that of domestic or local service industry
of the merchandise exporting economies, even the
share of services value-added in the overseas services
value-added within the region is lower than that
outside the region. Given the significant position of
service industry in the international division of
production, examining the changes in the share of
service industry within the region in Table 4.3 is
very meaningful for us to understand the economic
integration among Asian economies. Between
2015 and 2020, the share of services value-added in
19 of 25 economies has increased with various
degrees, and decreased in only 6 economies. In
2020, the services value-added in 25 economies as
a whole within the region accounted for 43.9% of
the overseas services value-added, an increase of
5.9% over 2015. In 2019, this percentage was 41.3%,
an increase of 2.0% over 2010. 2
Last, measured by value-added trade, China’s
service trade balance changes from a deficit3 to a
surplus of USD71.42 billion. However, this surplus
comes from China’s surplus in service trade outside
the region (the surplus is USD111.16 billion, see Table
4.4). In the context of GVC trade, taking value-added
as the benchmark to calculate the trade balance can
better reflect the actual gains from trade. China still
has the highest deficit in intra-regional trade in
services, with a deficit of USD39.74 billion, higher than
the deficit of USD38.69 billion measured by traditional
statistics. Similarly, India and Vietnam also have a surplus
in service trade (value-added) outside the region,
USD62.72 billion and USD7.41 billion respectively, and
a deficit in service trade within the region, USD14.02
billion and USD11.27 billion respectively. Indonesia
Boao Forum for Asia Asian Economic Outlook and Integration Progress Annual Report 2022
086
maintains large service trade deficit both within and
outside the region (USD11.72 billion and USD15.47
billion). Replacing the traditional statistical standard
with the value-added standard, Singapore becomes a
large surplus economy in terms of intra-regional
service trade, together with Australia, Japan and
Taiwan Province of China (intra-regional service trade
surplus of USD28.27 billion, USD18.42 billion,
USD11.79 billion and USD29.79 billion respectively).
Regardless of surplus or deficit, intra-regional
trade in services will strengthen economic ties and
promote integration among Asian economies. The
pattern of holding surplus in (value-added) service
trade outside the regional while holding deficit in
service trade within the region will positively promote
the economic growth and employment of other
economies in the region.
Table 4.3 The Services Content and Composition of the Manufacturing Export in Selected Asian
Economies, 2020 (USD100 million, %)
Economies
Gross Goods Exports Service Content Overseas Service Content
Amount AAGR Amount AAGR Amount AAGR Outside
Share Intra-Region Share
Australia 723.0 2.20 251.7 3.30 37.3 -2.50 61.3 38.7 (3.4)
China 24,662.5 5.47 7,737.3 7.60 1,095.7 7.05 62.9 37.1 (3.5)
Indonesia 1,249.5 -3.28 249.9 -2.53 70.7 -1.94 45.7 54.3 (9.5)
India 2,584.4 3.94 777.7 1.76 178.4 8.78 71.3 28.7 (1.5)
Japan 6,063.9 -0.82 1,750.7 -0.53 307.1 -2.66 65.3 34.7 (-3.3)
Korea,
Republic of 5,231.8 -1.90 1,333.4 -1.62 424.1 -5.03 56.5 43.5 (4.1)
Taiwan, China 3,396.4 4.70 762.2 9.04 289.2 2.03 44.3 55.7 (6.0)
Bangladesh 365.0 3.90 105.3 2.12 27.0 10.29 34.9 65.1 (12.3)
Malaysia 1,659.7 0.90 516.2 4.25 166.7 -3.28 41.9 58.1 (23.5)
the Philippines 361.3 0.73 100.7 4.07 33.7 7.37 43.7 56.3 (11.4)
Thailand 1,872.9 6.88 654.6 11.08 210.5 8.88 51.3 48.7 (10.6)
Vietnam 2,331.7 20.37 621.2 27.52 344.7 28.12 37.5 62.5 (9.1)
Kazakhstan 147.0 9.74 37.3 10.35 5.3 21.45 79.1 20.9 (3.3)
Mongolia 6.2 29.10 1.6 33.47 0.7 41.61 62.6 37.4 (-5.3)
Sri Lanka 63.0 -1.87 15.1 1.51 3.6 -1.17 45.4 54.6 (3.6)
Pakistan 195.0 0.63 36.4 -0.19 5.4 7.09 68.2 31.8 (-10.6)
Laos 13.0 9.27 3.0 12.59 0.8 17.38 31.0 69.0 (9.9)
Brunei 8.0 -22.94 1.5 -5.30 0.4 -10.68 50.4 49.6 (21.2)
Bhutan 2.9 20.41 0.7 21.66 0.2 14.06 25.8 74.2 (21.5)
Kyrgyzstan 9.9 -1.42 1.5 -5.87 0.5 -9.62 67.8 32.2 (-4.7)
Cambodia 101.5 18.47 25.7 20.30 18.0 29.93 23.1 76.9 (14.2)
Maldives 2.4 21.86 0.8 14.54 0.3 12.99 74.6 25.4 (-7.8)
Nepal 8.4 22.45 1.8 20.64 0.6 16.10 36.5 63.5 (-4.8)
Singapore 2,077.1 4.80 815.9 11.45 424.3 6.31 62.1 37.9 (4.3)
Hong Kong
SAR, China 336.4 19.62 222.7 23.32 62.7 4.18 45.0 55.0 (7.6)
Total 53,472.9 3.67 16,025.1 5.73 3,708.1 4.09 56.1 43.9 (5.9)
Source: see Table 4.1.
Note: AAGR refers to the average annual growth rate between 2015 and 2020.
The number in parentheses in the column of “Intra-Region Share” are the changes in the share in 2020 relative to the share in 2011.
Chapter 4 Service Trade Integration of Asian Economies
087
Table 4.4 Trade Balance of Services in 25 Asian Economies, 2020 (USD100 million)
Exports Baseline (Traditional Statistics) Value-Added Baseline
Trade
Balance
Intra-
Regional
Balance
Inter-
Regional
Balance
Value-Added
Trade Balance
Intra-
Regional
Balance
Inter-Regional
Balance
Australia 123.7 177.8 -54.1 171.5 282.7 -111.2
China -1,189.7 -386.9 -802.8 714.2 -397.4 1,111.6
Indonesia -101.1 -11.3 -89.8 -272.0 -117.2 -154.7
India 839.1 -35.5 874.6 486.9 -140.2 627.2
Japan -108.7 184.3 -293.0 -17.7 184.2 -201.9
Korea, Republic of -213.8 88.9 -302.7 -135.1 75.9 -211.0
Taiwan, China 132.8 119.5 13.3 149.4 117.9 31.6
Bangladesh -24.7 -29.0 4.4 -80.4 -85.3 4.8
Malaysia -94.2 -4.6 -89.7 25.5 24.2 1.3
the Philippines 149.9 32.1 117.8 -14.9 -40.8 25.9
Thailand -96.2 -96.6 0.4 124.0 23.6 100.5
Vietnam 72.3 4.6 67.8 -38.6 -112.7 74.1
Kazakhstan -34.8 0.8 -35.6 -22.1 1.1 -23.2
Mongolia -14.2 -2.2 -11.9 -9.5 -0.7 -8.8
Sri Lanka 7.9 1.2 6.7 -18.2 -17.2 -1.1
Pakistan -21.8 -4.2 -17.6 -90.5 -40.1 -50.4
Laos -1.2 0.1 -1.3 -12.6 -8.8 -3.9
Brunei -9.8 -3.6 -6.2 -18.1 -8.4 -9.7
Bhutan 0.6 -0.4 1.0 -0.9 -1.5 0.7
Kyrgyzstan -1.1 -0.3 -0.8 -6.7 -2.2 -4.5
Cambodia 8.9 -1.5 10.3 -25.0 -27.8 2.8
Maldives 10.9 2.5 8.5 4.9 0.1 4.8
Nepal 0.1 0.1 0.0 -28.3 -18.6 -9.8
Singapore 120.5 27.9 92.7 787.5 297.9 489.6
Hong Kong SAR, China 250.2 -63.5 313.7 321.7 11.4 310.3
Total -194.4 0.0 -194.4 1,995.1 0.0 1,995.1
Source: See Table 4.1 and Table 4.2.
Boao Forum for Asia Asian Economic Outlook and Integration Progress Annual Report 2022
088
4.2 The Present and Future of
Digital Trade in Asia
In recent years, rapid changes in digital technology
have facilitated the development of digital trade. According
to the United Nations Conference on Trade and
Development (UNCTAD), in 2020, 63% of the world trade in
services could be digitally delivered. Meanwhile,
digital service trade export from Asia has steadily
increased. In 2020, Asia was the only continent where
digital service trade exports expanded. At current stage,
many Asian economies are actively promoting digital
transformation. The improvement of digital infrastructure,
the breakthrough of digital technology, and the rise of
digital platforms also drive the vigorous growth of
digital trade in Asia. This section introduces digital
trade's definition and measurement, the highlights of
digital trade in Asia as well as its future directions.
4.2.1 Digital Trade: Definition and
Development
4.2.1.1 Definition of Digital Trade
At present, the international community is still
exploring the definition and measurement framework
for digital trade. In March 2020, Organization for
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD),
WTO, and IMF jointly released the Handbook on
Measuring Digital Trade (hereafter the Handbook). It
defines digital trade as "all trade that is digitally
ordered and/or digitally delivered" and categorizes
digital trade from the nature of trade, the products
traded and the actors involved (see Figure 4.1).
Specifically, digital trade includes: (1) products and
services only digitally ordered, such as products and
services ordered via e-commerce platform and
delivered offline; (2) digitally ordered and digitally
delivered services, such as 5G services, cloud
computing services and digital platform services; (3)
services only digitally delivered, such as offline
ordered and digitally delivered telecommunication
services. The Handbook also emphasizes the critical
role of the digital intermediation platform. Although
the non-monetized information and data are not yet
included in the current definition of digital trade possibly
due to measurement difficulties, they are playing an
essential role in promoting digital trade. Thus, how to
measure and evaluate this kind of information and data
will undoubtedly become an important part when
measure digital trade in the future since they have
played an essential role in promoting digital trade.
Figure 4.1 Conceptual Framework of Digital Trade
Source: OECD-WTO-IMF (2020).1

1 OECD, WTO and IMF. 2020. Handbook on Measuring Digital Trade (Version 1). Note that NPISHs refers to non-profit institutions serving households.
Chapter 4 Service Trade Integration of Asian Economies
089
Definitions of digital trade differ in economies.
The European Union defines digital trade as
“commerce that is enabled by electronic technologies”.1
The US gave it a definition as “commerce in products
and services delivered via the Internet” in 20132 and
extended its scope with the development of digital
technology. At the end of 2021, the Congressional
Research Office of the US stated that digital trade
includes “end-products, such as downloaded movies,
and products and services that rely on or facilitate
digital trade, such as streaming services and
productivity-enhancing tools like cloud data storage
and e-mail”. 3 In China, the White Paper on the
Development of Digital Trade issued by China Information
and Communication Research Institute in 2020 4
depicted that digital trade is a form of trade where
digital technology plays a significant role, and the
major difference between digital and traditional trade
lies in the digitalization of trade methods and trade
products.
4.2.1.2 Measurement and Current Status of
Digital Trade
According to the Handbook, digital trade refers to
all trade that is digitally ordered and/or digital
delivered. The measurement of digitally ordered and
digitally delivered trade are introduced below
respectively.
(1) Digitally Ordered Trade: E-Commerce
The Handbook defines digitally ordered trade as
"the international sale or purchase of a good or
service, conducted over computer networks by
methods specifically designed for the purpose of
Figure 4.2 Sales and Proportion of E-Commerce in Various Economies, 2019
Source: UNCTAD.5
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1 https://trade.ec.europa.eu/access-to-markets/en/content/digital-trade-0#:~:text=Digital%20trade%20refers%20to%20commerce,important%
20for%20the%20European%20industry.
2 USTIC (2013). https://www.usitc.gov/publications/332/pub4415.pdf.
3 Digital Trade and U.S. Trade Policy. https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R44565.
4 http://www.caict.ac.cn/kxyj/qwfb/bps/202012/P020201216506475945126.pdf.
5 https://unctad.org/news/global-e-commerce-jumps-267-trillion-covid-19-boosts-online-sales
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receiving or placing orders”, following the OECD
definition of e-commerce. 1 Therefore, this section
uses the scale of e-commerce to measure the digitally
ordered trade.
Asian economies are at the forefront of
e-commerce development. In 2019, the international
cross-border e-commerce transaction volume
reached USD26.7 trillion, equivalent to 30% of global
GDP that year. B2B transactions amounted to USD21.8
trillion, accounting for 82% of total sales. In 2019, the
cross-border e-commerce transaction volume in the
US ranked first globally reaching USD9.6 trillion,
followed by Japan and China, with their transaction
volume of USD3.1 trillion and USD2.6 trillion
respectively (see Figure 4.2). Korea's cross-border e-
commerce transactions took the highest proportion
of its GDP, standing at 79%; China's B2C cross-border
e-commerce transaction volume ranked first in the
world, with a scale of USD1.5 trillion; Japan's B2B
accounted for the highest share of e-commerce,
reaching 95%.
According to e-marketer, in 2020, retail
e-commerce sales in the Asia-Pacific region
ranked first in the world, exceeding USD2 trillion,
followed by North America and Western Europe (see
Figure 4.3). In terms of growth rate, Latin America lead
the rest of the world (36.7%), and the Asia-Pacific
ranked fourth (26.4%). The COVID-19 pandemic has
accelerated the shift to online spending. The proportion
of online retail sales in crucial global e-commerce
markets to total retail sales has increased from 16% in
2019 to 19% in 2020.2 In 2020, Korea had the highest
online retail share, reaching 25.9%, followed by
China with 24.9%. In terms of the growth rate of retail
e-commerce, the Asia-Pacific region ranked fourth
(26.4%).
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1 Page 13 of the Handbook.
2 https://unctad.org/system/files/non-official-document/p01_tdb_ede_wg2021_Fredriksson.pdf;
https://unctad.org/news/global-e-commerce-jumps-267-trillion-covid-19-boosts-online-sales
3 On January 13, 2021, the Blue Book of Overseas Development of Chinese Enterprises: Annual Report of Overseas Development of Chinese
Enterprises (2020) jointly released by Beijing Enterprises Research Base for International Operations of the University of International
Business and Economics and Social Science Literature Publishing House shows that the booming “Stay-at-Home Economy” worldwide due
to the spread of the pandemic over the global market has largely contributed to the rapid growth of the cross-border e-commerce.
https://baijiahao.baidu.com/s?id=1688863671574538387&wfr=spider&for=pc.
