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The seductive force of ‘noumenal power’: a new path (or impasse) for critical theory? PDF Free Download

The seductive force of ‘noumenal power’: a new path (or impasse) for critical theory? PDF free Download. Think more deeply and widely.


CitaonSusen, S. (2018). The Seductive Force of ‘Noumenal Power’: A New Path (or
Impasse) for Critical Theory?. Journal of Political Power, 11(1), pp. 4-45. doi:
10.1080/2158379x.2017.1362734

 
Permanent repository link: https://openaccess.city.ac.uk/id/eprint/18532/
Link to published versionhttps://doi.org/10.1080/2158379x.2017.1362734
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The Seductive Force of ‘Noumenal Power’:
A New Path (or Impasse) for Critical Theory?
Simon Susen
Introduction
Th
e
m
a
in
p
ur
p
os
e
o
f
t
hi
s
p
a
p
er
i
s
t
o
exa
min
e
R
a
in
er
F
o
r
s
t
’
s
acco
un
t
o
f
‘
n
o
um
en
a
l
p
o
w
er
’
1
.
F
o
r
s
t
’
s
p
r
o
p
osa
l
f
o
r
a
r
e
v
i
se
d
‘
cr
i
t
ic
a
l
t
h
e
o
r
y
o
f
p
o
w
er
’
2
i
s
fir
m
ly
emb
e
dde
d
in
hi
s
p
hi
lo
s
o
p
hic
a
l
un
der
s
t
a
n
din
g
o
f
‘
t
h
e
r
ig
h
t
t
o
j
u
s
t
ific
a
t
io
n
’
3
.
W
h
er
e
a
s
t
h
e
l
a
tt
er
h
a
s
b
e
en
ext
en
sively discussed in the
secondary literature, the former has
–
with the exception of various exchanges
that have taken place between Forst and his critics at academic conferences
–
received little attention. This paper is an attempt to fill this gap in the
literature. Given the
in
cr
e
a
sin
g
infl
uen
ce
o
f
F
o
r
s
t
’
s sc
h
o
l
a
r
ly
w
r
i
t
in
gs
o
n
p
a
radig
m
a
t
ic
de
v
e
lo
pm
en
ts
in
co
n
temporary critical theory, it is imperative to
scrutinize the key assumptions underlying
hi
s
co
n
cep
t
io
n
o
f
‘
n
o
um
en
a
l
p
o
w
er
’
a
n
d
t
o
a
ssess
i
ts
u
s
ef
u
ln
ess
f
o
r
o
v
er
co
min
g
t
h
e s
h
o
r
t
comings of alternative
explanatory frameworks. In order to accomplish this, the analysis is divided into
four parts. The first part provides some introductory definitional reflections on the
concept of power. The second part focuses on several dichotomous meanings
attached
t
o
t
h
e
co
n
cep
t
o
f
p
o
w
er
–
n
o
t
a
b
ly
,
‘
s
o
ft
p
o
w
er
’
vs.
‘h
a
r
d
p
o
w
er
’
,
‘
p
o
w
er
t
o
’
vs.
‘
p
o
w
er
o
v
er
’
,
a
n
d
‘
p
o
w
er
f
o
r
’
vs.
‘
p
o
w
er
a
ga
in
s
t
’
.
Th
e
t
hird
p
a
r
t
e
l
ucid
a
t
es
t
h
e
p
r
in
ci
p
a
l
f
e
a
t
ur
es
o
f
F
o
r
s
t
’
s
in
t
er
p
r
et
a
t
io
n
o
f
‘
no
u
mena
l
p
o
w
er
’
,
in
addi
t
io
n
t
o
dra
w
in
g
a
tt
en
t
io
n
t
o
hi
s
t
yp
o
log
ic
a
l
di
s
t
in
c
t
io
n
bet
w
e
en
‘
p
o
w
er
’
,
‘
r
u
le
’
,
‘
do
min
a
t
io
n
’
,
a
n
d
‘
v
io
len
ce
’
.
The
fin
a
l
p
a
r
t
o
ff
er
s
a
n
a
ss
e
ssm
e
n
t
o
f
F
o
r
s
t
’
s
acco
un
t
o
f
‘
n
o
um
en
a
l
p
o
w
er
’
,
a
r
guin
g
t
h
a
t,
a
l
t
h
o
ug
h
i
t
s
ucce
e
d
s
in
a
v
o
idin
g
t
h
e
drawbacks of rival approaches, it suffers from significant limitations. The paper
concludes by giving a synopsis of the vital insights that can be obtained from
the preceding inquiry.
I.
The concept of power
‘
P
o
w
er
’
i
s
a
hig
h
ly
co
nt
r
o
v
er
si
a
l
co
n
cep
t,
w
hic
h
h
a
s
b
e
en,
a
n
d
co
nt
in
ues
t
o
b
e
,
g
i
v
en
n
um
er
ous different meanings in both academic and non-academic
discourses. Notwithstanding
t
h
e
q
ues
t
io
n
o
f
w
h
et
h
er
o
r
n
o
t
o
n
e s
h
a
r
es F
o
r
s
t
’
s
v
ie
w
t
h
a
t
‘
t
h
e
m
e
a
nin
g
o
f
t
hi
s
im
p
o
r
t
a
nt
co
n
cep
t
i
s
ra
r
e
ly
m
ade
exp
lici
t,
es
p
eci
a
lly
in
t
h
e
co
nt
ext
o
f
n
o
r
m
a
t
i
v
e
di
sc
u
s
sio
n
s
’
4
,
a
c
ur
s
o
r
y
s
ur
v
e
y
o
f
t
h
e
r
eleva
nt
li
t
era
t
ur
e s
uffices
t
o
i
ll
u
s
t
ra
t
e
t
h
a
t
t
h
e
t
er
m
‘
p
o
w
er
’
r
em
a
in
s
a
n
‘
ess
en
t
i
a
lly
co
nt
es
t
e
d
’
5
c
a
t
eg
o
r
y
in
s
o
ci
a
l
a
n
d
p
o
li
t
ic
a
l
t
h
o
ug
h
t.
I
n
a
g
en
era
l
s
en
se
,
i
t
r
ef
er
s
t
o
a
n
ac
t
o
r
’
s
a
b
i
li
t
y
t
o
do
s
o
m
et
hin
g
in
o
n
e
wa
y
o
r
a
n
o
t
h
er
.
I
n
G
er
m
a
n,
t
h
e
n
o
un
Ma
c
h
t
(‘
p
o
w
er
’),
w
hic
h
i
s s
em
a
nt
ic
a
lly
r
e
l
a
t
e
d
t
o
t
h
e
v
erb
mache
n
(‘
t
o
m
ak
e
’
o
r
‘
t
o
do
’),
exp
r
esses this basic meaning of the concept of power.
In Latin languages, the emphasis is placed on
‘
c
a
p
aci
t
y’
t
o
des
cr
i
b
e
‘
p
o
w
er
’:
in
F
r
en
c
h,
p
ou
v
oi
r
;
in
I
t
a
li
a
n,
p
o
t
e
re
;
in
S
p
a
ni
s
h,
pode
r
.
Th
ese
t
er
m
s s
ug
g
es
t
t
h
a
t
acces
s
t
o
‘
p
o
w
er
’
r
e
q
uir
es
t
h
e c
a
p
aci
t
y
t
o
do
s
o
m
et
hin
g
a
n
d/o
r
t
o
ac
t
upon
the world in a particular way.6
T
o
b
e
s
ur
e
,
i
t
w
o
u
ld
b
e
er
r
o
n
e
o
u
s
t
o
a
ss
um
e
t
h
a
t
‘
a
p
o
w
er
r
e
l
a
t
io
n
i
s
n
eces
s
a
r
i
ly
a
r
e
l
a
t
io
n
o
f
s
u
bo
r
din
a
t
io
n
a
n
d
do
min
a
t
io
n
’
7
,
sin
ce
s
uc
h
a
fa
t
a
lis
t
ic
p
er
s
p
e
c
t
i
v
e
w
o
u
ld
m
a
k
e i
t
diffic
u
l
t,
if
n
o
t
im
p
os
si
b
le
,
t
o
di
s
t
in
gui
s
h
bet
we
en
leg
i
t
im
a
t
e
a
n
d
i
l
leg
i
t
im
a
t
e
‘
f
o
r
m
s
o
f
t
h
e ex
er
ci
s
e
o
f
p
ow
e
r
’
8
.
N
o
t
w
i
t
h
s
t
a
n
din
g
t
h
e
q
ues
t
io
n
o
f
w
h
et
h
er
o
n
e w
i
s
h
es
t
o
m
ak
e
a
c
a
se
f
o
r
t
h
e
‘
ess
enti
all
y
no
u
mena
l
n
a
t
u
r
e’
9
o
f
p
o
w
er
o
r
see
ks
t
o
c
h
a
rac
t
er
ize
t
h
e
f
un
d
a
m
en
t
a
l
co
n
s
t
i
t
u
t
io
n
o
f
power in an alternative way, it is crucial not to reduce
all
modes of exercising
power to their negative, repressive, or oppressive variants. For such a one-
sided approach draws attention away from those kinds of power that lead to,
or presuppose, both genuine and legitimate processes of human
empowerment. The objective of the next sections is to contribute to a
sociologically insightful, comprehensive, and non-reductive understanding of
power.
II.
Dichotomies of power
It is striking that, within both classical and contemporary currents of social
and political thought, it is common to attach numerous
dichotomous
meanings to the concept of power. This tendency appears to suggest that it
is possible to distinguish fundamental types of power in binary terms. In this
respect, the following conceptual oppositions are especially
im
p
o
r
t
a
n
t:
(1)
‘
s
o
ft
p
o
w
er
’
vs.
‘h
a
r
d
p
o
w
er
’
,
(2)
‘
p
o
w
er
t
o
’
vs.
‘
p
o
w
er
o
v
er
’
,
a
n
d
(3)
‘
p
o
w
er
f
o
r
’
vs.
‘
p
o
w
er
a
ga
in
s
t
’
.
(1) Th
er
e
i
s
t
h
e
di
s
t
in
c
t
io
n
bet
we
en
‘
s
o
ft
p
o
w
er
’
a
n
d
‘
h
a
r
d
p
o
w
er
’
.
Th
e
f
o
r
m
er
i
s
‘
s
o
ft
’
in
the sense that it refers to
symbolic
forms of power. These may be
articulated conceptually,
lin
gui
s
t
ic
a
lly
,
di
sc
ur
si
v
e
ly
,
a
n
d/o
r
ide
o
log
ic
a
lly
.
Th
e
l
a
tt
er
i
s
‘h
a
r
d
’
in
t
h
e s
en
se
t
h
a
t
i
t
co
n
cerns
material
forms of power. These may
be observed and measured empirically, insofar a
s
t
h
e
y
co
n
s
t
i
t
u
t
e
t
a
n
g
i
b
le
co
mp
o
n
en
ts
o
f
s
o
ci
a
l
r
e
a
li
t
y
.
S
o
ft
p
o
w
er
,
a
s
a
‘
co
n
s
t
r
uc
t
i
v
i
s
t
’
may suggest, is
about the representational world; it is made of symbolic forms
–
such as
conceptual, linguistic, discursive, and/or ideological imaginaries. By contrast,
‘[r]eal
and
h
a
r
d
p
o
w
er
,
a
“
r
e
a
li
s
t
”
mig
h
t
s
a
y
,
i
s
a
bo
u
t
t
h
e
em
pir
ic
a
l
w
o
r
ld
,
i
t
i
s
m
ade
o
f
m
a
t
er
i
a
l
s
t
uff
,
li
k
e
p
o
li
t
ic
a
l
p
osi
t
io
n
s,
m
o
n
et
a
r
y
m
e
a
n
s
o
r
,
u
l
t
im
a
t
e
ly
,
mi
li
t
a
r
y
in
s
t
r
um
en
ts
o
f
f
o
r
ce
’
10
.
I
n
short, the former is aimed at
persuasion
,
whereas the latter asserts its influence by virtue
of coercion.
(2) There is the distinction between
‘power to’ and ‘power over’
. The former
designates
a
n
en
t
i
t
y’
s c
a
p
aci
t
y
t
o
do
s
o
m
et
hin
g
a
n
d/o
r
t
o
ac
t
u
p
o
n
t
h
e
w
o
r
ld
in
a
p
a
r
t
ic
u
l
a
r
wa
y
.
I
n t
hi
s s
en
se
,
i
t
m
a
y
b
e
des
cr
i
b
e
d
a
s
a
p
r
od
uc
t
i
ve
f
o
r
m
o
f
p
o
w
er
.
Th
e
l
a
tt
er
c
a
p
t
ur
es
a
n
en
t
i
t
y’
s
capacity to exercise influence, or even
control, over something or somebody in a particular
way and to a specific
extent. In this sense, it may be interpreted as a
coercive
form of power.
‘
Po
w
er
t
o
’
i
s ess
en
t
i
a
l
t
o
s
o
ci
a
l
o
r
der
,
a
n
d
in
de
e
d
t
o
h
um
a
n
lif
e
,
in
s
o
fa
r
a
s s
u
b
j
ec
ts
n
ee
d
to be able to act upon the world, in order to shape it according to their
individual and collective interests, needs, desires, beliefs, and/or convictions.
Actors cannot construct the symbolic and the material elements of their reality
unless they possess a certain degree of power
to do
so. The purposive,
cooperative, and creative potential of human entities would
b
e
u
seless w
i
t
h
o
u
t
t
h
eir
c
a
p
aci
t
y
t
o
ex
er
cise
a
t
le
a
s
t
a
minim
a
l
a
m
o
un
t
o
f
‘
p
o
w
er
t
o
’
w
h
en
relating
to, attaching meaning to, and acting upon the world.
'
Po
w
er
o
v
er
’
i
s
cr
uci
a
l
t
o
t
h
e s
t
ra
t
ific
a
t
io
n
o
f
b
e
h
a
v
io
ura
l
,
ide
o
log
ic
a
l
,
a
n
d
in
s
t
i
t
u
t
io
n
a
l
patterns of existence that emerge within social order in particular
and within human life in general, illustrating that subjects have to be able to
influence one another, in order to shape
e
ac
h
o
t
h
er
’
s
in
t
er
es
ts,
n
ee
d
s,
desir
es,
b
e
liefs,
a
n
d/o
r
co
n
v
ic
t
io
n
s.
Ac
t
o
r
s c
a
nn
o
t
co
n
s
t
r
uc
t
the symbolic and the
material elements of their reality unless they exercise a certain degree
o
f
p
o
w
er
ov
e
r
o
n
e
a
n
o
t
h
er
.
P
e
o
p
le
’
s
a
b
i
li
t
y
t
o
h
a
v
e
a
n
im
p
ac
t
u
p
o
n
t
h
e
ob
j
ec
t
i
v
e
,
n
o
r
m
a
t
i
v
e
,
and subjective dimensions of their existence is inconceivable
without their capacity to
ex
er
cise
a
t
le
a
s
t
a
minim
a
l
a
m
o
un
t
o
f
‘
p
o
w
er
o
v
er
’
t
h
e
p
h
ysic
a
l
,
s
o
ci
a
l
,
a
n
d
p
er
s
o
n
a
l
facets
of their lifeworlds.
•
‘
Po
w
er
t
o
’
c
a
n
b
e
defin
e
d
a
s
t
he
c
a
p
a
ci
ty
o
f
A
t
o
t
h
i
n
k
o
r
t
o
d
o
s
o
me
t
h
i
n
g
i
n
a
cc
o
r
d
a
n
c
e
with A’s
–
consciously or unconsciously pursued
–
interests, needs, desires,
beliefs, and/ or convictions
.
•
‘
Po
w
er
o
v
er
’
c
a
n
b
e
defin
e
d
a
s
‘
t
he
c
a
p
a
ci
ty
o
f
A
t
o
m
o
t
i
v
a
t
e
B
t
o
t
h
i
n
k
o
r
d
o
s
o
me
t
h
i
n
g
t
h
a
t
B
w
o
u
l
d
o
t
h
er
w
i
s
e
n
o
t
h
a
v
e
t
h
o
u
ght
o
r
d
o
n
e
’
11
.
In relation to both the former and the latter, it is important to recognize that
something
m
a
y
b
e
t
h
o
ug
h
t
o
r
‘
do
n
e
f
o
r
(a
n
d
b
y
u
s
i
n
g)
go
o
d
o
r
b
a
d
r
e
as
o
ns
’
12
–
t
h
a
t
i
s,
t
h
e
v
a
li
di
t
y
of
the grounds on which something is conceptually or empirically
performed is, at least in principle, contestable. With respect to both the former and
the latter, it is, furthermore, vital to acknowledge that both A and B may end up
thinking or doing something ‘for the sake of or contrary to’13 A’s and/or B’s interests.
In brief, both the cogency of the reasons behind
and the role of the
interests
underlying human thoughts and actions are not necessarily
straightforward, let alone transparent.
(3) There is the distinction between
‘power for’ and ‘power against’
. The
former stands for power as the
assertion
of something or somebody. The latter
refers to power as the
rejec
t
i
on
o
f
s
o
m
et
hin
g
o
r
s
o
m
e
bo
d
y
.
Th
e
di
a
lec
t
ics
o
f
‘
p
o
w
er
f
o
r
’
a
n
d
‘
p
o
w
er
a
ga
in
s
t
’
–
w
hic
h
m
a
y
b
e
co
n
cei
v
e
d
o
f
in
t
er
m
s
o
f
t
h
e
r
e
l
a
t
io
n
s
hi
p
bet
we
en
‘
p
o
w
er
’
a
n
d
‘
co
un
t
er
-p
o
w
er
’
14
o
r
,
if
o
n
e
p
r
ef
er
s,
‘
p
o
w
er
’
a
n
d
‘
a
nt
i-p
o
w
er
’
15
–
lies
a
t
t
h
e
h
e
a
r
t
o
f
b
e
h
a
v
io
ura
l
,
ide
o
log
ic
a
l
,
and
institutional struggles between asymmetrically positioned actors in stratified
societies. Indeed, the conflict between experiences of empowerment and
experiences of disempowerment is embedded in the friction between
mechanisms of domination and processes of emancipation, which appears to
permeate all stratified small-scale and large-scale societal formations.
16
I
t
w
o
u
ld
b
e
mi
s
t
ak
en,
h
o
we
v
er
,
t
o
es
t
a
b
li
s
h
a
n
o
r
m
a
t
i
v
e
hiera
r
c
h
y
bet
we
en
‘
p
o
w
er
f
o
r
’
a
n
d
‘
p
o
w
er
a
ga
in
s
t
’
.
J
u
s
t
a
s
bo
t
h
o
f
t
h
em
c
a
n
in
v
o
l
v
e
exp
erien
ces
o
f
em
p
o
w
er
m
en
t
a
n
d
processes of emancipation, both of them can entail
experiences of disempowerment and
m
ec
h
a
ni
sm
s
o
f
do
min
a
t
io
n.
S
t
i
ll
,
t
h
e
di
a
lec
t
ics
o
f
‘
p
o
w
er
f
o
r
’
a
n
d
‘
p
o
w
er
a
ga
in
s
t
’
in
dic
a
t
es
that the deep
ambivalence
of the human condition is an object of permanent struggle
for
and
against
specific constellations of power. One of the most obvious, and historically most
tangible, examples of this ambivalence is the tension-laden constitution of
modernity.
17
On the one hand, there is a
dark
modernity: its
repressive
facets
cannot be dissociated from the socio-historical preponderance of
instrumental
reason. On the other hand, there is a
bright
modernity: its
emancipatory
aspects
have been brought about, as well as grasped, by the
di
sc
ur
si
v
e
f
o
r
ce
o
f
crit
i
c
a
l
re
a
s
o
n
.
18
Th
e
f
o
r
m
er
‘
a
r
e
in
t
im
a
t
e
ly
a
ss
o
ci
a
t
e
d
w
i
t
h
va
r
i
a
t
io
n
s
of control
–
such
as power, authority, order, discipline, obedience, enclosure, and heteronomy
–
and materialize themselves in social processes of domination, regulation,
exploita
t
io
n,
a
lien
a
t
io
n,
f
ra
g
m
en
t
a
t
io
n,
exc
l
u
sio
n,
a
n
d
di
s
cr
imin
a
t
io
n
’
19
.
Th
e
l
a
tt
er
‘
a
r
e
exp
r
esse
d
in Enlightenment ideals
–
such as progress, tolerance,
liberty, equality, solidarity, dignity, sovereignty, and autonomy
–
and manifest
themselves in social processes of liberation,
se
lf-det
er
min
a
t
io
n,
a
n
d
unifica
t
io
n
’
20
.
I
rr
es
p
ec
t
i
v
e
o
f
t
h
e
k
in
d
o
f
ob
j
ec
t
i
v
es
t
h
a
t
in
di
v
id
u
a
l
and collective
actors may, or may not, pursue in particular contexts, their daily efforts to
ga
in
acces
s
t
o
m
a
t
er
i
a
l
a
n
d
sy
m
bo
lic
r
es
o
ur
ces
a
r
e
en
t
a
n
g
le
d
in
s
t
r
ug
g
les
‘
f
o
r
’
a
n
d
‘
a
ga
in
s
t
’
constellations of power.
III.
Noumenal power
Thi
s sec
t
io
n
p
r
o
p
os
es
t
o
e
l
ucid
a
t
e
t
h
e
p
r
in
ci
p
a
l
f
e
a
t
ur
es
o
f
F
o
r
s
t
’
s
acco
un
t
o
f
no
u
mena
l
power. In the relevant literature, one is confronted with a large variety of
approaches to power: Hobbesian, Lockean, Rousseauian, Marxian, Durkheimian,
Weberian, Arendtian, Schmittean, Foucauldian, Bourdieusian, Habermasian,
Honnethian, Fraserian, and
B
u
t
ler
i
a
n
a
pp
r
o
ac
h
es
–
t
o
m
en
t
io
n
o
n
ly
a
f
ew
.
Th
e
t
er
m
‘
p
o
w
er
’
i
s
a
co
nt
es
t
a
b
le
co
n
cep
t,
to which different meanings can be
ascribed, depending on the theoretical perspective
o
n
e
m
a
y
w
i
s
h
t
o
def
en
d
.
