TREND-FOLLOWING STRATEGIES IN CRYPTOCURRENCIES, OPTIMIZED FOR DOWNSIDE RISK-ADJUSTED RETURNS PDF Free Download

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TREND-FOLLOWING STRATEGIES IN CRYPTOCURRENCIES, OPTIMIZED FOR DOWNSIDE RISK-ADJUSTED RETURNS PDF Free Download

TREND-FOLLOWING STRATEGIES IN CRYPTOCURRENCIES, OPTIMIZED FOR DOWNSIDE RISK-ADJUSTED RETURNS PDF free Download. Think more deeply and widely.

Master's Degree Program in
Statistics and Information Management
TREND-FOLLOWING STRATEGIES IN CRYPTOCURRENCIES,
OPTIMIZED FOR DOWNSIDE RISK-ADJUSTED RETURNS
Exploring Successful Trend-Following Algorithmic Trading Strategies
with a Deleveraging Mechanism in the Cryptocurrency Markets
Carlos Sakarías Koljonen Caballos
Master Thesis
presented as a partial requirement for obtaining a master’s degree in Statistics and Information Management
NOVA Information Management School
Instituto Superior de Estatística e Gestão de Informação
Universidade Nova de Lisboa
MEGI
NOVA Information Management School
Instituto Superior de Estatística e Gestão de Informação
Universidade Nova de Lisboa
TREND-FOLLOWING STRATEGIES IN CRYPTOCURRENCIES, OPTIMIZED FOR DOWNSIDE
RISK-ADJUSTED RETURNS
Exploring Successful Trend-Following Algorithmic Trading Strategies with a Deleveraging
Mechanism in the Cryptocurrency Markets
By
Carlos Sakarías Koljonen Caballos
The master's thesis was presented as a partial requirement for obtaining the master’s
degree in Statistics and Information Management, with a specialization in Risk Management.
Supervised by
Prof. Doutor Jorge Miguel Ventura Bravo (PhD)
Universidade Nova de Lisboa & Université Paris-Dauphine PSL
July,
2024
i
STATEMENT OF INTEGRITY
I hereby declare having conducted this academic work with integrity. I confirm that I have not
used plagiarism or any form of undue use of information or falsification of results along the
process leading to its elaboration. I further declare that I have fully acknowledged the Rules
of Conduct and Code of Honor from the NOVA Information Management School.
In Lisbon, 15/07/2024
ii
DEDICATION
To my future wife
For tirelessly striving to bring out the best in me,
For understanding the importance of freedom in the world.
iii
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
I would like to extend my deepest gratitude to Professor Jorge M. Bravo for his invaluable
inputs and ideas over the past months. His guidance has been instrumental in shaping this
thesis.
I also wish to express my heartfelt thanks to my friend Clifford D. Roman. Our countless
conversations, whether willingly or unwillingly on his part, have significantly contributed to
the enhancement of this work.
To my future wife, Katia F. Ferreira, I owe a special debt of gratitude for discovering this
master’s program, encouraging me to pursue it, and supporting me every step of the way. I
cannot imagine a better partner to share my life with.
I want to thank my parents for their unwavering support throughout this journey. Their
encouragement and belief in me have been the foundation upon which I have built my
academic and personal successes.
Finally, I would like to acknowledge Javier Milei for reviving my motivation to give the cultural
battle for the libertarian ideas. As Ludwig von Mises used to say: Tu ne cede malis, sed contra
audentior ito.
iv
ABSTRACT
Despite its popularity, trend-following lacks a cohesive theoretical framework, resulting in
fragmented understanding and application. This thesis addresses this gap by integrating
principles from the Austrian School of Economics to provide a structured foundation for trend-
following. It posits two key assumptions: the unpredictability of market movements and the
existence of trends, introducing the theorem of the impossibility of accurate market
predictions based on dispersed human knowledge.
Traditional risk-adjusted metrics like the Sharpe, Sortino, and Calmar Ratios have a different
set of limitations. This thesis proposes the Koljonen Ratio, a novel downside risk-adjusted
return metric that combines drawdown and downside volatility for a more nuanced
evaluation, particularly in cryptocurrency markets.
The study aims to: (1) consolidate trend-following philosophy with Austrian economic theory,
(2) develop a superior downside risk-adjusted return metric, (3) assess traditional trend-
following strategies in cryptocurrency trading, and (4) implement an innovative and
sophisticated trading strategy with a deleveraging mechanism to enhance downside risk-
adjusted returns.
Anticipated contributions include a robust theoretical framework for trend-following,
improved performance evaluation metrics, practical insights into cryptocurrency trading, and
an advanced strategy for better downside risk-adjusted returns. This thesis aspires to advance
both academic research and practical applications in trading strategies.
KEYWORDS
Trend-Following; Austrian School of Economics; Cryptocurrencies; Downside-Risk;
Algorithmic Trading; Koljonen Ratio
Sustainable Development Goals (SDG):
v
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Statement of Integrity ........................................................................................................ i
Dedication ......................................................................................................................... ii
Acknowledgments ............................................................................................................ iii
Abstract ............................................................................................................................ iv
List of Figures.................................................................................................................. viii
List of Tables ..................................................................................................................... ix
List of Abbreviations and Acronyms.................................................................................. x
1. Introduction .................................................................................................................. 1
2. Trend-Following ............................................................................................................ 3
2.1. Foundational Assumptions .................................................................................... 3
2.1.1. On the Future’s Unpredictability .................................................................... 4
2.1.1.1. The Theorem of the Impossibility of Socialism .................................... 4
2.1.1.2. The Theorem of the Impossibility of Making Accurate Predictions .... 6
2.1.1.3. Trend-Following as a Philosophy of Reaction and Adaptation ............ 7
2.1.2. On the Existence of Trends in Prices .............................................................. 8
2.1.2.1. Static Efficiency vs Dynamic Efficiency ................................................ 9
2.1.2.2. Austrian School of Economics (ASE) .................................................. 11
2.1.2.3. Behavioral Finance ............................................................................. 17
2.1.2.4. Newton’s First Law of Motion............................................................ 18
2.2. Principles ............................................................................................................. 19
2.2.1. Follow the Trend .......................................................................................... 19
2.2.2. Systematic .................................................................................................... 21
2.2.3. Directional Flexibility .................................................................................... 23
2.2.4. Risk Management ......................................................................................... 24
2.2.4.1. Diversification .................................................................................... 24
2.2.4.2. Portfolio Heat ..................................................................................... 26
2.2.4.3. Stop-Loss ............................................................................................ 26
2.2.4.4. Position Sizing .................................................................................... 27
2.2.5. Absolute Returns .......................................................................................... 29
2.2.6. Sophisticated Simplicity ............................................................................... 30
2.2.7. Emotional Discipline ..................................................................................... 32
2.3. Historical Perspectives and Portfolio Properties................................................. 33
2.3.1. Historical Perspectives ................................................................................. 33
2.3.2. Portfolio Properties ...................................................................................... 36
vi
2.3.2.1. Crisis Alpha ......................................................................................... 36
2.3.2.2. Low Correlation with Traditional Assets ............................................ 37
2.3.2.3. Low Drawdowns ................................................................................. 37
2.3.2.4. Positive Skewness .............................................................................. 38
2.3.2.5. Good Risk-Adjusted Returns .............................................................. 38
2.3.2.6. Good Diversifier ................................................................................. 38
3. Introducing a New Measure of Downside Risk: the Koljonen Ratio .......................... 39
3.1. The Sharpe Ratio as a Measure of Risk-Adjusted Returns .................................. 39
3.2. The Sortino Ratio as a Measure of Downside Risk-Adjusted Returns ................. 39
3.3. The Calmar Ratio as a Measure of Downside Risk-Adjusted Returns ................. 40
3.4. Combining Sortino and Calmar Ratios: The Koljonen Ratio ................................ 41
3.5. Interpretation ...................................................................................................... 41
3.6. Limitations ........................................................................................................... 42
3.7. Conclusion ........................................................................................................... 43
4. Methodology .............................................................................................................. 44
4.1. General Methodology ......................................................................................... 44
4.1.1. Data Sources and Python Libraries Used ..................................................... 44
4.1.2. Time Frame and Window ............................................................................. 44
4.1.3. Cryptocurrencies and Commissions ............................................................. 44
4.1.4. Performance Evaluation ............................................................................... 45
4.2. Traditional Trend-Following Strategies Applied to Cryptocurrencies ................. 45
4.3. An Ensemble Trend-Following Strategy, Optimized for Downside Risk-Adjusted
Returns ............................................................................................................................ 46
4.3.1. Strategies ...................................................................................................... 46
4.3.2. Ensemble Signal Generation ........................................................................ 46
4.3.3. Optimization Without a Deleveraging Mechanism ...................................... 47
4.3.4. Optimization with a Deleveraging Mechanism ............................................ 47
4.3.1. Application of the Kelly Criterion ................................................................. 49
5. Results and Discussion................................................................................................ 50
5.1. Traditional Trend-Following Strategies Applied to Cryptocurrencies ................. 50
5.1.1. Results .......................................................................................................... 50
5.1.1.1. 50/100 Days SMA Crossover Long-Only ............................................ 50
5.1.1.2. 20 Days Donchian Channel Long-Only ............................................... 51
5.1.1.3. Daily Heikin-Ashi Candles Long-Only ................................................. 52
5.1.1.4. 50/100 Days SMA Crossover Long-Short ........................................... 52
5.1.1.5. 20 Days Donchian Channel Long-Short .............................................. 53
vii
5.1.1.6. Daily Heikin-Ashi Candles Long-Short ................................................ 54
5.1.2. Discussion ..................................................................................................... 55
5.1.2.1. General Performance Trends ............................................................. 55
5.1.2.2. Key Metrics Analysis .......................................................................... 56
5.1.2.3. Conclusion .......................................................................................... 57
5.2. An Ensemble Trend-Following Strategy for Cryptocurrencies, Optimized for Downside
Risk-Adjusted Returns ..................................................................................................... 57
5.2.1. Results .......................................................................................................... 57
5.2.1.1. Ensemble Model Strategy Without a Deleveraging Mechanism ....... 57
5.2.1.2. Ensemble Model Strategy With a Deleveraging Mechanism ............ 58
5.2.1.3. Ensemble Model Strategy With a Deleveraging Mechanism, Including the
Application of the Kelly Criterion ........................................................................ 59
5.2.2. Discussion ..................................................................................................... 60
5.2.2.1. Risk-Adjusted Return Metrics ............................................................ 61
5.2.2.2. Drawdowns Metrics ........................................................................... 62
5.2.2.3. Overall Perspective ............................................................................ 63
5.2.2.4. Conclusion .......................................................................................... 63
6. Conclusions and Future Works.................................................................................... 65
Bibliographical References .............................................................................................. 67
Appendix A ...................................................................................................................... 71
Appendix B ...................................................................................................................... 78
viii
LIST OF FIGURES
Figure 2.1 Drawdown vs Return to Recover ......................................................................... 26
Figure 2.2 Price Evolution of the Tulip Bulbs ........................................................................ 36
Figure 2.3 Barclay CTA Index Performance vs S&P 500 ........................................................ 37
ix
LIST OF TABLES
Table 2.1 - Effect of Combining Trend-Following and Value Investing Portfolios .......... 35
Table 5.1 - 50/100 Days SMA Crossover Long-Only Strategy Metrics ............................ 50
Table 5.2 - 20 Days Donchian Channel Long-Only Strategy Metrics ............................... 51
Table 5.3 - Daily Heikin-Ashi Candles Long-Only Strategy Metrics ................................. 52
Table 5.4 - 50/100 Days SMA Crossover Long-Short Strategy Metrics ........................... 52
Table 5.5 - 20 Days Donchian Channel Long-Short Strategy Metrics ............................. 53
Table 5.6 - Daily Heikin-Ashi Candles Long-Short Strategy's Metrics ............................. 54
Table 5.7 - Ensemble Model Strategy Metrics without Deleveraging Mechanism ........ 58
Table 5.8 - Ensemble Model Strategy Metrics with Deleveraging Mechanism, Optimized for
the Koljonen Ratio ................................................................................................... 59
Table 5.9 - Ensemble Model Strategy Metrics with Deleveraging Mechanism, Optimized for
the Koljonen Ratio, with the Kelly Criterion applied ............................................... 60
Table 5.10 - Risk-Adjusted Return Ratio's Comparison - Pre-Kelly vs Post-Kelly ............ 62
Table 5.11 - Drawdown Metrics Comparison - Pre-Kelly vs Post-Kelly ........................... 63
x
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS
ABCT Austrian Business Cycle Theory
ASE Austrian School of Economics
CR Calmar Ratio
KR Koljonen Ratio
NFLM Newton’s First Law of Motion
SR Sharpe Ratio
SoR Sortino Ratio
TF Trend-following
1
1. INTRODUCTION
Despite its popularity, the literature on trend-following investment knowledge remains
fragmented and lacks a cohesive theoretical framework. This thesis addresses this gap by
consolidating scattered information and introducing a structured theoretical foundation based
on the Austrian School of Economics. Trend-following, renowned for its effectiveness and
popularity among practitioners, is often discussed across numerous disjointed sources,
necessitating a more organized and systematic approach. This fragmentation has long
hindered a comprehensive understanding and robust application of trend-following
principles. Drawing on the Austrian School of Economics teachings, this framework
significantly enriches and advances the trend-following philosophy, offering new insights and
a solidified approach to this successful trading methodology.
Trend-following as a trading philosophy is grounded in two fundamental assumptions: the
unpredictability of future market movements and the existence of trends in market prices. The
first assumption emphasizes the benefits of a reactive approach to investing, rather than
relying on predictive models, while the second acknowledges the persistence of trends over
time, making trend-following a viable strategy, especially due to its reactive and adaptive
nature. Drawing on the Austrian School of Economics, we will provide theoretical content to
support these two axioms. Additionally, this thesis introduces the theorem of the impossibility
of making accurate predictions, derived from the theorem of the impossibility of Socialism,
which argues that the vast and tacit nature of knowledge in human minds makes it impossible
for any central authority to coordinate society efficiently. Similarly, this impossibility extends
to accurately predicting market movements due to the dispersed, subjective, and non-
articulable nature of information. After establishing these foundational assumptions, we will
lay down the seven principles governing the trend-following philosophy, as well as some
historical perspectives and portfolio properties.
Traditional risk-adjusted measures like the Sharpe Ratio, Sortino Ratio and Calmar Ratio offer
valuable information but have also significant limitations. To address this, we introduce the
Koljonen Ratio, a new downside risk-adjusted return metric combining the Sortino Ratio and
Calmar Ratio. This metric combines actual drawdown and downside volatility in a single data
point, offering a more nuanced approach to evaluating the performance of trend-following
strategies in the context of highly volatile markets. This lays the groundwork for the practical
part of the thesis, where we analyze and optimize traditional and sophisticated trend-
following strategies applied individually to the five main cryptocurrencies by market cap. By
incorporating the Koljonen Ratio, this thesis provides a significant advancement in assessing
and managing downside risks, thereby enhancing the robustness of trend-following strategies.
The financial landscape has been irrevocably transformed by the advent of cryptocurrencies,
presenting novel opportunities and unprecedented challenges for trading strategies. Among
2
these, trend-following strategies are revered for their historical resilience and adaptability
across different market conditions. However, applying trend-following to this nascent asset
class underscores significant gaps in existing research due to their youth and, consequently,
the limited data. This thesis addresses these gaps by evaluating the efficacy of traditional
trend-following trading strategies in cryptocurrency markets and innovating strategies to
enhance risk-reward ratios when trading these markets.
This study sets four primary objectives. First, it seeks to consolidate and enrich the
understanding of trend-following philosophy, establishing its theoretical underpinnings with
the help of the Austrian School of Economics. Second, it seeks to obtain a downside risk-
adjusted return metric that will prove more helpful than existing metrics when performing
optimizations. Third, the study evaluates the performance of traditional trend-following
methods within the volatile context of cryptocurrency trading. Lastly, it aims to develop and
implement novel sophisticated strategies incorporating deleveraging techniques tailored to
mitigate the risk of overextended trends, thereby enhancing downside risk-adjusted returns.
The anticipated contributions of this research are multifaceted. First, by consolidating and
enriching the theoretical foundation of trend-following with insights from the Austrian School
of Economics, this thesis aims to provide a more cohesive and robust framework for
understanding this trading philosophy. Second, the introduction of the Koljonen Ratio offers
a new and more comprehensive downside risk-adjusted return metric, which is expected to
enhance the accuracy and effectiveness of performance evaluations in highly volatile markets,
particularly cryptocurrencies. Third, the empirical evaluation of traditional trend-following
strategies within the context of cryptocurrency markets addresses significant gaps in existing
research and provides practical insights into their efficacy. Finally, the development and
implementation of innovative and sophisticated strategies, including deleveraging techniques,
are expected to improve risk management and enhance downside risk-adjusted returns,
offering a more sophisticated approach to trading in digital financial markets. Through these
contributions, the thesis aspires to advance both academic research and practical applications
in the field of trading strategies.
The structure of the thesis is as follows. Section 2 provides an in-depth analysis of trend-
following as an investment philosophy, including their foundational assumptions, principles,
and historical perspectives. Section 3 introduces the Koljonen Ratio, a new measure of
downside risk, and discusses its advantages over traditional risk metrics. Section 4 outlines the
methodology used to apply traditional and sophisticated trend-following strategies to
cryptocurrencies, detailing data sources, strategy implementations, and performance
evaluations. Section 5 presents the results and discussion of the empirical analysis,
highlighting the effectiveness of the strategies and the impact of the Koljonen Ratio. The thesis
concludes with Section 6, which summarizes the findings, discusses their implications, and
suggests directions for future research.
3
2. TREND-FOLLOWING
Although trend-following (TF) is a pretty recent trading philosophy, following trends is an
innate part of human behavior.
1
TF consists of systematic and rules-based trading strategies
that involve identifying and taking advantage of the direction and persistence of market trends
until there is a trend reversal sign. It is based on the idea that financial markets tend to move
in trends over time and that traders can be profitable by recognizing them early and riding
them accordingly. TF strategies have been successfully applied to many markets, including
stocks, bonds, commodities, and currencies (Covel, 2017). This section will delve deeply into
TF's underlying assumptions, principles, and some other important considerations.
2.1. FOUNDATIONAL ASSUMPTIONS
We have seen that following trends is a natural psychological phenomenon embedded in
human nature, which could be seen as a spontaneous, evolutionary, adaptive, and irrational
behavior at times. TF attempts to take advantage of this phenomenon by applying a second
layer of behavior where there is a premeditated intelligent response to market action.
2
At the heart of TF strategies lie two fundamental assumptions, which, for practical purposes,
can be considered axioms due to their inherent and widely accepted nature.
The first assumption is acknowledging the impossibility of predicting the future, in general, and
future market movements, in particular. This tenet is based on the understanding that
financial markets are complex systems influenced by various factors, unpredictable or
unknown. The future has been, is, and will always be uncertain and unpredictable.
The second assumption is the belief that price movements in financial markets exhibit trends
over time. This axiom is grounded in the empirical observation that prices tend to move in
sustained directions, either upward, downward, or sideways, for various periods. TF strategies
aim to capitalize on this tendency by identifying and riding these trends for profit. Together,
these two axioms form the bedrock upon which TF strategies are built.
Axioms, as self-evident truths or propositions are the starting point used by the ASE to build
an entire system of economics (Rothbard, 1976)
3
.
In this chapter, we delve into the intricacies of these axioms, exploring their implications and
how they shape the practice of TF in the trading world. We also examine the effectiveness of
these strategies and how they fare in different market conditions, shedding light on their
1
Appendix A lists a brief history of TF.
2
https://www.trendfollowing.com/nature-origins-trend-following/
3
https://mises.org/library/praxeology-methodology-austrian-economics
4
strengths and limitations. Understanding these foundational assumptions is crucial for anyone
looking to navigate the complexities of TF trading strategies in the ever-evolving financial
markets.
2.1.1. ON THE FUTURES UNPREDICTABILITY
Although developed societies have created institutions
4
that reduce uncertainty over certain
aspects
5
, the future is not deterministic, and so remains inherently uncertain, and consistently
entirely accurate predictions are impossible, regardless of the data, analysis, speculation, or
computational methods used. The ASE brilliantly elucidates the rationale behind this
phenomenon through the Theorem of the Impossibility of Socialism, which will allow us to
apply those same arguments to the impossibility of having certainty of the future, of making
predictions of the future, in general, and future market prices, in particular. Doing so will
establish The Theorem of the Impossibility of Accurate Predictions.
2.1.1.1. THE THEOREM OF THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF SOCIALISM
Mises (1920, 1922, 1949), in his Theorem of the Impossibility of Economic Calculation under
Socialism
6
, contributed profoundly to our understanding of spontaneous market processes
and their importance for society’s coordination.
7
This theory later transformed into the Theorem of Impossibility of Socialism. From the
perspective of the social process, socialism is an intellectual error since it is not possible to
conceive that the governing body in charge of intervening through mandates can obtain the
necessary information to coordinate society successfully (Huerta de Soto, 1992).
For the governing body to be able to acquire the necessary information, a requirement is for
it to have a technology capable of reading human minds. However, even in that case, creating
coordinating mandates is impossible. The reasons are the following:
4
Defined as a set of spontaneously created rules or norms that reduce future uncertainty. Examples are the
institution of marriage, a calendar, or any timetable.
5
The State, private property, markets, money, savings, capital, and capital markets are some of these institutions.
6
According to Austrians, socialism is defined as any system of institutional aggression on the free exercise of
entrepreneurship (Huerta de Soto, 1992).
7
According to him, there are two separate worlds. One is the ordinal and internal world of subjective valuations,
which only allows for comparisons, not economic calculations. The other is the cardinal and external world, with
prices and where economic agents are able to perform economic calculations. The internal world of subjective
valuations drives changes in the external world. The institutions that bridge both worlds are free exchanges and
money. If both institutions are in place, every exchange will set market prices, creating a quantitative historical
reality that allows market participants to perform economic calculus. If, on the other hand, as it occurs in socialist
regimes, the free exchange of capital goods is prevented coercively or money is corrupted, market prices cannot
be set, and economic calculus is disabled, causing society’s discoordination and consequently a misallocation of
resources.
5
1. The Volume of the Information: The intervention body cannot consciously assimilate
the enormous number of bits of information dispersed in every mind. In order for the
entity in charge to be able to give coordinating content to its mandates, it would be
essential that the entity be able, in some way, to digest, understand, and comprehend
all the bits of information that are found in the internal world of each human actor in
the world.
2. The Character of the Information: The information the central planner needs is
essentially non-transferable due to its tacit, privative, dispersed
8
, and non-articulable
nature
9
. The knowledge is practical and subjective, not scientific nor articulable.
3. Timing: It is impossible to transmit information that has yet to be discovered or created
by the actors; it only arises from the free process of exercising human action. To rule
successfully, the central planner would need a constant stream of immediate and
future information and be able to impose its mandates immediately.
4. Coercion: Coercive mandates prevent the entrepreneurial process from discovering,
creating, and acting on the information necessary to coordinate society. It prevents
information creation and its transmission, coordination, and adjustment. This idea is
known as the socialism paradox.
These are definitive arguments as to why socialism is doomed to fail, even with the
advancement of computer technology (Huerta de Soto, 1992)
10
. In the next section, we will
apply those same arguments to explain why making consistently completely accurate
predictions is impossible.
8
Hayek elaborated on this theme in his seminal essay The Use of Knowledge in Society (Hayek, 1945), arguing
that knowledge is dispersed and decentralized among individuals. The price system in a free market act as a
mechanism for communicating information, allowing individuals to make decisions based on their local
knowledge and circumstances. For Hayek, the attempt to centralize economic planning failed because it
underestimated the complexity of economic systems and the impossibility of any single entity possessing all the
necessary knowledge to make efficient decisions.
9
Examples of this type of information are riding a bike or entrepreneurship. Most of the information humans
have is tacit, unable to be articulated, and privative. Indeed, one can know all the theories about riding a bike or
entrepreneurship, but the most relevant information is the practical one.