4 https://unctad.org/news/global-e-commerce-jumps-267-trillion-covid-19-boosts-online-sales.
The Asia-Pacific e-commerce market is full
of vitality, and China and Japanese cross-border
e-commerce platforms rank among the top 10 in the
world. In 2020, the scale of global cross-border
e-commerce transactions exceeded USD100 billion,
with an average annual growth rate of 30%, much
higher than the growth rate of global trade in goods.3
According to Statista, in 2020, the scale of cross-
border e-commerce market in the Asia-Pacific
reached USD450 billion, that of Western European
countries reached USD143 billion, and that of North
America was USD109 billion, accounting for 53.6%, 18.9%
and 14.4% of the global total respectively (see Figure
4.4). Among the globally active market for the cross-
border e-commerce, with the emergence of
multinational platforms with international influence
(such as China’s Alibaba) and small- and medium-
sized platforms that have regional characteristics and
focus on certain segments (such as Shopee and
Lazada in Southeast Asia focusing on electronic 3C
and apparel fashion). In addition, there is also JD
CENTRAL, a platform for cross-border collaboration of
capital that was jointly built by China’s JD Group and
Thailand’s Central Group and officially launched
online in September 2018. Among the top ten B2C e-
commerce companies in GMV in 2020, China holds
four seats, where Alibaba ranks first, with a turnover of
USD1.1 trillion in 2020; The US occupies four seats,
where Amazon ranks second in the world, with a
turnover of USD0.6 trillion in 2020; Canada's Shopify
ranked fifth, and Japan's Lotte ranked tenth.4 The
US holds four seats, of which Amazon ranks second
in the world, with a turnover of USD.6 trillion in
2020.
Chapter 4 Service Trade Integration of Asian Economies
091
Figure 4.3 Sales and Growth Rate of Retail E-Commerce in Various Economies, 2020
Source: E-Marketer.1
Cross-border e-commerce cooperation between
China and ASEAN economies is expected to become
a new growth source for e-commerce platforms. As
can be seen from the report by Google, Temasek and
Bain Capital on economic digitalization and cross-
border e-commerce development in Southeast Asia,
the number of internet users in Vietnam, Thailand, the
Philippines, Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia
jumped from 360 million in 2019 to 400 million in
2020. During the COVID-19 pandemic, the e-commerce
market in the above six countries bucked the trend
and grew to USD62 billion (up 63% year on year), and is
expected to exceed USD170 billion by 2025 (see
Figure 4.5). The expansion of the e-commerce sector
has partly offset the negative impact of contracting
sectors such as transport, which fell 58% year on year.
Meanwhile, China's e-commerce maintained a
momentum of 9.3% annual growth from 2016 to
2020, with transaction volume rising from RMB26.1
trillion to RMB37.21 trillion. This is supported by
China's huge number of internet users, network
infrastructure, convenient mobile payment and other

1 https://www.emarketer.com/content/global-ecommerce-update-2021;
https://www.emarketer.com/content/global-ecommerce-2020.
factors. With 782 million online shoppers, China has
the world's largest online retail market. Total imports
and exports of cross-border e-commerce reached
RMB1.69 trillion in 2020, up 31.1% (in comparable
terms) (see Figure 4.6), according to the General
Administration of Customs of China (see Figure4.6).
This has greatly facilitated residents' lives and
stabilized employment during the pandemic. Among
them, exports reached RMB1.12 trillion, up 40.1%, and
imports reached RMB0.57 trillion, up 16.5%. The first
category of retail exports was specially traded goods
and unclassified goods. Most of the top ten categories
of retail exports(see Figure 4.7) maintained rapid
growth. Chemical industry and related industrial
products topped the list of retail imports, and most of
the top ten retail imports also maintained rapid
growth (see Figure 4.8). In the first year of the
pandemic, the advantages of cross-border e-commerce
over traditional international trade became clear.
Developed countries still dominated the main
destinations of origin of China's cross-border e-
commerce retail imports in 2020.. In terms of export
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destinations, Malaysia, Singapore and the Philippines
ranked first, third and fifth respectively, indicating that
China has great potential for cooperation with
Southeast Asia in the emerging field of cross-border
e-commerce. ASEAN has been China's largest trading
partner in a row. With the growing influence of emerging
trade patterns such as cross-border e-commerce and
digital trade, China and ASEAN are expected to
continue to deepen economic and trade cooperation
in this area.
Figure 4.4 Global Distribution of the Market Size of Cross-Border E-Commerce, 2020
Source: Statista.
Figure 4.5 Trading Volume and Forecast of the Cross-Border E-Commerce
in Five Southeast Asian Economies
Source: e-Conomy SEA. 2020. At Full Velocity: Resilient and Racing Ahead, by Google, Temasek, and Bain & Company; Lu Wenwen, Lin
Jihong. 2021. Research on China-Asean Cross-Border E-Commerce Cooperation, Asia-Pacific Economy Review, No. 5.
Chapter 4 Service Trade Integration of Asian Economies
093
Figure 4.6 Total Imports and Exports of China’s Cross-Border E-Commerce
and Growth Rate (on a comparable basis)
Source: General Administration of Customs of China.
Figure 4.7 Proportion and Year-on-Year Growth of the Top 10 Categories of China’s
Cross-Border E-Commerce Export Retail, 2020
Source: E-Commerce in China 2020.
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094
Figure 4.8 Proportion and Year-on-Year Growth of the Top 10 Categories of China’s
Cross-Border E-Commerce Import Retail, 2020
Source: E-Commerce in China 2020.
(2) Digitally Delivered Trade: Digitally-Deliverable
Services
According to the Handbook1, potentially ICT-
enabled services is a starting point to measure
digitally delivered trade, though a difference exists
between potential and actual delivery. Potentially ICT-
enabled services, or digitally-deliverable services,
includes: (1) insurance and pension services, (2) financial
services, (3) charges for the use of intellectual property
n.i.e., (4) telecommunications, computer and information
services (hereafter ICT services 2 ), (5) research and
development (R&D) services, (6) professional and
management consulting services, (7) architectural,
engineering, scientific and other technical services,
(8) other business services, (9) audio-visual and
related services, (10) health services, (11) education
services, (12) heritage, and recreational services.
The share of Asia’s digitally-deliverable service
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1 Page 13 and page 83.
2 Analyses of trade in ICT services commonly include trade in telecommunications services and in computer and information services. See
UNCTAD Technical Note in ICT Services in 2015 (page 5). https://unctad.org/system/files/official-document/tn_unctad_ict4d03_en.pdf.
export in the world has steadily increased, from 16.6%
in 2005 to 25.5% in 2020 (see Figure 4.9). In 2020, Asia
was the only region in the world where digital trade in
services was growing (see Figure 4.10). Within Asia,
nearly half of digitally-deliverable service exports are
concentrated in East Asia (46.7%), followed by
Southeast Asia (22.4%), South Asia (20.1%), and West
Asia (10.7%). In 2020, the US ranked first among the
top 10 economies in digitally-deliverable service
exports, with Asia taking four seats and Europe five.
Within Asia, India's digitally-deliverable service
exports ranked fifth, China ranked sixth, Singapore
and Japan ranked ninth and tenth respectively (see
Table 4.5). In 2020, ASEAN economies' digitally-
deliverable service exports accounted for 5.7% of the
world, reaching USD180 billion, while that of RCEP
economies accounted for 16.1%, amounting to
USD510 billion.
Chapter 4 Service Trade Integration of Asian Economies
095
Figure 4.9 Share of Digitally-Deliverable Services by Region, 2005-2020
Source: UNCTAD.1
Figure 4.10 Growth Rates of Digitally-Deliverable Services by Region
Source: UNCTAD.
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1 https://unctadstat.unctad.org/wds/TableViewer/tableView.aspx?ReportId=158358.
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Table 4.5 Top Ten Economies in Digitally-Deliverable Service Exports, 2020
Rank Economies Export
(USD billion)
Share in the World
(%)
Growth Rate
(%) Region
1 the US 5,330.9 16.8 0.8 America
2 UK 2,867.0 9.1 -2.8 Europe
3 Ireland 2,441.5 7.7 9.7 Europe
4 Germany 2,036.6 6.4 0.1 Europe
5 India 1,547.8 4.9 4.6 Asia
6 China 1,543.8 4.9 7.5 Asia
7 France 1,429.4 4.5 -8.0 Europe
8 the Netherlands 1,268.1 4.0 -33.9 Europe
9 Singapore 1,222.7 3.9 -2.0 Asia
10 Japan 1,147.4 3.6 -2.5 Asia
Source: UNCTAD.
Asia has been the leading ICT services and
consulting service exporters. Exports from Asia in
these two industries both account for more than 30%
in the world. Moreover, Asia accounts for 22.3% in the
world’s insurance and pension service exports, 20% in
R&D service, 19.4% in charges for intellectual property,
and 17.1% in financial services (see Figure 4.11). Asian
economies also enjoy comparative advantages in
different sub-sectors (see Figure 4.12). In 2020,
Japan's export of charges for intellectual property
ranked third globally, accounting for 11% in the world,
while its exports of R&D services, financial services and
professional and management consulting services
were also among the top ten economies. Singapore
ranked fourth in both financial services and professional
and management consulting services, accounting for
6% and 8% respectively, while its insurance and
pension services and ICT service were among the top
ten. China ranked third in the world in terms of ICT
service exports, with a 8% share, with its insurance and
pension services and intellectual property charges also on
the top ten list. India ranked second and third in ICT
services and professional and management consulting
services respectively, both services accounting for 10% in
the world.
Figure 4.11 Sub-Sectors of Digitally-Deliverable Services by Region
Source: UNCTAD.
Chapter 4 Service Trade Integration of Asian Economies
097
Figure 4.12 Share of Sub-Sectors in Digitally-Deliverable Services
in Selected Economies
Source: UNCTAD.1
Note: Selected European economies includes Luxembourg, Switzerland, Liechtenstein, Ireland, France, Belgium, Sweden, and the
Netherlands.
4.2.2 Highlights of Digital Trade Development
in Asia
4.2.2.1 Digital Technology Develops Rapidly
Key digital technologies cover semiconductor,
infrastructure such as Information and communication
technology (ICT), transactional and integrating
technologies such as artificial intelligence (AI), as well
as technologies for future. 2 According to OECD,
Asian economies lead the world in application of
ICT and AI IP5 (intellectual property 5) family
patents. Patent applications in China, Japan, and
Korea account for over half of the world's total in
ICT and AI industries. Among the global top 5
economies for ICT and AI patent applications, Asia
occupy three seats, namely Japan, China, and Korea
(see Table 4.6). In terms of ICT patents, in 2018, Japan
ranked first, with 16,133 applications, accounting for a
quarter of global ICT patent applications, followed by
China, the US, Korea, and Germany. China's ICT patent
applications accounted for the highest share of the
country's total patent applications, reaching 53.8%. In
terms of AI patents, Japan also ranked first in the
number of applications in 2017, accounting for a
quarter of global AI patents.
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1 Archeological, engineering, scientific and other technical services, other commercial services, health services, education services, heritage
and entertainment services are not shown in the graph since the majority of data for these sub-sectors are missing in 2020.
2 Asian Development Bank. 2021. Asian Economic Integration Report. Annex 8b, page 289-290.
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Table 4.6 Top Five Economies in ICT or AI IP5 Family Patent Applications
Economies Number of 2018 ICT
Patents
Share of the Economy’s Total
Patents (%)
Share in Global ICT Patents
(%)
Japan 16,132.8 34.2 25.1
China 11,476.5 53.8 17.9
the US 10,655.4 36.2 16.6
Korea,
Republic of 9,196.4 51.5 14.3
Germany 2,550.0 16.3 4.0
Economies Number of 2017 AI
Patents
Share of the Economy’s Total
Patents (%)
Share in Global AI Patents
(%)
Japan 1,115.4 1.7 25.2
the US 1,065.1 2.2 24.0
China 791.7 2.6 17.9
Korea,
Republic of 494.1 2.4 11.1
Germany 146.2 0.6 3.3
Source: OECD.
Note: Calculated according to the patent priority date and the inventor's country of residence. The latest available years of ICT and AI patents
are 2018 and 2017 respectively.
In 2021, the US, China and India have the most
significant number of unicorns globally, to a certain
extent, reflecting the latest development of digital
technology in the world. According to the Global
Unicorn Index Report released by Hurun Research Institute
in December 2021, 1 worldwide unicorn enterprises
almost doubled in 2021. There were 487 unicorns
from the US, followed by 301 in China. America and
China together host 74% of unicorns in the world.
India ranked third with 54 unicorns, up by 33 compared
with last year and more than twice the previous year.
The industry focus is different between the US and
China. In the US, Software-as-a-Service (SaaS) and
Fintech industries have one-third of the unicorns,
while in China, e-commerce, health technology, and
artificial intelligence industries attract one-third of the
unicorns. The top 2 unicorns in terms of valuations
come from China, namely Byte Dance and Ant Group,
while SpaceX of the US ranks third.
Asian unicorn enterprises are active in
Fintech, SaaS, e-commerce, artificial intelligence,
sharing economy, and big data.
Table 4.7 list the top three unicorns in
different industries. In Fintech, the most valuable
unicorn is China’s Ant Group. In SaaS, Australia’s
Canva ranks first, followed by China’s Xiaohongshu.
In e-commerce, China’s clothing retailer Shein and
Indonesia’s J&T Express lead the industry, followed
by China’s Cars; Meanwhile, China has the most
e-commerce unicorns (42), followed by the US (28)
and India (15). In the area of artificial intelligence,
China’s Shangtang Technology ranks second. In
sharing economy, Indonesia’s online ride-hailing
platform GO-JEK ranks first, followed by Indian hotel
aggregator OYO. In big data, Ping An International
Smart City of China ranks second.
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1 Unicorn is defined as a global start-up founded after 2000 and worth at least USD1 billion, which has not yet been listed on a public
exchange. Data as of November 30, 2021. https://www.hurun.net/en-US/Info/Detail?num=R18H7AJUWBIX.