W
e
s
h
o
u
ld
co
n
ce
de
a
t
t
h
e
o
u
tset
t
h
a
t
n
o
defini
t
io
n
o
f
p
o
w
er
‘
i
s
a
va
i
l
a
b
le
t
h
a
t
a
v
oid
s ess
en
t
i
a
l
co
nt
es
t
a
t
io
n
’
21
,
e
v
en
if
F
o
r
s
t
h
a
rb
o
ur
s
t
h
e
h
o
p
e
t
h
a
t
hi
s
o
w
n
explanatory framework may be an exception in this respect.22 As we shall see, it is
worth
co
n
sider
in
g
F
o
r
s
t
’
s
p
r
o
p
osa
l
f
o
r
a
cr
i
t
ic
a
l
t
h
e
o
r
y
o
f
n
o
um
en
a
l
p
o
w
er
in
det
a
i
l
.
I
n
ess
en
ce
,
his conceptual outline is based on several key assumptions,
which shall be examined in subsequent sections.
1.
Cognitivism
Power cannot be understood without taking into account the cognitive structures
and processes by which it is sustained. In order to shed light on the underlying
factors shaping
t
h
e
p
o
w
er
o
f
p
o
w
er
ex
er
cise
d
b
y
h
um
a
n
ac
t
o
r
s,
i
t
i
s
im
p
era
t
i
v
e
t
o
g
ra
s
p
‘
w
h
a
t
g
o
es
o
n
in
t
he he
ad
s
o
f
t
h
os
e w
h
o
a
r
e s
u
b
j
ec
t
e
d
t
o
i
ts
p
o
w
er
o
r
w
h
o
h
a
v
e
f
r
ee
d
t
h
em
se
l
v
es
f
r
o
m
i
t
’
23
.
Noumenal power is firmly
embedded in spheres of cognition
–
that is, in realms of reflection
a
n
d
in
t
en
t
io
n.
Thi
s
i
s
n
o
t
t
o
s
ug
g
es
t,
h
o
we
v
er
,
t
h
a
t
n
o
um
en
a
l
p
o
w
er
co
n
s
t
i
t
u
t
es
‘
a
s
ep
a
ra
t
e
f
o
r
m
o
f
p
o
w
er
a
lo
n
gside
t
hr
e
a
ts
o
f
f
o
r
ce
’
24
.
R
a
t
h
er
,
t
hi
s
i
s
t
o
a
ffir
m
t
h
a
t
‘
i
t
i
s
t
h
e
v
er
y
co
r
e
o
f
s
uc
h
t
hr
e
a
ts
a
s ex
er
cises
o
f
p
o
w
er
’
25
.
Pu
t
diff
er
en
t
ly
,
a
ll
h
um
a
n
f
o
r
m
s
o
f
p
o
w
er
c
a
n
b
e c
h
a
rac
t
er
ize
d
a
s
‘
n
o
um
en
a
l
’
t
o
t
h
e
ext
en
t
t
h
a
t
t
h
e
y
c
a
nn
o
t
b
e
di
ss
o
ci
a
t
e
d
f
r
o
m
t
h
e
m
en
t
a
l
configurations and activities that
produce, reproduce, and
–
potentially
–
transform them.
I
n
o
r
der
t
o
co
mp
r
e
h
en
d
‘h
o
w
a
n
ex
er
cise
o
f
p
o
w
er
m
o
v
es
p
er
s
o
n
s
’
26
,
we
n
ee
d
t
o
p
r
o
v
ide
‘a
cognitive account of power that is neutral with regard to its positive or negative
evalua
t
i
o
n’
27
.
S
uc
h
a
n
o
um
en
a
l
a
pp
r
o
ac
h
co
n
cei
v
es
o
f
p
o
w
er
a
s
‘
t
he
c
a
p
a
ci
ty
o
f
A
t
o
m
o
t
i
v
a
t
e
B t
o
t
h
i
n
k
o
r
d
o
s
o
me
t
h
i
n
g
t
h
a
t
B
w
o
u
l
d
o
t
h
er
w
i
s
e
n
o
t
h
a
v
e
t
h
o
u
ght
o
r
d
o
n
e
’
28
.
A
cco
r
din
g
t
o
t
hi
s
defini
t
io
n,
t
h
e
cog
ni
t
i
v
e
(‘
t
o
t
hin
k
’)
a
n
d
t
h
e
p
er
f
o
r
m
a
t
i
v
e
(‘
t
o
do
’)
dim
en
sio
n
s
o
f
s
o
ci
a
l
existence are fundamental to the exercise of power. In a
world constructed by subjects capable of self-justification, there is no exercise of
power through particular actions without the motivational influence exerted by
structures and processes of cognition.
2.
Rationalism
Power, as it unfolds within and exerts its influence upon the social world, cannot
be divorced
f
r
o
m
t
h
e ci
v
i
liza
t
io
n
a
l
f
o
r
ce
o
f
re
a
s
o
n
.
I
n
de
e
d
,
‘
t
o
h
a
v
e
a
n
d
t
o
exer
ci
s
e
p
o
w
er
me
a
ns
t
o
b
e
able – in different degrees – to influence, use, determine, occupy, or
even seal off the space o
f
r
e
as
o
ns
f
o
r
o
t
h
er
s
’
29
.
Ev
en
if
–
a
n
d
,
o
n
s
o
m
e
o
cc
a
sio
n
s,
es
p
eci
a
lly
w
h
en
–
i
t
m
a
y
n
o
t
b
e
immediately obvious that, and how, the
exercise of
power
is inextricably linked to shaping, instrumentalizing, governing,
colonizing, or even isolating the space of
reasons
, the former is unthinkable
without the omnipresence of the latter. There is no human performativity
without its permeation by human rationality, and vice versa. The
intertwinement of power and reason is especially apparent in the unfolding of
human practices that are
–
consciously or unconsciously
–
driven by ideological
patterns of motivation. For instance, ‘[r]eligion
[…]
i
s
a
v
er
y
p
o
w
er
f
u
l
m
o
t
i
va
t
in
g
f
o
r
ce
in
m
a
n
y
s
o
ciet
ies
a
n
d
f
o
r
m
a
n
y
p
e
o
p
le
’
30
;
a
l
t
h
o
ug
h
radical secularists may
argue that religious beliefs are largely or completely
irrational
, those who are
motivated by faith invoke
reasons
when justifying their actions and/or those of
their fellow devotees. Just as human performativity and human rationality are
intimately
in
t
er
r
e
l
a
t
e
d
,
s
o
a
r
e
h
um
a
n
p
rac
t
ices
a
n
d
h
um
a
n
in
t
er
ests:
‘
r
e
a
s
o
n
s
exp
l
a
in
b
e
liefs,
a
n
d
b
e
liefs
exp
l
a
in
in
t
er
es
ts
a
n
d
ac
t
io
n
s
’
31
.
F
r
o
m
a
n
o
um
en
a
l
p
er
s
p
ec
t
i
v
e
,
t
h
en,
t
h
er
e
i
s
n
o
do
u
b
t
t
h
a
t
‘
t
h
e
deep
er
o
n
e
digs,
t
h
e
m
o
r
e
o
n
e
n
ee
d
s
t
o
in
q
uir
e
in
t
o
p
e
o
p
le
’
s
r
e
as
o
ns
’
32
.
Th
e
r
e
a
lm
o
f
r
e
a
s
o
nin
g
–
exp
r
esse
d
in
t
h
e s
p
e
cies-co
n
s
t
i
t
u
t
i
v
e
c
a
p
aci
t
y
o
f
j
u
s
t
ify
in
g
o
n
e
’
s
ac
t
io
n
s
–
co
n
s
t
i
t
u
t
es
a
f
o
un
d
a
t
io
n
a
l
s
p
h
er
e
o
f
t
h
e
a
n
t
hr
o
p
o
logic
a
l
co
n
di
t
io
n.
F
o
r
h
um
a
n
bein
gs,
i
t
r
ep
r
es
en
ts
‘
t
h
e
b
a
sic
le
v
e
l
o
f
exp
l
a
n
a
t
io
n
o
f
t
h
eir
ac
t
io
n
s
a
s
t
he
ir
ac
t
io
n
s
–
a
s w
h
a
t
t
h
e
y
see
a
s
j
u
s
t
ifie
d
’
33
.
Th
e
hi
s
t
o
r
ic
t
ra
n
si
t
io
n
f
r
o
m
Mund (mouth) to Mündigkeit (maturity)34 took place, and
continues to take place, to the degree that human subjects acquired, and
continue to acquire, the capacity
–
literally
–
to speak on their own behalf, as
rational
–
and, therefore, responsible and accountable
–
entities
a
b
le
t
o
p
r
o
v
ide
r
e
a
s
o
n
s
f
o
r
,
a
n
d
t
o
a
tt
ac
h
j
u
s
t
ifi
a
b
le
m
o
t
i
v
es
t
o
,
t
h
eir
ac
t
io
n
s.
‘
Ju
st
i
fi
c
a
t
i
on
s
a
r
e
ba
s
ic
,
n
o
t
in
t
er
es
ts
o
r
desir
es
’
35
,
b
ec
a
u
se
h
um
a
n
p
rac
t
ices
–
in
c
l
udin
g
t
h
e
ex
er
cise
o
f
power
–
are embedded in the daily exercise of reason-guided action.
3.
Recognitivism
There is no exercise of power without dynamics of recognition. Put differently,
power rela
t
io
n
s
a
r
e
r
ecog
ni
t
i
v
e
r
e
l
a
t
io
n
s.
‘
I
n
co
nt
ra
s
t
t
o
t
h
e
ex
er
ci
s
e
o
f
p
h
ysic
a
l
f
o
r
ce
o
r
v
io
len
ce
,
p
o
w
er
r
es
ts
o
n
r
e
cog
ni
t
io
n
.
’
36
F
o
r
i
ts
exis
t
en
ce
n
ee
d
s
t
o
b
e
im
p
lici
t
ly
o
r
exp
lici
t
ly
co
nfir
m
e
d
b
y
both those who exercise it and those over
whom it is exercised, in order to exert any kind of influence at all. Even
–
or,
perhaps, especially
–
in situations in which the exercise of power is reduced to
mere physical force or violence, the attempt to reduce human subjects to sheer
objects, deprived of their sense of autonomy and agency, cannot isolate them
from the
‘
n
o
um
en
a
l-
s
o
ci
a
l
co
nt
ext
s
’
37
i
n
w
h
ic
h
t
h
e
y
a
r
e
i
mm
er
se
d
.
I
n
d
ee
d
,
w
i
t
hi
n
t
h
e
h
um
a
n
w
o
r
ld
,
‘
a
n
ex
er
cise
o
f
p
h
ysic
a
l
f
o
r
ce
i
s
m
e
a
nt
t
o
h
a
v
e
a
no
u
mena
l
e
ff
e
ct
’
38
o
n
t
h
os
e
exp
os
e
d
t
o
i
t.
As such, it may be aimed at robbing
actors of their dignity. Even if and when it is intended to accomplish this,
however, it implicitly recognizes their very humanity.
4.
Justificationism
Given its meaning-laden constitution, there is always an implicit or explicit reason
behind the exe
r
c
i
se
o
f
n
o
u
m
e
n
a
l
p
o
we
r
.
‘
Th
e exe
r
c
i
se
a
n
d
e
ff
ec
t
s
o
f
p
o
we
r
a
r
e
b
a
se
d
o
n
t
h
e
r
ec
o
g
n
i
t
i
o
n
of a reason
–
or better, and more often, of various
reasons
–
to act differently than one would
h
a
v
e
ac
t
e
d
wi
t
h
o
u
t
t
h
a
t
r
e
a
s
o
n
.
’
39
S
u
b
j
ec
ts,
w
h
en
ex
er
ci
sin
g
a
p
a
r
t
ic
u
l
a
r
f
o
r
m
o
f
p
o
w
er
,
n
ee
d
t
o
b
e
m
o
t
iva
t
e
d
b
y
‘
a
“
g
oo
d
eno
ug
h
”
r
e
a
s
o
n
t
o
ac
t
’
40
a
n
d
do
s
o
b
y
v
ir
t
ue
o
f
im
p
lici
t
o
r
exp
lici
t
ju
st
i
fi
c
a
t
i
on
s
.
I
n
fac
t,
‘[p]o
w
er
r
es
ts
o
n
r
e
cog
nize
d
,
accep
t
e
d
j
u
s
t
ific
a
t
io
n
s
’
41
.
I
rr
es
p
ec
t
i
v
e of the question of whether
–
from an external point of view
–
their
justifications may be
r
ega
r
de
d
a
s
‘
g
oo
d
’
o
r
‘
b
ad
,
‘
co
n
v
in
cin
g
’
o
r
‘
un
co
n
v
in
cin
g
,
‘leg
i
t
im
a
t
e
’
o
r
‘
i
l
leg
i
t
im
a
t
e
’
,
t
h
e
y
are vital to the exercise, as well as to the efficiency,
of power. From a noumenal perspective,
‘
p
o
we
r
ex
i
s
t
s
o
n
l
y
w
h
e
n
t
h
e
r
e
i
s s
u
c
h
a
cce
p
t
a
n
ce
’
42
o
f
p
r
es
u
pp
o
s
i
t
i
o
n
s
,
w
h
o
se
v
a
l
i
d
i
t
y
n
ee
d
s to be projected onto
interactional situations, in order for them to acquire legitimacy and to provide
culturally codified spheres suitable for the unfolding of human agency.
5.
Pluralism
W
h
en
n
a
v
iga
t
in
g
t
h
eir
wa
y
t
hr
o
ug
h
t
h
e
m
a
t
r
ix
o
f
s
o
ci
a
l
lif
e
,
ac
t
o
r
s
a
r
e
co
nf
r
o
nt
e
d
w
i
t
h
‘
a
sp
e
ctr
u
m
o
f
k
in
d
s
o
f
accep
t
a
n
ce
’
43
.
Th
ese
ra
n
g
e
f
r
o
m
t
h
os
e
f
o
un
de
d
o
n
cr
i
t
ic
a
l
r
efle
c
t
io
n
a
n
d
personal conviction, those motivated by
sheer opportunism and complicity, to those based on arbitrary authority and
forceful imposition. Notwithstanding the normative defensibility of implicit or
explicit patterns of justification, the noumenal constitution of the social world
implies that all human forms of power, in order to acquire a noticeable degree
of empirical significance, require being validated through
variegated
processes
of recognition.
The heterogeneous constitution of social life manifests itself in the pluralist
configuration of justifications. Different interactional realms generate, and are in
turn generated by, different
‘
s
p
aces
o
f
j
u
s
t
i
fi
c
a
t
io
n
s
’
44
.
The
o
b
j
ec
t
i
v
e
,
n
o
r
m
a
t
i
v
e
,
a
n
d
s
u
b
j
ec
t
i
v
e
p
r
es
u
pp
osi
t
io
n
s
un
der
l
y
in
g
specific patterns of justification
diverge across spatiotemporally contingent contexts. A com
p
r
e
h
en
si
v
e
‘
a
n
a
l
ysi
s
(a
n
d
cr
i
t
iq
ue)
o
f
p
o
w
er
m
u
s
t
r
e
co
n
s
t
r
uc
t
t
h
ese d
i
ff
eren
t
m
o
de
s
a
n
d
t
h
eir
p
o
ssi
bl
e
c
ombi
n
a
t
i
on
s
in
a
g
i
v
en
s
o
ci
a
l
si
t
u
a
t
io
n
’
45
,
in
o
r
der
t
o
acco
un
t
f
o
r
t
h
e fac
t
t
h
a
t
s
u
b
j
ec
ts
c
a
p
a
b
le
o
f
ac
t
io
n
a
n
d
s
e
lf-j
u
s
t
i
fi
c
a
t
io
n
c
a
n
b
e
m
o
t
iva
t
e
d
b
y
‘
va
r
io
u
s
r
e
a
s
o
n
s’
46
w
h
en
ex
er
ci
sin
g
,
or responding to, particular modes of noumenal
power. In short, noumenal types of power are no less pluralized than the life
forms within which, and in relation to which, they operate.
6.
Motivationism
Power
–
as it is exercised within, and exerts its impact upon, the human world
–
needs to be understood in
motivational
terms. Regardless of their specific
–
for
instance, intuitive or discursive, practical or theoretical, instrumental or value-
rational, pragmatic or ideological, internal or external
–
grounds of motivation,
actors have to be
driven
in one way or another in order to exercise power.
Crucially, however, power may not only be shaped by the motivations of the actor
exercising it, but also be aimed at influencing the motivations of other individual or
collective actors. The difference between these two options is expressed in the
aforementioned
di
s
t
in
c
t
io
n
bet
we
en
‘
p
o
w
er
t
o
’
a
n
d
‘
p
o
w
er
o
v
er
’:
t
h
e
f
o
r
m
er
desig
n
a
t
es
t
h
e c
a
p
aci
t
y
o
f
A
t
o
t
hin
k
o
r
t
o
do
s
o
m
et
hin
g
in
acco
r
d
a
n
ce w
i
t
h
A
’
s
–
co
n
s
cio
u
s
ly
o
r
un
co
n
s
cio
u
s
ly
p
ur
s
ue
d
–
in
t
er
es
ts,
n
ee
d
s,
desir
es,
b
e
liefs,
a
n
d/o
r
co
n
v
ic
t
io
n
s;
t
h
e
l
a
tt
er
r
ef
er
s
t
o
‘
t
h
e c
a
p
aci
t
y
o
f
A
t
o
m
o
t
i
v
ate
B
t
o
t
hin
k
o
r
do
s
o
m
et
hin
g
t
h
a
t
B
w
o
u
ld
o
t
h
er
w
i
se
n
o
t
h
a
v
e
t
h
o
ug
h
t
o
r
do
n
e
’
47
.
7.
Performativism
Power is inconceivable without the
performative
structures and processes by
which it is supported. In order to shed light on the underlying factors shaping
the power of power exercised by human actors, it is essential to comprehend
what actors
do
by virtue of power, as well as what they
fail to do
due to their
(relative or absolute) lack of access to power.
48
Noumenal power is located in
spheres of action
–
that is, in realms of practices, perfor
m
a
n
ces,
a
n
d
en
ac
t
m
en
ts.
Th
u
s,
‘
p
o
w
er
t
o
’
49
co
n
cer
n
s
t
h
e c
a
p
aci
t
y
t
o
do
s
o
m
et
hin
g
,
w
h
er
e
a
s
‘
p
o
w
er
o
v
er
’
50
r
e
l
a
t
es
t
o
t
h
e c
a
p
aci
t
y
t
o
do
s
o
m
et
hin
g
t
o
s
o
m
e
bo
d
y
e
l
se
b
y
ex
er
ci
sin
g
a certain degree of control over their thought and/or behaviour.
Owing to the noumenal constitution of power, the German word
Macht
is
usually employed to describe a power relation exercised over human
subjects, rather than over nonhuman forms of existence. The fact that
Macht
is exerted exclusively over human, rather than nonhuman, entities is indicative
of the noumenal constitution of power in the social world: the human
exercise
o
f
‘
p
o
w
er
o
v
er
’
(
Ma
c
h
t
)
i
s
co
n
ceiva
b
le
o
n
ly
a
s
a
di
s
t
in
c
t
ly
h
um
a
n
p
er
f
o
r
m
a
n
ce
(
mache
n
)
in relation to human performers (
Macher
).
8.
Consequentialism
The exercise of power would be pointless if the consequences triggered by it
were irrelevant. As s
t
a
t
e
d
a
bo
v
e
,
‘
t
o
h
a
v
e
a
n
d
t
o
exer
ci
s
e
p
o
w
er
me
a
ns
t
o
b
e
a
b
l
e –
i
n
d
i
ff
eren
t
de
g
r
ee
s
–
t
o
i
n
fl
u
en
c
e,
u
s
e,
de
t
er
m
i
n
e,
o
c
cup
y
,
o
r
e
v
en
s
e
a
l
o
ff
t
he
s
p
a
c
e
o
f
r
e
as
o
ns
f
o
r
o
t
h
er
s
’
51
.
U
n
less
i
t
s
ucce
e
d
s
in
bein
g
‘
s
oc
ia
ll
y
e
ff
e
ct
i
ve
’
52
,
t
h
e ex
er
cise
o
f
p
o
w
er
i
s
f
u
t
i
le
.
I
f
s
u
b
j
ec
ts
ex
er
t
in
g
both particular types and particular degrees of
power were not concerned with the consequences of their actions, their
performances would remain largely irrelevant
–
not only to
t
h
em
se
l
v
es,
b
u
t
a
l
s
o
t
o
t
h
eir
n
a
t
ura
l
a
n
d
s
o
ci
a
l
en
v
ir
o
nm
en
ts.
H
en
ce
,
t
o
r
e
cog
nize
t
h
a
t
‘
t
h
e
p
h
en
o
m
en
o
n
o
f
p
o
w
er
i
s
n
o
um
en
a
l
in
n
a
t
ur
e
’
53
i
s
t
o
ac
k
n
o
wle
dg
e
t
h
a
t
t
h
e s
o
ci
a
l
w
o
r
ld
i
s
a
co
n
g
lo
m
era
t
e
o
f
bo
t
h
‘
t
hin
gs
in
t
h
em
se
l
v
es
’
(
D
i
n
ge
a
n
s
i
c
h
)
a
n
d
‘
t
hin
gs
f
o
r
t
h
em
se
l
v
es
’
(
Dinge für sich
)
–
that is, of forms of being that
are objectively present, normatively assembled, and subjectively grasped.
Power constitutes a consequentialist category in the sense that it
impacts
upon the physical, social, and personal dimensions of our existence as well
as, more importantly, upon the ways in which we engage, or fail to engage,
with them.
54
There would be no point in exercising power if it bore no
relation to the objective, normative, and subjective construction of reality.
9.
Normativism
Noumenal power constitutes a
normative
force. As such, it is always open to
question
in
g
,
co
mp
et
i
t
io
n,
a
n
d
s
t
r
ug
g
le
.
Th
er
ef
o
r
e
,
‘
a
n
y
a
n
a
l
ysi
s
o
f
n
o
um
en
a
l
p
o
w
er
h
a
s
t
o
accep
t
a
m
b
i
va
len
ce
a
n
d
co
nt
es
t
a
t
ion;
i
t
c
a
n
n
e
v
er
b
e
fin
a
l
a
n
d
co
mp
let
e
ly
ob
j
ec
t
i
v
e
’
55
.
