The Historical Misrepresentation of the Confederacy’s War Horse: Antebellum, Gettysburg, and the Lost Cause PDF Free Download
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Southern New Hampshire University
James Longstreet
The Historical Misrepresentation of the Confederacy’s War Horse: Antebellum, Gettysburg, and
the Lost Cause
A Capstone Project Submitted to the College of Online and Continuing Education in Partial
Fulfillment of the Master of Arts in History
By
James L. Raube
Alta, Wyoming
September 2023
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Copyright © 2023 by James L. Raube
All Rights Reserved
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Abstract
General James Longstreet had a long and fruitful life in military service. He was one of
the few proponents of positive change after the downfall of the Confederate States of America,
but for it was criticized. However, his personal and professional connections with various
individuals such as Ulysses S. Grant and Robert E. Lee made him the focal point for criticism of
the Lost Cause Movement and post-war Southern sympathizers. These individuals and
organizations took control of America’s media as well as the stories of Civil War soldiers.
Anyone who went against the Lost Cause’s narrative would be subject to extensive scrutinization
as well as personal attacks on their character and image. Longstreet’s forward-thinking mind and
willingness to accept defeat of the South made him the prime target for Southern hate.
Longstreet’s reputation was destroyed after the war for his honest criticism of the South’s
beloved hero: Robert E. Lee. Criticism from the South, as well as other Confederate
commanders, accused Longstreet of being a traitor and willingly attempting to destroy the Army
of Northern Virginia through his actions. The Battle of Gettysburg continues to be the focal point
for this disparity in the historical representation of Longstreet. This paper argues against these
accusations toward Longstreet and attempts to rewrite the false narrative surrounding his military
career and life in public service. Utilizing secondary and primary source evidence, this paper will
broaden the perception of Longstreet’s character in attempts to uphold his name in history.
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Dedication
I would like to dedicate this thesis to Paul Raube Jr. and General James Longstreet (C.S.A).
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Table of Contents
Abstract .......................................................................................................................................... iv
Dedication ........................................................................................................................................v
Table of Contents ........................................................................................................................... vi
List of Figures ............................................................................................................................... vii
Preface.......................................................................................................................................... viii
Acknowledgements ........................................................................................................................ ix
Introduction ......................................................................................................................................1
Chapter 1: The Antebellum Life of Old Pete ..................................................................................6
Chapter 2: The Historiography of Longstreet at Gettysburg .........................................................16
Chapter 3: The Gettysburg Disaster ...............................................................................................26
Chapter 4: Longstreet’s Post-War Actions ....................................................................................52
Chapter 5: The Lost Cause .............................................................................................................59
Conclusion .....................................................................................................................................72
Bibliography ..................................................................................................................................76
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List of Figures
Figure 1. Lt. Gen. Jas. Longstreet ................................................................................................... 7
Figure 2: Louisa Garland Longstreet ............................................................................................ 16
Figure 3: Lee's Northern Invasion ................................................................................................ 28
Figure 4: Gettysburg Day One ...................................................................................................... 33
Figure 5: Gettysburg Day 2........................................................................................................... 41
Figure 6: Gettysburg Day Three ................................................................................................... 47
Figure 7: Helen Longstreet ........................................................................................................... 56
Figure 8: James Longstreet at 70-80 Years Old............................................................................ 70
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Preface
During my adolescence I was surrounded by historical books and paintings. These
historical works quickly sparked my interest. Most notably, being named after General James
Longstreet made it nearly impossible to separate his life from mine. I recall hearing conflicting
stories about Longstreet throughout my adolescent life which left me confused about the
individual who gave my name depth and meaning. In poetic nature, I will be ending my
historical studentship with exactly what initially triggered my interest in the discipline. This
thesis provides the perfect opportunity for me to expand my knowledge of Longstreet and give a
definitive answer to my long-term curiosity surrounding Longstreet’s charter, life, and legacy.
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Acknowledgments
I would like to acknowledge my historical thesis Dr. Christopher Ward for his guidance and
insight during the writing of this thesis.
I would like to acknowledge the professors at Southern New Hampshire University as well as my
academic advisor Brett Fox for their counsel during my historical studies.
I would like to give warm thanks to my family, Rose, Paul, and Reilly Raube for their
overwhelming support through this long endeavor as well as Brooke Burkhart for her love and
care.
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Introduction
The American Civil War is filled with stories of valor, sacrifice, and heartbreak. During
the war, the American continent was quickly altered and separated though arbitrary boarders,
friendship, and political agendas. Despite many leaving the war with stories of courage and
bravery, not all who survived ended their military careers upon an ivory tower. General James
Longstreet of the Confederate States of America was one of those individuals whose story
punctured into history the fruits and famine of early American life. Longstreet, a lifelong
warrior, would fulfill his military requirements to the utmost degree. However, unlike many who
fought with him, he was one of the few that did not leave the world in a positive light amid
Southern heroes such as Robert E. Lee, Jefferson Davis, or “Stonewall” Jackson. Longstreet
became the Judas Iscariot of the Confederacy after the war.
The America Civil War was the bloodiest conflict to have been fought upon American
soil. The battle and leaders shaped the foundations of the United States. The war was a conflict
between the Northern states and the Southern states over the issue of slavery and states’ rights.
Angered at the North’s willingness to provide more power to the federal government, Southern
slaveholders became resentful. The morality of slavery perplexed a majority of United States
citizens when referring to the Constitution’s remarks that “every man be created equal”.
The disconnect between states’ rights and the federal government made for a hostile
situation. Southerners believed that it was the states that should decide the fate of slavery. This
narrow approach allowed for better representation of the population’s desires. The election of
President Abraham Lincoln, who greatly opposed the institution of slavery, indirectly threated
the South’s industry. In a response to the election, the Southern states succeeded from the Union
in attempts to uphold their rights. The first shots of the war were seen at Fort Sumter and with it
2
began the four-year conflict. Although the South had significantly fewer military resources, their
defensive style and pride allowed for them to become successful in the eastern theater of
operations. Commanding General Robert E. Lee led the Confederacy to achieve decisive
victories against their Northern foes.
With military success, Lee took the offensive and invaded the Northern States in 1863.
Fearful of the South’s invasion, President Lincoln called forth his entire army to meet Lee on the
field of battle. Knowing well that the North could lose the war, a decisive victory was needed.
Their much needed victory came to them at the Battle of Gettysburg and with it the downfall of
the Southern war effort. Despite the war lasting another two years, Lee would never regain his
former strength. The Civil war ended in 1865 with Lee surrendering at Appomattox Courthouse
to Union commander Ulysses S. Grant.
Post-war Reconstruction efforts quickly began. However, with President Lincoln’s
assassination, all hopes for a peaceful reunion of the states would falter. Ex-Confederate
sympathizers would diligently use this opportunity to reinstate their oppressive policies and with
it dominated federal politics and rhetoric. Despite the industry of slavery’s official downfall with
the Emancipation Proclamation, the South was able to continue their disenfranchisement of
African Americans. The surrender at Appomattox Courthouse was the official end to the war, but
due to the failures of reconstruction and the anger of Southern citizens made the United States a
hostile environment for those seeking peace.
Various movements to uphold Southern pride were successful. A major movement called
the Lost Cause successfully kept those seeking peace and African Americans from achieving
fruitful lives. Angered at their failure to achieve succession, the Lost Cause attempted to regain
3
control over the population through the media. Active propaganda though newspapers, film, and
literature allowed for the Lost Cause to continue the Southern legacy of slavery and racism.
Opposed to the Lost Causes rhetoric, James Longstreet, an ex-confederate commander,
took it upon himself to go against the South’s twisted agenda. Longstreet, being forward
thinking, sought peace, but for it became wrongfully belittled. Longstreet’s reputation during and
after the war became the focal point for Southern hatred. Longstreet became the unpopular
commander of the once formidable Army of Northern Virgina. Overshadowed by Robert E. Lee,
every aspect of Longstreet’s life became the target of the Lost Cause Movement and Southern
sympathizers. His willingness to accept defeat and desire to further the South’s future in a
progressive manner triggered extensive backlash. Labeled as a traitor and scalawag, Longstreet
was the favorable candidate for Southern hatred.
From a young age, Longstreet developed a forward-thinking mind. Throughout his
adolescence he developed a quiet and direct approach to conflict. Stoic, hardworking, and caring,
Longstreet established the perfect persona for military command. He developed an exceptional
strategic mind which later in life led him to be one of the prime candidates for military command
of the Confederacy. However, his bluntness and ridged desire to achieve success backfired
during and after the war.
The Battle of Gettysburg solidified the former general’s reputation as a traitor and
incapable commander. His boldness led him to openly criticize Lee after the war, which
immediately made him an outlaw within the South. In return, Confederate commanders
ostracized Longstreet from their ranks and questioned every aspect of his commitment to the
Confederacy. His commanding during Pickett’s Charge led to massive amounts of unjustified
4
criticism. As a result, Longstreet was falsely blamed for the Gettysburg disaster and ridiculed for
his actions during reconstruction.
This paper will address Longstreet’s personal life, character, military activity, and post-
war agendas in attempts to rewrite his controversial story. Utilizing primary documents such as
letters, newspapers, and military records, this paper will provide a pivotal collection of never-
before-seen analysis of the Confederate commander. This paper argues that Longstreet was not
to blame for the rebel failure at Gettysburg and therefore was wrongfully defamed after the war.
The Lost Cause movement of ex-Confederate soldiers blatantly and wrongfully destroyed
Longstreet’s reputation and the way he was depicted throughout history. The twisted agenda of
the South affected everyone seeking prosperity. Looking to uphold the Southern tradition of
racial hatred and the power of state’s rights, the Lost Cause was successful in its attempts to
monopolize the hearts and minds of the public. The South needed someone to blame for their
loss, and Longstreet was their antihero.
This paper will expose false claims against Longstreet as well as address secondary
literature surrounding the Battle of Gettysburg. In defense of Longstreet’s character, this
document directly targets the Lost Cause Movement for its wrongful actions and exposes gaps in
mainstream historical literature. To justify these claims, this paper considers all arguments made
by primary and secondary sources surrounding Longstreet to eliminate biases. It would be a
disservice to the historical community to take one account as dogma and therefore extensive
scope is utilized.
Post-war hatred and anger gave way to the Lost Cause and with it furthered the
disenfranchisement of Longstreet. Longstreet’s willingness to change perspective and own up to
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his mistakes made him an honorable character in history. The South’s bitterness destroyed an
honest man’s life. This paper intends to set the record straight.
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Chapter 1: The Antebellum Life of Old Pete
Born in 1821, James Longstreet’s future was undetermined. His exciting life outshined
most who enter the world, especially during the early foundation of the modern American
continent. Modest in his youth and homelife, James Longstreet witnessed everything good and
bad about Antebellum life.1 The Antebellum period was the 30 years prior to the American Civil
War. Born with powerful stature, excellent skill, and a methodical personality, Longstreet was
the perfect fit for military command. Each of his actions as an adolescent were unknowingly
designed for a fruitful life in military service for and against the United States. Growing up on a
farm with his Dutch ancestors, Longstreet developed a rugged persona. Knowing well of the
difficulties that his family faced, Longstreet worked hard to expand his technological education.
It was at this time that Longstreet experimented with technology such as steam power, cotton
gins, efficient sawmills, and other combustion mechanics used to support local infrastructure and
the economy.2 He developed his forward-thinking mind with these entrepreneurial interests. This
interest in machinery was also seen with James Longstreet’s second-generation ancestors, Dirck
and William Longstreet, or Langestraet as they were originally called. Many referred to his
ancestors as geniuses because of their systematic knowledge. This was because of their ability to
think analytically to achieve wealth and fame. Even at such a young age, James Longstreet’s
presence overpowered the majority of people who he surrounded himself with.
In the outskirts of Gainesville, Georgia, James Longstreet’s parents James and Mary Ann
Dent Longstreet allowed the young soldier to express his interests through physical activity and
1 D. B. Sanger, James Longstreet: Solder, Politician, Officeholder, and Writer (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State
University Press, 1952), 5. Sanger’s book is utilized in nearly every rendition of Longstreet’s life. It is the
foundational work that grounds most of Longstreet literature. Although the book provides significant bias toward
Longstreet, it does however display intriguing arguments for and against his depiction.
2 Sanger, James Longstreet, 6.
8
higher authority. His excessive stubbornness made for a rather difficult path. For his lack of
scholarly application, he was nearly expelled from school at a young age. Reviving poor grades
and acquiring backlash from teachers for bad temper, made his early education difficult. After an
unknown report of disobedience of orders, Longstreet was put on trial at West Point. It was here
that he was charged with three demerits and one account of disobeying orders. Dick Garnett, a
friendly eyewitness, along with Longstreet’s charm and wit, helped get these charges dropped.
Garnett, a later commander of one of Longstreet’s corps at the Battle of Gettysburg and victim of
Pickett’s Charge remained loyal to Longstreet until his death.6 Longstreet’s reputation and
likable nature allowed him to progress though school even with inferior grades and disdain of
teachers. However, difficulties in school were fairly common for many young cadets. At the
time, only one cadet had passed though West Point with a perfect record – Robert E. Lee, class
of 1829.7 Longstreet’s extensive knowledge was apparent, however when it came to displaying
his knowledge, he failed significantly. His struggle with schooling became extensively
exacerbated by the death of his father in 1833 when he struggled financially to remain in school.
Amid schooling, Longstreet had a decision to make: to stay with education or to live the
remainder of his life making ends meet while providing for his mother. Longstreet, visiting his
mother, when possible, decided to further his military education, and due to his absence, tensions
with family arose. After his mother’s passing in 1855 Longstreet would talk little of her again
and she would hardly be mentioned in his personal writings.8
6 H. J. Eckenrode, James Longstreet: Lee’s War Horse (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1986), 3;
James Longstreet, From Manassas to Appomattox, 13. Eckenrode’s book is greatly scrutinized by the historical
community for its lack of foundation in regard to source evidence. Although Eckenrode’s lack of a bibliography and
citations, his writings are confirmed to be true by later research.