10
The advancement of computer technology will not make socialism more feasible; rather, it will further highlight
its impracticality. Computer technology, while powerful, cannot overcome the inherent challenges of socialism
related to the acquisition and utilization of dispersed, tacit knowledge necessary for societal functioning. Even as
computers enhance the ability of individuals to generate and utilize complex, detailed information, they cannot
replicate or replace the entrepreneurial creativity and discovery that drive social processes. Computers can
process explicit, articulated information but cannot act entrepreneurially to discover unrecognized opportunities
as humans do. Therefore, the belief that technological advancements in computing could facilitate the
management of a socialist system underestimates the complexity of social information and the indispensable
role of human creativity. Even the most advanced computer systems cannot address the fundamental issues
posed by socialism.
6
2.1.1.2. THE THEOREM OF THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF MAKING ACCURATE PREDICTIONS
Expanding upon the Theorem of the Impossibility of Economic Calculation under Socialism, it
becomes evident that the same foundational principles apply equally to the domain of making
accurate predictions, particularly within complex social systems. This application of the
theorem underscores the inherent limitations of predictive efforts due to the following
reasons directly stemming from the discussed theorem:
1. The volume of the Information: Just as a central planning body under socialism cannot
assimilate the vast number of information bits dispersed across every individual's
mind, predictive models face an analogous challenge. The sheer volume of data
required to make accurate predictions about future states of social, economic, or any
complex system exceeds the capacity of any existing or conceivable technology to
capture, process, and interpret effectively.
2. The character of the Information: Information necessary for accurate predictions often
possesses the same tacit, privative, and non-articulable nature that thwarts economic
calculation under socialism. Much of the knowledge that would inform accurate
predictions is subjective, context-dependent, and not readily quantifiable, making it
inherently resistant to being captured or utilized by predictive algorithms or
methodologies.
3. Timing and Dynamism: The dynamic nature of information, where new data is
constantly generated through human action, presents a timing challenge akin to that
faced by socialist planners. Predictive models must contend with existing data and
anticipate spontaneous future situations. This unpredictability and the need for
immediate and future-oriented information render consistently accurate predictions
unfeasible.
4. Impact of Prediction: Just as coercive mandates under socialism inhibit the discovery,
creation, and transmission of information necessary for societal coordination,
interventions based on predictions can similarly distort the very outcomes they aim to
forecast
11
. Predicting can alter behaviors and conditions, introducing feedback loops
that invalidate the premises of the predictions.
These parallels demonstrate that the difficulties inherent in central planning under
socialismstemming from the challenges of information volume, character, timing, and
coercion's counterproductive effects undermine the feasibility of making consistently
accurate predictions. When applied to predictions, the insights from the theorem highlight
the fundamental limitations of predictive endeavors, reaffirming the importance of humility
and adaptability in the face of complex systems' inherent unpredictability. This is fully
applicable to predicting price movements in markets.
11
For example, if a “perfect” model is predicting that the price of a stock is going to be 30% higher in one month,
the actions carried out using that prediction may distort the reality as it was initially predicted, making the
prediction not entirely accurate.
7
2.1.1.3. TREND-FOLLOWING AS A PHILOSOPHY OF REACTION AND ADAPTATION
Considering the challenges and limitations associated with making accurate predictions in
complex systems, the philosophy of trend-following (TF) emerges as a potent, heuristic, and
pragmatic approach to trading markets. Fundamentally, TF is a strategy that does not attempt
to predict future market movements but rather reacts to what has already occurred and
continues to unfold in the market.
TF in trading emphasizes adaptability and reduced risk by reacting to actual market trends,
enabling traders to adjust their positions in line with current market dynamics and mitigate
risks from speculative forecasts. These strategies capitalize on the market's natural tendency
for trends, allowing traders to profit without deciphering the underlying causes. It offers
resilience to volatility through systematic rules for entry, exit, and risk management, fostering
a disciplined framework that navigates market fluctuations effectively. Furthermore, by
adhering to predefined rules, TF curtails emotional biases and enhances consistency, which is
vital in the unpredictable realm of financial markets. In essence, TF embodies a pragmatic and
adaptable approach to trading, demonstrating the effectiveness of reacting to what the
market does, rather than what it might do.
Although saying the future is uncertain might seem unnecessary, many investment
philosophies and strategies are based on trying to predict or foresee future market
movements. Investments based on fundamentals, and more specifically, value investing, are
based on intrinsic value calculations based on free cash flow forecasts and other methods.
Although we are not arguing against the validity of these investing philosophies, we must
clarify that the timing component of these types of strategies is usually lacking. We argue that,
according to the axiom we are dealing with here, the position initiations should always be
accompanied by initial price movements that confirm the future price prediction of the asset.
The Adaptive Market Hypothesis (AMH), conceived by Andrew Lo (Lo, 2004), introduces a
revolutionary framework for understanding market dynamics through the lens of evolutionary
biology. This hypothesis posits that financial markets are not static realms governed solely by
efficiency or irrationality but are instead adaptive environments where survival and success
are predicated on the ability to evolve. In this complex ecosystem, market participantsakin
to species in the natural worldmust continually adapt to survive amidst the relentless forces
of competition, mutation, and natural selection.
This evolutionary perspective provides a compelling explanation for the efficacy of dynamic
strategies like TF. It underscores the importance of adaptation as a critical factor in the long-
term survival and success of market participants. By framing markets as ecologies and traders
as species, AMH elucidates why TF strategies excel particularly during periods of market
divergence and financial crises. These scenarios represent significant environmental shifts
8
where price dislocations are pronounced, highlighting the adaptive advantage of TF
approaches that thrive in the face of such dislocations.
Contrasting sharply with the Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH), which posits that market
prices reflect all available information (Fama, 1965, 1970; Malkiel & Fama, 1970), AMH and TF
stand in direct opposition. TF, with its systematic investment across asset classes based on
historical price trends, challenges the foundational premises of even the weakest form of
EMH. Instead, AMH offers a framework that reconciles these discrepancies by demonstrating
how markets evolve, how opportunities manifest, and how participants either flourish or fail
through mechanisms akin to those found in evolutionary biology.
AMH's depiction of markets as ecologies filled with competing 'species' of market participants
introduces a dynamic view of financial markets where profit opportunities vary with resource
availability and competitive intensity. It suggests that periods of high resources and low
competition foster profit opportunities. However, as competition intensifies, only those
participants who possess a competitive edge survive and adapt, thereby initiating a new cycle
of evolutionary dynamics.
12
Factors influencing adaptation in these 'market ecologies' include institutional restrictions,
market functionality, and behavioral biases. Constraints such as drawdown limits, risk limits,
allocation constraints, and market access limitations all shape the evolutionary fitness of
market participants. Likewise, market functionality aspectssuch as liquidity and
counterparty riskas well as prevalent behavioral biases like loss aversion and herding, play
crucial roles in determining who adapts successfully and who does not. By adopting the AMH
framework, one gains a deeper understanding of the inherent adaptability and resilience of
trend-following strategies. It reveals how these strategies, through their inherent adaptive
properties, not only navigate but thrive in the evolutionary cycle of financial markets. This
adaptability is key to their success, especially in navigating the tumultuous periods of market
dislocations and financial crises, where traditional strategies might falter.
2.1.2. ON THE EXISTENCE OF TRENDS IN PRICES
The persistent risk-adjusted returns observed in TF can be attributed to the inherent tendency
of free market prices to demonstrate trends and serial correlations. However, a largely
unaddressed inquiry in the realm of TF research pertains to the underlying reasons for the
existence of these trends
13
. To address this query comprehensively, it is imperative to
delineate between static and dynamic efficiency within market contexts. This bifurcation is
12
This cycle is particularly evident during financial crises, which represent drastic changes in the market
environment, testing the adaptability of market strategies to the extreme.
13
This idea is showcased in the following article: https://www.trendfollowing.com/2013/07/09/why-does-it-
trend/
9
crucial as the static perspective, rooted in the efficient market hypothesis, offers limited
explanatory power regarding price trends. Conversely, the dynamic framework provides a
more fertile ground for understanding the genesis of trends. Following the establishment of
this fundamental theoretical distinction, various explanations for the existence of trends will
be explored and articulated.
This examination will be conducted through the lenses of various disciplinary perspectives:
the Austrian School of Economics, Behavioral Economics, and, intriguingly, from the domain
of Physics, explicitly referencing Newton's First Law of Motion. Each framework offers a
unique vantage point for understanding the phenomenon, enriching the analysis with diverse
theoretical insights.
2.1.2.1. STATIC EFFICIENCY VS DYNAMIC EFFICIENCY
Although still under discussion in academic circles (Lekovic, 2018), throughout financial
history, the Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH)
14
(in its weak
15
, semi-strong
16
, and strong
17
forms) has proven to be invalidated by a large number of papers and empirical studies
18
.
As hypothesized, the refutation of the weak form of market efficiency axiomatically entails
the concurrent negation of both the semi-strong and strong forms of market efficiency.
19
14
Efficient Market Hypothesis is a cornerstone of modern financial theory. It suggests that asset prices fully reflect
all available information. Developed by Eugene Fama in the 1960s, EMH posits that it is impossible to consistently
achieve higher-than-average returns by using any information that the market already knows because stock
prices already incorporate and reflect all relevant information. There are three versions of this theory, each
differing in terms of the degree to which information is reflected in stock prices.
15
The weak form efficiency asserts that all past trading information, including historical prices, volume, and
returns, is already incorporated into stock prices. Therefore, no one can predict future stock prices based on past
price trends or patterns. This form of EMH suggests that technical analysis, which relies on historical price data,
is ineffective in predicting future stock movements and beating the market.
16
The semi-strong form efficiency states that stock prices include not only all historical trading information but
also all publicly available information. This includes news, financial statements, economic data, and other publicly
disseminated information. This implies that neither technical analysis nor fundamental analysis can consistently
outperform the market, as any new information that could be used for trading is quickly and accurately reflected
in stock prices.
17
The strong form efficiency claims that stock prices fully reflect all information, both public and private (insider
information). Thus, no one, not even company insiders with undisclosed information, can consistently achieve
higher-than-average returns. If the market is strong-form efficient, even insider trading cannot lead to consistent
outperformance of the market. Testing strong form efficiency is challenging, as it involves assessing the illegal
use of private information.
18
Lo and MacKinlay (1999) discovered that in the short term, stock prices show serial correlations that differ
from zero, contradicting the random walk hypothesis and suggesting the presence of momentum in short-term
stock prices. Additionally, Moreover, Lo, Mamaysky and Wang (2000) employed advanced nonparametric
statistical methods to identify patterns in stock prices and found that certain technical analysis signals, like "head
and shoulders" formations and "double bottoms", may possess some modest predictive ability.
19
If historical trading data is not fully reflected in stock prices (contradicting the weak form), then it is unlikely
that more complex and diverse sets of information (like earnings reports, economic data, etc.) are fully reflected,
as posited by the semi-strong form. Similarly, if simpler, more readily available information (past trading data) is
10
Many simple rules-based strategies based on technical analysis have shown that it is possible
to consistently have higher-than-average returns in different markets employing the same
strategy in all of them (Covel, 2017), invalidating not only the weak form of efficiency but also
the other two hypotheses developed by Eugene Fama in 1970
20
.
This refutation, in our view, does not imply that free markets are inefficient, although it does
mean that Famas definition of efficiency is inaccurate
21
, as it misses the essence of how
markets work and fails to understand the importance of time, uncertainty, and human action
in market processes.
Frank Shostak (1997) explains it eloquently:
“…The major problem with the EMH is that it assumes that all market participants arrive at rational
expectations forecast. This, however, means that all market participants have the same expectations
about future securities returns. Yet, if participants are alike in the sense of having homogeneous
expectations, then why should there be trade? After all, trade implies the existence of heterogeneous
expectations. (…) Even if we were to accept that modern technology enables all market participants
equal access to news, there is still the issue of news interpretations. The EMH framework implies that
market participants have the same knowledge…”. (p. 27)
22
Although the static efficiency of the EMH does not offer us a viable framework to understand
market processes and why trends take place without departing from the assertion that
markets are efficient, understanding efficiency through a dynamic perspective allows us to
explain the existence of trends harmonized with the idea that free markets are efficient.
The dynamic efficiency perspective was developed by the ASE (Huerta de Soto, 2008). This
theory (and others from the same school of thought), in conjunction with the insights offered
by Behavioral Economics and Newton’s First Law of Motion, will give us a thorough theoretical
framework to establish a successful justification for the existence of trends.
not properly integrated into stock prices, it's even more implausible that more exclusive and complex information
(like insider information, as in the strong form) is fully reflected.
20
Berkshire Hathaway’s results of excess risk-adjusted rates of return over many decades is also a clear example
of an empirically invalidated EMH semi-strong form of efficiency since they use primarily fundamental analysis
(https://www.princeton.edu/~ceps/workingpapers/91malkiel.pdf).
Moreover, insider trading is clearly a profitable activity, as it gives the unfair edge to the investor to act on
material nonpublic information. This invalidates the strong form of efficiency.
(https://www.investopedia.com/articles/stocks/09/insider-trading.asp).
21
Fama’s framework is a static environment where time and uncertainty do not play a factor and where efficiency
is a static point. In this framework, prices virtually instantaneously appear in a state of equilibrium”. In our view,
this is the wrong way to understand market processes. A more accurate view of efficiency has been developed
by Austrian School economists (Huerta de Soto, 2008). For them, efficiency is not a market result where a price
is in “equilibrium”, but a continuous market process (time) of trial and error (uncertainty) of many market
participants, where price has a strong tendency to move towards a dynamic level where their preferences are
coordinated (Kirzner, 1973). Fama’s view is, in this sense, an objective, mechanical, and uniform way of
understanding efficiency and markets.
22
https://mises-media.s3.amazonaws.com/rae10_2_2_5.pdf
11
2.1.2.2. AUSTRIAN SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS (ASE)
From the standpoint of the ASE, it is possible to interpret and explain the existence of trends
through three distinct theoretical lenses: the theory of entrepreneurship discovery and
dynamic efficiency, the subjective theory of value, and the business cycle theory.
Theory of Entrepreneurship Discovery and Dynamic Efficiency
From the theory of entrepreneurship
23
discovery and dynamic efficiency perspective, to
understand the reason trends are an inherent characteristic of free market prices from the
Austrian perspective, it is essential to first understand the role that free prices have in an
economy. From an ASE perspective, markets function as intricate social learning processes in
which knowledge
24
is communicated through prices
25
. In this sense, prices are a signal, a
medium, through which this learning is facilitated (Hayek, 1945)
26
. In these social learning
processes, knowledge is communicated and utilized by individuals for economic calculation
and coordination (Mises, 1922 & 1949)
27
.
But what causes knowledge to change and spread? What is the agent of change? The answer
to this question was only fully developed in 1973 with Kirzner’s (Kirzner, 1973) theory of
entrepreneurial discovery.
28
According to Kirzner, the agent of change is the alertness to
23
Etymologically, the term entrepreneur comes from the French verb entreprendre (inter prehendere in Latin,
from the verb in prehendo-endi-ensum), which is closely related to every human actor. ‘Prehendere’ in Latin
means to seize, grasp, take hold of, or take possession of, and, in a broader sense, to discover, see, perceive,
realize, and catch.
24
Most of this knowledge, as it encompasses individual scarcity expectations and preferences, is information
that entrepreneurs are constantly creating when they act. This information is subjective, practical (in the sense
that it is only created through the exercise of business action in its corresponding contexts), dispersed (since it is
scattered in the mind of all human beings), and tacit (in the sense of which is very difficult to articulate in a
formalized way) (Huerta de Soto, 2008). In this sense, free prices are the only reliable mechanism and signs
through which this knowledge is spread.
25
In this sense, prices are mechanisms of data compression.
26
According to Hayek in ‘The Use of Knowledge in Society’, prices are a mechanism for communicating
information. Prices in a market economy reflect the relative scarcity of goods and services, and the preferences
of consumers. By observing prices, individuals can make informed decisions about where to allocate their
resources. Prices act as a signal that helps coordinate the actions of millions of individuals, each with their unique
knowledge and preferences. Hence, free prices are an indispensable requirement for the economic calculation
and coordination of economic agents that leads to a dynamic efficiency.
27
Mises, in his critique of socialism, argued that without market prices it would be impossible for central planners
to allocate resources efficiently. Prices, in the Austrian view, emerge from voluntary exchanges in the market
and are crucial for entrepreneurs to calculate profits and losses. This calculation is essential for coordinating
economic activities and ensuring that resources are used where they are most valued by consumers.
28
Kirzner in his theory of entrepreneurial discovery, provided a Misesian answer (Mises, 1945) to a Hayekian
question (Hayek, 1937). For Hayek, markets are social learning processes in which knowledge is communicated
through prices, enabling people to better coordinate their plans. What Hayek was not able to fully explain was
exactly how that learning process took place and what causes knowledge to change and spread to generate that
learning. Hayek argued that prices are the medium by which knowledge is conveyed, but he struggled to explain
who or what is the agent of change. Kirzner’s answer to that question was to pick up on Mises’ emphasis on
human action and the entrepreneurial element of human behavior and apply it to Hayek’s argument. Hence,
what causes knowledge to change, and spread is the alertness to opportunities by the entrepreneurial and
speculative spirit that every human has, which permits us to grasp pure profit.
12
opportunities
29
by the entrepreneurial and speculative spirit that every human actor has,
which permits us to grasp pure profit
30
in a competitive environment
31
through a process of
entrepreneurial and price discovery
32
, which leads to dynamic efficiency (Huerta de Soto,
2008)
33
, describing a never-ending market process where prices constantly attempt to
converge
34
towards a dynamic efficient price where market participants’ preferences are
coordinated. Time
35
plays a crucial role in this framework, as changes in the market do not
happen instantaneously or discretely but unfold gradually and continuously instead.
It is this constant and gradual evolution and accumulation of knowledge and opportunities
that give rise to the observable trends in market prices.
29
Kirzner is referring to our ability to foresee ways of doing things that others have overlooked, of seeing
possibilities not given by the data. It is the act of seeing new means-end relationships rather than optimizing
based on a given economic and static framework. Entrepreneurship is a moment of discovery, of genuine
surprise, of serendipity. Successful entrepreneurship brings the expectations of market actors into greater
coordination by using resources in new ways to better satisfy wants.
30
Profit and losses are key, as they signal the success or failure of entrepreneurship. Note that the entrepreneur
imagines a new set of means and ends, of future reality, but they might be right or wrong about whether those
will be successful. Entrepreneurship and competition are two sides of the same coin. As long as people are free
to envision alternative uses of resources and act on that vision, markets are competitive. Profits and losses play
a crucial role in this context. They serve as indicators of the speculator's success or failure in anticipating market
trends correctly. These financial outcomes are crucial feedback mechanisms, informing speculators whether
their insights and actions have brought their expectations in line with market realities.
31
Competition here is not understood as the perfectly competitive market of mainstream economics, where
people react passively to given prices and cost curves, or where there is a large number of small firms, but
instead, competition refers to the process by which people constantly engage their entrepreneurial alertness, to
see the world in new and better ways. Viewing competition as a discovery procedure is more helpful for
understanding the world than the very different conceptions of competition and monopoly used by many
economists. Kirzner’s understanding of competition as rivalry better aligns with the sorts of market behavior we
normally think of as competitive (lowering prices, advertising aggressively, or differentiating one's products).
32
In the markets, speculators do not merely react to existing price signals; instead, they actively anticipate future
market movements. This anticipation is akin to Kirzner’s concept of seeing new means-end relationships.
Speculators imagine new scenarios and outcomes, assessing the potential for profit in these foresights. Their
actions, based on these anticipations, contribute significantly to the price discovery process, a critical component
of market efficiency. The price discovery process is a never-ending process where many rational actors (from a
subjective point of view) apply their entrepreneurial alertness to their speculation over the future, and where
prices are constantly attempting to converge to a dynamic efficient price that successfully coordinates the limited
availability of the asset (scarcity) and the utility of the different actors.
33
The theory of dynamic efficiency was formulated by Jesús Huerta de Soto, a prominent Spanish economist. The
theory criticizes the mainstream economic focus on static efficiency, which is concerned with the optimal
allocation of given resources at a point in time. Instead, Huerta de Soto advocates for dynamic efficiency, which
is about how well an economy adapts to changes over time, promotes innovation, and creates wealth.
34
This attempt to converge is not perfect, but there is a strong tendency for this convergence to occur. This
convergence over time and not instant can also be understood as caution from the market participants, due to
the fact that the so-called optimal price is constantly moving.
35
The concept of time is integral to dynamic efficiency. It recognizes that economic conditions, preferences, and
technology change, and it values the capacity of an economy to adapt and evolve in response to these changes.
13
Subjective Theory of Value
The subjective theory of value
36
solved the diamond-water paradox
37
, as it stated that the
price of a good is determined by the marginal utility
38
, which considers not only the subjective
utility
39
of a good or service but also its perceived scarcity
40
.
The means-end dynamics of every actor, which in turn determines the utility of goods and
services, are highly dynamic, and in constant change.
By investing in financial markets, market participants seek to achieve profits by applying their
entrepreneurship alertness, speculating
41
over the uncertain future cash flows and risk
premiums
42
(Covel, 2017) of a specific asset, which are the elements of the utility a financial
asset can bring. Commodities and other real assets, on the other hand, do not necessarily
provide cash flows, but their price is also explained by their perceived utility (which can be
productive or non-productive) and scarcity.
In the same way that an actor's means and ends are constantly changing due to their
entrepreneurship alertness, the perceived utility and scarcity of any financial or real asset also
36
Notoriously developed by Menger (Menger, 1871), Jevons (Jevons, 1871) and Walras (Walras, 1874) in
different geographical points and little to no communication between them. This marked the Marginal
Revolution in economic thought, shifting the focus from classical economics to a new era of understanding
economics.
37
This is the contradiction that, although water is more useful in terms of survival, diamonds are more expensive.
Marxist labor theory of value and other theories emphasizing production costs failed to explain this paradox.
38
Marginalists focused on the utility of each additional unit of a good, rather than its total utility. While water's
total utility is high due to its necessity for survival, its abundant supply results in low marginal utility. Therefore,
the value and price of water are lower because consuming an additional unit doesn't significantly increase its
usefulness or the willingness to pay for it.
39
Value is defined as the subjective and psychic appreciation, more or less intense, that the actor gives to his
ends. Utility, on the other hand, is also a subjective and psychic appreciation, that the actor gives to a means
more or less intense, depending on the value the actor gives to the end which that means is perceived to help
achieve. The utility of a good or service (means) is, hence, directly proportional to the value we give to the end
it is perceived to help achieve. Value is projected to a means through the concept of utility. In this sense, value
and utility are two sides of the same subjective coin.
40
Scarcity here, from the Mengerian Austrian School perspective, must also be understood as a subjective
concept applied to the means. The actor must think that the means at his disposal are insufficient to achieve all
the ends that are chased. Without perceived scarcity, a good or service is not a means.
41
The concepts of speculation, entrepreneur and human action are intricately related and must be understood
as such. Human action is every deliberate behavior performed by a person. This happens because the person
acts to change from a situation of relative lower satisfaction to a situation of higher satisfaction. Speculation is
the individual and subjective aspiration to forecast the future. Entrepreneurs are humans that speculate, but also
every human has an innate entrepreneurial spirit.
42
When risk premiums increase or decrease, the underlying assets are repriced. Since investors have different
expectations and their views are sticky, significant shifts in the market generally occur over several months or
years as expectations are gradually adjusted. Markets do not reflect perfectly efficient prices at all moments (as
is understood in mainstream economics). However, they tend to asymptotically move towards them through a
process of trial and error. This means that, as long as there is uncertainty about the future, we can safely assume
there will be trends.
14
have a dynamic nature
43
. This inherent characteristic explains the constant changes in the
supply and demand structure
44
of a specific asset, which in turn explains the movement of
prices, although not necessarily the reason they exhibit trends.
Although the utility and perceived scarcity might have a discrete and immediate shift due to
changes in the perception of a specific individual, this is not typically the case for market
processes
45
, where knowledge is spread and interpreted in different ways and speeds. This is
why prices tend to move gradually over time, creating the trends we see in the prices of
commodities and financial assets.