R
e
v
e
a
lin
g
its normative constitution, noumenal power
is enmeshed in social relations whose participants
–
since they are equipped
with critical, reflexive, and moral capacities
–
possess a
sense of justice
.
56
Put
differently, noumenal power is exercised by, as well as exerted upon, actors
who constantly produce, reproduce, and transform
normative orders
.
57
Behavioural, ideological, and institutional patterns of functioning are
inconceivable without their validation by means of noumenal power within
realms of normativity, which provide the presuppositional parameters for
generating sustainable degrees of social legitimacy. In fact,
‘t
h
e
fi
r
s
t
dem
a
n
d
o
f
ju
s
t
i
c
e
o
f
t
h
os
e s
u
b
j
ec
t
e
d
t
o
a
n
o
r
m
a
t
i
v
e
o
r
der
’
58
i
s
‘
t
o
h
a
v
e
s
t
a
n
ding
a
s
e
q
u
a
l
n
o
r
m
a
ti
v
e
a
u
th
o
r
i
ti
e
s
w
i
t
hin
s
uc
h
a
n
o
r
der
’
59
.
B
o
t
h
t
h
e ex
er
cise
o
f
a
n
d
t
h
e
exp
os
ur
e
t
o
n
o
um
en
a
l
p
o
w
er
a
r
e
sy
mp
t
o
m
a
t
ic
o
f
h
um
a
n
s
u
b
j
ec
ts
’
n
ee
d
t
o
defin
e
–
a
n
d
,
if
r
e
q
uir
e
d
,
to redefine
–
the place they occupy within normative
orders. They are able to act upon this
n
ee
d
,
h
o
we
v
er
,
o
n
ly
t
o
t
h
e
deg
r
ee
t
h
a
t
t
h
eir
‘
r
ig
h
t
t
o
j
u
s
t
ific
a
t
io
n
’
60
i
s
im
p
lici
t
ly
o
r
exp
lici
t
ly
r
e
cog
nize
d
.
Ide
a
lly
,
‘
a
ll
t
h
os
e
w
h
o
a
r
e s
u
b
j
ec
t
e
d
t
o
a
n
o
r
m
a
t
i
v
e
o
r
der
s
h
o
u
ld
b
e
i
ts
co-a
u
thors as equal
participants and normative authorities in adequate justificatory practices that
cr
i
t
ic
a
lly
r
efle
c
t
o
n
a
n
d
co
n
s
t
i
t
u
t
e
t
h
a
t
o
r
der
’
61
.
Every normative order is constructed, and potentially reconstructed, by
actors with
‘
n
o
r
m
a
t
i
ve
p
o
we
r
s
’
62
.
Th
ese
p
o
w
er
s
em
a
n
a
t
e
f
r
o
m
p
e
o
p
le
’
s
cr
i
t
ic
a
l
,
r
eflexi
v
e
,
a
n
d
m
o
ra
l
capacities, by means of which they can attach meaning
to, make judgements about, and position themselves in relation to
social
arrangements
by either confirming or undermining
t
h
eir
leg
i
t
im
ac
y
.
‘
Ev
er
y
s
o
ci
a
l
o
r
der
in
g
en
era
l
,
a
n
d
e
v
er
y
s
o
ci
a
l
s
u
bsys
t
em
in
p
a
r
t
ic
u
l
a
r
,
is based on a
certain understanding of its purpose, aims, and rules
–
in short, it is a nor-
m
a
t
i
v
e
o
r
der
a
s
a
n
o
r
d
er
o
f
ju
s
t
i
fi
c
a
t
i
o
n.
’
63
N
o
t
w
i
t
h
s
t
a
n
din
g
t
h
e
t
yp
o
log
ic
a
l
s
p
e
cifici
t
y
o
f
the social realm one may wish to examine, each of them
possesses not only its own mode of functioning but also its own order of
justification. Consider, for instance, the following social realms: the economic
realm, the political realm, the cultural realm, the artistic realm, the religious
realm, the scientific realm, the technological realm, or the military realm
–
to
mention only a few. In each of these social realms, subjects justify their actions
in different ways, but they do so by referring (implicitly or explicitly) to the
underlying grammar of the normative order in which they find themselves
immersed. It is possible to characterize a
n
o
r
m
a
t
i
v
e
o
r
der
a
s
‘
dem
ocra
t
ic
a
lly
r
u
le
d
’
64
t
o
t
h
e
ext
en
t
t
h
a
t
t
h
os
e w
h
o
b
ui
ld
i
t
a
r
e
‘
t
h
e
normative authorities
who co-determine this order through democratic justification pro
ce
d
ur
es
’
65
–
t
h
a
t
i
s,
‘
t
hr
o
ug
h
t
h
e
r
u
le
o
f
r
eci
p
r
o
c
a
lly
a
n
d
g
en
era
lly
j
u
s
t
ifi
a
b
le
r
e
a
s
o
n
s
’
66
invoked by those able and willing to articulate
–
and, if necessary, to defend
–
them. Given
e
v
er
y
h
um
a
n
ac
t
o
r
’
s
in
e
l
uc
t
a
b
le si
t
u
a
t
e
dn
ess w
i
t
hin
n
o
r
m
a
t
i
v
e
o
r
der
s,
t
h
er
e
a
r
e
n
o
f
o
r
m
s
of noumenal power capable of bypassing the
foundational status of justificatory processes.
10.
Contextualism
N
o
um
en
a
l
p
o
w
er
c
a
nn
o
t
b
e ex
er
cise
d
‘
in
i
s
o
l
a
t
io
n
f
r
o
m
n
o
um
en
a
l-s
o
ci
a
l
c
o
n
texts
’
67
.
As
such, it is not a free-floating force, abstracted from
spatiotemporally contingent settings. Rather, it is always
situated
in space and
time
–
that is, in relationally configured sets of circumstances encountered, as
well as shaped, by human actors. Noumenal power may
emer
g
e
in
a
va
r
iet
y
o
f
co
nt
exts:
‘
in
t
h
e
co
nt
ext
o
f
a
s
i
n
gl
e e
v
en
t
’
68
,
s
uc
h
a
s
a
p
er
f
o
r
m
a
t
i
v
e
ac
t
c
a
rr
ie
d
o
u
t
b
y
a
c
h
a
r
i
sm
a
t
ic
figur
e;
in
‘
in
t
h
e
co
nt
ext
[…]
o
f
a
s
e
q
u
en
c
e
o
f
e
v
en
ts
’
69
,
s
uc
h
as a
succession of small-scale or large-scale happenings changing the course of
history;
o
r
,
in
t
h
e
co
nt
ext
o
f
‘
a
g
en
era
l
s
oc
ia
l
s
i
t
ua
t
io
n
o
r
s
tr
uc
t
u
r
e
’
70
,
f
o
r
min
g
t
h
e
in
t
er
sec
t
io
n
a
lly
constituted background to interactions taking place between
different subjects. In a broad sense, every type of noumenal power is
embedded in an
objective
context of physical states of affairs, in a
normative
context of cultural conventions and arrangements, as well as in a
subjective
context of personal feelings, thoughts, and perceptions.
71
In short, there is no
noumenal power without a particular context, or sets of contexts, in which it is
located and to which both those exercising it and those exposed to it make
implicit or explicit reference when engaging in social interaction.
11.
Coherentism
Noumenal power, in order for it to be effective, requires a minimal degree of
coherence
. In essence, this is due to its embeddedness in different forms of order
–
notably,
social orders
72
,
normative orders73, orders of justification74, orders of action75,
political orders76, and
–
finally
yet importantly
–
orders of power
77
. Inevitably, both the
exercise of and the exposure to noumenal power take place within different
kinds of order. In fact, its attachment to socio-ontologically contingent
variants of order reveals its multifaceted constitution: noumenal power is
simultaneously
a social, normative, justificatory, performative, political, and potent
manifestation of symbolically mediated modes of existence. Its situatedness
within a range of orders is indicative of the grammatical organization of
power.
12.
Discursivism
Noumenal power is articulated through different
discourses
. As such, it is
exercised through the construction of different narratives
–
notably,
narratives of
justification
.
78
It is not simply because human beings are storytelling animals
but, rather, because they need to provide rationally defensible justifications
for their actions that the narratives they attach to their
exp
erien
ces
a
r
e
cr
uci
a
l
t
o
t
h
eir
ex
er
cise
o
f
,
a
s we
ll
a
s
exp
os
ur
e
t
o
,
n
o
um
en
a
l
p
o
w
er
.
‘
I
n
t
h
e
light of
such narratives, social relations and institutions and certain ways of thinking
and
ac
t
in
g
a
pp
e
a
r
a
s
j
u
s
t
ifie
d
a
n
d
leg
i
t
im
a
t
e
[…]
.
’
79
I
n
t
hi
s
r
es
p
ec
t,
t
h
e
p
r
im
a
r
y
q
ues
t
io
n
i
s
n
o
t
whether these narratives stand up to scrutiny, when dissecting
their epistemic claims to
universal
validity, but, rather, whether they permit those
who implicitly or explicitly endorse them to justify their thoughts and actions in
relation to the
particular
sets of circumstances in which they find themselves
situated. Put differently, narratives of justification constitute discursive
frameworks that attribute coherence, cogency, and legitimacy to behavioural,
ideological, and institutional expressions of both individual and collective
modes of agency.
13.
Foundationalism
Noumenal power, regardless of its capacity to impose itself upon the course of
history, cannot be exercised, let alone experienced, by human subjects without
presuming that they possess a right to justification.80 Of course, while this right
can be implicitly or explicitly recognized, it can also be covertly or openly
misrecognized, undermined, or violated. Yet, all efforts to deny its existence
–
irrespective of whether they are based on argument or on force
–
are futile in
that, ultimately, they highlight its ubiquity in all realms of human sociality: the very
attempt to repudiate the right to justification presupposes the right to justification;
for such an endeavour can claim to possess objective, normative, or subjective
validity only to the extent that it can purport to be justified. Far from being
reducible to a
m
et
a
p
h
ysic
a
l
fa
nt
a
sy
,
t
h
e
‘
r
ig
h
t
to
ju
st
i
fi
c
a
t
i
on
o
f
s
o
ci
a
l
a
n
d
p
o
li
t
ic
a
l
r
e
l
a
t
io
n
s
bet
we
en
f
r
ee
a
n
d
e
q
u
a
l
p
er
s
o
n
s
’
81
i
s
emb
e
dde
d
in
co
mm
unic
a
t
i
v
e
ly
s
t
r
uc
t
ur
e
d
lif
ew
o
r
ld
s,
in
w
hic
h
a
ll
subjects are not only capable of speech and
action but also capable of reflection, interpretation, and explanation.
Notwithstanding the situational or typological specificities of the numerous ways
in which noumenal power may, or may not, operate, it cannot bypass, let alone
eliminate, the right to justification enjoyed by those who exercise, and those who
are exposed to, it.
14.
Structuralism
‘
A
n
im
p
o
r
t
a
nt
t
es
t
o
f
t
h
e
r
e
a
li
sm
o
f
t
h
e
t
h
e
o
r
y
o
f
n
o
um
en
a
l
p
o
w
er
i
s w
h
et
h
er
i
t
c
a
n
exp
l
a
in
t
he
p
o
w
er
o
f
“
s
tr
u
ct
u
r
e
s
”
,
b
e
i
t
g
en
era
l
s
o
ci
a
l
s
t
r
uc
t
ur
es
o
r
m
o
r
e
p
a
r
t
ic
u
l
a
r
o
r
ga
niza
t
io
n
a
l
s
t
r
uc
t
ur
es
[…]
.
’
82
W
h
en
see
k
in
g
t
o
s
h
e
d
lig
h
t
o
n
t
h
e
s
t
r
uc
t
ura
l
co
n
s
t
i
t
u
t
io
n
o
f
s
o
ci
a
l
lif
e
,
i
t
is vital to recognize the centrality of four
aspects of noumenal power:
(a)
Grounding: There is no social order, and indeed no social subsystem, that is
not
f
o
un
de
d
o
n
a
s
p
e
cific
‘
un
der
s
t
a
n
din
g
o
f
i
ts
p
ur
p
os
e
,
a
im
s,
a
n
d
r
u
les
’
83
.
Ev
er
y
in
t
erac
tional order established between directly or indirectly
interrelated subjects constitutes
a
‘
n
o
r
m
a
t
i
v
e
o
r
der
’
84
b
a
se
d
o
n
a
n
‘
o
r
der
o
f
j
u
s
t
ific
a
t
io
n
’
85
.
Th
e
m
o
r
e
diff
er
en
t
i
a
t
e
d
a society becomes, the more
diverse the justification narratives on which its order
a
s we
ll
a
s
i
ts
s
u
bsys
t
em
s
a
r
e
b
a
se
d
t
ur
n
o
u
t
t
o
b
e
.
F
a
r
f
r
o
m
bein
g
s
u
s
t
a
in
e
d
b
y
‘
a
sin
g
le
g
ra
n
d
n
a
r
ra
t
i
v
e
a
lo
n
e
’
86
,
a
ll
s
o
ci
a
l
o
r
der
s
a
n
d
s
o
ci
a
l
s
u
bsys
t
em
s
a
r
e
p
r
o
d
uce
d
,
reproduced, and transformed by multiple
–
coexisting and, on
several levels, competing
–
patterns of justification.
(b)
Reproduction:
Social structures, in order to be both relatively stable and
relatively
f
o
r
cef
u
l
,
n
ee
d
t
o
b
e
‘
accep
t
e
d
o
n
t
h
e
b
a
sis
o
f
[…]
n
a
r
ra
t
i
v
es
a
n
d
j
u
s
t
ific
a
t
io
n
s
’
87
by those who draw upon and function within them.
Irrespective of their actual or
p
o
t
en
t
i
a
l
limi
t
a
t
io
n
s
a
n
d
s
h
o
r
t
co
min
gs,
a
s
lo
n
g
a
s
t
h
e
y
a
r
e
p
er
cei
v
e
d
a
s
‘
in
e
v
i
t
a
b
le
’
,
o
r
e
v
en
a
s
‘
n
a
t
ura
l
’
,
t
h
e
y
t
en
d
t
o
im
p
r
in
t
t
h
em
se
l
v
es
in
t
h
e
min
d
s
a
n
d
bo
dies
o
f
those who
consciously or unconsciously reinforce their legitimacy by
reproducing
t
h
em.
‘
Th
e
n
o
r
m
a
t
i
v
e
p
o
w
er
o
f
t
h
e fac
t
u
a
l
’
88
i
s
t
a
nt
a
m
o
un
t
t
o
t
h
e fac
t
u
a
l
p
o
w
er
o
f
t
h
e
n
o
r
m
a
t
i
v
e
,
t
o
t
h
e
ext
en
t
t
h
a
t
‘[w]h
a
t
g
o
es w
i
t
h
o
u
t
s
a
y
in
g
g
o
es
’
89
.
(c)
I
n
fl
u
e
nce
:
S
o
ci
a
l
s
t
r
uc
t
ur
es ex
er
t
infl
uen
ce
o
v
er
h
um
a
n
ac
t
o
r
s.
As
lo
n
g
a
s
‘
t
h
e
n
o
u
m
en
a
l
p
o
w
er
s
t
r
uc
t
ur
e
t
h
a
t
s
u
pp
o
r
ts
s
o
ci
a
l
p
o
w
er
r
e
l
a
t
io
n
s
i
s
s
t
i
ll
in
p
l
ace
’
90
,
t
h
e
l
a
tt
er
’
s
b
ac
kg
r
o
un
d
s
o
lidi
t
y
i
s
co
nfir
m
e
d
b
y
t
h
e
f
o
r
m
er
’
s
in
t
er
p
r
et
i
v
e
n
a
r
ra
t
i
v
i
t
y
,
t
h
er
e
b
y
m
a
in
t
a
inin
g
a
p
a
r
t
ic
u
l
a
r
‘
o
r
der
o
f
ac
t
io
n
’
91
o
n
t
h
e
b
a
sis
o
f
a
v
i
a
b
le
deg
r
ee
o
f
implicit or explicit justification.
In this regard, a distinction can be drawn between
‘
infl
uen
ce
’
a
n
d
‘
p
o
w
er
’:
t
h
e
f
o
r
m
er
i
s
‘
n
o
t
in
t
en
t
io
n
a
lly
ex
er
cise
d
b
y
p
er
s
o
n
s
o
v
er o
t
h
e
r
s’
92
,
w
h
er
e
a
s
t
h
e
l
a
tt
er
i
s
m
e
a
nin
g-
a
n
d
p
ur
p
os
e-l
aden.
S
t
r
uc
t
ura
l
infl
uen
ce
i
s nonhuman and nonintentional. Noumenal power, by contrast, is human
and inten
t
io
n
a
l.
‘
S
t
r
uc
t
ur
es
do
n
o
t
“
ex
er
ci
s
e
”
p
o
w
er
a
s
p
er
s
o
n
s
do
’
93
,
w
h
er
e
a
s
p
er
s
o
n
s
‘
ex
er
ci
s
e
’
power in a way that structures fail to do.
(d)
R
e
s
o
u
rc
e
:
Th
er
e
i
s
n
o
n
o
um
en
a
l
p
o
w
er
w
i
t
h
o
u
t
‘
n
o
um
en
a
l
c
a
p
i
t
a
l
’
94
.
W
i
t
hin
t
h
e
h
um
a
n
w
o
r
ld
,
‘
p
o
w
er
i
s
exer
ci
s
ed
w
i
t
h
i
n
s
t
r
uc
t
ur
es
’
95
.
Pu
t
diff
er
en
t
ly
,
t
h
er
e
i
s
n
o
human agency without a background of
resourceful structurality. To the extent that
‘
t
h
e es
s
en
t
i
a
l
p
o
w
er
o
f
s
uc
h
s
t
r
uc
t
ur
es
i
s
o
f
a
n
o
um
en
a
l
k
in
d
,
definin
g
va
l
ues,
n
o
r
m
s
and rules and
social positions, such power structures enable persons with sufficient
no
u
m
e
n
a
l
c
a
pi
t
a
l
in
t
h
e
a
pp
r
o
p
r
i
a
t
e
s
p
h
er
e
’
96
t
o
m
o
b
i
li
ze
t
h
eir
m
a
t
er
i
a
l
a
n
d
s
y
m
b
o
li
c
resources to interact with and to act upon the world in a
purposive fashion. Within spheres of noumenal power, subjects
participate in the construction of reality by positioning themselves in
relation to, while being positioned by, others. Thus, social
s
t
r
uc
t
ur
es c
a
n
b
e
co
n
cei
v
e
d
o
f
‘
a
s
a
re
s
o
u
rc
e
t
o
ex
er
cise
p
o
w
er
o
v
er
o
t
h
er
s
’
97
a
s we
ll
a
s,
u
l
t
im
a
t
e
ly
,
o
v
er
o
n
ese
lf
.
I
n
de
e
d
,
w
i
t
h
o
u
t
t
h
e
‘
b
ac
kg
r
o
un
d
r
es
o
ur
ces
’
98
p
r
o
v
ide
d
by social structures, there is no foreground agency driven by
noumenal power.
15.
Relationalism
Noumenal power is, by definition, a
relational
state of affairs. The relational
constitution of noumenal power has several implications.
(a)
N
o
um
en
a
l
p
o
w
er
co
n
s
t
i
t
u
t
es
a
r
e
l
a
t
io
n
o
f
s
oc
ia
l
i
t
y
.
As s
uch,
i
t
des
cr
i
b
es
‘
a
s
o
ci
a
l
r
e
l
a
t
i
o
n’
99
bet
we
en
dir
ec
t
ly
o
r
indir
ec
t
ly
in
t
er
co
nn
ec
t
e
d
en
t
i
t
ies.
(b)
N
o
um
en
a
l
p
o
w
er
co
n
s
t
i
t
u
t
es
a
r
e
l
a
t
io
n
o
f
a
genc
y
.
As s
uch,
i
t
i
s
b
a
se
d
o
n
‘
a
r
e
l
a
t
io
n
bet
we
en
a
g
en
ts
’
100
,
w
h
os
e
p
er
f
o
r
m
a
n
ces
co
nt
r
i
b
u
t
e
ei
t
h
er
t
o
i
ts
r
ep
r
o
d
uc
t
io
n
o
r
t
o
its transformation.
(c)
Noumenal power constitutes a relation of
indeterminacy
. As such, it
demonstrates
t
h
a
t,
‘
a
s
lo
n
g
a
s
a
r
e
l
a
t
io
n
o
f
p
o
w
er
exis
ts,
a
t
le
a
s
t
o
n
e
a
l
t
er
n
a
t
i
v
e
wa
y
o
f
ac
t
in
g
i
s
o
p
e
n’
101
t
o
t
h
os
e
in
v
o
l
v
e
d
in
i
ts
co
n
s
t
r
uc
t
io
n.
(d)
Noumenal power constitutes a relation of
structurality
. As such, it
permeates both symmetrically and asymmetrically organized social
arrangements
–
that is, not only
r
e
l
a
t
io
n
s
o
f
em
p
o
w
er
m
en
t
a
n
d
em
a
n
ci
p
a
t
io
n
b
u
t
a
l
s
o
‘
r
e
l
a
t
io
n[s]
o
f
s
u
bo
r
din
a
t
io
n
a
n
d
do
min
a
t
io
n
’
102
.
(e)
Noumenal power constitutes a relation of
normativity
. As such, it
illustrates the
s
o
cio
log
ic
a
l
sig
nific
a
n
ce
o
f
a
t
en
sio
n-l
aden
co
n
s
t
e
ll
a
t
ion:
e
v
en
w
h
en
‘
a
r
e
l
a
t
io
n
o
f
n
o
um
en
a
l
p
o
w
er
t
ur
n
s
in
t
o
a
r
e
l
a
t
io
n
o
f
o
v
er
w
h
e
lmin
g
p
h
ysic
a
l
fac
t
ici
t
y’
103
an
d
,
co
n
se
q
uen
t
ly
,
t
h
e
l
a
tt
er
’
s
v
iolen
ce
i
s
a
im
e
d
a
t
a
nni
hi
l
a
t
in
g
t
h
e
f
o
r
m
er
’
s
n
o
r
m
a
t
i
v
i
t
y
,
‘
t
h
e
exc
h
a
n
g
e
o
f
j
u
s
t
ific
a
t
io
n
s
’
104
r
em
a
in
s
t
h
e
o
n
l
y
wa
y
in
w
hic
h
r
e
a
s
o
n-g
i
v
in
g
en
t
i
t
ies
can convert critical reflexivity into the motivational
cornerstone of the symbolically mediated interactions shaping the
development of society.