Chapter 4 Service Trade Integration of Asian Economies
099
Table 4.7 Industries of Top Unicorns by Valuations, 2021
Ra
nk Industry No. of
Unicorns
% of
Total Value Top Unicorns
1 Fintech 139 19.50%
1. Ant Group (USD150 billion) China
2. Stripe (USD95 billion) Ireland
3. Klarna (USD46 billion) Sweden
2 SaaS 134 10.40%
1. Canva (USD40 billion) Australia
2. Xiaohongshu (USD20 billion) China
3. Airtable (USD12 billion) the US
3 E-commerce 122 8.40%
1. Shein (USD20 billion) China
2. J&T Express (USD20 billion) Indonesia
3. Cars (USD10 billion) China
4 Artificial
Intelligence 84 6.00% 1. Grammarly (USD13 billion) the US
2. SenseTime (USD12 billion) China
5 HealthTech 80 4.70%
1. Ping An Healthcare Technology (USD9 billion)
China
2. WeDoctor (USD7 billion) China
6 Cyber
Security 40 2.50%
1. Tanium (USD9 billion) the US
2. Lacework (USD8.5 billion) the US
3. Fireblocks (USD8 billion) the US
7 Biotech 31 1.90% 1. Biosplice Therapeutics (USD12 billion) the US
2. Tempus (USD8.1 billion) the US
8 Blockchain 30 4.00%
1. FTX (USD25 billion) Bahamas
2. Binance (USD15 billion) Malta
3. Digital Currency (USD10 billion), Kraken (USD10
billion) and Ripple (USD10 billion) the US
9 Sharing
Economy 29 2.40% 1. GO-JEK (USD10.5 billion) Indonesia
2. OYO (USD9.5 billion) India
10 Big Data 27 2.40%
1. Databricks (USD38 billion) the US
2. Ping An International Smart City (USD8 billion)
China
3. Dataiku (USD4.6 billion) the US
Source: Hurun Research Institute.1
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1 https://www.hurun.net/en-US/Info/Detail?num=R18H7AJUWBIX.
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4.2.2.2 Digital Platforms in Asia Are Booming
Digital platforms intermediate digital trade,
reshaping the way we work, socialize and trade.
Digital platforms in Asia are constantly emerging. In
2020, among the digital platform enterprises with a
global market value exceeding USD10 billion, the
number of Chinese enterprises ranked first globally.
According to the Platform Economy and Competition
Policy Observation Report released by the China
Academy of Information and Communications
Technology (CAICT) in 20211, by the end of 2020, 76
digital platform enterprises globally had a market
capitalization exceeding USD10 billion, amounting to
USD12.5 trillion in total, with a year-on-year growth
rate of 57%. In terms of the number of platform
enterprises, China and the US had a total of 64 digital
platform enterprises, among which China had 36,
ranking first in the world, the US had 28, India had 3,
and Canada, Brazil, Sweden, Russia, Germany, Korea,
Japan, Singapore, Indonesia each hosted one. In terms
of scale, Chinese and American enterprises accounted
for 96.3% of the total value of digital platforms, with
the American platforms taking 71.5% (USD8.9 trillion),
and Chinese ones 24.8% (USD3.1 trillion).
Asian digital platform enterprises are active
in the internet and e-commerce areas (see Table 4.8).
As of January 10, 2022, China has four seats among
the top ten internet companies in terms of market
value, including Tencent, Alibaba, Meituan, and JD.
In e-commerce, the top ten companies have more
Asian origins, with China, Singapore, and Korea
occupying six seats. China's Alibaba and Meituan
ranked second and third, while JD and Pinduoduo
ranked fifth and seventh. Singapore company Sea and
Korean company Coupang also ranked among the
top ten. Meanwhile, the e-commerce market in
Southeast Asia is expanding. Table 4.9 shows the
online platform with the most visits in Southeast Asia
in April 2021. Shopee, founded by Sea in 2015, is now
the most popular platform in Southeast Asia, with
342 million visits, covering Indonesia, Vietnam, the
Philippines, Thailand, Malaysia and Brazil. The second-
largest online market in Southeast Asia is Tokopedia,
focusing on Indonesian. Lazada, the platform invested
by Alibaba2 ranked third, focusing on Thailand, the
Philippines, and Indonesia.
Table 4.8 Top Ten Companies by Market Capitalization in Internet and
E-Commerce Industries
Rank Internet
Domain Economies Market Value
(USD trillion)
E-Commerce
Domain Economies
Market
Value (USD
trillion)
1 Alphabet
(Google) the US 1.78 Amazon the US 1.61
2 Amazon the US 1.61 Alibaba China 0.35
3 Meta
(Facebook) the US 0.89 Meituan China 0.16
4 Tencent China 0.55 Shopify Canada 0.14
5 Alibaba China 0.36 JD China 0.11
6 Netflix the US 0.24 Sea (Garena) Singapore 0.10
7 PayPal the US 0.22 Pinduoduo China 0.07
8 Meituan China 0.16 Mercado Libre Argentina 0.05
9 Shopify Canada 0.14 Coupang Korea, the
Republic of 0.04
10 JD China 0.11 eBay the US 0.04
Source: https://companiesmarketcap.com.3

1 http://www.caict.ac.cn/kxyj/qwfb/ztbg/202105/P020210528594083206416.pdf.
2 Alibaba acquired control of lazada in 2016. https://www.alibabagroup.com/en/news/article?news=p160412.
3 https://companiesmarketcap.com/internet/largest-internet-companies-by-market-cap/.
Chapter 4 Service Trade Integration of Asian Economies
101
Table 4.9 The Most Visited Online Platforms in Southeast Asia, April 2021
Time Order Name Region/Country Southeast Asia Visits in Millions/Month
1 Shopee Southeast Asia 342.8
2 Tokopedia Indonesia 137.3
3 Lazada Southeast Asia 128.4
4 Bukalapak Indonesia 30.4
5 Blibli Indonesia 20.6
6 Tiki Vietnam 15.6
7 Sendo Vietnam 7.4
8 Zalora Southeast Asia 6.9
9 Qoo10 Southeast Asia 3.7
Source: Similar Web, Web retailor1.
The vigorous development of digital platforms is
accompanied by enormous cross-border flow of data.
The data flow in Asia has shifted from America to Asia.
In 2010, Asia's internet traffic flowed to the US and
Canada the most, accounting for 49.2%, and this
proportion dropped to 24.9% in 2019. The ratio of
bandwidth flowing to economies within Asia
increased from 37.8% in 2010 to 54.0% in 2019.2 In
2019, China's cross-border data traffic ranked first
globally, accounting for 23% of global cross-border
data traffic, and the US ranked second, accounting for
12%. China's data flow has also shifted from the US to
Asian economies in the past two decades. The
proportion of data flow to and from the US in China's
two-way data flow has dropped from 45% in 2001 to
25% in 2019. To and from Asian economies data flow
currently account for more than half of China's total,
with Vietnam accounting for 17% and Singapore
accounting for 15%.3

Data were obtained on January 10, 2022.
1 https://www.webretailer.com/b/online-marketplaces-southeast-asia/.
The data cover online marketplaces (either pure-play marketplaces or retailers with a third-party marketplace) with more than 2.5 million
monthly visits from within Southeast Asia. The data excluded three marketplaces with more than 2.5 million monthly visits from Southeast
Asia, but for which Southeast Asia represents less than 5% of their global traffic: JD.com (5.1 million visits), Amazon (3.8 million) and
Taobao (3.1 million).
2 Table 6.2 of Asian Economic Integration Report released by ADB in 2021, page152.
3 UNCTAD. Digital Economy Report 2021, page 20.
The expansion of digital platforms has also
led to an increase in digital revenue, with Asia
absorbing nearly half of the world total. According
to the Asian Economic Integration Report released in
2021, in 2019, the digital revenue in the world reached
USD3.8 billion, of which USD1.8 billion were in Asia,
accounting for 48.1%, followed by 22.1% in the US.
Within Asia (see Figure 4.13), China's digital revenue
accounts for 32.8% (USD1.2 billion) of the world total,
and Australia, New Zealand, and Japan accounted for
6.4% (USD240 million). Asian economies are excelled in
their e-commerce and gained a 58% share of global e-
commerce revenue. E-commerce is the most
profitable industry in the digital sector, with a revenue
of USD1.92 billion. Online travel ranked second (USD1
billion), with 37.8% revenue from Asia, and advertising
technology came after (USD330 million), with 33.3%
from Asia.
Boao Forum for Asia Asian Economic Outlook and Integration Progress Annual Report 2022
102
Figure 4.13 Share of Digital Revenue by Economy
Source: ADB. Asian Economic Integration Report in 2021.1
4.2.2.3 Digital Transformation Strategies Bring
Opportunities to Asian Digital Trade
The digital transformation strategies of Asian
economies will bring new growth opportunities
for digital trade. As shown by Table 4.10, Asian economies
have actively introduced digital transformation
strategies. For example, Singapore issued the Research,
Innovation and Enterprise 2025 Plan (RIE 2025) in 20202,
focusing on four areas: (1) manufacturing, trade and
connectivity, (2) human health and potential, (3) urban
solutions and sustainable development, (4) smart
nation and digital economy. In 2021, China released
the 14th Five-Year Plan for Digital Economy Development
and put forward the development goals for 2025
around the data factor market, industrial digital
transformation, digital industrialization, digital public
service and digital economic governance system. 3
India put forward the Digital India strategy in 2015,
which mainly focused on three aspects: digital
infrastructure construction, digital government
services, and digital education for citizens. Among
them, the key measures of digital infrastructure
include introducing Aadhaar electronic biometric
identification system and a unified electronic financial
payment interface. In September 2021, India
launched the Ayushman Bharat Digital Mission
(ABDM)4, aiming to alleviate medical difficulties. ABDM
mainly includes four contents: health ID, information
of medical facilities, residents' health cloud storage
and information of medical professionals. By October
2021, ABDM had included 1.3 billion health IDs, 1,538
health facilities, 3,212 approved doctors, and 120
thousand downloads of medical records.5

1 Asian Economic Integration Report 2021, page 193.
2 https://www.nrf.gov.sg/rie2025-plan.
3 http://www.gov.cn/zhengce/content/2022-01/12/content_5667817.htm.
4 https://pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=1758520.
5 https://www.gsma.com/asia-pacific/wp-content/uploads/2021/10/181021-Digital-Societies-in-Asia-Pacific-2021_final.pdf.
Chapter 4 Service Trade Integration of Asian Economies
103
Table 4.10 Digital Transformation Strategies in Selected Asian Economies
Economies Strategy
Japan Priority Policy Program for Realizing Digital Society, 2021
e-Japan Strategy, 2001
Korea, Republic of Korean New Deal 2.0, 2021
China The 14th Five-year Plan for the Development of Digital Economy, 2021
India Ayushman Bharat Digital Mission, 2021
Digital India, 2015
Thailand Thailand 4.0, 2016
Malaysia Malaysia Digital Economy Blueprint, 2021
Singapore Research, Innovation and Enterprise 2025 Plan, 2020
the Philippines Digital Cities 2025, 2021
The Philippines Digital Strategy for 2011 to 2016, 2011
Indonesia Roadmap Digital Indonesia 2021-2024, 2021
Brunei Digital Economy Masterplan 2025, 2019
Vietnam Vietnam’s Future Digital Economy towards 2030 and 2045, 2019
Laos Laos Digital Transformation Methodology, 2018
Myanmar Digital Economy Roadmap, 2019
Cambodia Cambodia Digital Economy and Society Policy Framework 2021-2035, 2021
Bangladesh Digital Bangladesh & Vision 2021, 2019
Iran Digital Iran (2020-2025), 2019
Kazakhstan Digital Kazakhstan (2018-2022), 2017
Mongolian National Digital Transformation for Mongolia, 2021
Nepal Digital Nepal Framework, 2018
Pakistan Digital Pakistan Policy, 2018
Sri Lanka National Policy Framework, 2019
Tajikistan Digital Economy in Tajikistan, 2019
Uzbekistan Digital Uzbekistan 2030 Strategy, 2020
Source: Collected by the author.
Active participation in agreements related to
digital trade plays an important role in Asian
economies’ digital transformation. The CPTPP and RCEP,
which involve many Asian economies, includes
specialized content for digital trade. Pure digital trade
agreements include Digital Economy Partnership
Agreement (DEPA) between Singapore, Chile and New
Zealand, US-Japan Digital Trade Agreement, Singapore-
Australia Digital Economy Agreement (SADEA), and the
recent Singapore-UK Digital Economy Agreement
finalized in December 2021. Digital trade agreements
help reduce barriers to digital trade and enhance
Boao Forum for Asia Asian Economic Outlook and Integration Progress Annual Report 2022
104
exchanges and cooperation in digital trade. DEPA
includes three important themes: digital trade
facilitation, trustworthy data flow, and building trust in
digital systems.1DEPA is divided into 16 modules and
economies can choose to participate in the modules
that interest them. The modular structure dramatically
improves the feasibility of DEPA and injects new
vitality into the development of digital trade in Asia.2
CPTPP and RCEP both have chapters related to e-
commerce, but differ in the focus of digital: CPTPP
opposes mandatory disclosure of software source
code and prohibit mandatory data localization, while
RCEP, with members from various stages of development,
pays more attention to rules-of-origin, e-commerce,
SME development and liberalization in goods and
service trade.
4.2.3 The Future Directions of Digital Trade in Asia
4.2.3.1 Enhance Consumer Protection in the
Digital Age
Consumers in the digital age are enjoying a more
convenient life, but are also concerned about data
and privacy protection, digital platform reliability,
product safety. In 2019, more than half of the world's
population were internet users.3 However, a global
survey4 by the Center for International Governance
Innovation (CIGI) in 2019 showed that 80% of the
respondents expressed concerns about online privacy
protection, and 53% were more worried than a year
ago. Less than half of the respondents believed that
the government had made enough efforts to protect
online data and personal information. In terms of trust
in the internet, 25% of the respondents said they
didn't trust the Internet, and this distrust has made
people disclose less information, use internet more
selectively and shop less online. 44% of the
respondents said they were sometimes cheated by
fake news; Respondents believed that social media
platforms were an essential source of fake news. When
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1 Digital trade facilitation includes digital identity, paperless trade, electronic invoice, Fintech; Data flow includes personal data protection,
cross-border data flow, government data opening, data innovation and regulatory sandbox; Digital system trust includes artificial
intelligence, online consumer protection, small and medium-sized enterprise cooperation and digital inclusiveness.
