
Theory of organizational design
29
bij op, beginnend met 1000’ for Dutch pupils, as ‘1000, + 2, +2, etc.’, or
as ‘1000, 1002, 1004,…’.14 Methodology as a set of rules is the
methodology-in-use of competent practitioners, methodology as a set of
rule-formulations is a methodology-on-paper, the result of reflection,
codification, systematization, validation, and amelioration activities. A
methodology-on-paper is a stylized narrative about how to act, possibly in
the form of procedures, phase-models, diagrams, ‘if…then’ statements, or
best practice stories. Constructing and telling these narratives is a practice
of its own. This practice may be closely related to the practice to which it
refers, for instance when methodological narratives are told as a part of
explanations, justifications, or evaluations of competent practitioners. But
it may also be uncoupled from practice, and become a part of academic
work, or of practitioners’ professionalization activities. In those cases, the
point of articulating rules lies outside the original practice itself, in the
14 This example refers to a famous example from Wittgenstein’s (1953) Philosophical
Investigations. A boy is told to follow the rule ‘add 2, starting from 1000’. He performs this
action correctly with numbers below 1000, but after that he starts writing down ‘1000, 1004,
1008’. Apparently, he regards adding over a 1000 as a new situation, and applies the rule ‘add
2, starting from 1000’ as what people who are competent in adding practices, would regard as,
‘add 2 up to 1000, 4 up to 2000, 6 up to 3000, and so on’. He might also have written the
series ‘1000, 10002, 100022, 1000222’, ‘1010, 1100, 1110’, counting binary, or write down
‘1002’ and stop. Wittgenstein uses this example to explicate the paradox that many courses of
action may be thought to be in accordance with the rule ‘add 2, starting from 1000’. He says:
“no course of action could be determined by a rule, because every course of action can be
made out to accord with a rule. […] if everything can be made out to accord with a rule, then
it can also made out to conflict with it. And so there would be neither accord nor conflict
here,” (Wittgenstein, 1953, section 201). This paradox has aroused a lot of discussion among
philosophers and social theorists (e.g. Bloor vs. Lynch in Pickering, 1992). A solution that has
been proposed is to say that we know how to follow a rule, because we know how to
interpret the rule correctly. However, this solution has some unattractive facets. An
interpretation is a rule to apply a rule, and has the same ‘shortcoming’ as other rules. It is
possible to add a rule to interpret rules, but this would lead to a regressus ad infinitum. To
stop this regression, so-called rule skepticists argue that through education, training and
socialization, we have been taught which interpretation is regarded as correct (Kripke, 1982;
Bloor, 1983, 1992). According to skepticists, practices are dependent, through interpretations,
on social structures and culture. Another solution is to assert that Wittgenstein’s paradox is
about the relation between rule-formulations and practices and not about the relation between
rules and practices. Rules have an internal relation with practice, they are rules-in-use (Baker
& Hacker, 1984, 1985). According to the propagators of this solution, the mistake of the rule
skepticists is to isolate rules from practice, and to create a ‘quasi-causal’ picture of rule –
following, in which a rule is to determine practice (Shanker, 1987; Lynch, 1992). If rules and
practices are considered internally related, the question “’how does the rule determine this as
its application?’ makes no more sense than: ‘how does this side of the coin determine the
other side as its obverse?’” (Baker & Hacker, 1984, p. 96).