7 Wert, General James Longstreet, 28.
8 Sanger, James Longstreet, 26.
9
After the death of his parents, Longstreet’s military life became more important to him.
Longstreet’s military impact could not have come at a more perfect time. With the onset of the
Mexican American War, Longstreet, like many other significant American characters had the
opportunity to rise in rank before the American Civil War. It was at this point in time when
Longstreet began to develop friendships with future president and general Ulysses S. Grant. This
friendship with Grant caused Longstreet’s reputation to be questioned after the Confederacy’s
defeat in the American Civil War. To Longstreet’s delight, Grant continued his soldier’s path
after graduating from West Point a year after Longstreet. Longstreet recalls his friendship with
Grant by stating in his memoirs:
But the next class after us (1843) was destined to furnish the man who was to eclipse all,
- to rise to the rank of general, an office made by congress to honor his services; who
became President of the United States, and for a second term; who received the
salutations of all the powers of the world in his travels as a private citizen around the
earth; of noble, generous heart, a lovable character, a valued friend, - Ulysses S. Grant.9
The two became inseparable. Through their years of service, Longstreet would continue to admit
his admiration for Grant. The two greatly influenced each other, not just in war but also in
civilian life. Both have the other to thank for introducing them to their wives, and both were
allegedly present at each other’s weddings. It was not until Grant’s death in 1885 that Longstreet
spoke publicly of their relationship. Longstreet published an article in the New York Times
named “Longstreet’s Reminiscences”. Longstreet publicly stated “He was the truest as well as
the bravest man that had ever lived… There was a charm that held us together”.10 Public support
of Grant during and after the war would scar Longstreet’s Southern reputation and made Lost
Cause sympathizers skeptical of his loyalty throughout his years of service in the Confederacy.
9 James Longstreet, From Manassas to Appomattox, 14.
10 “Longstreet Reminiscences”, New York Times, July 24, 1885.
10
Longstreet’s first military assignment was with the Fourth Infantry, stationed near St.
Louis.11 Despite Longstreet’s sense of security and friendships in St. Louis, in 1846 his
commander, Zachary Taylor transitioned Longstreet’s assignment to the Rio Grande. The young
Lieutenant Longstreet officially began his soldier’s journey. Longstreet recalls this moment in
1885:
In 1842 I was attached to the Fourth Infantry as Second Lieutenant. A year later Grant
joined the same regiment, stationed in the year at Fort Jefferson, 12 miles from St. Louis.
By the middle of October, 1846, three thousand eight hundred and sixty men of all arms
had concentrated at Corpus Christi.12
In 1846, “The Army of Observation” under the command of Zachary Taylor, sought
stability in Texas. Longstreet, fought side by side throughout the Mexican American War with
notable commanders Grant, Reynolds, Garnett, McLaws, Stewart, Hill, Hancock, and Pickett,
fought side by side throughout the Mexican American War. All these soldiers and more were
also present in the future pinnacle conflict: the Battle of Gettysburg. These individuals would
become intimately familiar with each other over the coming years. Longstreet stated that most
people who fought also greatly enjoyed their leisure time together. Other than fighting and
constant military drills, Longstreet and his peers enjoyed fishing and hunting near and in the Gulf
of Mexico. Additionally, courtesy of the officers, a theatre was constructed so that soldiers could
entertain each other with plays. Longstreet fondly remembered participating in the “Moor of
Venice” by William Shakespeare.13 The Mexican American War was shaped those who fought
later in American history. Little did these soldiers know that most would go their separate ways
after the Texas conflict and face off against each other on the field of war. The American Civil
11 Eckenrode, James Longstreet, 6.
12 “Longstreet Reminiscences”, New York Times, July 24, 1885; James Longstreet, From Manassas to Appomattox,
15.
13 James Longstreet, From Manassas to Appomattox, 15.
11
War was an unfortunate event where friends fought against friends. Many would die by the hand
of their previous comrades.
Longstreet was well-connected with those around him during the Mexican American
War. Significantly revered by his comrades, Longstreet was admired for his powerful stature and
fierce sense of battle tactics. Longstreet fought alongside Winfield Scott Hancock at the Battle of
Churubusco, where both upcoming generals made a name for themselves for their successful
campaigns. Hancock would later become the crux to Longstreet’s biggest “failure” at Gettysburg
on the slopes of Cemetery Ridge.14 Later battles of Molino del Rey, Vera Cruz, and Chapultepec
were further successes for Longstreet and contributed to his fruitful career. However, his push to
fame would quickly ended at the Battle of Chapultepec where he suffered from a bullet wound to
his thigh.15 The regimental flag that Longstreet was carrying was picked up by none other than
George Pickett, the same individual that would be famous for his disastrous charge at Gettysburg
at the direction of Robert E. Lee and Longstreet. Quickly rushed to a field hospital, Longstreet’s
military career came to a halt.16 Longstreet did not mention this setback in his memoirs.
After his injury at the Battle of Chapultepec, Longstreet’s military life took hold.
Meanwhile, the developing commander’s home life took a major turn. With Longstreet’s higher
status within the army as a major, he was allowed to wed his wife, Louisa Garland. Previous
restrictions to the marriage were delayed due in part to Louisa’s father who would only permit
marriage after Longstreet achieved the rank of major or higher. Retreating to Alabama and
14 James McPherson, Battle Cry of Freedom (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988), 4; H. J. Eckenrode, James
Longstreet, 8. McPherson is one of the greatest modern critics of Longstreet’s life. McPherson displays his dislike
for Longstreet when blaming him for the Confederate loss at Gettysburg.
15 Eckenrode, James Longstreet, 8.
16 Sanger, James Longstreet, 12.
13
Despite Longstreet’s past struggles with the education system, having the rather relaxing
station at Fort Bliss allowed the commander to make arrangements for his children to enter
reputable schools. Longstreet made significant strides as a father by attempting to set his eldest
child with a good schooling and proper funding amongst the most elite scholars, preferably in
New York, Pennsylvania, or South Carolina. Deciding on Columbia University, James
Longstreet would occasionally visit his son during his educational journey.19 It was during this
time that Longstreet would reunite again with his life-long friend Ulysses S. Grant. Noticing that
Grant was dressed poorly, Longstreet offered money to sharpen his friend’s appearance.
However, whether this payment was made in part of Longstreet’s kindness or due to Grant’s
inferior gambling is greatly argued. Longstreet recalls this meeting during his condolences after
Grants untimely death in 1885:
We engaged in the game of brag and five cent ante and similar diversions. We instructed
Grant in the mysteries of these games, but he made a poor player. The man who lost 75
cents in one day was esteemed in those times a peculiarly unfortunate person. I found
myself walking in front of Planters when I found myself in front of Grant. Placing in the
palm of my hand a five-dollar gold piece, insisted that I should take it in payment of a
debt of honor over 15 years old. I declined. Seeing the determination in the man’s face,
and in order to save him from mortification, I took the money, and shaking hands we
parted. The next time we met was at Appomattox.20
This payment was not made until after the end of the war. Longstreet and Grants paths diverged
during the late 1850s. Additionally, Fort Bliss allowed the meeting of more significant characters
such as J.E.B, Stuart, a young dragoon lieutenant, as well as R.S. Ewell, a captain. Both
individuals would witness Longstreet’s most controversial engagement at Gettysburg.21
19 John Eicher, Civil War High Commands (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2002), 350-353.
20 “Longstreet Reminiscences”, New York Times, July 24, 1885.
21 Sanger, James Longstreet, 14.
14
President Abraham Lincoln’s election in 1860 transitioned the United States into a hostile
realm of politicians and citizens. The suspense that Longstreet felt for the country was irregular
and difficult to navigate. The United States Army was split, and difficult decisions based on
family, friends, and homeland were beginning to be made. A large majority of citizens, including
Longstreet, dreaded the election and were scornful of the current state of the union. The country
was bitterly divided over constitutional rights and slave labor. A New York Times editor wrote,
“We demand that the constitution shall be respected and if we reject and secede from an
administration duly and constitutional formed, we will be committing treason ourselves, and
proclaim to the world our own inconsistency”.22 However, for many, including Longstreet, the
role of the federal government was considered inferior to the inseparable bond between a citizen
and its home state. Longstreet’s decision on secession was quickly decided after Lincoln’s
inauguration. The decision for many Southerners was difficult but necessary. Longstreet’s
devotion was first and foremost to his family and his home state of Alabama, not the federal
government. Longstreet formally offered his military service to aid the State of Alabama in the
case of conflict in early 1861, two months prior to Fort Sumter.
It was a sad day when we too leave of lifetime comrades and gave up a service of twenty
years. Neither Union officers nor their families made efforts to conceal feelings of
deepest regret. When we drove out from the post, a number of officers rode with us,
which only made the last farewell more trying. I reported on the 2d, and was assigned to
command of the First, Eleventh, and Seventeenth Regiments of Virginia Volunteers, to
be organized as a brigade. On the 6th they marched out. The regiments were stationed at
Manassas Junction.23
Longstreet was very connected to his home state of Alabama. Not only was it the home
of his ancestors, but it was also the place in which he helped raise his children. Any threat to the
22 “Southern Sentiment”, New York Times, November 6, 1860.
23 James Longstreet, From Manassas to Appomattox, 21, 22.
15
prosperity and wealth of Alabama was a direct attack on Longstreet. Alabama was inherently a
pro-slave state due to its location in the South and its massive agriculture network. Longstreet,
being familiar with slavery due to his upbringing, never had felt as if they were lesser beings.
However, it was part of Alabama culture and therefore a part of Longstreet’s life. However,
Longstreet’s tactical and economic mind did make him worry about the nationwide repercussions
of freeing African American slaves. Despite being a part of the Southern cause, Longstreet’s
primary reason for aligning himself with the Southern cause was never initially about slavery.
Longstreet’s unique approach to the slavery issue was far more progressive than most
Confederate warriors. Southern commanders such as Jubal Early, A.P. Hill, and Richard Ewell
would differ from Longstreet in their reasoning to fight for the South and therefore caused
tension between them later in life.24
It was in Longstreet’s nature to pick the difficult path when it came to challenges.
Naturally the South was at a severe disadvantage in all aspects thought the Civil War.
Longstreet’s stubbornness and determination for success drove him down an interesting path.
However, Longstreet never saw the Confederacy as a personal endeavor for fame but rather a
duty that became imposed on him as well as his elevated degree of care for his comrades. The
Battle of the First Manassas would quickly follow, and the physically and mentally destructive
war would rage on for many years. According to Robert E. Lee, Longstreet’s service to the
Confederacy was invaluable.25
24 Sanger, James Longstreet, 15; New Orleans Times, The Library of Congress, March 19, 1867.
25 Piston, Lee’s Tarnished Lieutenant, 7.
16
Chapter 2: The Historiography of Longstreet at Gettysburg
Secondary literature is at the forefront of the debate about Longstreet’s reputation
throughout history. To this day, Longstreet’s representation has continued to be questioned. As
for his actions at Gettysburg, there is a lack of cohesive evidence to suggest a single conclusion
as to whether or not Longstreet was at fault for the Southern defeat at Gettysburg. Historiography
of Longstreet provides an excellent lens into the continuation of Longstreet’s reputation and
depiction. His actions at Gettysburg were controversial. Despite the copious amounts of primary
source evidence that displays Longstreet’s movements, not all are analyzed the same. This
chapter will explain and provide dialogue between historical arguments to gain a foundation to
this controversial topic.1
Reardon, McPherson, Boritt, and Jones provide a useful lens on secondary sources about
Longstreet. Regarding historical methodologies, Jones and Boritt share similar styles. All these
historians utilize similar bibliographies and conclusions. These historians provide different
accounts of the Bettle of Gettysburg, most notably Pickett’s Charge. Pickett’s Charge was the
military engagement made on the part of Lee during the third day at Gettysburg. Pickett’s Charge
failed and with it created a massive amount of animosity toward those who commanded the
attack. Reardon and McPherson’s methodologies display the extreme ends of the spectrum
regarding the aftermath of Pickett’s Charge concerning Lee and Longstreet’s post-war
reputation. Both McPherson and Reardon’s bibliographies utilize a significant number of
1 James Raube, Historiographical Essay: Longstreet, Lee, and Pickett’s Charge (Alta: Southern New Hampshire
University, 2022); James Raube, Robert E. Lee: Analysis of Civil War Commanders and Traditional Military Theory
(Alta: Southern New Hampshire University, 2023). This chapter is a revised and peer reviewed edition on previous
historical research regarding the historiography of James Longstreet and Robert E. Lee. This chapter provides
additional arguments and revisions to the existing work in attempts to bolden these papers arguments. All rights of
content are confirmed and allowed by the author.
17
primary sources, mostly consisting of wartime correspondence between generals. Primary source
interpretation is a potential source of bias. For example, McPherson’s book Battle Cry for
Freedom neglects many primary sources that prove Longstreet’s innocence. McPherson’s
research heavily favors Lee’s side of the story. Historian Reardon displays bias in her research
when referring to General Pickett’s side of the story. Although the events of Gettysburg are well
researched, the interpretations on its outcome are greatly argued. General Longstreet is the focal
point of criticism.
Even though there is no way to rewrite history and change Pickett’s Charge, its impact on
history is of the highest concern. Pivotal events should be debated, well-researched, and
scrutinized. Arguably, if Pickett’s Charge had been a success, the American Civil War might
have ended very differently. Additionally, Longstreet’s reputation might have also been looked
upon more favorably. It is important to understand each historian’s motivation, bias, and
reasoning so that a historian can better understand the implications of military engagement.