(f)
Noumenal power constitutes a relation of
rationality
. As such, it exerts its
influence
u
p
o
n
t
h
e w
o
r
ld
t
hr
o
ug
h
‘
t
h
e s
p
ace
o
f
r
e
a
s
o
n
s w
i
t
hin
w
hic
h
s
o
ci
a
l
o
r
p
o
li
t
ic
a
l
r
e
l
ations are being framed
–
relations which form a
structured, durable, and stable social
o
r
der
o
f
ac
t
io
n
a
n
d
j
u
s
t
ific
a
t
io
n
’
105
a
n
d
r
e
l
a
t
io
n
s w
i
t
h
o
u
t
w
hic
h
t
h
er
e w
o
u
ld
b
e
n
o
possibility of
hermeneutically guided self-realization.
(g)
Noumenal power constitutes a relation of
validity
. As such, its longevity
depends on its ability to obtain sustainable levels of discursive
acceptability. Indeed,
‘[i]n
cases of unjustifiable asymmetrical social
relations which rest on a closing off of the space of justifications such that
these relations appear as legitimate, natural, God-given, or in any way
unalterable and leave hardly any alternative for those who are subjected,
we
e
n
c
o
u
nt
e
r
f
o
r
m
s
o
f
dom
i
n
a
t
i
on
’
106
.
No
u
m
e
n
a
l
p
o
w
e
r
–
e
v
e
n
w
h
e
n
i
t
i
s
m
i
s
r
e
p
r
e
s
e
nt
e
d
by the veil of total legality, infallibility, transcendentality, or
inalterability
–
can never obliterate the need for discursive acceptability
pervading all spaces of justifications, whose legitimacy hinges upon
rationally defensible validity.
(h)
Noumenal power constitutes a relation of justification. As such, its existence
is indicative of the fact that ‘[r]elations and orders of power are relations
and orders of
j
u
s
t
ific
a
t
io
n
’
107
.
B
e
h
a
v
io
ura
l
,
ide
o
log
ic
a
l
,
a
n
d
in
s
t
i
t
u
t
io
n
a
l
p
a
tt
er
n
s
o
f
f
un
c
t
io
nin
g
a
r
e s
u
pp
o
r
t
e
d
b
y
‘
n
a
r
ra
t
i
v
es
o
f
j
u
s
t
ific
a
t
io
n
’
108
,
f
o
r
t
h
e
f
o
r
m
er
’
s
q
ues
t
f
o
r
leg
i
t
im
ac
y
w
o
u
ld
b
e
un
s
u
s
t
a
in
a
b
le
w
i
t
h
o
u
t
t
h
e
l
a
tt
er
’
s
c
l
a
im
s
t
o
va
lidi
t
y
.
‘
A
ll
[…]
f
o
r
m
s
o
f
bein
g
m
o
v
e
d
b
y
j
u
s
t
ific
a
t
io
n
s
a
r
e
“
n
o
um
en
a
l
”
in
t
h
e
r
eleva
nt
s
en
se
in
s
o
fa
r
a
s
t
h
e
y
in
v
o
l
v
e
a
cer
t
a
in
r
e
l
a
t
io
n
in
t
h
e s
p
ace
o
f
j
u
s
t
ific
a
t
io
n
s
.
’
109
B
o
t
h
‘
t
h
e
j
u
s
t
ific
a
t
o
r
y
q
u
a
li
t
y
o
f
r
e
a
s
o
n
s’
110
a
n
d
t
h
e
ra
t
io
n
a
l
q
u
a
li
t
y
o
f
j
u
s
t
ific
a
t
io
n
s
a
r
e
p
r
e
co
n
di
t
io
n
s
f
o
r
t
h
e
n
o
u-
menal quality of social relations.
(i)
Noumenal power constitutes a relation of
reality
. As such, it lies at the
core of the
e
mp
i
r
i
c
a
l
c
o
n
s
t
i
t
u
t
i
o
n
o
f
h
u
m
a
n
ex
i
s
t
e
n
ce
.
‘
A
n
o
u
m
e
n
a
l
a
cc
o
u
n
t
o
f
p
o
we
r
r
e
l
a
t
i
o
n
s
i
s
m
o
r
e
“
r
e
a
l
i
s
t
i
c
”
t
h
a
n
t
h
e
o
r
i
es w
h
i
c
h
l
o
c
a
t
e
p
o
we
r
i
n
m
a
t
e
r
i
a
l
o
r
p
h
y
s
i
c
a
l
m
e
a
n
s
’
111
,
t
o
the extent that the former
uncovers the parasitical nature of the latter: in the human world, the
exercise of merely material or physical force is derived from intentions and
motivations, which, in order to reach at least a minimal degree of
legitimacy, require rationally defensible justifications. Even extreme forms
of violence cannot eliminate the forceless force of justification based on
the better argument.
(j)
Noumenal power constitutes a relation of
resources
. As such, it is
inconceivable
w
i
t
h
o
u
t
acces
s
t
o
‘
n
o
um
en
a
l
c
a
p
i
t
a
l
’
112
.
S
u
b
j
ec
ts
o
cc
u
p
y
in
g
diff
er
en
t
p
osi
t
io
n
s
in
society need to be equipped with
different dispositions, permitting them to mobilize their material and
symbolic resources in order to engage in processes of interaction,
deliberation, and justification.
(k)
Noumenal power constitutes a relation of
humanity
. As such, it defies
systemic
t
en
den
cies
t
o
wa
r
d
s
t
ra
n
sf
o
r
min
g
‘
s
o
ci
a
l
r
e
l
a
t
io
n
s
in
t
o
r
e
l
a
t
io
n
s
bet
we
en
t
hin
gs
’
113
.
Commodification processes, following the profit-
maximizing logic of the market, as well as bureaucratization processes,
following the administrative logic of the state, can convert subjects into
objects and, consequently, social relations into reified relations.
The
most profound colonization of communicatively structured lifeworlds by
instrumentally driven systems, however, cannot do away with the nominal
power exercised by subjects capable of both action
and
self-justification.
A typology of power
In order to avoid advocating a reductive conception of the noumenal
constitution of social life, we may distinguish four types of power:
(a)
Po
w
e
r:
Th
e
co
n
cep
t
o
f
‘
p
o
w
er
’
c
a
n
b
e
defin
e
d
a
s
‘
t
h
e c
a
p
aci
t
y
o
f
A
t
o
i
n
fl
u
e
nce
t
he
space of reasons
for B and/or C (etc.) such that they think and
act in ways they
w
o
u
ld
n
o
t
h
a
v
e
do
n
e w
i
t
h
o
u
t
t
h
e
in
t
er
f
er
en
ce
b
y
A
’
114
.
Cr
uci
a
l
,
in
t
hi
s
r
es
p
ec
t,
i
s
t
h
e
p
r
es
u
pp
osi
t
io
n
t
h
a
t
‘
t
h
e
m
o
v
e
b
y
A
m
u
s
t
h
a
v
e
a
m
o
t
i
v
a
t
ing
f
o
rc
e
f
o
r
B
a
n
d/o
r
C
(et
c.)
t
h
a
t
co
rr
es
p
o
n
d
s
t
o
A
’
s
i
nt
e
nt
i
o
n
s
a
n
d
i
s
n
o
t
j
u
s
t
a
side
eff
ec
t
(i
.e
.,
a
f
o
r
m
o
f
influence)’
115
. In other
words, power is not reducible to a force that makes individual or collective
actors behave and/or think in one way or another. Rather, it stands for a
s
u
b
j
ec
t
’
s c
a
p
aci
t
y
t
o
en
s
ur
e
t
h
a
t
i
ts
purp
o
s
e
–
b
a
se
d
o
n
s
p
e
cific
g
o
a
l
s
o
r
t
a
r
g
ets
–
i
s
the impetus behind the processes of action and/or cognition
performed by
another
individual or collective subject.
(b)
Ru
l
e
:
Th
e
co
n
cep
t
o
f
‘
r
u
le
’
r
ef
er
s
t
o
‘
a
f
o
r
m
o
f
p
o
w
er
w
h
er
e
t
h
e
p
o
w
er
-
h
older
do
es not only use his or her capacity to decisively influence the
space of justifications for others, but where certain comprehensive (religious,
metaphysical, historical, or moral) justifications (and usually a mixture
thereof) determine the space of reasons within which social or political relations are
being framed
–
relations which form a structured,
d
ura
b
le
,
a
n
d
s
t
a
b
le s
o
ci
a
l
o
r
der
o
f
ac
t
io
n
a
n
d
j
u
s
t
ific
a
t
io
n
’
116
.
I
rr
es
p
ec
t
i
v
e
o
f
t
h
e question of
whether a particular form of rule is based on good or bad justifications, it
provides the normative framework in which human actions and
interactions take place. Rule, then, constitutes the regulatory umbrella of
social life. The behavioural, ideological, and institutional modes of
functioning prevalent in different spheres of society are governed by
different types of rule: political rule, cultural rule, educational rule,
economic rule, judicial rule, religious rule, or scientific rule
–
to mention
only a few. There is no society without context-specific sets of rules.
(c)
D
om
i
n
a
t
i
on
:
Th
e
co
n
cep
t
o
f
‘
do
min
a
t
io
n
’
desig
n
a
t
es
a
n
a
sy
mme
tr
i
c
a
ll
y
s
tr
u
ctur
ed po
we
r
r
ela
t
io
n
t
h
a
t
hin
g
es
u
p
o
n
‘
a
c
l
o
s
i
n
g
o
ff
o
f
t
he
s
p
a
c
e
o
f
ju
s
t
i
fi
c
a
t
i
o
ns
s
uc
h
t
h
a
t
these relations appear as legitimate, natural, God-
given, or in any way unalterable a
n
d
le
a
v
e
h
a
r
d
ly
a
n
y
a
l
t
er
n
a
t
i
v
e
f
o
r
t
h
os
e w
h
o
a
r
e s
u
b
j
ec
t
e
d
’
117
.
Diff
er
en
t
m
o
des
o
f
domination are sustained
by different forms of hegemonic justification, designed to reinforce the
notion that there is no viable alternative to the existing state of affairs.
Th
er
e
a
r
e
n
um
ero
u
s
m
e
a
n
s
b
y
w
hic
h
t
h
e
‘
r
e
a
lm
o
f
r
e
a
s
o
n
s
’
118
c
a
n
b
e
se
a
le
d
o
ff
,
if
only temporarily, three of which are particularly common: in
the first scenario, domination may be accepted because of the
persuasive influence of the
dominant ideology
; in the second scenario,
domination may be accepted because active and explicit opposition to
it may trigger tangible variants of
repression
; in the third scenario, we
may be confronted with a
combination
of the previous two options.
All
f
o
r
m
s
o
f
p
o
li
t
ic
a
l
do
min
a
t
io
n,
h
o
we
v
er
,
im
p
ly
(i)
‘
t
h
e
r
u
le
b
y
un
j
u
s
t
ifi
a
b
le
n
o
r
m
s
’
119
as well as (ii) the lack of democratic procedures and structures,
by virtue of which
the normative parameters underlying a specific
ensemble of social arrangements can be discussed, called into
question, revised, and
–
if necessary
–
replaced by an alternative.
(d)
V
i
o
l
e
nce
:
The
co
n
cep
t
o
f
‘
v
io
len
ce
’
des
cr
i
b
es
a
p
o
w
er
r
e
l
a
t
io
n
in
w
hic
h
‘
t
h
e
exc
h
a
n
g
e
of justifications is denied entirely and the space of reasons is
supplanted by means of
s
hee
r
ph
y
si
c
a
l
for
c
e
’
120
.
A
n
y
si
t
u
a
t
io
n
t
o
w
hic
h
t
hi
s
a
pp
lies
p
r
es
u
pp
os
es
t
h
a
t
‘
a
r
e
l
a
t
io
n
o
f
n
o
um
en
a
l
p
o
w
er
’
121
,
c
h
a
rac
t
er
ize
d
b
y
t
h
e
co
n
s
t
a
nt
n
eg
o
t
i
a
t
io
n
o
f
n
o
r
m
a
t
i
v
i
t
y
,
i
s
co
n
v
er
t
e
d
in
t
o
‘
a
r
e
l
a
t
io
n
o
f
o
v
er
w
h
e
lmin
g
p
h
ysic
a
l
fac
t
ici
t
y’
122
,
m
a
r
k
e
d
b
y
t
h
e
imposition of
illegitimate legitimacy. Under such extreme circumstances, subjects are
degraded to mere objects, implying that, rather than being recognized
as fully-fledged members of humanity, they are deprived of their sense
of, and access to,
se
lf-r
e
a
lize
d
a
n
d
se
lf-r
e
alizin
g
a
g
en
c
y
.
‘
A
t
t
h
a
t
m
o
m
en
t,
p
o
w
er
a
s
a
n
o
r
m
a
t
i
v
e
f
o
r
ce
m
o
v
in
g
a
n
e
v
en
minim
a
lly
f
r
ee
a
g
en
t
fades
a
wa
y
[…]
.
’
123
I
n
s
uc
h
a
co
n
s
t
e
ll
a
t
io
n
of reifying
desubjectivization, the noumenal power of reason is shattered by the
a
rb
i
t
ra
r
y
f
o
r
ce
o
f
v
iolen
ce
.
‘
Po
w
er
i
s
a
wa
y
o
f
b
indin
g
o
t
h
er
s
t
hr
o
ug
h
r
e
a
s
o
n
s;
i
t
b
r
e
a
ks
do
w
n
w
h
en
t
h
e
o
t
h
er
i
s
t
r
e
a
t
e
d
a
s
a
m
er
e
“
t
hin
g
”
a
n
d
n
o
lo
n
g
er
a
s
a
n
a
g
en
t
o
f
j
u
s
t
ific
a
t
io
n
w
h
os
e
co
mp
li
a
n
ce
r
es
ts
o
n
s
o
m
e
f
o
r
m
o
f
r
e
cog
ni
t
io
n
.
’
124
As
lo
n
g
a
s
there is power in the noumenal sense,
there are subjects able and willing to recognize one another as
sovereign, yet interdependent, entities.
As illustrated above, power
–
far from being reducible to a fixed, neat, and
clearly defined category
–
should be examined in terms of a
continuum of social
relations
. In the social world, power is a relation between two or more subjects,
which manifests itself in different forms and different contexts, while shaping
human actions and interactions to different degrees and according to
different parameters, in addition to being governed by different causes and
leading to different consequences. The continuum of social relations
comprises a spectrum of power relations, which can be schematized on four
principal levels:
(a)
t
h
e ex
er
cise
o
f
p
o
w
er
as
‘
p
o
w
er
’
,
b
a
se
d
o
n
a
s
u
b
j
ec
t
’
s c
a
p
aci
t
y
t
o
infl
uen
ce
o
t
h
er
subjects by influencing the space of reasons;
(b)
t
h
e ex
er
cise
o
f
p
o
w
er
as
‘
r
u
l
e
’
,
b
a
se
d
o
n
a
s
u
b
j
ec
t
’
s c
a
p
aci
t
y
t
o
s
et
t
h
e
a
g
en
d
a
w
i
t
hin
particular spaces of reasons by ensuring some
comprehensive justificatory frameworks prevail over others;
(c)
t
h
e ex
er
cise
o
f
po
we
r
a
s
‘
do
m
i
n
a
t
io
n
’
,
b
a
se
d
o
n
a
s
u
b
j
ec
t
’
s c
a
p
aci
t
y
t
o
c
los
e
o
ff
t
h
e
space of justifications by virtue of a dominant ideology and/or a
disciplinary system, guaranteeing the hegemonic position of the ruling
forces;
(d)
the exercise of
power (or, to be exact, power beyond power) as ‘violence’
, based
on a
s
u
b
j
ec
t
’
s c
a
p
aci
t
y
t
o
u
se
m
er
e
p
h
ysic
a
l
f
o
r
ce
in
o
r
der
t
o
p
ur
s
ue
,
a
n
d
t
o
r
e
a
lize
,
a
specific goal.
Ironically, the last option
–
that is, the use of violence
– ‘lies
outside of the
realm of
p
o
w
er
,
bein
g
in
s
t
e
ad
a
r
efle
c
t
io
n
o
f
t
h
e
l
ac
k
o
f
p
o
w
er
’
125
,
p
r
ecise
ly
b
ec
a
u
se
i
t
s
u
pp
r
esses
t
h
e
exchange of justifications between reason-giving
subjects. The aforementioned categories a
r
e
‘
ide
a
l
t
yp
es
’
126
,
in
t
h
e s
en
se
t
h
a
t,
in
p
rac
t
ice
,
‘
t
h
e ex
er
cise
o
f
p
o
w
er
u
s
u
a
lly
fa
ll
s s
o
m
ew
h
er
e
in
bet
we
en
’
127
a
n
d
m
a
y
,
in
t
er
m
s
o
f
bo
t
h
i
ts
c
a
u
ses
a
n
d
i
ts
co
n
se
q
uen
ces,
fi
t
m
o
r
e
than one
variant.
IV.
The concept of ‘noumenal power’: limitations
Having examined its key underlying presuppositions, it is possible to provide
a critical
a
ss
es
sm
en
t
o
f
F
o
r
s
t
’
s
acco
un
t
o
f
‘
n
o
um
en
a
l
p
o
w
er
’
.
D
es
p
i
t
e i
ts
co
n
sidera
b
le
co
n
cep
t
u
a
l
dep
t
h
a
n
d
exp
l
a
n
a
t
o
r
y
s
t
r
en
gt
h,
F
o
r
s
t
’
s
a
pp
r
o
ac
h
s
uff
er
s
f
r
o
m
sig
nific
a
nt
limi
t
a
t
io
n
s,
w
hic
h
s
h
a
ll
be examined in subsequent
sections. For the sake of clarity, we shall follow the thematic structure of the
preceding analysis.
a.
The concept of power
T
o
b
eg
in
w
i
t
h,
F
o
r
s
t
c
l
a
im
s
t
h
a
t,
a
l
t
h
o
ug
h
t
h
e
t
er
m
‘
p
o
w
er
’
i
s
w
ide
l
y
u
s
e
d
in
s
o
ci
a
l
a
n
d
p
o
li
t
ic
a
l
p
hi
los
o
p
h
y
,
‘
t
h
e
m
e
a
nin
g
o
f
t
hi
s
im
p
o
r
t
a
nt
co
n
cep
t
i
s
ra
r
e
l
y
m
ade
exp
lici
t,
es
p
eci
a
ll
y
in
t
h
e
co
nt
ext
o
f
n
o
r
m
a
t
i
v
e
di
s
c
u
s
sio
n
s
’
128
.
A
dmi
tt
e
d
ly,
t
h
e
den
o
t
a
t
i
v
e
s
en
s
e
o
f
t
h
e
w
o
r
d
‘
p
o
w
er
’
is often taken for granted by researchers in
the humanities and social sciences. Furthermore, it is true that especially those
who grapple with, shed light on, and criticize both the causes and the
consequences of different types of asymmetrically structured social relations
should be able to offer basic definitional, explanatory, and evaluative insights
into the concept of
‘
p
o
w
er
’
.
G
i
v
en
t
h
e vas
t
a
m
o
un
t
o
f
sc
h
o
l
a
r
ly
li
t
era
t
ur
e
a
va
i
l
a
b
le
o
n
t
h
e s
u
b
j
ec
t
129
,
h
o
we
v
er
,
it is untenable to affirm that the meaning
of this concept is hardly ever made explicit.
A
t
t
h
e s
a
m
e
t
im
e
,
i
t
i
s
bo
t
h
n
a
ï
v
e
a
n
d
de
cep
t
i
v
e
t
o
m
ak
e
a
c
a
se
f
o
r
‘
a
no
r
ma
t
i
v
e
l
y
ne
u
t
ra
l
n
o
t
io
n
o
f
p
o
w
er
’
130
a
n
d
t
o
co
nt
en
d
t
h
a
t
‘
we
n
ee
d
a
cog
ni
t
i
v
e
acco
un
t
o
f
p
o
w
er
t
h
a
t
i
s
n
e
u
t
ra
l
w
i
t
h
r
ega
r
d
t
o
i
ts
p
osi
t
i
v
e
o
r
n
ega
t
i
v
e
eva
l
u
a
t
io
n
’
131
.
Th
er
e
i
s
n
o
s
uc
h
t
hin
g
.
I
t
i
s
n
o
less erroneous and short-sighted to
maintain that, while the epistemic validity of numerous
co
n
cep
t
io
n
s
o
f
p
o
w
er
s
uff
er
s
f
r
o
m
bein
g
‘
n
o
r
m
a
t
i
v
e
a
n
d
co
nt
es
t
a
b
le
’
132
,
‘
a
bet
t
er
defini
t
io
n
i
s
a
va
i
l
a
b
le
t
h
a
t
a
v
oid
s
e
ss
e
n
t
i
a
l
c
on
testa
t
i
on
’
133
.
A
ga
in,
t
h
er
e
i
s
n
o
s
uc
h
t
hin
g
.
I
t
i
s,
a
t
b
es
t,
ir
onic
o
r
,
a
t
w
o
r
s
t,
b
a
ffling
t
h
a
t
a
n
a
n
a
l
ysi
s
t
h
a
t
s
ets
i
ts
e
lf
t
h
e
t
a
s
k
o
f
a
imin
g
‘
t
o
p
r
ep
a
r
e
t
h
e
wa
y
f
o
r
a
crit
i
c
a
l
t
h
e
or
y
of
p
o
we
r’
134
see
ks
t
o
do
s
o
b
y
g
i
v
in
g
t
h
e
mi
sle
adin
g
im
p
r
es
sio
n t
h
a
t
s
uc
h
a
n
in
t
r
in
s
i
ca
ll
y
no
r
ma
t
i
v
e
en
de
a
v
o
ur
c
a
n
b
e
acco
m
p
lis
h
e
d
b
y
p
r
o
v
idin
g
a
‘
n
eu
t
ra
l
’
,
‘
n
o
n-e
va
l
u
a
t
i
v
e
’
,
a
n
d
‘
n
o
n-co
nt
es
t
a
b
le
’
a
pp
r
o
ac
h.