2 https://www.mti.gov.sg/Improving-Trade/Digital-Economy-Agreements/The-Digital-Economy-Partnership-Agreement.
3 https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/IT.NET.USER.ZS.
4 The survey cooperated with Internet Society and UNCTAD, involving 25 economies, including Australia, China, India, Indonesia, Japan,
Pakistan, Russia, and Korea.
https://www.cigionline.org/cigi-ipsos-global-survey-internet-security-and-trust/.
5 https://www.cigionline.org/cigi-ipsos-global-survey-internet-security-and-trust/.
6 https://unctad.org/news/building-back-better-requires-stronger-competition-and-consumer-protection-digital-economy.
purchasing internet-related equipment, residents in
developing countries are willing to pay a higher price
for safety. In contrast, residents in developed countries
pay more attention to price, which may be due to
stricter supervision of product safety or better
remedial mechanisms.5 In the digital age, consumers
are also confronted with information asymmetry
problems and various risks, such as being unable to
judge the product quality and firm trustworthiness,
having trouble in goods return, or understanding
complicated terms, and being easily cheated by
digital frauds. Vulnerable groups, such as people with
inadequate digital education, the disabled, and the
elderly, also have difficulty in receiving information or
adapting to new technologies, and may be more likely
to fall into scams. Since the pandemic, more and more
economic and social activities have been conducted
online, making consumer protection, especially for
vulnerable people, urgent and important. 6
Meanwhile, enhancing consumer protection in the
digital age can boost consumer confidence in
transactions and help promote economic growth
after the pandemic.
Cross-border consumer protection becomes
increasingly important. Digital platforms have
made cross-border transactions more and more
common. However, how to return defective goods
across borders? Who should pay for the cost and who
should supervise the process? How to ensure that
goods from across the border are safe? Is there a
platform for online dispute resolution? There are not
yet clear answers to these concerns in many countries.
ASEAN made the attempts relatively early. The ASEAN
Committee on Consumer Protection (ACCP) was
established in 2007. Its essential purpose is to ensure
that all member countries have consumer protection
measures, build consumer remedy and product recall
mechanisms, strengthen consumer access to
information, and enhance institution capacity. At
Chapter 4 Service Trade Integration of Asian Economies
105
present, all ASEAN member countries have implemented
consumer protection laws and the consumer protection
and product recall websites have been established in
ASEAN,1 notifying real-time product recall information.
The future strategic objectives of ASEAN in consumer
protection include: provide specific policies in
e-commerce, unfair contract terms, product safety, and
labeling; organize training sessions, develop online
interactive and distance learning tools, and enhance
consumer protection ability and awareness; continue
efforts in areas such as dispute settlement measures and
remedial mechanisms.2 Cross-border consumer protection
should also pay attention to the cooperation and
coordination of cross-border law enforcement agencies.
Meanwhile, since Asian countries are in various
development stages, possible externalities should be
reduced through international cooperation mechanisms.
Otherwise, poor-quality products are more likely to
flow into the market with weak consumer protection,
thus harming consumer health.
The responsibilities and obligations of the
digital platform should be further clarified. Large
digital platforms collect an enormous amount of
consumer data and profit from it. However, platform
information leaks are common, and many countries
lack legislation on digital platforms' responsibilities.
Although some economies require that consumer
data collection should be in the minimum range, the
digital platforms have substantial control over the
information to be collected. Consumers can only
agree to various contract terms for using digital
platform services, with little bargaining power. Also, it
is often unclear what kinds of data are collected by the
platforms and consumers may be forced to see
advertisements related to their browsing history without
prior consent. Big data-enabled price discrimination
incidents frequently occur. These facts all point to the
possibility of the abuse of consumer data by the
digital platforms. Further, some digital platforms have
a vast market share, forcing merchants to bind to their
own platform only, causing substantial harm to
market competition and consumer welfare. Therefore,
legislation on responsibility and obligation of the digital
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1 www.aseanconsumer.org.
2 Refer to ASEAN consumer protection action plan.
https://aseanconsumer.org/read-publication-new-asapcp-2025-and-implementation-schedule-2021-2025;
https://aseanconsumer.org/file/post_image/ASAPCP%20Implementation%20Schedule%20(2021%20-%202025)%20-%2030Apr21.pdf.
3 https://www.samr.gov.cn/xw/mtjj/202110/t20211030_336274.html.
platforms is an essential aspect of consumer protection.
Some economies are improving the supervision of
digital platforms. For example, in December 2020, the
European Union introduced the Digital Services Act
and the Digital Market Act. The former defined
seventeen new obligations for online platforms, while
the latter introduced the concept of "gatekeeper" for
large-scale online platforms and formulated regulations
accordingly. In February 2021, China issued the Anti-
monopoly Guideline on Platform Economy, aiming to
prevent and stop platform monopoly. In November,
China introduced the Guide for Classification and
Grading of Internet Platforms and the Guide for
Implementing the Main Responsibility of Internet Platforms
(both are drafts for comment). The former outlined the
classification and supervision of Chinese Internet
Platforms. The latter stipulated the obligations of
proof of fair competition, governance on an equal
footing, and open ecology for internet platforms,
especially for bigtechs.3
Data security and privacy protection are
important issues. In the digital age, there are risks of
data been misused by enterprises, as well as illegally
collected and sold by individuals. Many offline
communities or recreational venues are increasingly
keen to use digital access control technologies such
as face recognition, but may not be able to strictly
protect the data. During the epidemic, big data
technology has contributed to containing infection.
However, the information disclosure of infected cases
sometimes caused doxing and cyber violence,
arousing widespread public concerns. What is the
boundary between enterprises, individuals, and
governments to collect and use data? What responsibility
do they bear? How do individuals take legal measures
to protect their privacy? These issues need to be
addressed urgently. Some Asian economies have
been putting forward data and privacy protection
policies (see Table 4.11). From 2020 to 2021, Singapore,
Japan, the Republic of Korea, New Zealand, and China
upgraded or passed data protection laws, while
Brunei, India, Indonesia, Vietnam, and Sri Lanka are
closer to adopt their own data protection
Boao Forum for Asia Asian Economic Outlook and Integration Progress Annual Report 2022
106
frameworks.1 However, some Asian economies have
not yet put in place data protection laws. After the
epidemic, cybercrimes and fraud incidents have
increased dramatically, leading to higher demand for
data and privacy protection. Moreover, personal data
and privacy protection is the legitimate right for citizens in
the digital age. Adequate data and privacy protection
policies can help consumers build trust in digital
technologies and systems, enhance their sense of
security in digital activities, increase their willingness to
share data and use digital platforms, and further
promoting future development of digital trade.
Table 4.11 Data and Privacy Protection Policies in Selected Asian Economies
Economies Main Legislations
Japan
The Act on Improving Transparency and Fairness of Digital Platforms, 2020
Act on the Protection of Personal Information (APPI), 2017
Amended APPI 2020 (as amended in 2020)
Korea, Republic of Personal Information Protection Act, 2011 (as amended in 2020)
China Personal Information Protection Law, 2021
Cybersecurity Law, 2017
India The Information Technology (Intermediary Guidelines and Digital Media Ethics Code) Rules, 2021
Information Technology Act, 2000
Australia Privacy Act 1988 and States Privacy Acts
New Zealand Privacy Act, 1993 & Privacy Act, 2020
Thailand Personal Data Protection Act (PDPA), 2019
Malaysia Personal Data Protection Act, 2010 and its Public Consultation Paper in 2020
Singapore Personal Data Protection Act, 2012
the Philippines Data Privacy Act, 2012
Indonesia
The draft of the Personal Data Protection Act, 2021
Government Regulation No. 71, 2019
MOCI Regulation No. 20, 2016
Law No. 11 of 2008 on Electronic Information and Transactions and its amendment Law No. 19
of 2016
Brunei Public Consultation Paper on Personal Data Protection for the Private Sector, 2021
Data Protection Policy, 2014
Vietnam
Draft Decree on Personal Data Protection, 2021
Law on Network Information Security, 2015
Law on Cyber Security, 2018
Laos Law on Electric Data Protection, 2017
Myanmar Law Protecting the Privacy and Security of Citizens, 2017
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1 https://fpf.org/blog/event-report-from-digital-x-adb-driving-digital-development-across-asia-and-the-pacific-trade-offs-or-synergies-data-
privacy-and-protection-as-an-engine-of-data-driven-innovation/.
Chapter 4 Service Trade Integration of Asian Economies
107
(continued)
Economies Main Legislations
Cambodia Sub-decree on Establishment of National Internet Gateway, 2021
E-commerce Law, 2019
Bangladesh Digital Security Act (DSA), 2018
Mongolia Personal Secrecy Act, 1995
Sri Lanka The Bill to provide for the Regulation of Processing of Personal Data, 2021
Information and Cyber Security Strategy 2019-2023, 2018
Iran Personal Data Protection and Safeguarding Draft Act, 2019
Kazakhstan The Personal Data Law, 2013 (as amended in 2020)
Nepal The Privacy Act 2075, 2018
Pakistan The revised draft of the Personal Data Protection Bill, 2021
Tajikistan The Law on Personal Data, 2018
Uzbekistan The Law on Personal Data, 2019
Source: Deloitte Asia Pacific Privacy Guide 2020-2021, and author collections.
4.2.3.2 Narrow Digital Divide in ICT Infrastructure
and Human Capital
Information infrastructure provides the bases for
digital trade development; however, the digital divide
in infrastructure between regions, countries, and even
within countries restricts the development of digital
trade and is more likely to aggravate inequality. In
terms of information infrastructure, although Asia has
a large population and a large number of netizens,
there is room for improvement in internet penetration,
and in bridging the gap between urban and rural
areas (see Table 4.12). According to International
Telecommunication Union (ITU), in 2021, the share of
Internet users in the Asia-Pacific region is 61%,
compared with 87% in Europe and 81% in America. In
2020, the share of Internet users in urban Asia was
75%, while that in rural areas was only 35%.1 In terms
of fixed broadband subscriptions per 100 people,
Europe ranks first, with an average of 34 subscriptions
per 100 people, and America and Asia rank second
and third, with 23 and 15 subscriptions respectively.
Regarding mobile subscriptions per 100 people, Asian
has 108 subscriptions, with 118 and 114 in Europe and
America respectively. There is also a significant gap
among Asian countries. For example, there are 43.6
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1 In the same year, the proportion of urban and rural Internet users in Europe was 87% and 80% respectively, and that in the Americas was
83% and 60%.
fixed broadband subscriptions per 100 people in
Korea, 33.6 in China, but only 1.1 in Pakistan. There are
166.6 mobile cellular subscriptions per 100 people in
Thailand and 83.6 per 100 people in India, only half of
that in Thailand.
The digital divide is not only in infrastructure
but also in digital human capital across economies.
The continuous upgrade of digital technology also
propels vigorous development of the online education
industry. Education in today's world is increasingly
dependent on the assistance of digital technology.
Students can review in-class knowledge and take
extra-class lessons on platforms. Future education
may be more deeply integrated with digital technology
and become more tailor-made. After the outbreak of
the pandemic, more and more economies have
shifted their education online. However, it is undoubtedly
a challenge for families and students who have not yet
or not sufficiently got access to the internet.
Regarding the proportion of households with internet
access at home, 99.8% of households in Korea have
internet access at home, but only 23.8% in India.
Regarding the school internet access index, Singapore
scored 6.2, China scored 4.6, and Pakistan scored 3.6.
And the average years of schooling is 12.8 years in
Boao Forum for Asia Asian Economic Outlook and Integration Progress Annual Report 2022
108
Japan, 6.5 years in India, and only 5.2 years in Pakistan.
The current gap in information infrastructure will not
only directly have implications on the growth of
the digital industries but also on the efficiency of
learning and teaching, thus having a profound
impact on human capital accumulation, income
discrepancy and social equity.
Table 4.12 ICT Infrastructure and Education Gap in Asia
Economies
Fixed
Broadband
Subscription per
100 People
Mobile Cellular
Subscription
per 100 People
The proportion
of Households
with Internet
Access at
Home
School
Network
Access (1-7, 7 Is
the Best)
Average Years
of Education
Japan 34.5 152.0 96.9 5.2 12.8
Korea,
Republic of 43.6 137.5 99.8 5.8 12.2
China 33.6 117.9 --4.6 8.1
India 1.6 83.6 23.8 4.6 6.5
Indonesia 3.9 130.1 78.2 4.8 8.2
Kazakhstan 13.9 134.1 92.4 4.9 11.9
Malaysia 10.4 135.1 91.7 5.3 10.4
Pakistan 1.1 79.5 34.1 3.6 5.2
Qatar 10.3 131.8 95.0 5.6 9.7
Saudi Arabia 22.7 124.1 99.5 4.4 10.2
Singapore 25.9 144.1 98.4 6.2 11.6
Thailand 16.6 166.6 85.2 4.6 7.9
Vietnam 17.2 142.7 74.8 4.1 8.3
Sources: International Telecommunication Union (ITU), World Bank, United Nations Development Program (UNDP), World Economic Forum
(WEF).1
4.2.3.3 Resolve Market Segmentation and Regulatory
Arbitrage Problems
There are significant differences in digital trade
regulations among economies around the world,
which increase the compliance cost of enterprises
and lead to market segmentation. Different
economies have introduced various policies on cross-
border data flow and privacy protection. The
operating rules that enterprises adapt to in one
market may not be suitable in another market, thus
increasing costs of information acquisition and
compliance for enterprises. For instance, the
regulations in Asian economies, the EU, and the US
vary, embedding difference focuses and concerns. For
example, the EU and China pay more attention to

1 Due to data availability, we use the latest data available by January 2022. The data of fixed broadband subscription (per 100 people) and
mobile cellular subscription (per 100 people) are from the World Bank. The former indicator has data in 2020. The latter indicator has data
in 2019 for the US and data in 2020 for other economies.
Data on the proportion of households that can access the internet at home comes from the International Telecommunication Union (ITU).
Data are available in 2018 for India, in 2019 for Japan, Malaysia and the US, and in 2020 for other economies.
Data on the average years of education in 2019 are from UNDP.
School internet access index comes from the World Economic Forum available in 2017.