Business Cycle Theory
Although there are many different explanations for why business cycles take place, most of
these explanations, although some of them plausible, have major flaws, and refuting them
goes beyond the scope of this thesis.
The Austrian Business Cycle Theory (ABCT) can also serve as a theoretical framework to explain
the existence of trends in market prices, especially the overextended ones. To understand this
theory is imperative to start from the theory of capital, elaborated by Menger (1888) and
Böhm-Bawerk (1889). Mises (1912 & 1949) and Hayek (1933) expanded on this knowledge,
effectively creating the ABCT. From their subjective perspective, capital goods (as well as
consumption goods) are considered a means to reach an end. They are the means of
production; therefore, they are considered economic goods of a higher order than
consumption goods.
They appear thanks to the accumulated conjunction of three essential elements: work, time,
and natural resources. The essential requirement for creating capital goods lies in savings,
which means choosing not to consume in the present moment and to be able to potentially
consume more sometime in the future
46
. The production project using higher order goods
43
Changes in the perceived utility and/or scarcity can have many reasons. It does not need to be based in reality.
That is why behavioral economics, when explaining human biases, play an important role complementing the
explanation of shifts in perceived utility and scarcity that are not based in reality.
44
Which is manifested in the changes in the liquidity in the orderbook structure in centralized exchanges and
brokers. In the case of decentralized exchanges it is directly manifested in the prices, as there are no orderbooks.
45
For example, the sentiment of a market participant might be different than the market general sentiment of a
specific moment.
46
The actor, therefore, will only be able to create and reach successive intermediate stages of production
increasingly distant in time from consumption if he has given up immediate satisfaction of his human needs
(consumption). Böhm-Bawerk’s example of Robinson Crusoe on his land is very illustrious: Robinson, who
recently arrived on the island, has as his only means of subsistence picking blackberries by hand. With all his
effort he can collect more than necessary for his daily subsistence. After some time at that regime, he realizes
that he could be much faster with a wooden stick. But he finds that he believes that he must dedicate five days
of work to get the stick ready, during which he will not be able to pick any blackberries. To do this he must
consume a smaller number of blackberries than he collects. He must, therefore, save a portion of the berries, by
reducing his consumption or collecting more than he currently consumes. This saving represents an unavoidable
15
than previously is more prolonged from a time perspective, as it incorporates more productive
stages. In modern economies, capital goods are transitory
47
, and the complexity of these
productive processes is extremely intricate and prolonged
48
.
Every human actor has a time preference
49
, so a delay in consumption will only occur if the
actor thinks that ends of higher value may or will be achieved in the future. The actor must
coordinate their present behavior with their foreseeable future one
50
. This coordination occurs
through interest rates
51
, which are the most important price signals for consumers, savers,
investors, and entrepreneurs
52
. The manipulation of interest rates from the natural level to
sacrifice, but he subjectively thinks that it compensates him concerning the end he intends to achieve in the
uncertain environment in which he finds himself. During the following weeks, he reduces his consumption, going
somewhat hungry, saving berries until he reaches five days' worth of subsistence while he produces the stick.
Once its end is reached, it can reach previously inaccessible places, hitting with more power, and thus managing
to multiply its productive capacity by ten. Now, in a tenth of a day, he harvests the berries necessary to support
himself, and can dedicate the rest of the time to higher purposes or leisure. In modern economies this function
is performed by capitalists, who make available to workers the necessary resources to sustain themselves until
the production has concluded.
47
Capital goods are non-perpetual due to physical expenditure and economic or technological obsolescence. To
increase the sophistication and number of capital goods, savings must be higher than the capital expenditure.
48
These processes are divided in multiple subprocesses, where since the beginning of production the
consumption good can take a few years to be sold. Additionally, there is a higher division of labor as people
specialize in different parts of the productive processes. The difference between poor and rich nations is that
rich ones have a greater sophistication and number of well-invested capital assets, due to their previous savings.
They are the ones that have achieved more time accumulation in the form of capital goods. It is important to
distinguish the stages depending on their degree of proximity to consumption; they closer they are to the
consumer goods the more difficult it is to repurpose them for other uses.
49
Human beings, ceteris paribus, prefer to satisfy their needs or achieve their ends as soon as possible. In other
words, between two identical ends, the actor will prefer the one that is closest in time. Or rather, with identical
circumstances, present means are preferred to future means. Time preference is not a psychological or
physiological category, but a requirement of the logical structure of every human action. The intensity of this
preference varies from person to person. This difference in psychic intensity gives rise to beneficial exchanges
between economic agents.
50
If the actor undertakes action processes that are excessively long in relation to their savings (if they save too
little), they would be left without savings before having reached their end. In contrast, if they have excess savings
in relation to their future needs, it means they made an excessive and unnecessary sacrifice. The subjective
estimation of his time preference is what leads the actor to appropriately coordinate and adjust his present
behavior in relation to his future behaviors and needs.
51
Although it may seem that interest rates are a social and monetary phenomenon, this is not the case. In our
example, Robinson Crusoe, in a solitary environment without an indirect means of exchange, had a certain time
preference, a certain interest rate, which led him to create a rod and not a blast furnace or to continue picking
the blackberries with the hands. In developed societies, gross (market) interest rates on the credit market
contains society’s natural interest plus a liquidity premium, risk premium and a premium for expected inflation
or deflation.
52
As we previously saw, prices convey a vast amount of information and are mechanisms of coordination.
Specifically, interest rates are prices that coordinate intertemporal behavior and the relationship between
consumption, savings, and investments; this is, present behavior with future foreseeable one with regards to
consumption. It is the price of present goods or services with regards to future goods or services. For instance, a
society that has a high rate of savings will have a high amount capital, and its interest rates will tend to be lower.
With lower interest rates, the discount factor of long-term investment projects makes them more appealing to
entrepreneurs. This must be interpreted in the following way: higher savings and lower interest rates work as a
signal, where society is conveying the information that actors do not want to consume goods and services today
and want to consume them in the future instead. This signal is transmitted to entrepreneurs, who have the
16
artificially lower ones, conducted by Central Banks
53
, causes the banking system to excessively
lend, incentivizing an expansion of credit (lending and borrowing) in the economy
54
. This
creates a disproportionate and exaggerated optimism and an unsustainable economic boom
based on malinvestments
55
, where a widespread resource misallocation
56
takes place over
time. Eventually, the Central Bank starts normalizing interest rates
57
to stave off high levels of
inflation or address other economic concerns
58
. In this process, the malinvestments carried
out during the period of low rates become apparent; unprofitable projects are abandoned,
leading to higher unemployment and a decrease in economic activity.
These artificially induced business cycles, with booms and busts, exacerbate the volatility and
trends that otherwise assets would experience. This phenomenon generates an unsustainable
cycle of apparent prosperity, wherein asset prices predominantly exhibit an upward trajectory.
However, as malinvestments come to light, another period emerges there where asset prices
trend downwards.
incentive to pull productive resources from stages that are closer to consumption and convert them into stages
that are farther. For this transition to happen efficiently, production factors (specially the original ones) need to
have flexible markets where agents can exchange property rights with the lowest possible social and economic
costs. Additionally, entrepreneurs lengthen the productive process by investing more in goods and services that
take longer to be produced and less in the ones that take shorter, increasing the stages of production and making
the productive process longer and more productive.
53
In current modern societies, financial systems do not operate with several private central banks (with gold and
other types of reserves) in competition, but with a public monopolistic one governed by the State. This, and the
fact that Central Banks do not operate with full convertibility to the reserves they hold, opens the door for
monetary policies which manipulate interest rates and the quantity of fiat money in the economy.
54
Low interest rates cause this credit expansion due to the fact that the banking system operates with fractional
reserves, which is the idea that banks can lend the money of their clients’ deposits. Many Austrian economists
propose a 100% cash ratio for client’s deposits, where banks behave as trustees. This does not mean that banks
would not be able to lend and operate as a financial institution, but they would do so only with the money that
is lent to them by their clientele.
55
This term refers to poor investment decisions based on low interest rates, made not because consumers have
saved more and will have a higher future demand, but because of the distorted signals sent by the artificially low
interest rates. Certain sectors (like housing or technology, which are longer-term investment projects) might
experience a boom as a result of this influx of cheap credit. This is because with lower interest rates, many long-
term investment projects that were not profitable on paper now become profitable. Lower interest rates cause
a proportional reduction in the discount factors applied to investment projects. A reduction in the discount factor
has more incidence in cash flows that are farther in the future than cash flows occurring in the near term.
56
Low interest rates cause resource misallocation due to the fact that there is a distortion between savings and
consumption. The economy looks it is doing well, but it is not aligned with actual consumer preferences and
savings rates. This causes a shift in the production structure towards longer term projects, where capital is
directed away from sectors that truly reflect consumer preferences.
57
This process of normalization entails the interest rates hikes and credit tightening policies towards banks, who
are then financially compelled to implement similar measures with their clients.
58
These concerns can be an overheating economy, asset bubbles, exchange rate stability, current account
deficits, debt levels and credit quality, excessive risk of financial institutions, etc.
17
2.1.2.3. BEHAVIORAL FINANCE
The existence of trends in the markets can also be understood and justified through the
behavioral finance perspective; this is, through the lens of human psychology and cognitive
biases. Kahneman's (Kahneman, 2011) work often highlights the divergence from the rational
agent model assumed in classical economics
59
, and provides insight into why and how trends
develop in financial markets.
Behavioral finance posits that investors are not always rational actors who make decisions
solely based on objective data and logical analysis. Instead, their decisions are often
influenced by subjective reference points with psychological biases and emotional responses.
This leads to behavioral patterns in market behavior that can manifest as overreactions and,
ultimately, overextended trends.
Some of these biases are overconfidence, herd mentality, loss aversion
60
, and confirmation.
These biases can lead to excessive trading, and the formation of market bubbles, as investors
pile into trending assets, further driving up prices without regard to their fundamental value.
One key concept in behavioral finance is the idea of heuristics, which are mental shortcuts
that people use to make judgments and decisions. While heuristics can be useful, they can
also lead to systematic errors or biases
61
.
Behavioral finance theorists posit that investors frequently exhibit a proclivity for suboptimal
responsiveness to novel information, precipitating a gradual adjustment in asset prices
towards the equilibrium level that fully reflects the new data. This phenomenon, ascribed to
the investor's delayed assimilation of the information's implications, contributes to the
observable momentum in price movements. Concurrently, these theorists acknowledge the
occurrence of excessive reactions, often attributed to the bandwagon effect engendered by
collective behavior dynamics, which can lead to an exaggerated prolongation of prevailing
market trends.
In summary, from a behavioral finance perspective, market trends are not just reflections of
economic fundamentals but are also deeply influenced by human psychology. Cognitive biases,
59
Behavioral finance posits a divergence from the rational objectivity inherent in classical economic theories,
asserting the absence of a wholly rational agent within the economic milieu. However, it is crucial to acknowledge
that behavioral finance does not inherently contravene the subjective rationality delineated by the ASE, wherein
economic actors operate rationally in subjective terms, since (with every action) they attempt to turn from a
subjectively less satisfactory situation to a subjectively more satisfactory one, although this happens, inevitably,
within the framework of their limited knowledge and biases.
60
Prospect theory, another key contribution by Kahneman, explains how people make decisions in situations of
risk and uncertainty, which are commonplace in financial markets. This theory suggests that people value gains
and losses differently, leading to irrational financial decisions that can contribute to market trends.
61
For example, the representativeness heuristic might lead investors to assume that a good company is always
a good investment, overlooking fundamental analysis. This can create and perpetuate trends based on popular
sentiment rather than intrinsic value.
18
heuristics, overconfidence, loss aversion, and the asymmetry in how gains and losses are
perceived all play a significant role in how trends are formed and sustained in financial
markets. Understanding these psychological factors is crucial for explaining and anticipating
market movements.
2.1.2.4. NEWTONS FIRST LAW OF MOTION
Another alternative explanation for the existence of trends in prices can come from the realm
of physics, not only economics.
In 1687, Isaac Newton introduced the Newton's First Law of Motion
62
(NFLM) (Newton, 1687),
which has remarkable similarities to TF ideas in its foundational principles. NFLM, which
addresses the persistence of an object's state of motion, offers a compelling framework to
understand the behavior of financial markets, especially the continuation and reversal of
trends.
In NFLM, we can find the following principles:
1. Persistence of State (Inertia): An object will maintain its state of motion (either at
rest or in uniform motion) unless an external force is applied.
2. Resistance to Change: The inertia of an object makes it resist changes in its state of
motion.
3. Impact of External Forces: It takes an external force to change the motion of an
object, either by accelerating it, decelerating it, or changing its direction.
4. Predictability and Reaction: The law allows for the prediction of the motion of an
object if the forces acting on it are known.
5. Momentum: The concept of momentum in physics (mass times velocity) is closely
related to the first law, indicating how an object will continue moving in the same
direction.
We could say that TF strategies are based on the same ideas and principles, identifying any
free market price in economics to what any object would be in physics. By exchanging the
words object for price, state of motion for trend, and external forces for variations in the
supply-demand dynamics, we can apply the same principles to trend following and
simultaneously explain (from a physics perspective) why trends exist. In this sense:
62
An object at rest stays at rest, and an object in motion stays at the same speed and direction unless acted upon
by an unbalanced force.
19
1. Persistence of trends: A price will maintain its trend until it experiences an
antagonistic force with enough strength. This force can be either supply or
demand.
2. Resistance to Change: The inertia of a price makes it resist changes in its trend.
3. Impact of Variations in the Supply-Demand Dynamics: It takes a variation in the
supply-demand dynamics to modify the momentum or trend of a price, either by
accelerating it, decelerating it, or changing its direction.
4. Predictability and Reaction: The prospective evolution of supply-demand dynamics
is always uncertain. However, considering the considerations, it is prudent to assert
that the most reliable forecast typically entails the continuation of the existing
trend.
5. Momentum: It is already a widely used concept in technical analysis in trading,
borrowed from physics. It has to do with the strength of a certain price direction.
2.2. PRINCIPLES
The following are the core TF principles:
2.2.1. FOLLOW THE TREND
The main characteristic of TF is to follow and stay inside the trend until there is a reversal sign.
This idea unfolds into three essential elements
63
:
1. To initiate positions based on the perceived direction of the trend.
64
2. To hold positions based on the perceived direction of the trend.
3. To liquidate positions based on the perceived direction of the trend.
There is a high reliance on the price and its sustained direction
65
, on which most decisions and
actions are based. The fundamental idea behind this is that before a market price can
substantially shift in a particular direction, it typically experiences a modest movement in that
direction. This suggests that initiating a position at this modest stage can ride the rest of the
trend for an extended duration and ultimately close the position with a profit. While this
concept might not hold in every instance, if it proves accurate frequently enough and with
sufficient magnitude, it could result in profitable trading over the long term.
63
https://www.trendfollowing.com/nature-origins-trend-following/
64
Note that initiating positions cannot only occur at the beginning of the trend, but also at any moment of the
trend, as long as it is perceived as such. In the early trend-following days, the evidence seems to show that large
and well-known traders used to initiate their positions based in economic fundamentals.
65
It is important to mark here that TF is not a long volatility type of strategy, but rather long market divergence.
This is because it might be the case that volatility increases and there are no trends, in which case a TF strategy
would not perform well (Greyserman & Kaminski, 2014).
20
In the famous David Ricardo maxim
66
, we can see that, although there is nothing about
initiating positions, it contains the second and third essential elements of TF described above,
eloquently exposing a central tenet of TF philosophy: traders should not get out of a trade as
long as it is going their way.
There are many ways of putting this into practice, which will be covered later in this thesis.
One important idea to consider is that if the initiation and liquidation decisions are specified
with certainty, the decision to hold the position becomes something irrelevant or of a
secondary nature, as it will depend on the set liquidation rule. Although the reason to initiate
positions could just be a fundamental one, most trend-followers only act after a price
confirmation signal. There are two main signals used for initiating a position (Greyserman &
Kaminski, 2014): breakouts and moving averages.
When breakouts are used, the investor initiates a position when the price surpasses a certain
critical point. Some examples are:
Previous Tops/Bottoms: this might be a local or historical maximum or minimum.
Patterns: head and shoulders, triangles, wedges, double top or bottom, flags and
pennants, cups and handles, rounded bottoms, gaps, etc.
Channels: Donchian Channels or Bollinger Bands.
Candles: Heikin Ashi
67
.
On the other hand, moving averages can be simple or exponential. Some strategies involving
moving averages are:
Price vs. Moving Average: a signal is created when the price crosses a moving average
in a certain direction.
Double Moving Average: a signal is created when the fast-moving average crosses the
slow-moving average in a certain direction.
Triple Moving Average: a signal is created when one moving average crosses the other
two moving averages.
66
Cut short your losses; let your profits run on.
67
One strategy might be to initiate a position once a Heikin Ashi candle has closed with a different color than the
previous one. In this strategy, a confirmation of n backcandles can be introduced. In the wide sense, this strategy
can be understood as a breakout one.
21
2.2.2. SYSTEMATIC
Although systematically performing trend-following strategies is not an absolute
requirement
68
, currently, most trend followers use a purely systematic approach.
We could divide technical traders into discretionary (predictors) and systematic (reactors)
groups. The first group relies on the ability to read charts or use indicators to predict or
forecast a specific market direction or price action. In contrast, the second group neither
predicts nor forecasts but reacts to price action using a rules-based decision-making process
based on a series of if statements (Covel, 2017).
Trend followers identify market trends; they do not attempt to predict them. They codify a
valid basic philosophy into a specific plan encompassing all possible contingencies. They
believe that, in the long run, a systematic investment strategy can only be as successful as the
extent of the investor's discipline to comply with the system in the face of adversity. If traders
adhere to their initial strategy, their decisions will not be subject to behavioral biases. The
following list contains some of the behavioral biases that are relevant for traders and can be
avoided with systematic trading systems (Kahneman, 2011):
1. Prospect Theory: Kahneman's Prospect Theory suggests that people value gains
and losses differently, leading to irrational decision-making. This can lead to
holding losing positions too long in the hope of them bouncing back or selling
winning positions too early to lock in gains. It is also called Loss Aversion.
2. Representativeness Heuristic: traders may judge the probability of an event by
finding a 'comparable known event' and assuming the probabilities will be similar.
This can lead to misjudging the actual risks involved.
3. Anchoring: occurs when individuals rely too heavily on an initial piece of
information (the "anchor") to make subsequent judgments. In the context of stock
prices, if an anchor is set (like a historical high), traders might interpret future price
movements concerning this anchor, influencing their expectations and decisions
and thereby affecting price trends.
4. Overconfidence and Illusion of Control: Kahneman's work highlights how
overconfidence in one's judgment and the illusion of control can lead to irrational
investment decisions. Traders might believe they can predict or control market
movements, contributing to the persistence of trends as they make trades based
on these beliefs.
5. Confirmation Bias: this leads individuals to favor information that confirms their
beliefs and ignore information that contradicts them. In financial markets, if
68
It is possible to be a subjective trend follower, or even to combine systematic and subjective elements in a
trend-following system (https://www.trendfollowing.com/nature-origins-trend-following/).
22
investors believe a trend exists, they're more likely to notice information that
supports this belief and disregard contrary evidence. This can lead to prolonged
trends as investors collectively reinforce their initial beliefs.
6. Availability Bias: Decisions are influenced by what is most immediately recallable
to a person. Recent market events or news can disproportionately influence
traders’ trading decisions.
7. Hindsight Bias: After an event has occurred, individuals often believe they could
have predicted the outcome. In trading, this can lead to overconfidence in one's
predictive abilities.
8. Framing Effect: How information is presented (framed) can affect decision-making.
In financial markets, the way news or financial data is framed can influence
investors' perceptions and actions, contributing to trending behaviors.
For trend followers, their opinions about what the markets will do are irrelevant; hence, they
do not act on them. Some have publicly stated that some of the best trades are the ones where
the market does something completely different from what they thought it would do.
This systematic approach not only allows for the avoidance of behavioral biases but also allows
the strategy to be automated using computer programs to perform all the necessary checks
and actions. For a strategy to be susceptible to automation, the following aspects should be
considered:
Trend Identification: When does the trading system consider that there is a trend?
When does the trend end?
Entry Point: When are we going to decide to act? Typically, it is at the start of
identifying a trend, but the entry point does not need to be at the beginning of a
specific trend, as many trend followers will act even if the trend has been going on for
a while.
Risk Involved: What risk will be taken from the total portfolio in that specific trade?
Stop-Loss Order: Where are we going to set our stop-loss order?
Position Size: What is the number of units of that asset or contract that you can buy
or sell in that specific trade?
Exit Point: When are we going to exit the trade? For trend-followers, this usually
happens when the price hits the stop-loss, as it will be set where a trend reversal is
considered materialized.
Take-profit orders are generally not adopted by trend followers because their strategy focuses
on remaining in a trade until there are clear indications of a trend reversal or a transition to a
non-trending market. Instead of targeting a predetermined profit level, trend followers exit
trades based on specific conditions indicative of trend changes. This approach avoids
23
prematurely limiting potential profits, which could lead to a positively skewed distribution of
returns.
2.2.3. DIRECTIONAL FLEXIBILITY
Directional flexibility is a cornerstone principle in trend-following trading strategies. Unlike
traditional investment approaches that primarily focus on buying low and selling high, trend-
following strategies embrace the notion of profiting from upward and downward market
trends. This approach aligns with the philosophy that markets can be unpredictable, and
directional biases may limit profitability.
In practice, directional flexibility involves using technical indicators to identify potential
trends. Traders might use moving averages, momentum oscillators, or breakout systems to
gauge market direction. Once a trend is identified, the strategy may involve going long in rising
or short-selling in falling markets. This approach requires a disciplined risk management
strategy to mitigate the potential for significant losses, especially in volatile market conditions.
Research by authors like Covel (2017) illustrates the efficacy of directional flexibility. By
analyzing various market scenarios, Covel demonstrates how TF traders have capitalized on
bullish and bearish markets. Similarly, Clenow (2012) provides empirical evidence of the
success of TF strategies across different market conditions.
Strategies that do not have directional flexibility, like Buy-and-hold ones, are often at odds
with the principles of TF investing. Trend followers typically view the buy-and-hold mentality
as suboptimal, primarily due to its passive nature and potential for significant drawdowns.
Trend followers usually criticize buy-and-hold strategies because (1) they ignore market
trends
69
, (2) there is potential for large drawdowns
70
, (3) there is a low or a lack of
responsiveness to market dynamics
71
, and (4) they have an overreliance on the idea that
markets are going to recover relatively quickly
72
.
69
Trend followers believe in actively and systematically respond to market conditions. The buy-and-hold
strategy, by contrast, often entails remaining invested in an asset regardless of prevailing market trends. Trend
followers argue that it is more logical to maintain a position in an asset and consistently lose value when market
trends suggest a different course of action.
70
A key concern with the buy-and-hold approach is the risk of substantial drawdowns during market downturns.
Trend followers emphasize risk management and capital preservation, strategies that often involve cutting losses
early. Buy-and-hold investors, in contrast, may experience significant portfolio devaluations during market
declines, going against the trend followers' principle of protecting capital.
71
Trend followers critique the buy-and-hold strategys lack of responsiveness to changing market dynamics. They
argue that this static approach fails to capitalize on profitable opportunities presented by market trends, both
upward and downward, and does not adequately adjust to evolving economic and financial landscapes.
72
Buy-and-hold assumes that markets will always recover and continue to grow over the long term. However,
trend followers contend that this assumption can be risky, especially during prolonged bear markets or when
specific sectors or assets do not rebound as expected.
24
Although the default for a TF strategy might, in theory, be agnostic to long and short bias,
some managers intentionally impose either a market or a directional bias. Directional biases
can create dispersion in returns among systems and change some of the statistical properties
of the strategy. For example, TF strategies with a large equity long bias can exhibit negative
skewness similar to equity market returns (Greyserman & Kaminski, 2014).