H
o
r
k
h
eimer
’
s fa
m
o
u
s
di
s
t
in
c
t
io
n
bet
we
en
‘
t
radi
t
io
n
a
l
t
h
e
o
r
y’
a
n
d
‘
cr
i
t
ic
a
l
t
h
e
o
r
y’
135
is
based on the conviction that the latter, unlike the former, recognizes
the
intrinsic normativity
of all aspects of social reality, including all conceptual
attempts to grasp its inner workings, as expressed in explanatory frameworks
grappling with the nature of power within human
societies. More specifically,
such a reflection obliges us to draw attention to five fundamental
presuppositions underlying the pursuit of a critical epistemology:
First, given that knowledge is always socially embedded, it is necessarily
normative (
Erkenntnisnormativität
). Second, since knowledge is always
generated from a specific position in the social space, even so-called
descriptive knowledge is situation-laden (
Erkenntnisstandpunkt
). Third, to the
extent that bodily actors, regardless of whether they are laypersons or experts,
take on particular roles in society, knowledge is permeated by the relationally
constituted functions fulfilled by those who make use of it in accordance with
their contextually defined interests (
Erkenntnisfunktion
). Fourth, considering that
cognitive actors are discursively competing entities, the production of knowledge
is permeated by scientific power struggles (
Erkenntniskampf
). Fifth, because
symbolic and informational resources can be used in various ways and for
multiple reasons, the production of knowledge can be instrumentalized for
extra-scientific
–
notably, economic
–
purposes (
Erkenntnisnutzung
). In short, the
positivist quest for objectivity loses credibility when confronted with the
relational constitution of epistemic enquiry. The conditions of knowledgeability
are impregnated with normativity, positionality, functionality, conflictuality, and
instrumentality.
136
A genuinely critical theory of power needs to face up to its own immersion in
normativity,
in
s
t
e
ad
o
f
p
ur
s
uin
g
t
h
e
i
ll
u
s
o
r
y
g
o
a
l
o
f
r
e
ac
hin
g
a
n
ep
i
s
t
emic
s
t
a
t
e
o
f
‘
n
eu
t
ra
li
t
y
’
,
c
a
p
a
b
le
o
f
permitting its advocates to rise above the structural
constraints, and perspectival intricacies, of socially constructed realities.
b.
Dichotomies of power
Undoubtedly, it makes sense to distinguish fundamental types of power in
binary terms
–
n
o
t
a
b
ly
,
o
n
t
h
e
b
a
sis
o
f
t
h
e
a
f
o
r
em
en
t
io
n
e
d
co
n
cep
t
u
a
l
o
pp
osi
t
io
n
s:
(1)
‘
s
o
ft
p
o
w
er
’
vs.
‘h
a
r
d
p
o
w
er
’
,
(2)
‘
p
o
w
er
t
o
’
vs.
‘
p
o
w
er
o
v
er
’
,
a
n
d
(3)
‘
p
o
w
er
f
o
r
’
vs.
‘
p
o
w
er
a
ga
in
s
t
’
.
W
e
need to acknowledge, however, that
these dichotomous distinctions have been on the a
g
en
d
a
e
v
er
sin
ce
‘
p
o
w
er
’
h
a
s
b
e
en
s
t
udie
d
(b
o
t
h
em
pir
ic
a
lly
a
n
d
t
h
e
o
r
et
ic
a
ll
y)
–
a
bo
v
e
a
ll
,
in
t
h
e
h
um
a
ni
t
ies
a
n
d
s
o
ci
a
l
s
cien
ces. A
r
gu
a
b
ly
,
F
o
r
s
t
’
s
p
le
a
f
o
r
a
cr
i
t
ic
a
l
t
h
e
o
r
y
o
f
p
o
w
er
–
em
p
h
asizin
g
i
ts
a
l
leg
e
d
ly
‘
n
o
um
en
a
l
’
n
a
t
ur
e
–
fa
i
l
s
t
o
add
u
s
ef
u
l
,
let
a
lo
n
e
original, insights to recent and ongoing debates on the significance of
these conceptual pairs for exploring the variegated functions of different
modes of power in the daily construction of social life.
S
t
r
i
k
i
n
g
i
n
t
h
i
s
c
o
nt
e
x
t
i
s
F
o
r
s
t
’
s
d
i
s
t
i
n
c
t
i
o
n
b
e
t
w
ee
n
H
e
rr
s
c
h
a
ft
a
n
d
B
ehe
rr
s
ch
un
g
,
w
h
ic
h
,
although it is relegated to a footnote137, illustrates the limited use value of
semantic hair-splitting. Surely, the concept of Herrschaft (domination) remains
central to understanding social power dynamics, which
–
in all human life forms
–
are shaped by the interplay between (1)
‘
s
o
ft
p
o
w
er
’
a
n
d
‘h
a
r
d
p
o
w
er
’
,
(2)
‘
p
o
w
er
t
o
’
a
n
d
‘
p
o
w
er
o
v
er
’
,
a
s we
ll
a
s
(3)
‘
p
o
w
er
f
o
r
’
a
n
d
‘
p
o
w
er
a
ga
in
s
t
’
.
F
o
r
s
t
c
l
a
im
s
t
h
a
t
‘[i]t
i
s
unf
o
r
t
un
a
t
e
t
h
a
t
He
rr
s
c
h
a
ft
–
w
hic
h
m
e
a
n
s
r
u
le
–
i
s
u
s
u
a
lly
t
ra
n
s
l
a
t
e
d
a
s
“
do
min
a
t
io
n
”
,
w
hic
h
co
rr
es
p
o
n
d
s
t
o
t
h
e
G
er
m
a
n
B
ehe
rr
s
c
h
ung
’
138
.
I
n
this respect,
however, we need to examine the validity of the assertion that Herrschaft means
‘
r
u
le
’
a
n
d
t
h
a
t
B
ehe
rr
s
c
h
ung
m
e
a
n
s
‘
do
min
a
t
io
n
’
.
Th
e
n
o
un
B
ehe
rr
s
c
h
ung
i
s
a
co
n
cep
t
t
h
a
t
is hardly ever used in written, let alone spoken, German. By
contrast, the verb beherrschen – w
hic
h
F
o
r
s
t
do
es
n
o
t
m
en
t
io
n
in
hi
s
acco
un
t
a
n
d
w
hic
h
m
e
a
n
s
‘
t
o
do
min
a
t
e
’
,
‘
t
o
r
u
le
’
,
‘
t
o
m
a
s
t
er
’
,
o
r
‘
t
o
co
nt
r
o
l
’
–
i
s
co
mm
o
n
ly
em
p
lo
y
e
d
,
n
o
t
o
n
ly
in
ac
ademic
t
exts,
b
u
t
a
l
s
o
in
o
r
din
a
r
y
l
a
n
gu
a
g
e
.
M
o
r
e
im
p
o
r
t
a
nt
ly
,
e
v
en
if
F
o
r
s
t
’
s
di
s
t
in
c
t
io
n
bet
we
en
He
rr
s
c
h
a
ft
an
d
Beherrschung
stood up to scrutiny, it would be far from obvious what, if
anything, could be gained (theoretically or practically) from differentiating
between these two terms. No
p
r
o
min
en
t
s
o
ci
a
l
o
r
p
o
li
t
ic
a
l
t
h
e
o
r
i
s
t
s
er
io
u
s
ly
b
elie
v
es
t
h
a
t
‘
t
h
e ex
er
cise
o
f
p
o
w
er
i
s
i
nv
a
r
i
ab
l
y
a
m
a
tt
er
o
f
do
min
a
t
io
n
’
139
,
let
a
lo
n
e
t
h
a
t
we s
h
o
u
ld
di
sc
a
r
d
t
h
e
p
os
si
b
i
li
t
y
t
h
a
t
–
a
s
in
dica
t
e
d
b
y
M
ax
W
e
b
er
140
–
‘leg
i
t
im
a
t
e
r
u
le
i
s
al
s
o
a
n
ex
er
ci
s
e
o
f
p
o
w
er
’
141
.
On
t
h
e
co
nt
ra
r
y
,
n
o
t
o
n
l
y
i
s
t
h
e
t
er
min
o
logic
a
l
di
s
t
in
c
t
io
n
bet
we
en
‘
p
o
w
er
’
a
n
d
‘
do
min
a
t
io
n
’
(o
r
,
in
G
er
m
a
n,
between
Macht
and
Herrschaft
) common in contemporary social and
political analysis, but, in addition, it continues to be an object of controversy.
Indeed, this conceptual separation compels us to reflect upon the interplay
between fundamental forms of power
–
such as
(1)
‘
s
o
ft
p
o
w
er
’
a
n
d
‘h
a
r
d
p
o
w
er
’
,
(2)
‘
p
o
w
er
t
o
’
a
n
d
‘
p
o
w
er
o
v
er
’
,
a
s we
ll
a
s
(3)
‘
p
o
w
er
f
o
r
’
a
n
d
‘
p
o
w
er
a
ga
in
s
t
’
.
F
o
r
s
t
’
s
di
s
t
in
c
t
io
n
bet
we
en
He
rr
s
c
h
a
ft
an
d
B
ehe
rr
s
c
h
ung
,
o
n
t
h
e
o
t
h
er
hand, is of little
–
if any
–
use value for the critical study of power.
c.
Noumenal power
The obvious question that poses itself in light of the previous analysis is
whether or not the concept of
noumenal power
makes sense. Forst appears to
suggest that
all
forms of social power are noumenal forms of power. More
specifically, he posits that power can be defined
as
‘
t
he
c
a
p
a
ci
ty
o
f
A
t
o
m
o
t
i
v
a
t
e
B
t
o
t
h
i
n
k
o
r
d
o
s
o
me
t
h
i
n
g
t
h
a
t
B
w
o
u
l
d
o
t
h
er
w
i
s
e
n
o
t
h
a
v
e
t
h
oug
h
t
or done
’
142
.
I
t
i
s
n
o
t
e
v
iden
t,
h
o
we
v
er
,
w
h
y
we s
h
o
u
ld
u
se
t
h
e
ad
j
ec
t
i
v
e
‘
n
o
um
en
a
l
’
to describe any
form of power that corresponds to the above definition. Consider, for
instance, the following passage:
[…] I want to claim that the
real
and
general
phenomenon of power is to be
found in the noumenal realm, or better
–
to avoid misunderstandings about
Platonic ideas or a Kantian
m
et
a
p
h
ysics
o
f
‘
t
hin
gs
in
t
h
em
se
l
v
es
’
–
in
t
h
e
‘
s
p
ace
o
f
r
e
a
s
o
n
s
’
,
t
o
bo
rr
o
w
S
e
ll
a
r
s
’
s fa
m
o
u
s
phrase, understood as the realm of
justifications.
143
While Forst, explaining the presuppositions that undergird his own
approach, spells
o
u
t
w
h
a
t
‘
n
o
um
en
a
l
’
do
es
n
ot
m
e
a
n,
h
e fa
i
l
s
t
o
m
ak
e
exp
lici
t
w
h
a
t
i
t
doe
s
m
e
a
n
a
n
d
w
h
y
i
t
s
h
o
u
ld
b
e
iden
t
ifie
d
w
i
t
h
‘
t
h
e
r
e
a
lm
o
f
j
u
s
t
ific
a
t
io
n
s
’
.
I
n
K
a
nt
i
a
n
p
hi
los
o
p
h
y
,
a
s
i
s w
ide
ly
acknowledged, a
noumenon
is
an object that exists independently of the mind (thing-in-
itself [
Ding an sich
]),
as opposed to a
phenomenon
, that is, an object that is knowable by the
s
en
s
es
thr
o
ug
h
p
h
eno
m
en
a
l
a
tt
r
i
b
u
t
es.
F
o
r
s
t
a
ss
er
ts
t
h
a
t
hi
s
o
w
n
u
s
e
o
f
t
h
e
t
er
m
‘
n
o
um
en
a
l
’
is not reducible to the way it is employed in Kantian metaphysics or
in Platonic philosophy.
I
t
r
em
a
in
s
un
cle
a
r
,
h
o
we
v
er
,
w
h
a
t
e
x
a
ct
ly
h
e
m
e
a
n
s
b
y
‘
n
o
um
en
a
l
’
a
n
d
w
h
y
h
e c
h
o
os
es
t
o
in
v
o
k
e
t
hi
s
t
er
m
t
o
r
ef
er
t
o
‘
t
h
e
r
e
a
lm
o
f
j
u
s
t
ific
a
t
io
n
s
’
.
Another problem emerging in this context concerns the following issue: if
all
forms of social power are noumenal, then
–
at least in relation to the
human world
–
the term
‘
n
o
um
en
a
l
p
o
w
er
’
i
s
a
t
a
u
t
o
log
y
.
F
o
r
,
acco
r
din
g
t
o
t
hi
s
defini
t
io
n,
t
h
er
e
i
s
n
o
s
uc
h
t
hin
g
a
s
a
n
o
n-n
o
um
en
a
l
f
o
r
m
o
f
s
o
ci
a
l
p
o
w
er
.
W
h
a
t
i
s
mi
s
sin
g
in
F
o
r
s
t
’
s
acco
un
t,
t
h
er
ef
o
r
e
,
i
s
a
r
ig
o
r
o
u
s
co
n
cep
t
u
a
l
dem
a
r
c
a
t
io
n
bet
we
en
‘
t
h
e
n
o
um
en
a
l
’
a
n
d
‘
t
h
e
n
o
n-n
o
um
en
a
l
’
,
b
a
se
d
on a
precise explanation of what these two spheres are supposed to represent and
how they
a
r
e s
u
pp
os
e
d
t
o
diff
er
.
F
o
r
s
t
’
s
a
tt
em
p
t
t
o
iden
t
ify
t
h
e
f
o
r
m
er
w
i
t
h
‘
t
h
e
r
e
a
lm
of
j
u
s
t
ific
a
t
io
n
s
’
a
pp
e
a
r
s
t
o
im
p
l
y
t
h
a
t
t
h
e
l
a
tt
er
c
a
n
b
e
co
n
cei
v
e
d
o
f
a
s
‘
t
h
e
r
e
a
lm
de
vo
id
o
f
j
u
s
t
ific
a
t
io
n
s
’
,
b
u
t
the reader is left wondering as to whether the
difference between these two realms actually
exis
ts
a
n
d
,
if
s
o
,
w
h
et
h
er
t
h
e
t
er
m
‘
n
o
um
en
a
l
’
,
let
a
lo
n
e
t
h
e
t
er
m
‘
n
o
um
en
a
l
p
o
w
er
’
,
s
h
o
u
ld
be regarded as
appropriate to shed light on their sociological
–
that is, ontological, genea-
logical, and functional
–
specificities.
*** *** ***
F
o
r
s
t
’
s
p
r
o
p
o
s
a
l
f
o
r
a
c
r
i
t
ic
a
l
t
h
e
o
r
y
o
f
n
o
u
m
e
n
a
l
p
o
w
e
r
i
s
b
a
s
e
d
o
n
s
e
v
e
r
a
l
k
e
y
a
ss
u
mp
t
i
o
n
s
,
which have been elucidated above. The validity of the principal
presuppositions underlying
F
o
r
s
t
’
s
co
n
cep
t
u
a
l
o
u
t
lin
e s
h
a
ll
b
e
exa
min
e
d
in
t
h
e
f
o
l
lo
w
in
g
sec
t
io
n
s.
1.
Cognitivism
F
o
r
s
t
’s
c
o
g
ni
t
i
v
i
s
t
co
n
cep
t
io
n
o
f
p
o
w
er
ov
e
r
e
s
t
im
a
t
e
s
t
h
e
r
o
le
o
f
cog
ni
t
io
n
a
n
d
co
n
s
cio
u
s
ness in social life; at the same time, it
underestimates
the importance
of the body and the unconscious. In the human world, the effective exercise of
power is inconceivable without its capacity to shape our corporeal dispositions
of perception, appreciation, and action. These tend to be acquired, as well as
mobilized, in habitual and intuitive, rather than reflexive and discursive, ways.
Both the exercise of and the exposure to power are, primarily, a matter of the
unfoldin
g
o
f
bod
i
ly
d
i
s
po
s
i
t
io
n
s
,
ra
t
h
er
t
h
a
n
o
f
‘
w
h
a
t
g
o
es
o
n
i
n
t
he he
ad
s
’
144
,
o
f
h
um
a
n
ac
t
o
r
s.
A
dm
i
tt
e
d
l
y
,
F
o
r
s
t
s
ee
k
s
t
o
a
v
o
i
d
t
h
e c
o
g
n
i
t
i
v
i
s
t
f
a
ll
a
c
y
b
y
c
o
n
ce
d
i
n
g
t
h
a
t
‘
t
h
e
b
o
d
y
s
h
o
u
l
d
n
o
t
b
e se
en
a
s
a
r
e
a
li
t
y
b
e
y
o
n
d
j
u
s
t
ific
a
t
io
n
’
145
a
n
d
t
h
a
t,
in
s
t
e
ad
,
i
t
s
h
o
u
ld
b
e
in
t
er
p
r
et
e
d
a
s
‘
t
h
e
r
es
u
l
t
o
f
a
cer
t
a
in
o
r
der
in
t
h
e
r
e
a
lm
o
f
s
o
ci
a
l
j
u
s
t
ific
a
t
io
n
s
t
h
a
t
m
ak
es
p
er
s
o
n
s
t
hin
k
a
n
d
f
ee
l
a
b
o
u
t
t
h
e
m
s
e
l
v
e
s
i
n
a
ce
r
t
a
i
n
w
a
y
’
146
.
D
e
s
p
i
t
e
t
h
i
s
c
o
n
ce
ss
i
o
n
,
h
o
w
e
v
e
r
,
F
o
r
s
t
f
a
i
l
s
t
o
acknowledge the socio-
ontological centrality of the body, let alone the pivotal role played by
t
h
e
un
co
n
s
cio
u
s
in
s
h
a
pin
g
e
v
er
y
d
a
y
ac
t
io
n
s
a
n
d
in
t
erac
t
io
n
s.
U
l
t
im
a
t
e
l
y
,
F
o
r
s
t
’
s
a
tt
em
p
t
t
o
cross-fertilize the (neo-) Foucauldian focus on bodily normalization
processes and the (neo-)
Kantian focus on
cognitive categorization processes
is
doomed to failure, because it does not
g
o
fa
r
eno
ug
h.
F
o
r
s
t
’
s
co
nt
en
t
io
n
t
h
a
t
‘
t
h
e
bo
d
y
i
s
“
n
o
r
m
a
lize
d
”
[à
l
a
F
o
uc
a
u
l
t]
o
n
ly
thr
o
ug
h
t
h
e
ado
p
t
io
n
o
f
cer
t
a
in
c
a
t
eg
o
r
iza
t
io
n
s
a
n
d
“
t
r
u
t
h
s
”
[à
l
a
K
a
n
t]
a
bo
u
t
i
ts
inn
er
se
lf
’
147
fa
ll
s
short of
accounting for the fact that bodily dispositions are largely obtained, and
drawn upon,
without
having to rely on noumenal classifications, let alone
rational justifications.
2.
Rationalism
F
o
r
s
t
’s
r
a
t
i
on
a
l
i
st
co
n
cep
t
io
n
o
f
p
o
w
er
p
l
aces
t
oo
s
t
r
o
n
g
a
n
em
p
h
a
si
s
o
n
t
h
e
r
o
le
o
f
re
a
s
o
n
in
the construction of social life. Indeed, it disregards not only the fact
that reason is not always
the motivational driving force behind human practices,
but also the fact that subjects capable
of speech and reflection often act in
irrational
ways, even if
–
and, sometimes, especially if
–
they exercise, or are
exposed to, a specific degree and type of power. In this respect, it may
be
useful to distinguish between two types of reason: on the one hand, reason as
a
motive
or
purpose
, implying a particular degree of
intentionality
; on the other
hand, reason as a
root
or
source
, implying a particular degree of
causality
. The
former may be conceived of as
internal, cognitive, or volitional reason (in German:
Motiv or Beweggrund); the latter may be
described as
external
,
situational
, or
circumstantial
reason (in German:
Ursache
or
Grund
).
Forst tends to suggest that the preponderant force in noumenal power
is the former,
rather than the latter. Hence, he
overstates
the significance of
reasons based on
intentionality
and
understates
the significance of reasons
founded on
causality
. Such a rationalist
conception of social life leads to a
reductive conception of power, which fails to take into
consideration not only
the major relevance of non-rational modes of agency to the construction of
society, but also the structural constraints affecting the course of history.
Granted,
t
h
e ex
er
cise
o
f
p
o
w
er
i
s
p
ar
t
l
y
r
efle
c
t
e
d
in
t
h
e c
a
p
aci
t
y
‘
t
o
b
e
a
b
l
e –
i
n
d
i
ff
eren
t
de
g
r
ee
s
–
t
o
i
n
fl
u
en
c
e,
u
s
e,
de
t
er
m
i
n
e,
o
c
cup
y
,
o
r
e
v
en
s
e
a
l
o
ff
t
he
s
p
a
c
e
o
f
r
e
as
o
ns
f
o
r
o
t
h
er
s
’
148
.
Y
et,
i
t
i
s al
s
o
–
a
n
d
,
o
ft
en,
m
o
r
e
cr
uci
a
ll
y
–
i
ll
u
s
t
ra
t
e
d
in
o
n
e
’
s
c
a
p
aci
t
y
t
o
ac
t
w
i
t
h
o
u
t
a
n
y
ob
v
io
u
s,
let
a
lo
n
e se
lf-r
egu
l
a
t
e
d
,
r
e
a
s
o
n.
U
n
less
‘
t
h
e s
p
ace
o
f
r
e
a
s
o
n
s
’
i
s
defin
e
d
a
s
a
r
e
a
lm
t
h
a
t
in
c
l
udes
non-rational, non-intentional, and
non-discursive reasons, it constitutes too narrow a category to do justice to
both the complexity and the variety of factors that play a decisive role in both
the exercise of and the exposure to different forms of power.