Pickett’s Charge was the final nail in the coffin of the Confederacy offensive. Never again would
Lee regain his initial strength again. As for Longstreet and Pickett, their stories end much
differently.2
With Pickett’s division broken, his force was incapable of seeing action again. Pickett
recalls the horrors of Lee’s bold plan. Pickett, writing to his wife after the battle, recalling his
great defeat, made it very clear that he was angry at Robert E. Lee’s commanding. A backlash
occurred when Pickett’s criticism of Lee became available to the public. His discussions about
General Lee and the events during Gettysburg seemed controversial to many historians and
2 Raube, Historiographical Essay.
18
Southern sympathizers. Many stated that his words were false, and poorly edited by his wife,
LaSalle. It is important to note that no official copies of the letters were found.3
At the beginning of the second day of the Battle of Gettysburg, Longstreet was
increasingly concerned about the conflict.4 Throughout the three-day battle, Longstreet proposed
three different flanking maneuvers. Only one came to fruition. Scholars such as Carol Reardon
argue about Lee’s decision to disregard Longstreet’s proposal to flank the Northern army and
separate them from Washington.5 Some mention that Lee made a mistake, others say that he did
the right thing. According to historian Gellen Tucker, “No one can recreate the exact
conversation between Lee and Longstreet, but it is clear that Longstreet opposed the frontal
assaults on days two and three.”6 It is important to note that Longstreet was not the only officer
that opposed Lee’s attacks. A.P. Hill, Jubal Early, and Richard Ewell all showed extreme
reluctance to pursue the attack. Entrusting Longstreet’s military capabilities, Lee ordered
Longstreet to attack. Many reported that the night before the attack Longstreet was depressed.7
Knowing very well that the attack would fail, Longstreet foresaw the death of his fellow
comrades. Both of Lee’s assaults failed and they constituted the largest Southern defeat
throughout the Eastern Theater of Operations. Lee’s esteemed memory as one of the greatest
3 Gary W. Gallagher, “A Widow and Her Soldier: Lasalle Corbell Pickett as Author of the George E. Pickett
Letters.” The Virginia Magazine of History and Biography 94, no. 3 (1986): 331; LaSelle Corbell Pickett, ed., Heart
of a Soldier: As Revealed in the Intimate Letters of General George E. Pickett C.S.A. (New York: New York, 1913),
107. These letters are greatly criticized by historians such as McPherson and Boritt for their potential bias. However,
historians such as Reardon, Wert, and Piston would argue that they are critical to the story of Pickett’s Charge.
There was no reason for LaSalle Corbitt to alter her husband’s words for devious reasons.
4 James Longstreet, From Manassas to Appomattox (Ontario: East India Publishing, 2021), 362.
5 Carol Reardon, Pickett’s Charge in History and Memory (North Carolina: North Carolina University Press, 1997),
92.
6 Glenn Tucker, Lee, and Longstreet at Gettysburg. (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1968), 362-425.
7 Eckenrode, Lee's Warhorse, 189.
19
military commanders overshadowed historical accuracy and blamed Longstreet’s hesitation as
the reason for the Confederacy's defeat at Gettysburg.8
Longstreet was quickly blamed for the South’s defeat. According to historian Piston, he
became “a scapegoat for the South's defeat, a Judas for the new religion of the Lost Cause”.9
Longstreet’s military excellence and fame essentially died on April 9th, 1865. The destruction of
his fame was due to the South seeking a reason for their defeat. The always needs to be a victim,
and Longstreet was the best fit for the role. Unlike many of his fellow Southerners, he wanted to
rebuild the South. Because of it, he lived the rest of his life under scrutiny and disdain.
Carol Reardon provides accurate and objective insight into what really happened during
Pickett’s Charge. Reardon helps support the thesis of this paper by analyzing the military
strategy as well as the commanders during the Battle of Gettysburg. Regarding the war at large,
Reardon emphasizes the importance of Pickett’s Charge in reference to the overall outcome of
the war.
Reardon’s research precedes historian Connelly Thomas, but the two share similar
viewpoints regarding Pickett’s Charge. Thomas states that the southern mindset was fixated on
Lee. No matter the deviation, Lee would have never been to blame for the Gettysburg disaster.10
Unfortunately, Longstreet took the brunt of the criticism because he was second in command.
This criticism sparked literature such as Lee's Tarnished Lieutenant by William Garrett Piston
and General James Longstreet: The Confederacy's Most Controversial Soldier by Jeffry D.
8 Eckenrode, Lee’s Warhorse, 207; Connelly, God, and General Longstreet, 32-35.
9 Piston, William Garrett. Lee's Tarnished Lieutenant. (Georgia: University of Georgia Press, 1988), 137-151.
10 Connelly, Thomas Lawrence. The Marble Man: Robert E. Lee and His Image in American Society (Baton Rouge:
LSU Press, 1978), xv. Thomas’s book provides one of the greatest renditions of Lee’s life. However, due to its bias
toward Lee, it fails to provide counterarguments surrounding Lee’s actions at Gettysburg. This book provides no
alternative points of view regarding Robert E. Lee’s character.
20
Wert. Both sources, especially the latter, attempted to uphold Longstreet’s reputation by
displaying irregularities in anti-Longstreet rhetoric.11
Historians such as Reardon, Wert, and Piston argue that historians overestimated Lee’s
judgment during the Battle of Gettysburg. They claim that it was not Longstreet’s fault for the
defeat but rather J.E.B Stuart and Robert E. Lee. According to these historians, Lee acted
impulsively and focused on delivering a fatal blow to the Union. Attempting to defy the odds,
Lee’s boldness blinded him from reason.12 Pickett’s Charge was the accumulation of various
military inaccuracies. Historians such as Wert and Piston analyze each Southern commander
involved in the charge in attempt to display each in an objective manner. They defend
commander Longstreet from Southern disapproval due to his “lack of aggressiveness” and
“tardiness.” Additionally, Reardon argues that the South was logistically unmatched due to
terrain, numbers, and responsiveness and therefore had no chance at victory.13
Although historian McPherson displays the events of Gettysburg correctly, his criticism
of Longstreet does not provide ample evidence. In defense of Longstreet, Carol Reardon directly
argues against McPherson shifting the blame toward Lee for not listening to commanders and for
his lack of patience. Reardon enforces her claim against McPherson by stating that he
“oversimplifies” the events regarding Gettysburg. Additionally, she argues that if it weren't for
Longstreet’s cautiousness before and after Pickett’s Charge, Lee would have been destroyed if
the Union chose to pursue another attack.
11 Piston, Lee's Tarnished Lieutenant, 1-10.
12 Reardon, Pickett’s Charge, 85.
13 Reardon, Pickett’s Charge, 84; Raube, Historiographical Essay.
21
Press reports concerning the Battle of Gettysburg are utilized in Reardon, Wert, and
Piston’s research so that the reader can obtain a better understanding of the Battle of Gettysburg
regarding Primary source evidence. This is not seen in McPherson’s writings. Connelly Thomas
states that Lee’s image was invincible, and his actions developed an unwavering devotion to his
esteemed image.14 Therefore, alternative viewpoints of Pickett’s Charge were disregarded.
Robert E. Lee was much more than a military commander but rather a hero for those who shared
the vision of the Southern cause. Anyone or anything that remotely questioned his actions was
instantly rejected and refuted. Longstreet, being outspoken, had the audacity to question Lee’s
commanding after the war and thus condemned him to Southern backlash. The normal historical
canon regarding Longstreet’s blunder at Gettysburg provides many aspects of bias in the
historical community. Favorable bias toward Lee blinded proper analysis of unpredictable events
of the war.
Other historians such as Kevin Dougherty provide middle-ground research regarding
Pickett’s Charge and does not specifically state an argument regarding the reasoning behind the
Confederate’s loss, but rather makes commentary about already existing facts about the charge's
military logistics. Dougherty strictly provides an analysis of military actions taken by both the
North and the South without getting into depth about the commander's disagreements or actions.
By stepping away from the arguments surrounding Gettysburg, Dougherty sidesteps historical
backlash. Dougherty refuses to blame any general for miscalculations. It is possible that the lack
of historical literature surrounding Dougherty’s book, Battles of the Civil War 1861-1865
illustrates the bias and protectiveness toward Lee’s character.15
14 Connelly, The Marble Man, 52.
15 Dougherty, Kevin J. Battles of the Civil War 1861-1865 (New York: Metro Books, 2007), 160, 162.
22
Dougherty argues that it was a combination of military inferiority and the lack of
organization of the Confederacy that led to their defeat at Gettysburg. He argues that Lee’s
advance north was a critical turning point that led to a significant domino effect for the South.
According to Dougherty, the lack of military intel regarding the Union’s movements was
devastating for Lee’s ability to make educated maneuvers.16 The only individual that Dougherty
explicitly blames for the Confederacy's defeat was J.E.B. Stuart. Stuart’s vigilante expedition of
his cavalry units left the rebel army blind in unfamiliar territory and caused significant confusion
when the initial shots were fired on the outskirts of Gettysburg. Glenn Tucker in his book Lee
and Longstreet at Gettysburg expands Dougherty’s remarks concerning J.E.B. Stuart by stating
that both Lee and Longstreet agreed that Stuart significantly altered the Confederacy's chances of
success in the spring of 1863.17
Dougherty does not follow conventional historical interpretations or ideas surrounding
Pickett’s Charge. Unlike most historians who blame either Longstreet or Lee, Dougherty
recognizes that both individuals were correct in their decisions. In this unique interpretation, Lee
was not to blame for his eagerness to end the war, because he knew that the Confederacy would
not be able to last much longer unless a significant, bold victory occurred. Additionally,
Longstreet’s hesitation was only a protest against Lee’s rapid decisions. Longstreet had every
right to be concerned.
Why the South Lost the Civil War, by Archer Jones, is a modern assessment of the
“simplistic and outdated arguments of the past Civil War writings.”18 Jones states that the
16 Dougherty, Battles of the Civil War, 163.
17 Tucker, Lee and Longstreet at Gettysburg, 400.
18 Archer Jones, Why the South Lost the Civil War (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1986), 106.
23
South’s lack of nationalism caused it to fail. Additionally, their inability to focus their resources
on one military front caused significant losses and devastation.19 Gettysburg was a clear example
of this problem. Longstreet’s favorable defensive strategy was in response to this lack of
resources. Unfortunately, Lee was pressed for time, and the Confederacy was economically
suffocating, Pickett’s Charge was a hopeful response to the rebel’s problems. Similar to historian
Jones, James McPherson provides significant, well-documented research about the
Confederacy’s failure on July 3rd. McPherson’s Battle Cry of Freedom analyzes Pickett’s
Charge and the events leading up to it. According to McPherson, Pickett’s Charge was a
significant blunder on the Confederacy’s behalf, one that the South could not afford.
McPherson states that the main reason for the Confederate’s loss at Gettysburg was a
threefold issue, none of which held Lee responsible. In McPherson’s eyes, it was Jeb Stuart’s
loss of connection, General Ewell and Early’s tardiness, and Longstreet’s lack of cooperation
and vigor.20 The first two arguments are accurate depictions according to Reardon and Boritt.
However, the third regarding Longstreet is still debated. McPherson argues that the lack of
organization mixed with Longstreet’s defiance cost the Confederacy the battle, and potentially
the war. Longstreet’s desire for tactical defense caused meaningless delays that cost the South
precious time in an increasingly hostile environment. His lack of communication with Lee on
July 2nd and July 3rd left the rebels in an unfavorable position. Longstreet confronted Lee twice
about his concerns and both times he was left rejected. According to McPherson, the
19 Jones, Why the South Lost the Civil War, 439.
20 James McPherson, Battle Cry of Freedom (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988), 662.
24
commanding general made up his mind and any arguments against it only hurt the Confederacy’s
chances of victory further.21
McPherson and Boritt display little sympathy for the misjudgment of the Confederate
army. Historian Reid Mitchell in Why the Confederacy Lost upholds McPherson’s historical
work by stating “McPherson is right to point us toward consideration of the element of
contingency- things could have gone differently, on the battlefield and elsewhere, and those
could have produced a Confederate victory”. This is one point where Reardon and McPherson
would agree, but the logistics behind their reasoning would continue to clash.
Historian Boritt follows similar arguments to Archer Jones, that it was a combination of
economic, military, and political lenses that shaped the Confederacy’s defeat.22 Archer Jones
centers his research around the factors that cost the South its chance at victory. Boritt states that
the South was outmatched in almost all aspects of the war. Despite the South’s favorable military
victories at the wars beginning, the longer the war lasted the larger the power gap between the
two sides grew. McPherson, Gary Gallagher, and Archer Jones share their arguments in various
sections throughout their books. Each of their arguments pertains to a different aspect of the war.
McPherson argues that it was the internal issues of the Confederacy that eventually led to its
defeat. Historians Jones and Gallagher focus on external factors such as the number of soldiers,
minority influence, and economic advantages. If it weren't not for these internal and external
characteristics, Pickett’s Charge might have ended differently.23
21 McPherson, Battle Cry of Freedom, 663.
22 Jones, Why the South Lost the Civil War, 430.
23 Gabor S. Boritt, Why the Confederacy Lost (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), 7.
25
Longstreet’s historiography has various gaps. Unfortunately, many stories of soldiers are
glossed over without proper primary source evidence. Most wartime veterans choose not to talk
about their hardships or tend to overemphasize their deeds.24 There are gaps concerning
Longstreet’s history and this is in part because of the post-war Lost Cause southern pride. Lee’s
monumental aura outshine most historical analysis of post-war America. The reasoning behind
these gaps can be attributed to the Lost Cause. Historians have looked over other opinions
regarding Pickett’s Charge so as not to stain Lee’s reputation. Additionally, historians find it
easier to defend Lee over his subordinate generals due to his prior military prowess.25
Despite Gettysburg being the beginning of the end for the Confederacy, the rebel cause
destined to fail due to economic inferiority. There should be no reason to tarnish any
commander's reputation, but rather look at their actions constructively, from all sides of history.
It would be a disservice to take a single historical approach as dogma.