2.2.4. RISK MANAGEMENT
Risk management is a fundamental principle in TF trading strategies. Trend followers place
significant emphasis on managing and mitigating risk over profit maximization. This approach
acknowledges financial market uncertainties and volatilities, prioritizing capital preservation
over speculative gains. This approach is critical for institutional investors pursuing Liability
Driven Investment (LDI) asset-liability management (ALM) strategies whose goal is to match
assets to liabilities and manage risks (e.g., interest rate, inflation, credit) so that income is
available to satisfy specific (e.g., pension fund, insurance, banking) financial obligations (Bravo
& Silva, 2006; Simões et al., 2021; Bravo & Nunes, 2021; El Mekkaoui et al. 2021; Bravo, 2019,
2022; Bravo & El Mekkaoui, 2018). For trend followers, the focus must be on the risk, as the
profits will automatically appear if the strategy is good and is followed accordingly.
As the ASE has a different method for studying the economy
73
than mainstream academia,
trend followers also have a different way of understanding risk. Instead of understanding risk
as volatility, they understand it as the possibility of loss
74
. This highly affects the way they
trade, mitigate and measure risk.
To manage the inherent risk of trading in the markets, trend followers typically focus on four
pillars: diversification, portfolio heat, stop loss, and position sizing.
2.2.4.1. DIVERSIFICATION
Thanks to the simplicity of their heuristic approach, trend followers are known for trading
many different markets simultaneously. This is easily done because they do not need to be
experts in understanding the drivers that move a specific asset or asset class.
73
Austrian economists have a distinct view of approaching the economic field from classical, neoclassical, and
other schools that transcend the economic discipline. Their subjectivism (instead of objectivism) and the theory
of human action (instead of human decision) are understood as a dynamic process (praxeology) instead of a
static one (Huerta de Soto, 1998). Since its formal foundation in 1871, the ASE has gone through different stages
of academic debates where it has defended and perfected its methodological positions. The first round of this
notorious methodenstreit started with Carl Menger against the German Historical School, then Böhm-Bawerk
versus John Bates Clark, Marshall, and Marx. In the third round, it was Mises, Hayek, and Mayer versus socialism,
Keynes, and the neoclassical. Finally, the Neo-Austrians versus the mainstream and methodological nihilisms.
74
See Appendix B for more on this topic.
25
Diversification is an essential strategy that followers employ to manage risk and enhance risk-
return ratios
75
. It involves spreading investments across various assets, markets, or strategies
to reduce exposure to any single source of risk. Trend followers use diversification in several
ways, each addressing different aspects of market risk.
Types of diversification:
By Asset Class: This involves allocating investments across different asset classes, such
as stocks, bonds, commodities, and currencies. Each asset class responds differently to
market conditions, so this form of diversification helps reduce the impact of volatility
in any single asset class on the overall portfolio.
Geographic Diversification: Trend followers often diversify investments across various
regions and countries. Different markets can respond differently to global economic
events, and geographic diversification can mitigate the risk associated with a downturn
in a particular region.
Directional Diversification: This type of diversification involves taking long and short
market positions. By doing so, trend followers can profit from rising and falling
markets, reducing their reliance on market direction for returns.
Timeframe Diversification: Involves trading across different timeframes. Some trend
followers might engage in short-term trades, while others focus on medium- or long-
term trends. Diversifying across timeframes can help capture trends of different
durations and reduce the risk associated with any specific trading horizon.
Sector and Industry Diversification: This strategy involves investing across different
sectors and industries. Since sectors and industries can react differently to economic
events, this diversification helps mitigate sector-specific risks.
Methodological Diversification: Trend followers may diversify their methodologies,
using different trend identification and trading strategies. This diversification ensures
that the portfolio's performance is not dependent on a single analytical approach or
trading system.
Diversification is essential in TF because it reduces the risk
76
and increases the performance
stability
77
and the market adaptability
78
of the portfolio.
75
It is believed that no one ever knows which market or strategy will be the big trend that will pay for the losses.
Hence the need for diversification.
76
It spreads risk across different assets, markets, and strategies, reducing the impact of any single adverse event
on the overall portfolio. This risk reduction occurs not only in terms of a reduction in volatility but also in a
reduction in the possibility of loss.
77
By diversifying, trend followers aim to achieve more consistent performance, avoiding significant fluctuations
that might occur in less diversified portfolios.
78
Diversification allows trend followers to adapt to changing market conditions, capitalizing on opportunities
across a broad spectrum of assets and markets.
26
2.2.4.2. PORTFOLIO HEAT
Trend followers place high importance on the overall percentage of the portfolio at risk or the
portfolio heat
79
to a level that never exceeds a small amount of the entire portfolio
80
. This is
not only important for the peace of mind of the investors but also because it gets exponentially
harder to recover the portfolio's losses in percentage terms.
Figure 2.1 Drawdown vs Return to Recover
Source: Own preparation.
The drawdowns achieved in TF strategies tend to be lower than in buy-and-hold strategies
(Greyserman & Kaminski, 2014; Covel, 2017), mainly because of the directional flexibility and
the focus on maintaining the portfolio heat at a reasonably low level using stop losses.
2.2.4.3. STOP-LOSS
The stop-loss order is a primary tool in trend followers' risk management arsenal. It is designed
to close a trade automatically at a predetermined price level, effectively capping any potential
loss. By setting these limits, trend followers ensure that losses are cut early and remain small,
aligning with the Ricardian maxim of cutting losses short.
Contrastingly, trend followers typically avoid setting take-profit orders. The rationale behind
this is closely tied to their risk management philosophy. Take-profit orders, which
automatically close a trade at a specified profit level, can prematurely limit the potential gains
from a trade. Since trend followers aim to capitalize on the full extent of market trends, setting
79
Portfolio heat was a term coined by Ed Seykota. Considering the stop-losses in place, it is defined as the
percentage of the portfolio that is susceptible to being lost at any given time. On the contrary, core equity is the
percentage of the portfolio that is not at risk.
80
This is a subjective decision, but typically it is shared that the portfolio heat should be between 10% and 20%.
0.00%
50.00%
100.00%
150.00%
200.00%
250.00%
300.00%
350.00%
510 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 65 70 75
Drawdowns vs Return to Recovery
Drawdown Return to Recovery
27
a take-profit limit could prevent them from fully benefiting from prolonged favorable trends.
This also aligns with the other part of the Ricardian maxim of letting your profits run on.
Although there are many types of stop-losses
81
, this thesis will differentiate between two
types that will become useful and relevant in the practical part: explicit and implicit. The
explicit ones are set directly in the exchange or broker. The implicit ones are not set in the
exchange directly but are instead set indirectly through the logic of the code. These two forms
of stop losses may coexist in the same strategy.
Ideally, stop losses should consider the asset's historical volatility over the last n periods. This
way, they will be more meaningful and adaptive to the asset's volatility when setting the stop
loss. Some examples of initial stop losses based on the latest historical volatility of the assets
are: average true ranges (ATR)
82
, support or resistance levels
83
, channels or bands
84
, volatility
stop losses
85
, moving averages crossovers
86
and fibonacci retracements
87
.
After the initial stop loss is set, designing the rules for adjusting the stop loss as the price
evolves is paramount. Most of these methods already incorporate a dynamic approach where
the stop is adjusted automatically. In contrast, others are static, and additional rules might
need to be in place to correctly adjust the stop loss over time (ATR, support or resistance
levels, and Fibonacci retracements).
2.2.4.4. POSITION SIZING
For trend-followers trading several markets, a portfolio allocation to each market is usually
decided before deciding the size of a specific position inside a specific market. The main ways
81
Standard stop loss, stop limit order, trailing stop loss, guaranteed stop loss, volatility stop loss, and time stop
are some of them.
82
The ATR is the average of the last n (typically 14) true ranges. A true range is the maximum of three alternatives
(TR=max[(High−Low),(High−Previous Close),(Low−Previous Close)]. Typically, the ATR is used with a multiplier
(usually 2 or 3) to set a stop loss level. For example, if the multiplier is 2, in long positions, the stop loss will be
put at the purchase price ATR*2.
83
The stop loss is set in long positions below the relevant support level; in short positions, the stop loss is set
above the resistance level. These supports or resistances correspond to previous local bottoms or tops,
respectively. A buffer of 1% to 2% is typically used.
84
Donchian Channels or Bollinger Bands for instance.
85
Similar to using the ATR, but this method might involve other volatility indicators such as the Standard
Deviation or the Volatility Index (VIX) for a broader market.
86
A stop loss is set relative to a moving average. For long positions, a stop could be placed below a relevant
moving average (such as the 50-day or 200-day MA), believing that the uptrend is intact as long as the price
remains above this average.
87
After a significant price move, traders can use Fibonacci levels to set stop losses, anticipating that retracements
will respect these levels. For example, placing a stop loss just below a 38.2% or 61.8% Fibonacci retracement
level in anticipation of the continuation of the original trend.
28
to allocate risks per market are equal dollar risk allocation (EDR)
88
, equal risk contribution
(ERC)
89
, and market capacity weighting (MCW)
90
(Greyserman & Kaminsky, 2014).
Position sizing is an essential part of risk and money management. Trend-followers use two
main ways to size their positions: investing the same portfolio percentage per trade or risking
the same portfolio percentage per trade. Investing in the same portfolio percentage per trade
is often seen as less desirable than risking the same percentage per trade due to the latter
distributing the risk equally. Investing in the same portfolio percentage per trade typically
leads to risking a different percentage of the portfolio per trade, especially if the stop losses
are set depending on the specific volatility of the asset.
91
A strategy that risks the same percentage per trade inside a specific market and considers the
volatility of the asset to set the stop loss follows an EDR method on an asset level. This is very
common among trend followers. In this case, the historical volatility determines where the
stop loss will be set, and the position size (PS) will depend on the absolute value of the
difference between the initialization price (IP) and the stop loss (SL), divided by the dollar
amount of risk allocated to the asset ($Ra):
 

(1)
The dollar amount of risk allocated to the asset ($Ra) depends on the portfolio value (PV),
portfolio heat (Hp), the percentage of the portfolio heat allocated to the specific market (Hm),
and the number of assets (n) that will be traded within that market:
 
where:

Although this allocating method does not consider the correlation between assets traded, this
does not pose a serious drawback for trend followers. This is because they emphasize the
importance of following market trends, largely disregarding other factors, such as market
88
EDR is a strategy that allocates the same dollar risk to each market. This approach does not consider the
correlation between markets. This approach is similar to the 1/N approach.
89
ERC is a strategy that allocates risk based on the risk contribution of each market, taking correlation into
account. This approach is similar to risk parity.
90
MCW is an approach where capital is allocated as a function of individual market capacity. In future markets,
a market capacity weighting will depend on the market size as measured by both volume and daily price volatility.
91
Ideally, stop losses should consider the historical volatility of the asset of the last n periods. This way, stop
losses will be adapted to the current volatility of the investment and will be more meaningful.
29
correlations. They understand that correlations are dynamic and may change drastically over
different periods, making them unreliable for consistent TF strategies. Instead of relying on
the stability of correlations, trend followers can focus on the robustness of their trend-based
models, which are designed to capture trends regardless of how assets move in relation to
each other. This approach accepts that the nature of correlations can vary significantly during
different market phases, such as during crises or calm periods, and thus does not integrate
correlation analysis into the core of their trading strategy. Instead, trend followers accept the
ever-changing correlations as a market reality and concentrate on the trend behavior of
individual markets to drive their trading decisions. Nevertheless, with proper diversification
between markets and directional flexibility, the issue of exaggerated losses due to a high
correlation between some of those markets is usually mitigated to a high extent.
2.2.5. ABSOLUTE RETURNS
The principle of absolute return is central to trend-following investing. Unlike traditional
investment strategies that focus on relative returns, measuring performance against a
benchmark or index, TF strategies aim for positive returns independent of external
benchmarks. This approach is grounded in the belief that the primary goal is to generate profit
in absolute terms, regardless of the broader market's performance.
“The concept of indexing and benchmarking is beneficial in the EMT world of traditional long-only
passive investing, but it has almost zero usefulness for an absolute return process. [] At its core, the
concept of absolute return investing is antithetical to benchmarking, which encourages traditional
managers to have similarly structured portfolios and look at their performance on a relative basis”.
(Covel, 2017, p. 92-93).
Traditional investment strategies often emphasize relative returns, where the success of an
investment is judged against a specific benchmark, like the S&P 500, Russell 2000, or another
market index or a combination of them. This approach can sometimes lead investors to
prioritize outperforming the benchmark over generating positive returns. In contrast, the
absolute return approach adopted by trend followers is not bound by the performance of any
index or sector. Their success is solely measured by the ability to generate profits, not by
outperforming a benchmark.
30
Some of the benefits of the absolute return approach are market independence
92
, risk
mitigation
93
and adaptability to market conditions
94
.
Investors who adopt an absolute return approach must be comfortable with a methodology
that may diverge significantly from traditional market indices. This divergence can sometimes
mean underperformance relative to a booming market. However, it can also lead to positive
returns in a declining market, highlighting the non-correlation of absolute return strategies
with market trends
95
.
2.2.6. SOPHISTICATED SIMPLICITY
The principle of simplicity is present in many of our society’s history’s best thinkers, from the
physicist Albert Einstein
96
to the musicians Charles Mingus
97
or Frédéric Chopin
98
, or the
notorious innovator and entrepreneur Steve Jobs
99
.
Following this principle, trend followers like to keep it sophisticatedly simple (Covel, 2017). TF
strategies have a rather simplistic way of dealing with markets. It simplifies the trader's life as
much as possible by eliminating all the noise (news, market events, etc.) and focusing on one
essential aspect of the asset: the price action, which is the aggregation of everyone’s
expectations, containing a vast amount of heterogeneous information.
100
92
By focusing on absolute returns, trend followers are not confined to the constraints of matching or beating a
benchmark. This independence allows for greater flexibility in investment choices and strategies.
93
Absolute return strategies often emphasize risk management. Since the goal is to make positive returns under
market conditions, trend followers typically employ methods like diversification, position sizing, and rigorous
stop-loss orders to protect against significant losses.
94
TF strategies, with their focus on absolute returns, are inherently adaptable. They can capitalize on market
trends, whether upward or downward, without adhering to a specific benchmark’s constraints or composition.
95
This non-correlation of TF strategies with a specific market creates diversification opportunities. For instance,
the introduction of Greyserman & Kaminski (2014) showcased how a 50:50 portfolio of the S&P 500 Total Return
Index and the Barclay CTA Index (leveraged to have the same volatility as the equity index) would have increased
the equity market’s Sharpe Ratio by 66%. Also, in Part I, in a study of over 3 centuries, is shown how combining
traditional 60/40 equity bond portfolios with TF (to 48/32/20) increases the Sharpe Ratio from 1 to over 1.2.
96
With the quote “genius is making complex ideas simple, not making simple ideas complex.
97
With the quote “anyone can make the simple complicated. Creativity is making the complicated simple”.
98
With the quote simplicity is the final achievement. After one has played a vast quantity of notes and more
notes, it is simplicity that emerges as the crowning reward of art”.
99
With the quote, “simplicity is the ultimate sophistication. It takes a lot of hard work to make something simple,
to truly understand the underlying challenges, and come up with elegant solutions. […] It’s not just minimalism
or the absence of clutter. It involves digging through the depth of complexity. To be truly simple, you have to go
really deep. […] You have to deeply understand the essence of a product in order to be able to get rid of the parts
that are not essential”.
100
Free market prices are pieces of information that contain and convey a vast amount of heterogeneous data
(Hayek, 1945) and help coordinate society’s preferences (Mises, 1949). They are beacons that tell society where
to produce, how to produce, how much to produce, when to produce, where to transport and sell, how to
advertise, how to sell, etc. In the same way, prices in financial markets contain a vast amount of heterogeneous
information that goes beyond the extent of the information or knowledge that any given individual may have
without insider knowledge. That is why trend followers focus on the price.
31
Although price and volume can be manipulated in extreme scenarios, they are, in most cases,
the most reliable and current information that market participants can rely on, much more
than annual or quarterly reports
101
.
While developing a trading system, it's crucial to be aware of the propensity to incur
overfitting, an unavoidable danger highlighted by Lopez de Prado (2018), who points out that
traders cannot know ex-ante if they have effectively avoided overfitting. However, the risk of
overfitting, particularly during the back-testing and systematization phases, can be reduced
through the adoption of simple strategies, such as TF ones, and by not selecting the exact
combination that performed the best in back-testing but rather opting for strategies that have
shown consistent and robust performance across different assets or markets. This approach
is further supported by employing multiple hypotheses testing, as suggested by Covel (2017),
to mitigate the danger of overfitting, underscoring the importance of simplicity and
generalizability in strategy development.
As opposed to the criticism that Kahneman (2011) does of using heuristics, Gigerenzer (1999)
proved that it is an effective method for decision-making in complex and uncertain situations,
like financial markets. His premise is the following: Fast and frugal heuristics employ a
minimum of time, knowledge, and computation to make adaptive choices in real
environments. […] Fast and frugal heuristics can guide behavior in challenging domains when
the environment is changing rapidly (for example, in stock market investment), when the
environment requires many decisions to be made in a successively dependent fashion. These
particular features of social environments can be exploited by heuristics that make rapid
decisions rather than gathering and processing information over a long period during which a
fleeter-minded competitor could leap forward and gain an edge”.
Trend followers employ heuristics to simplify identifying profitable trends, relying on
straightforward rules that can be consistently applied across various market conditions. These
rules are often based on price action and volume, which provide direct and immediate
information, making them less prone to the biases and overfitting that can accompany more
complex and discretionary strategies. By focusing on these clear, measurable criteria, TF
strategies can swiftly adapt to market changes while minimizing the impact of noise, such as
news or market events. This simplicity in approach aligns with the principle of Ockham's
razor
102
, which suggests that the simplest solution is often the most effective. The heuristic-
101
Annual or quarterly reports not only contain past and, on many occasions, outdated information, but also can
be biased and manipulated with conservative or aggressive practices or bad faith altogether. That is why, on
many occasions, prices behave in very different ways compared to what the analysis of the last quarterly report
would suggest.
102
In its original Latin form, Pluralitas non est ponenda sine necessitate, which could be translated as plurality
should not be postulated without necessity. With this in mind, Ockham wanted to state that the entities or causes
should not be more than what is strictly necessary to explain the observed events. This methodological and
philosophical principle has been constantly applied to modern sciences, interpreted as the simplest of two or
32
based methods in TF not only streamline the decision-making process but also enhance the
robustness and reliability of the trading system, ensuring that the strategies remain effective
even when faced with the unpredictable nature of financial markets.
2.2.7. EMOTIONAL DISCIPLINE
In exploring TF philosophy, emotional discipline stands out as a critical element, even within
a systematic, rules-based approach designed to minimize behavioral biases. This approach,
while effective in reducing the sway of such biases, is not entirely immune to the psychological
complexities that traders face, particularly during the development of their trading systems
and through challenging periods of system performance.
Understanding emotional discipline begins with recognizing the limitations of human
knowledge and the prevalence of biases, a concept illuminated by Daniel Kahneman's
prospect theory. Kahneman and Amos Tversky's work revealed how typical behaviors, like the
law of small numbers and a disproportionate loss aversion, lead to irrational decision-making
in financial markets. Such behaviors explain the common tendency among investors to sell
winning stocks too hastily and hold onto losing ones for too long, driven by a fear of loss and
an over-optimistic hope for recovery.
A trader's emotional discipline is anchored in humility, patience, and self-discipline. Humility
in trading acknowledges that trying to outsmart the market is futile, advocating for an open-
minded approach free from personal biases. Patience is emphasized in TF trading, which often
requires minimal active management, highlighting the importance of restraint. Self-discipline
is crucial, especially when it comes to executing a trading strategy, requiring traders to follow
established rules and resist the temptation to deviate. This involves having the courage and
conviction to act when is needed and the patience to not act when it is not needed.
Covel (2017) identifies a range of market behaviors that are antithetical to successful trading,
such as lack of discipline, impatience, greed, and the inability to remain objective. These
behaviors stress the importance of admitting mistakes and cutting losses early, practices that
necessitate humility and acknowledging one's fallibility.
Furthermore, the concept of sunk costs plays a significant role in emotional discipline. It
represents costs that have already been incurred and cannot be recovered. The challenge lies
in not letting these sunk costs influence future trading decisions, a common pitfall for many
traders who might invest further in a declining stock in the hope of recovery, often leading to
greater losses.
more competing theories is preferable. Ockham’s razor does not guarantee the most straightforward solution
will be correct, but it focuses priorities (Covel, 2017).
33
In conclusion, emotional discipline in TF trading transcends mere adherence to a set of rules.
It involves a deep understanding of one's psychological predispositions and biases. By
cultivating humility, patience, and self-discipline, traders can navigate the emotional
complexities of the market, making informed decisions that reflect a systematic, bias-aware
approach. Mastering emotional discipline is thus essential for safeguarding against irrational
behaviors that can undermine the foundations of successful trading.
2.3. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES AND PORTFOLIO PROPERTIES
2.3.1. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES
The performance of TF has been discussed extensively in the applied and academic finance
literature. Perhaps the most thorough investigation presented to date can be found in the
work of Greyserman & Kaminski (2014), which examines an expansive timeframe spanning
nearly eight centuries, from 1223 to 2013. While such an analysis may not achieve absolute
rigor due to its vast scope
103
, the extensive period covered provides substantial evidence to
underscore the advantages of TF as a trading philosophy. Overall, after analyzing 84 markets
(equity, fixed income, foreign exchange, and commodities), this study documents low
correlation with traditional asset classes
104
, lower drawdowns
105
and positive skewness
106
,
and robust performance during crisis periods, generating an average annual return of 13
percent, with annualized volatility of 11.2 percent. This results in a Sharpe ratio of 1.16. In
comparison, a buy-and-hold portfolio of equities, bonds and commodities
107
obtains an
average annual return of 4.8 percent, volatility of 10.3 percent and consequently a Sharpe
ratio of 0.47. This study suggests that there may be a premium to active management with TF
principles.
103
This is because in this type of analysis, with so many centuries studied and with limited information for some
assets, there are inevitably numerous assumptions, questions on data reliability, and other biases used. These
are appropriately addressed by the author.
104
The overall correlation between the monthly returns of the representative TF system and the equity index is
0.05, and 0.09 with the bond index. This causes the betas of TF with equity and bond markets to be generally
extremely low as well.
105
The portfolio demonstrated significantly reduced drawdowns across various measures, including drawdown
duration, maximum drawdown, and the aggregate of the five largest drawdowns. Specifically, the maximum
drawdown decreased by more than 23 percent compared to the rebalanced buy-and-hold portfolio. The total of
the five largest drawdowns also saw a reduction of over 33 percent against the same benchmark. Remarkably,
the duration of the longest drawdown was cut by more than 90 percent, and the average duration of the five
longest drawdowns was 83 percent shorter than those experienced by the benchmark portfolio.
106
The skewness for monthly returns is 0.3. Positive skewness indicates that the chance for left tail risk or large
drawdowns in TF is relatively small, which is a somewhat unique characteristic, as most asset classes and
strategies exhibit negative skewness.
107
This buy-and-hold portfolio is monthly rebalanced to maintain equal risk with the corresponding TF portfolio.
34
The study also breaks TF performance over different interest rate
108
and inflation
109
regimes,
with robust results, and shows that TF strategies tend to perform especially well in financial
crises
110
and bubbles
111
throughout history. This is because TF tends to perform well during
moments when market divergence is the largest.
112
These characteristics make TF a good candidate to diversify traditional portfolios. The study
shows that the improvement of the Sharpe ratio is substantial, not only by combining
separately TF with equities and bonds
113
, but also when combining TF with the traditional
60/40 equity bond portfolio
114
. This explains why the use of TF as an alternative investment
strategy has grown over the past 40 years.
Sabar (2013)
115
performed a study to see why TF underperformed during the 2009-2013
period and discovered that TF performs best in regimes when correlation and volatility are
both high or low, and not when one of them is high and the other one is low.