3.
Recognitivism
F
o
r
s
t
’s
re
c
o
g
n
i
t
i
v
i
s
t
co
n
cep
t
io
n
o
f
p
o
w
er
i
s
b
a
se
d
o
n
t
h
e
H
ege
li
a
n
co
n
v
ic
t
io
n
t
h
a
t
t
h
er
e
i
s
no exercise of power without the implicit or explicit recognition
of power relations. Put differently, all power relations are recognitive relations.
Just as it is vital to explore the manifold ways in which the exercise of power is
based on processes of recognition, however, it is imperative to examine the
numerous ways in which it is shaped by, and may reinforce, processes of
misrecognition
. The fact that, in the social world, processes of recognition and
processes of misrecognition are inextricably interrelated is highlighted by
advocates of
t
he
‘
p
o
li
t
ics
o
f
iden
t
i
t
y
’
149
,
t
h
e
‘
p
o
li
t
ics
o
f
diff
er
en
ce
’
150
,
a
n
d
t
h
e
‘
p
o
li
t
ics
o
f
r
e
cog
ni
t
io
n
’
151
.
Grammars of social conflict are constantly being
defined and redefined not only by
struggles for recognition
but also by
struggles
against misrecognition
. A critical theory of power
n
ee
d
s
t
o
acco
un
t
f
o
r
t
h
e fac
t
t
h
a
t
‘
in
di
v
id
u
a
l
a
n
d
co
l
lec
t
i
v
e
ac
t
o
r
s c
a
n
b
e
m
a
r
g
in
a
lize
d
b
y
the hegemonic
forces of society
because
of their identity,
because
they are different from the
dominant groups, and
because
they lack recognition and suffer from
exclusionary processes
o
f
mi
sr
e
cog
ni
t
io
n
’
152
.
S
in
ce
p
r
o
cesses
o
f
in
c
l
u
sio
n
o
ft
en
in
v
o
l
v
e
p
r
o
cesses
o
f
exc
l
u
sio
n
in
relation to multiple
–
notably, inferiorized and
disempowered
–
actors, struggles for recognition
and
struggles against
misrecognition are integral to the production, reproduction, and potential
transformation of power relations.
4.
Justificationism
F
o
r
s
t
’s
ju
st
i
fi
c
a
t
i
on
i
st
co
n
cep
t
io
n
o
f
p
o
w
er
i
s
p
r
ob
lem
a
t
ic
f
o
r
a
n
um
ber
o
f
r
e
a
s
o
n
s.
(a)
G
i
v
en
t
h
e
cen
t
ra
li
t
y
acco
r
de
d
t
o
j
u
s
t
ific
a
t
o
r
y
p
r
o
cesses
in
F
o
r
s
t
’
s
a
r
c
hi
t
ec
t
ur
e
o
f
t
h
e s
o
ci
a
l
,
i
t
r
em
a
in
s
un
cle
a
r
w
h
y
h
e c
h
a
rac
t
er
izes
hi
s
o
w
n
a
pp
r
o
ac
h
a
s
a
‘
crit
i
c
a
l
t
h
e
or
y
of
p
o
we
r’
153
,
ra
t
h
er
t
h
a
n
a
s
a
‘
ju
st
i
fi
c
a
tor
y
t
h
e
o
r
y
o
f
p
o
w
er
’
,
a
n
d
a
s
a
‘
t
h
e
o
r
y
of
no
u
mena
l
p
ow
e
r
’
154
,
ra
t
h
er
t
h
a
n
a
s
a
‘
t
h
e
o
r
y
o
f
ju
st
i
fi
c
a
tor
y
p
o
we
r
’.
(b)
F
o
r
s
t
p
osi
ts
t
h
a
t
‘[a]l
l
[…]
f
o
r
m
s
o
f
bein
g
m
o
v
e
d
b
y
ju
st
i
fi
c
a
t
i
on
s
a
re
“
no
u
mena
l
”
in
the relevant sense insofar as they involve a certain relation in
the space of justifica
t
i
on
s
’
155
.
A
ga
in,
t
h
e
r
e
ader
i
s left w
o
n
der
in
g
w
h
y
‘
s
p
aces
o
f
j
u
s
t
ific
a
t
io
n
s
’
s
h
o
u
ld
b
e c
h
a
rac
t
er
ize
d
a
s
‘
n
o
um
en
a
l
’
,
ra
t
h
er
t
h
a
n
sim
p
ly
a
s
‘
di
sc
ur
si
v
e
’
.
(c)
Forst
presupposes
, rather than demonstrates, the validity of the
assumption that the exercise of power is pervaded by the socio-
ontological preponderance of justificatory
p
r
o
ces
ses
.
Y
et
,
t
h
e
n
o
t
io
n
t
h
a
t
‘[p]
o
w
er
r
es
t
s
o
n
r
e
cog
nize
d
,
ac
cep
t
e
d
j
u
s
t
ifi
c
a
t
io
n
s
’
156
applies to some, but
not to all, variants of power. In numerous instances, subjects
ex
er
ci
sin
g
a
p
a
r
t
ic
u
l
a
r
f
o
r
m
o
f
p
o
w
er
a
r
e
n
ot
m
o
t
iva
t
e
d
b
y
‘
a
“
g
oo
d
eno
ug
h
”
r
e
a
s
o
n
t
o
a
c
t’
157
–
ir
r
es
p
ec
t
i
v
e
o
f
t
h
e
q
ues
t
io
n
o
f
w
h
et
h
er
t
h
eir
de
e
d
s
m
a
y
b
e
r
ega
r
de
d
a
s
ob
j
ec
tively, normatively, and/or subjectively justifiable. We
need to resist the tendency to fetishize the role of justificatory
processes by portraying them as omnipresent cornerstones of all
constitutive elements of social life. Not
all
‘[r]elations and orders
o
f
p
o
w
er
a
r
e
r
e
l
a
t
io
n
s
a
n
d
o
r
der
s
o
f
j
u
s
t
ific
a
t
io
n
’
158
,
sin
ce s
o
m
e
o
f
t
h
e
f
o
r
m
er
a
r
e
n
o
t
motivated by, and/or bypass the reasoning logic of, the latter.
(d)
One dimension that Forst fails to scrutinize in his account of the
relationship between justification and power is the nexus between validity
and legitimacy. The question of whether an action, representing an
expression of noumenal power, can be considered justifiable or
unjustifiable depends not only on what is being done, but also on
w
ho
do
es
i
t
w
he
n
,
w
he
re
,
a
n
d
to
w
hom
.
‘
F
o
r
ob
je
ct
i
v
i
ty
(“
W
h
a
t?
”)
i
s
–
in
e
v
i
t
a
b
ly
–
a
m
a
tt
er
o
f
s
o
ci
a
l
a
u
t
h
o
r
i
ty
(“
W
h
o?
”),
s
p
a
t
i
o
t
em
p
o
r
a
l
c
o
n
t
extu
a
l
i
ty
(“
W
h
er
e
a
n
d
w
h
en?
”),
a
n
d
i
nte
r
a
ct
i
on
a
l
r
e
l
a
t
i
on
a
l
i
t
y
(“
To
w
h
o
m?
”)
.
’
159
W
h
a
t
i
s
mi
s
sin
g
in
F
o
r
s
t
’
s approach is a critical understanding of the intimate relationship
between validity
and legitimacy
160
, notably in terms of its far-
reaching consequences for both the construction and the
deconstruction of power relations.
(e)
F
o
r
s
t
’
s
cen
t
ra
l
c
l
a
im
t
h
a
t
‘
[j]u
s
t
i
fi
c
a
t
i
o
ns
a
r
e
b
asi
c
,
n
o
t
in
t
er
es
ts
o
r
desir
es
’
161
,
i
s
t
h
e
o
retically naïve and empirically untenable. To the extent that, in
practice,
interests and desires tend to determine reasons and justifications
, rather
than the other way around, the former are effectively more powerful than
the latter. Human subjects provide all sorts of justifications for their
actions, especially those that suit them and permit them to attach
legitimacy to their practices, which take place within objectively,
normatively, and subjectively contingent realities. Granted, while all
human actions are
interest
-
laden
(that is, permeated by the existence of
particular interests), not all of them are
interest
-
driven
(that is, motivated
by the pursuit of particular interests). Arguably, the same applies to the
role of desires in shaping human actions. The point
in
t
hi
s
co
nt
ext,
h
o
we
v
er
,
i
s
t
o
ac
k
n
o
wle
dg
e
t
h
a
t
F
o
r
s
t
’
s
a
ss
er
t
io
n
n
ee
d
s
t
o
b
e
t
ur
n
e
d
upside down in order to be sociologically defensible:
interests and desires
are basic
, not justifications (or reasons). In everyday life, most
justifications are given
a posteriori
, rather than
a priori
; that is,
justifications tend to be provided (either before or after an action takes
place) in order to attribute legitimacy to a specific action
in
acco
r
d
a
nce
w
i
t
h
a
p
er
s
o
n
’
s
in
t
er
es
ts,
desir
es,
a
n
d
exp
erien
ces.
Most of the time, reasons to act in one way or another are derived not
from reason
itself but from the interests that underlie, or indeed
constitute, our
real
reasons. To attribute socio-ontological preponderance
to justifications is tantamount to con
s
t
r
uc
t
in
g
a
n
‘
ide
a
l
r
e
a
s
o
nin
g
si
t
u
a
t
io
n
’
162
,
in
w
hic
h
a
ll
j
u
s
t
ific
a
t
io
n
s
–
ir
r
es
p
ec
t
i
v
e
o
f
w
h
et
h
er
t
h
e
y
a
r
e
deem
e
d
‘
g
oo
d
’
o
r
‘
b
ad
’
–
acq
uir
e
t
h
e s
t
a
t
u
s
o
f
a
n
a
nt
hr
o
p
o
log
ic
a
l
infrastructure, while interests and desires are relegated to the sphere of
performative
ep
i
p
h
eno
m
en
a. The
‘
r
e
a
l
in
t
erac
t
io
n
a
l
si
t
u
a
t
io
n
’
163
,
h
o
we
v
er
,
desig
n
a
t
es
a
n
em
pir
ic
a
l
conglomerate of circumstances in which interests
and desires tend to be at least as powerful as justifications and reasons
in shaping human practices. To attach a foundational or determining
status to one or the other means to fall into the trap of explanatory
reductionism. A truly critical theory of power needs to develop a wide-
ranging account of the multiple factors shaping human action. Such a
daunting task requires providing not only a
typology of justifications
164
and a
typology of rationality
165
, but also a
typology of interests
166
and a
typology of
desires
167
, without which there is no satisfying
typology of power
168
.
(f)
F
o
r
s
t
s
t
r
e
ss
e
s
t
h
e
s
i
g
n
i
fi
c
a
n
ce
o
f
‘
n
a
rr
a
t
i
v
e
s
o
f
j
u
s
t
i
fi
c
a
t
i
o
n
’
169
i
n
t
h
e e
x
e
r
ci
s
e
o
f
p
o
w
e
r
.
According to his theoretical framework, ‘[r]elations and orders
of power are relations a
n
d
o
r
der
s
o
f
j
u
s
t
ific
a
t
io
n
’
170
,
w
hic
h
a
r
e
r
efle
c
t
e
d
in
‘
n
a
r
ra
t
i
v
es
o
f
j
u
s
t
ific
a
t
io
n
’
171
.
What Forst fails to take into
consideration, however, is the fact that, far from being reducible to
mere epiphenomena of an underlying power infrastructure,
narratives
of
justification enjoy ‘relative autonomy’172. Different narratives of justification
emerge in
relation to different historical circumstances characterized
by different sets of power relations. This does not mean, of course,
that the former constitute a mere product of the latter. One way of
capturing the relative autonomy of narratives of justification is to
explore the role of metanarratives in the modern era.
173
From a
historical perspective, five types of metanarrative have been
particularly influential: (i)
political
metanarratives, (ii)
philosophical
metanarratives, (iii)
religious
metanarratives, (iv)
economic
metanarratives, and (v)
cultural
metanarratives. A truly critical theory of
power needs to offer an in-depth understanding of the multiple
narratives of justification employed by actors to give hermeneutic
coherence to their practices. Such a challenging task requires providing
not only a
typology of justifications
but also a
typology of narratives of
justification, including a typology of metanarratives.174
5.
Pluralism
F
o
r
s
t
’s
p
lur
a
li
s
t
co
n
cep
t
io
n
o
f
p
o
w
er
i
s
b
a
s
e
d
o
n
t
h
e
a
ss
um
p
t
io
n
t
h
a
t
ac
t
o
r
s,
w
h
en
n
a
v
iga
t
in
g
t
h
eir
wa
y
t
hr
o
ug
h
t
h
e
m
a
t
r
ix
o
f
s
o
ci
a
l
lif
e
,
a
r
e
co
nf
r
o
nt
e
d
w
i
t
h
‘
a
sp
e
c
tr
u
m
o
f
k
in
d
s
o
f
accep
t
a
n
ce
’
175
a
n
d
j
u
s
t
ific
a
t
io
n.
Diff
er
en
t
in
t
erac
t
io
n
a
l
r
e
a
lm
s
g
en
era
t
e
,
a
n
d
a
r
e
in
t
ur
n
g
en
era
t
e
d
b
y
,
diff
er
en
t
‘
s
p
aces
o
f
j
u
s
t
ific
a
t
io
n
s
’
176
.
W
h
a
t
s
uc
h
a
p
l
ura
li
s
t
a
pp
r
o
ac
h
do
es
n
o
t
exp
l
a
in,
however, is why some forms
of power
–
and, correspondingly, some modes of justification
–
are more
influential than others. A critical theory of society needs to confront the chal-
lenge of exploring not only the polycentric constitution of power, including
the discursive practices by which it is either reproduced or transformed, but
also the spatiotemporally contingent conditions that determine why social
relations are asymmetrically structured and, hence, exert different degrees of
influence on the micro-spheres (individuals), meso-spheres (communities),
and macro-spheres (societies) of human existence.
6.
Motivationism
F
o
r
s
t
’s
m
o
t
i
v
a
t
i
on
i
st
co
n
cep
t
io
n
o
f
p
o
w
er
p
osi
ts
t
h
a
t
ac
t
o
r
s,
in
o
r
der
t
o
ex
er
cise
p
o
w
er
,
have to be
driven
in one way or another. The social world
constitutes a universe shaped by a large variety of motivational backgrounds.
These may be intuitive or discursive, practical or theoretical, instrumental or
value-rational, pragmatic or ideological, internal or external –
t
o
m
en
t
io
n
j
u
s
t
a
f
ew
p
os
si
b
i
li
t
ies.
I
n
t
hi
s
r
es
p
ec
t,
t
h
e
di
s
t
in
c
t
io
n
bet
we
en
‘
p
o
w
er
t
o
’
a
n
d
‘
p
o
w
er
o
v
er
’
i
s
cr
uci
a
l:
s
u
b
j
ec
ts
m
a
y
ac
t
p
r
im
a
r
i
ly
in
acco
r
d
a
n
ce w
i
t
h
t
he
ir
own
(‘
p
o
w
er
t
o
’)
or
o
t
h
er
s
u
b
je
c
ts
’
(‘
p
o
w
er
o
v
er
’)
in
t
er
es
ts,
n
ee
d
s,
desir
es,
b
e
liefs,
a
n
d/o
r
co
n
v
ic
t
io
n
s.
F
o
r
s
t
’
s
approach, however, sheds little
–
if any
–
light on the
potentially
convoluted
constitution of motivational backgrounds, which can overlap and are
not always clear-cut in terms of their intentional specificity. When carrying out
an action, subjects may be driven (consciously
o
r
un
co
n
s
cio
u
s
l
y)
b
y
n
um
ero
u
s fac
t
o
r
s,
in
t
h
e
b
r
o
ad
s
en
se
,
ra
t
h
er
t
h
a
n
o
n
ly
b
y
‘
r
e
a
s
o
n
s
’
,
in
t
h
e
n
a
rr
o
w s
en
se
.
I
n
m
a
n
y
c
a
ses,
i
t
i
s fa
r
f
r
o
m
ob
v
io
u
s
h
o
w
‘
m
o
r
e
de
cisi
v
e
’
fac
t
o
r
s
c
a
n
b
e
di
s
t
in
gui
s
h
e
d
f
r
o
m
‘les
s
de
cisi
v
e
’
o
n
es,
m
ak
in
g
i
t
r
em
a
r
ka
b
ly
diffic
u
l
t
t
o
p
a
in
t
a
cle
a
r
a
n
d
coherent picture of a possibly unclear and incoherent
motivational background structure. A critical theory of society needs to face up
to the complexity, diversity, and interpenetrability of the motivations that
human actors may, or may not, have when engaging in the daily construction
of power-laden realities.
7.
Performativism
F
o
r
s
t
’s
p
e
r
for
m
a
t
i
v
i
st
co
n
cep
t
io
n
o
f
p
o
w
er
s
t
r
esses
t
h
a
t,
w
i
t
hin
h
um
a
n
lif
e
f
o
r
m
s,
a
ll
structures and processes are located in spheres of action
–
that is, in
realms of practices,
performances, and enactments. On this interpretation, the
exercise of power (
Macht
) is essentially about being able (
pouvoir
) to do or to
make (
machen
) something in a particular way (
Vorgehensweise
). In order to grasp
the sociological relevance of power, it is imperative to comprehend what actors
do
by virtue of power, as well as what they
fail to do
due to their (relative or
absolute) lack of access to power. The strength of such a performativist
approach is that it does justice to the fact that, in the social world, power
without performance would be powerless. Indeed,
‘[i]f
power were not
performative, our performances
w
o
u
ld
b
e
p
o
w
er
less
’
177
.
Th
e we
ak
n
ess
o
f
s
uc
h
a
p
er
f
o
r
m
a
t
i
v
i
s
t
a
pp
r
o
ac
h,
h
o
we
v
er
,
i
s
t
h
a
t,
due to its underlying
anthropocentrism, it focuses exclusively on
human
forms of agency. G
i
v
e
n
i
ts
m
o
t
i
va
t
io
n
a
l
i
s
t
p
r
es
u
pp
osi
t
io
n
s,
F
o
r
s
t
’
s
a
pp
r
o
ac
h
di
s
r
ega
r
d
s
t
h
e
in
fl
uen
ce
o
f
n
o
n
human upon human forms of agency, let alone their confluence. In
technologically advanced
‘
g
lo
b
a
l
n
et
w
o
r
k
s
o
ciet
ies
’
178
,
t
h
e
dem
a
r
c
a
t
io
n
lin
e
bet
we
en
h
um
a
n
a
n
d
n
o
n
h
um
a
n
f
o
r
m
s
o
f
agency has become (both
theoretically and practically) more and more blurred, enabling
o
ur
s
p
ecies
t
o
p
u
s
h
t
h
e
limi
ts
o
f
t
h
e
t
radi
t
io
n
a
l
s
ep
a
ra
t
io
n
bet
we
en
‘
n
a
t
ur
e
’
a
n
d
‘
c
u
l
t
ur
e
’
.
179
A
critical sociology of power needs to study both human and nonhuman forms
of agency if it seeks to offer a comprehensive analysis of the multiple forces
shaping the development of both individuals and society.
8.
Consequentialism
F
o
r
s
t
’s
c
on
s
e
q
u
e
n
t
i
a
l
i
st
co
n
cep
t
io
n
o
f
p
o
w
er
em
p
h
a
sizes
t
h
a
t,
in
o
r
der
t
o
h
a
v
e
a
n
y
r
e
le
va
n
ce
t
o
t
h
e
unf
o
ldin
g
o
f
h
um
a
n
in
t
erac
t
io
n
s,
p
o
w
er
n
ee
d
s
t
o
b
e
‘
s
oc
ia
ll
y
e
ff
e
ct
i
ve
’
180
.
Y
et,
F
o
r
s
t
’
s c
l
a
im
t
h
a
t
‘
t
o
h
a
v
e
a
n
d
t
o
exer
ci
s
e
p
o
w
er
me
a
ns
t
o
b
e
a
b
l
e
–
i
n
d
i
ff
eren
t
de
g
r
ee
s
–
t
o
i
n
fl
u
en
c
e,
u
s
e,
de
t
er
m
i
n
e,
o
c
cup
y
,
o
r
e
v
en
s
e
a
l
o
ff
t
he
s
p
a
c
e
o
f
r
e
as
o
ns
f
o
r
o
t
h
er
s
’
181
i
s
p
r
ob
lem
a
t
ic. F
o
r
it reduces the consequentialist constitution of
power to an individual or a collective sub
j
ec
t
’
s c
a
p
aci
t
y
t
o
s
h
a
p
e
t
h
e
s
p
a
c
e
o
f
r
e
as
o
ns
in
p
a
r
t
ic
u
l
a
r
,
ra
t
h
er
t
h
a
n
co
n
cei
v
in
g
o
f
i
t,
m
o
r
e
broadly, in terms of the
ability to affect the
space of social arrangements
in general. Such a
limi
t
e
d
p
er
s
p
ec
t
i
v
e
,
f
o
un
de
d
o
n
a
p
ec
u
li
a
r
co
m
b
in
a
t
io
n
o
f
ra
t
io
n
a
li
s
t
deo
nt
o
log
y
(‘
s
p
ace
o
f
r
e
a
s
o
n
s
’)
a
n
d
s
o
cio
log
ic
a
l
co
n
se
q
uen
t
i
a
li
sm
(‘
s
o
ci
a
l
eff
ec
ts
’),
fa
i
l
s
t
o
acco
un
t
f
o
r
t
h
e fac
t
that the exercise of power is embedded in multiple
modes of being-in-the-world:
(a)
objective, normative, and/or subjective;
(b)
behavioural, ideological, and/or institutional;
(c)
foundational, contingent, and/or ephemeral.
182
(a)
As physical beings, we are immersed in
objectivity
. As social beings, we are
immersed in
normativity
. As self-conscious beings, we are immersed in
subjectivity
.
(b)
As performative beings, we engage in and with the world by virtue of
different forms
of
behaviour
. As meaning-producing beings, we
engage in and with the world by virtue of different
ideologies
. As
organizational beings, we engage in and with the
world by virtue of
different
institutions
.