2 https://www.forbes.com/sites/forbestechcouncil/2020/07/29/the-privacy-mindset-of-the-eu-vs-the-us/?sh=46b171ea7d01.
privacy protection, while the US advocates the free
flow of data. In May 2018, the European Union
implemented the General Data Protection Regulations
(GDPR), which clarified privacy rights and the specific
conditions of cross-border data flow. In March 2018,
the US Congress promulgated Clarifying Lawful
Overseas Use of Data (CLOUD) Act, requiring American
enterprises to ensure that the authorities can access
all stored data, including data stored on foreign
servers. This directly contradicts GDPR and increases
the uncertainty of enterprises.2 In China, the Personal
Information Protection defines the management of
personal information processing, and has data
localization requirements, which is different from the
position of some developed economies. Moreover,
Chapter 4 Service Trade Integration of Asian Economies
109
Asia countries have divergent practices over whether
individual consent is required for personal data
transmission. For example, in Indonesia, written
permission is required in most cases, while in Australia,
the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand, obtaining
consent is an optional condition for data transmission.
Besides, Asian economies’ regulations differ on
whether data can be transmitted to economies with
adequate data protection standards. 1 Diverse
regulations may entail compliance cost for enterprises
and impede digital trade in Asia.
Rule differences may also lead to regulatory
arbitrage. Many Asian economies have introduced
privacy protection laws (see Table 4.11) or
strengthened supervision of platforms. For instance,
China, Malaysia, Brunei, Indonesia and Vietnam have
data localization requirements. 2 The Intermediary
Guide and Code of Ethics for Digital Media issued by
India in 2021 requires large social media platforms
such as Facebook and Twitter to conduct additional
due diligence and also requires the platforms to
appoint chief compliance officers, contact persons
and public complaints officers. Then, for enterprises, it
may be more advantageous to set up platforms s in
localities with weaker supervision, to make use of the
loopholes in cross-border supervision, or to serve the
target market offshore rather than having physical
entities. According to the Asian Economic Integration
Report 2021, 34 Asian economies have some form of
data protection legislations, 6 have draft legislations,
and 16 have no data protection legislations.3 There is
a big gap in data protection legislations in Asia, which
increases the possibility of regulatory arbitrage.
However, the development of digital trade is bound
to be accompanied by the cross-border data flow.
Ensuring data security and consumer privacy while
promoting safe data flow is an important issue to be
solved. Coordinating regulatory discrepancies,
mitigating possible regulatory arbitrage, and further
expanding the Asian digital trade market are key
components for Asia to work together in the future.
Asian economies should promote the
formulation and cooperation of international
rules in digital trade. At present, regional

1 ADB. Asian Economic Integration Report 2021, page 207-298, Annex 8e.
2 https://theaseanpost.com/article/southeast-asias-data-localisation.
3 Page 245.
agreements involving digital trade signed one after
another already have inconsistencies in the articles,
causing market segmentation and regulatory
arbitrage problems. The existing trade agreements,
such as DEPA, RCEP, CPTPP, and USMCA, have formed
common expectations on some issues, such as
electronic authentication, paperless trade, internet
security, but significantly differ in other areas, such as
cross-border data flow, data localization, intermediary
platform governance, source code, and open
government data. It reflects the differences in
interests and development stages of different
economies. Moreover, there are still many problems to
be further explored, such as digital tax, social media
content supervision, platform anti-monopoly,
platform responsibility. However, Asian economies
still lack an intergovernmental cooperation
mechanism in digital trade. In the future, Asian
economies should work together and strengthen
international exchanges and cooperation, build an
Asian market with coordinated and harmonized
regulations, pay attention to the connection with
other international rules, and promote the long-run
development of digital trade.
4.3 Key Service Industry
Analysis
This section focuses on the interdependency
analysis of the Asian tourism industry, a key service
industry. In 2020, Asian tourism was hit hard as many
economies adopted strict entry restrictions, including
mandatory testing, quarantines and border closures,
in the face of uncertainty about the pandemic (see
Figure 4.14). According to the United Nations World
Tourism Organization, the number of global tourist
arrivals was just 400 million in 2020, down 74% year-
on-year from 2019. Of these, Asia and the Pacific saw
an 84 percent drop in arrivals due to the implementation
of stricter entry restrictions. In addition, the number of
inbound tourists from Africa fell 77 percent, the
Middle East fell 73 percent, and Europe and the
Americas fell 68 percent.
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110
Figure 4.14 Year-on-Year Change in Global Arrivals to Asia by Region, 2020
Source: United Nations World Tourism Organization (UNWTO).
The plunge in tourist arrivals had dealt a huge
blow to the tourism industry in various economies
(see Table 4.13). Asia has long been a popular
destination for international tourists, and tourism is an
important industry for some Asian economies. After
the outbreak of the pandemic, the tourism’s share of
GDP in Southeast Asia fell from 11.8% in 2019 to 5.8%
in 2020, and jobs related dropped from 13.4% to
11.3%. Tourism revenue in Thailand and Cambodia
dropped to about 30% of 2019 levels. In 2020, tourist
arrivals in the Philippines were 1.48 million, down
sharply from 8 million in 2019, and the tourism's share
of GDP plummeted from 13% to 5.4%.
In contrast to the hard-hit cross-border tourism,
some domestic tourism markets are gaining
momentum while doing their part to prevent and
control infections. In China, for example, the year-on-
year tourism decline narrowed significantly in the
third and fourth quarters of 2020 (see Figure 4.15).
From the supply side, the tourism industry has been
transforming itself by creating "tours on live
broadcasting" "VR tourism" "intelligent tour guide"
and many other business forms, boosting the
economic vitality. From the demand side, "contact-
free vacation” “suburban tour“ “tours upon reservation"
have become the key words for consumers. The
Japanese government also launched the “Go To
Travel” campaign in July 2020 to support the
development of domestic tourism, where participants
can receive travel fee reductions. In July 2020,
Indonesia's Ministry of Tourism and Creative Economy
launched the nationwide “Indonesia Care” campaign
to implement a comprehensive health management
system and verification procedures to gradually
restore domestic tours.
Chapter 4 Service Trade Integration of Asian Economies
111
Table 4.13 Year-on-Year Change in Tourism Revenue of Major Asian Economies
ASEAN and China-Japan-
Korea
Tourism Revenue
USD billion,
2019
USD billion,
2020
GDP Share, 2019
(%)
GDP Share, 2020
(%)
Brunei 0.73 0.53 5.60 4.10
Cambodia 6.97 2.37 25.90 9.00
Indonesia 64.70 34.50 5.90 3.20
Laos 1.89 0.91 10.00 4.80
Malaysia 41.80 17.60 11.70 5.20
Myanmar 5.50 2.07 5.90 2.20
the Philippines 90.00 52.80 22.50 14.60
Singapore 39.20 15.70 11.10 4.70
Thailand 106.50 41.70 20.10 8.40
Vietnam 23.20 11.95 7.00 3.50
China 1665.60 667.20 11.60 4.50
Japan 373.00 234.90 7.10 4.70
Korea, Republic of 73.20 39.90 4.40 2.40
SourcesStatista, World Bank, The World Travel & Tourism Concil (WTTC), IMF.Amro, Edited by BFA Academy.
Figure 4.15 Year-on-Year Change in Domestic Tourist Arrivals in China, 2020
Source: China Tourism Academy.
Boao Forum for Asia Asian Economic Outlook and Integration Progress Annual Report 2022
112
The pandemic poses huge challenges for
updating Asia-Pacific Tourism Interdependency Index.
This dependence index was constructed by calculating
the ratio of international tourist arrivals from other
Asian economies to the total international arrivals
from the world. It is used to show the dependency of
one economy’s tourism market on Asia and the Pacific
region. From the result, despite the plunge in tourist
arrivals in 2020 due to the pandemic, Hong Kong
Special Administrative Region of China inbound
tourism market still ranked first in 2020 in terms of
dependence on Asia, excluding Chinese mainland, at
89.94%, surpassing Malaysia (89.03%), Taiwan Province
of China (85.93%) and Japan (82.69%) (see Figure 4.16).
Looking back to 2019, the dependence of the
inbound tourism market of Chinese mainland on Asia
was 94.71%, while that of the inbound tourism market
of Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of China
on Asia was 92.94%, Malaysia 91.11%, Taiwan Province
of China 89.09% and Japan 84.12%, and it is easy to
see that the dependence of inbound tourism of major
economies on Asia has declined.
In 2020, due to the severe impact of the pandemic,
major Asian economies regulated inbound tourism
strictly through route control, entry quarantine and
other measures, resulting in declining dependence of
tourism exports of the above-mentioned economies
on the Asian market (see Table 4.14). Indonesia which
experienced a decline on its dependency on Asia from
2017-2019 with a drop of nearly 10%, is the only
economy that has an increasing dependence ratio on
Asian tourism exports. But, in 2020, the total number
of inbound tourists to Indonesia was about 4.05
million, down 74.8% year-on-year compared to about
16.11 million in 2019, including 3.05 million inbound
tourists from Asia, down 73.2% year-on-year compared
to about 11.4 million from Asia in 2019.
Table 4.14 Tourism Dependence Index on Asia and the Pacific Region for
Selected Economies, 2017-2020 (%)
Number Economies 2017 2018 2019 2020
1 China 92.45 91.25 94.71 --
2 Hong Kong SAR, China 92.01 92.62 92.49 89.94
3 Malaysia 92.55 91.24 91.11 89.03
4 Taiwan, China 89.26 88.97 89.02 85.93
5 Japan 84.00 84.60 84.12 82.69
6 Korea, Republic of 80.79 82.11 83.36 77.86
7 Singapore 77.47 76.90 76.42 66.79
8 Indonesia 79.44 71.48 70.79 75.27
9 Australia 51.63 49.73 49.76 44.56
10 the US 31.53 29.77 30.33 28.51
Sources: Tourism official agency and statistical office of each economy.
Table 4.15 shows the interdependence in
international inbound tourists among different
economies in Asia and the Pacific. There was no
obvious change in the overall pattern of tourism
export dependence among the economies. The
neighboring economies being the main trading
partners is the prominent feature of Asian tourism.
Due to the impact of the pandemic control, the selected
economies’ tourism export dependence on China fell
by 2~15 percentage points year-on-year in 2020.
Chapter 4 Service Trade Integration of Asian Economies
113
Figure 4.16 Tourism Dependence Index on Asia and the Pacific Region for Selected Economies, 2020
Sources: Tourism official agency and statistical office of each economy.
Note: Index of China in 2020 missed due to data unavailability.
Table 4.15 Interdependence Among Different Asian and the Pacific Economies, 2020 (%)
on B
of A China Malaysia
Hong
Kong
SAR, China
Singapore Korea,
Republic of Japan Indonesia Taiwan,
China
the
US Australia
China (VF) -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
Malaysia (TF) 9.35 -- -- 35.66 2.76 1.72 16.43 1.39 1.13 1.68
Hong Kong
SAR, China (TF) 75.83 0.58 -- 0.64 1.12 1.41 0.72 2.95 2.26 1.32
Singapore (VF) 13.04 5.61 2.15 -- 3.27 4.59 16.70 2.26 4.50 7.53
Korea,
Republic of (VF) 27.25 1.93 3.53 0.71 -- 17.10 2.65 2.65 8.75 0.92
Japan (VF) 25.98 1.86 8.41 1.34 11.86 -- 1.89 16.87 5.33 3.49
Indonesia (TF) 5.92 24.18 0.06 6.92 1.86 2.28 -- 0.88 2.26 6.32
Taiwan,
China (VF) 8.06 5.28 12.89 3.62 12.98 19.57 4.04 -- 6.01 1.37
the US (TF) 4.98 0.00 0.00 0.00 5.78 9.17 0.00 1.20 -- 2.75
Australia (TF) 11.76 3.22 3.15 4.17 2.82 5.18 2.01 1.81 9.66 --
Sources: Tourism official agency and statistical office of each economy.
Note: “--” =figure or data not (yet) available; TF: International tourist arrivals at frontiers (excluding same-day visitors); VF: International
visitor arrivals at frontiers (tourists and same-day visitors). China did not publish the data of International tourist arrivals in 2020.
Boao Forum for Asia Asian Economic Outlook and Integration Progress Annual Report 2022
114
Focusing on China's inbound tourism market,
the country saw a precipitous drop after the Spring
Festival in 2020. According to statistics released by the
Ministry of Culture and Tourism and the China Tourism
Academy, China received a total of 27.47 million
inbound tourists in 2020, down 81 percent year-on-
year. According to the China Tourism Academy,
China's top 15 inbound tourism source markets of
2020 were Macao Special Administrative Region of
China, Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of
China, Myanmar, Vietnam, Taiwan Province of China,
the Philippines, Mongolia, Korea, Russia, Japan,
the US, India, Indonesia, Malaysia and Canada.
Against the backdrop of closer economic and trade
ties between China and the Philippines, the Philippines
jumped to become China's third largest foreign
source market in 2020. A survey on travel intentions
and attitudes of potential visitors to China conducted
jointly by the China Tourism Academy and Google in
2020-2021 shows that 8 percent of overseas people
are considering visiting China if the epidemic is
effectively contained in the next two years and
economies generally liberalize their border restrictions.
China ranked 6th in the list of overseas destinations
that global tourists plan to visit.
Chapter 5 FDI Integration in Asia
115
Chapter 5
FDIIntegrationinAsia
The inflows and outflows of foreign direct
investment (FDI) in Asian economies1 showed better
performance than the rest of the world in 2020. Both
the inflows and outflows of FDI in Asian developing
economies increased. Despite the continuing COVID-
19 pandemic in the world, Asian economies obtained
resilient investment and economic recovery.
Asia itself is still the main source of FDI inflows.
While the intra-Asia dependence on the inward FDI
remained stable, the intra-Asia dependence on the
outward FDI fluctuated greatly and increased sharply
in 2020. Consequently, the self-dependence of Asia’s
direct investment (inflows plus outflows) rose to
nearly 65 percent.
5.1 Current Status of FDI
Integration in Asia
5.1.1 Higher Intra-Asia FDI Dependence
An economy’s FDI inter-dependence index
measures the extent of one economy’s dependence
on another in the FDI flows (inflows plus outflows) and
is calculated as the share of the FDI flows with a
particular economy in the total FDI flows with the
world. An economys FDI dependence on Asia is
calculated as the ratio of FDI flows (inflows plus
outflows) with the Asian economies in the total FDI
flows with the world. FDI self-dependence on Asia
measures the share of intra-Asia FDI flows as a
percentage of the global FDI flows of all Asian
economies based on available data.