116
Crises are
108
The division is done over four different regimes: high interest rates, low interest rates, rising interest rates and
falling interest rates. The return is robust across different regimes, performing better over high interest rates
(1.56 Sharpe ratio) and falling interest rates (1.3 Sharpe ratio).
109
The division is done over 3 different regimes: inflation less than 5 percent, inflation between 5 and 10 percent
and inflation over 10 percent. The return is robust across different regimes, with better results in environments
with high inflation (1.02 Sharpe ratio when inflation is over 5% vs. 0.87 when it is less than 5%).
110
The Great Depression and the 1929 Wall Street Crash, or housing bubble of 2007-2008.
111
Like the Dutch Tulip Bubble of 1936-1937
112
A key characteristic of TF strategies is known as the CTA smile. This phenomenon refers to the observed
pattern where the highest returns are achieved during both the periods of strongest and weakest performance
of equities or other assets.
113
The study merges the TF strategy with an equal distribution of first equities and then bonds, to confirm that
performance metrics are enhanced. Analyzing the period from 1695 to 2013, equities demonstrated a Sharpe
ratio of 0.7, while TF strategies outperformed with a Sharpe ratio of 0.83. When equities and TF strategies were
combined in equal proportions, the Sharpe ratio impressively increased to 1.1. In the case of bonds, evaluated
from 1300 to 2013, the Sharpe ratio stood at 0.9, but for TF strategies, it was significantly higher at 1.16. By
integrating bonds and TF strategies equally, the Sharpe ratio further rose to 1.42. This significant improvement
highlights the robust and substantial enhancement of investment performance through the strategic
combination of TF with traditional asset classes.
114
The research introduces TF strategies into the classic 60/40 equity-bond mix, adjusting the allocation to 48%
equities, 32% bonds, and 20% TF. Throughout the extensive period from 1695 to 2013, incorporating a 20%
investment in TF into the portfolio has successfully elevated the Sharpe ratio from 1.0 to 1.2, indicating a notable
enhancement in risk-adjusted returns.
115
https://www.cmegroup.com/education/files/when-do-trend-followers-make-money.pdf
116
According to the author, these are the four possible regimes in terms of volatility and correlation:
Low Volatility, Low Correlation: This regime is favorable for trend followers because assets respond less
dramatically to news, increasing the chance of underreaction and subsequent momentum opportunities. Low
correlation between markets means that trends can emerge gradually across related markets, allowing trend
followers to capitalize on these developments over time.
High Volatility, Low Correlation: Although low correlation still offers opportunities to benefit from lead-lag
relationships between assets, high volatility increases the risk of overreaction to news, leading to possible market
reversals. This makes it challenging for trend followers, as the two forces counterbalance each other, resulting
in a neutral outcome for trend following strategies.
Low Volatility, High Correlation: High correlation among assets diminishes the potential for lead-lag profits and
can lead to trend followers taking large positions at inopportune times due to a lack of asset-specific momentum
35
characterized by high volatility and high correlation. The other environment where TF works,
according to this author, is one where assets do not react violently to information arrival. This
increases the likelihood of underreaction to news (and thereby follow-on momentum), which
is good for trend followers.
Hurst, Ooi, and Pedersen (2017) found that TF strategies have generally performed well across
a variety of economic environments. However, they identified that the most crucial factor
influencing TF performance is the level of correlation among assets. Specifically, TF strategies
tend to perform better during periods of low correlation between assets. This characteristic
allows TF strategies to more effectively capture trends and generate returns when the markets
are not moving in a highly synchronized manner.
Covel (2017) presents the findings of Bernard Drury and his TF firm, Drury Capital. Drury
explored the potential enhancement of the already successful Berkshire Hathaway stock by
integrating it with other assets. Drury Capital met the criteria of delivering strong positive
returns on a standalone basis while maintaining a low correlation with BRKA. The study
utilized data from May 1997 to February 2015. The results were clear. Combining Drury and
BRKA improved significantly not only the return/risk metrics but also the maximum drawdown
percentage-wise and time-wise.
Table 2.1 Effect of Combining Trend-Following and Value Investing Portfolios
SUMMARY
Drury
BRKA
50% / 50%
Rate of Return (ROR)
32.50%
10.40%
10.90%
Standard Deviation (Vol)
32%
20.60%
14.40%
Maximum Drawdown (DD)
23%
44.50%
23.90%
ROR/DD
0.35
0.23
0.50
ROR/Vol
0.57
0.23
0.83
Peak to trough (months)
32
14
10
Trough to peak (months)
23
47
8
Total (months)
55
61
18
Note. Adapted from Covel (2017). Trend Following (5th Edition): How to Make a Fortune in
Bull, Bear and Black Swan Markets (p. 112-113). Wiley.
and synchronized movements across asset classes. This scenario is mixed for trend followers, as it combines
opportunities in asset-specific momentum with the risk of being overly exposed during exogenous shocks.
High Volatility, High Correlation: Characterized as a crisis regime, high volatility and correlation are generally
negative for trend followers due to reduced asset-specific trends and synchronized movements across asset
classes. However, during periods of crisis-induced deleveraging, the large positions taken by trend followers can
result in significant gains, provided the deleveraging occurs over an extended period. The performance of CTAs
(Commodity Trading Advisors) in such conditions has varied, with success in early samples but challenges more
recently, indicating faster deleveraging since 2008.
36
2.3.2. PORTFOLIO PROPERTIES
From Greyserman & Kaminski’s (2014) work, as well as Covel’s example of Drury’s case, we
can see that TF has some unique characteristics. It is a good performer in periods of crises,
with low correlation with traditional assets, low drawdowns, positive skewness, excess
kurtosis and good risk-adjusted returns. These main properties make TF a good candidate to
qualitatively diversify traditional portfolios.
2.3.2.1. CRISIS ALPHA
TF has consistently demonstrated strong performance across various conditions compared to
buy-and-hold strategies, particularly during financial downturns
117
and bubbles. This aligns
with the concept of the CTA smile, which describes how the largest gains are often made in
times when equities or other assets are performing at their best and worst.
In the study by Greyserman & Kaminski (2014), the author investigates the application of a
standard channel breakout TF strategy to the historic tulip bulb market during 1636 to 1637.
He suggests that a TF investor might have initiated a long position before November 25th,
1636, when the price was under or around 50, and then might have closed the position and
potentially begun short selling (if that would have been possible) around February 9th, 1637,
when the price was around 148.
Figure 2.2 Price Evolution of the Tulip Bulbs
Source: https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/financial-history-review/article/explaining-the-
timing-of-tulipmanias-boom-and-bust-historical-context-sequestered-capital-and-market-
signals/20BEB345A7BB4BF2E84C07F9077361A1
117
https://quantpedia.com/trend-following-in-the-times-of-crisis/
37
The author gets a similar result in the Dow Jones Industrial Index from October 1928 to
October 1930, with roughly a 90% profit in a span of two years comprising the October 28,
1929 crash. Additionally, in Figure 2.3 we can see the performance of the Barclay CTA Index
118
during two difficult periods: the dotcom and the housing bubbles.
Figure 2.3 Barclay CTA Index performance vs S&P 500
Source: https://www.iasg.com/blog/2019/09/13/frequently-asked-questions-about-managed-futures
From the graph we are not able to conclude there were bubbles or crises, with an extremely
low volatile, although very mild, returns.
2.3.2.2. LOW CORRELATION WITH TRADITIONAL ASSETS
TF, due to its high diversification across markets and its directional flexibility tends to achieve
low levels of correlation with any specific market.
2.3.2.3. LOW DRAWDOWNS
In Greyserman & Kaminski (2014), the portfolio demonstrated significantly reduced
drawdowns across various measures, including drawdown duration, maximum drawdown,
and the aggregate of the five largest drawdowns. Specifically, the maximum drawdown
decreased by more than 23 percent compared to the rebalanced buy-and-hold portfolio. The
total of the five largest drawdowns also saw a reduction of over 33 percent against the same
benchmark. Remarkably, the duration of the longest drawdown was cut by more than 90
percent, and the average duration of the five longest drawdowns was 83 percent shorter than
those experienced by the benchmark portfolio. Additionally, in Drury’s case in Covel (2017)
we saw a significant reduction in drawdowns, not only percentagewise but also timewise.
118
The Barclay CTA Index serves as a prominent benchmark reflecting the performance of commodity trading
advisors in the industry. As of 2023, it incorporates 412 programs in its calculation. This Index is balanced equally
and undergoes a rebalancing process at the start of each year, and it is a good proxy for analyzing how diversified
TF strategies performed.
38
2.3.2.4. POSITIVE SKEWNESS
In Greyserman & Kaminski (2014), the skewness of monthly returns was recorded at 0.3,
indicating a distribution leaning towards positive extreme values. Such a positively skewed
distribution suggests a pattern of more common small losses contrasted with less frequent but
significantly larger gains. This characteristic is often sought after in investment strategies as it
hints at the possibility of achieving exceptional positive returns, which can markedly improve
the aggregate performance of an investment portfolio. Essentially, positive skewness implies
that, despite the regular occurrence of minor losses, the potential for securing considerable
profits exists, potentially outweighing the smaller losses over the long term.
2.3.2.5. GOOD RISK-ADJUSTED RETURNS
Greyserman & Kaminski’s 2014 study offers a comprehensive examination of trading
outcomes over an extensive period, stretching nearly eight centuries from 1223 to 2013.
Despite potential limitations due to its broad scope, the research highlights the effectiveness
of TF as a trading strategy. By analyzing 84 markets across equity, fixed income, foreign
exchange, and commodities, the study reveals TF's low correlation with traditional asset
classes, reduced drawdowns, positive skewness, and strong performance during crises. It
showcases an impressive average annual return of 13 percent with an annualized volatility of
11.2 percent, leading to a Sharpe ratio of 1.16. This contrasts markedly with the buy-and-hold
strategy across equities, bonds, and commodities, which shows an average annual return of
4.8 percent, a volatility of 10.3 percent, and a Sharpe ratio of 0.47. Greyserman & Kaminski’s
findings indicate a potential premium for active management following TF principles,
suggesting that investors might achieve better risk-adjusted returns through this approach.
2.3.2.6. GOOD DIVERSIFIER
The integration of TF strategies into traditional portfolios has been validated as a method to
significantly enhance investment performance and diversify asset allocations. A
comprehensive study, citing data from 1695 to 2013, revealed that TF strategies not only
outperform equities and bonds individually in terms of the Sharpe ratio but also considerably
boost the performance metrics of the conventional 60/40 equity-bond portfolio. Specifically,
equities and bonds, when paired separately with TF strategies in equal proportions, saw their
Sharpe ratios climb to 1.1 and 1.42, respectively, from their standalone ratios of 0.7 for
equities and 0.9 for bonds. This improvement is also pronounced when TF strategies are
incorporated into a modified 60/40 portfolio, adjusting the allocation to include 20 percent
TF, which elevated the Sharpe ratio from 1.0 to 1.2. This strategic enhancement, underscored
by Greyserman & Kaminski’s research in 2014, demonstrates the robust benefit of including
TF in diversified investment strategies, underscoring its growing popularity over the last four
decades to achieve superior risk-adjusted returns.
39
3. INTRODUCING A NEW MEASURE OF DOWNSIDE RISK: THE
KOLJONEN RATIO
In the field of portfolio management, accurately measuring and managing risk is paramount.
Traditional metrics, such as the Sharpe Ratio (SR), offer a partial understanding of risk by
equating it with volatility. However, true risk is better represented by the possibility of losing
money. This section introduces the Koljonen Ratio (KR), a comprehensive measure, created
by the author of this thesis, which integrates two critical downside risk metrics: the Sortino
Ratio (Sor) and the Calmar Ratio (CR).
3.1. THE SHARPE RATIO AS A MEASURE OF RISK-ADJUSTED RETURNS
The SR is widely used to measure risk-adjusted returns, defined as:
  

(3)
Where:
Rp = Portfolio return
Rf = Risk-free rate
Op = Standard deviation of the portfolio
Despite its strengths
119
, the SR has significant limitations that are often not adequately
addressed by mainstream academia and traditional practitioners
120
. Although its many
limitations, in our view, the main one lies in its use of total volatility (standard deviation) as a
measure of risk. This approach does not distinguish between upside and downside volatility,
treating all fluctuations as equally undesirable. Consequently, the SR may penalize portfolios
that exhibit positive volatility, providing a skewed perception of risk.
3.2. THE SORTINO RATIO AS A MEASURE OF DOWNSIDE RISK-ADJUSTED RETURNS
The SoR addresses which in our view is the main SR’s limitation, by focusing exclusively on the
downside volatility. Although it still understands risk as volatility, this is a step in the right
direction in comparison with the SR. It is defined as:


(4)
119
Simplicity, standardization, widely usage and flexibility (it can be applied to any portfolio/asset).
120
Assumes a normal distribution, ignores extreme events, does not distinguish between upside and downside
volatility and assumption of linear relationship between risk and return, among other drawbacks.
40
Where:
Rp = Portfolio return
Rf = Risk-free rate
Od = Standard negative deviation of the portfolio
By considering only the volatility of negative returns, the SoR provides a more accurate
measure than the SR of the risk that investors are primarily concerned with: the possibility
permanent losses. However, a limitation of the SoR is that it still understands risk as volatility.
In our view, volatility represents the risk only in a partial way, as it fails to represent and
address the possibility of permanent losses.
Despite this, the SoR offers a more targeted approach by focusing on the downside risk, which
is a critical concern for most investors. This focus on downside volatility makes the Sortino
ratio a better tool for assessing investments, as it aligns more closely with the practical
concerns of risk management and the investor's aversion to losses. While it is not a perfect
measure and does not completely encapsulate the concept of risk as the possibility of loss, it
nonetheless enhances the evaluation of risk-adjusted returns by honing in on the most
detrimental aspect of volatility: negative deviations. A good SoR is typically considered to be
over 2.
3.3. THE CALMAR RATIO AS A MEASURE OF DOWNSIDE RISK-ADJUSTED RETURNS
The CR is a measure that focuses on drawdowns, notoriously relevant for long-term investors,
who are concerned about the potential for large sustained losses. It is defined as:
  

(5)
Where:
Rp = Portfolio return
Rf = Risk-free rate
Od = Downside standard deviation
MD = Maximum peak-to-trough decline during the period
The primary limitation of the CR is its disregard for downside volatility, which is a significant
strength of the SoR. The SoR and CR thus complement each other effectively, providing a more
comprehensive evaluation of risk-adjusted performance when used together.
A higher CR indicates better performance in terms of risk-adjusted returns and drawdown
management. A good CR is typically considered to be over 1.
41
3.4. COMBINING SORTINO AND CALMAR RATIOS: THE KOLJONEN RATIO
Combining these two downside risk metrics creates a comprehensive measure of risk-adjusted
performance based on pure downside risk. The KR is introduced to integrate the strengths of
both the SoR and CR, providing a one-stop metric for evaluating overall downside risk.
The KR is defined as the geometric mean of the CR and the maximum of 0 or the SoR minus 1:
 󰇛󰇛󰇜󰇜
(6)
By subtracting 1 from the SoR, we adjust for portfolios that perform only adequately (SoR =
1), setting the baseline contribution to zero. This adjustment ensures that only portfolios with
a SoR greater than 1 contribute positively to the KR, emphasizing superior performance over
the downside standard deviation. This approach also helps align the scales of the SoR and CR,
making normalization less critical.
In detailed form, the KR formula is:
 󰇛 
  
 󰇜
(7)
Where:
Rp = Portfolio return
Rf = Risk-free rate
Od = Downside standard deviation of the portfolio
MD = Maximum peak-to-trough decline during the period
This step-by-step combination ensures that the metric reflects both downside volatility risk
management and drawdown risk-adjusted performance. The use of the maximum function
ensures that the ratio does not produce negative values, making it more interpretable.
3.5. INTERPRETATION
The Koljonen Ratio provides a nuanced view of risk-adjusted performance:
KR = 0: The portfolio's return has not exceeded the minimum required return to
compensate for downside risk. This indicates that the portfolio's performance is
inadequate when considering downside risk.
0 < KR < 1: While the portfolio has managed to achieve higher returns than the
minimum required (i.e. SoR > 1), these returns are not sufficient to cover the downside
risk adequately. This indicates that the portfolio's performance, when adjusted for
42
downside risk, is lacking, suggesting a higher vulnerability to losses and insufficient
reward for the risks taken.
KR = 1: The portfolio's downside risk is perfectly balanced with the actual or predicted
return, indicating an equal trade-off between return and downside risk.
KR > 1: The portfolio's downside risk-adjusted return is higher than the actual or
predicted return, indicating that the portfolio is effectively managing downside risk
while achieving superior returns.
3.6. LIMITATIONS
While the KR offers a comprehensive measure of downside risk, it is not without limitations:
Complexity: The KR is more complex to calculate than either the SoR or the CR alone.
This complexity may make it less accessible or understandable for some investors,
particularly those without a strong mathematical background.
Scale Differences: Although the subtraction of 1 helps align the scales of the SoR and
CR, they might not be perfectly aligned, but this adjustment is a good enough proxy
for practical purposes.
Assumption of Normality: Like the SoR and CR, the KR still assumes a certain degree of
normality in the distribution of returns. While it focuses on downside risk, it may not
fully account for extreme events or fat tails in the distribution.
Historical Data Dependency: The KR, like its component ratios, relies on historical data.
This reliance can be problematic if past performance is not indicative of future results,
especially in volatile or rapidly changing markets.
Subjectivity in Target Return: The SoR requires a target or minimum acceptable return,
which can be subjective. The choice of this target can significantly impact the KR,
introducing potential bias.
Overemphasis on Downside Risk: While focusing on downside risk is beneficial, it might
lead to an overemphasis on avoiding losses at the expense of achieving high returns.
Investors might overlook opportunities with higher volatility but also higher potential
returns.
Negative SoR Handling: The KR sets the contribution of the SoR to zero when it is less
than or equal to one, which might oversimplify scenarios where slightly below-average
performance still needs to be considered. This binary approach might not capture
nuanced performance differences adequately.
Volatility vs. Risk: The KR, like the SoR and CR, still equates volatility with risk. For many
investors, risk is more accurately defined as just the possibility of loss rather than
volatility alone. While the KR aims to address this by focusing on downside risk, it might
still not fully capture all aspects of risk that concern investors.
Non-Standardization: The use of the maximum function and the subtraction of one
from the SoR might make the KR less standardized and harder to compare across
43
different portfolios or investment strategies. The normalization and interpretation
might require additional context.
Data Requirements: Calculating the KR requires detailed data on portfolio returns, the
risk-free rate, downside deviations, and maximum drawdowns. Ensuring the accuracy
and completeness of this data can be challenging and resource-intensive.
3.7. CONCLUSION
By introducing the KR, we aim to create a more robust and balanced metric that effectively
captures all aspects of downside risk. This new metric not only assesses the actual drawdowns
of the portfolio but also accounts for downside volatility, providing a comprehensive view of
risk-adjusted performance.
44
4. METHODOLOGY
We will divide the practical section into three distinct parts. In the first part, we will outline
the general methodology used in our analysis. The second part will examine the application
of traditional TF strategies to significant cryptocurrencies, aiming to verify the robustness of
TF strategies in both traditional and emerging asset classes. The third part will focus on the
methodology used to implement TF strategies in cryptocurrencies, incorporating techniques
to reduce exposure during overextended trends to mitigate high maximum drawdowns.
4.1. GENERAL METHODOLOGY
4.1.1. DATA SOURCES AND PYTHON LIBRARIES USED
The data for our analysis will be fetched using the yfinance library
121
. For trading decisions,
we will utilize the 'Adj. Close' prices, as this adjusted closing price accounts for all corporate
actions and provides a more accurate reflection of the asset's value.
We are going to use Python 3.9.6. The primary library used for back testing our strategies will
be backtesting.py
122
, a Python library designed for this purpose. Additionally, we will employ
several other libraries for various tasks, including data processing and technical indicator
calculations.
4.1.2. TIME FRAME AND WINDOW
We will use daily candlesticks for our analysis, focusing on the 'Adj. Close' column from the
data frame provided by yfinance. The backtesting period will span two Bitcoin halving cycles,
starting on July 9, 2016, and ending on April 19, 2024. This period is chosen to capture a
comprehensive view of market behavior across significant cryptocurrency market events.
For cryptocurrencies that were not in existence at the beginning of this period, we will use the
earliest available data from Yahoo Finance as the starting point for our analysis.
4.1.3. CRYPTOCURRENCIES AND COMMISSIONS
We are going to study the top 5 cryptocurrencies excluding stablecoins and duplicates
123
.
These are Bitcoin, Ethereum, BNB, Solana and XRP, which combined represent over 70% of
121
https://pypi.org/project/yfinance/
122
https://kernc.github.io/backtesting.py/
123
For example, Lido Staked Ether is considered as a duplicate of Ethereum, as it a derivative of Ether and follows
closely the same price.
45
the total cryptocurrency market capitalization, including stablecoins, according to
Coingecko.
124
The default explicit commission used is the typically charged among the different exchanges
(0.1% per trade amount). No interest has been applied to the open positions, as long-only
strategies have been considered.
4.1.4. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
The performance metrics that we will use are the following: Annualized Return, Annualized
Volatility, Maximum Drawdown, Sharpe Ratio, Sortino Ratio, Calmar Ratio, Koljonen Ratio and
Hit Ratio, among other less relevant metrics.
4.2. TRADITIONAL TREND-FOLLOWING STRATEGIES APPLIED TO CRYPTOCURRENCIES
TF strategies will be applied to cryptocurrencies, and the results will be compared with a buy-
and-hold approach for the same cryptocurrency, which will serve as the benchmark.
The strategies we are going to test to determine the effectiveness of traditional TF strategies
when applied to cryptocurrencies are as follows:
50/100 Days SMA Crossover: This strategy uses two simple moving averages (SMA)
with different periods. If the fast-moving average (50 days) crosses above the slow-
moving average (100 days), it generates a buy signal. Conversely, if the fast-moving
average crosses below the slow-moving average, it generates a sell signal.
20 Days Donchian Channel: This strategy is based on Donchian channels, which use the
highest high and lowest low over the last 20 days to create upper and lower bands. A
buy signal is generated if the upper band moves upwards without the lower band
moving downwards in the same candle. A sell signal is generated if the lower band
moves downwards without the upper band moving upwards.
Daily Heikin-Ashi Candles: This strategy uses Heikin-Ashi candlestick patterns. If the
most recent Heikin-Ashi candle closes green, it generates a buy signal. If the candle
closes red, it generates a sell signal.
We will test both long-only and long-short strategies to evaluate their performance in the
cryptocurrency market. In all cases, buy means to go long, and sell means to sell the long
position. In the case of long-short strategies, sell also means to go short.
124
https://www.coingecko.com/
46
4.3. AN ENSEMBLE TREND-FOLLOWING STRATEGY, OPTIMIZED FOR DOWNSIDE RISK-
ADJUSTED RETURNS
In this section, we will develop an ensemble long-short model comprising four distinct trend-
following trading strategies: SMA crossover, Donchian channel, Heikin-Ashi candles, and the
Ichimoku Cloud. The ensemble approach leverages the strengths of each individual strategy
to create a more robust trading system. The use of ensembles (combinations) to cope with
conceptual uncertainty, accurately capture information on the underlying structure of the
data, and complement the errors associated with each strategy or classifier, has been
advocated recently by many authors (see, e.g., Tsai et al., 2011, 2014; Ayuso et al., 2021; Bravo
et al., 2021, 2023; Stell, 2020; Ashofteh et al., 2022).
4.3.1. STRATEGIES
The ensemble model comprises four distinct trend-following strategies, each with its unique
approach to generating trading signals. These strategies are as follows:
SMA Crossover: This strategy involves two Simple Moving Averages (SMA) of different
periods. A buy signal is generated when the short-term SMA crosses above the long-
term SMA, and a sell signal is generated when the short-term SMA crosses below the
long-term SMA.
Donchian Channel: The Donchian Channel strategy tracks the highest high and lowest
low over a specified period. The bid band is the average between the high and low
band. A buy (sell) signal is generated when the price closes above (below) the mid
band.