24 Robert Kirk, "Perspective on Robert E. Lee," C-SPAN, April 28, 2007.
25 Gary W. Gallagher, Causes Won, Lost and Forgotten : How Hollywood and Popular Art Shape What We Know
About the Civil War (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2008), 5-27.
26
Chapter 3: The Gettysburg Disaster
The Battle of Gettysburg was a major turning point of the American Civil War that
haunts both the soldiers and commander. Despite knowing that a major confrontation was to
occur north of the Potomac, the Army of Northern Virginia knew little of when or where it
would take place. Regardless of the location, the upcoming battle would greatly alter the course
of American history. The Battle of Gettysburg quickly became a military spectacle, filled with
disaster, bravery, and excellent leadership. The battle displayed the valor of the South, and the
unnerving resistance of the North. Both sides sought total victory during the three-day conflict,
and neither, especially Robert E. Lee, would settle for less. This, however, was the beginning of
the end for the Confederacy, and with it any hopes of achieving separation. The Gettysburg
disaster started a domino effect for the remainder of the war. Despite future battles being fought
and won on behalf of Lee, the crippled South started its decline in all aspects of warfare.26
Many individuals received fame from the battle; others would perish. However, regarding
General James Longstreet, neither would be true. Longstreet would later receive massive
amounts of criticism for his actions at Gettysburg. Some historians in the past have greatly
attributed the Southern loss at Gettysburg to Longstreet. In order to address this, this chapter
seeks to first educate about the battle and second address Longstreet’s actions. This section will
determine whether or not Longstreet was actually to blame for the disaster.
The early summer of 1863 found American citizens worrying about the implications of
long-term warfare. Both the North and the South had their own set of issues. With death looming
26 Edward B. Clark, “Story of Famous Civil War Fight: Turning Point of Conflict”, Iron County Register, July 3,
1913. Future battles fought and won on part of Lee’s commanding after the Battle of Gettysburg include the Battle
of the Wilderness, Chickamauga, and Spotsylvania Courthouse. The Battle of Chickamauga being one of the few
times that the rebel army outnumbered the Northern army.
27
for Stonewall Jackson, a significant commander for the South, and the dwindling numbers of
southern soldiers, Robert E. Lee knew that his timeframe for victory was coming to an end. Lee
was desperate to end the war. He knew that the longer the war lasted and with casualties
mounting, the South would eventually crumble. After Jackson’s death in early May, Lee turned
his trust to Longstreet. This companionship between Longstreet and Lee would become
increasingly fruitful but with-it major confrontation with commanding style and strategic
movements.27 The conversations that were made between the two commanders were
unfortunately not documented, however, they would be recalled in later writings after the war.
After the war, Longstreet argued that it was Lee who had changed strategy during the summer of
1863 and thereby breaking their military agreements made in early May. Longstreet attempted to
distance himself from Lee’s mistakes at Gettysburg, but unfortunately this was unsuccessful due
to the overwhelming support for Lee from Southern Lee sympathizers.28 Longstreet would recall
that “any plan or wish [to Lee] became useless and improper that would lead to a different
course.”29 In early May, Longstreet was under the impression that Lee had agreed upon a
defensive campaign, such as seen at Fredericksburg, but with his decision to march north of the
Potomac, Longstreet feared for the worst. Lee was unwilling to budge:
His plan or wishes announced, it became useless and improper to offer suggestions
leading to a different course. All that I could ask was that the policy of the campaign
should be one of defensive tactics; that we should work so as to force the enemy to attack
us, is such good position as we might find in his own country, so well adapted to that
purpose, - which might assure us of a grand triumph.30
27 Jeffry D. Wert, General James Longstreet: The Confederacy’s Most Controversial Soldier (New York: Simon and
Schuster, 1993), 243.
28 Wert, General James Longstreet, 243.
29 James Longstreet, letter to L. McLaws, University of North Carolina, July 25, 1873.
30 James Longstreet, From Manassas to Appomattox (Ontario: East India Publishing, 2021), 217.
28
Figure 3: Lee's Northern Invasion
Historical Landmarks Commission
29
Lee’s decision to go on the offensive was a decision made in part on his anxieties. Anxious that
the end was near, and with the death of his close friend Jackson, impassable failure would
follow. Knowing that Longstreet was unable to change Lee’s mind, he quickly began working on
resonance. A forward advancement North was inevitable.31
Lee set out and organized his total army of 75,000 men, three corps and six brigades of
cavalry. The second corps, previously Stonewall Jackson’s, was now under the management of
Richard Ewell. News of the Southern push north struck fear in Northern citizens. President
Lincoln naturally did not accept this news well. Southern morale was at an all-time high, and
with Lee in command, many felt as if nothing could stop them.32 However, issues quickly arose
for the South. The Southern cavalry commander J.E.B Stuart broke away from the main army in
attempts to raid the Union’s flanks. This, however, was a grave blunder as the Army of Northern
Virginia was left blind in foreign territory. For nearly a week, Stuart and his cavalry were
missing in action and thus making the already anxious Lee unsure of the path ahead.33
Attempting to evade the Northern Army, Lee quickly advanced north. Within the final
days of June, all three corps of the Confederate Army were north of Potomac, converging at
Harrisburg. However, with the absence of Stuart’s cavalry there was much hesitation and
confusion within the Southern army. Military commanders such as Richard Ewell and Jubal
Early blame Longstreet for Stuart’s absence. After the war they argued that it was Longstreet that
persuaded Stuart to disengage from the main force. Official documents of military orders do
31 Longstreet, From Manassas to Appomattox, 218.
32 “The South Invades” Richmond Examiner, July 7, 1863. This primary source provides great insight into how the
American public felt regarding Lee’s invasion. Fearful of the war escalation northward, many were concerned for
the fate of the country. In 1863, Southern morale was at an all time high. Southern newspapers display their
hopefulness.
33 James McPherson, Battle Cry of Freedom (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988), 649.
30
suggest this accusation; however, it was apparent that any change to movement should have been
directly communicated with Lee. If Longstreet were to have made orders, with his personality
and respect for Lee, he would have done with proper allowance. Additionally, potential errors
could have been made if orders were not clear, but this was certainly not the case.34
Lee rarely left Longstreet’s side during the South’s push North. The two were frequently
seen together.35 Therefore, errors and miscommunication between Longstreet and Lee were very
unlikely.36 Settling at Chambersburg, a few miles west of Gettysburg, Longstreet and Lee were
relieved to hear news from Longstreet’s scout, Harrison. Harrison was a greatly overlooked
character when referring to Longstreet’s commanding capabilities. Before the Army of Northern
Virginia left Fredericksburg to invade the North, and Longstreet’s lengthy attempts to change
Lee’s military strategy, Longstreet quickly called for Harrison to begin reconnaissance missions
just in case the Confederates lacked information about the enemy. This was a well-scheduled
order by Longstreet. It is as if Longstreet knew that something would go wrong with the invasion
of Pennsylvania, and quickly used his forward-thinking mind to find solutions. Harrison was the
solution, and he kept the rebel army intact. Harrison’s reports of the federal movements allowed
the Confederates to remain knowledgeable of the impending battle despite their lack of cavalry
intelligence. Few historians take this into account, and if it were not for Longstreet, Lee would
have been completely blind to the Federal troop movements.37 In this case, Lee placed too much
34 Robert E. Lee to General J.E.B Stuart, University of North Carolina, June 23, 1863.
35 Arthur James Lyon Fremantle, Three Months in the Southern States (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press,
1991), 128.
36 D. B. Sanger, James Longstreet: Solder, Politician, Officeholder, and Writer (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State
University Press, 1952), 161.
37 Historian McPherson in his book Battle Cry for Freedom does not consider Longstreet’s spy Harrison. With the
refusal to depict this crucial character it does not give Longstreet the credit that he deserves for keeping the
Confederate army intact.
31
faith in Stuart’s ability to protect the Southern army. Additionally, Southern commanders
underestimated the audacity and energy of the North, especially after the Army of the Potomac’s
significant failure at Fredericksburg. The North was hasty in their pursuit of Lee. This was an
unknown action due to Stuart’s absence. Explanation of the disorganized Southern force is not
explained, especially after the seemingly precise actions from months prior at the Battle of
Fredericksburg. Accounts of Lee being sick and being in poor condition were also reported but
are not sustainable in definitive historical context.38
On June 28, the Northern Army became blessed with new management, George Meade.
Dissatisfied with previous commander, Joseph Hooker, President Lincoln placed a heavy burden
on the new commander to “kick Lee out of the North.”39 By June 29th, Lee and Longstreet were
becoming increasingly uneasy about Stuart’s absence as well as the haste at which the Federal
army was moving. Ordering to consolidate the rebel force was at the utmost concern. According
to Longstreet’s staff officer Moxley Sorrel, the corps general was frequently visited by Lee in
order to discuss plans.40 It was apparent that conflict would occur somewhere between
Gettysburg and Chambersburg. However, when or specifically where was yet to be decided.
Ideally, the Confederates would have already entrenched themselves between the Army of the
Potomac and Washington, but due to miscommunication and the lack of communication this was
unable to happen. Longstreet’s plans for organized defensive warfare became bleak.
As both armies began to consolidate their forces and quicken their pace, Harry Heth,
under A.P. Hill’s division, moved south to Gettysburg in hopes of finding supplies for the
38 Sanger, James Longstreet, 162.
39 Sanger, James Longstreet, 163.
40 G. Moxley Sorrel, Recollections of a Confederate Staff Officer (Connecticut: K and K Publishing, 1994), 164.
Sorrels personal accounts are greatly undermined by the historical community. Longstreet critics such as McPherson
do not utilize Sorrels “pro-Longstreet” writings in their arguments.
32
upcoming conflict. However, the conflict was already forming. Brief clashes with the Northern
cavalry under command of John Buford made the situation far more confusing than intended.
Skirmishes would quickly cease during the latter half of the day. With all units now converging
toward Gettysburg, as the sun began to rise, the first day of the battle would begin the following
day on July 1st.41
The eve of the great battle was crowded with events. Movements for the concentration of
the two vast armies went on in mighty force, but with a silence in strong contrast to the
swift-coming commotion of their shock in conflict. It was the pent quiet of the gathering
storm whose bursting was to shake the continent and suddenly command the startled
attention of the world.42
The concentration of forces was necessary for the Confederacy to catch the federal troops off
guard. However, it ended up being the other way around. According to Lee’s military reports, he
did not wish to engage the enemy with offensive maneuvers. Longstreet was at ease with this
decision. However Lee was concerned that the federals would cut him off from his supply routes
from Virginia and with this concern, Gettysburg was the only viable option, that is if it was not
already occupied by the Northern army, which it was. The Northern campaign was already
becoming a disaster for the South. Lee was essentially blind to every military movement; there
was no way for anyone to know exactly what was going to happen.43
Unfortunately for Lee, a conflict at Gettysburg was unavoidable. Lee stated that he did
not intend to fight upon such conditions or ground. He made it very clear to Longstreet that
offensive attacks were not advisable. However, something switched in Lee’s plans, which
inherently shocked Longstreet. With morale high, the transition of leadership to Meade, and
41 Sanger, James Longstreet, 166.
42 Longstreet, From Manassas to Appomattox, 266.
43 H. J. Eckenrode, James Longstreet: Lee’s War Horse (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1986),
180.
33
Figure 4: Gettysburg Day One
American Battlefield Trust
34
boldened by prior successes, Lee viewed the situation optimistically and pressured aggressive
attacks.44 Once again Lee sought counsel with Longstreet, and during the same time Longstreet’s
brigade commanders advised greatly against any attack against the fortified federals. Longstreet
deeply expressed this concern to Lee but with no avail. Not only was the Southern calvary still
missing, but Longstreet’s main corps was still on route to Gettysburg. The Northern force was
considered to be “very formidable” and massive casualties would occur if fought immediately.45
The first day of the battle erupted With A.P. Hill’s division confronting Buford’s
cavalry, as they did briefly the day before. Ignorant of what laid before him, Hill pressured attack
without any word from Lee:
It seemed that General Hill misconstrued the orders of the day, or was confused by the
change of orders, and was under the impression that he was to march by York and cross
the Susquehanna towards Philadelphia or Harrisburg. He ordered his leading division
under Heth to Cashtown, however, and followed with Pender’s division on the 30th,
leaving orders for the division of Anderston to follow on the1st. The purpose of General
Lee’s march east was only preliminary, -a concentration about Cashtown.46
In hopes to delay the rebels untill General Reynolds could join the field, Buford entrenched his
dismounted cavalry. Commanding General Meade pressed his commanders to make haste and
keep the rebels from obtaining the high ground. Longstreet was unnerved at the aggressive
attacks made on the first day. Although being understanding that Gettysburg was a point of
significance in regard to its central location to many important roads, without the high ground it
became a battlefield of nightmares. According to Longstreet, even before his arrival at the
battlefield, they were at a significant disadvantage.47 Longstreet arrived at Gettysburg to find Lee
44 Fremantle, Three Months in the Southern States, 205.
45 Wert, General James Longstreet, 259.
46 Longstreet, From Manassas to Appomattox, 227.
47 F. Gregory Toretta, The Most Misunderstood Civil War General: Lieutenant General James Longstreet (New
York: Oxford Casemate, 2022), 37.
35
surveying the entrenched Union atop rocky heights. Longstreet did not understand why it was so
important for Lee to force attack upon such ground. After all, the rebels already controlled the
town as well as the roads that conjoined it.