Table 5.1 shows the interdependence index of
1 In this Chapter, Asian economies include Australia and New Zealand.
FDI for the selected economies (reporters) on the
partners in 2020. For the bilateral cross-border
investment, Chinese mainland and Hong Kong
Special Administrative Region of China had the
highest dependence on each other. Chinese
mainland depended on Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region of China for 62.64 percent of its
total FDI flows (inflows plus outflows) while the
dependence of Hong Kong Special Administrative
Region of China on Chinese mainland was 54.87
percent, both higher than the previous year. Chinese
mainland and Hong Kong Special Administrative
Region of China were the top two economies in Asia
in terms of total FDI, and the FDI inflows and outflows
of Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of China
had rebounded sharply in 2020. Based on this, Asia’s
FDI self-dependence had increased accordingly.
Singapore maintained its role as an investment
channel among Asian economies, and Indonesia’s FDI
inter-dependence on Singapore was more than a
third in 2020. Singapore also had a significant impact
on direct investment in India, Chinese mainland and
the Republic of Korea.
China, Indonesia and the Republic of Korea
ranked top three countries with highest dependence
on Asia FDI flows and achieved higher level than those
in 2019. As China has significantly reduced its
investment in the rest of the world, its FDI
dependence on Asia has exceeded 90 percent. The
dependence of Hong Kong Special Administrative
Region of China on Asian FDI was close to 60 percent.
Japan and India showed the dependence indices of
Boao Forum for Asia Asian Economic Outlook and Integration Progress Annual Report 2022
116
more than 30 percent on Asian FDI. Australia has
reduced its financial dependence on Asia and in turn
increased its economic ties with the US.
China's influence on intra-Asian FDI has risen to
the first place, and the dependence of Asian direct
investment on Chinese mainland has increased
significantly from 9 percent in 2019 to 21 percent. It
was followed by Hong Kong Special Administrative
Region of China, with more than 20 percent. The rank
of ASEAN has also been elevated, and its proportion in
Asian direct investment has increased from 11.76
percent to 12.81 percent.
In 2020, the overall dependence of Asian direct
investment on the 15 signatories of RCEP increased by
20 percentage points to 49.2 percent, reflecting
investors' confidence and expectation on market
opportunities brought by the signing of the agreement
and its gradual implementation in member countries.
Asia’s self-dependence in FDI flows increased
from 47.83 percent in 2019, to 64.72 percent in 2020.
The increase in Asia’s self-dependence in FDI was due
to the sharp rise of the intra-Asia outward FDI. From
2019 to 2020, the interdependence index of the
outward FDI steeply rose from 44.78 percent to 86
percent (see Table 5.1). Asian economies have
brought COVID-19 under control more effectively and
quickly than Europe and the US, so the investment
environment of Asian economies has continued to
improve, making Asian markets more attractive to
capital.
Table 5.1 Interdependence of FDI (Inward plus Outward), Selected Asian
Economies, 2020 (%)
Of Reporter
(X) On
Partner(Y)
Partner
China Japan
Korea,
Republic
of
Hong
Kong
SAR,
China
India Australia
Indonesia
Singapore ASEAN
RCEP
(15)
CPTPP
(11) ASIA the US EU (27) ROW
China 0 7.02 2.99 62.64 0.10 1.76 1.13 10.35 15.17 27.18 21.48 93.28 4.81 8.40 -6.50
Japan 5.73 0 2.15 1.79 1.00 7.75 -0.78 6.93 11.43 27.29 17.78 31.01 21.56 9.48 37.96
Korea,
Republic
of
18.77 9.56 0 2.44 1.70 2.64 2.01 9.93 21.25 52.76 31.91 59.90 20.32 21.50 -1.72
Hong
Kong
SAR,
China
54.87 -0.70 -0.79 0 -0.37 -0.29 -0.06 5.82 7.00 60.27 15.09 59.69 1.07 4.33 34.91
India 0.20 10.12 0.36 -0.15 0 0.16 0.03 17.05 19.11 29.97 29.19 31.01 23.01 3.99 41.99
Australia
-4.14 19.09 1.02 2.99 -0.51 0 0.03 -0.99 3.18 16.12 26.09 17.76 21.45 11.41 49.38
Indonesia
13.12 -23.21 9.29 24.14 -0.03 -1.09 0 33.70 45.37 58.87 12.54 72.77 13.94 17.15 -3.87
Singapore
a
6.65 6.44 0.56 0.08 -0.63 0.43 -1.80 0 6.99 21.83 14.40 27.32 27.39 26.57 18.73
ASIA 21.27 6.70 2.26 20.21 0.48 2.58 1.02 10.58 12.81 49.20 27.24 64.72 13.79 19.66 1.83
Sources: Based on IMF Coordinated Direct Investment Survey (CDIS) database, and the data from the Statistical Bureaus of the individual economy.
Notes: Inter-dependence Index for FDI of X on Y (FDIIXY) = FDIXY/FDIWX, FDIXY = FDI inflow from Y to X and outflow from X to Y, FDIWX
= total global FDI inflow and outflow of economy X.
RCEP (15) refers to the 15 countries that have signed RCEP, namely ASEAN 10 countries, China, Japan, Korea, Australia, and New
Zealand.
CPTPP (11) refers to the 11 countries that have signed the CPTPP, namely Australia, Brunei, Canada, Chile, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico,
New Zealand, Peru, Singapore and Vietnam.
Since January 1, 2021, the members of European Union are Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech, Denmark, Estonia,
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal,
Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain and Sweden.
a
FDI data of Singapore are that in 2019.
Reporter
Chapter 5 FDI Integration in Asia
117
5.1.2 Intra-Asia Dependence on the Inward
FDI remained resilient
The dependence on inward FDI measures the
extent of one economy’s dependence on another in
the FDI inflows and is calculated as the share of the
FDI inflows from a particular economy (the partner) in
the total FDI inflows from the world to the reporter.
Table 5.2 shows the interdependence index of
inward FDI for the selected Asian economies and US
in 2020. Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of
China remained the largest source of FDI inflows into
Chinese mainland.1 Reciprocally, Chinese mainland
was also the largest source of FDI inflows into Hong
Kong Special Administrative Region of China. Singapore
was the largest source of FDI inflows into Indonesia
and the Republic of Korea, and also the main source
of FDI inflows into Chinese mainland and India. Singapore
largely depended on investment from the US.
The FDI inflows into the US from China recorded
negative values in 2017, 2018 and 2020. However, in
2020, the FDI inflows into China from the US increased
significantly, and China's dependence on direct
investment from the US increased from about 2
percent in 2018 and to 7 percent in 2019.
In 2020, the largest source of foreign investment in
ASEAN is the US. The dependence of ASEAN on other
ASEAN countries’ investments increased in 2020 and the
intra-ASEAN FDI is still an important source of ASEAN’s
FDI inflows.
For the 15 members of RCEP, the intra-RCEP
dependence on the inward FDI rose to 38 percent, up
by 10 percentage points over 2019.
The inward FDI dependence on Asia for an
individual economy is calculated as the ratio of one
economy’s FDI inflows from Asia to the total FDI
inflows from the world. In 2020, Indonesia reached a
new record of 96.5 percent in their FDI inflows
dependence on Asia, as shown in Table 5.3. Chinese
mainland retained its over 80 percent dependence on
Asia in FDI inflows. ASEAN and RCEP rebounded in
their dependence on Asia in FDI inflows.
From 2016 to 2020, the intra-Asia FDI
1 The share of FDI from Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of China was 38.38 percent with the data from IMF CDIS. According to
the data from the Ministry of Commerce of China, that was 70 percent.
2 The share of OFDI from China to Asia was calculated with the data from IMF CDIS. According to 2020 Statistical Bulletin of China’s
Outward Foreign Direct Investment, with the statistics of actual outward direct investment, Asian economies (including Australia and New
Zealand) account for 74% of China’s total OFDI.
3 Ministry of Commerce, National Bureau of Statistics and State Administration of Foreign Exchange of China, 2020 Statistical Bulletin of
China’s Outward Foreign Direct Investment, September 2021.
4 UNCTAD. World Investment Report 2021, July 2021.
dependence index had remained over 50 percent for
five consecutive years. This shows that despite the
raging of COVID-19 and unresolved trade disputes
between China and the US, Asian economies have
remained resilient enough to keep regional production
chains intact.
5.1.3 Sharp Rebound of Asian Economies’
Dependence on the Outward FDI
The outward FDI (OFDI) dependence index
shows the importance of an economy as investment
destination. The index is calculated as the proportion
of one economy’s OFDI to a particular destination (its
partner) in its total global OFDI.
Table 5.4 shows the outward FDI dependence
index (OFDII) of some Asian economies to their
partners in 2020. Chinese mainland and India's
investment in Asia exceeded their global investment
(accounting for more than 100 percent), 2 mainly
because Chinese investors withdrew their direct
investment from other regions (negative) and
reduced the investment in the EU (from 7.68 percent
to 2.77 percent) while India has significantly
withdrawn its investment from the US.
In 2020, China's outward direct investment grew
drastically, with a flow of USD153.71 billion, ranking
first in the world for the first time, accounting for 20.2
percent.3 China's huge investment into Asian market
has led to a sharp rise in intra-Asia dependence on the
outward FDI. Meanwhile 80 percent of the FDI from
China has been achieved through Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region of China. FDI outflows from
Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of China
have doubled in 2020, mainly through multinational
enterprises (MNEs) listed in Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region of China reinvesting in their
subsidiaries in Chinese mainland and other parts of
Asia.4 Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of
China injected more than 75 percent of its OFDI into
the Asian market with more than 66 percent into
Chinese mainland market.
Boao Forum for Asia Asian Economic Outlook and Integration Progress Annual Report 2022
118
Table 5.2 Interdependence of Inward FDI, Selected Asian Economies and the US, 2020 (%)
Of Reporter
(X) On
Partner (Y)
Partner
China Japan
Korea,
Republic
of
Hong
Kong
SAR,
China
India Australia India Singapore ASEAN RCEP
(15)
CPTPP
(11) ASIA the US EU
(27) ROW
China
0 16.49 6.78 38.38 0.03 0.77 0.05 16.78 18.27 42.52 35.94 82.05 7.05 16.21 -5.31
Japan
0.76 0 2.73 1.91 0.34 0.03 0.02 10.17 9.81 13.35 9.83 16.55 7.27 0.28 75.90
Korea,
Republic
of
-0.54 27.36 0 -7.62 0.97 -2.00 -0.10 16.56 18.17 45.08 48.87 48.88 -0.35 39.55 11.92
Hong
Kong
SAR,
China
39.32 -2.65 -0.95 0 0.02 -2.02 -0.13 8.28 6.19 39.90 12.59 38.84 1.37 5.62 54.17
India
0.21 10.52 0.42 -0.89 0 0.12 0.01 15.42 16.14 27.42 26.43 27.59 24.98 4.02 43.41
Australia
2.19 34.09 1.98 2.71 0.05 0 0.05 9.11 4.74 43.07 62.04 45.04 -6.65 -222.45 284.05
Indonesia
10.88 -52.01 20.83 52.09 -0.24 -3.37 0 38.72 92.47 96.54 -11.64 96.51 31.41 2.92 -30.84
Singapore
3.84 3.21 1.67 6.42 -1.30 1.50 -0.79 0 1.50 12.05 8.38 19.63 41.45 9.74 29.17
ASEAN
5.63 6.20 4.99 8.81 1.55 0.39 0.45 9.42 16.56 33.82 22.16 47.70 25.51 7.29 19.50
RCEP (15) 1.73 14.10 5.07 21.44 0.48 1.49 0.14 13.35 15.37 37.94 32.40 61.55 9.94 -12.90 41.41
CPTPP (11) 3.82 9.98 4.31 10.07 -0.32 2.67 -0.28 5.23 6.85 26.36 20.25 37.14 18.85 -45.63 89.65
ASIA 19.71 10.27 3.19 13.67 0.37 0.65 0.07 11.89 13.02 48.85 26.33 51.62 11.54 -5.07 41.90
the US
-0.88 7.24 4.23 0.71 -1.23 4.75 0.02 0.54 0.51 15.72 19.25 36.32 0 38.38 25.30
Sources: Based on IMF Coordinated Direct Investment Survey (CDIS) database and the data from the Statistical Bureaus of the individual economy.
Notes: Inter-dependence Index for FDI Inflows of X on Y (IFDIIXY) = IFDIXY/IFDIWX, IFDIXY = FDI inflow from economy Y to X, IFDIWX =
total global FDI inflow to economy X.
The negative value means the negative value of FDI inflow from economy Y to X, i.e., net outflow from economy X to Y.
Table 5.3 Self-Dependence of Inward FDI in Asia, Selected Asian Economies, 2016-2020 (%)
Economies 2008 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
China 61.50 78.67 83.56 76.97 84.96 82.05
Japan 14.91 23.57 31.42 50.86 25.31 16.55
Korea,
Republic of 34.90 51.72 40.55 80.11 40.29 48.88
Hong Kong SAR,
China 43.56 34.49 39.74 36.02 64.20 38.84
India 18.11 44.66 35.28 16.26 40.95 27.59
Australia 22.77 25.28 41.80 29.04 57.63 45.04
Indonesia 61.31 72.87 72.73 79.32 77.78 96.51
Singapore 21.12 8.87 15.87 28.27 25.67 19.63
ASEAN -- 58.81 52.77 40.05 31.41 47.70
RCEP (15) -- 57.61 56.95 62.34 52.83 61.55
ASIA 38.28 51.78 54.65 52.02 52.93 51.62
Sources: Based on IMF Coordinated Direct Investment Survey (CDIS) database and the data from the Statistical Bureaus of the individual economy.
Notes:--= Not available.
Reporter
Chapter 5 FDI Integration in Asia
119
Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of
China remained the favorite destination for Asian
investors, receiving 30 percent of Asia’s outward
investment in 2020. Chinese mainland ranked the
second, accounting for 23.81 percent of Asia’s foreign
investment.
ASEAN has invested more than 60 percent of its
OFDI internally and more than 80 percent in Asian
market. RCEP members invested more than 90
percent of their OFDI in Asia. The 11 members of
CPTPP put 57 percent of their OFDI into Asian
economies.
Intra-Asia outward FDI dependence nearly
doubled from 44.78 percent in 2019 to 86.06 percent.
This is much higher than the 63.42 percent recorded
in 2018, showing a sharp fluctuation.