Heikin-Ashi Candles: This strategy uses modified candlestick charts to smooth out
price action. A series of green (red) Heikin-Ashi candles generates a buy (sell) signal.
We use the variable ‘backcandle’ to reflect the number of candles needed to generate
a given signal.
Ichimoku Cloud: The Ichimoku Cloud strategy uses multiple components to identify
support, resistance, and trend direction. A buy signal is generated when the
conversion line is above the base line. A sell signal is generated when the conversion
line is below the baseline.
4.3.2. ENSEMBLE SIGNAL GENERATION
The trading signals from each of the four strategies will be combined using a majority rule.
Specifically:
If three or four strategies generate a buy signal, we will take a long position.
If zero or one strategy signals a buy, we will take a short position.
47
If exactly two strategies signal a buy, we will remain out of the market to avoid
ambiguity and reduce potential drawdowns.
4.3.3. OPTIMIZATION WITHOUT A DELEVERAGING MECHANISM
Bitcoin is going to be our training dataset for optimization, which will be tested in the other 4
cryptocurrencies. We are going to optimize this ensemble model for the Koljonen Ratio
described in Chapter 3.
These are the parameters and the list of possible values that we are going to optimize:
SMA Crossover
fastSMA_range = range(2, 9, 2)
slowSMA_range = range(40, 101, 5)
Donchian Channel
donchian_period_range = range(20, 81, 5)
Heikin-Ashi Candles
backcandles_range = range(1, 5)
Ichimoku Cloud
tenkan_range = range(2, 10, 2)
kijun_range = range(10, 56, 5)
4.3.4. OPTIMIZATION WITH A DELEVERAGING MECHANISM
To try and enhance the risk-adjusted results obtained from the ensemble model we will
introduce a deleveraging mechanism and we will compare the results of the ensemble model
without the deleveraging mechanism and with the deleveraging mechanism.
The deleveraging mechanism consists in systematically reducing the position size when we
detect an overextension of the trend when a certain risk threshold is met. Specifically, the
strategy will monitor the ratio of the fast SMA to the slow SMA. If the ratio exceeds a
predefined threshold (indicating potential overextension), a portion of the current position
will be closed. This portion will start small and increase incrementally each time the threshold
is met again, thus gradually and incrementally deleveraging the position. This method aims to
lock in gains and reduce exposure during periods of high volatility or potential reversals.
48
This approach helps in managing risk dynamically by adjusting the position size based on
market conditions, thereby aiming to improve the overall risk-adjusted performance of the
strategy.
These are the parameters and the list of possible values that we are going to optimize:
SMA Crossover
fastSMA_range = range(2, 5, 2)
slowSMA_range = range(55, 76, 5)
Donchian Channel
donchian_period_range = range(60, 101, 5)
Heikin-Ashi Candles
backcandles_range = range(1, 3)
Ichimoku Cloud
tenkan_range = range(3, 8, 2)
kijun_range = range(10, 30, 10)
Deleveraging Mechanism
SMARatio_long_range = np.arange(1.5, 1.8, 0.05)
SMARatio_short_range = np.arange(1.4, 1.7, 0.05)
st_portion_range = [0.001]
inc_portion_range = np.arange(0.003, 0.007, 0.001)
The deleveraging mechanism works in the following way:
Long Positions:
o When the fast SMA to slow SMA ratio exceeds the threshold set by
SMARatio_long, a portion of the long position will be closed.
o The initial portion closed will be st_portion.
o If the condition is met again, the portion closed will be incremented by
inc_portion each time, gradually reducing the position size.
Short Positions:
o When the slow SMA to fast SMA ratio exceeds the threshold set by
SMARatio_short, a portion of the short position will be closed.
o The initial portion closed will be st_portion.
o If the condition is met again, the portion closed will be incremented by
inc_portion each time, gradually reducing the position size.
49
The deleveraging mechanism helps manage risk dynamically for long and short positions by
reducing the position size when the market may be overextended. It locks in gains and reduces
exposure and risk.
Overall, this mechanism aims to improve the strategy's risk-adjusted performance by
systematically managing position sizes based on market conditions.
4.3.1. APPLICATION OF THE KELLY CRITERION
After optimizing for the Koljonen Ratio with 100% equity invested in each trade, we will apply
the Kelly Criterion (Kelly, 1956) using the results from this optimization. By determining the
optimal exposure through Kelly's formula
125
, we will backtest the strategy with this specific
exposure. Finally, we will compare the results obtained from both scenarios to evaluate the
impact of the Kelly Criterion on the strategy's performance, main risk-adjusted return ratios
and drawdown measures.
125
Expected excess return divided by the portfolio’s expected variance.
50
5. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
5.1. TRADITIONAL TREND-FOLLOWING STRATEGIES APPLIED TO CRYPTOCURRENCIES
5.1.1. RESULTS
5.1.1.1. 50/100 DAYS SMA CROSSOVER LONG-ONLY
For the 50/100 days SMA crossover long-only strategy, the results obtained are the following:
Table 5.1 50/100 Days SMA Crossover Long-Only Strategy Metrics
Metrics
Values
Bitcoin
Ethereum
BNB
Solana
XRP
Start
2016-07-09
2017-11-09
2017-11-09
2020-04-10
2017-11-09
End
2024-04-19
2024-04-19
2024-04-19
2024-04-19
2024-04-19
Duration
2841 days
2353 days
2353 days
1470 days
2353 days
Exposure Time [%]
58.55
51.36
54.25
46.23
47.41
Equity Final [$]
8,410,267
506,187
3,246,302
3,132,084
8,217
Equity Peak [$]
12,828,055
1,446,548
6,123,737
4,472,177
121,911
Return [%]
8310.27
406.19
3146.30
3032.08
-91.78
B&H Return [%]
9707.60
853.39
27773.10
14902.36
131.64
Return (Ann.) [%]
76.69
28.59
71.53
135.05
-32.12
Volatility (Ann.) [%]
114.35
91.42
156.45
254.76
63.85
Sharpe Ratio
0.67
0.31
0.46
0.53
0.0
Sortino Ratio
1.94
0.64
1.52
2.49
0.0
Calmar Ratio
1.16
0.37
0.91
1.68
0.0
Koljonen Ratio
1.05
0.0
0.689511
1.579611
0.0
Max. Drawdown [%]
-66.06
-77.88
-78.25
-80.52
-93.80
Avg. Drawdown [%]
-10.103976
-13.655578
-14.20844
-16.332745
-29.42
Max. Drawdown Dur.
1102 days
1074 days
1082 days
856 days
1991 days
Avg. Drawdown Dur.
51 days
76 days
75 days
49 days
537 days
# Trades
13
11
10
8
18
Win Rate [%]
53.846154
45.454545
40.0
37.5
27.78
Best Trade [%]
1505.54
366.95
1725.53
895.630359
43.98
Worst Trade [%]
-33.34
-38.60
-49.19
-48.471351
-48.69
Avg. Trade [%]
40.67
15.87
41.63
53.80867
-12.96
Max. Trade Duration
484 days
230 days
393 days
173 days
132 days
Avg. Trade Duration
127 days
109 days
127 days
84 days
61 days
Profit Factor
18.42
4.83
17.68
16.206803
0.362
Expectancy [%]
141.53
39.80
195.59
157.277485
-10.03
SQN
1.2144
0.5737
0.9680
1.039354
-2.66
Source: Own preparation.
51
5.1.1.2. 20 DAYS DONCHIAN CHANNEL LONG-ONLY
For the 20-Day Donchian Channel strategy, the results gotten are the following:
Table 5.2 20 Days Donchian Channel Long-Only Strategy Metrics
Metrics
Values
Bitcoin
Ethereum
BNB
Solana
XRP
Start
2016-07-09
2017-11-09
2017-11-09
2020-04-10
2017-11-09
End
2024-04-19
2024-04-19
2024-04-19
2024-04-19
2024-04-19
Duration
2841 days
2353 days
2353 days
1470 days
2353 days
Exposure Time [%]
60.555947
52.548853
51.869159
53.365058
45.157179
Equity Final [$]
10,158,056
3,007,902
71,185,530
77,803,033
739,384
Equity Peak [$]
11,289,009
4,366,964
79,416,301
91,462,233
1,790,170
Return [%]
10058.06
2907.90
71085.53
77703.03
639.38
B&H Return [%]
9707.60
853.39
27773.10
14902.36
131.64
Return (Ann.) [%]
81.02
69.52
176.87
421.61
36.37
Volatility (Ann.) [%]
104.59
121.13
275.98
728.04
144.75
Sharpe Ratio
0.78
0.57
0.64
0.58
0.25
Sortino Ratio
2.30
1.65
4.13
6.94
0.78
Calmar Ratio
1.26
1.20
2.28
5.11
0.44
Koljonen Ratio
1.28
0.883
2.67
5.51
0.0
Max. Drawdown [%]
-64.50
-57.79
-77.67
-82.50
-83.41
Avg. Drawdown [%]
-8.56
-13.01
-12.84
-14.20
-23.82
Max. Drawdown Dur.
1051 days
813 days
565 days
778 days
1184 days
Avg. Drawdown Dur.
44 days
62 days
51 days
34 days
210 days
# Trades
37
33
31
17
33
Win Rate [%]
45.95
51.52
61.29
47.06
42.42
Best Trade [%]
388.26
325.10
1386.36
2366.96
177.12
Worst Trade [%]
-21.79
-29.86
-15.69
-57.61
-32.54
Avg. Trade [%]
13.35
10.87
23.60
47.93
6.25
Max. Trade Duration
190 days
134 days
149 days
138 days
109 days
Avg. Trade Duration
46 days
37 days
39 days
46 days
32 days
Profit Factor
5.776
4.15
23.09
21.52
2.89
Expectancy [%]
24.06
19.01
68.15
200.54
12.66
SQN
1.23
1.22
1.82
1.20
0.67
Source: Own preparation.
52
5.1.1.3. DAILY HEIKIN-ASHI CANDLES LONG-ONLY
For the Daily Heikin-Ashi Candles strategy, the results gotten are the following:
Table 5.3 Daily Heikin-Ashi Candles Long-Only Strategy’s Metrics
Metrics
Values
Bitcoin
Ethereum
BNB
Solana
XRP
Start
2016-07-09
2017-11-09
2017-11-09
2020-04-10
2017-11-09
End
2024-04-19
2024-04-19
2024-04-19
2024-04-19
2024-04-19
Duration
2841 days
2353 days
2353 days
1470 days
2353 days
Exposure Time [%]
58.163265
54.672897
54.970263
52.413324
49.830076
Equity Final [$]
3,104,913
396621
6397067
4986047
2532466
Equity Peak [$]
5,001,514
607064
8771477
6732450
4512053
Return [%]
3004.91
296.62
6297.07
4886.05
2432.47
B&H Return [%]
9707.60
853.39
27773.10
14902.36
131.64
Return (Ann.) [%]
55.46
23.82
90.56
163.80
65.05
Volatility (Ann.) [%]
77.23
73.87
170.55
282.14
170.24
Sharpe Ratio
0.72
0.32
0.53
0.58
0.38
Sortino Ratio
1.91
0.66
2.35
3.19
1.57
Calmar Ratio
0.78
0.40
1.54
2.78
1.10
Koljonen Ratio
0.84
0.0
1.44
2.46
0.791
Max. Drawdown [%]
-71.525872
-59.360322
-58.946378
-58.965071
-59.046711
Avg. Drawdown [%]
-9.381619
-17.924788
-13.83378
-15.198037
-17.806941
Max. Drawdown Dur.
1133 days
957 days
1074 days
434 days
1101 days
Avg. Drawdown Dur.
66 days
94 days
90 days
45 days
138 days
# Trades
305
273
263
163
283
Win Rate [%]
39.672131
38.461538
44.86692
43.558282
38.162544
Best Trade [%]
110.453132
71.011366
202.449382
108.650055
200.684844
Worst Trade [%]
-13.397021
-22.335779
-13.695981
-25.352849
-28.705672
Avg. Trade [%]
1.13286
0.503889
1.59372
2.427291
1.148518
Max. Trade Duration
25 days
21 days
19 days
17 days
20 days
Avg. Trade Duration
5 days
4 days
4 days
4 days
4 days
Profit Factor
1.874445
1.4119
2.183334
2.21885
1.962516
Expectancy [%]
1.620768
0.96793
2.56541
3.847515
2.238953
SQN
0.961639
0.727959
1.040321
1.730006
0.675348
Source: Own preparation.
5.1.1.4. 50/100 DAYS SMA CROSSOVER LONG-SHORT
For the 50/100 days SMA crossover long-short strategy, the results obtained are the following:
Table 5.4 50/100 Days SMA Crossover Long-Short Strategy Metrics
53
Metrics
Values
Bitcoin
Ethereum
BNB
Solana
XRP
Start
2016-07-09
2017-11-09
2017-11-09
2020-10-04
2017-11-09
End
2024-04-19
2024-04-19
2024-04-19
2024-04-19
2024-04-19
Duration
2841 days
2353 days
2353 days
1470 days
2353 days
Exposure Time [%]
96.375792
94.604928
94.647409
5.098572
45.751912
Equity Final [$]
2,611,566
154,753
417,036
0.0
0.0
Equity Peak [$]
9,534,430
1,430,213
2,070,309
128,394
203,890
Return [%]
2511.57
54.75
317.04
-100
-100
B&H Return [%]
9707.60
853.39
27,773.10
14902.36
131.64
Return (Ann.) [%]
52.05
7.01
24.78
0.0
0.0
Volatility (Ann.) [%]
121.04
100.10
147.41
633.91
750.96
Sharpe Ratio
0.43
0.07
0.17
0.0
0.0
Sortino Ratio
1.09
0.13
0.41
0.0
0.0
Calmar Ratio
0.61
0.08
0.27
0.0
0.0
Koljonen Ratio
0.23
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
Max. Drawdown [%]
-85.588807
-93.126272
-91.733439
-100
-100
Avg. Drawdown [%]
-10.746792
-11.963261
-17.955789
-40.125708
-16.197287
Max. Drawdown Dur.
1102 days
1074 days
1082 days
1213 days
1991 days
Avg. Drawdown Dur.
49 days
59 days
96 days
318 days
149 days
# Trades
25
22
20
1
17
Win Rate [%]
48
40.909091
45
0.0
17.647059
Best Trade [%]
1505.544359
366.953544
1725.534938
-101.058378
33.327732
Worst Trade [%]
-47.392891
-50.14898
-70.24009
-101.058378
-126.427603
Avg. Trade [%]
13.942439
2.008767
7.403983
0.0
0.0
Max. Trade Duration
484 days
231 days
393 days
74 days
121 days
Avg. Trade Duration
110 days
102 days
112 days
74 days
64 days
Profit Factor
7.137347
2.348432
7.172271
0.0
0.123289
Expectancy [%]
71.044072
16.804793
92.339025
-101.058378
-26.978264
SQN
0.392236
0.074061
0.291984
NaN
-1.26721
Source: Own preparation.
5.1.1.5. 20 DAYS DONCHIAN CHANNEL LONG-SHORT
For the 20 Day Donchian Channel long-short strategy, the results gotten are the following:
Table 5.5 20 Days Donchian Channel Long-Short Strategy Metrics
Metrics
Values
Bitcoin
Ethereum
BNB
Solana
XRP
Start
2016-07-09
2017-11-09
2017-11-09
2020-10-04
2017-11-09
End
2024-04-19
2024-04-19
2024-04-19
2024-04-19
2024-04-19
Duration
2841 days
2353 days
2353 days
1470 days
2353 days
Exposure Time [%]
99.155524
99.065421
98.980459
97.756628
98.513169
Equity Final [$]
4,154,707
2,541,858
37979422.97
82,862,651
879,701
54
Equity Peak [$]
4,776,855
9,330,242
41315092.06
125,228,046
4,185,539
Return [%]
4054.71
2441.86
37879.42297
82762.65
779.70
B&H Return [%]
9707.60
853.39
27773.09871
14902.36
131.64
Return (Ann.) [%]
61.39
65.15
151.17
429.83
40.10
Volatility (Ann.) [%]
121.75
155.22
315.12
958.47
206.91
Sharpe Ratio
0.50
0.42
0.48
0.45
0.19
Sortino Ratio
1.36
1.24
2.73
5.74
0.62
Calmar Ratio
1.00
0.82
1.72
4.88
0.46
Koljonen Ratio
0.60
0.45
1.72
4.81
0.0
Max. Drawdown [%]
-61.686989
-79.527845
-88.086529
-88.110916
-86.749336
Avg. Drawdown [%]
-10.736621
-12.648331
-13.527449
-14.149101
-26.919123
Max. Drawdown Dur.
1046 days
615 days
761 days
676 days
956 days
Avg. Drawdown Dur.
50 days
39 days
46 days
29 days
144 days
# Trades
75
66
62
35
66
Win Rate [%]
44
43.939394
53.225806
48.571429
43.939394
Best Trade [%]
388.264244
325.102474
1386.362559
2366.959438
177.123406
Worst Trade [%]
-38.970098
-29.858367
-47.944309
-57.613273
-50.05324
Avg. Trade [%]
5.12957
5.027725
10.054083
21.166294
3.349441
Max. Trade Duration
190 days
134 days
149 days
138 days
109 days
Avg. Trade Duration
38 days
36 days
38 days
42 days
36 days
Profit Factor
2.963142
2.496204
6.991898
12.508827
2.127987
Expectancy [%]
11.272564
10.266663
34.341896
98.766785
7.800997
SQN
0.931961
0.470484
1.768483
0.779981
0.299111
Source: Own preparation.
5.1.1.6. DAILY HEIKIN-ASHI CANDLES LONG-SHORT
For the Daily Heikin-Ashi Candles strategy, the results gotten are the following:
Table 5.6 Daily Heikin-Ashi Candles Long-Short Strategy’s Metrics
Metrics
Values
Bitcoin
Ethereum
BNB
Solana
XRP
Start
2016-07-09
2017-11-09
2017-11-09
2020-10-04
2017-11-09
End
2024-04-19
2024-04-19
2024-04-19
2024-04-19
2024-04-19
Duration
2841 days
2353 days
2353 days
1470 days
2353 days
Exposure Time [%]
99.894441
99.872557
99.872557
99.796057
99.872557
Equity Final [$]
125,824
447,952
187,791
2,089,182
37,615,004
Equity Peak [$]
414,634
622,064
307,687
2,194,460
52,844,582
Return [%]
25.82
347.95
87.79
1,989.18
37,515.00
B&H Return [%]
9,707.60
853.39
27,773.10
14,902.36
131.64
Return (Ann.) [%]
3.00
26.18
10.26
112.58
150.80
Volatility (Ann.) [%]
67.34
112.74
122.34
373.52
371.39
Sharpe Ratio
0.04
0.23
0.08
0.30
0.41
Sortino Ratio
0.08
0.52
0.19
1.45
2.60
55
Calmar Ratio
0.04
0.36
0.12
1.46
2.07
Koljonen Ratio
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.81
1.81
Max. Drawdown [%]
-80.624918
-72.109228
-82.834256
-77.298076
-72.956527
Avg. Drawdown [%]
-19.870803
-17.498674
-31.410489
-18.049135
-14.597072
Max. Drawdown Dur.
2250 days
1062 days
2218 days
538 days
597 days
Avg. Drawdown Dur.
157 days
98 days
293 days
52 days
39 days
# Trades
536
469
446
281
481
Win Rate [%]
39.552239
45.628998
44.618834
46.263345
50.10395
Best Trade [%]
115.225665
61.163377
203.2428
108.903469
217.432737
Worst Trade [%]
-23.446652
-24.525691
-49.394895
-44.746086
-61.223609
Avg. Trade [%]
0.017329
0.320961
0.141588
1.087603
1.240477
Max. Trade Duration
25 days
21 days
19 days
17 days
20 days
Avg. Trade Duration
5 days
5 days
5 days
5 days
4 days
Profit Factor
1.164366
1.291927
1.320749
1.616929
1.985839
Expectancy [%]
0.378558
0.795772
0.941917
2.244831
2.126359
SQN
0.071106
0.521958
0.238549
1.617653
1.490067
Source: Own preparation.
5.1.2. DISCUSSION
Our comprehensive analysis of TF strategies applied to various cryptocurrencies reveals
several key insights. The performance of these strategies was evaluated using crucial risk-
adjusted metrics: Sharpe Ratio, Sortino Ratio, Calmar Ratio, and the newly introduced
Koljonen Ratio. Additionally, Maximum Drawdown was considered to understand the
downside risk.
5.1.2.1. GENERAL PERFORMANCE TRENDS
Long-Only vs. Long-Short Strategies:
In general, long-only strategies significantly outperformed their long-short
counterparts across all cryptocurrencies. The long-only approaches demonstrated
higher returns and better risk-adjusted performance, indicating that capturing the
upward trends in these volatile markets was more beneficial than attempting to
profit from both upward and downward movements.
Long-short strategies often struggled with higher volatility and deeper drawdowns,
which reduced their overall performance. This could be due to the persistent
upward trend in cryptocurrency markets over the analyzed period, where short
positions were more likely to incur losses. Traditional strategies tend to not work
in cryptocurrencies, as they exhibit a much different speed of movement than
other traditional assets.
Performance Across Cryptocurrencies:
56
Bitcoin: Bitcoin consistently achieved solid returns across different strategies. Its
historical data, longer market presence, and relative stability compared to other
cryptocurrencies contributed to more reliable performance metrics. For example,
Bitcoin showed a strong Sortino Ratio and Calmar Ratio in most long-only
strategies, indicating efficient management of downside risk relative to the returns
achieved.
Ethereum: Ethereum's performance was moderate, showing reasonable returns
but with higher volatility and drawdowns. It had lower Sharpe and Sortino Ratios
compared to Bitcoin, reflecting a higher risk relative to its returns.
BNB and Solana: BNB and Solana exhibited exceptional returns in several
strategies, particularly in long-only approaches. Solana, being a newer
cryptocurrency with fewer data points, showed extraordinary results, especially in
strategies that capitalized on its significant price movements. However, these high
returns came with substantial volatility and drawdowns.
XRP: XRP generally underperformed across all strategies. It showed lower returns
and higher drawdowns, leading to poor Sharpe and Sortino Ratios. This
underperformance highlights its higher susceptibility to adverse market
conditions.
5.1.2.2. KEY METRICS ANALYSIS
1. Sharpe Ratio: The Sharpe Ratio, which measures the risk-adjusted return of an
investment, was higher for long-only strategies. Bitcoin and Solana showed the highest
Sharpe Ratios among the cryptocurrencies, indicating better risk-adjusted returns. For
instance, in the Donchian Channel long-only strategy, Bitcoin and Solana
demonstrated strong Sharpe Ratios, reflecting efficient reward per unit of risk.
2. Sortino Ratio: The Sortino Ratio, which focuses on downside risk by measuring returns
relative to the negative deviation, was also higher for long-only strategies. Solana
achieved outstanding Sortino Ratios, especially in the Donchian Channel strategy, due
to its significant upward price movements. Bitcoin maintained a consistently good
Sortino Ratio, underscoring its stable performance relative to downside risk.
3. Calmar Ratio: The Calmar Ratio, which evaluates performance relative to maximum
drawdown, highlighted the robustness of long-only strategies. Solana and Bitcoin again
stood out with higher Calmar Ratios, indicating their ability to generate substantial
returns while managing drawdowns effectively. In contrast, long-short strategies
generally showed lower Calmar Ratios, reflecting deeper drawdowns and lower
returns.
4. Koljonen Ratio: The newly introduced Koljonen Ratio provided a comprehensive
measure of risk-adjusted performance, focusing on downside risk. Long-only strategies
exhibited higher Koljonen Ratios, with Solana and Bitcoin leading. This ratio helped
highlight the strategies' effectiveness in balancing returns and managing downside
57
risk. For example, Solana's Koljonen Ratio was particularly high in the Donchian
Channel long-only strategy, reflecting its strong performance despite high volatility.
5. Maximum Drawdown: Maximum Drawdown, a critical measure of downside risk, was
significantly lower for long-only strategies compared to long-short strategies. Bitcoin
and Solana showed better drawdown management, with Solana achieving higher
returns despite experiencing high drawdowns. The maximum drawdown for long-short
strategies was notably severe, particularly for newer cryptocurrencies like Solana and
XRP, which experienced complete losses in some instances.