I drew my glasses and made a studied view of the position upon which the enemy was
rallying his forces, and of the lay of the land surrounding. General Lee was engaged at
the moment. He had announced beforehand that he would not make any aggressive battle
in the enemy’s country. After the survey and consideration of plans, the lofty perch of the
enemy, the rocky slopes from it, all marking the position clearly defensive, - I said “we
could not call the enemy to position better suited to our plans. All we have to do is to file
around his left and secure good ground between him and his capital.” This, when said,
was thought to be the opinion of my commander as much as my own. I was not a little
surprised, therefore, at his impatience, as, striking the air with is closed hand, he said, “if
he is there tomorrow I will attack him”.48
In many ways this did not sit well with Longstreet. Lee was becoming impatient whereas
Longstreet was not. Lee’s confusion, anger, and fatigue was eliminating any option for flexible
troop movements. Gettysburg was the only place for a conflict in Lee’s eyes. This was not the
same mindset that his commanding generals had felt. Lewis Armistead, one of Longstreet’s
brigade commanders reflected on the federal position with cautiousness.49 Longstreet’s grand
strategy to out maneuver the federal force and force the enemy to attack upon poor ground, just
as they did at Fredericksburg, was an unacceptable suggestion for Lee. Rather than pushing his
agenda and tactical thoughts, Longstreet respected Lee’s overwhelmed state and gave him time
to reflect, hoping that with time and rest he would change his mind about such bold actions.50
Boldened by the success of the first day, Lee rejected any remark made by Longstreet to
advance to the left of the Union. Pressuring Meade to attack the Confederates also had the added
benefit of potentially relieving tension in the western theater of the war at Vicksburg. If the
48 James Longstreet, From Manassas to Appomattox, 233.
49 Wert, General James Longstreet, 259.
50 Toretta, Lieutenant General James Longstreet, 39.
36
Army of Northern Virgina were to eventually assault the Federal front, Longstreet’s lifelong
friend, Ulysses S. Grant who at the time was commanding forces in the west, would be forced to
withdraw from Vicksburg. Vicksburg being the gateway to the Mississippi and the South’s last
fortification from total invasion. However, time and rest did not sway Lee, but rather solidified
his plans to enact offensive assaults. Lee broke his promise to Longstreet that were made weeks
prior to the northern invasion.51 Lee recalls his decision to disregard Longstreet by stating:
It had not been intended to deliver a general battle do far from our base unless attacked,
but coming unexpectedly upon the whole federal army, to withdraw though the
mountains with our extensive tarins would have been difficult and dangerous. A battle
had, therefore, become in a measure unavoidable, and the success already gained gave
hope of a favorable issue.52
Despite being rather practical, the only reason why Lee happened to stumble across the entire
Federal army was due to Stuart’s absence. Longstreet was cautious, but Lee, knowing well that
he was confused continued to press forward, thus making any further movements impossible.
According to Lee, the Confederacy was condemned to fight upon unfavorable ground.
With supplies running low and with Meade’s decision to fortify, day two of the
Gettysburg disaster was inevitable. Unfortunately for Lee, Meade held his ground which gave
him no other option but to fight upon incredibly difficult terrain. Not only was the terrain
difficult to navigate, but Lee would also break his promise to Longstreet and attack on the
offensive, thus risking copious lives, far more than was advisable by his general staff. Lee
already anticipated failure when in some correspondence with General Anderson stated that
“Those defiles and gorges which we have passed this morning will shelter us from disaster”.53 It
51 Toretta, Lieutenant General James Longstreet,40; Longstreet, From Manassas to Appomattox, 217.
52 Longstreet, From Manassas to Appomattox, 357.
53 Longstreet, From Manassas to Appomattox, 220.
37
was as if Lee was already planning for escape after failed offensive engagements. Even with
Lee’s optimistic view after the first day, he was still at a severe disadvantage on the morning of
July 2, 1863. Before sunrise on the second day, Stuart would eventually contact Lee’s
headquarters, anticipating arrival within 24 hours. However, this would be too late to alter the
course of the battle.
Questions whether or not the Confederacy should fight upon such ground began to spread
amongst the general staff. Longstreet had already spoken his mind but with no avail. Colonel E.
Alexander, later to be in charge of the mass artillery bombardment on the third day would recall
what he thought to be the best-case scenario for the rebels, it did not include offensive assaults:
We had a fine defensive position on Seminary Ridge ready at our hand to occupy. It was
not really a wonderful position as the enemy had happened to fall into, but it was not a
bad one, and it could never have been successfully assaulted. The onus of attack was
upon Meade anyhow. We could have fallen back to Cashtown and held the mountain
passes with all the prestige of victory and popular sentiment would have forced Meade to
take the aggressive.54
This was the exact mindset that Longstreet wished would have come to fruition. However Lee
was concerned that withdrawing would be bad for morale as well as resources. Neither of these
arguments were plausible. Resources for the Southern army were secure via train routes that
General Stuart had successfully fortified, and the Army of Northern Virginia would have
followed Lee anywhere without question. None-the-less, day two of Gettysburg had begun, and
the sequence of events that would ignite the domino effect for the downfall of the Confederacy
began to take action.
54 Gary G. Gallagher, Fighting for the Confederacy: The Personal Recollections of General Edward Porter
Alexander (North Carolina: University of North Carolina Press, 1998), 233.
38
It was during the second day that accusations against Longstreet’s ability to command
and commit to the battle were beginning to form. General Ewell, General Early, Captain J. P.
Smith and Commander Robert Rodes would express their anger at Longstreet for his seemingly
lackluster approach to Gettysburg. Ewell and Smith would both approach Lee stating that
Longstreet “was indefinite and noncommittal with his absence of right flank support”.55
However in defense of Longstreet, General Walter Taylor would express that Ewell himself was
noncommittal with the “Yanks on the run” and the capture of the town.56 Due to the
miscommunication of orders as well as the delay from all sides of the Confederate army, the
Union was able to reinforce their lines upon Cemetery Hill and beyond. General Ewell would
eventually examine the situation on the morning of day two and confirm that an offensive attack
would cause great loss.
Longstreet awakened early on the second day at 3:00 am to organize his desired battle
plans. Arguments made by various historians such as McPherson would argue that Longstreet
was late to action and thus allowed the federals to reinforce further and led to the defeat on the
second day. However, this argument fails when considering Robert E. Lee and Ewell’s
miscommunication when attempting to coordinate with Longstreet. Colonel Alexander would
recall that Lee and Ewell’s inability to make decisions and consecutive arguments destroyed the
effectiveness of the army. Longstreet was in fact not late to engage and was certainly not late to
order the pursuit of his troops. Longstreet would convene with Lee before the sunrise along with
his division commanders McLaws, Alexander and Hood, all of which were tired from a hard
nights march from Cashtown. Fremantle of His Majesty’s Coldstream Guard would witness this
55 Walter Taylor, Four Years with General Lee (Princeville: Bonanza Books, 1962), 190.
56 Walter Taylor, Four Years with General Lee, 190.
39
deliberation and mention that Longstreet as well as his commanding generals would once again
attempt to persuade Lee to abort.57
The Federal army was in the shape of a fishhook, only but a few miles from one end to
the other. The right flank of the line was situated at two large peaks that overlooked the
Gettysburg battlefield: Little and Big Round Top. Both peaks were steep with formidable rock
features that simple hiking along such paths would induce fatigue, let alone a full-scale military
assault. The Union flank ended at Little Round Top. Little Round Top was the end of the line.
Below Little Round Top, known as Devils Den, was an incredibly rocky landscape that
commanded the field. Both positions were held by the Union. The Confederates needed to act
quicky as time was not on their side. The full force of the Union army was yet to arrive at
Gettysburg which meant that Lee stood a chance to outperform his opponent by numbers alone.
However, Longstreet understood that their numbers were irreplaceable and far more precious
than that of the Union.58 General Hood would voice his concerns about attacking the heights by
stating “The enemy is here and if we do not whip him, he will whip us”.59 Longstreet would
becoming incredibly uneasy about the impending conflict. Moxley Sorrel would provide the best
eyewitness account to this displeasure, anger, and concern by General Longstreet:
We can discover that he did not want to fight on the ground or on the plan adopted by the
General-in-Chief. The former failed to conceal some anger. There was apparent apathy in
his movements. They lacked fire and point of his usual bearing on the battlefield. His
plans may have been better than Lee’s but it was too late to alter them with the troops
ready to open fire on each other.60
57 Fremantle, Seven Months in the Southern States, 210.
58 Harry Hansen, The Civil War: A History (New York: Signet Publishing, 2010), 374.
59 Cory M. Pfarr, Longstreet at Gettysburg: A Critical Assessment (Jefferson: Farland Publishing, 2019), 112.
60 Moxley Sorrel, Recollections of a Confederate Staff Officer (Ontario: East India Publishing, 2016), 134.
40
It was unfortunate that Longstreet was put into this position. Nearly his entire corps faced
potential disaster. Against a significantly superior foe Longstreet was asked by Lee to enact an
assault that went against the military strategy of the South: tactical defense. Lee had broken his
promise to Longstreet regarding military strategy. With improvements to military technology
that benefited the Union such as canister shot, rifled guns and mini ball ammunition, the only
way the rebels stood a chance against Meade in a foreign land would have been with tactical
defensive maneuvers. Longstreet, acting unusual to his normal self, should have caused Lee to
question his actions. It was as if Lee did not know Longstreet and did not trust in his judgement.
Additionally, the hesitation of most Southern commanders would have been incredibly hard to
disregard.
The alleged delay and anger provided by Longstreet would increase criticism against
him. However, once again this criticism does not hold its own when consulting personal records
of the battle. Longstreet’s early arrival the morning of as well as his haste when bringing forth
McLaws and Hood demonstrated his quick action. Fremantle would confirm this in his memoirs.
Fremantle would declare that at 7 am Longstreet, frustrated and angered, deployed his battalions.
However, due to the lack of time as well as prolonged preparation for a full-scale assault of the
rocky heights was not enacted until 12:55pm that the first shot was fired. Ideally the assault
would have begun earlier, but due to difficulties deploying artillery and the mass of troops
attempting to organize themselves perpendicular to the Emmitsburg Road made for slower
movements. Additionally, unknown to Lee, the land upon which Longstreet was instructed to
occupy prior to fighting was incredibly hard to navigate. Sorrel would once again remark on this
in his writings by stating that with further knowledge of the land Lee would have probably not
have attempted such movements. Once again, the lack of cavalry and the potential
41
Figure 5: Gettysburg Day 2
United States National Parks
42
reconnaissance that could have been made by general Stuart backfired. Just because the army
was not prepared to fight due to the terrain and lack of reconnaissance did not mean that
Longstreet did not do everything in his power to further Lee’s battleplans. No matter the
situation, it did not look good for Longstreet.61 To further the cause for delay, the night prior Lee
provided no significant battleplan to assault the rocky heights. Lee did not make his final
decision until 1 am of the second day. The cause of delay was Longstreet’s fault but rather Lee’s
lack of information regarding the surrounding area and indecision from the night before.62
The full force of the Confederate first corps was engaged in combat by 3:30pm.
However, despite the initial success in the peach orchard, Hood and McLaws began to meet
significant resistance along the rocky heights. This resistance was not anticipated by Lee’s scouts
that morning. Hood made countless requests to move further to the right of the Union flank to
avoid the bulk of the federal forces. As much as this mauver might have changed the outcome of
the second day, Longstreet was unable to make further movements due to the pressure placed
upon him by Lee. Fighting commenced and despite heavy losses for the rebels there were able to
break the Union lines, thus forcing them back to Little Round Top.63
General Hood was severely wounded whilst commanding troops in Devils Den.
Longstreet, despite being instructed to stay behind for safety, disobeyed Lee’s request and was
on the front lines with his corps. Moxley Sorrel would attest to Longstreet’s commanding
capabilities and inspiring persona amongst his troops. Longstreet was seen upon his horse with
hat in hand, sword unsheathed, pushing his lines forward to meet the enemy.64 On the backlines,
61 Freemantle, Three Months in the Southern States, 263; Sorrel, Recollections, 130; Longstreet, From Manassas to
Appomattox, 236.
62 Sanger, James Longstreet, 177.
63 Sanger, James Longstreet. 177.
64 Sorrel, Reflections, 168.
43
Lee was becoming increasingly angered at Longstreet for the “delay” spent before military
engagement and his perceived recklessness on the frontlines.
Thick fighting commenced till sundown. The confederates were unsuccessful at
achieving their desired objective. Longstreet’s corps lost nearly six thousand throughout the day
with various commanders being wounded or killed. Both sides that participated in the fight were
significantly exhausted. However, as time furthered on, the federals continued to reinforce their
position and rally additional strength from incoming divisions who had yet reached Gettysburg.
It was after the events of the second day that Longstreet and Lee began to divide in terms
of companionship. It was apparent both parties were significantly frustrated with the other.
Additionally, Longstreet’s reputation as a commander was becoming increasingly questioned by
other high-ranking generals such as Ewell and Hill. However, their accusations fail, because
Ewell and Hill were both unsuccessful on the second day due to poor communication and
complications with orders from Lee. The entire Confederate Army was unsynchronized. There
were three accounts of Longstreet offending Lee on the second day at Gettysburg. The first being
his proposed flanking maneuvers further to the right side of the Union flank. The second being
Longstreet’s inability to coordinate his attacks due to the early morning delays. However, these
delays were unavoidable and partially Lee’s fault for not providing accurate information during
the construction of his battle plans. The third offence was Longstreet’s recklessness upon the
frontlines thus assuming the role of a lesser commander rather than staying behind and observing
movements as a methodical leader.65 These offences were but the prequel to the following day.
65 Sanger, James Longstreet, 179.
44
However, arguments against Longstreet’s failure during the second day due to his lack of
coordination seem to fail when taking into account the constrictions placed upon him from Lee.