Table 5.4 Interdependence Index for Outward FDI, Selected Asian Economies, 2020 (%)
On Partner
(Y)
Of Reporter
(X)
Partner
China Japan
Korea,
Republic
of
Hong
Kong
SAR,
China
India Australia Indonesia Singapore ASEAN RCEP
(15)
CPTPP
(11) ASIA the US EU (27) ROW
China 0 0.19 0.25 80.15 0.16 2.47 1.90 5.70 12.94 16.10 11.03
101.40
3.19 2.77 -7.36
Japan 7.77 0 1.91 1.73 1.28 10.93 -1.11 5.59 12.10 33.03 21.06 36.96 27.44 13.27 22.33
Korea,
Republic
of
25.03 3.79 0 5.70 1.93 4.14 2.70 7.78 22.25 55.24 26.41 63.47 27.02 15.65 -6.14
Hong
Kong
SAR, China
66.53 0.75 -0.67 0 -0.66 1.02 0.00 3.98 7.61 75.55 16.97 75.33 0.84 3.36 20.47
India 0.09 -0.04 -1.28 18.56 0 1.27 0.71 58.25 94.35 94.54 98.98 117.62 -26.85 3.20 6.03
Australia -12.32 -0.31 -0.21 3.36 -1.24 0 0.00 -14.03 1.16 -18.71 -20.39 -17.51 57.76 313.70 -253.96
Indonesia 14.93 -0.08 0.02 1.69 0.15 0.74 0 29.67 7.53 28.61 31.97 53.69 -0.09 28.59 17.80
Singapore
a
11.92 12.50 -1.53 -11.84 0.64 -1.57 -3.70 0 17.32 40.21 25.73 41.76 0.95 58.18 -0.89
ASEAN 3.61 1.87 0.17 19.87 2.56 1.00 18.66 22.22 61.40 58.64 36.63 83.01 2.17 136.02 -121.21
RCEP (15)
5.62 0.90 1.17 51.10 1.16 9.08 4.20 10.78 14.23 33.65 29.15 93.15 29.39 71.85 -94.39
CPTPP (11)
4.45 18.30 6.79 8.69 2.69 -5.33 1.34 4.78 17.62 43.07 19.22 57.01 66.91 125.87 -149.78
ASIA
23.81 0.88 0.75 30.89 0.67 5.73 2.55 8.44 12.47 49.77 28.72 86.06 17.46 59.98 -63.50
the US
4.36 1.27 -1.87 5.49 -0.03 0.93 -0.25 4.15 -6.34 -1.45 15.33 14.88 0 27.17 57.95
Source: Based on IMF Coordinated Direct Investment Survey (CDIS) database and the data from the Statistical Bureaus of the individual economy.
Notes: Inter-dependence Index for Outward FDI of X on Y (OFDIIXY) = OFDIXY/OFDIWX, OFDIXY = FDI outflow from economy Y to X,
OFDIWX = total global FDI outflow from economy X.
-- = Not available.
The negative percentage means the negative value of FDI outflow from economy X to Y, i.e., net inflow from economy Y to X.
a
The outward FDI data of Singapore was those in 2019.
Reporter
Boao Forum for Asia Asian Economic Outlook and Integration Progress Annual Report 2022
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5.2 Outlook of Cross-Border
Investment in Asia
Compared with the global average level in 2020,
cross-border investment in Asian economies recovered
faster. Global cross-border direct investment is expected
to see a rebound in 2021 and 2022.1 Better investment
environment in Asian economies, the entry into
force and gradual implementation of RCEP among
members, and the further promotion of investment
stabilization and facilitation measures will still be
conducive to the good performance of cross-border
investment in Asia.
Thanks to the rapid recovery and growth of China's
economy, the sharp increase in service industry
investment and the continuous promotion of investment
facilitation measures, the amount of foreign investment
absorbed by China in 2021 has increased by more
than 20 percent on the basis of 2020. Since the
introduction of the first version of the negative list of
foreign capital access in 2013, the list has been revised
six times by the end of 2021. The special management
measures have been reduced from 190 in the first version
to 31 in the 2021 national list. China has basically opened
up the manufacturing industry and are steadily and
continuously opening up the agricultural and service
industry, which has played a positive role in realizing the
continuous foreign investment growth in China. FDI in
the digital economy sectors and infrastructure-related
industries helped to mitigate the fall of FDI in other sectors
in the wake of the pandemic in ASEAN, which will lead to
increase of future productivity and attract more FDI.
The further strengthening of regional economic
connections in Asian economies is conducive to direct
investment growth in the region. The RCEP agreement
was signed in November 2020 and entered into force
in some member states in 2022. The role of RCEP in
promoting investment has been obvious, which is
reflected in the rapid rise of RCEP's internal investment
dependence and its attraction to Asian capitals. With the
implementation of the agreement, the internal and
external investments RCEP could attract will further
increase.
1 UNCTAD. Global Investment Trend Monitor, Issue 40, January 2022.
Chapter 6 Financial Cohesion and Development in Asia
121
Chapter 6
FinancialCohesionand
DevelopmentinAsia
Financial cohesion is an important part of Asian
economic integration. Stepping out of the shadow of
the Asian financial crisis (AFC) in late 1990s, Asian
economies have actively integrated into the global
supply and production chain, enjoyed rapid
economic growth and made remarkable progress in
regional integration. Finance is crucial to economic
development. Drawing lessons from the AFC, Asian
economies have, on the whole, adopted sound
macroeconomic policies including macro-
prudential management, strengthened financial
institutions and opening up their financial markets. As
a strong magnet for global financial capital, Asia
contributed significantly to the sound operation of
the international financial and monetary system.
Since the outbreak of COVID-19, the world and
Asian economies have been hit hard. New variants of
the Coronavirus continue to emerge and industrial
and supply chains are hampered. Looking ahead to
2022, global inflation is hiking, commodity prices are
soaring, and economic recovery becomes uneven
and hard to sustain. The International Monetary Fund
forecasted a 4.4% growth of the world economy in
2022. The major advanced economies begin to TAPER
and normalize their monetary policies, posing risks of
stagflation, debt sustainability, financial market
instability for Asia and many developing economies.
The financial cohesion in Asia will help Asian
economies tackle with international challenges and
promote regional and global financial stability.
This chapter mainly analyzes the degree of
cohesion and development of Asian financial markets
from three aspects: the openness of Asian financial
markets, currency cooperation and the vigorous
international financial centers in Asia.
6.1 Financial Market Openness
in Asia
This section uses the cross-border portfolio
investment data from the IMF Coordinated Portfolio
Investment Survey (CPIS) to analyze the degree of
openness and development of Asian financial
markets. The global portfolio investment decreased in
2018, and rebounded in 2019, with the total amount
reaching USD66.7 trillion. In 2020, despite the heavy
blow of COVID-19 to the global economy, the global
portfolio investment registered USD76.32 trillion, up
14.4% year-on-year increase (see Figure 6.1). At the
end of 2020, the total portfolio investment outflow
from Asian economies had reached USD11.55 trillion,
an increase of 15.8%. This figure is broadly the same as
that in 2019, and slightly higher than the global
average (see Figure 6.2). At the same year, Asia’s
portfolio investment inflow recorded USD8.9 trillion
and grew by 18.40%, 4 percentage points higher than
that in 2019, indicating that Asian financial markets
maintained its attractiveness during the epidemic.
Within Asia, Japan ranked first in terms of
absolute value of portfolio investment outflow. From
2017 to 2020, Japan’s outstanding portfolio investment
Boao Forum for Asia Asian Economic Outlook and Integration Progress Annual Report 2022
122
outflow reached USD4,106.257 billion, USD4,068.775
billion, USD4,536.099 billion and USD5,073.668 billion
respectively. In 2020, Japan’s outflow growth reached
USD537.587 billion, up 11.85%. China has seen its
portfolio investment outflow growing at a rate of
39.3%, not only higher than Asia’s average (15.8%), but
also more than doubled the global average (14.4%)
(see Figure 6.2). For Asia as a whole, portfolio
investment inflow kept growing in the past two years,
with a rate exceeding the global average (see Figure
6.3). Within Asia, Japan, China and the Republic of
Korea are the major economies absorbing portfolio
investment inflows. In 2020, Japan absorbed USD
472.53 billion portfolio inflows, while China attracted
USD433.22 billion. Portfolio inflows both to China and
Japan have enjoyed rapid growth. In 2019 and 2020,
that to China grew by 21.8% and 30.2%, while that to
Japan increased by 11.5% and 17.1%. (see Figure 6.3).
From the perspective of a longer time span, since
2010, except for in 2011 and 2015, China has enjoyed
0ver 15% yearly high growth of portfolio investment
inflow. In general, from 2010 to 2020, the portfolio
investment inflows to Asian economies grew quicker
than that of the world for most part of the time,
showing strength of Asian economies and financial
markets and their long-term attraction to capital (see
Figure 6.4).
Figure 6.1 Capital Outflow Under Global Portfolios,
2017-2020
Source: CPIS, complied by the author, several countries and regions with incomplete data were deleted.
Chapter 6 Financial Cohesion and Development in Asia
123
Figure 6.2 Capital Inflow Under Global Portfolios, 2017-2020
Source: CPIS, complied by the author, several countries and regions with incomplete data were deleted.
Figure 6.3 Capital Inflow Under Global Portfolios, 2009-2020
Source: CPIS, complied by the author, several countries and regions with incomplete data were deleted. To maintain comparability, countries
in the region are aligned with the capital outflow chart.
Note: Asia, China, Japan and the Republic of Korea (right axis).
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Figure 6.4 Growth Rate (Year-on-Year) of Capital Inflow Under
Global Portfolios, 2010-2020
Source: CPIS, complied by the author, several countries and regions with incomplete data were deleted. To maintain comparability, countries
in the region are aligned with the capital outflow chart.
6.2 Progress in Asian
Monetary Cooperation
A major focus of Asian monetary cooperation is
to fortify global, regional and bilateral financial safety
nets. Since the global financial crisis, global policymakers
have strengthened the global financial safety net. The
IMF has greatly expanded its capacity to provide
liquidity support to economies in balance of payments
crisis by issuing special drawing rights and enlarging
the general borrowing arrangements. In September
2021, the IMF made a "historic decision" to carry out a
new round of special drawing rights allocation with a
scale of USD650 billion. 1 Emerging market and
developing economies, including developing Asia,
received USD275 billion in Special Drawing Right
1 https://baijiahao.baidu.com/s?id=1707126021795846929&wfr=spider&for=pc.
(SDR), enhancing their ability of self-bailout and
mutual support and further strengthening the global
financial safety net.
The construction of financial safety net in Asia
began after the AFC. In 1998, the 10 ASEAN countries
and China, Japan and Korea established the "10+3"
financial cooperation mechanism and established the
Chiang Mai Initiative (CMI) in 2000. All countries
decided to jointly provide liquidity assistance to
countries with balance of payments problems. In
2007, “10+3” agreed to "merge" multiple bilateral
agreements into a single reserve pool to better play
the rescue role in times of crisis. In 2009, Hong Kong
Special Administrative Region of China became a new
contributor. In 2020, the Chiang Mai Initiative
multilateralization agreement came into force with a
Chapter 6 Financial Cohesion and Development in Asia
125
total size of USD120 billion, serving as a key regional
financial safety net. In 2012, member economies
continued to deepen the multilateral monetary
agreement, doubled the scale of investment and
increased the proportion of decoupling from the loan
conditions of the IMF. In April 2021, the special revised
version of the CMIM agreement signed by the finance
ministers and central bank governors of “10 + 3” and
the Head of the Hong Kong Monetary Authority came
into force. The revisions included that members can
provide local currency-denominated loans on a voluntary
and demand-driven basis. The local currency funding
provisions will promote the use of Asian currencies. In
addition, "10 + 3" also strengthened the economic
assessment and early warning of regional economies.
In terms of bilateral local currency swaps, since
2020, many Asian centered banks and monetary
authorities have further promoted bilateral local
currency swap, settlement and other monetary
cooperation. By the end of 2020, the People’s Bank of
China (PBC) had signed bilateral local currency swap
agreements with central banks or monetary
authorities in 40 countries and regions, with a total
amount of more than RMB3.99 trillion. The scale of the
bilateral currency swap agreement renewed with the
Bank of Korea expanded to USD59 billion, the largest
among the currency swap agreements signed by the
PBC. Japan attaches great importance to establishing
currency swap arrangements with many Asian
countries, including Indonesia, the Philippines,
Singapore and other ASEAN countries, and adds a
liquidity crisis prevention mechanism to some
currency swap agreements. In 2021, the Bank of Japan
and the PBC renewed the bilateral currency swap
agreement, with a scale of RMB200 billion/3,400
billion yen. India actively promotes currency swap
arrangements under the framework of the South
Asian Association for Regional Cooperation. The latest
currency swap arrangement period is 2019-2022, and
the Reserve Bank of India will provide a swap
arrangement line of USD2 billion. In 2021,
Bangladesh and Sri Lanka launched a currency
swap agreement, and the Central Bank of Bangladesh
will provide Sri Lanka with a loan of USD250 million.
The currency swap arrangements of South Asian
countries help to enhance their ability to cope
with the decline of foreign exchange reserves
and the risk of exchange rate fluctuations during
the epidemic.
The use of local currency settlement is the
cornerstone of practical monetary cooperation in
Asia. The use of RMB in China’s foreign trade and
investment settlement continued to grow. In 2020,
the RMB settlement volume of China’s trade in goods
exceeded RMB4 trillion. Indonesia has actively
promoted the expansion of the Local Currency
Settlement (LCS) framework signed with the central
banks of Thailand, Malaysia and the Philippines. In
August and September 2021, Bank of Indonesia
successively signed LCS agreements with the Ministry
of finance of Japan and the PBC, identifying their
commercial banks as Appointed Cross Currency
Dealer (ACCD). As the G20 chair in 2022, Indonesia
actively promotes the use of local currency settlement
in bilateral trade and investment. At the meeting of
G20 central bank governors and finance ministers in
last February, Indonesia proposed an annual target of
increasing local currency settlement by 10%.
In 2021, the proportion of Asian currencies in
global payment and settlement continued to increase
(see Figure 6.5). According to SWIFT data, as of
December 2021, the share of RMB in international
payments rose to 2.70% from 2.14% in November.
In the same month, the share of RMB in international
payments rose to the fourth. The Japanese yen
ranked fifth, the Hong Kong dollar ranked eighth
and the Singapore dollar ranked ninth, accounting
for 2.58%, 1.17% and 0.95% respectively. Thai baht
and Malaysia’s ringgit are also among the list of Top
20 payment currencies in the world.