5.1.2.3. CONCLUSION
In summary, our analysis indicates that long-only strategies are more effective for
cryptocurrencies when it comes to traditional TF strategies, delivering better risk-adjusted
returns and managing downside risks more efficiently than long-short strategies. Bitcoin
emerged as the most reliable performer across various strategies, while Solana demonstrated
exceptional but extremely volatile returns due to its recent market entry and significant price
movements. The inclusion of the Koljonen Ratio provided a valuable perspective on downside
risk management, highlighting the strengths of long-only approaches in this high-risk, high-
reward market. Moving forward, optimization of these strategies will focus on enhancing
returns while further minimizing drawdowns and volatility, aiming to achieve a balanced and
sustainable investment approach in the cryptocurrency space.
5.2. AN ENSEMBLE TREND-FOLLOWING STRATEGY FOR CRYPTOCURRENCIES, OPTIMIZED
FOR DOWNSIDE RISK-ADJUSTED RETURNS
5.2.1. RESULTS
5.2.1.1. ENSEMBLE MODEL STRATEGY WITHOUT A DELEVERAGING MECHANISM
Without the deleveraging mechanism in place yet, the ensemble strategy’s optimization took
about 2 hours, with 108,160 combinations checked at around 15 items per second. The best
combination gotten was the following:
fastSMA = 4; slowSMA = 65; donchian_period = 80; backcandles = 1; tenkan = 5; kijun = 10
The results obtained are summarized in the table below:
58
Table 5.7 Ensemble Model Strategy Metrics without Deleveraging Mechanism
Metrics
Values
Bitcoin126
Ethereum
BNB
Solana
XRP
Start
2016-07-09
2017-11-09
2017-11-09
2020-10-04
2017-11-09
End
2024-04-19
2024-04-19
2024-04-19
2024-04-19
2024-04-19
Duration
2841 days
2353 days
2353 days
1470 days
2353 days
Exposure Time [%]
96.903589
96.474087
96.431606
94.289599
96.389125
Equity Final [$]
81,273,734.44
1,238,722.41
4,753,665.18
11,463,147.86
6,396.45
Equity Peak [$]
92,270,500.84
5,607,762.42
5,611,893.63
12,041,743.31
379,348.71
Return [%]
81,173.73
1,138.72
4,653.67
11,363.15
-93.60
B&H Return [%]
9,707.60
853.39
27,773.10
14,902.36
131.64
Return (Ann.) [%]
136.44
47.73
81.98
224.32
-34.71
Volatility (Ann.) [%]
170.04
129.13
187.34
557.71
78.59
Sharpe Ratio
0.80
0.37
0.44
0.40
0.0
Sortino Ratio
3.44
0.97
1.64
3.05
0.0
Calmar Ratio
2.63
0.60
1.17
2.85
0.0
Koljonen Ratio
2.53
0.0
0.87
2.42
0.0
Max. Drawdown [%]
-51.82
-79.34
-69.94
-78.62
-98.44
Avg. Drawdown [%]
-8.21
-10.81
-15.71
-19.34
-12.70
Max. Drawdown Dur.
419 days
1,074 days
856 days
340 days
1,242 days
Avg. Drawdown Dur.
22 days
34 days
65 days
37 days
94 days
# Trades
234
241
230
127
267
Win Rate [%]
36.75
31.12
32.17
38.58
28.09
Best Trade [%]
201.55
262.66
734.21
676.77
152.59
Worst Trade [%]
-14.85
-22.45
-19.19
-39.98
-70.84
Avg. Trade [%]
2.91
1.05
1.69
3.80
-1.02
Max. Trade Duration
112 days
115 days
96 days
110 days
90 days
Avg. Trade Duration
12 days
10 days
10 days
11 days
9 days
Profit Factor
3.04
1.78
2.85
3.40
1.03
Expectancy [%]
4.41
2.27
4.98
11.75
0.11
SQN
1.72
0.35
1.14
1.78
-0.28
Source: Own preparation.
5.2.1.2. ENSEMBLE MODEL STRATEGY WITH A DELEVERAGING MECHANISM
The ensemble strategy with the deleveraging mechanism, optimized for the Koljonen Ratio,
took about 4 hours, with 211,680 combinations checked at around 14 items per second. The
best combination gotten was the following:
fastSMA = 4; slowSMA = 65; donchian_period = 100; backcandles = 1; tenkan = 5; kijun = 10;
SMARatio_long = 1.55; SMARatio_short = 1.40; st_portion = 0.001; inc_portion = 0.003
126
In this study, Bitcoin was utilized as the training asset for the optimization process. The remaining assets
(Ethereum, BNB, Solana, and XRP) were designated as testing assets to evaluate the robustness and
generalizability of the optimized strategies.
59
The results obtained are summarized in the table below:
Table 5.8 Ensemble Model Strategy Metrics with Deleveraging Mechanism, Optimized for
the Koljonen Ratio
Metrics
Values
Bitcoin
Ethereum
BNB
Solana
XRP
Start
2016-07-09
2017-11-09
2017-11-09
2020-10-04
2017-11-09
End
2024-04-19
2024-04-19
2024-04-19
2024-04-19
2024-04-19
Duration
2841 days
2353 days
2353 days
1470 days
2353 days
Exposure Time [%]
96.199859
95.581988
95.581988
92.92998
95.539507
Equity Final [$]
178978544.80
1519649.52
3045129.63
25282843.80
2896.17
Equity Peak [$]
203202923.40
9158905.43
3592999.93
26558992.30
246363.04
Return [%]
178878.54
1419.65
2945.13
25182.84
-97.10
B&H Return [%]
9707.60
853.39
27773.10
14902.36
131.64
Return (Ann.) [%]
161.67
52.49
69.84
294.65
-42.26
Volatility (Ann.) [%]
185.22
130.00
172.84
641.72
68.37
Sharpe Ratio
0.87
0.40
0.40
0.46
0
Sortino Ratio
4.17
1.10
1.40
4.18
0
Calmar Ratio
2.82
0.61
1.02
3.76
0
Koljonen Ratio
2.987
0.24
0.64
3.46
0
Max. Drawdown [%]
-57.38
-86.09
-68.27
-78.34
-98.91
Avg. Drawdown [%]
-7.714332
-9.557522
-17.165602
-13.005034
-13.401285
Max. Drawdown Dur.
419 days
1074 days
856 days
328 days
1242 days
Avg. Drawdown Dur.
19 days
29 days
77 days
25 days
98 days
# Trades
364
478
436
500
532
Win Rate [%]
60.989011
64.435146
61.697248
84.8
57.894737
Best Trade [%]
272.878997
358.082057
1080.828084
626.671947
296.576995
Worst Trade [%]
-14.849735
-18.527556
-19.190339
-39.983628
-67.486115
Avg. Trade [%]
22.727737
29.038485
38.131885
85.071859
18.458747
Max. Trade Duration
106 days
115 days
96 days
91 days
90 days
Avg. Trade Duration
21 days
24 days
22 days
28 days
17 days
Profit Factor
24.572971
27.992035
49.289297
105.584052
12.651983
Expectancy [%]
31.161307
39.665504
78.541117
119.571802
24.343669
SQN
1.928059
0.312677
1.043971
1.882989
-0.487188
Source: Own preparation.
5.2.1.3. ENSEMBLE MODEL STRATEGY WITH A DELEVERAGING MECHANISM, INCLUDING THE
APPLICATION OF THE KELLY CRITERION
With these results in the table above, when we apply the Kelly Criterion formula to the asset
optimized for this strategy (Bitcoin), assuming the risk-free rate is 0, we determine that the
optimal exposure should be 47.14%.
127
The results with this exposure of the equity per trade,
keeping the rest in cash, are the following:
127
f* = 1.6167/1.85222 = 0.4714.
60
Table 5.9 Ensemble Model Strategy Metrics with Deleveraging Mechanism, Optimized for
the Koljonen Ratio, with the Kelly Criterion applied
Metrics
Values
Bitcoin
Ethereum
BNB
Solana
XRP
Start
2016-07-09
2017-11-09
2017-11-09
2020-10-04
2017-11-09
End
2024-04-19
2024-04-19
2024-04-19
2024-04-19
2024-04-19
Duration
2841 days
2353 days
2353 days
1470 days
2353 days
Exposure Time [%]
96.199859
95.581988
95.581988
92.92998
95.539507
Equity Final [$]
7036055.53
632873.34
1365948.47
5133650.26
39172.13
Equity Peak [$]
7582307.60
1377985.39
1508565.45
5266113.73
198947.45
Return [%]
6936.06
532.87
1265.95
5033.65
-60.83
B&H Return [%]
9707.60
853.39
27773.10
14902.36
131.64
Return (Ann.) [%]
72.68
33.12
49.99
165.71
-13.53
Volatility (Ann.) [%]
58.00
54.00
82.43
203.44
44.03
Sharpe Ratio
1.25
0.61
0.61
0.81
0
Sortino Ratio
3.62
1.29
1.80
3.99
0
Calmar Ratio
2.22
0.55
1.23
2.91
0
Koljonen Ratio
2.41
0.40
0.99
2.95
0
Max. Drawdown [%]
-32.70
-60.06
-40.60
-56.95
-81.04
Avg. Drawdown [%]
-4.07
-5.62
-9.40
-9.94
-8.74
Max. Drawdown Dur.
366 days
1074 days
853 days
300 days
1242 days
Avg. Drawdown Dur.
19 days
30 days
66 days
27 days
98 days
# Trades
363
478
436
500
532
Win Rate [%]
60.055096
64.435146
61.697248
84.8
57.894737
Best Trade [%]
272.878997
358.082057
1080.828084
626.671947
296.576995
Worst Trade [%]
-16.269498
-18.527556
-19.190339
-39.983628
-67.486115
Avg. Trade [%]
21.559231
29.038485
38.131885
85.071859
18.458747
Max. Trade Duration
106 days
115 days
96 days
91 days
90 days
Avg. Trade Duration
20 days
24 days
22 days
28 days
17 days
Profit Factor
21.998216
27.992035
49.289297
105.584052
12.651983
Expectancy [%]
29.721287
39.665504
78.541117
119.571802
24.343669
SQN
2.609287
0.85202
1.367105
1.991066
-0.492616
Source: Own preparation.
5.2.2. DISCUSSION
In a related study (PLOS ONE, 2021), the researchers examined various TF strategies across
multiple asset classes, including equities, commodities, and currencies . The study highlighted
the importance of optimizing the averaging window to improve the adaptability and
performance of TF strategies, particularly in managing downside risks during significant
market reversals. Notably, their findings indicated that an adaptive approach could
significantly enhance risk-adjusted returns by mitigating the impact of large drawdowns.
61
Comparing these insights with the results of our ensemble TF strategy optimized for
cryptocurrencies, we observe several similarities and distinctions. Similar to the PLOS ONE
study, our research underscores the critical role of dynamic risk management techniques. For
instance, our ensemble model, especially with the integration of the deleveraging mechanism
and the Kelly Criterion, demonstrated improved risk-adjusted performance across
cryptocurrencies like Bitcoin and Solana. However, the challenge of managing extreme
volatility in newer cryptocurrencies like Solana and XRP remains pronounced, as evidenced by
the persistent high drawdowns despite optimization efforts .
These findings reinforce the notion that while adaptive TF strategies can enhance
performance and reduce risks, the inherent volatility and unique market behaviors of
cryptocurrencies require continuous refinement and adjustment of the strategies employed.
By integrating the adaptive principles from the PLOS ONE study, future research could further
optimize our approach, potentially leading to more resilient and effective trend-following
models in the cryptocurrency market.
The ensemble strategy's optimization across different cryptocurrencies provided valuable
insights. Here is a comparison of the strategy's performance with and without the
deleveraging mechanism and the deleveraginh mechanism with the addition of the Kelly
Criterion for the exposure per trade:
5.2.2.1. RISK-ADJUSTED RETURN METRICS
The addition of the deleveraging mechanism notably improved the performance of Bitcoin
and Solana:
Bitcoin: The Koljonen Ratio increased from 2.53 to 2.99, with annual returns rising from
136.44% to 161.67%. The maximum drawdown slightly worsened from -51.82% to -
57.38%, but the improved risk-adjusted returns justified the trade-off.
Solana: The Koljonen Ratio rose from 2.42 to 3.46, with annual returns jumping from
224.32% to 294.65%. Although the maximum drawdown remained high (-78.62% vs. -
78.34%), the strategy's risk-adjusted performance significantly improved.
BNB: There was a slight decrease in performance with deleveraging. The Koljonen
Ratio dropped from 0.87 to 0.64, and annual returns decreased from 81.98% to
69.84%. The maximum drawdown improved marginally from -69.94% to -68.27%.
Ethereum: Ethereum saw moderate improvement with the deleveraging mechanism.
The Koljonen Ratio increased from 0 to 0.24, and annual returns improved from
47.73% to 52.49%. The maximum drawdown remained high (-79.34% vs. -86.09%),
indicating the difficulty for mid-term TF strategies in cryptocurrencies to achieve good
results with acceptable drawdowns.
62
XRP: XRP showed extremely poor performance in both scenarios. The deleveraging
mechanism did not significantly improve XRP's results, with the annual return
remaining negative and high drawdowns persisting. This highlights the difficulty of
applying trend-following strategies to non-trending assets like XRP
128
, where the
maximum drawdown was over 98% in both cases.
On the other hand, although the application of the Kelly criterion decreased the performance,
it decreased more the overall volatility of the portfolio, especially in terms of the Sharpe ratio,
obtaining more robust results. We can see the results in the following table:
Table 5.10 Risk-Adjusted Return Ratio’s Comparison – Pre-Kelly vs Post-Kelly
Metrics
Bitcoin
Ethereum
BNB
Solana
XRP
Pre-Kelly Criterion
Sharpe Ratio
0.87
0.4
0.4
0.46
0
Sortino Ratio
4.17
1.1
1.4
4.18
0
Calmar Ratio
2.82
0.61
1.02
3.76
0
Koljonen Ratio
2.99
0.24
0.64
3.46
0
Post-Kelly Criterion
Sharpe Ratio
1.25
0.61
0.61
0.81
0
Sortino Ratio
3.62
1.29
1.8
3.99
0
Calmar Ratio
2.22
0.55
1.23
2.91
0
Koljonen Ratio
2.41
0.4
0.99
2.95
0
Source: Own preparation.
5.2.2.2. DRAWDOWNS METRICS
It seems that for a mid-term TF strategy is extremely difficult to reduce the high maximum
drawdowns below the 50% mark. Even though we optimized for a downside risk-adjusted
return metric (the Koljonen Ratio), we still got extremely high volatilities and drawdowns. The
deleveraging mechanism helped with the downside risk-adjusted returns, but the overall risk
remains too high.
Bitcoin: The maximum drawdown slightly worsened from -51.82% to -57.38%.
Solana: The maximum drawdown remained high but slightly improved from -78.62%
to -78.34%.
Ethereum: The maximum drawdown worsened from -79.34% to -86.09%, indicating a
need for further risk management strategies.
128
This phenomenon does not just happen in XRP within the cryptocurrency universe. There are some other
notable examples of assets that are not trending most of the time. Meme coins like Dogecoin and Shiba Inu are
examples of this. These are particularly difficult assets when it comes to using mid-term TF strategies, according
to the price action seen in the past.
63
This is why we decided to apply the Kelly Criterion to this strategy, maintaining a specific
position's exposure at 47.14% of the equity per trade. This approach significantly decreased
downside risks to a much more reasonable level, resulting in reduced maximum drawdowns
as follows:
Table 5.11 Drawdown Metrics Comparison Pre-Kelly vs Post-Kelly
Metrics
Bitcoin
Ethereum
BNB
Solana
XRP
Pre-Kelly Criterion
Max. Drawdown [%]
-57.38
-86.09
-68.27
-78.34
-98.91
Avg. Drawdown [%]
-7.71
-9.56
-17.17
-13.01
-13.40
Max. Drawdown Duration
419 days
1074 days
856 days
328 days
1242 days
Avg. Drawdown Duration
19 days
29 days
77 days
25 days
98 days
Post-Kelly Criterion
Max. Drawdown [%]
-32.70
-60.06
-40.60
-56.95
-81.04
Avg. Drawdown [%]
-4.07
-5.62
-9.40
-9.94
-8.74
Max. Drawdown Duration
366 days
1074 days
853 days
300 days
1242 days
Avg. Drawdown Duration
19 days
30 days
66 days
27 days
98 days
Source: Own preparation.
By applying the Kelly Criterion and maintaining a 47.14% exposure per trade, we effectively
reduced the maximum drawdowns and achieved a more balanced risk-reward profile. The
results illustrate significant improvements in downside risk management, enhancing the
overall robustness of the trading strategy.
5.2.2.3. OVERALL PERSPECTIVE
From an overall perspective, the deleveraging mechanism generally enhanced risk-adjusted
returns across multiple assets. The overall improvement in the average Koljonen Ratio from
1.164 to 1.4654 reflects better risk management and return balance. This suggests that a good
deleveraging mechanism can contribute to a more robust and resilient portfolio, despite some
individual asset challenges. The high maximum drawdowns in all instances point out the
importance of combining cryptocurrencies with other asset classes in the portfolio (like stocks,
bonds, commodities, cash, etc.). With the application of the Kelly Criterion, we observed a
significant improvement in the Sharpe Ratio, indicating better risk-adjusted returns. This
method reduced overall portfolio volatility and made the investment strategy more robust,
balancing the trade-off between risk and return more effectively. It highlights the potential of
optimizing exposure per trade to enhance portfolio performance and resilience.
5.2.2.4. CONCLUSION
64
The combination of the deleveraging mechanism and the Kelly Criterion has demonstrated its
efficacy in improving risk-adjusted returns and reducing downside risks across a range of
cryptocurrencies. While the deleveraging mechanism alone provided substantial
improvements in the performance of assets like Bitcoin and Solana, the application of the Kelly
Criterion further optimized exposure per trade, leading to reduced volatility and more robust
results. However, the persistent high drawdowns, especially in assets like XRP, indicate the
necessity of integrating cryptocurrencies with other asset classes to achieve a well-rounded
and resilient portfolio. Overall, these strategies highlight the importance of dynamic risk
management techniques in enhancing the performance and stability of cryptocurrency
investment strategies.
65
6. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORKS
This thesis has made several significant contributions to the field of trend-following strategies,
particularly within the context of cryptocurrency markets. Through a combination of
theoretical exploration and empirical analysis, we have advanced the understanding and
application of trend-following in several ways:
1. Enhanced Understanding of Trend-Following Philosophy: By applying a theoretical
framework grounded in the Austrian School of Economics, we have provided a more
structured and cohesive understanding of the trend-following philosophy. This
framework has enriched the theoretical basis of trend-following, offering new insights
and solidifying its principles.
2. Introduction of the Koljonen Ratio: One of the key contributions of this research is the
introduction of the Koljonen Ratio, a novel metric designed to measure downside risk-
adjusted returns more accurately and comprehensively. This metric addresses the
limitations of existing measures and provides a more nuanced evaluation of the
performance of trend-following strategies, especially in highly volatile cryptocurrency
markets.
3. Applicability of Trend-Following in Cryptocurrency Markets: Our study has
corroborated that trend-following strategies can be effectively applied in the
cryptocurrency space, particularly for cryptocurrencies that exhibit clear trending
behavior. However, it was noted that trend-following is less effective for
cryptocurrencies that spend prolonged periods without trending.
4. Development of an Ensemble Trend-Following Strategy: We developed an ensemble
mid-term trend-following strategy for daily candles. This strategy proved to be very
profitable in most scenarios, demonstrating the viability of trend-following approaches
in the cryptocurrency market.
5. Incorporation of Deleveraging Mechanisms: By integrating deleveraging mechanisms
into the trend-following strategy, we enhanced the downside risk-adjusted returns.
This adjustment helps mitigate the risks associated with overextended trends,
improving the overall performance of the strategy.
6. Challenges in Reducing Drawdowns: Our research highlighted the difficulty in reducing
drawdowns to traditionally acceptable levels within cryptocurrency trend-following
strategies. This finding underscores the need for a diversified portfolio that includes
not only crypto assets but also other asset classes like stocks, bonds, and commodities
to manage risk effectively.
7. Importance of the Kelly Criterion: The application of the Kelly Criterion has proven
crucial in ensuring that mid-term trend-following trading strategies in cryptocurrencies
do not result in significant capital loss. By optimizing the position size per trade, the
Kelly Criterion enhances the strategy's robustness and sustainability, providing a
66
critical safeguard against the high volatility and risk inherent in cryptocurrency
markets.
There are numerous avenues for future research to build upon the findings and contributions
of this thesis:
1. Expansion to More Cryptocurrencies: While this study focused on five
cryptocurrencies, representing a substantial portion of the market, future research
could extend this analysis to include a broader range of cryptocurrencies. This
expansion would provide a more comprehensive understanding of trend-following
applicability across different digital assets.
2. Portfolio Perspective: This study took an individual asset perspective. Future research
could adopt a portfolio perspective, examining trend-following strategies both within
the crypto space and in combination with traditional and alternative assets. This
approach would provide insights into how these strategies perform within a diversified
portfolio.
3. Further Development of Trend-Following Philosophy: While this thesis laid the
groundwork for understanding trend-following as a philosophy, there is potential for
further enhancement and development. Future studies could explore additional
theoretical frameworks or refine the existing one to provide deeper insights into trend-
following principles.
4. Advancement of the Koljonen Ratio: The Koljonen Ratio has proven to be highly useful
in practical terms within this thesis. Future research could further validate and refine
this metric, potentially adapting it for different asset classes or market conditions to
enhance its applicability and robustness.
5. Exploration of Additional Deleveraging Mechanisms: In this work, we used simple
moving averages to make deleveraging decisions. Future research could explore other
reactive techniques or predictive methods, including Machine Learning or Deep
Learning, to develop more sophisticated and effective deleveraging mechanisms.
6. Integration of Advanced Technologies: The incorporation of advanced technologies
such as Machine Learning and Deep Learning in trend-following strategies could
provide predictive insights and enhance decision-making processes. Future research
could investigate the potential of these technologies to improve the accuracy and
profitability of trend-following strategies.
In conclusion, this thesis has made significant contributions to the understanding and
application of trend-following strategies in cryptocurrency markets. By addressing theoretical
gaps, introducing the Koljonen Ratio, and developing innovative strategies, we have provided
valuable insights and tools for practitioners. Future research can build on these findings to
further advance the field and enhance the effectiveness of trend-following strategies in the
rapidly evolving digital financial landscape.
67
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71
APPENDIX A
HISTORY OF TREND-FOLLOWING
Humans have followed trends since primitive societies
129
, where survival needs, and
environmental factors primarily influenced trends. In more civilized societies, traders and
merchants observed and followed the patterns of price movements in various markets
(Greyserman & Kaminski, 2014). This behavior, which has critical social implications
130
, has
129
These trends were essential for the sustenance, safety, and environmental factors. In early hunter-gatherer
societies, survival depended on efficiently hunting animals and gathering edible plants. The migration patterns
of animals dictated the trends in these activities, the seasonal availability of plants, and the development of tools
and techniques for hunting and gathering. For instance, using spears and later bows and arrows revolutionized
hunting practices, representing a significant trend in these societies. Early humans followed trends in shelter-
building that were influenced by their environment. In colder regions, trends included the construction of
insulated dwellings using materials like animal hides, while in warmer climates, the use of natural materials like
leaves and branches was common. The trend of transitioning from nomadic lifestyles to settled communities was
a significant change driven by the development of agriculture. Clothing trends in primitive societies were dictated
by climate and the availability of materials. Animal furs and skins were common in colder regions, while lighter
materials like woven grass or leaves were used in warmer climates. The invention of sewing, leading to more
fitted and protective clothing, was a significant trend in these societies. With the advent of agriculture, trends
shifted towards domesticating plants and animals. The climate and soil fertility of the region largely influenced
this shift. For example, wheat and barley cultivation emerged in the Fertile Crescent, while maize, beans, and
squash were domesticated in the Americas. Primitive societies also had social and cultural trends influenced by
their environment and survival needs. For example, in societies where hunting was predominant, cultural trends
often revolved around hunting rituals and glorifying skilled hunters. In contrast, agricultural societies developed
rituals and societal structures around planting and harvest seasons. The evolution of toolmaking was a significant
trend in human history. Early humans started with simple stone tools and developed more sophisticated tools
like axes, significantly improving their hunting efficiency and other activities. The trend of tool specialization,
where different tools were developed for specific tasks, marked a significant advancement in human societies.