Longstreet would remark:
Hood’s front was very rugged, with no field for artillery, and very rough for advance of
infantry. As soon as he passed the Emmitsburg road, he sent to report of the great
advantage of moving on by his right around to the enemy’s rear. His scouting parties had
reported that there was nothing between them and the enemy’s trains. He was told that
the move to the right had been proposed the day before and rejected; that General Lee’s
orders were to guide my left by the Emmitsburg road.66
Again and again, Hood attempted to gain support from Longstreet to move to the right, but with
Longstreet’s previous confrontations with Lee, he was unable to command his troops to his
discretion and expertise. It was as if Lee did not trust Longstreet’s judgement and confined him
to only one option, despite better alternatives. Even the commander of the Union, George Meade,
would indirectly agree with Longstreet’s judgment by stating “[moving to the right] was a step
that I most feared Lee would take”.67
Longstreet’s inability to take the rocky heights did not fall upon him alone. The other two
corps of the Confederate army were ordered to support his flanking maneuvers by pressuring the
Union center. This however did not happen which allowed Meade to funnel reinforcement to
Little Round Top. Lee was reported to have been at his headquarters with General Hill avoiding
action as well as the battlefield itself.68 Longstreet’s two divisions had no support from the
remaining Confederate army. Colonel Alexander remarked that Hill and Ewell did nothing
beneficial to support Longstreet’s advance. The support that was needed was not at Longstreet’s
disposal and unknowing to him he was alone in the fight for the Union flank. With no significant
66 Longstreet, From Manassas to Appomattox, 239.
67 Longstreet, From Manassas to Appomattox, 365; Gallagher, Fighting for the Confederacy, 239.
68 Edward Alexander, Military Memoirs of a Confederate: A Critical Narrative (St. Helena: Legare Street Press,
1993), 393.
45
gain of ground and with the Union forces constantly gaining strength the second day of
Gettysburg proved to be a stalemate. Pickett’s division would arrive in the evening as well as
Stuart’s long-lost cavalry.
Longstreet carried a heavy burden from the losses of day two. But it would only get
worse as the morning of the third day of the Gettysburg battle commenced. Longstreet received
minimal sleep the night before the third day and was immensely nervous worrying about
additional attacks against the fortified Federal troops. Both Lee and Longstreet both hoped that
Meade would have left by the morning, but this was not the case. Meade and his commanding
generals all voted to continue to pressure Lee after their close successes of day two. Meade, like
Lee would not give command of the field.69
Longstreet did not visit Lee the night before the third day but rather opted to send staff
officers to relay information on the status of his corps. Longstreet was noted to be seen walking
amongst his soldiers, engaging in conversation, and strengthening morale before a quick night’s
sleep. Daylight on the third day arrived and so did Longstreet’s fears of Lee’s offensive actions.
The announcement of battle plans came as a shock to Longstreet which furthered frustration and
resentment toward Lee. The battle plans were as followed as provided by Colonel Armistead
Long:
With Longstreet reinforced, the assault on the heights of Cemetery Ridge while Ewell
was to assault the enemy’s right. Pickett’s division was fresh having not taken part in the
previous day’s fight. The assault was to be made directly at the enemy’s main position.
Cannon fire would be used to surpass the Federal’s advantage whilst the main body of the
army would make their assault.70
69 Alexander, Military Memoirs of a Confederate, 313.
70 Longstreet, From Manassas to Appomattox, 73.
46
Longstreet was quick to object to this attack. Longstreet pointed out to Lee that an assault on the
Union center was over a mile of open ground, laced with fences and accumulating with a
fortified stone wall which the Federals would use as a barrier. Most of Longstreet’s corps was
tried and weak from the day before and were unequipped for such a risky assault. According to
Longstreet, any major attempt to defy the enemy’s position would result in a slaughter.
Longstreet’s objection to Lee’s plans was just and admirable. Tactically, the assault was a
mistake.
However, Longstreet’s strong objection did not alter Lee’s plan. If anything, it angered
Lee, especially after Longstreet’s defiance from the day before. Lee was impatient with
Longstreet and attempted to quell his fears. Lee estimated that the Confederate’s exposure was at
a minimum due to the natural sways in the hills. Additionally, Longstreet’s division would also
be supported by the Third Corps. Nearly fifteen thousand men were now at Longstreet’s
disposal. The greater responsibility for Longstreet was also exacerbated due to Lee’s insistence
that Longstreet be in charge of ordering the attack, even though the main column of soldiers
were not part of his corps. Longstreet knew that the attack would fail, and was cornered to send
his troops, in which he cared for greatly to their deaths. Longstreet noted:
I have been a soldier my entire life, I may say, from the ranks up to the position I now
hold. I have been in pretty much all kinds of skirmishes, from those of two or three
soldiers up to those of an army corps, and I think I can safely say there never was a body
of fifteen thousand men who could make that attack successfully.71
Neither Longstreet nor Lee had faith in the others’ tactical knowledge and generalship.
Resentment between the two would quickly grow. However, it was Longstreet who risked his
71 Taylor, Four Years, 103.
47
Figure 6: Gettysburg Day Three
United States National Parks
48
reputation, regardless of the outcome. The South’s love for Lee shielded him from any who
questioned his abilities.
Longstreet’s defiance of Lee’s orders would provide the foundation for the Lost Cause to
question Longstreet’s faithfulness to the Confederacy. However, the Lost Cause’s accusations
held no ground. Longstreet was doing his best he could to defend the Confederacy from poorly
planned attacks. Other generals such as J.E.B. Stuart were also blamed for subordination during
the events of Gettysburg. When the word got out the Longstreet was not in favor of Lee’s plans
as well as Stuart’s excursion during the first two days of the conflict, Lee’s aide suggested that
they should be shot.72 This however was not an option for Lee despite the frustration. Longstreet
was upfront with Lee. Before the Northern campaign, Longstreet would recall telling Lee that as
second command, he was unwilling to sugarcoat his opinions. Longstreet felt as if it were his
duty to inform Lee if he had concerns. He strongly felt as if Pickett’s Charge would fail.
However, Lee was persistent.73
The first cannon barrage from the Confederate artillery opened a few minutes after 1:00
pm. E.P. Alexander would recall that the first barrage lasted roughly forty minutes. Lee’s tactical
plan required a great deal of precision and timing in order for the charge to be effective.
However, Longstreet was cautious. He made his orders slowly and reluctantly. According to E.P.
Alexander, it seemed as if Longstreet was finding ways to avoid the assault. Whether it was
insufficient organization, lack of ammunition, or improper timing, Longstreet sought nearly
every avenue to avoid the battle. However, Lee was unwilling to allow Longstreet to step down
from the second command. In hindsight, it would have been more beneficial for Lee to have
72 Wert, General James Longstreet, 281.
73 Piston, Lee’s Tarnished Lieutenant, 59.
49
placed another commander in charge of the assault that was willing to conduct such a risky
assault. This would have at least held up some of the promises made by Lee to Longstreet before
the northern invasion regarding offensive attacks.
Nonetheless, the attack commenced. Longstreet ordered his division to step forth.
Longstreet was unable to speak when witnessing Pickett’s Charge. He knew that many of the
soldiers and commanders, many of which were his friends, would not return. The assault was
doomed, and despite the initial breakage of the Union line, there was not enough power behind
the Confederate advance to drive the Federals off the heights. Longstreet remained poised when
witnessing the worst defeat in military history. Both Aurthur Fremantle and General Kemper
would remark on Longstreet’s ability to stay levelheaded.74
General Pickett would recall the moment that the attack commenced:
At the Beginning of the fight I was so sanguine, so sure of success! I had been assured by
Alexander that General Lee had ordered that every brigade in his command was to charge
Cemetery Hill; I had no fear of not being supported. Alexander also assured me of the
support of his artillery. When ordered to make the charge, dear Old Peter read it to me in
sorrow and reluctantly bowed his head in assent.75
Pickett was sure that he had the full support of the army. This was not the case, and as Longstreet
knew, Pickett was walking his troops to their deaths. Lee had promised that the assault be joined
by the other two corps of the Confederacy. Both Ewell and A.P. Hill were supposed to provide
flanking maneuvers on either side of the Union lines in order to draw the federals in a long thin
line. However, as known by Longstreet, neither commander was to be trusted in this endeavor.
Support never came from either flank which left Pickett alone in the field of death.
74 Robert E. Lee to James Kemper, Harvard University, September 20, 1869; Fremantle, Three Months, 266.
75 George E. Pickett, Soldier of the South: General Pickett's War Letters To His Wife (Montana: Kessinger, 2010),
105.
50
There was one general who was being proactive to the engagement, and that was
Longstreet. Knowing that support was unlikely to come, he ordered his other two divisions:
Hood and McLaws, to remain ready to charge behind Pickett once the union line was met.
Longstreet also ordered a defense to be made quickly once the attack ended in case of a Union
counteroffensive. No other commander was seen making these decisions.76
Longstreet was not to blame for the loss of Pickett’s Charge, nor should have taken the
fall for the events at Gettysburg. Longstreet was ordered to command Pickett’s assault but no
more. The artillery which proved useless due to its inability to hit its intended target was also not
Longstreet’s fault. Additionally, the support from the flanks was not in Longstreet’s jurisdiction
but rather Lee’s. Lee had promised Pickett and Longstreet that they were to have the full backing
of the Confederate army, this was not the case. Insufficient ammunition was not reported by
artillery officers, and the co-ordination of the attacks was abysmal amongst other commanders
due to the lack of communication along the Confederate front line.77 Lee however did take
responsibly for his actions at Gettysburg in a letter to Jefferson Davis after the South’s retreat.78
This however did not lesser the burden placed upon Longstreet after the war. Additionally,
Pickett would later write blaming Lee for the massacre of his men.79
The Battle of Gettysburg was an impulsive attack made upon the Confederacy in a time
of miscommunication and disorganization. Being thrusted into a fight that was not planned made
Lee uneasy and quick to make his decisions. Impulsive attacks on the first day were successful
for the Confederacy but did not capitalize on their momentum and superior position. The second
76 Sanger, James Longstreet, 184.
77 Sanger, James Longstreet, 186
78 Douglas Southall, Lee's Dispatches: Unpublished Letters of General Robert E. Lee, C.S.A., to Jefferson Davis and
the War Department of the Confederate States of America, 1862-65 (Louisiana: Louisiana State Press, 1994), 110.
79 George E. Pickett, Soldier of the South, 100.
51
day’s assault was once again uncoordinated and risky. Lee provided Longstreet with no leeway
or alternative avenues for success but rather subjected him to enact against the army’s main goal
of defensive warfare. The third day was the greatest tragedy. Pickett’s Charge was gallant yet
somber. With it, the Confederacy lost all hopes of victory in the Civil War.
52
Chapter 4: Longstreet’s Post-War Actions
After the defeat at Gettysburg, Longstreet continued to provide excellent assistance to the
Confederate cause. Longstreet continued his military prowess at the battles of Chickamauga and
the Wilderness both of which were successful for the Confederates. However, with the western
invasion of the South and the mounting pressure placed upon Lee, the Confederate cause came to
an end at Appomattox. With it, the end of Longstreet’s military career. Longstreet and Lee would
have their final, in-person correspondence briefly before the peace negotiations. When
confronted with the prospect of surrender, Longstreet, who at the time was overwhelmed with
sorrow and anger spoke his final words to Lee: “Your situation speaks for itself”.1 For
Longstreet, surrender was not an option. Lee however took the responsibility to surrender to
General Grant’s Army of the Potomac.
After the surrender at Appomattox, Longstreet’s future was undetermined. The second
phase of his life would revolve around politics. He wanted to remain within the public sector, but
this however would cause the downfall of his reputation. Later expressed in chapter six,
Longstreet became the figurehead of reconstruction as well as the “scapegoat” for the Southern
defeat.
Longstreet’s personal life also took a turn during this time. Other than being furiously
attacked by the Lost Cause and ex-Confederate soldiers, his connections with ex-Union
commanders strengthened. Residing in Texas, Longstreet built a career within the railroad sector.
It was here that he reunited with his wife, and the two gave birth to their final two children.
Initial difficulties began during this phase of his life due to his lack of knowledge in anything
1 Alexander, Military Memoirs of a Confederate, 603.
53
other than military implications. With little knowledge about business or economics, he struggled
to fit in with the normality of Texan society.2
Due to the initial struggles along the frontier of America, Longstreet later moved to New
Orleans where he would remain for the remainder of his life. Once a soldier of war, he switched
his focus on the peaceful ways of life. Beginning his writing career for various New Orleans
newspapers and magazines, he became a pivotal figure for right wing rhetoric. Later in his
writing career he would publish his memoirs of the war in his book From Manassas to
Appomattox as well as his northern centered mind in his book Campaigns of the Amry of
Potomac. These two writings were used as a shield against those wishing to defame his actions
throughout the war.
New Orleans was a hotbed for ex-Confederate commanders who sought amnesty with the
newly reformed Union. However, not all who resided were at peace with the new laws and
decisions regarding slavery. Longstreet developed a decent life in New Orleans for his family
despite the backlash against himself and the lingering hatred for African Americans.
Alongside his publishing, he worked two separate jobs, both of which cemented his place
in Southern history. The first being at an insurance company and the other as the president for
Ohio Railroad Company. Both business ventures allowed him to flourish where others of the
same rank and stature were unable to find a place in the reformed country. After the war, many
prominent Southern opted to leave the country rather than recontributing their efforts to further
2 Sanger, James Longstreet, 317, 318.
54
American society.3 Regarding his insurance job, many pro-Confederate leaders were appalled to
learn that Longstreet was willing to help and aid African Americans with their finances.4
During his business, Longstreet helped develop various railroads throughout the South.
This allowed for better commerce and communication between the westward growing nation
westward. Being successful from all sides of life, Longstreet was able to introduce himself into
the political sector. He helped fund and organize employment methods for military divisions as
well as became a spokesperson for hostilities along the Mexican American boarder. Additionally,
moving away from Confederate ideals, Longstreet helped expose Southern radicals who lived
undercover spewing hatred against the government and African Americans.5
The first significant action made by the new politician came quickly once the available
outlet for speech was presented to Longstreet. Distressed with the failure of various
reconstruction efforts in the South, Longstreet proposed a meeting in which powerful members
of the South come together to agree upon issues.6 Urging a large-scale council meeting within
New Orleans, Longstreet took the center stage in his fight against radical racism and Southern
hostilities. Longstreet believed that further hate and resistance against the government would
cause more harm than good for the nation, regardless of one’s political ideology.