(c)
As interdependent beings, we are situated in
foundational
fields, the
existence of which is
necessary
for the emergence of social order. As
socio-constructive beings,
we are situated in
contingent
fields, the
existence of which is
possible
within, but not
indispensable to, the
emergence of social order. As transient beings, we are situated in
ephemeral
fields, the existence of which is largely
irrelevant
to the
emergence of social order.
183
Both the exercise of and the exposure to power take place in the
aforementioned modes of being-in-the-world, all of which affect the
numerous ways in which we relate to, make sense of, and act upon reality. A
critical theory of human reality must resist the temptation
t
o
r
e
d
uce
i
ts
s
co
p
e
o
f
a
n
a
l
ysi
s
t
o
‘
t
h
e
s
p
ace
o
f
r
e
a
s
o
n
s
’
a
n
d
,
in
s
t
e
ad
,
s
h
e
d
lig
h
t
o
n
t
h
e
t
a
n
g
i
b
le
co
n
se
q
uen
ces
o
f
t
h
e exis
t
en
ce
o
f
p
o
w
er
r
e
l
a
t
io
n
s
in
‘
t
h
e s
p
ace
o
f
s
o
ciet
y
’
.
9.
Normativism
F
o
r
s
t
’s
n
orm
a
t
i
v
i
st
co
n
cep
t
io
n
o
f
p
o
w
er
accen
t
u
a
t
es
t
h
e fac
t
t
h
a
t
s
o
ci
a
l
r
e
l
a
t
io
n
s
a
r
e
a
l
wa
ys
open to questioning, competition, and struggle. Noumenal power is
exercised by, as well as exerted upon, actors who constantly produce,
reproduce, and transform
normative orders
. In this respect, we are confronted
with an irony: on the one hand, Forst underscores the
normatively charged
constitution of power relations, including its discursive representations;
o
n
t
h
e
o
t
h
er
h
a
n
d
,
F
o
r
s
t
a
im
s
t
o
‘
def
en
d
a
no
r
ma
t
i
v
e
l
y
ne
u
tr
a
l
n
o
t
io
n
o
f
p
o
w
er
’
184
,
fa
i
lin
g
t
o
r
ec
o
g
n
i
z
e
t
h
a
t
t
h
e
r
e i
s
n
o
s
u
c
h
t
h
i
n
g
a
s
a
‘
n
o
n
-
p
a
r
t
i
a
l
’
,
‘
n
o
n
-
e
v
a
l
u
a
t
i
v
e
’
,
a
n
d
‘
n
o
n
-
c
o
nt
e
s
t
a
b
l
e
’
account of power, because every epistemic claim to validity is
permeated by relationally contingent degrees of social legitimacy. A
genuinely normativist understanding of power needs to accept its own
normativity in order to grasp the relative arbitrariness that characterizes all
forms of human sociality.
10.
Contextualism
F
o
r
s
t
’s
c
on
te
xt
u
a
l
i
st
co
n
cep
t
io
n
o
f
p
o
w
er
i
s
a
r
emin
der
o
f
t
h
e fac
t
t
h
a
t
a
ll
s
o
ci
a
l
p
rac
t
ices
are
situated
in space and time. As such, they are embedded in
relationally configured sets of circumstances encountered, as well as
constructed, by human actors. Noumenal power
c
a
nn
o
t
b
e ex
er
cise
d
,
let
a
lo
n
e
t
ra
n
sf
o
r
m
e
d
,
‘
in
i
s
o
l
a
t
io
n
f
r
o
m
n
o
um
en
a
l-s
o
ci
a
l
c
o
n
texts
’
185
.
Irrespective of
whether ones focuses on
objective
contexts of physical states of affairs,
nor-
mative
contexts of cultural conventions and arrangements, or
subjective
contexts
of personal feelings, thoughts, and perceptions
–
every form of noumenal
power is located in spheres of objectivity, normativity, and subjectivity.
186
It is
far from obvious, however, what determines which of these three foundational
spheres of human existence is the most important one in shaping power
relations in a
particular
situation. A critical theory of society needs to scrutinize
the interplay between objective, normative, and subjective factors, shedding
light on their specific role in producing, reproducing, or transforming power
relations.
F
a
r
f
r
o
m
bein
g
r
e
d
uci
b
le
t
o
‘
a
n
ob
j
ec
t
i
v
e fac
t
’
,
‘
a
n
o
r
m
a
t
i
v
e
co
n
s
t
e
ll
a
t
io
n
’
,
o
r
‘
a
s
u
b
j
ec
t
i
v
e
p
r
o
j
ec
t
io
n
’
,
p
o
w
er
i
s
a
l
wa
ys
a
co
m
b
in
a
t
io
n
o
f
t
h
ese
t
hr
ee e
lem
en
ts
in
s
p
a
t
io
t
em
p
o
ra
lly
contingent contexts.
11.
Coherentism
F
o
r
s
t
’s
c
oh
e
r
e
n
t
i
st
co
n
cep
t
io
n
o
f
p
o
w
er
i
s
b
a
se
d
o
n
a
s
t
ra
ig
h
t
f
o
r
wa
r
d
a
ss
um
p
t
ion:
n
o
um
e
nal power, in order for it to be effective, requires a
minimal degree of
coherence
. Different types of power are embedded in
different forms of order: social orders, normative orders, orders of
justification, orders of action, political orders, cultural orders, or moral orders
–
to mention only a few. These orders are symptomatic of the grammatical
organization of social relations in general and of power relations in
particular. While these orders are
essential for defining the underlying
parameters of social interaction, variants of
disorder
may be no less crucial in
challenging, and redefining, these parameters. Indeed, in some radical cases,
forms of
disorder
may become forms of
order
–
that is, forms of
disordered o
rd
e
r
–
in
w
hic
h,
p
a
rado
xic
a
lly
,
t
h
e
n
o
r
m
m
a
y
b
e
t
h
e
a
bs
en
ce
o
f
n
o
r
m
s.
F
o
r
s
t
’
s
a
pp
r
o
ac
h
i
s
insightful in illustrating the socio-ontological significance of
different orders, but it contains little in the way of contributing to a critical
understanding of the constitution, let alone the functions, of variants of
disorder. In the social world, all forms of order can be challenged by manifold
forms of disorder. In this regard, the interplay between orders and disorders
of power is no exception.
12.
Discursivism
F
o
r
s
t
’s
di
s
cur
s
i
v
i
s
t
co
n
cep
t
io
n
o
f
p
o
w
er
m
a
in
t
a
in
s
t
h
a
t
n
o
um
en
a
l
p
o
w
er
i
s
ex
er
ci
s
e
d
t
hr
o
ug
h
the construction of different narratives
–
notably,
narratives of
justification
. In culturally codified life forms, human beings are expected to
provide rationally defensible justifications for their actions. Narratives of
justification constitute discursive frameworks that attribute coherence,
cogency, and legitimacy to behavioural, ideological, and institutional expres-
sio
n
s
o
f
bo
t
h
in
di
v
id
u
a
l
a
n
d
co
l
lec
t
i
v
e
m
o
des
o
f
a
g
en
c
y
.
F
o
r
s
t
’
s
a
pp
r
o
ac
h,
h
o
we
v
er
,
fa
i
l
s
t
o
cast light on the complexity of the
relationship between power
structures and narratives of justification
. The interplay between, on the one hand,
conservative and subversive power structures and, on the other hand,
hegemonic and counterhegemonic narratives of justification is irreducible to a
homological architecture of social determinacy, according to which
dominant
actors necessarily support
reactionary
discourses oriented towards
maintaining
the status quo and
dominated
actors necessarily endorse
progressive
discourses
oriented towards
challenging
the status quo.
187
A critical theory of society needs
to face up to the fact that different power arrangements are sustained by
varieties of discursive constellations, whose relative autonomy escapes the
stifling logic of structuralist determinism.
13.
Foundationalism
F
o
r
s
t
’s
fou
n
d
a
t
i
on
a
l
i
st
co
n
cep
t
io
n
o
f
p
o
w
er
in
sis
ts,
a
bo
v
e
a
ll
,
o
n
t
h
e exis
t
en
ce
o
f
o
n
e
b
a
sic
r
ig
h
t:
t
h
e
r
ig
h
t
to
ju
st
i
fi
c
a
t
i
on
.
Th
e
p
r
ob
lem
w
i
t
h
F
o
r
s
t
’
s
a
pp
r
o
ac
h,
h
o
we
v
er
,
i
s
t
h
a
t
it
presumes
, rather than proves, the validity of the assumption
that human beings have a right to justification, as if it were built into their
existence in a quasi-natural fashion. One may draw analogies with natural law
theories, which face a similar problem, in the sense that they affirm that
certain rights are inherent in the human condition.
188
Depending on
o
n
e
’
s
t
ak
e
o
n
t
hi
s
p
osi
t
io
n,
pa
rt
icu
la
r
–
s
uc
h
a
s ci
v
i
l
,
lega
l
,
p
o
li
t
ic
a
l
,
s
o
ci
a
l
,
e
co
n
o
mic,
o
r
sexual
–
rights may be interpreted as
universal
–
that is, human
–
rights.
Paradoxically, power relations may both confirm and undermine the
contention that human beings possess a right to justification: they may
confirm
it, insofar as the exercise of power, in order for it to be viable, needs
to be justifiable, at least in the eyes of those making use of it; at the same
time, they may
undermine
it, insofar as the exercise of power, in extreme
cases, may not be justifiable, not even in the eyes of those making use of it.
Indeed, despotic versions of power need not be based on reasonable
justifications in order for them to be truly powerful. The right to justification is
worthless to those actors who do not enjoy a right to power, let alone to
empowerment.
14.
Structuralism
F
o
r
s
t
’s
s
tr
u
ct
ur
a
li
s
t
co
n
cep
t
io
n
o
f
p
o
w
er
dra
ws
a
tt
en
t
io
n
t
o
t
h
e
cen
t
ra
li
t
y
o
f
f
o
ur
a
s
p
ec
ts
o
f
noumenal power: (a)
grounding
, (b)
reproduction
, (c)
influence
, and (d)
resource
. In essence, these four dimensions illustrate that noumenal power is
inconceivable without the following:
(a)
the
normative orders of justification
in which it is embedded;
(b)
the
normative power of the factual
, which manifests itself in the taken-for-
grantedness of the arbitrary;
(c)
the
normative impact of interpretive narrativity
on the emergence of relatively
solidified forms of sociality; and
(d)
the
normative significance of noumenal capital
for the distribution of
material and symbolic resources, which is reflected in the asymmetrical
structuration of social positions and dispositions.
Th
e s
t
r
en
gt
h
o
f
t
hi
s
a
pp
r
o
ac
h
lies
in
i
ts
c
a
p
aci
t
y
t
o
un
e
a
r
t
h,
in
a
‘
r
e
a
li
s
t
’
fas
hion,
t
h
e
relative structural determinacy pervading all forms of human
sociality. Its weakness, however, stems from its lack of explanatory force
concerning the unfolding of human agency, notably with regard to its ability
to challenge its own relative determinacy by virtue of species-constitutive
features, such as the assertion of autonomy and self-determination guided by
the empowering cognitive force of different forms of rationality. The cognitive
resources of reason
–
epitomized in the species-constitutive triad of
Verstand
,
Vernunft
, and
Urteilskraft
189
–
are as relevant to exercising power as they are
crucial to defying it. A critical theory of society needs to account not only for
the structural determinacy of power relations but also for the extent to which
they can be called into question
–
and, if considered necessary, subverted
–
by
those who are directly or indirectly affected by them.
15.
Relationalism
F
o
r
s
t
’s
r
e
l
a
t
i
on
a
l
i
st
co
n
cep
t
io
n
o
f
p
o
w
er
em
a
n
a
t
es
f
r
o
m
o
n
e
cen
t
ra
l
co
n
v
ic
t
ion:
n
o
um
en
a
l
power is, by definition, a
relational
state of affairs. What is missing
from this interpretation, however, is an analytically precise understanding of
the five cornerstones of the social in general and of the exercise of power in
the human world in particular: (a)
relationality
, (b)
reciprocity, (c) reconstructability,
(d) renormalizability, and (e) recognizability.190
(a)
Society can come into existence only to the extent that its members
relate
to one another. It is made up of
relational
selves, who cannot exist
in complete isolation from each other. As such, it constitutes a form of
being-
with
-one-another (
Miteinandersein
).
(b)
Society can come into existence only to the extent that its members
reciprocate
one another. It is sustained by
reciprocal
selves, who relate to
each other on the basis of quotidian actions, reactions, and
interactions. As such, it constitutes a form of
being-through-one-another
(Durcheinandersein).
(c)
Society can come into existence only to the extent that its members
reconstruct
one another. It is created by
reconstructable
selves, who
constantly invent and reinvent themselves as well as the realities by
which they are surrounded. As such, it constitutes a form of being-
beyond
-one-another (
Jenseitsvoneinandersein
or
aufhebbares Sein
).
(d)
Society can come into existence only to the extent that its members
renormalize
one another. It is shaped by
renormalizable
selves, who
attribute meaning and value to
e
ac
h
o
t
h
er
’
s,
a
s we
ll
a
s
t
o
t
h
eir
o
w
n,
ac
t
io
n
s.
As s
uch,
i
t
co
n
s
t
i
t
u
t
es
a
f
o
r
m
o
f
bein
g-
about-one-another
(Übereinandersein).
(e)
Society can come into existence only to the extent that its members
recognize
one another. It is generated by
recognizable
selves, who seek
acknowledgment, acceptance, and appreciation when establishing
meaningful relationships with their fellow human beings. As such, it
constitutes a form of being-
within
-one-another (
Ineinandersein
).
In short, society can be considered an interactional realm that is brought
into existence
by relational, reciprocal, reconstructable, renormalizable, and
recognizable selves. It is based on networks of sociality, mutuality, transformability,
signifiability, and identity, which allow
for the emergence of individual and
collective forms of engagement oriented towards the construction of
meaning-laden realities. All forms of social power are permeated by these five
ontological conditions of human coexistence.
Conclusion
Th
e
m
a
in
p
ur
p
os
e
o
f
t
hi
s
p
a
p
er
h
a
s
b
e
en
t
o
exa
min
e F
o
r
s
t
’
s
acco
un
t
o
f
‘
n
o
um
en
a
l
p
o
w
er
’
.
In order to accomplish this, the foregoing investigation has
covered a number of key aspects a
r
i
sin
g
f
r
o
m
t
h
e
cr
i
t
ic
a
l
a
n
a
l
ysi
s
o
f
F
o
r
s
t
’
s
t
h
e
o
r
et
ic
a
l
f
ra
m
ew
o
r
k.
•
The first part has provided some
definitional
reflections on the concept of
power, stating
t
h
a
t,
in
t
h
e
m
os
t
g
en
era
l
s
en
se
,
i
t
r
ef
er
s
t
o
a
n
en
t
i
t
y’
s ca
p
ac
i
t
y
t
o
do
s
o
m
et
hin
g
a
n
d/o
r
to act upon the world in a particular way.
•
The second part has focused on several dichotomous meanings attached to
the concept
o
f
p
o
w
er
,
n
o
t
a
b
ly
(1)
‘
s
o
ft
p
o
w
er
’
vs.
‘h
a
r
d
p
o
w
er
’
,
(2)
‘
p
o
w
er
t
o
’
vs.
‘
p
o
w
er
o
v
er
’
,
a
n
d
(3)
‘
p
o
w
er
f
o
r
’
vs.
‘
p
o
w
er
a
ga
in
s
t
’
.
•
Th
e
t
hird
p
a
r
t
h
a
s e
l
ucid
a
t
e
d
t
h
e
p
r
in
ci
p
a
l
f
e
a
t
ur
es
o
f
F
o
r
s
t
’
s
un
der
s
t
a
n
din
g
o
f
‘
n
oumena
l
p
o
w
er
’
,
a
r
guin
g
t
h
a
t
i
t
c
a
n
b
e c
h
a
rac
t
er
ize
d
a
s
(1)
cog
ni
t
i
v
i
s
t,
(2)
ra
t
io
n
a
li
s
t,
(3)
recognitivist, (4) justificationist, (5) pluralist,
(6) motivationalist, (7) performativist, (8) consequentialist, (9) normativist,
(10) contextualist, (11) coherentist, (12) discursivist, (13) foundationalist, (14)
structuralist, and (15) relationalist. Furthermore, attention
h
a
s
b
e
en
dra
w
n
t
o
t
h
e
p
r
es
u
pp
osi
t
io
n
a
l
un
der
p
innin
gs
o
f
F
o
r
s
t
’
s
t
yp
o
logic
a
l
di
s
t
in
c
t
io
n
bet
we
en
‘
p
o
w
er
’
,
‘
r
u
le
’
,
‘
do
min
a
t
io
n
’
,
a
n
d
‘
v
iolen
ce
’
.
•
Th
e
fin
a
l
p
a
r
t
h
a
s
o
ff
er
e
d
a
n
a
ss
e
ssm
e
n
t
o
f
F
o
r
s
t
’
s
acco
un
t
o
f
‘
n
o
um
en
a
l
p
o
w
er
’
,
m
a
in
taining that it suffers from significant limitations. Especially
noteworthy, in this respect, is its inability to develop an explanatory
framework capable of capturing the multiple ways in which power
operates
–
not only in the noumenal sphere of reason and justification,
but also, often more forcefully, in the empirical sphere of vested interests,
unconscious desires, and asymmetrically structured interactions.
A genuinely
comprehensive
critical theory of society needs to engage with
the multifaceted complexity of power
191
, instead of reducing it to its noumenal
dimensions, which, irrespective of their socio-ontological centrality, represent
only part of the story.
As should be clear from the previous sections, however, this article
–
far
from simply engaging in a discursive demolition exercise
–
has sought to
provide a balanced analysis of
n
o
t
ew
o
r
t
h
y
s
t
r
en
gt
h
s
a
n
d
we
ak
n
esses
o
f
F
o
r
s
t
’
s
co
n
cep
t
io
n
o
f
n
o
um
en
a
l
p
o
w
er
.
Th
er
ef
o
r
e
,
it seems sensible to conclude by
giving a synopsis of the vital insights that can be obtained from the preceding
inquiry:
(1)
In a world shaped by meaning-generating entities, power is
sustained by virtue of structures and processes of
cognition
. Our will
to power is inseparable from our species-constitutive capacity to
construct reality by interacting with it
–
and by doing so not only
intuitively but also reflectively.
(2)
Even in its most inhumane and degrading variants, both the exercise
of and the exposure to power cannot be dissociated from the
civilizational force of
reason
. Subjects who lack access to power lack a
raison d’être
, since the ability to act upon reality in a purposive manner
lies at the core of a meaningful existence. Our reason to live is
entrenched in the life of reason.
(3)
To the extent that the successful use of power hinges on processes of
recognition
(and, potentially, on processes of
misrecognition
), the pursuit
of social legitimacy is built into the condition of humanity. Struggles
for recognition, as well as struggles against misrecognition, are so
deeply implanted in the fabric of everyday life that the unfolding of
power dynamics is intimately intertwined with practices of social
positioning.
(4)
The exercise of legitimate power is inconceivable without the (implicit
or explicit) acceptance of legitimate
justifications
. Failure to be able to
provide a valid reason
f
o
r
o
n
e
’
s ex
er
cise
o
f
p
o
w
er
i
s
t
a
nt
a
m
o
un
t
t
o
t
h
e
l
ac
k
o
f
c
a
p
aci
t
y
t
o
j
u
s
t
if
y
o
n
e
’
s
action(s). Regardless of the
question of whether
reasons
and
justifications
are socio-ontologically
preponderant over
interests
and
desires
(or vice versa), the
development of humanity cannot be divorced from the civilizational
force of rationality, which manifests itself in the species-empowering
–
notably (a) constative, (b) normative, (c) expressive, (d)
communicative, and (e) imaginative
–
functions of human
linguisticality.
(5)
When navigating their way through the matrix of social life, actors
encounter a
spectrum
of modes of acceptance and justification. To
the degree that different interactional realms are produced,
reproduced, and potentially transformed by different objective,
normative, and subjective parameters, constellations of power evolve
in relation to a multiplicity of physical, social, and personal
components of human existence.
(6)
In order to exercise power, actors have to be
driven
in one way or
another, implying that they follow variable and adjustable, yet also
both habitualized and habitualizing, cognitive patterns of
motivation
.
It is because human subjects have a deep-seated need to relate to,
to make sense of, and to act upon reality that their daily participation
in the construction of society is pervaded by context-specific modes
and degrees of intentionality. In a universe shaped by purposeful
actions and projections, there is no will to live without the will to
exercise, and the willingness to be exposed to, power.
(7)
If power were not performative, our performances would be not only
powerless but also pointless. Asserting its empirical significance, the will
to power (
Wille zur Macht
) is not necessarily a will to domination (
Wille
zur Herrschaft
) but, more fundamentally, a will to action (
Wille zur Tat
).
(8)
Power matters because both its presence and its absence have
consequences
. To exercise power means to exert some kind of
influence upon the physical, social,
a
n
d/o
r
p
er
s
o
n
a
l
dim
en
sio
n
s
o
f
o
ur
,
a
n
d/o
r
o
t
h
er
p
e
o
p
le
’
s,
exis
t
en
ce
.
I
f
i
t
bo
r
e
n
o
relation to the
objective, normative, and subjective construction of reality, the
exercise of power would be irrelevant to the constitution, let alone
the evolution, of humanity.
(9)
Within the social world, power is exercised by, as well as exerted
upon, actors who constantly produce, reproduce, and potentially
transform
normative orders
. Just as there is no normativity without
contestability, there is no pursuit of justice
–
and, indeed, no pursuit
of injustice
–
without the value-laden regulation of social realities.
(10)
Power cannot be understood in isolation from the sociohistorically
specific
contexts
in which it emerges, for all human practices are
situated in space and time. The construction of human existence is
shaped by the tension-laden confluence of
objective
factors (such as
physical states of affairs),
normative
factors (such as cultural
conventions and arrangements), and
subjective
factors (such as
personal
f
ee
lin
gs,
t
h
o
ug
h
ts,
a
n
d
p
er
cep
t
io
n
s).
