
THE
COMMUNIST
INTERNATIONAL
137
the
Second International, also corresponds to the
conditions of the earlier stagnation epoch and could
be justified
by
these conditions, as Comrade Alpari
apparently
thinks?
Of
course not. Doubtless,
the
tactics used in
the
epoch of stagnation should differ
from those of the revolutionary epoch,
but
the
Marxist can and
must
maintain their revolutionary
character in the stagnation period also. Lenin,
building a new Bolshevik Party said,
that
it
would be
"prepared
for everything, beginning with saving the
honour, prestige and heritage of
the
Party in the
moment of the greatest revolutionary oppression
....
"
It
was this, the desire
"to
save the honour,
presti~;e
and succession" of revolutionary Marxism during the
stagnation epoch, which was lacking in the leaders of
the
Second International, to the extent required, even
in their best years. And Marx and Engels, far from
belittling the importance
of
the big positive achieve-
ments of
the
German social-democratic party,
unfailingly pointed
out
to its leaders when they
committed opportunist errors,
that
with their
opportunist way
of
saying nothing about the main
questions
of
the
revolution, they were sacrificing the
interests of the future, for the sale
of
the transitory
interests
of
the present.
The
correctness of these
warnings has been historically justified.
In
the
comparatively "peaceful" pre-imperialist epoch, the
"orthodox-Marxist" leaders of the Second Inter-
national did useful work. Lenin
wrote:
"Bourgeois democracy is outlived,
as
the
Second
International, which performed a historically
necessary useful work, when the preparation of the
working masses within the framework
of
bour-
geoise-democracy stood on
the
order of the day."
In
spite
cif
the
fact
that
by
adapting their methods
to
legalism
the
leaders of
the
International avoided
fundamental questions like
that
of
the "relation of the
State to the social revolution
and
the social revolution
to
the
State,"
they fulfilled the chief task
of
the
"peaceful " epoch, to the extent
that
they founded
mass political and economic organisations of
the
working-class,
that
they lead its class struggle in the
economic and parliamentary arena, repudiated class
co-operation in principle, coalition policy, votes for
credits, to the extent
that
they were internationalists.
Consequently, in estimating their work in this
comparatively "peaceful" epoch, Engels could speak of
the
enormous successes of German social-democracy,
and Lenin of
the
"comparatively small sins of
German social democracy" (Vol.
XVII,
p. 126,
Russian Edition). But thanks to this indicated
silence they first of all armed the proletariat for future
revolutionary struggles insufficiently ; secondly,
when
the
epoch
of
imperialism ensued, with its
sharpening
qf
all contradictions, we find among the
"orthodox-Marxist" leaders of the Second
Inter-
national, according to Lenin,
that
"of
the sum total
of their avoidance of
the
question, their silence, their
deviations, there came about the inevitable, complete
transition to opportunism."
Lenin and the Leninist Party did
not
behave in this
way. During the period of the greatest oppression
of
the revolutionary movement, in
the
full bloom of
the
Stolypin reaction, Lenin demanded a corres-
ponding change in tactics,
the
transition from
"French"
methods
of
struggle to
"German,"
that
"all legal possibilities" should be utilised, and, on
this basis, he waged a fight against the
"left"
deviators
who continued to insist
upon
the boycott of the
Duma
and the recall of deputies from
the
Duma.
At
the
same time he fought against the liquidators, including
Trotsky, who repudiated underground work. and the
propaganda
of
revolutionary slogans : the republic,
confiscation
of
landlords' estates, eight-hour working
day.
Lenin was an irreconcilable revolutionary, who
never forgot for a moment
that
the Marxist Party
must
be and remain the vanguard of the working-class
never ceasing for a moment to fight against
K~'ostism.
But
this revolutionary singleness of purpose does
not
exhaust Leninism. Lenin was a mighty strategist
and great tactician, and his strategy and tactics were
based on the deepest understanding of the theory of
dialectic materialism.
For
Lenin, Marxism was not a
dogma, but a guide
to
action. Lenin did not build up a
philosophical sect, but built a Party, closely linked with
the masses, penetrating into the depths
of
hfe with all its
contradictions, rapidly reacting to every change
of
circumstance, to every ebb and flow, bearing in
mind
the level
of
the masses which
it
aims at drawing into
the revolutionary struggle, reckoning with the class
nature of the allies of the proletariat ; he
built
a
Party prepared to compromise with
the
allies of the
proletariat, if these compromises really serve to raise
the revolutionary movement to a higher stage,
or
would make
it
possible to defend the revolutionary
positions already gained.
Lenin drew
up
a strategic plan for every stage of the
revolution.
He
drew
up
one plan in Russia in 1903
to the February revolution, during the period of
struggle for the bourgeois-democratic revolution,
another-from
the
February revolution to
the
October revolution during
the
epoch of transition
from the bourgeois-democratic revolution to the
socialist; a
third-after
the October victory.
During
the pre-war period, also, he discriminated between
the
strategic tasks in Russia, which was passing
through a revolutionary situation, and in the Western
European countries,which were experiencing {up to a
certain time) a still comparatively "peaceful" period.
Lenin applied his strategic plans with extreme
severity and rigidity, yet within the limits
of
each
strategic plan, his tactics were distinguished for their
extreme flexibility.
It
suffices to refer to three well-
known exam pies.
During
the October revolution Lenin
, decided to accept the Social Revolutionaries programme