By utilizing the newspapers within the South, Longstreet was able to voice his concerns
for the nation and the South. Despite being a member of the Democrat Party, Longstreet began to
unaligned himself with its ideology. To affirm this, Longstreet wrote in a private
correspondence:
3 James Longstreet to Goree and Owen and Company, The Library of Congress, March 1866.
4 New York Times, June 20, 1866.
5 Sanger, James Longstreet, 327.
6 Q. Fellows, New Orleans Times, March 1867.
55
Like most Southern men I had aligned myself with the Democrat Party, merely because it
was opposed to the Republican. But as far as I can judge, there is nothing tangible about
it other than the issues presented to me during the war. Finding nothing be prejudice,
which cannot be worked into good for anyone, it is proper and right that I seek stand-
point from which good may be done…7
Longstreet would then go on to state his dissatisfaction with the disenfranchisement of African
Americans within Southern culture. As far as Longstreet was concerned, the South had lost its
fight for slavery and therefore should move on. Longstreet would also go on record stating that
his main goal was to provide justice for all Americans, regardless of color.8 Other than his desire
to remain loyal to his state, Longstreet did not fight for slavery like many other Southern
commanders such as Jubal Early, A.P. Hill and Ewell.
Although Longstreet’s honorable decisions after the war, many were deciding that he had
become a turncoat.9 This however was an erroneous accusation made by those who sought to
protect “the old ways of the South”. Longstreet gave these remarks little thought. Instead, he
sought further strength though his business ventures. By 1870, Longstreet had been able to fund
co-ownership with his New Orleans insurance company. With his funds, he was able to help past
Confederate leaders such as John Bell Hood start anew after the war. Longstreet was one of the
few ex-Confederate leaders that did not struggle financially. Due to his forward-thinking mind,
he was able to build a strong foundation within the nation.10
Despite difficulties with his image, his later years of life were of some of the happiest.
Financially secure from his post-war work, he was able to enjoy the remainder of his life
amongst friends and family. He lived comfortably on a farm which he partook in hunting,
7 Longstreet, From Manassas to Appomattox, 431.
8 Longstreet, New Orleans Times, June 1867.
9 The New York Times, June 10, 1867.
10 The New York Times, June 10, 1867.
57
come to terms with his place in Southern history.
There were few things that affected Longstreet’s happiness. However, in the late 1880s
Longstreet was bombarded with various episodes of depression. His lifelong friend Ulysses S.
Grant and wife, Lousia Garland, passed away within a year of each other. Despite his major
losses, Longstreet being familiar with death from his time in military service allowed him to
continue forward with optimism. Further difficulties in life also presented themselves to
Longstreet when his home burnt down destroying most of his wartime artifacts and personal
records.
Despite the decline of Longstreet’s life, at the age of seventy-six, he found love again
with Ms. Helen Dortch, later to be his second wife. Helen, a significantly younger lady in
comparison to Longstreet, wedded the former general and confirmed the family within the
Catholic Church. Greatly devoted to her husband, Helen spent much of her time before and after
Longstreet’s death attempting to rebuild his reputation.12
The final years of Longstreet’s life were conflicting. However, feelings of fulfillment
eventually presented themselves during the Confederate Reunion 1896. Being the only living
survivor of Confederate high command, Longstreet found that many forgot about their hatred
toward him. Whether or not it was a façade, it pleased Longstreet greatly.13 After the reunion,
Longstreet tried to tour the battlefields that he had participated on thought his military career.
This tour was for Longstreet’s personal agenda to pay respect for those that had fallen under his
command. Unfortunately, he did not receive the same treatment after his death in 1904. Due to
12 Piston, Lee’s Tarnished Lieutenant, 162.
13 Eckenrode, James Longstreet, 377.
58
his tarnished reputation most ex-Confederate soldiers and organizations refused to place flowers
on his grave.14
14 Eckenrode, Lee’s Warhorse, 378.
59
Chapter 5: The Lost Cause
Post-war Southerners felt as if they still had a fighting chance to uphold their ideas
regarding the nation’s rights and slavery. Despite losing the war, the South still had significant
sway toward public opinion and governmental policies in Washington. This group of determined
individuals were known as the Lost Cause. They sought to further pre-war agendas via the use of
media, public figures, and popular support. The Lost Cause provided the theme to post war
rhetoric and discussion. Their goal was to romanticize the Civil War and those who fought for
the Confederacy via a religious setting. The Lost Cause upheld Southern beliefs regarding race
theory and hoped to memorize the ideas and warriors of the Confederacy. Any who did not fit
into their agenda were outlawed.1
Memorials, graves, poems, books, and many other works were created because of the
Lost Cause’s desire to idolize those who fought and died for the South. However, Longstreet did
not fit into this category, nor did he receive adequate representation among Southern
sympathizers. Longstreet turned away from the Lost Cause’s dated ideas regarding human rights
and reconstruction. This gave the South ample cause to defame him and exile him from any
positive representation in history. After Robert E. Lee’s death in 1870, there was no individual
who was alive or able to give an appropriate account of Longstreet’s devotion to the South or his
wartime actions. Without Lee being able to set the record straight, the Lost Cause was able to run
rampant with their bombastic ideas and belittling rhetoric.2
Few individuals came out of the American Civil War without regrets, sacrifice, or
resentment. Many who fought, whether it was for the North or the South, felt as if their duty was
1 Piston, Lee’s Tarnished Lieutenant, 113.
2 Jubal Early, The Campaigns of General Robert E. Lee: An Address (Montana: Kessinger, 2010), 30.
60
to combat those who sought to interfere with their ideologies. James Longstreet was no
exception. Longstreet had always fought for what he had thought was the proper in regard to his
home, family, and state. It is unfortunate however that he had to face the difficult reality to end
his reign as a commanding general of the Southern states. Longstreet cared deeply for the
Southern cause as well as the individuals who fought for it. As during his adolescence, he wanted
nothing but success for himself and those around him. Longstreet was quick to repent for his
actions against the United States and quickly sought peace.
It was Longstreet’s quick action to peace that made him an easy target for the remaining
hatred amid the South. Longstreet has been misrepresented in history as due to Southern
resentment and because of it allowed improper interpretations to bleed though historical context.
Longstreet fought for the Southern cause with the full dignity of a commander, but when
defeated, his respectful demeanor spoke loudly, and he sought reconciliation for his actions.3
Unlike Robert E. Lee who was seen as a hero to the South, Longstreet, being a lesser figure, was
immediately labeled as a traitor during and after the war. His character had been also called into
question. Unlike other commanders such as Lee and Stonewall Jackson, Longstreet possessed a
quieter, more obscure nature. Aspects of his quiet, rugged, and methodical personality sparked
the imagination his critics. Despite his successes in school, which topped nearly ninety precent of
white males, most historians only remember his lower placement in graduation and thus called
into question his intellect.4 Additionally, long lasting friendships with Northern commanders
such as Ulysses S. Grant made skeptics question whether Longstreet intended for the South to
win the war.
3 R. L. Di Nardo, James Longstreet: The Man, They Soldier, The Controversy (Boston: Da Capo, 1998), 192.
4 Di Nardo, James Longstreet, 192.
61
After Appomattox, Longstreet was one of the few who responded to reconstruction
efforts. In New Orleans, public reconstruction programs sought individuals who possessed
stature and guidance, Longstreet was more than willing to participate. However, Longstreet was
not alone in his reconstruction efforts. Other Southern commanders such as Raphael Moses,
George Pickett, and P.G.T. Beauregard also stated their desire for peace.5
Things turned sour for Longstreet regarding his political alignment. The Republican Party
remained to be the bane of Southern sympathizers. Longstreet thought it necessary to uphold
positive relations with the Republican Party in order to promote positive dialogue within the
United States government. This however was misconstrued and incredibly off-putting for
Southern Democrats. Southern Democrats felt as if Longstreet was betraying them as well as
their cause by willingly communicating with the Republican Party. Longstreet remarks: “I am
not a politician or office seeker; it is my burden and duty to assist the good of the people.”6
Longstreet took the honorable route in the face of Southern pride and the Lost Cause Movement.
As known from his adolescence, Longstreet always fought for what he felt was right, even
though it may cause difficulties.7
There was a double standard with regard to Longstreet’s political views versus the
public’s view on Longstreet. Longstreet was still aligned with the Democrat Party and continued
to pledge his support to the South. Additionally, he twice attempted to plot against Lincoln’s
reelection, which should have pleased Southerners. Plans to continue the North and the South’s
separation was constantly on Longstreet’s mind. This, however, was not public news, which
5 New Orleans Times, The Library of Congress. March 24, 1867.
6 New Orleans Times, The Library of Congress. March 19, 1867.
7 Piston, Lee’s Tarnished Lieutenant, 106.
62
made for confusion amongst the public when looking at his conflicting actions on both sides of
the political aisle. Longstreet was to blame for this confusion for his unwillingness to publicly
publish anything that stated his political intentions after the war.8 Longstreet’s mere cooperation
with the Republican Party was additional fuel for his misrepresentation in history.
Longstreet critics became increasingly hostile in the late 1860s. Like many other
Southern soldiers, Longstreet filed for a federal pardon for his military actions. This pardon was
accepted by President Ulysses S. Grant, which furthered hatred toward Longstreet by mading it
seem as if he was participating in an inside job with the former Union commander. Grant would
go on record defending his friend regarding the pardon in which he set fourth:
Knowing that General Longstreet, late of the army which was in rebellion against the
authority of the United States, is in the city, and presuming that he intends asking
executive clemency before leaving, I beg to say a word in his favor. I think I can safely
say that there is nowhere among the highest class a more honorable man. General
Longstreet stands high among this class. I shall feel it a personal favor to myself if this
pardon is granted.9
Despite the initial reluctance of the federal government to issue a pardon for the high ranking
general, it was passed due to Longstreet’s positive reputation after the war.
The relationship that Longstreet and Grant built was one of the most impressive displays
of unity after the nation’s separation. Longstreet gladly attended Grant’s inauguration as
president. Knowing of this, radical Southern’s barked with disgust and anger. Just as Lincoln’s
election, many Lost Cause sympathizers boycotted the federal election in hopes of spurring
additional backlash. Longstreet’s attendance solidified his peace pact with the Northern states,
and the Republican party. However, it was not just the Lost Cause that showed its hate toward
8 Piston, Lee’s Tarnished Lieutenant, 107.
9 Longstreet, From Manassas to Appomattox, 416.
63
the former Confederate general. Northern newspaper The New York Times attacked Longstreet
for his attendance by publishing:
The nomination was an attempt to restore peace within the South. That’s the maiming of
loyalty, there was one of Lee’s Lieutenants. To poverty and immortality, Longstreet, has
preferred ostracism and wealth, and there is not a genuine man of either party but
despises his swift recantation and swifter search for spoils. Our scalawag is the local
leper of the community, he must be naive.10
Nearly everywhere Longstreet traveled he was defamed. Whether it was for his link to the
Confederacy or his willingness to accept unity, he encountered backlash. Regardless of his want
to succeed fanatically, which may in fact have been his goal after the war, it was clear that he
was at least able to move on after the war and accept defeat. Longstreet’s desire for financial
security was not devious but rather for the benefit of himself and his family. There is no existing
evidence that suggests that Longstreet used his relationship with Grant or the Republican Party
for devious monetary gain.11
Longstreet’s nomination for federal office under the supervision of Grant did not sit well
with Southerners. Longstreet was ostracized for working alongside the South’s antagonist, “the
butcher”, Ulysses S. Grant. This did not stop Longstreet from pursuing his political agendas.
Longstreet’s entrance into the federal government was approved with a vote 25 to 10. The
individuals who had voted against were outspoken about his relationship with the Confederacy.
Longstreet, like Grant was seen as a butcher, but for the opposite side of the conflict.12
Longstreet was appointed by President Grant to oversee seaside federal ports. This
sparked further desires to defame his name. This new job for Longstreet paid incredibly well in
10 New York Times, March 12, 1869
11 Sanger, James Longstreet, 346.
12 New York Times, March 20, 1869; Sanger, James Longstreet, 346.
64
comparison to other post-war Confederate commanders of the same rank. Rumors began to
spread that Longstreet had struck an agreement with Grant before the war had ended to secure
his fate if the Confederacy were to have lost. However, is no record of any agreement being
made.13
In addition to Longstreet’s approach to reconstruction and political affiliations, his
military actions throughout the war also fueled his “villain arch” amid the Lost Cause and
Southern pride. The Battle of Gettysburg was the crux of the false accusations against
Longstreet. His actions at Gettysburg resulted in the destruction of his reputation as well as the
blame for the Confederacy’s loss for the entire war. As historian Thomas states, “Longstreet was
the scapegoat for Gettysburg.”14 The Lost Cause sought to defame Longstreet for his military
actions and began to nitpick every questionable decision made by the commander. However, it is
invalid to assume that Longstreet was a traitor to the Confederacy as he was the longest serving
general to the Southern cause, longer than Jackson, Lee, Hill or Ewell. Longstreet fought from
the First Manassas to Appomattox without hesitation. It was only until he decided to preached
cooperation with the North that he became a target.15
Significant resentment came to Longstreet with his thoughts regarding African
Americans. Rather than outright disenfranchising this group of citizens, Longstreet sought
cooperation with them in both political and societal lenses. Whether or not Longstreet viewed
African Americans as equal to whites is unknown, but what is known was his ability to set aside
the South’s hostile actions against the former slaves. Longstreet sought ways to incorporate the
13 “Longstreet Reminiscences”, New York Times, July 24, 1885.
14 Wilbur Thomas, General James “Pete” Longstreet: Lee’s “Old War Horse” Scapegoat for Gettysburg (West
Virgina: McClain Publishing, 1979), vii.