Po
w
er
–
fa
r
f
r
o
m
bein
g
r
e
d
uci
b
le
t
o
‘
a
n
ob
j
ec
t
i
v
e fac
t
’
,
‘
a
n
o
r
m
a
t
i
v
e
co
n
s
t
e
ll
a
t
io
n
’
,
o
r
‘
a
s
u
b
j
ec
t
i
v
e
p
r
o
j
ec
t
io
n
’
–
co
n
s
t
i
t
u
t
es
a combination of these three
elements in any human life form.
(11)
In order to be effective, power requires a minimal degree of
coherence
.
Different types of power are embedded in different forms of order
–
such as social orders, normative orders, orders of justification, orders
of action, political orders, cultural orders, and moral orders. Any
attempt to challenge a particular power constellation is futile if it fails to
confront, let alone to subvert, its grammatical organization.
(12)
The exercise of power is inextricably linked to the construction of
context-specific
discourses
, which serve the vital function of providing
narratives of justification. Both as participants and as observers,
human subjects draw upon narratives of justification, in order to
attribute coherence, cogency, and legitimacy to behavioural,
ideological, and institutional expressions of both individual and
collective modes of agency.
(13)
Notwithstanding the question of whether human beings possess a
right to justification
, either in a foundationalist sense (as a natural
right) or in a constructivist sense (as a sociohistorically contingent
right), power is exercised by, and potentially imposed upon, subjects
who are not only capable of speech and action but also capable of
reflection, interpretation, and explanation. Any exercise of power that,
in the eyes of those who are affected by its influence, fails to obtain at
least a minimal degree of justifiability is unviable, since legitimacy
cannot be sustained without a healthy level of acceptability.
(14)
Given its reliance on relatively
solidified
forms of interaction, the social
world is composed of multiple sets of power
structures
. Power
constellations constitute structural relations that are (a) grounded in
orders of justification, (b) reproduced by the normative force of the
factual, (c) sustained by spheres of influence, and
(d) shaped by the
unequal distribution of resources.
(15)
Power is, by definition, a
relational
state of affairs. Owing to their
relational constitution, power constellations are never forever:
inasmuch as they can be
con
structed, they can be
de
constructed and
re
constructed. Power is most powerful when those affected by it are
able to relate to it without noticing it. Power is least powerful when
those affected by it notice it without being able to relate to it. Either way,
it permeates
–
while, at the same time, being permeated by
–
five
pillars of human sociality: relationality, reciprocity, reconstructability,
renormalizability, and recognizability. As long as the social does not
go away, power will be here to stay.
Notes
1. See Forst (2015b). See also Forst (2015c).
2. Forst (2015b, p. 111).
3. See, for instance: Forst (2012 [2007], 2013 [2003], 2014, 2015a). See also, for
example: Allen
et al
. (2014) and Forst (2015b, esp. p. 117).
4. Forst (2015b, p. 111).
5.
See Lukes (2005 [1974], p. 108). See also Lukes (1986a, 1986b, 2007). In addition,
see Forst (2015b, p. 113). Furthermore, see Gallie (1956).
6.
On this point, see Susen (2014b, pp. 14–15).
7. Forst (2015b, p. 111).
8. Ibid., p. 111.
9. Ibid., p. 111 (italics in original).
10. Ibid., p. 112.
11.
Ibid., p. 115 (italics in original).
12.
Ibid., p. 115 (italics added).
13.
Ibid., p. 115 (italics added).
14.
See, for example, ibid., p. 123.
15.
See, for instance, Susen (2008a, 2008b).
16.
On this point, see, for example, Susen (2009a, 2015b).
17. On this point, see Susen (2015a), pp. 16–18. See also ibid., pp. 1, 16–22, 44, 75, 113, 119,
143,
174, 178, 179, 180, 190, 191, 204, 205, 219, 223, 235, 236, 269, 273, 276, 279, and
285n86. On the social and political challenges arising from the experience of ambivalence
under modern and/or postmodern conditions, see, for instance: Bauman (1991), Bauman
and Tester (2007, esp. pp. 23–25 and 29), Hammond (2011, pp. 305, 310, 312, and
315), Iggers (2005 [1997],
pp. 146–147), Jacobsen and Marshman (2008, pp. 804–
807), Kellner (2007, p. 117), Mulinari and Sandell (2009, p. 495), Quicke (1999, p.
281), Susen (2010d, esp. pp. 62–78), and van
Raaij (1993, esp. pp. 543–546, 551–
555, and 559–561).
18. On this point, see, for example: Susen (2016b, esp. pp. 430 and 432–433, 2017b,
esp. pp. 104–105). See also Outhwaite (2016) and McLennan (2017).
19. Susen (2015a, p. 17).
20. Ibid., p. 17.
21. Forst (2015b, p. 113).
22. On this point, see ibid., p. 113: ‘[…] I think a better definition is available that avoids
essential
co
nt
es
t
a
t
io
n
’
.
23.
Ibid., p. 114 (italics added).
24.
Ibid., p. 114.
25. Ibid., p. 114.
26. Ibid., p. 115.
27.
Ibid., p. 115 (italics added).
28.
Ibid., p. 115 (italics in original).
29.
Ibid., p. 116 (italics in original).
30.
Ibid., p. 118.
31.
Ibid., p. 118.
32.
Ibid., p. 118 (italics added).
33.
Ibid., p. 118 (italics in original).
34.
On this point, see Susen (2007, pp. 35, 37, 40, 69, 72, 82, 227
n
23, and 251). See
also Susen (2018, p. 48). In addition, see Habermas (1987 [1965/1968], p. 314).
35. Forst (2015b, p. 118) (italics added). On the concept of ‘justification’, see, for example:
Bergmann
(2006), BonJour and Sosa (2003), Fahrmeir (2013), Forst (2012 [2007],
2013 [2011], 2013, 2014, 2015a), Habermas (2004 [1999]), Jetté (2003), McCain
(2014), Müller-Doohm (2000), Porter (2006), Vaisey (2009). On
the concept of
‘justification’ in Luc Boltanski’s ‘pragmatic sociology of critique’
, see, for instance:
Blokker and Brighenti (2011), Boltanski (2002, 2009b), Boltanski
et al
. (2010, 2014
[2009]), 2014 [2010]), Boltanski and Thévenot (1991, 2006 [1991]), Corcuff (1998),
Eulriet (2014), Lemieux (2014), Livet (2009), Silber (2011), Stark (2009), Susen
(2012b, 2014 [2012], 2014a, 2014d, 2014 [2015], 2015c, 2016a), Susen and Turner
(2014), and Wagner (1999).
36. Forst (2015b, p. 115), On this point, cf. Susen (2007, pp. 145, 193, 196–197, and
202n93).
37. Forst (2015b, p. 115).
38. Ibid., p. 115 (italics added).
39. Ibid., p. 116.
40. Ibid., p. 116.
41. Ibid., p. 116.
42. Ibid., p. 116.
43.
Ibid., p. 116 (italics added).
44.
On this concept, see ibid., pp. 115
n
14, 116, 124, and 125.
45.
Ibid., p. 116 (italics added).
46.
Ibid., p. 116 (italics added).
47.
Ibid., p. 115 (in the original version, the entire sentence appears in italics).
48.
S
ee
i
bid
.,
pp
.
115,
115
n
14, 124,
a
n
d
125
(‘
t
o
do
s
o
m
et
hin
g
’)
a
s we
ll
a
s
i
bid
.,
p
.
121
(‘
t
o
do
cer
t
a
in
t
hin
gs
’).
49. See ibid., pp. 115 and 115n15.
50. See ibid., pp. 113, 114, 115, 115n14, 115n15, 116n17, and 121.
51.
Ibid., p. 116 (italics in original).
52.
Ibid., p. 115 (italics added).
53.
Ibid., p. 116.
54.
On
the concept of ‘engagement’
, see, for instance, Susen (2016c).
55.
Forst (2015b, p. 126).
56.
On this point, see, for example: Forst (2002 [1994], 2012 [2007], 2014). See also, for
instance: Boltanski (1990), Boltanski (2009b, 2012 [1990]), Fraser and Honneth
(2003), Honneth (2007 [2000]), Merle (2013), Miller and Walzer (1995), Nachi
(2006), Rawls (1999 [1971]), Ricœur (1995), Turner (2014), and Walzer (1983).
57.
On
the concept of ‘normative order’
, see Forst (2015a). See also Forst (2015b, pp. 117,
118, 119, 121
n
30, 125, and 126). In addition, see, for instance: Forst (2002 [1994],
2012 [2007], 2013 [2003], 2013 [2011], 2014).
58.
Forst (2015b, p. 118) (italics added).
59.
Ibid., p. 118 (italics added).
60.
See, for instance: Forst (2012 [2007], 2013 [2003], 2014, 2015a). See also, for
example: Allen
et al
. (2014) and Forst (2015b, esp. p. 117).
61. Forst (2015b, p. 117).
62.
Ibid., p. 117. See also ibid., pp. 114, 120, and 126. On this point, see also Bohman
(2007).
63.
Forst (2015b, p. 119) (italics in original).
64.
On this point, see ibid., p. 125.
65.
Ibid., p. 125.
66. Ibid., p. 125.
67.
Ibid., p. 115 (italics added).
68.
Ibid., p. 116 (italics added).
69.
Ibid., p. 116 (italics added).
70.
Ibid., p. 116 (italics added).
71.
On this point, see ibid., p. 119.
72. Ibid., pp. 116, 119, 120, 124, and 125.
73. Ibid., pp. 117, 118, 119, 121n30, 125, and 126.
74. Ibid., pp. 117, 117n18, 119, 124, and 125.
75. Ibid., pp. 120 and 124.
76. Ibid., p. 125.
77. Ibid., p. 117.
78. On this point, see ibid., pp. 117, 117
n
18, 119, 120, 121, 122, and 126. In addition,
see, for example: Fahrmeir (2013), Forst (2013), and Forst and Günther (2011a,
2011b).
79. Forst (2015b, p. 117).
80.
See, for instance: Forst (2012 [2007], 2013 [2003], 2014, 2015a). See also, for
example: Allen
et al
. (2014) and Forst (2015b, esp. p. 117).
81.
Forst (2015b, p. 117) (italics in original).
82.
Ibid., pp. 118–119 (italics added).
83.
Ibid., p. 119.
84. Ibid., pp. 117, 118, 119, 121n30, 125, and 126.
85. Ibid., pp. 117, 117n18, 119, 124, and 125.
86. Ibid., p. 120.
87. Ibid., p. 120.
88. Ibid., p. 120.
89. Susen (2007, p. 145).
90. Forst (2015b, p. 120.)
91. Ibid., p. 120. See also ibid., p. 124.
92. Ibid., p. 120.
93. Ibid., p. 120.
94. Ibid., p. 126. See also ibid., pp. 120 and 121n30.
95.
Ibid., p. 120 (italics in original).
96.
Ibid., p. 120 (italics in original).
97.
Ibid., p. 121 (italics in original).
98. Ibid., p. 121.
99. Ibid., p. 112. See also ibid., pp. 117, 118, 121, 125, 126, and 127.
100. Ibid., p. 115.
101. Ibid., p. 115.
102. Ibid., p. 111.
103. Ibid., p. 125.
104. Ibid., p. 125.
105. Ibid., p. 124.
106. Ibid., p. 125 (italics in original).
107. Ibid., p. 117.
108. Ibid., p. 117 (italics removed). On this concept, see also ibid., p. 126.
109. Ibid., p. 116.
110. Ibid., p. 126.
111. Ibid., p. 118.
112. Ibid., p. 126. See also ibid., pp. 120 and 121n30.
113. Ibid., p. 121.
114.
Ibid., p. 124 (italics added).
115.
Ibid., p. 124 (italics added).
116.
Ibid., p. 124 (italics added).
117.
Ibid., p. 125 (italics added).
118. Ibid., p. 125.
119. Ibid., p. 125.
120. Ibid., p. 125 (italics added).
121. Ibid., p. 125.
122. Ibid., p. 125.
123. Ibid., p. 125.
124. Ibid., p. 126.
125. Ibid., p. 126.
126. On
the concept of ‘ideal type’
, see, for example: Haug
et al
. (2004) and Rosenberg
(2016). See also Susen (2015a, pp. 57, 100, 204, 205, 207, and 217).
127. Forst (2015b, p. 126).
128. Ibid., p. 111.
129.
See, for example: Bachrach and Baratz (1971 [1962]), Baumgartner
et al
. (1976),
Bendix and Lipset (1967), Bentham (1971 [1843]), Berenskoetter and Williams
(2007), Boltanski (2009a), Bourdieu (1976, 1979, 1992), Browne and Susen (2014),
Burns and Buckley (1976), Champlin (1971a, 1971b), Clegg (1979, 1989), Clegg
and Haugaard (2009), Cox
et al
. (1985), Dowding (1996, 2011), Emmet (1971
[1954]), Foucault (1979 [1975], 1980), Goldman (1986 [1972]), Habermas (1981a,
1981b, 1987 [1985]), Haugaard (1997, 2002), Hearn (2012, 2014), Hearse (2007),
Hindess (1996), Hobbes (1971 [1651]), Holloway (2005 [2002]), Haugaard (2014a,
2014b), Holloway and Susen (2013), Honneth (1991 [1986]), Isaac (1987), Lukes (1974,
1986a, 1986b, 2007), MacKenzie (1999), March (1971 [1966]), Martin (1977), Marx
(1972 [1852]), McClelland (1971 [1966]), Mendieta y Nuñez (1969), Miller (1987),
Morgenthau (1971 [1958]), Morriss (2002 [1987]), Poggi (2001), Poulantzas (1980
[1978]), Russell (1986 [1938]), Saar (2010), Scott (1990, 1996, 2001), Simmel (1986
[1950]), Stewart (2001), Susen (2007, 2008a, 2008b, 2009a, 2011, 2012a, 2012b,
2013b, 2013c, 2014a, 2014b, 2015b, 2016a, 2016c), Susen and Turner (2011, 2014),
Weber (1980 [1922]), Wolin (1988), and Wrong (1995 [1979]).
130.
Forst (2015b, p. 111) (italics added).
131.
Ibid., p. 115 (italics added).
132. Ibid., p. 113.
133.
Ibid., p. 113 (italics added).
134.
Ibid., p. 111 (italics added).
135.
See Horkheimer (1976). On the
distinction between ‘traditional theory’ and ‘critical
theory’
, see also, for example: Bohman (1999, p. 459), Dallmayr (1992, pp. 121–124),
Edgar (2005, pp. 8–10), Geuss (1981, esp. p. 55), Habermas (1987 [1965/1968], p.
302, 1987 [1981], p. xliii, 1988 [1963]-a, p. 211, 1988 [1971], pp. 2–3), Kompridis (2005,
p. 299), Leonard (1990, pp. xiii, 3–4, 36–37, and 39), Power (1998, p. 207), Susen
(2007, pp. 33, 38–39, and 238), and Velasco (2003, p. 20).
136. Susen (2015a, p. 61). On this point, see also Susen (2007, pp. 164–165, 2013b, p.
224).
137. See Forst (2015b, p. 114n11).
138. Ibid., p. 114
n
11.
139. Ibid., p. 114
n
11 (italics added).
140. See, for example, Weber (1978 [1922], pp. 30–38, 60, and 1082–1085).
141.
Forst (2015b, p. 114
n
11) (italics added).
142.
Ibid., p. 115 (italics in original).
143.
Ibid., p. 112 (italics in original).
144.
Ibid., p. 114 (italics added).
145. Ibid., p. 123.
146. Ibid., p. 123 (italics in original).
147. Ibid., p. 123.
148.
Ibid., p. 116 (italics in original).
149. On the ‘politics of identity’, see, for example: Susen (2010a, pp. 204–208, 2010b, pp. 260–
262 and 271–274, 2013a, pp. 93, 97, and 100n35, 2015a, pp. 4, 171, 172, 180, 182, 193,
and 272, 2017a, esp. pp. 170 and 178).
150. On the ‘politics of difference’, see, for example: Susen (2010a, pp. 204–208, 2010b, pp. 260–
262 and 271–274, 2013a, pp. 93, 97, and 100n351, 2015a, pp. 4, 109, 110, 171, 172, 180,
182, 183, 184, 272, and 318n4).
151. On the ‘politics of recognition’, see, for example: Susen (2007, pp. 192–198, 2015a, pp. 4,
171, 172, 180, 182, and 272).
152.
Susen (2015a, p. 199) (italics in original).
153.
Forst (2015b, p. 111) (italics added).
154.
Ibid., pp. 118 and 122 (italics added).
155.
Ibid., p. 116 (italics added).
156. Ibid., p. 116.
157. Ibid., p. 116.
158. Ibid., p. 117.
159.
Susen (2015a, p. 10) (italics in original).
160. On the relationship between ‘validity claims’ and ‘legitimacy claims’, see, for example:
Susen (2007, p. 257, 2013b, esp. pp. 200, 207–215, 217–218, 219, 222, 225–230, 2013c,
esp. pp. 330, 331, 334, 335, 337, 339, 341, 342, 343, 344, 349, 363, 365, and 369,
2015a, pp. 10, 55, and
200) and Susen and Baert (2017).
161.
Forst (2015b), p. 118 (italics added).
162. Cf. Habermas’s concept of the ‘ideal speech situation’; see, for example: Habermas (1970,
pp. 367 and 371–374, 1988 [1963]-b, pp. 279 and 281, 1992, pp. 419, 422, and 452,
2001 [1984],
pp. 85–86, 93, 97–99, and 102–103, 2001, pp. 7–8, 10–13, 23, 29, 37, 42, 45–47, 52,
and 83–84,
2004, p. 875). See also, for example: Susen (2007, pp. 74, 88–90, 99–
100n105, 116, 122, 123, 144, 261, and 306, 2009a, pp. 81–82 and 93–99, 2010c, esp. pp.
107–111).
163. Cf. Susen’s concept of the ‘real speech situation’; see, for example: Susen (2013b, 2013c).
See also Susen (2007, pp. 144 and 261).
164.
For a tentative outline of a
typology of justifications
, see, for example, Susen (2017d).
165. For a tentative outline of a typology of rationality, see, for example, Susen (2015a, p.
54). See also ibid., pp. 13, 15, 20, 35, 44, 45, 48, 62, 90, 104, 105, 115, 116, 120, 121,
137, 165, 175, 183, 190, 191, 198, 199, 225, 227, 235, 236, 255, 261, 274, 281, and
292n39.
166. For a tentative outline of a typology of interests, see, for example, Susen (2016d, pp. 130–
131).
167.
For a tentative outline of a
typology of desires
, see, for example, Susen (2007, pp.
293–296).
168.
For a tentative outline of a
typology of power
, see, for example, Susen (2014b, esp.
pp. 14 and 20, 2015a, esp. p. 117). In addition, see Susen (2008a, 2008b).
169.
Forst (2015b, p. 117) (italics removed). On this concept, see also ibid., p. 126.
170. Ibid., p. 117.
171.
Ibid., p. 117 (italics removed). On this concept, see also ibid., p. 126.
172.
On
the concept of ‘relative autonomy’
, see, for example, Susen (2015a), pp. 80, 81, 88,
99, 101, 105, 129, and 266.
173. On the concept of ‘metanarrative’, see ibid., pp. 11, 27, 46, 107, 140, 141, 142, 143, 149,
166, 170, 186, 187, 188, 189, 218, 240, 245, 255, 256, 259, 260, 268, 271, 281, 291n23,
312n11, 334n29, 339n185, 339n187, and 340n192.
174. For a tentative outline of a typology of metanarratives, see, for example, ibid., pp. 140–
143.
175.
Forst (2015b, p. 116) (italics added).
176.
On this concept, see ibid., pp. 115
n
14, 116, 124, and 125.
177.
Susen (2014b, p. 14).
178. On the concept of the ‘global network society’, see, for example: Castells (1996, 1997,
1998). See also, for instance: Baert and da Silva (2010 [1998], pp. 249–255), Beck and
Lau (2005, pp. 525–533), Burawoy et al. (2000, esp. pp. 34–35 and 345–349), Buzan
et al. (1998, pp. 388–391), della Porta et al. (2006), Featherstone and Lash (1995, pp. 1–
15), Giddens (1990,
p. 64, 1991, pp. 1 and 20–23), Kali and Reyes (2007), Latour (2005,
esp. pp. 247–262), Ruby
(1990, p. 35), Susen (2015a, pp. 118, 125, 170, 210, 227, 255,
and 277), and Toews (2003, p. 82).
179.
On this point, see, for example,
Bruno Latour’s actor
-
network theory
, which tends to
reject traditional notions of the human subject and makes a case for a non-
anthropocentric exploration of the concept of agency. See Latour (1990, 2005).
For an excellent discussion of this issue, see, for example, Wilding (2010). See also
Susen (2015a, pp. 143 and 312
n
14).
180.
Forst (2015b, p. 115) (italics added).
181.
Ibid., p. 116 (italics in original).
182.
On this point, see Susen (2016c).
183.
On this point, see Susen (2013b, p. 236
n
121).
184.
Forst (2015b, p. 111) (italics added).
185.
Ibid., p. 115 (italics added).
186.
On this point, see Susen (2014c, pp. 349–350) (point 13). See also Susen (2017c, esp.
p. 115); in addition, see ibid. pp. 104–106, 110, 113–115, 118, and 120.
187.
On this point, see, for example, Susen (2016a, p. 220) (point 6). See also ibid., pp.
201–202. In addition, see Susen (2014a).
188.
On
the relationship between natural law and social theory
, see, for instance: Chernilo
(2013a, 2013b), Chernilo and Fine (2013), Fine (2013), Thornhill (2013), and Turner
(2013). See also Susen (2015a, pp. 215 and 275).
189. On this point, see Susen (2015a, pp. 13, 105, 215, 236, 259, and 275). On the
distinction between ‘Verstand’ and ‘Vernunft’, see, for example: Susen (2009b, pp. 104–
105, 2010c, pp. 112–113, 2013c, pp. 326 and 330–331, 2015b, pp. 1027–1028).
190. See Susen (2007, pp. 192–198).
191. For a
Grundriß
of a critical theory of power, see, for example, Susen (2014b). See
also Susen (2015a, esp. p. 117). In addition, see Susen (2008a, 2008b).
Acknowledgements
I am immensely grateful to two anonymous reviewers for providing me with useful and
constructive comments on a draft version of this article. Furthermore, I would like to
thank Mark Haugaard and
William Outhwaite for making several valuable suggestions.
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