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Figure 6.5 Share of International Payments in Major Global
Currencies, December 2021
Source: SWIFT.
6.3 Development and
Innovation of Asian
International Financial Centers
6.3.1 Asian Cities Occupy an Important
Position in the Global Financial Center Cities
According to the Global Financial Centers Index
(GFCI) in 2021, Hong Kong Special Administrative
Region of China, Singapore, Shanghai, Beijing and
Tokyo ranked third, fourth, sixth, eighth and ninth
among the top ten financial center cities in the world.
Asian cities hold more than half of the seats.
Despite of the significant impact of COVID-19 on
the flows of personnel and capital in of Asian financial
center, the economic growth of Singapore and Hong
Kong Special Administrative Region of China in 2021
reached 7.2% and 6.4% respectively. GDP of Beijing
and Shanghai reached USD624.2 billion and USD669.9
billion respectively, and that of Shenzhen reached
USD475.3 billion (see Figure 6.6). Tokyo is still the
largest urban economy in Asia. Before the epidemic in
2019, its metropolitan area GDP was close to USD1
trillion, surpassing all other financial central cities in
Asia.
Chapter 6 Financial Cohesion and Development in Asia
127
Figure 6.6 GDP of Asian Financial Center Cities
Sources: The GDP data for Beijing, Shanghai and Shenzhen come from their respective city statistics bureaus, and the RMB exchange rate
against the US dollar comes from an annual average. Data for Singapore and Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of China
come from the World Bank. Nominal GDP for Singapore and Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of China in 2021 has not
yet been released. The figures come from the aggregate calculation of nominal GDP of 2020, real growth and annual inflation.
The added value of Beijing’s financial industry
reached RMB760.37 billion in 2021, a year-on-year
increase of 4.5%, accounting for 18.9% of its GDP.
Comparing the two urban economies of Hong Kong
Special Administrative Region of China and
Singapore, it can be seen that the share of the added
value of HKSAR’s financial industry in its GDP has
stabilized at about 20% in recent two or three years,
while the share trended upward in Singapore from
9.7% to 14.3% in the past decade (see Figure 6.7). The
figure for Tokyo is relatively low, basically stable at
about 9%. In addition to the financial industry, retail
trade, manufacturing, information technology and
real estate are also the pillar industries of Tokyo (see
Figure 6.8).
Important progress has been made in the
construction of international financial centers in West
and Central Asia. Abu Dhabi International Financial
Center attaches importance to the leading role of
financial technology. In May 2021, the Abu Dhabi
Global Market Digital Lab (ADGM Digital Lab) Platform
was officially launched. It was jointly built by China’s
OneConnect Financial Technology and Abu Dhabi
International Financial Center, providing a new
platform for many types of financial institutions to
exchange modes and technologies. Kazakhstan’s
Astana International Financial Center, established in
2018, has established a special green finance center to
support the issuance of green bonds, and plans to
become a regional RMB settlement center.
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Figure 6.7 Evolution of the Proportion of Added Value of Financial
Industry to GDP in Singapore, Hong Kong SAR, China and Tokyo
Sources: The data of Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of China come from Statista, Singapore data from the Ministry of Trade and
Industry, and Tokyo data from the Tokyo Metropolitan Statistics Office.
Figure 6.8 The Share of Various Industries in Tokyo’s GDP, 2019
Source: the Tokyo Metropolitan Statistics Office.
6.3.2 Asian Stock Markets Are Enjoying
Steady Development
Asian stock markets are also developing steadily.
China’s Shanghai Stock Exchange, Shenzhen Stock
Exchange, Hong Kong Stock Exchange, Tokyo Stock
Exchange, Korea Stock Exchange and Singapore Stock
Exchange, and India’s National Stock Exchange are all
important trading venues serving home and abroad.
Over the past decade, Asia’s major exchanges have
experienced rapid growth in market capitalization
(see Figure 6.9). The market capitalization of listed
companies is an important index to measure the
importance and influence of exchanges. By the end of
2021, the market capitalization of Shanghai Stock
Exchange was RMB51,969.834 billion (about
USD8,057.3 billion), that of Shenzhen Stock Exchange
was RMB39,638.98 billion (about USD6,145.6 billion),
and that of Hong Kong Stock Exchange was 42,272.77
billion Hong Kong dollars (about USD5,438.9 billion)
(see Figure 6.9). The market capitalization of the first
and second parts of the Tokyo stock exchange market
Chapter 6 Financial Cohesion and Development in Asia
129
and the gem is 753 trillion yen. If the two parts of
Japan Association of Securities Dealers Automated
Quotation (JASDAQ) and Tokyo Pro market are
included, the market capitalization of the Tokyo Stock
Exchange reaches 933 trillion yen (about USD8.2
trillion) (see Figure 6.10). The total trading volume of
the Tokyo Stock Exchange in Japan significantly
exceeded that of the exchanges in several other
economies (the Republic of Korea, India, Singapore,
Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of China).
Ernst & Young’s statistics show that the year 2021 saw
the most active IPO market and China is the most
active among all. Six of the world’s top ten IPOs were
Chinese enterprises, and the Shanghai Stock
Exchange and Hong Kong Stock Exchange accounted
for half of the top ten IPOs. In October 2021, Paytm, a
well-known Unicorn company in India, landed on the
Indian Stock Exchange and raised USD2.2 billion,
becoming the largest IPO in the Indian market in 2021.
In August 2021, Bukalapak, an e-commerce platform,
was listed in Indonesia, raising USD1.5 billion, and
making the largest IPO in Indonesia. In December
2021, Singapore real estate investment trust digital
core REIT was listed on the main board of the
Singapore Stock Exchange, raising USD600 million,
the largest IPO scale in the Singapore stock market in
the whole year. The attraction of Asian exchanges to
high-quality enterprises has continued unabated.
Global stock exchanges are highly competitive,
and all parties continue to push through the old and
bring forth the new. In order to better attract the
attention of potential listed companies, especially
large technology companies, unicorns and investors
around the world, Asian stock exchanges actively
adapt to the new situation and embrace new
technologies. In the whole year of 2021, China’s SSE
STAR Market, the Sci-Tech Innovation Board, added
160 listed companies, including 19 companies in the
semiconductor industry chain, and raised funds of
RMB200.7 billion. By the end of 2021, the market
capitalization of these listed companies had reached
RMB2.13 trillion. The total market capitalization of the
SSE STAR Market reached RMB5.95 trillion, an increase
of 70.33% over the end of 2020. In September 2021,
Beijing Stock Exchange (BSE) was registered and
established. This is China’s first corporate-owned stock
exchange. The establishment of the BSE is a
continuation of comprehensively deepening the
reform of the New Third Board. It is positioned to serve
innovative small and medium-sized enterprises and
opens a new chapter in the multi-level layout of
China’s capital market. By the end of 2021, the total
number of listed companies on BSE had reached 82,
with a total market capitalization of RMB272.275
billion.
As the regulatory environment of the US stock
market tightens, the adverse impact of Sino-US trade
friction on the listing environment of Chinese concept
stocks in the US is emerging, and more overseas-listed
Chinese firms began to return to the Hong Kong SAR
of China market. According to Wind data, in 2021, a
total of 8 overseas-listed Chinese firms were listed in
Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of China for
the second time, including Ctrip group, Baidu group,
bilibili and other well-known companies. Of course,
the return of these stocks may impose certain liquidity
and give pressure on stocks prices over Hong Kong
Stock Exchange in the short term, bringing pressure
to the stock price. But in the long run, high-quality oversea-
listed Chinese stocks are expected to be favored by long-
term investors home and abroad. Hong Kong Stock
Exchange has also accelerated the pace of
institutional innovation. In December 2021, it
announced the consultation summary on special
purpose acquisition companies and the revision
opinions on the Securities Listing Rules of the Hong Kong
Exchange Limited, which will open a new channel for
the listing of special purpose acquisition companies.
This has adapted to the new situation of the global
capital market and enhanced the attraction of the
Hong Kong Stock Exchange to global unicorn enterprises.
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Figure 6.9 The Evolution of Stock Market Capitalization of Chinese Mainland and
Hong Kong SAR, China
Source: CEIC.
Notes: Chinese mainland (left axis); Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of China (right axis).
Figure 6.10 Stock Market Capitalization of Tokyo Stock Exchange, Including First,
Second and the GEM
Source: CEIC.
Note: Growth Enterprise Market (GEM).
The stock trading volume is a measurement of
the activeness of the stock market. The stock trading
volume in Chinese mainland exceeds that of other
economies, showing a relatively prosperous trading
situation, followed by Japan and the Republic of Korea
(see Figure 6.11). It can be seen that the prosperity and
economic strength of the economy are the
underlying forces for stock trading. This index of Hong
Kong Special Administrative Region of China accounts
for a higher GDP proportion, followed by the Republic
of Korea, China and Japan (see Figure 6.12). Of course,
this is related to the key feature of Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region of China as an urban economy
and an international financial center. Measured by the
domestic share turnover ratio index, China, the
Republic of Korea and Japan have most active stock
markets in Asia (see Figure 6.13).
Chapter 6 Financial Cohesion and Development in Asia
131
Figure 6.11 Evolution of Total Annual Stock Trading Volume of
Asian Financial Center Stock Exchanges
Source: the World Bank.
Figure 6.12 Evolution of Total Annual Value of Stock Trading volume as a
Percentage of GDP on Asian Financial Center Stock Exchanges
Source: the World Bank.
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Figure 6.13 Annual Turnover Ratio of Domestic Shares Traded on the
Asian Financial Center Stock Exchanges
Source: the World Bank. .
6.3.3 International Financial Centers
Accelerate the Development of Fintech
The analysis of the financial technology industry,
users and ecological development of more than 80
cities in the world in the 2021 Global Financial
Technology Center City Report shows that the top nine
financial technology centers in the first tier are Beijing,
San Francisco, New York, Shanghai, Shenzhen,
London, Hangzhou, Singapore and Chicago. The
report also shows that financial technology
experience in developing countries and Asia gained
high ranking and all of the top 10 cities in this regard
are located in Asia. Hangzhou ranked first in the global
consumer experience for three consecutive years, and
Shenzhen second with more than 90% of financial
technology users for the first time. The Southeast
Asian market also performed well, and the experience
of Fintech consumers in Singapore, Kuala Lumpur and
other cities continued to improve.
The forces of the market, technology, and rules
and regulations have played important roles in the
development of Fintech firms in Asia’s international
financial centers. In February 2022, the PBC and other
four departments of government issued the
Development Plan for Financial Standardization
During the 14th Five-Year Plan Period, steadily
promoted the construction of financial technology
standards, and strengthened the development and
effective application of standards such as cloud
computing, block chain, big data, artificial intelligence,
biometrics and the Internet of things. The Hong Kong
Monetary Authority announced the “financial
technology 2025” strategy in June 2021, strengthening
cross-border financial technology cooperation and
promoting the implementation of new cross-border
payment technologies. Singapore has attracted strong
investment in Fintech. In 2021, Singapore’s financial
technology industry recorded a five-year high of 191
transactions, and the total transaction volume
increased by 59% to USD3.94 billion from USD2.48
billion in 2020, through venture capital (VC) and
private equity (PE) investment and mergers and
acquisitions (M&A). The Singapore Monetary Authority
also launched the regulatory sandbox PLUS, relaxed
the application threshold, improved the subsidy
application process, and better helped Fintech
institutions obtain funds, regulatory support and
industry exchanges.
References Financial Cohesion and Development in Asia
133
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Boao Forum for Asia Asian Economic Outlook and Integration Progress Annual Report 2022
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Preparation Notes and Acknowledgements Financial Cohesion and Development in Asia
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Preparation Notes and
Acknowledgements
This annual Report is co-edited by Professor Zhang Yuyan, Director of the Institute of World
Economics and Politics, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, Professor Lin Guijun, former Vice President
of the University of International Business and Economics, and Cao Li, Vice President of the Boao Forum
for Asia Academy. Vice President Cao Li is also responsible for the overall organization and coordination
of the Report.
The Report is divided into two parts, Part 1 is titled "Asian Economic Outlook" and is edited by
Professor Zhang Yuyan. In terms of division of the writing, the Overview was written by Xu Xiujun,
Chapter 1 was written by Feng Weijiang (1.1 and 1.2), Xiong Aizong (1.3 and 1.4) and Jia Zhongzheng
(1.5), and Chapter 2 was written by Xu Xiujun (2.1 and 2.2), Jia Zhongzheng (2.3) and Tu Xinquan, Li Siqi
and Du Yingxin (2.4). Part 1 was finally proofread by Zhang Yuyan and Xu Xiujun. Part 2 is on "Asian
Economic Integration Progress", co-edited by Professor Lin Guijun and Vice President Cao Li, and the
writing team included Cao Li (Overview), Pei Jiansuo and Zhang Meng (3.1), Deng Shizhuan (3.2), Wang
Fei (4.1), GaoKailin (4.2), DengHaowen (4.3), Wang Chunrui (5), WangQianzheng (6). From the
formulation to the conclusion of the Report, all members of the writing team worked diligently and
cooperatively to ensure the smooth delivery of the Report with outstanding professionalism and
enthusiasm.
Mr. Li Baodong, the Secretary-General of Boao Forum for Asia, provided comprehensive guidance
and assistance during the conceptualization and writing of the Report. Four experts, including Yao
Wang, former Executive Director of Boao Forum for Asia Academy and President of the Western
Returned Scholars Association,Wang Yuzhu, Researcher of the Asia-Pacific and Global Strategy Institute
of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, Secretary General of the Asia Pacific Society of China, Sang
Baichuan, Director of the Institute of International Economics of the University of International Business
and Economics, and Shen Jianguang, Chief Economist of the JD Group made professional comments
on the Report. We would like to express our sincere gratitude to the Secretary General of the Forum
and the review experts for their contributions to the Report!
We thank the team of the University of International Business and Economics Press for their
professional editing and publishing job. We also thank Liu Yan, Peng Liyang, Xue Chen, Xie Zhiyu, Zhou
Yifan at Boao Forum for Asia Academy for their support in the editing process.
Despite full efforts, the Report is liable to mistakes or omissions due to our limited knowledge. The
authors take responsibility for the contents.
Boao Forum for Asia Asian Economic Outlook and Integration Progress Annual Report 2022
136