15 DiNardo, James Longstreet, 197.
65
Black vote into politics. Longstreet remarked in a private correspondence, “it seems plain to me
that we should do the work ourselves and have it white instead of black. Instead, we [should
have] the best men in public office”.16 It was at this time that Longstreet denounced the
Democrat party and transitioned over to the Republican, which fell directly in line with those
seeking to dismantle his Southern stature.17
Rather than joining his fellow commanders such as J.E.B. Stuart and Lee, Longstreet
revoked his interest in the Lost Cause and instead favored the Republican party. This was much
in part due to his lasting friendship with Grant, who had been incredibly successful in
Washington as a politician. After this, Longstreet was displayed as a “scalawag” and “traitor” in
the Southern news articles.18
Longstreet reputation as a scalawag outshines any aspect of his military career. If
anything, it made Southerners feel compelled twist stories in order to fit their agenda. Jubal
Early, one of Longstreet’s former military acquaintances was one of many who fueled the Lost
Cause’s anger toward Longstreet. Ironically, it was Early who had caused the Confederacy more
damage throughout the war than Longstreet. Early was one of the reasons why the Confederates
failed at Gettysburg due to his lackluster approach to Cemetery Hill on the first day. Due to his
inaction, the rebels spent an additional two days fighting upon ground which should have been
occupied. Devils Den, Little Round Top, and Pickett’s Charge would have turned out very
differently if Early was not hesitant with his actions.19 However, rather than pointing the finger
16 James Longstreet, Letter to Taliaferro, July 1867. Accessed by The Library of Congress despite original text being
derived from various letters and articles from New Orleans and The Louisiana Times.
17 Di Nardo, James Longstreet, 198
18 “A Scalawag” University of Virgina Magazine, April 1871. A Scalawag, as referred to in the post-war South, was
a term used for those who were friendly to former slaves of the African American race.
19 Carol Reardon, Pickett’s Charge, 7.
66
at what could have happened, it instead displays the double standard that Longstreet faced after
the war.
Jubal Early became one of the staunchest critics of Longstreet. Early openly criticized
Longstreet on multiple occasions. The first public criticism was in a 1872 speech when Early
blamed Longstreet for the defeat at Gettysburg. Already labeled as a scalawag, this was a very
enticing and believable story to Lost Cause sympathizers. Two other accounts of Early defaming
Longstreet were amid Southern-published pamphlets that gave Early’s account of the war as well
as Longstreet’s mistakes at Gettysburg.20
Early continued his assault upon Longstreet in 1873 when blaming Longstreet for the
delayed action during the Battle of Gettysburg. There were three accusations, one for each day,
made on part of Early. The first being Longstreet’s inability to arrive at Gettysburg with his
corps on the first day. Despite this being partially true, Longstreet’s corps was not needed for an
initial Confederate victory. Midway through the first day the rebels had pushed back the Union
army but due to miscommunication and hesitation the assault was prematurely halted.21
The second and third accusations regard Longstreet’s failure to attack the Union forces at
daybreak on the second and third day. Longstreet’s failure to attack at dawn, which has
previously been concluded to be impossible due to terrain, lack of reconnaissance, and confusion
with Lee, became a goldmine for Early’s Lost Cause slander. Despite the inaccuracies in Early’s
arguments, the South had no reason to refute his language.22
20 New York Times, January 9, 1872.
21 Robert E. Lee, Recollections and Letters, September 2016. Accessed through the Gutenberg files and edited by
Robert E. Lee’s son.
22 Sanger, James Longstreet, 433; Wert, General James Longstreet, 407.
67
Despite the intense accusations made by Early, Longstreet did nothing to rectify his case.
Apart from outright ignoring Early, Longstreet was also seen aiding African American police
officers in New Orleans.23 Alongside African Americans liberty fighters, Longstreet helped quell
various riots made by white Southerners most of which were ex-confederate rebels. This
affirmed Longstreet’s reputation as a scalawag. In addition, with Early’s widely accepted
account of Longstreet at Gettysburg, he was no longer able to use his military prowess as a
shield.
With the irreversible damage already being done to Longstreet’s reputation. Nothing
would be able to alter the Lost Cause Movement and Southern opinion. Even the words of
Robert E. Lee, before his death, were insufficient. In a later publication of Longstreet’s memoirs,
he provides the public with an excerpt written by Lee that state Lee’s regrets for not listening to
Longstreet’s council during the final day of Gettysburg.24
Political divides allowed hatred to brood within Longstreet’s personal and professional
life. In efforts to dismantle Longstreet, a specific faction was formed to enshrine Confederate
commanders who continued their rebel path after the war. Naturally, Longstreet did not fall into
this category and once again became an outlaw. By the late 1870s, Longstreet had limited
relations with his fellow Southerners. Significant names such as Jefferson Davis, Jubal Early,
and Lee’s staff officer Taylor were but a few who felt compelled to diminish Longstreet’s
reputation.25
23 New York Times, July 26, 1884.
24 New Orleans Republican, February 27, 1876.
25 Piston, Lee’s Tarnished Lieutenant, 130.
68
Great lengths were taken to ensure that Longstreet was silenced. According to Longstreet,
there were various attempts to arrest him for treason. Even newspaper organizations such as the
Amry and Navy Journal and the New Orleans Times outright called Longstreet a wanted
criminal.26 Longstreet was resilient enough to restrain himself for acting upon such claims.
Restraint was a trait that he developed later in life.
Jubal Early was the largest supporter of the anti-Longstreet faction. Efforts to reprint
speeches made by Longstreet and Lee were one of many of his ploys to gain popular control.
Early would tirelessly promote his rendition of the war to prominent Southerners in attempts to
bolster his claims against Longstreet. Over time the hostilities toward Longstreet took their toll.
Longstreet resorted to alternative measures to defend his reputation. The measures taken
unfortunately backfired, and many believed that Longstreet had overstepped his bounds.
Angered by years of verbal abuse from his former peers, Longstreet began to criticize
Robert E. Lee. This was a grave mistake as many believed that Lee’s reputation was
untouchable. Longstreet’s publishing regarding Lee came off as egotistical. Most of Longstreet’s
criticisms regarded the Battle of Gettysburg and the various strategic blunders made upon Lee.27
Although well founded, Longstreet’s analysis of Lee was disregarded and angered most ex-
Confederate soldiers. It was well known that criticism of Lee was off limits.
Early took great advantage of the situation and sought out various publishing agencies
and military documents to attack Longstreet. Articles in both the Philadelphia Times and the
Weekly Times made readers feel as if they had to choose between Longstreet or Lee. This was a
26 John Wade, Augustus Baldwin Longstreet: A Study of The Development Of Culture In The South (New York:
Smaller Books, 1999), 178.
27 Piston, Lee’s Tarnished Lieutenant, 133.
69
well-played move. Due to these newspaper editions, readers began to believe that there was some
sort of vendetta between Lee and his former “war horse”. Imagination took hold of the public
which made many believe that Longstreet was the only reason Lee had lost the Gettysburg battle.
Exaggerations of the battle as well as an overemphasis of Longstreet’s alleged blunders made for
a compelling story for those without proper insight into the battle’s innerworkings.28
Later in life, Longstreet understood that his reputation in Southern history was not going
to be positive after his death. Despite personal struggles with various deaths Longstreet’s uphill
fight to clear his name was not over. Longstreet remarked:
My arm is paralyzed and my voice that once could be heard by all is gone. I can scarcely
speak above a whisper. My hearing is very much impaired and sometimes I wish the end
would come. But I have some misrepresentations of my battles that I wish to correct, to
have my record correct before I die.29
Despite his old age and dwindling strength, Longstreet devoted the remainder of his life to this
cause.
His lengthened memoirs From Manassas to Appomattox gave way to his opinions
regarding the Civil War. Many, however, would discredit From Manassas to Appomattox due in
part to potential errors made by the aged gentleman. Due to his age, many did not believe that
Longstreet was able to recall the war’s events accurately. Additionally, the book provided
significant biases toward certain individuals.
The glorification of individuals such as Ulysses Grant, George Pickett, A.P. Hill, John
Hood, Lafayette Mclaws and Richard Ewell made it apparent where Longstreet’s allegiances lay.
Despite a few of these individuals’ history of attacking Longstreet, he had felt that positive
28 Piston, Lee’s Tarnished Lieutenant, 135.
29 Longstreet, From Manassas to Appomattox, 1-10. Extended notes from Gary Gallagher.
71
However, The Lost Cause was quick to react to this success. Lost Cause sympathizers cautioned
people when reading the book, blaming Longstreet for misrepresentation, and false objectivity.
Jubal Early also made a significant effort to discredit the book. Successful in their attempts,
Longstreet’s writings quickly faltered after their initial success. Both the Lost Cause and the anti-
Longstreet faction had overpowered the public sentiment and successfully destroyed any chance
for Longstreet to obtain a heathy image in history. Despite Longstreet’s best efforts to refurbish
his reputation, the Lost Cause and the anti-Longstreet faction were successful in their efforts.
American Civil War history is still dealing with the repercussions of those twisted agendas of
bitter Southern sympathizers and the Lost Cause.
72
Conclusion
James Longstreet remains to be one of the most controversial characters of the Civil War.
From the beginning of his existence, he breaks away from the norm regarding generalship,
education, strategy, and personality. However, due to his unique character and willingness to
move away from past ideologies his reputation was destroyed. To this day, historians continue to
debate his actions. Most notably, the Battle of Gettysburg proved to be the pinnacle of
Longstreet’s military career but because of his unfortunate position he was unjustifiably blamed
for the rebel’s decisive defeat.
Longstreet’s Antebellum life was spent building his military career in every way
possible. Whether it was his academics at West Point or actions during the Mexican American
War, everything was centered around becoming a notable commander. Longstreet was also able
to build connections that would last a lifetime. The friends that he made during Antebellum
America would later decide his fate after the Civil War. Ulysses S. Grant proved to be the
biggest factor of change for Longstreet’s character. The bond the two shared benefited
Longstreet immensely but was also used as ammunition against him via the Lost Cause. Because
of Grant, Longstreet was able to live a prosperous life after the war. As for his home life,
Longstreet was far from the perfect husband or father. Absent from much of his marriage due to
his career, he was unable to build fruitful relations with his first children. Nonetheless he was
able to financially support his family and cared for them deeply.
The Battle of Gettysburg became the biggest point of debate during Longstreet’s life.
Historical literature continues to debate this matter. This paper concludes that Longstreet was not
at fault for the Confederacies defeat and was greatly misrepresented after the war. Despite there
being significant secondary literature on this topic, there has yet to be a cohesive agreement on
73
Longstreet’s actions, that is until now. Utilizing military records, personal memoirs, and
newspaper editions, this paper displays a unique perspective on the Battle of Gettysburg. In
addition, this paper has addressed new dialogue with historiography that displays the disconnect
regarding this topic.
Due to Longstreet’s direct character, he was quick to voice his opinions, especially if he
had felt he was correct. This was certainly the case during Gettysburg. Longstreet was opposed
to the Northern invasion from the beginning. However, unable to persuade Lee he had no other
choice but to go forth with plans that he knew would fail. Longstreet was condemned to the
disdain of others. In addition, Longstreet was promised by Lee that risky offensive maneuvers
were not to be enacted. However, as confusion and haste took over the Confederate army, Lee
boldened his actions and disregarded the pact that he had made.
Longstreet became the scapegoat for the Gettysburg disaster. After the war he would be
defamed and blamed for three aspects of the battle, one for each day. The first day he was
blamed for his tardiness. This, however, has been refuted. The Army of Northern Virgina did not
need Longstreet’s corps to be successful on the first day. Further success along the frontline was
diminished, not because of Longstreet’s absence but rather Ewell and Early’s reluctance to
pressure the weekend Federal army. In addition, J.E.B. Stuarts unexplainable absence did not
help the Confedaracy’s odds for success.
The second day, Longstreet was defamed for his lack of generalship, organization, and
tardiness. Once again, these accusations do not hold. In fact, it was Lee’s inability and lack of
geographical knowledge of the surrounding area that led to Longstreet’s delays along the
Emmitsburg Road. Additionally, Longstreet did not receive support from the remainder for the
74
army. Longstreet was condemned to press fourth an attack that he knew would fail. Any
alteration of plans was unacceptable to the commanding general.
Longstreet’s hopes for a defensive campaign were destroyed by the third day. Pickett’s
Charge was the ultimate failure which was decided by Lee. Opposed to the attack, Longstreet
once again spoke his mind to Lee, and for it was greatly criticized. The failure of Pickett’s
Charge was due to tactical disadvantages and timing failures. Longstreet enacted his plan with
great prestige. His timing was impeccable. But due to the inaccuracy of the Confederate artillery
and A.P. Hill and Ewell’s inability to support the assault, the Confederate assault fell apart.
Longstreet was not to blame for the disaster.
After the war Longstreet sought peaceful ways, but due to Southern hatred, any attempt at
co-existing with the federal government was seen as preposterous. Longstreet became the prefect
target for the Confederacy’s downfall. Longstreet’s forward-thinking aspirations became the
target of the Lost Cause and for it he was defamed. Angered at Longstreet’s willingness for
accept defeat and ability to prosper financially led many to believe that he had been plotting
against the Confederacy during his generalship. This, however, was a preposterous allegation
against the Southern commander. Additionally, Longstreet’s willingness to denounce his
Democrat affiliation and transition to the Republican Party made him seem as if he was a traitor
to the Southern cause.
The evidence provided in this paper concludes that Longstreet was unjustifiably defamed
throughout history. The Lost Cause and the anti-Longstreet faction manipulated the public into
believing false narratives. Even to this day, secondary research does not give proper accounts of
his life and place in Southern history. This paper revaluates the false perceptions of Longstreet
75
and wholeheartedly rewrites the historical narrative for Longstreet’s depiction in American
History.
76
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