130
Trend-following serves as a mechanism for social cohesion and identity formation. In medieval societies,
trends in clothing and architecture were strongly influenced by the ruling classes, reflecting social status and
power dynamics. The Renaissance era saw art and science trends promoting individualism and humanism,
significantly shifting societal values and norms.
72
evolved over millennia
131
, adapting to the complexities of modern society
132
, yet retaining its
core psychological and social drivers
133
.
Trend-following is an inherent part of human societies, reflecting and shaping our values,
beliefs, and behaviors across different eras. From ancient civilizations to the digital age, the
nature and impact of trends have continuously evolved, mirroring the dynamic progression of
human societies.
Modern history is replete with instances of bubbles 6 emerging. Although they are rooted in
monetary phenomena (Huerta de Soto, 1998), these bubbles are exacerbated manifestations
of the innate and profound aspects of human behavior and societal dynamics characterized
by the propensity to adhere to prevailing trends.
Although trend-following has been a popular trading philosophy, it has a largely
undocumented history. This is due to the scarcity of records before the early 20th century and
the fact that trend-following was not fully articulated until about 50 years ago
134
. Despite its
widespread use by the early 1950s, trend-following lacked a formal definition or name. The
passive nature implied
135
by the term might have contributed to its underappreciation, as
human nature often favors bold and discretionary action
136
. Additionally, the simplicity of the
concept, similar to ideas like negative numbers or zero, might have led to its slow acceptance.
131
In ancient civilizations, trends often revolved around agricultural practices, religious beliefs, and social
hierarchies. For example, in Ancient Egypt, the trend of building monumental pyramids was a religious and
cultural expression and a reflection of the society's technological advancements and labor organization. Similarly,
in classical Greece, trends in philosophy, art, and politics were deeply intertwined, influencing the Greek city-
states and laying foundational ideas for Western civilization.
132
With the advent of industrialization and globalization, following trends has become increasingly prominent in
consumer culture. Fashion trends, for instance, are now rapidly changing and globally influenced, driven by a
combination of media, technology, and economic factors. Similarly, technology trends, like the rise of
smartphones and social media, have transformed how we communicate, work, and entertain ourselves.
Recently, there has been a growing trend towards sustainability and environmental consciousness. This shift
responds to the global challenges of climate change and resource depletion. Companies are increasingly adopting
'green' practices, and consumers are more mindful of their ecological footprint, reflecting a significant change in
societal values and priorities. The digital age has accelerated trend dissemination and adoption. Trends in digital
technology, like Artificial Intelligence and virtual reality, are rapidly evolving, influencing various aspects of life,
from healthcare to entertainment. Social media has also become a powerful platform for trend propagation,
enabling trends to emerge and spread globally at unprecedented speeds.
133
The psychological and social drivers behind following trends are multifaceted and deeply rooted in human
behavior and societal dynamics. Understanding why people follow trends involves delving into aspects of
psychology, sociology, and even evolutionary biology. Some of the key drivers are (1) social belonging and
acceptance, (2) identity and self-expression, (3) status and prestige, (4) fear of missing out (FOMO), (5) novelty
seeking, (6) cognitive conformity (conformity bias or herd-mentality), (7) influence of media and influencers, (8)
economic and marketing strategies.
134
https://www.trendfollowing.com/nature-origins-trend-following/
135
The implication of “following” is one of reaction, of passivity, instead of an assertive, bold, and discretionary
action.
136
Historical records focus on more sensational stories and prominent figures, such as market manipulators and
famous traders like Daniel Drew, Jay Gould, James A. Patten, and Arthur Cutten. As a result, less is known about
the lesser-known traders, or "followers", who might have been quietly analyzing the markets and potentially
73
Arguably, one of the first trend followers known in the investment world was the notorious
economist David Ricardo
137
. Although he is most known for his contributions to economics,
he laid down his trading maxims, which were (1) cut short your losses, let your profits run on,
and (2) never overtrade or trade too frequently.
Ricardo's success as a trader and his principles, which emphasize discipline, risk management,
and the asymmetrical treatment of gains and losses, align closely with the core tenets of trend-
following. While Ricardo did not use the modern tools and methods of trend followers (such
as technical analysis and computerized systems), his trading philosophy and principles share
a fundamental similarity with the trend-following approach. This is why some consider him an
early, if not the first, proponent of concepts that would later be formalized into trend-
following strategies in the financial markets.
Before the mid-19th century, financial speculation was predominantly an activity for the elite
and a small group of semi-elite trend followers, with the broader public engaging mainly
during financial bubbles. The period following saw a dramatic increase in market participants
and significant shifts in market practices and thought.
138
Although the prominent market players of yesteryears aligned with the trend, they were not
trend followers in the modern sense of the term. However, evidence of trend-following
practices exists from those times. For instance, when Benjamin P. Hutchinson
139
made a
purchase, the phrase "Hutch is buying" quickly spread, prompting others to follow suit.
140
Similarly, in the early 20th century, the prevailing question was "What are the trusts (or pools,
or rings) doing? and trend followers would mimic their actions. This approach to trend
following, albeit not particularly scientific, still qualifies as such. This highlights the notion that
trend-following has a humble and plebeian origin. It serves as a strategy for those outside the
financial elite to glean trading profits by emulating the elite's moves based on their economic
insights and overcoming their limited knowledge.
In the late 19th century, speculation was widely practiced but needed a solid theoretical
foundation. The need emerged for a method that could objectively analyze market behavior
and price trends over time, leading to the development of Dow Theory
141
by Charles H. Dow
(1851-1902) and his business partner Edward Jones in the late 1800s. This theory, expanded
achieving greater success than their more famous counterparts. Despite this, valuable insights can still be gleaned
by examining historical records considering the topic of trend-following.
137
David Ricardo (1772-1823) succeeded in the London markets trading stocks and consols (perpetual
government bonds) for over 20 years between the end of the 18th century and the beginning of 19th century,
which allowed him to focus on the field of economics, his primary interest in life.
138
https://www.trendfollowing.com/nature-origins-trend-following/
139
https://www.saddleandsirloinportraitfoundation.org/post/benjamin-peters-hutchinson-inducted-by-1920
140
https://www.trendfollowing.com/nature-origins-trend-following/
141
Dow Theory suggests buying at the breakout of an old high and selling at the breakout of an old low, with
additional rules for confirmation and volume.
74
upon by William Hamilton (Hamilton, 1922) and refined by Robert Rhea (Rhea, 1932) and
Richard Russell (Russell, 1961), laid the groundwork for modern trend-following by defining
bull and bear markets through a series of higher highs and lower lows, respectively.
Dow Theory is the earliest modern expression of an objective trend-following system, setting
precise entry and exit levels for trades. Its principles have been generalized and adapted,
influencing subsequent trend-following methodologies. Due to the lack of computing power,
the theory relied on logical observations rather than mathematical models.
Elliot wave theory, developed by Ralph Nelson Elliot in the 1930s through the contemplation
of the Dow theory, also attempts to describe and explain patterns that evolve naturally in
market prices. Both theories are based on the existence of trends and the importance of the
psychology of the market participants behind those trends.
Significant contributions to developing trend-following methodologies also came from Robert
Prechter, Richard W. Schabacker, Robert D. Edwards
142
, and John Magee, whose works
focused on technical patterns and trendlines as tools for identifying market trends. Although
not explicitly labeled as trend-following, these strategies aimed to capitalize on recognizing
trends' beginnings, continuations, and reversals. Frederic Drew Bond, William D. Gann, and
Richard D. Wyckoff emphasized the importance of following market trends and recognized
the role of influential market participants in creating these trends. The evolution of trend-
following strategies was driven by the necessity of adapting to market behaviors, focusing on
technical analysis and pattern recognition to navigate and profit from market movements.
As we have seen, the essential roots of trend-following can be traced back to the early 20th
century. Famous traders like Jesse Livermore (1877-1940) used principles akin to trend-
following. Livermore's trading style, documented in the books Reminiscences of a Stock
Operator (Lefèvre, 1923) and How to Trade in Stocks (Livermore, 1940), emphasized the
importance of following the market's direction, which is a core principle of trend-following.
From this book, some paragraphs show that Livermore appeared to be a breakout trader and
uses the words following the trend.
143
Alfred Cowles III and Herbert E. Jones, through their 1937 study at the Cowles Commission
(now Cowles Foundation), demonstrated the existence of serial correlation in stock market
prices, laying the groundwork for trend-following methodologies. Their findings suggested
that markets tend to continue in the direction they were moving, offering a basis for the use
of trend-following trading strategies.
142
Quoting him: Profits are made by capitalizing on up or down trends, by following them until they are
reversed”.
143
The quote is the following: “It may surprise many to know that in my method of trading, when I see by my
records that an upward trend is in progress, I become a buyer as soon as a stock makes a new high on its
movement, after having had a normal reaction. The same applies whenever I take the short side. Why? Because
I am following the trend at the time. My records signal me to go ahead!”
75
Alfred Winslow Jones, in his 1949 Fortune article, further explored stock forecasting
techniques, underscoring the momentum in psychological trends that underpin trend-
following. Jones's analysis acknowledged the potential for trends to perpetuate beyond
rational values before reversing, influenced by psychological factors and market dynamics.
In the 1950s, William Dunnigan significantly advanced the conceptualization of trend-
following. He differentiated between trap forecasting and continuous forecasting, suggesting
a shift from prediction-based trading to a model that focuses on identifying and acting on the
market signals or trends as they occur. Dunnigan's work, particularly in publications like New
Blueprints for Gains in Stocks and Grains, articulated the essence of trend-following as
leveraging the momentum of current trends without attempting to predict future market
movements.
Richard Donchian, often hailed as the father of trend-following, played a pivotal role in
formalizing this trading approach during the 1940s and 1950s through the development of a
system grounded in moving averages, which would pave the way for modern trend-following
methodologies. His creation of the Donchian Channel, a rules-based system, continues to be
a successful tool for traders today, highlighting his lasting impact on the trading world. As the
innovator behind the managed futures industry, Donchian's systematic approach to futures
money management and his establishment of the first publicly managed futures fund
(Futures, Inc. in 1948), marked a significant advancement in making trend-following a
recognized and viable trading methodology. Further solidifying his contributions in the late
1950s, particularly with his 1957 article, Donchian stressed the critical strategy of limiting
losses while not capping potential gains, and he advocated for holding market positions as
long as the trend continued. His advocacy for a diversified approach in commodities trading
and the development of the 5 20 moving average method showcased the practicality and
efficacy of trend-following strategies, underscoring his instrumental role in shaping the
field.
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Founded in the 1960s, Commodities Corporation (now part of Goldman Sachs) was a key
player in developing and popularizing trend-following strategies. Traders like Ed Seykota and
Bruce Kovner, who started their careers there, were instrumental in refining and spreading
trend-following methodologies.
In the 1980s, The Turtles became a famous group in the history of trading, known for an
experiment conducted by two commodity traders, Richard Dennis, and William Eckhardt, to
settle a debate about whether great traders are born with a unique talent or if they can be
trained.
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https://www.trendfollowing.com/whitepaper/donchian-commodities.pdf
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Richard Dennis was a highly successful commodity trader known for his trend-following
approach. He believed that trading skills could be taught. William Eckhardt, his long-time
friend and business partner, disagreed, believing that successful trading was innate.
To settle this debate, they decided to conduct an experiment. In 1983, they placed an ad in
The Wall Street Journal and Barron's, looking for applicants to train in the art of trading. From
over 1,000 applicants, they selected a diverse group of 21 people with various backgrounds
but little to no trading experience.
The group, which came to be known as the Turtles
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, was trained for two weeks.
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The
experiment was a resounding success.
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After the experiment, several turtles went on to have
successful careers in trading, and some started their own trading firms, like Jerry Parker in
Chesapeake Capital Corporation. The methods and rules taught to the Turtles were eventually
made public, influencing generations of traders.
The experiment is a significant part of trading history, highlighting the potential of systematic,
rule-based trading strategies. It provided empirical evidence supporting the concept of trend
following and the idea that disciplined adherence to a set of rules could be more effective
than relying on intuition or fundamental analysis.
The story of the turtle traders remains a foundational lesson in trading circles. It illustrates the
importance of a disciplined, systematic approach to trading and risk management and the
potential for individuals to learn and succeed in the markets with the proper training and
mindset.
Today, trend-following strategies have become a global phenomenon, embraced by traders
and investors across different continents and markets. This widespread adoption is a
testament to the versatility and resilience of trend-following methodologies, which have been
effectively applied not only in traditional equity and commodity markets but also in
currencies, bonds, and emerging market assets. The approach's fundamental appeal lies in its
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This is a nickname whose origin is a bit of a mystery, but some say it was because Dennis had recently returned
from a trip to Asia and likened the process to a Singapore turtle farm.
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They were taught a simple trend-following system, which involved buying futures contracts during market
breakouts and selling during downturns. The system had specific rules for when to buy or sell, how much to buy
or sell (based on market volatility), and where to place stop-loss orders. The rules were designed to be
mechanical and emotion-free, focusing on following the market trends, managing risk, and preserving capital.
After training, each turtle was given a trading account. Dennis funded these accounts with his own money, with
initial amounts ranging from $500,000 to $2 million. He closely monitored their performance, ensuring they
adhered to the rules.
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Over the next four years, the turtle traders reportedly earned an aggregate profit of over $100 million, proving
Dennis's theory that trading could be taught.
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simplicity and empirical basis: it relies on the observable momentum of market prices,
eschewing complex predictions about future events or economic conditions. As financial
markets have become increasingly interconnected and accessible through technological
advancements, trend-following principles have been adapted and refined to suit diverse
trading environments and instruments. Moreover, the proliferation of data analytics and
computing power has enabled the development of sophisticated trend-following models that
can analyze vast datasets to identify potential trends more accurately and swiftly.
Consequently, trend-following is not just a strategy limited to individual traders but has been
institutionalized by hedge funds, commodity trading advisors (CTAs), and quantitative
investment firms, further cementing its place as a fundamental component of modern
financial strategies on a global scale.
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APPENDIX B
RISK AS POSSIBILITY OF LOSS VS. RISK AS VOLATILITY
Definition of Risk
A correct theoretical perspective on risk is crucial to deciding which measures are most
relevant for investment purposes. That, in turn, allows portfolio managers to assess risks and
risk-adjusted returns accurately, make better-informed investment decisions, manage
portfolios effectively, handle the behavioral aspects of investing, and adhere to regulatory and
ethical standards in terms of transparency and accountability.
One common perspective of risk among intellectuals and professionals is viewing it as
volatility. This viewpoint equates risk with unpredictability in the asset's price movements.
Volatility is often measured statistically, for example, through standard deviation or variance
of returns. From this perspective, an investment with high price fluctuations is considered
riskier than one with stable, predictable returns.
However, seeing risk solely in terms of volatility presents a partial and sometimes misleading
view. This approach focuses on price movements without considering the fundamental
reasons behind these fluctuations. Moreover, it implies a symmetric view of risk, where both
upward and downward portfolio movements are treated equally, overlooking that investors
typically view gains more favorably than losses. Consequently, this perspective might
misrepresent the risk involved, especially for long-term investors for whom short-term
volatility might be less relevant.
As Howard Marks pointed out: “Academicians settled on volatility as the proxy for risk as a
matter of convenience. They needed a number for their calculations that was objective and
could be ascertained historically and extrapolated into the future. Volatility fits the bill, and
most of the other types of risk do not. The problem with all of this, however, is that I just don’t
think volatility is the risk most investors care about. Rather than volatility, I think that people
decline to make investments primarily because they’re worried about a loss of capital or an
unacceptably low return. To me, “I need more upside potential because I’m afraid I could lose
money” makes an awful lot more sense than “I need more upside potential because I’m afraid
the price may fluctuate.” No, I’m sure “risk” is -first and foremost-the likelihood of losing
money.
Trend followers view risk from a different perspective than mainstream finance academia. For
them, volatility is just a partial and misleading method to view the risk of a market. This is
because volatility can work in the traders’ favor, not only against them. This is why trend
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followers understand risk as the possibility of loss. This means that, as long as you own the
asset, you are at risk, so the best an investor can do is to manage that risk.
Risk Measures
Standard deviation is a widely used statistical measure in Finance to quantify the volatility of
an investment's return over a period of time. It estimates the variability of returns around the
mean (average) return. However, while it is a valuable tool, standard deviation has several
shortcomings
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as a measure of risk.
All these shortcomings can be extrapolated to the risk-return measures that contain the
standard deviation within their formula, such as the Sharpe Ratio.
Semi-standard deviations and downside deviations only count the volatility on the downside,
which makes them more relevant for calculating the probability of loss. The Sortino Ratio
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provides a much better picture of the risk of a portfolio, as it does not count the upside
volatility as risk.
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The shortcomings are the following:
1. Assumption of Normal Distribution: Standard deviation is most effective when an investment's
returns follow a normal (Gaussian) distribution. However, financial market returns often exhibit 'fat tails'
and are not normally distributed. This means extreme price movements are more common than a
normal distribution would predict. Standard deviation may underestimate the likelihood of these
extreme events (like market crashes).
2. Symmetrical Measurement: Standard deviation treats all deviations from the mean above and
below as the same. For investors and traders, however, the concerns are more about downside
deviations (losses) than upside deviations (gains). This symmetry in measurement does not align well
with the asymmetrical nature of investment risks.
3. Focus on Past Data: Standard deviation is a backward-looking measure based on historical data.
It assumes that past volatility will continue, which may not always be accurate. Markets can change
rapidly, making historical volatility an unreliable predictor of future risk.
4. Does Not Account for Extreme Events: Standard deviation may not adequately capture the risk
of rare but catastrophic events, often called "Black Swan" events. These events can significantly impact
trading portfolios but occur so infrequently that they do not significantly affect the standard deviation.
5. Over-simplification of Risk: Risk in trading is multifaceted and can stem from various sources
like market risk, liquidity risk, credit risk, operational risk, etc. Standard deviation primarily measures
market risk and does not account for these other types of risks.
6. Ignores Investment Time Horizon: A trader or investor's perception of an investment's riskiness
can vary based on their investment horizon. Standard deviation does not differentiate between short-
term and long-term risk perspectives.
7. Non-linear Risks: Risks are not linear in some trading strategies, particularly those involving
options or other derivatives. As a linear measure, standard deviation may not accurately capture the
risks inherent in these non-linear instruments.
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The Sortino Ratio uses the downside deviations of returns below a certain threshold called the minimum
acceptable return (MAR). The MAR depends on the specific requirements, preferences, or objectives of the
investor. Typically, MAR is set at 0%, but in some cases, investors might set the MAR according to their own rate
of return, which could be based on factors such as inflation, the risk-free rate, or a specific target return rate.
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“Hedge fund researcher Nicola Meaden (…) found that although trend following arguably
experiences higher volatility, it is often concentrated on the upside (positive returns), not the
downside (negative returns). Trend following performance is thus unfairly penalized by
performance measures such as the Sharpe ratio. The Sharpe ratio ignores whether volatility is
on the plus or minus side because it does not account for the difference between the standard
deviation and the semi-standard deviation. The actual formula is identical, with one exception
-the semi-standard deviation looks only at observations below the mean.” (Covel, 2017).
Being on the right side of a volatile market is what ultimately makes trend followers excel.
Some could think that trend followers are long volatility traders. Although on many occasions
they benefit from a high volatility environment, this is not always the case, as high volatility
can also play against trend following strategies, depending on their positioning.
Because of these limitations aforementioned, traders and investors often complement
standard deviation with other risk measures, such as Value at Risk (VaR), Conditional Value at
Risk (CVaR), maximum drawdown, and skewness/kurtosis analysis, to get a more
comprehensive view of the risks involved in their trading strategies.
A typical trend-follower trader is less concerned about volatility than the average professional
investor. For them, saying that a trader is volatile and thus bad makes little sense if examined
through the lenses of absolute return performance (Covel, 2017). For trend-following,
volatility is the precursor to achieving profit. Without volatility, there is no opportunity for
profit.
An alternative perspective of risk, and often considered more comprehensive, is viewing it as
the possibility of loss. This approach, advocated by investors like Ed Seykota, shifts the focus
from the unpredictability of returns to the potential for an investment to result in a capital
loss. It considers risk in terms of the likelihood and magnitude of a loss rather than just price
fluctuations.
Viewing risk as the possibility of loss aligns more closely with the primary concern of most
investors: the preservation of capital. This perspective encourages investors to consider the
worst-case scenarios and the durability of their investments under adverse conditions. It also
facilitates a more strategic approach to risk management, such as setting stop-loss orders or
diversifying portfolios to mitigate potential losses.
Moreover, this view acknowledges that not all volatility is detrimental; for instance, upward
price movements (positive volatility) in a portfolio favor investors. This perspective provides a
more nuanced and investor-centric understanding of risk by differentiating between desirable
and undesirable market movements.
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When considering risk as primarily the possibility of loss rather than just volatility, it's
important to use measures focusing on downside risks and potential losses. Here are some of
the best risk and risk-reward measures for this perspective:
Maximum Drawdown: This is a measure of the largest single drop from peak to trough
in the value of a portfolio before a new peak is attained. Maximum drawdown is an
excellent measure of the worst-case scenario loss an investor might have faced during
a specific period.
Value at Risk (VaR): VaR estimates the maximum potential loss in the value of a
portfolio over a defined period for a given confidence interval. For example, a 5% one-
month VaR of $1 million means there is a 5% chance that the portfolio will lose more
than $1 million over the next month.
Conditional Value at Risk (CVaR): Also known as Expected Shortfall, CVaR goes a step
further than VaR. It looks at the average losses that could occur beyond the VaR
threshold, providing insight into the severity of losses in the worst-case scenarios.
Calmar Ratio: This ratio measures the return of an investment compared to its
maximum drawdown risk. It is calculated by dividing the annualized return by the
maximum drawdown. A higher Calmar Ratio indicates a better risk-adjusted return,
emphasizing how well an investment has performed considering the potential for
significant losses.
Sortino Ratio: Unlike the Sharpe Ratio, which considers overall volatility, the Sortino
Ratio specifically measures performance relative to downside risk. It's calculated by
dividing the portfolio's excess return over the risk-free rate by the downside deviation,
focusing only on negative returns.
Tail Risk Measures: These include statistical measures like skewness and kurtosis,
which help understand the asymmetry and tail heaviness of the return distribution.
Negative skewness indicates a potential for significant negative returns, while high
kurtosis indicates a higher probability of extreme returns (both positive and negative).
Stress Testing and Scenario Analysis: These involve assessing how a portfolio would
perform under various adverse market conditions or specific "stress" scenarios, like
market crashes, interest rate hikes, etc. This helps in understanding the portfolio's
resilience to potential market shocks.
Omega Ratio: This measure compares the probability and size of gains versus losses. It
is defined as the ratio of the probability-weighted gain to the probability-weighted loss
for a given threshold level.
Downside Beta: This beta variation focuses on how a portfolio moves in relation to a
benchmark index during periods when the benchmark's returns are negative, offering
insight into relative downside risk.
Each measure focuses on different aspects of downside risk and potential losses. The choice
of which to use can depend on the specific investment strategy, the type of portfolio being
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assessed, and the investor's risk tolerance and objectives. Often, a combination of these
metrics provides a more comprehensive view of downside risks and the risk-reward profile of
an investment or portfolio. In this thesis, we introduced the Koljonen Ratio, which is a
combination of the Sortino Ratio and the Calmar Ratio, which provides an overall measure of
the downside risk of the asset, strategy or portfolio analyzed.
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